



HEMISPHERES

THE TUFTS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

A Tufts Undergraduate Student Publication

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ANNIE LEE

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EDITORIALS

The Tragedy of the Conflict
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Hemispheres, The Tufts University Undergraduate Journal of International Affairs, is the oldest academic publication of its kind. In 1975, under the direction of an energetic group of students that included Sashi Tharoor, the future undersecretary-general of the United Nations, the Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy at Tufts established the *Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*. Motivated by the *Fletcher Forum's* success, in 1977 students in the Tufts undergraduate program in International Relations established their own academic journal of international affairs, and this year's edition marks its 40th anniversary.

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Letter from the Editors

International Relations discourse methods are traditionally top down, examining how states interact with each other, how policy decisions impact different peoples, and how international institutions operate. What is rarely focused on are the factors that underpin the decisions made by states, peoples, and other actors. The 40th edition of Tufts Hemispheres attempts to analyze International Relations from this bottom-up method. The Global Commons explores the way in which tangible and intangible resources, norms, and institutions influence actors, power dynamics, and traditional decision-making in the 21st century.

To that end, this edition explores the dynamics of shared resources and commons; whether the Arctic is becoming a new battleground, the legality of Freedom of Navigation patrols by the U.S. Navy and other nation's warships, and the security threats posed by Space Debris. The journal also touches on the energy landscape and the differences in cultivation of renewables across the world from Jordan to Vermont. Further, we had the honor of interviewing Mr. Dev Sanyal from BP and Mr. Woonchung Wu from the ADB for their perspectives on renewable energy, climate change, and sustainable development.

Beyond tangible resources, we explore how ideas, norms, and institutions spread and impact their surrounding communities. From themes of how the Bollywood film industry has evolved and shaped the notion of "Indianness," to the ways in which democratization as an ideological force failed to account for the contextual background of post-communist Europe, the journal explores the dynamic nature of our ideological commons today. We additionally examined the influence of ideologies that are no longer prevalent in our society; in our first ever transcription of a podcast, the journal explores the disappearance of nuclear disarmament campaigns in Vancouver and around the world. Our photographic exploration illustrates perspectives on how humanitarian resources, such as healthcare and international aid, are spread and challenges preventing their further proliferation.

In our first ever collaboration with the Fletcher School's Building Bridges Research Symposium, this journal also includes the most outstanding paper from the symposium. It examines the intellectual commons of undergraduate education. The paper illustrates how Samuel Huntington's "The Clash of Civilizations" has influenced undergraduate academia.

We hope that our journal will introduce the reader to a variety of new perspectives on how shared resources, both tangible and intangible, interact and shape the world around us. We'd like to thank our staff for their hard work throughout the solicitation, review, selection, and editing process while simultaneously contributing to the Tufts community through the creation of events and panel discussions. It is due to their hard work that we were able to explore such a multifaceted and robust theme.

Nandita Baloo and Arman Smigielski

Articles

The Arctic: Past, Present, and Future: *Is the Arctic Becoming a Battleground in a New Cold War between Russia and the West?*

Annie Lee, *The University of British Columbia*

Abstract

This paper aims to discuss the realities of Arctic politics as an evolution from Cold War rivalries to one of cooperation between Russia and the West—a seemingly unprecedented circumstance, especially given the heated tensions between the two in current international affairs. Thus, this paper argues that while there may be similar parallels in the Arctic to historical Cold War dichotomy, current developments suggest otherwise, which can be attributed to a redefinition of security following the dissolution of the USSR, a new ambition underlying modernization and militarization in the Arctic, and newfound approaches to foreign policy by Russian governance. This paper suggests that using the perspective of Cold War politics to analyze the Arctic issue can impose limitations on international cooperation, and examines the possibility of future evolution in Arctic regimes through a comparison with other international institutions.

Understanding the Arctic's Significance

The place of the Arctic in the international political and economic system is a central question for understanding the history, present and future of the Arctic . . . [It] has been a major theatre of military operations in the geopolitical competition between great and super powers during World War Two and the Cold War. Today, the Arctic is much shaped by the twin international political and economic systemic changes of post-Cold War Russia-West relations and globalization.¹

Historically, the Arctic has played a vital role in Russian-Western exchanges due to its strategic location and favourable ice conditions, and subsequently was an area of major focus both for Russian and NATO forces. Today, the Arctic serves as an area on the brink of possibility, hovering between the potential to become once again an arena for Russian opposition against the West, or to become a new realm for international cooperation.

Following the end of the Cold War, Russia has striven to regain its global status, revised under the acknowledgement that it does not have the capacity to be an opposing force to the United States as it once was—instead, Russia has opted

for a pragmatic approach by preventing further American domination wherever possible.² Following the dissolution of the USSR, Russia under Boris Yeltsin saw a decline in Russia's global status and a destabilization of its domestic sphere—thus under the subsequent governance of Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev, policies have centered around rebuilding and re-establishing Russia as a world power with a focus on self-dependence, primarily in regards to energy security, a sector which has propelled Russia's economic growth. This response to the new world order has occurred with a new pragmatism and intense pursuance of national interests, as Russian foreign policy coming into the twenty-first century has been characterized by a lack of an ideological anchor and an aggressive focus on national security and national interest, coupled with a revived opposition between Russia and Western nations.³

What this narrative can suggest is a new Cold War thesis, supported by current Russian actions that are cause for alarm among the international community, such as the authoritarian management of its economy, Russian aggression toward other sovereign states, and the suppression of civil and political freedoms in Russia. However, while many of Russia's involvements on the international stage have received condemnations from Western countries, current Arctic politics appears disengaged from this.⁴ That is to say, while the Arctic has elements of a familiar dichotomy between Russia and the West, there are also unprecedented illustrations of international cooperation—thus, this paper will argue that while there are traces of Arctic politics that evoke memories of the Cold War, the reality of Russian cooperation and respect for international law challenges this perspective, and hints at a more extraordinary future in the Arctic.

Antagonistic Russia in the Arctic

In the international community, Russia is often regarded as a “wild card,” with mistrust from the international community stemming from a variety of Russian actions, such as its annexation of Crimea—actions that can be interpreted as Russia's willingness to insistently pursue national interests, even by means of aggression.^{5, 6} In the Arctic, incidents such as Artur Chilingarov planting a flag in the North Pole in August 2007 have incited international suspicions of Russian intentions in the Arctic, fuelling exaggerated speculations of an impending resource race and piquing global dialogue on issues of territory and sovereignty. Similarly, Russian strategic bomber flights along the Pacific and the Norwegian coast in 2007 were regarded as actions of antagonism, raising questions on whether Russia was aiming to establish itself once again as a naval power in the Arctic region.

Russia's return to its Cold War stance was evident with Putin's tightening of Kremlin control over domestic affairs—which weakened Russia's fragile budding democracy and was subsequently criticized by the West—thus, impacting the way Russian foreign policies have been received and contributing to further doubts and suspicions of Russian intentions on the

international stage.⁷ Russian foreign policies after the USSR have provoked fears of a renewed desire for Russian hegemony, as Putin's governance has emulated many of the USSR's statist traditions—in particular, Russia's Arctic policy has been described as “realpolitik with a Stalinist flavour,” suggesting a potential return to Cold War politics.⁸ Russia's presence in the Arctic carries echoes of its Cold War past—for example, there are similarities given the geographical and strategic importance of the Barents Sea and its surrounding area in Russia's nuclear deterrence strategies, but there is also a new dimension of this subject to consider: the importance of energy.

Russia and the Arctic: A New Definition of Security

The Arctic is integral both to the material and immaterial existence of Russia—it is a part of its national psyche and identity, as well as its sustenance. The Russians have continually identified as a Northern population, but more importantly, they have viewed their nation as a powerful one, propelled by a robust energy economy—hence, the Arctic represents an area where Russian leaders can “bolster Russia's image as a great power, a global energy player and a strong nation prepared to defend its sovereign interests.”⁹ Russia views the Arctic as a vessel to reinstate national identity, while intertwining and supporting elements of national security, energy security, and economic security. The importance of energy resources in the Arctic have endowed Russia with both economic and political influence, and Russia's “ability to harness [its] assets and translate [their] riches into continuous economic growth have afforded its political leadership greater freedom in conducting foreign relations [and] energy exports have become a key pillar of Russian foreign policy.”¹⁰

Russia's 2009 and 2015 national security strategies both emphasize the role of energy in strengthening Russia's influence and status on the international stage.¹¹ The linking of energy and national security means that Kremlin tends to regard any obstacles to obtaining access to energy resources as a threat to its energy wealth, and consequently, a threat to Russian security.¹² Russia is heavily invested in the Arctic region, as the U.S. Geographical Survey of 2008 estimated that 30% of the world's undiscovered reserves of natural gas and 13% of the world's undiscovered reserves of oil are within the limits of the Arctic Circle. Areas like the Shtokman fields in the Barents Sea, which hold an estimated 3.7 trillion cubic metres of gas and 31 million metric tonnes of gas condensate, further fuel Russia's investment in the Arctic¹³—not to mention the fact that 90% of Russian hydrocarbon reserves in the Russian continental shelf are located in the Arctic, mainly in the Barents and Kara Seas.¹⁴ “Russia's Energy Strategy for Russia up to 2020” formalized Russia's focus on the Barents Sea, Kara Sea, and Yamal Peninsula as key pillars in the Russian energy sector in an effort to sustain and propel economic growth,¹⁵ and “Russia's Energy Strategy for the period up until 2030” also articulated a focus of state policy on the exploration and development of territories and waters in the Arctic, aiming to develop and maintain gas and petroleum activities in the region.¹⁶

An area of the Arctic that holds profound significance in the Russian past and present is the Northern Sea Route. Historically, Russia had its military fleets scattered throughout the Barents Sea, the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and the Sea of Japan—a feature that played a role in colossal defeats in Tsushima in 1905 at the hands of the Japanese, and at the ports of Murmansk and Arkhangelsk during WWII at the hands of the Germans.¹⁷ While the Northern Sea Route is less important in its military strategic significance today, it has enormous potential to elevate Russia's economic growth—not through energy exports, but through an expansion of Russia's role in global networks. In particular, the port of Murmansk is vital in this route because it is relatively ice-free and links the North Atlantic with the Barents Sea, hence the development of the Northern Sea Route could lead to a staggering increase in maritime traffic as trade links between Europe and Asia intensify. Thus, the Arctic is a region where Russia can not only increase its economic activity, but also its participation in the international economy.

The Arctic: A Zone of Militarization

During the 1990s, Russian military presence diminished in the Arctic as the government focused its resources on the Chechen War. However, as the Arctic became a prominent issue on the international agenda and an integral aspect of Russia's energy sector, there was renewed interest in the region.¹⁸ Due to the redefinition of security and the incorporation of the energy dimension into the former, the Arctic, which was once considered vital to nuclear deterrence, is now less a region of military importance, and more a region with a focus on industrial and economic activity. However, this does not mean that the Arctic is devoid of military characteristics—in fact, the opposite is true.

One of the most important positions is the Barents Sea, which was once an area of tension due to the cache of Soviet nuclear submarines located there—now, it is a key domain in the Russian oil and gas industry, as well as an access point between the North Atlantic and Arctic Oceans. Thus, it can be garnered that the revived importance of strategic areas in the Arctic, now in an economic sense rather than military, offers a narrative that reverberates with Cold War parallels, as this revitalized emphasis is coupled with modernization and development of military strength. The Arctic is still considered by Russia to be a key operational area in terms of military strategy due to a lack of access to the Baltic and Black Seas as a result of geopolitical changes, and is a powerful base for the Northern Fleet and the naval component of the Russian nuclear triad.¹⁹ For example, in 2011, 67% of Russia's 567 sea-based nuclear warheads were operating from the Kola Peninsula, where the Northern Fleet is based, and the rest of the ballistic missile nuclear submarines were found on the Pacific Fleet on the Kamchatka Peninsula, which frequently voyage through Arctic waters.²⁰ However, it is essential to distinguish Russian militarization in the present from the past—Russia's current actions are still militaristic, but they are not explicitly designed for Western opposition and are intrinsically defensive. As Russia regards the Arctic as a primary resource base and a

primary corridor for future trade and shipping traffic, it is expected that Russia believes in a strong and sustained military presence to defend its national interests—especially its energy resources.

Russia's 2008 Arctic Strategy²¹ was designed by the Russian Security Council and reflected Russia's approach to the Arctic—focusing on particular interests and ambitions in lieu of adopting a consistent, overarching, and methodological strategy.²² This strategy highlighted Russia's willingness to protect its national interests, and by extension, its energy resources, as it mentions that one of the main goals of Russian policy in the Arctic was to provide "military security, defense and border protection [and] create groupings of Russian Army general purpose troops (forces) as well as other troops and military units and organs . . . capable of providing military security in the [Russian] Arctic zone."²³ In early 2010, Dmitri Medvedev also explicitly emphasized a willingness to use military means to secure Russian national interests, stating that Russia's intention to secure their "top strategic resource base"²⁴ in the Arctic could necessitate military force in addressing conflicts.²⁵ Russia's national security strategy of 2009 further reiterated the possibility of using military force to address emerging issues, especially when faced with threats to vital resources.²⁶ This was evidenced by Russia's rearmament plans of 2011, which vastly overshadowed the plans of the other Arctic nations—Russia declared it would spend 22 trillion rubles on modern weaponry, aiming for the purchases of 20 new nuclear submarines, 80 naval surface vessels, 600 warplanes, 1000 new helicopters, and new S-400 and S-500 air defense systems by 2020.²⁷ This ambitious plan was restrained by global economic crises, and thus the pace of modernization of Russia's military in the Arctic has been slow, though the "radical characteristic of military reforms being implemented aimed at moving away from a mass mobilization army to a permanent readiness brigade model, [revealing] a new quality in the Russian approach,"²⁸ where Russia seems to be ready to respond, but not to instigate any conflict. Russia's efforts to expand its capabilities in the Arctic have caused alarm in regards to a "technological arms race" against the West, with officials such as Admiral Haakon Bruun-Hanssen, Norway's chief of defense, explicitly drawing comparisons to the Cold War.²⁹

Despite the alarming militaristic ambitions of Russia, one factor to consider is that Russia still maintains its desire to influence and balance Western powers. One of Russia's aims in its foreign policy is to limit the influence of NATO, as NATO continually regards the High North as an area of strategic concern, thus fuelling Russia's desire to maintain military strength in this region as a defensive mechanism.³⁰ Given Russia's current presence in the Arctic, one can say that this objective has been achieved as Russia is the most populated power in the Arctic, possesses the only fully-fledged naval fleet, the largest ice-breaking fleet, and holds the largest ice-free port city, thereby offering a challenge to the western dominance.³¹ Thus, as the Arctic is an area which Russia has the capacity to, and does quite effectively, project its military power as a defensive and pragmatic response to the West, Russian strategies

to consolidate its image as a leading Arctic player are relatively successful—lending to perceptions of a new Cold War. However, if one detaches Cold War assessments of Russian-Western relations from Arctic politics, evidence points in the opposite direction.

Realities of Cooperation

Russia's Relationship with International Law

While Russia may be very vocal about its willingness to use aggression to defend its national security, implying engagement against Western nations if necessary to defend vital interests, Russia has demonstrated a commitment to international cooperation and negotiations with its Arctic neighbours. For example, Russia concluded a bilateral negotiation with Norway over the delimitation of a maritime boundary in the Barents Sea in 2010.³² It is important to highlight the fact that Russia's 2008 Arctic Strategy not only expressly confirmed Russia's investment in the Arctic region as a strategic resource base and a link between Russian petroleum exports to European and Asian markets, but also affirmed Russia's belief that the Arctic was to be a "zone of cooperation."³³ The document articulated Russia's willingness to work within the framework of regional and international institutions and willingness to comply with the norms and principles of such institutions, reflecting a new pragmatism and understanding of the new global order by the Russian leadership following the end of the Cold War.³⁴

Russia's willingness to abide by principles of international law and commitment to international cooperation had been long established before the publication of this document—Mikhail Gorbachev, in his speech at Murmansk, first called for Arctic peace and cooperation in 1987, thus laying the framework for what is now Arctic Council.^{35, 36} Similar collaborative vocabulary was used by Vladimir Putin in 2010 at a speech at the Arctic forum, where he stated that "[Russia believed] that preserving the Arctic as a zone of peace and cooperation [was] of the utmost importance,"³⁷ where "no single problem [in the Arctic could not] be solved cooperatively based upon common sense and solid foundation of international law" in the Arctic.³⁸ In 2013, Russia's Foreign Policy Concept once again articulated Russia's desire to strengthen its economic status in the global system through international and regional organizations, thus it can be seen that Russia's official rhetoric on Arctic politics follows a trajectory of respect for international law.³⁹ Russia's dedication to international law, international institutions, and multilateral decision-making processes is also a very logical position—as the legal successor of the dissolved USSR, Russia inherited a position of tremendous power in the United Nations Security Council, thus "unsurprisingly, a stated goal of Russian foreign policy has long been to empower the UN and thereby its own role within it"⁴⁰—and abiding by international principles can not only strengthen the role of international law, but also improve Russia's position on the global stage.

Thus, while there may be tensions between Russia and the West in other international matters, Russia in the Arctic should not be judged based on external incidents, as Russia has consistently acted as an abiding member of the international community in Arctic matters. While Russia is still not fully trustful of NATO's interest in the Arctic region and is reluctant to expand the Arctic institutions to include more members of the international community, Russia's focus on international cooperation should not be discounted.⁴¹ Defensive actions by Russia in the Arctic, in regards to military modernization and voiced aggression to deter imminent threats, may lead to confusion of Russian approaches to Arctic issues, but one should consider that "Russia's approach to Arctic affairs has been of two minds and thus sometimes confusing and difficult to interpret, [as] occasionally aggressive rhetoric has alternated with more conciliatory signals and practical compliance with international law."⁴² However, as factual evidence in the Arctic points toward policies of resolution and collaboration, resurgence of Cold War perspectives, which can incite speculative international tension,⁴³ can undermine this unprecedented cooperation.

The Cold War Argument: Outdated Rhetoric

Russia has undoubtedly expressed its intertwining of energy resources and national security, but does not appear to have a hidden desire to become the rival superpower of the Western nations. Moreover, Russia's focus on its energy security can be considered a projection of its soft power. Hence, Russia is behaving in a manner consistent as modern great powers, as "the use of soft power and persuasion is commonplace in international relations and a strong interdependent economy is the currency of soft power."⁴⁴ Vladimir Putin governs from a liberal view of international politics, where "strength comes only from economic power, [thus, if] Russia is to regain its status as a major international power, and if it wishes to do so at the level of the U.S. and not among the BRICs, then its ability to leverage its strong economy is its ticket there."⁴⁵ The Russians are very aware that the Cold War separation has terminated, and they are aware of and have adjusted to the current global world order. "[The Russians] know what their interests are what how the game is played in the new world. Russia has interests in the Arctic, as do Canada, the United States and others."⁴⁶ Thus it can be seen that Russia's desire to attain economic wealth is driven by the mindfulness of Russian leaders of what must be done to re-establish global influence—hence the focus on energy and economic growth, and the willingness to intimidate potential threats through a severe projection of strength.

"Russian foreign policy is motivated by a desire to be taken seriously among the world's powers and to develop, modernize, and enjoy the maximum benefit of its energy endowment. Though Russian leaders may not pursue cooperation with western nations because of some ideological predisposition toward peaceful coexistence, this does not mean the only remaining option is hostility or conflict. The Cold

War must remain in the history books and should not be conjured up whenever Russia asserts itself on the world stage, such an approach is not helpful and potentially impedes a fulsome understanding of Russia's motives."⁴⁷

Russian actions should not be interpreted as a catalyst for a new Cold War, as Vladimir Putin's strong expression of desire to reassert Russia's global status as a balance to the Western hegemony has been mitigated by Medvedev's "quiet assertions of sovereignty and his outreach to the west, notably his arms treaty with Obama and his stated objective of moving Russia's ties with the west in a more constructive direction."⁴⁸ Nonetheless, even if Russian intentions in the Arctic may not be clearly defined, the dichotomy that is drawn between allies and enemies underlying the Cold War perspective implies that there must be a hegemon that emerges, and this perspective can greatly hinder developments of cooperation in the Arctic's future.

Arctic Prospects: Inspirations from Europe and Antarctica

Although in the post-Cold War era Russia has openly and explicitly demonstrated its desire for prestige in the Arctic through various security policies and modernization of its military presence to further its national interests, it is evident that the relationship between Russia and the West has evolved. The Arctic is not becoming a new stage for the Cold War divide between Russia and the West—it is, in fact, becoming a stage for unprecedented cooperation, transcending other oppositions in international affairs. Furthermore, the "demonization" of Russia in international politics and the argument that the Arctic is a new battleground for the Cold War is precarious and impedes meaningful cooperation. The Arctic is an area of urgent concerns, propelled especially by mounting pressures fuelled by climate change, thus it is imperative that Arctic nations develop comprehensive and sustainable solutions that can strike a balance between national interests while complying with and strengthening international law.

Rapid changes to the Arctic entail new issues that arise from geopolitical, economic, and national security concerns—in order for these topics to be comprehensively addressed, the fragmented reality of Arctic governance will need to evolve. The Arctic Council, one of the most significant international institutions in the area, is incapable of expressly addressing issues regarding military security,⁴⁹ which is evidently a topic of tension among the Arctic nations, leading some to call for an evolution of this institution into a stronger and more inclusive one. However, the Arctic Council has been criticized for being too rigid for political discussions, and there has been much compromise and uncertainty marring the evolution of the Arctic Council—such as the shifting of foreign policies of the Arctic nations, and the controversy that arose with the creation of the Arctic Five. Moreover, the opposing views of Arctic nations on the significance of the Arctic Council in creating and

implementing policies and the opposing views of Arctic nations on potential inclusion of non-Arctic and non-state actors suggest that “despite recent steps to strengthen the Arctic Council, the Arctic states are not likely to agree on new measures that will transform the Council into something radically different from the neighbourly and non-binding forum that it is.”⁵⁰

The European Parallel

Given the fact that the Arctic has demonstrated itself as a place for international cooperation between Russia and the West, even among confrontations in other international affairs, one can wonder whether the Arctic could be the place for a new supranational entity borne out of the numerous bilateral and multilateral agreements that govern the area. The Arctic Council was initially created as a way to facilitate dialogue and cooperation between Russia and the West as world had just come out of the Cold War—this narrative has striking similarities to the beginnings of the European Union. The European Union began as the European Coal and Steel Community in 1950, originally intending to integrate the war industries of Europe, specifically for French-German reconciliation, in an effort to create sustainable European peace.⁵¹ Further integration of more European countries and an evolution of this institution to encompass different levels of social, economic, and political integration has led to the *sui generis* supranational institution existing today—perhaps a new multilateral agreement regulating economic and industrial activity in the Arctic could be the basis of a similar development.⁵² Future Arctic institutions and Arctic nations could follow a similar trajectory of gradual integration and evolution—but there are many fundamental differences that may suggest otherwise.

One of the central distinguishing features of the Arctic issue is that it’s an ocean surrounded by continents,⁵³ while the European Union concerns countries with clearly defined sovereign territories which are governed independently from one another. Thus, it is highly unlikely that there will be a similar pooling of sovereignty by the Arctic nations into a supranational institution, as there is little incentive to do so, especially given the apparent unwillingness of Arctic nations to strengthen the role of an already existing international institution. Another distinguishing feature is the difficulty in defining the “Arctic,” as limiting the boundaries of what is considered “the Arctic” poses a larger challenge than in territorially-defined frontiers, referring to the European case. The “Arctic” has a multitude of definitions and no clear consensus, not to mention an ambiguous legal status—it is virtually impossible to create an institution to govern an area that is undefined.⁵⁴

Perspectives from the South Pole

Perhaps a more relevant comparison can be drawn from the Antarctic, where half a century prior, nations were aiming to establish territorial control, eventually resolving conflicts through the Antarctic Treaty, thus establishing a binding international framework that governed the territory.⁵⁵ Through the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, claims to sovereignty were suspended, and Antarctica

was given a unique legal status as an area that was “common heritage of mankind,” to be used solely for peaceful and cooperative purposes by the international community.

However, the North and South Poles differ fundamentally as Antarctica is a territory with defined boundaries, whereas the Arctic issue essentially concerns an ocean that lies primarily within the jurisdictional boundaries of sovereign nations. Furthermore, the Antarctic region had significantly less scope of importance than the Arctic does today, as the Arctic has sizable populations, significant military systems, and is integral to industrialization.⁵⁶ Thus, declaring the Arctic as a zone to be preserved is fairly unlikely, and instead a future Arctic Treaty could address issues to prevent exploitation of resources while balancing national interests and create social policies to protect indigenous populations—two dimensions which were not relevant to the drawing of the Antarctic Treaty.⁵⁷ The Antarctic Treaty was a consequence of experimental policies and required modifications and agreements to form the innovative governance structure that exists today—and the Arctic today simply does not have the luxury of time to directly implement a similar regime and follow a course of trial-and-error.⁵⁸ Hence, while the Antarctic Treaty may prove to be a more useful international framework on which to base future Arctic politics than the European Union example, a future Arctic Treaty would certainly need to adjust to fit the conflicts and specificities of the region, and design an international institution to provide comprehensive and meaningful mechanisms to ultimately ensure “a balance between preserving the Arctic of yesterday and developing the Arctic of tomorrow.”⁵⁹

Concluding Remarks: The Arctic—Past, Present, and Future

The Arctic has been an area of historical tension between Russia and the West, augmented by the Cold War dichotomy and subsequent opposition between the two entities in recent international events. However, the Arctic is also a place where Russia has seemingly managed to balance its own interests of economic growth while maintaining a strong commitment to international institutions and cooperation, thus revival of Cold War rhetoric with respect to the Arctic is flawed. As Canadian explorer and ethnographer Vilhjalmur Stefansson once wrote: “There are two kinds of Arctic problems, the imaginary and the real. Of the two, the imaginary are the most real.”⁶⁰

Framing the Arctic issue within the framework of the Cold War does a disservice to understanding Arctic politics. Instead, considerations should move toward the construction of stronger cooperative mechanisms between nations, rather than repeating an illusory narrative that simplifies the Arctic to a new Cold War battleground between Russia and the West and disregards the realities of international cooperation. One can consider the Arctic as a blank slate, where future Arctic governance can draw inspiration from similar developments in international institutions such as the European Union and the Antarctic Treaty. Especially given current pressures surrounding the Arctic, it is imperative to

move away from the Cold War past, build upon the cooperative present, and work toward a future Arctic that is peaceful and constructive, for both the Arctic nations and for the rest of the international community.

Notes

1. Rasmus Gjedssø Bertelsen and Vincent Gallucci, 2016, "The Return of China, Post-Cold War Russia, and the Arctic: Changes on Land and at Sea," *Marine Policy* 72: 244.
2. Kari Roberts, 2010, "Jets, Flags, and a New Cold War?" *International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis* 65 (4): 961.
3. Roberts, "Jets, Flags, and a New Cold War?" 960.
4. *Ibid.*, 967–968.
5. Note that this is also in violation of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter
6. Roberts, "Jets, Flags, and a New Cold War?" 958.
7. Kari Roberts, 2015, "Why Russia Will Play by the Rules in the Arctic," *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 21 (2): 115.
8. Roberts, "Why Russia Will Play by the Rules in the Arctic," 113.
9. Roberts, "Why Russia Will Play by the Rules in the Arctic," 122.
10. Roberts, "Jets, Flags, and a New Cold War?" 963.
11. Note that the 2015 document invalidated the one from 2009, but points 6, and 59–63 in the Russian Federation's National Security Strategy of December 2015 do still emphasize the important role of energy security.
12. Roberts, "Jets, Flags, and a New Cold War?" 956.
13. Kristian Åtland, 2011, "Russia's Armed Forces and the Arctic: All Quiet on the Northern Front?" *Contemporary Security Policy* 32 (2): 272.
14. Katarzyna Zysk, 2017, "Russia's Arctic Strategy: Ambitions and Constraints," *JFQ* 57 (2nd quarter): 105.
15. Marlène Laruelle, *Russia's Arctic Strategies and the Future of the Far North* (London: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2015): 135.
16. "Russian National Security Strategy, December 2015—Full-Text Translation," 2016, *El Instituto Español De Estudios Estratégicos*.
17. David Fairhall, *Cold Front: Conflict Ahead in Arctic Waters* (London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2011): xxiii–xxiv.
18. Laruelle, *Russia's Arctic Strategies and the Future of the Far North*, 135–144.
19. Zysk, "Russia's Arctic Strategy: Ambitions and Constraints," 108.
20. Åtland, 2011, "Russia's Armed Forces and the Arctic: All Quiet on the Northern Front?" 267.
21. Note: this is referring to the document "Russian Federation Policy for the Arctic to 2020" (Rossiyskaya Gazeta).
22. Zysk, "Russia's Arctic Strategy: Ambitions and Constraints," 103–104.
23. Åtland, "Russia's Armed Forces and the Arctic: All Quiet on the Northern Front?" 276.
24. Roberts, "Jets, Flags, and a New Cold War?" 966.
25. Note that this was also stated during a low point in Russian-Western relations, which could be a factor in Medvedev's strong language.
26. Fairhall, *Cold Front: Conflict Ahead in Arctic Waters*, 55–56.
27. Åtland, "Russia's Armed Forces and the Arctic: All Quiet on the Northern Front?" 268.

28. Zysk, "Russia's Arctic Strategy: Ambitions and Constraints," 108.
29. Paul Sonne, 2016, "Russia's Military Sophistication in the Arctic Sends Echoes of the Cold War," *Wall Street Journal*.
30. Zysk, "Russia's Arctic Strategy: Ambitions and Constraints," 109.
31. Roberts, "Why Russia Will Play by the Rules in the Arctic," 114.
32. Roberts, "Jets, Flags, and a New Cold War?" 967.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid., 959–960.
35. Roberts, "Why Russia Will Play by the Rules in the Arctic," 121–122.
36. Another example of Russia's respect for international law can be illustrated by the submission to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in 2001, which was prior to their signing of the Ilulissat Declaration, a document that explicitly expressed a commitment to international law (specifically UNCLOS) at the Arctic Ocean Conference in 2008.
37. Laruelle, *Russia's Arctic Strategies and the Future of the Far North*, 12.
38. Roberts, "Why Russia Will Play by the Rules in the Arctic," 120.
39. Ibid., 121.
40. Ibid., 119.
41. Laruelle. *Russia's Arctic Strategies and the Future of the Far North*, 158–159.
42. Zysk, "Russia's Arctic Strategy: Ambitions and Constraints," 108.
43. Referring to the example of Chilingarov planting the Russian flag on the seabed, which created a sort of international scandal that was fuelled by media speculation and tenuous headlines, as well as Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014.
44. Roberts, "Why Russia Will Play by the Rules in the Arctic," 116.
45. Alfred B. Evans, as cited in Roberts, 2010, "Jets, Flags, and a New Cold War?" 973.
46. Roberts, "Why Russia Will Play by the Rules in the Arctic," 118.
47. Roberts, "Jets, Flags, and a New Cold War?" 975.
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49. As seen in the Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council, which states that "The Arctic Council should not deal with matters related to military security" (The Arctic Council, 1996).
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57. Watson, "An Arctic Treaty: A Solution to the International Dispute over the Polar Region," 328.
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60. As cited in Laruelle, *Russia's Arctic Strategies and the Future of the Far North*, 198.

It's Not All FON and Games: *U.S. "Freedom of Navigation" Operations and the Legal Debate Surrounding Innocent Passage*

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Abstract

U.S. Freedom of Navigation patrols in the South China Sea have revitalized the legal debate surrounding the concept of innocent passage through the territorial sea, as outlined in Section 3 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The current debate revolves around warships and whether they possess the right to traverse a foreign territorial sea without giving prior notice and/or seeking permission from the coastal state. While maritime powers assert that no distinction should be made between warships and commercial ships, nations with smaller navies maintain that the transit of warships through the territorial sea is inherently prejudicial to the security of the coastal state. After extensive analysis this essay will contend that, based on the text of UNCLOS, the right of innocent passage does not extend to warships. Nonetheless, actions undertaken by powerful nations have rendered the passing of warships through foreign territorial seas *de facto* legal. These findings reveal that codified and customary international law inform one another. International law is essentially a cycle and consists of various feedback loops between norms, state practice and treaty texts.

Introduction

The U.S. Freedom of Navigation (FON) Program in the South China Sea recently made headlines when the Philippine Defense Secretary announced that the Philippines is unlikely to allow the U.S. to continue using its naval bases as launching platforms for patrols.¹ This development is representative of both deteriorating U.S.-Philippine relations under President Duterte and an ever-more complex situation in the South China Sea. Over the course of the past century, the South China Sea has transformed into an agglomeration of competing interests, conflicting territorial and maritime claims, and numerous stakeholders. The area is of economic and strategic importance and has undergone extensive militarization. It has also been used as an arena for power projection. Some have suggested that the U.S. and China will go to war over the South China Sea.² While this projection may be overly pessimistic

and apocalyptic, it is undeniable that heightened tensions in the South China Sea pose a threat to international peace and security.

The United States has responded to these developments and “excessive claims”³ with sharp denunciation and freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs). FONOPs have been carried out in the South China Sea since the early 1990s and involve U.S. Navy warships sailing in close proximity to maritime features claimed by any of the five actors. The program’s purpose is to challenge territorial claims on the world’s oceans and airspace, preserve freedom of navigation, and enforce the U.S.’ interpretation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The most recent series of FONOPs began in October 2015. Since then, the Obama administration has authorized a total of four freedom of navigation patrols in the South China Sea, sparking widespread controversy.

With these operations came the revival of a broader legal debate as to whether warships have the right to innocent passage, meaning that they can transit within 12 nautical miles off a foreign coast.⁴ This matter has become subject to much contention and discussion. Does the right to innocent passage apply to foreign warships? If so, are coastal states prohibited from placing restrictions on the passage of warships through their territorial seas? Is it permissible to require prior notification or authorization? Moreover, are there discrepancies between the legal precedents set by the text of UNCLOS and the ones set by state practice? What does this reveal about the more general relationship between codified law, the Law of the Sea, and customary international law?

This essay will contend that, based on the text of UNCLOS, the right of innocent passage does not extend to warships. Nonetheless, actions undertaken by powerful nations have rendered the passing of warships through foreign territorial seas *de facto* legal. State conduct inevitably influences the manner in which UNCLOS is viewed and has, in this case, engendered an *opinio juris* (a subjective belief that a specific practice is “right”). Furthermore, there is a legal precedent for enacting prior notification or authorization legislation. However, in accordance with the interpretation of UNCLOS that is perpetuated by state practice and therefore deemed dominant, requiring prior authorization is illegal. Ultimately, these findings reveal that codified law and customary international law inform one another. International law is essentially a cycle and consists of various feedback loops. Rules govern practice and practice begets rules. States cite the treaty text to legitimize their behavior, which in turn shapes the interpretation of the treaty text itself. Neither UNCLOS nor customary international law exist in a vacuum and can therefore not be treated separately.

If this paper is to offer an extensive and detailed analysis of the aforementioned debate, further delimitation and definition of its scope is needed. Firstly, this essay does not aim to pass judgment on any territorial claims in the South China Sea. For consistency, all geographic locations will be identified using the names put forth by the U.S. Board on Geographic Names. The usage

of one name as opposed to another is not meant to imply partiality. Secondly, this essay will adopt the UNCLOS definition of the term “warship,” as outlined in Article 29. Thirdly, nuclear-powered warships, ships that carry hazardous waste, and submarines are outside the scope of this paper. Lastly, discussion is limited to the territorial sea, which extends 12 nautical miles from a state’s baseline. Assertions that coastal states can restrict the passage of warships through their contiguous zone (CZ) or their exclusive economic zone (EEZ) will not be considered.

The South China Sea and U.S. Freedom of Navigation Operations

The South China Sea, which encompasses the area between the Malacca Strait and the Strait of Taiwan, has become the scene of escalating territorial disputes between China and its neighbors, namely Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei. Disputed islands include the Paracel Islands, the Spratly Islands, and the Scarborough Shoals. Not only is region rich in natural resources (e.g., fossil fuel reserves and fisheries), it is also an important trading route. More than \$5 trillion worth of goods pass through the South China Sea each year.⁵ Power politics are at play as well; China strives to consolidate its position as regional hegemon, while its neighbors are attempting to resist this domination. Control over the disputed territories in the South China Sea has been identified as one of China’s main interests. In 2012, the President of China, Xi Jinping, declared that China “is strongly committed to safeguarding the country’s sovereignty and security and defending [its] territorial integrity.”⁶ China lays claim to around 90% of the South China Sea,⁷ offering a variety of justifications (e.g., historical, archipelago, and EEZ claims). It first articulated its claim to the territories within the nine-dash line in 1947, shortly after the end of the Century of Humiliation. Since then, China has enhanced its military capabilities in the South China Sea and has artificially built up islands to bolster its claims.

The situation in the South China Sea remains tense. In the past, hostilities in the area have intensified to the point of armed conflict. In 1974, for instance, the Chinese and South Vietnamese navies clashed near the Paracel Islands; the skirmish lasted for several hours and brought about the death of 71 military personnel.⁸ Recent developments have refueled such frictions. In July 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration announced that China has no legal basis to claim historic rights to the bulk of the South China Sea and thus sided with the Philippines.⁹ It ruled that UNCLOS supersedes historical claims. As expected, Beijing denounced the ruling and refused to accept it. Three months later, the U.S. conducted another FONOP in the Paracels, inviting criticism from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The U.S. Freedom of Navigation Program has been in effect since 1979. There are two components to the FON Program: diplomatic action and operational activities by U.S. military forces.¹⁰ Its purpose was first expounded upon

in the U.S. Oceans Policy of 1983. The FON Program is designed to demonstrate U.S. non-acquiescence to “unilateral acts of other states that restrict the rights and freedoms of the international community in navigation and overflights and other related high seas uses.”¹¹ There is no public record to verify the date of the first FONOP in the South China Sea. Nevertheless, one can assume that the first U.S. FONOP was carried out in 1992, as this is when the first Chinese outcry sounded.¹² The most recent series of FONOPs marks the end of a three-year FONOP hiatus.

The first operation of this series took place on the 27th of October 2015. The USS *Lassen*, a guided missile destroyer, sailed within 12 nautical miles of the Subi Reef, a feature in the Spratly Islands. It was accompanied by two maritime surveillance aircraft, a P-8A Poseidon and a P-3 Orion.¹³ Chinese officials confirmed that the U.S. Navy had neither sought prior authorization nor issued prior notification.¹⁴ Subi Reef is a submerged feature, which has been built up by China; hence, it is debatable whether Subi Reef generates a territorial sea.

The following FONOP was staged in the Paracel Islands. On the 30th of January 2016, the USS *Curtis Wilbur*, a guided missile destroyer, sailed within 12 nautical miles of Triton Island.¹⁵ Once again, Chinese authorities were not notified of this transit. What distinguishes this FONOP from the previous patrol is that Triton’s status is clear.¹⁶ It is a high-tide elevation and therefore generates a territorial sea. The concept of innocent passage applies unambiguously. Gregory Poling, director of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, affirms that this operation’s objective was to contest the restrictions China has imposed on innocent passage.¹⁷

The third FONOP of this series was conducted on the 10th of May 2016. The guided missile destroyer USS *William Lawrence* came within 12 nautical miles of the Fiery Cross Reef, a feature in the Spratly Islands.¹⁸ The U.S. Navy did not inform Chinese officials of its forthcoming passage. China has occupied the Fiery Cross Reef since 1988. It was a high-tide feature but it was artificially built-up by China; hence, it generates a territorial sea. This operation, too, aimed to challenge the restrictions China has placed on innocent passage.

Several months elapsed before the U.S. Navy carried out the fourth and most recent FONOP. On the 21st of October 2016, the USS *Decatur*, a guided missile destroyer, sailed near Triton Island and Woody Island, located in the Paracel group.¹⁹ Both features are currently occupied by China and both generate a territorial sea.²⁰ Woody Island is the largest naturally formed island in both the Paracel and Spratly groups. It is a major Chinese military outpost with a permanent posting of 1,400 personnel. It has also been equipped with surface-to-air missile systems, anti-ship cruise missiles, and surveillance drones.²¹ What is interesting about this operation is that the destroyer did not sail within 12 nautical miles of either island. U.S. officials label this act as a FONOP regardless; its alleged purpose was to protest China’s drawing of straight baselines.²²

Chinese Objections

China has reacted to these activities in a number of different ways. However, generally speaking, one can categorize the Chinese response as a middle ground between inaction and military overreaction. Chinese authorities have reacted angrily but cautiously. After the FONOP in October 2015, they pledged to “resolutely respond to future provocations.”²³ Later on, Chinese officials ironically accused the U.S. of “militarizing the South China Sea”²⁴ and of “endangering regional peace and stability.”²⁵ Foreign ministry spokesmen speak of “illegal entry,”²⁶ as none of the U.S. ships in question “received permission from the Chinese government.”²⁷ They condemn the “infringement of China’s territorial sea by any country under the pretext of maintaining freedom of navigation.”²⁸ Just recently, a Chinese admiral warned that “FON patrols carried out by foreign navies in the South China Sea could end in a disaster.”²⁹ U.S. FONOPs have clearly strained Sino-American relations.

Yet the Chinese response goes beyond verbal reactions. China has frequently resorted to more forceful and demonstrative tools. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) maintains a presence in both the Spratly and Paracel group, allowing for a quick response to U.S. FONOPs. In October 2015, the USS *Lassen* was shadowed by two PLAN vessels: a missile destroyer and a frigate.³⁰ A year later, PLAN dispatched three vessels. Furthermore, after the third FONOP, China retaliated by sending two J-10 fighter jets to hassle a U.S. aircraft. A U.S. reconnaissance plane was on routine patrol in international airspace over the East China Sea when the two Chinese jets made an “unsafe intercept,” allegedly coming within 50 feet of the U.S. plane.³¹ These military operations can be understood both as defending China’s interpretation of UNCLOS, as well as perpetuating its anti-access/area-denial policy (A2/AD). This strategy is directed at the “gradual extension of the strategic depth for offshore defensive operations and enhancing China’s capabilities in integrated maritime operations and nuclear counterattacks.”³² In the end, both the A2/AD policy and the promotion of China’s interpretation of UNCLOS serve the greater purpose of safeguarding China’s interests in the South China Sea and buttressing its territorial and maritime claims.

U.S. Justifications

It is these claims that the FON Program intends to contest. By carrying out FONOPs, the U.S. seeks to “demonstrate a non-acquiescence to excessive maritime claims.”³³ It hopes to both challenge current claims and pre-empt future ones. The Brookings Institute has unpacked the term “excessive claims,” identifying three such assertions: “the insistence on prior authorization or notification for warships to exercise innocent passage, the prohibition of military activities in the EEZ, and the drawing of straight baselines when geographic conditions for doing so are not satisfied.”³⁴

In essence, the FON Program is driven by two policy goals: protecting the freedom of navigation and reinforcing the U.S. interpretation of international maritime law (even though the U.S. has yet to ratify UNCLOS). As a powerful maritime nation, the U.S. aims to preserve innocent passage, transit passage, archipelagic sea lanes passage, and the freedom of the high seas in the broadest sense possible. To do so, the U.S. must propagate its liberal interpretation of UNCLOS. Moreover, one must note that the U.S. assumes no position on the territorial disputes themselves; it merely protests the claims that pertain to the sea encircling maritime features.

One of the arguments cited by U.S. officials when justifying FONOPs in the South China Sea is that specific features do not generate a territorial sea. From the U.S. perspective, “transforming a low-tide elevation into an artificial island does not entitle it to a territorial sea.”³⁵ It was this judgment that motivated the October 2015 FONOP. According to the U.S. Department of Defense, Subi Reef is not an island or inhabitable rock under international law and is thus not entitled to a territorial sea.³⁶ However, one must be careful when evaluating the October 2015 FONOP—it is rather peculiar and must be viewed from both the U.S. and Chinese standpoints. In order to demonstrate that submerged features and/or artificially built up islands do not generate a territorial sea, the U.S. would have had to conduct an operation that constitutes non-innocent passage. If Subi Reef does not engender a territorial sea, innocent passage does not apply and the U.S. Navy is free to do whatever it pleases. Since the U.S. believes warships enjoy the right of innocent passage, the USS *Lassen* would have had to engage in a non-innocent activity, such as surveillance or a military exercise. Nonetheless, because China considers the passage of warships through its territorial sea without prior authorization as non-innocent, the October 2015 FONOP *de facto* challenged China’s territorial claim to Subi Reef. The matter is further complicated by another feature that lies within 12 nautical miles of Subi that could be labelled as an island.³⁷ In short, the October 2015 FONOP is problematic due to the legal uncertainties surrounding Subi Reef and the obscure nature of the operation’s purpose.

The more robust defense of FONOPs states that warships have the right to innocent passage and hence must not adhere to prior notification or authorization requirements. This stance was clearly conveyed by the January 2016 FONOP. Unlike Fiery Cross Reef, the status of Triton Island is undisputed. It is an inhabited high-tide elevation and therefore an island under international law. It unquestionably generates a territorial sea, which was penetrated by the USS *Curtis Wilbur* during its transit. The ship “exercised a warship’s right to innocent passage in a territorial sea without seeking permission or giving notice,”³⁸ thereby challenging China’s prior authorization policy.

Innocent Passage

The concept of innocent passage grants vessels of any state the right to pass through the territorial sea of another country.³⁹ It is grounded in the UNCLOS

text but its “exact scope and judicial nature appear to be far from certain.”⁴⁰ Articles 17 through 25 outline exactly what innocent passage encompasses, as well as define the rights, responsibilities, and duties of the coastal state. The term “passage” connotes traversing the sea without entering internal waters, proceeding to or from internal waters, and without entering a port of call.⁴¹ Transit must be continuous and expeditious; stopping or anchoring is permitted only if this is “incidental to ordinary navigation or rendered necessary.”⁴² In accordance with Article 19, passage is “innocent” so long as it is not “prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal state.”⁴³ Innocent passage shall “take place in conformity with the convention and with other rules of international law.”⁴⁴ Furthermore, a vessel’s passage is to be adjudged innocent unless there exists evidence that speaks to the contrary; passage is innocent until proven non-innocent. It is also worth mentioning that innocent passage can be suspended, albeit temporarily and only if this essential for the protection of the coastal state.

It is difficult to pinpoint the beginning of the debate surrounding innocent passage. One could reason that it dates back to the Battle of the Books of the 17th century. Grotius’ idea of *mare liberum* is linked to the freedom of the seas principle, whereas Selden’s *mare clasum* argument supports the partial territorialization of the world’s ocean. Innocent passage itself can be seen as somewhat of a compromise.

The legal debate pertaining to innocent passage can be seen as a manifestation of the clash between the two overarching notions of ocean governance.⁴⁵ Is the sea common to all humankind or is the sea amenable to ownership by political entities? This question can be rephrased and tailored to the innocent passage debate: should the coastal state be able to exert absolute jurisdiction over its territorial sea or none at all? Innocent passage, as laid out in the text of UNCLOS, represents a middle ground. The coastal state has limited sovereignty over its territorial sea; it must allow for the innocent passage of vessels but it can impose certain regulations.

Warships and Innocent Passage

One of the most contentious and controversial topics within the aforementioned debate concerns warships and their right to innocent passage. The issue has been distorted by state practice but, based solely on the text of UNCLOS, the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea does not apply to warships. The fact that the passage of foreign warships through the territorial sea is tolerated nonetheless has to do with the practice, habitualization, normalization, and eventual legitimization of this action. A warship’s passage through a foreign territorial sea is not understood as a direct violation of UNCLOS, as long as the coastal state does not require prior notification or authorization. This is illustrative of the feedback loops between customary and codified international law; state practice shapes the way in which UNCLOS is viewed.

The modern phase of this debate began with the 1929 Hague Questionnaire. Shortly before the Wall Street Crash, the Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of International Law in The Hague distributed a survey, asking governments to comment on their understanding of innocent passage.⁴⁶ Do all vessels have the right to innocent passage or just some? Most governments replied by saying that that all ships, including warships, possess the right to innocent passage. However, there were three anomalies: Bulgaria, Poland, and the United States.⁴⁷ The committee's findings were presented at the 1930 Hague Conference, which unfortunately failed to produce a consensus on the matter.

Between then and the end of the World War II, the U.S. standpoint underwent a complete turnaround. Prior to 1945, the U.S. insisted that the right of innocent passage does not extend to warships. After 1945, the U.S. "emerged as the leading advocate of the right of innocent passage for warships."⁴⁸ The Soviet Union assumed the role of the dissenter, arguing that warships are barred from innocent passage.⁴⁹

What happened next would influence the international legal debate surrounding innocent passage for decades to come. Between 1947 and 1949, the International Court of Justice heard the well-known Corfu Channel Case. It was a complex case, the entirety of which is beyond the scope of this paper. The incident itself has been reconstructed as follows: in May 1946, two ships of the British Royal Navy passed through Albania's North Corfu Channel and were subsequently fired on by Albanian battery.⁵⁰ A year later, the United Kingdom submitted the case to the ICJ, contending that its ships were exercising their right of innocent passage and that Albania was wrong to attack. Albania countered by claiming that the UK had violated its territorial sea.⁵¹ The judges ruled in favor of the UK, with a vote of 14-2. They held that warships have the right to innocent passage during peacetime.⁵² Nevertheless, one must bear in mind that the Corfu Channel is an international strait and that the case cannot be divorced from the wartime versus peacetime and restricted versus unrestricted innocent passage debates.

Nearly a decade later, another attempt was made at codifying the concept of innocent passage. The Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of 1958 employed language that was very similar to that of the final version of UNCLOS. Warships were not mentioned; the "degree to which the passage of warships was qualified by coastal state sovereignty was not settled."⁵³ Naval powers, such as the United States, stressed that warships enjoy the right of innocent passage, while states with smaller coastal navies, such as the Soviet Union, argued that the convention does not compel states to grant warships innocent passage.

In 1983, a year after the finalization of UNCLOS, the USSR enacted legislation that limited innocent passage through the Soviet territorial sea. Innocent passage was restricted to three sea lanes: one through the Baltic Sea, another through the Sea of Okhotsk, and the last through the Sea of Japan.⁵⁴ The Soviets justified this step by citing Article 22 of UNCLOS, which permits the

coastal state to “where necessary, having regard to the safety of navigation, require foreign ships exercising the right of innocent passage through its territorial sea to use sea lanes.”⁵⁵ The United States responded to this by carrying out two FONOPs near Crimea, one in 1986 and one in 1988. During the latter, a Soviet frigate “bumped” the USS *Yorktown* with the intention of directing it toward international waters.⁵⁶ The following year, the U.S. and USSR signed the Uniform Interpretation of the Rules of International Law Governing Innocent Passage. The two nations agreed that “all ships, including warships, enjoy a right of innocent passage without prior notification or authorization.”⁵⁷ It is worth noting that, over the course of the 1980s, the Soviet leadership invested in the expansion of the Red Fleet, transforming the USSR into a leading maritime power. By 1989, it was within the interest of the USSR to limit the coastal state’s powers in the territorial sea.

The arguments that the USSR used to justify its U-turn resembled those that have been employed by the U.S. since 1982. Policy-makers, who insist that warships enjoy the right of innocent passage, highlight the fact that the subsection that defines innocent passage (Section 3 Subsection A) is entitled “Rules Applicable to All Ships.”⁵⁸ No distinction is made between warships and commercial ships. If commercial ships have the right to innocent passage, so do warships. They also maintain that the list under Article 19, which enumerates the activities that render passage “non-innocent,” is exhaustive and not open to interpretation. Moreover, it has been suggested that Article 30 simply “purports to tailor the innocent passage provisions to warships.”⁵⁹ Article 30 allows coastal states to require warships that do not comply with its laws and regulations concerning passage through the territorial sea to leave its waters immediately.⁶⁰ In the end, these arguments all buttress the same definition of innocent passage. It is “the right of civilian and military vessels to peacefully sail through the territorial waters of a foreign country as long as they do not perform activities not directly related to transit.”⁶¹

However, this definition does not conform with the actual meaning of the UNCLOS text. As per Section 3 of the Convention, the right to innocent passage does not extend to warships.

There exists a multitude of sound arguments in favor of this interpretation, the most compelling of which unpacks Article 19. Article 19(2)(a) affirms that the passage of a foreign ship is non-innocent if the vessel engages in “any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of the coastal state.”⁶² A warship that traverses the territorial sea of a foreign nation represents a “threat of force” in itself, unless, of course, the countries in question have entered a bilateral agreement that states otherwise. As U.S. delegate Elihu Root declared in 1912, “Warships may not pass without consent into this zone because they threaten. Merchant ships may pass and repass because they do not threaten.”⁶³ A document released by the International Law Commission in 1955 bolsters this claim: “The passage of warships through the territorial sea of another state can be considered by a state as a threat to its security and territorial integrity.”⁶⁴ This is because

warships inherently connote the presence of weapons and firing capabilities.⁶⁵ Furthermore, one must consider that warships are equipped with superior surveillance, radar, and sonar equipment technology. These installations aren't necessarily turned off during the warship's passage through a foreign territorial sea, which implies a violation of both Article 19(2)(c) and 19(2)(j). These stipulations prohibit ships practicing innocent passage from collecting "information to the prejudice of the defense or security of the coastal state"⁶⁶ and "carrying out research or survey activities."⁶⁷ The mere transit of a warship through the territorial sea of a foreign coastal state constitutes non-innocent passage; therefore, warships do not have an unrestricted right to innocent passage.

Viewing the debate in terms of risk management further elucidates why warships do not possess the right to innocent passage. If one were to perform a risk analysis, one would arrive at the conclusion that the prevention of non-innocent activities is more important than the unhindered passage of a foreign vessel. The preemption of non-innocent activities must be prioritized, even if this comes at a cost to innocent passage. In terms of risk aversion, restricting innocent passage one time too often is preferable to restricting it one time too few. From afar, it is difficult to determine whether a ship is engaging in a non-innocent activity, such as interfering with the coastal states' communication systems or collecting sensitive information. Warships, by their nature, are more likely to engage in such activities than other vessels.⁶⁸ Hence, it is appropriate to distinguish between a commercial ship and a warship. If one were to identify one category of ships to specifically regulate, warships would be an obvious choice.

The distinction between commercial and warships is grounded in both UNCLOS and customary international law. Article 30, for instance, demonstrates that warships are dealt with separately, as it emphasizes that warships in particular must comply with the laws and regulations put in place by the coastal state.⁶⁹ Moreover, in customary international law, "all ships" was not uniformly understood to include warships.⁷⁰ There certainly exists a legal precedent for differentiating between warships and other vessels.

What is more, there is no need for warships to traverse the territorial sea of a foreign coastal state. Wherever it is unavoidable to come within 12 nautical miles of the coastline to travel to another part of the high seas or the EEZ, innocent passage is defined in a much broader sense. The provisions for transit passage through international straits include neither a surfacing requirement for submarines nor a list as to what actions constitute non-innocent passage.⁷¹ A warship's passage through the territorial sea is not a navigational necessity but much rather a strategic move.

The debate pertaining to warships and innocent passage can, in essence, be reduced to a single normative question. Does a warship's passage through a foreign territorial sea represent a credible threat to the "peace, good order or security of the coastal state?"⁷² The answer to this question will vary from government to government, depending on its interests and perceptions of

military force. Nonetheless, this paper stands by its judgment that, based on the text of UNCLOS, innocent passage does not extend to warships.

Yet, it seems as though this verdict is irrelevant in the context of contemporary state practice. By contending that warships possess the right to innocent passage and by undertaking actions consistent with this conviction, the world's most powerful nations have irrevocably shaped the manner in which UNCLOS is viewed. The United States and Russia formalized their interpretation of innocent passage via the aforementioned Joint Statement of 1989. Even China has *de facto* subscribed to the notion that warships enjoy the right of innocent passage. In September 2015, Chinese navy ships sailed within 12 nautical miles of the Aleutian Islands, entering the U.S. territorial sea.⁷³ PLAN did not seek U.S. permission nor did it notify the U.S. of the passage, as the U.S. does not ask for this.⁷⁴ China evidently recognizes a warship's right to innocent passage, while simultaneously acknowledging a coastal state's right to impose a prior notification or authorization requirement. In any case, such actions generate an *opinio juris* and mold the dominant interpretation of the UNCLOS text, any deviation from which is labelled "wrong" or "illegal."

These findings shed light on the relationship between codified international law (e.g., UNCLOS) and customary international law. Norms, state practice, and formal treaties are indubitably intertwined. State practice informs norms that inform legal discourse that in turn informs state practice. Codified law does not exist in a vacuum; its provisions will always be viewed against prevalent state practice. At times, state practice is congruent with international law; at other times, it conflicts with international law. Even though states "adopt treaties and consider them legally binding, it is not uncommon for them to derogate from the treaty text when it is in their interest to do so."⁷⁵ Whether or not this violating behavior is denounced depends on the circumstances and on the perpetrating nation's status within the international system.

Yet, what does this say about UNCLOS? Does the interdependence between codified and customary international law strengthen or weaken UNCLOS as a framework institution? There is no clear-cut or definitive answer to this question. On the one hand, the feedback loops between UNCLOS and state practice ensure that the treaty is as realistic as can be. An idealistic treaty that does not reflect the realities of the situation is useless. On the other hand, by behaving in a way that is contradictory to the treaty, states erode the foundation of UNCLOS and undermine its very integrity.

Innocent Passage, Warships and Prior Notification/Authorization Policies

Over the past decade, the focus of the debate surrounding innocent passage has shifted toward the imposition of prior notification and authorization requirements. Do coastal states have the right to enact such legislation and must foreign warships adhere to it? Do they have to give notice and/or seek authorization if required to do so? UN members have yet to reach a

consensus on this issue. Nevertheless, UNCLOS does offer a legal precedent for a notification policy; the coastal state may regulate passage through its territorial sea if this is vital to the protection. An authorization requirement, on the contrary, is excessive and incompatible with the dominant interpretation of maritime law that asserts that innocent passage extends to warships. As of now, there are approximately 40 states that have adopted prior notification/authorization policies, including China, South Korea, India, and Finland.⁷⁶

A first attempt at settling the question of prior notification/authorization policies was made in 1955 by the International Law Commission. The body established the right of coastal states to subject warships to prior notification/authorization requirements; “normally, however, [the coastal state] shall grant innocent passage.”⁷⁷ This decision had long-lasting and significant ramifications and is cited until this day. Unfortunately, it did not lead to a resolution of the dispute; after all, a single judgment cannot amount to robust jurisprudence.

At the following ILC meeting, Germany proposed the deletion of the word “authorization” from the 1955 draft. It argued that “coastal states should not be empowered to deny passage but are entitled to have notice of the presence of warships.”⁷⁸ The amendment failed, despite vocal support from the United States.

Two years later, in 1958, the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone was signed. Its text did not preclude the imposition of a notice-authorization barrier. Article 17 of the convention reads:

“Foreign ships exercising the right of innocent passage shall comply with the laws and regulations enacted by the coastal states in conformity with these articles and other rules of international law and, in particular, with such laws and regulations relating to transport and navigation.”⁷⁹

The language used is discernibly more ambiguous than that of the final version of UNCLOS. This vagueness set the stage for a variety of unilateral declarations by coastal states, requiring warships to give prior notification and/or seek authorization.⁸⁰

In 1973, a group of Mediterranean and Southeast Asian states submitted the so-called Draft Articles on Navigation Through the Territorial Sea Including Straits Used for International Navigation. The provisions outlined in this document would have allowed coastal states to “require prior notification or authorization for the passage of foreign warships through their territorial sea.”⁸¹ It did not pass either.

A decade later, UNCLOS was finalized. Its stipulations are considerably more restrictive, in the sense that they limit the scope of the regulations that a coastal state can impose. Nonetheless, during the plenary meeting of UNCLOS III, numerous states suggested that they might require prior notification or authorization regardless.⁸²

In 1992, China followed suit on this promise. Article 6 of its Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone “requires states to seek permission

before warships engage in innocent passage.”⁸³ It should not come as a surprise that this announcement was followed by a U.S. FONOP.

That same year, the UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, presented a special report on the progress made in the implementation of UNCLOS to the General Assembly. The report noted that “proposals to the effect that warships should give prior notification or should seek prior permission before entering the territorial sea in exercise of the right to innocent passage were not included in the Convention.”⁸⁴

Those who support this assertion usually base their line of argument on Article 21 and Article 24 of UNCLOS. The latter forbids the adoption of policies “which have the practical effect of denying or impairing the right of innocent passage.”⁸⁵ Prior notification/authorization requirements can be understood as a violation of this article. Opponents of such requirements also consider the list beneath Article 21(1) exhaustive, all-inclusive, and complete;⁸⁶ coastal states may only enact laws and regulations that fall within the listed policy categories. In their view, this prohibits coastal states from requiring prior notification or authorization, as Article 21(1) does not explicitly permit the adoption of such a policy.

The counter-argument contends that Article 21(1) “only expands on what Article 19(1) already implies.”⁸⁷ Coastal states may take the necessary steps to ensure that the passage of foreign warships is not prejudicial to its security. Article 21(1) merely elaborates on this point. If a coastal state deems the passage of warships a threat in the context of its security interests, it has the right to impose a prior notification/authorization policy. A statement made by the president of the third and final UNCLOS conference confirms this view. It “clearly placed coastal state security within the scope of Article 19 and Article 25.”⁸⁸

The judges that heard the *Corfu Channel Case* arrived at a similar conclusion. They ruled that Albania may regulate passage through the channel, albeit not to the extent of demanding prior authorization or outright barring the transit of warships.⁸⁹ According to this verdict, a prior notification policy is acceptable; an authorization requirement, on the other hand, is excessive. Yet one must reiterate that this case pertains to the passage of warships through international straits during peacetime. The ruling cannot be directly applied to the question of a warship’s passage through a foreign territorial sea.

The final (and arguably most persuasive) argument justifying the imposition of prior notification/authorization policy relates the concept of innocent passage to national sovereignty. The idea of innocent passage presupposes sovereignty over the territorial sea.⁹⁰ If the territorial sea weren’t under the jurisdiction of the coastal state, any passage through it would simply be a passage. There would be no consideration of (non-)innocence or (in-)offensiveness. On the high seas, for example, there is no such thing as innocent passage as no single state can claim sovereignty over the high seas.⁹¹ Hence, because the coastal state has jurisdiction over its territorial sea, it is free to subject warships to prior notification/authorization requirements.

Ultimately, it comes down to whether states treat innocent passage as an inherent right or privilege. A right is unassailable, while a privilege is susceptible to restriction. This essay will remain loyal to its claim that coastal states have the right to impose a prior notification requirement with regards to warships. A prior authorization policy, on the contrary, is indefensible. Such a requirement is inconsistent with the principal interpretation of UNCLOS that extends the right of innocent passage to warships. If a warship must seek permission before traversing the territorial sea, then its right to innocent passage implicitly hinges on the consent of the coastal state. This negates and undermines the very concept of innocent passage.

Conclusion

For centuries, scholars and policymakers have explored what exactly innocent passage entails. What kinds of behavior constitute non-innocent passage? May warships freely traverse the territorial sea of a foreign coastal state or do they represent a “threat of force?” Does the coastal state have the right to regulate innocent passage through its territorial sea? If so, to what extent? May coastal states enact prior notification/authorization legislation? The topic is complex to say the least. Today, in light of the U.S. FON operations in the South China Sea, the discussion surrounding innocent passage is more pertinent than ever before.

As was maintained throughout this essay, the right to innocent passage does not necessarily extend to warships. Moreover, there exists a legal precedent for the imposition of a prior notification requirement. These judgments are firmly grounded in the text of UNCLOS. Nonetheless, the meaning of UNCLOS has been distorted by state practice. Now, most nations accept that warships enjoy the right to innocent passage, due to the fact that this interpretation has been propagated and normalized by the world’s most powerful countries. The notion that prior notification/authorization policies violate UNCLOS, however, remains highly disputed.

In the end, one must question what these findings reveal about the relationship between UNCLOS and customary international law. For one, it is worth noting that the development of international law follows a cyclical pattern. State practice begets habits that give rise to institutions that shape laws that in turn influence practice. Put another way, the interpretation and application of codified rules pave the path for their further definition. To conclude, the era of customary international law has not ended. Codified law will continue to be molded and altered by actions that states consider to be customs. In the words of the great judge Oliver Holmes: “The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience.”⁹²

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Solar Power Development in Vermont and Jordan

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Abstract

In the 21st century, world leaders are struggling to address the issue of climate change. Climate change affects everyone; melting ice caps, causing sea levels to rise, creating extreme weather patterns, as well as increasing risks to human health and wildlife and costs to society and the economy.¹ Another issue that many governments face is energy security. From the decline of oil to dependency on foreign energy exports, increasing energy security is an issue on the forefront of many government's minds. Thanks to developments in renewable energy technology, solar power offers a solution to both issues. To take advantage of solar, governments must create policies and incentives for individuals to invest, slowing climate change while simultaneously increasing energy security.

One can see some of these policies already having an effect as solar power usage grows rapidly around the world. In 2011, solar accounted for roughly 0.5% of global electricity demand.² By 2015, that amount had more than doubled.³ In this paper, I explore the cause of this growth by comparing solar power development in two vastly different areas of the world; Jordan and Vermont. This research specifically explores the economic and environmental motivations behind solar power investment in each region, as well as the expected impact that investment will have on an individual investor or business, economy of the region, and solar development in the future.

Background

While not perfectly comparable, Vermont and Jordan have relatively similar landmasses, populations, and GDPs.⁴ At the same time, the two regions have very different climates as well as development levels. Vermont is a cold northern state with a mere 157 sunny days per year and a highly developed economy.⁵ Jordan, on the other hand, is a desert country, which lies in the solar belt of the world and receives an average of 310 sunny days per year, with a developing economy.⁶ While these differences are quite stark, the fact that both regions are experiencing a dramatic increase in solar power usage and development makes them useful to compare in order to explore the effects of government policies.

Jordan

In 2015, 97% of Jordan's energy needs come from foreign energy sources: mostly imported crude oil and other petroleum derivatives. Jordan has experienced difficulties with obtaining this energy due to a series of attacks on the Arab Gas Pipeline in Egypt. In addition, the influx of Syrian refugees added approximately 10% to the Jordanian population, further increasing the demand for energy. To alleviate this problem, Jordan plans to reduce its energy imports by 37% in the coming years, bringing Jordan's total energy consumption to 40% domestic and 60% imported.⁷ Jordan also has a National Energy Efficiency Strategy for 2005–2020 to meet a 5.5% yearly rising demand of energy which dictates that the “share of renewable energy . . . shall reach 7% by 2015 and 10% by 2020 . . .”⁸

Solar power is not new to Jordan; there are photovoltaic units in rural villages used for everything from lighting to heating water. In addition, about 15% of all households in Jordan are equipped with a solar water heating system, with 30% expected to be equipped by the year 2020.⁹ Multiple businesses are also working to bring domestic green energy sources to Jordan. For example, Kavar Energy is partnering with the Ma'an Development Area to launch a \$400 million project which would build a 52MW solar power plant in Jordan, making it the largest PV plant in the Middle East.¹⁰ Jordan also inaugurated its first solar-powered charging station in El Hassan Science City for electric cars in February 2012. In addition, the southern city of Aqaba is endeavoring to create an oasis in their otherwise hot and uninhabited land by using concentrated solar power.¹¹

Vermont

Vermont produces less than 40% of the electricity it consumes, depending on power from the New England grid and Canada.¹² Hydro-Quebec supplies Vermont with about a quarter of its energy needs.¹³ To increase its domestic production of energy as well as protect the environment, Governor Shumlin aims to turn Vermont into the nation's first all-green-energy economy, with 90% of energy production in the state coming from renewable sources by 2050.¹⁴ Additionally, Vermont's mandatory renewable energy program requires 55% of all Vermont electricity to come from renewable sources by 2017. Once the 2017 goals have been met, the requirement increases by 4% every three years until reaching 75% by 2032.¹⁵

Vermont's 2016 subsidy policies strongly favor the adoption of solar and renewable energy technologies. The Vermont Energy Act of 2011 requires utilities “to offer a standard benefit at 20 cents per kWh produced by a customer's solar system.”¹⁶ This is on top of the federal tax credit of 30% on the net cost of all solar installations. In addition, Vermont enacted a blanket 100% property tax exemption in 2013 for solar photovoltaic systems up to and including 10kW. There is also an exemption on 100% of all applicable sales taxes with the purchase of a solar power system.¹⁷ In addition to the federal and state

government, solar incentives are also offered at the utility level; including solar tax credits, up front solar rebates, premium feed in tariffs (net metering) and solar production incentives.¹⁸ For example, Green Mountain Power offers its own incentive and will pay you 5.3 cents for every kWh of solar power you produce, in addition to net metering savings.¹⁹ These policies appear to widely successful. In fact, all new electricity generating capacity added to Vermont's grid in 2014 was solar powered.²⁰

Methodology

In *Sampling for qualitative research*, judgement sampling is the most appropriate technique to use when it “may be advantageous to study a broad range of subjects . . . who have specific experiences or subjects with special expertise.”²¹ Also known as snowball sampling, judgement samples are created by selecting the most productive sample to answer the research question. In snowball sampling, you first decide the purpose you want your participants to serve, find an informant, and then ask them to recommend others in the population who you might want to interview.

In both Jordan and Vermont, I used this method to find respondents to interview. In Jordan, the staff at the Middlebury School Abroad in Amman provided initial contacts, and I continued the snowball sampling method from there, asking for the contact information of other potential respondents with each person I interviewed. In Vermont, I started with staff and faculty at Middlebury College as initial contacts, and continued with the snowball sampling method to find the contact information of other potential research participants.

Snowball sampling method does create some challenges; namely finding respondents and starting referral chains, controlling the types of chains and number of cases in any chain, and pacing and monitoring referral chains and data quality.²² I found respondents by asking contacts I already knew to start the referral chain. To control the types of chains, I only asked people who I knew met the research criteria, and to control the number of cases in any chain, I limited the number of respondents I meet with from each referral. Lastly, in pacing and monitoring referral chains and data quality, I made sure that a number of different snowballs were proceeding simultaneously.

The one challenge I was not able to completely control for is the extent to which snowball sampling is dependent on social networks. By nature, snowball sampling “does not produce a statistically representative sample in a large population.”²³ However, in a relatively small and elite community (like those who use solar power), snowball sampling is considered an effective way to select people at random to interview from an existing framework.²⁴ In addition, in a qualitative study, the size of a research sample can be smaller than is considered appropriate in a quantitative study as long as it “adequately answers the research question.”²⁵ In fact, there is growing evidence that as few as 10–20 knowledgeable participants are enough to properly understand the research material.²⁶ Again, the idea here is that snowball sampling is effective

because “specialized informants have particular competence in some cultural domain.”²⁷ Because of this, every case has to count.

In Jordan, I conducted 21 in-person interviews in Arabic and English with four categories of respondents: installers, policy makers, business users, and residential users. Installers were mostly engineers at solar energy companies; policy makers were government employees and employees at national research and conservation centers; business users were hotel engineers and school managers; and residential users were home owners. In Vermont, I conducted 11 interviews which proportionally reflected the four categories of respondents in Jordan, with slight differences in makeup. Policy makers were community board members, and business users were farmers and small business owners. While different in size, both samples are considered large enough for a qualitative research study.

Given the language barrier, I decided that face-to-face interviews had the most potential in Jordan, as they are, “the most flexible form of data collection method.”²⁸ However, in Vermont, without the language barrier, I decided to use the telephone interview method because it allows for a reduction of error due to interviewer style.^{29,30}

I used a semi-structured method in all my interviews because it works well in projects where there are high-level bureaucrats and elite members of the community involved.³¹ In both Jordan and Vermont, I asked a prepared list of questions in a set order; a set of country-common questions that were comparable across contexts, as well as country-specific questions that created a unique national context. The country-common questions asked what drove their decision to invest as well as about solar power’s effects on their lives and on the region. Questions that were Jordan specific asked Jordanians’ opinions on nuclear energy, the National Energy Efficiency Strategy, as well as foreign investment. Questions that were Vermont specific asked Vermonters’ opinions on the nuclear energy plants’ closure, the physical appearance of solar power plants, as well as opinions on wind power.

Results and Discussion

I split my findings into five sections: economic motivations, environmental motivations, effects on the future with regards to self/business and the region, and lastly, country-specific questions. In each section, results in Jordan and Vermont are discussed to discover the effects of government policies and compare solar power development in each region.

Economic Motivations

For most Jordanians, economic and monetary motivations were their main reason for investing in solar energy. In contrast, economic motivations and policy incentives only played a minimal role in Vermont, as solar became more affordable and attractive to people. However, no respondent was investing in solar for purely economic gain.

Jordan

With rising electricity costs and a billing system that overcharges those who use a large amount of electricity to subsidize the cost for those who only use a little, solar power has become a very attractive investment for many of the wealthier Jordanian citizens and large private businesses, “solar is most useful for those buildings which have a high level of consumption.”^{32, 33} For these groups, the investment in solar saves money and carries a low level of risk. However, even if it pays off in the long run, solar still carries a high initial investment cost.³⁴ These initial costs combined with subsidized energy from the government make solar out of reach and an unattractive investment for those with little wealth.

The general consensus among installers, business, and residential users was that in the long run, solar power is cheaper than the electricity provided by the government. It was only among policy makers that solar power is still thought to be expensive due to its high capital investment, servicing, and maintenance costs, “Green energy is expensive, and we are not a very rich country.”³⁵

The Al Bayan school just outside of Amman is one example of a wealthy private business that has decided to install solar. As of fall 2015, 94% of the school was running on solar power. To ensure that the government has enough profits to subsidize electricity costs for the poor, the government only gave the school enough licensing to generate 94% of their needs, with 6% coming from the grid. However, even without producing enough to meet their full energy needs, with solar Al Bayan says they will save at least a quarter million JD (approximately \$353,000) on electricity.³⁶ In addition, they are also able to heat their water with solar electricity as opposed to diesel, saving even more on fuel. With an initial investment cost of about 30,000JD (approximately \$42,300), Al Bayan school’s payback period will be less than 3 years, after which they will continue to save.

Another example of a private business investing in solar is Hotel Toledo in Amman. Hotel Toledo initially used solar to heat their Jacuzzi and spa water, but their solar produced more hot water than could be used in the Jacuzzi and spa alone. So, they invested in tanks to keep the water hot overnight for people’s morning showers. Using solar to heat water was so successful that in the fall of 2015, the hotel was investing in a wheeling system that would cost about 1 million JD (approximately \$1.41 million), but would power all of Hotel Toledo’s three properties (two hotels and one farm which consume roughly 1 million kW a year) with a payback period of approximately 4 years.³⁷

While the majority of my interviews took place in Amman, I was also able to interview at a few businesses that had invested in solar in Aqaba, a city in the far south of Jordan on the banks of the Red Sea. Interestingly enough, solar was not as cheap or viable of an investment in Aqaba as it was in Amman. Perhaps this was due to the fact that there are little to no solar companies based out of Aqaba. However, even with the higher cost, solar was still considered a viable investment for some large energy consumption businesses. In the summer, the demand for electricity at luxury hotels in Aqaba can reach

35kW per day, making solar an extremely attractive investment. The InterContinental Hotel in Aqaba invested in solar to heat water for their swimming pool. Like Hotel Toledo, the InterContinental's solar system was so effective that it produced enough hot water for their swimming pool, as well as to meet their laundry and kitchen needs. As of fall 2015, the hotel's owners were looking at building a 3.5MW wheeling system to reduce the electricity costs for all hotels under their ownership.

Feynan Ecolodge is an eco-resort located in the heart of the Dana Biosphere Reserve, far from the grid. They use solar for everything, from lighting bathrooms at night to heating water. While acknowledging that the system is incredibly expensive, staff at the lodge firmly believe that it is better both environmentally and monetarily for the lodge to use solar as opposed to gas or oil. In addition to the panels, the lodge also uses a battery to hold energy, which adds to the expense.

In addition to solar users, I was also able to talk to a number of solar installers. Kavar energy was one of the first solar companies in Jordan which worked with the government to coordinate private and public sector efforts, attract foreign investors, and build Jordan's technology capacities enough to launch an era of renewable energy. There are also business associations in Jordan that advocate for the government to build infrastructure supporting renewable energy, raise public awareness, and attract more investment.

Thanks to foreign investment, the solar industry in Jordan is booming, drawing young talented engineers from around the country with the promise of a job. In fact, none of the installers I interviewed were working in the solar industry because of their concern for the environment, but because solar provided job opportunities in a country with an average unemployment rate of 50% post university graduation.³⁸ According to one installer, there was so much work to be done that the company doubled its employees in just a few years.

Government policies play a large role in encouraging solar investment for those who can afford the high up-front cost. In 2015, the Jordanian government offered zero taxes on anything having to do with renewable energy. Outside of monetary policies, banks also used fiscal policies to incentivize investment with interest rates as low as 3–5% for green energy loans.³⁹ However, many hesitate to take advantage of these policies and make the necessary capital investment because the Jordanian government could change regulations without warning. In addition, some hotels faced delays in getting approval for their wheeling systems, waiting anywhere from 1.5 to 12 years, and discouraging other large businesses from starting the process.⁴⁰

In addition to government incentives, some private companies also offered incentives to encourage solar investment. For example, one company offered to install panels on a house free of charge. Instead of paying the utility, customers would pay the company the value of their electric bill until the panels were paid off. After that, the panels would be owned by the customer, who would no longer pay an electricity bill for the remainder of the system's life. Other companies offered to assess the buildings' energy efficiency with

the goal of lowering consumption levels before investing in solar. Increased energy efficiency lowers the number of panels needed as well as size of the initial investment, increasing solar's attractiveness.

Vermont

For residential users, as of fall 2016 investing in solar is heavily subsidized by both the state and federal government, making it fairly affordable. With an average payback period between 10–20 years and a 25-year warranty on the system, initial investment costs in solar are high but, “ecologically as well as economically [make] complete sense.”⁴¹ For one residential user, the total cost was around \$21,000; \$7,000 which was reimbursed by the federal government and \$1,000 from the state, so they only actually paid \$13,000 out of pocket. Another residential user already passed the 10-year payback period, and in fall 2016 ran a \$600 credit, enough to carry him through the winter. In fact, his panels produced so much energy that he donated a large portion of his credit to his in-laws so their power bills were partially covered by his solar panels. Some residential users also charged their electric car with the solar panels energy, essentially driving for free. In addition to saving money on gas, they also saved on car maintenance. With the added savings from driving an electric car, one user's payback period was reduced to approximately 7 years.

Solar Haven Farm in Shoreham, Vermont has slowly expanded its net metered solar array. In fall 2016, the farm used solar electricity for refrigeration and to freeze the berry crop as well as power the irrigation system. According to a rough calculation of their energy consumption, Solar Haven estimated they save about \$1,300 a year with their array. What stood out to me is that the respondent had never previously calculated their savings until I asked, showing that the savings was clearly not a driving factor for their decision to invest. The Marquis is a local movie theater that decided to buy into a community solar system after seeing that their business consumed a large amount of electricity. As of fall 2016, the system was still being built, but once it is completed the respondent expects it will take a percentage off of his bill.

For local installers, the environment and climate change were the most important motivators behind solar power development. However, it is undeniable that solar is also very profitable. In fall 2016, one installer attested that their revenue has doubled every year since 2011 and continues to grow. Because of this growth, the installer has been able to hire locals as well as contribute in a positive manner to the tax base and local community. As of fall 2016 solar is also an industry that paid above average, which helps income levels as well as the economy. Installers like SunCommon also profit off of solar by building large installations in New England and selling the energy credits to companies in New York for their “greenness.” SunCommon also offers solar owners incentives to install extra panels, the revenue from which goes to decreasing their payback period.

It is undeniable that Vermont could be considered among the worst places in the world for solar. However, due to government and utility incentives, solar

development is booming. With the federal and Vermont state reimbursements, anyone who is investing in a system will automatically receive approximately $\frac{1}{3}$ of their expenses reimbursed in the form of a tax credit. On top of this, unlike other power companies in the country, Green Mountain Power is actively encouraging solar energy development by paying \$0.05 cents for every kWh produced, demonstrating why Vermont's solar industry is one of the fastest growing in the country.

Environmental Motivations

As a developing desert country with little pollution compared to the U.S. and even less natural resources, in Jordan, environmental motivations were not a concern. In Vermont, the reverse was true as decisions to invest were fueled by environmental motivations.

Jordan

Only a handful of respondents believed that because it is a desert country with plenty of sun, Jordan should be using solar as much as possible to reduce the use of oil and cut down on pollution for future generations. For the others, the economy also inevitably played a role. Many of the environmentally motivated business users were encouraged to adopt green practices by the Green Key Certification,⁴² which brings monetary gains in addition to good environmental stewardship. This was not surprising, as environmental awareness in Jordan is low. When asked why, respondents said Jordanians are not worried about the environment or climate change because the countries emissions are miniscule compared to Europe, the U.S., or China.

Al Bayan is a Green Key certified school that teaches conservation and recycling to all its students. Many of its staff are environmentally friendly, and were the first to push their administration to invest in solar. However, what finally convinced the school was the monetary savings. According to staff, Al Bayan used to pay 1,500 to 2,000JD (approximately \$2,100 to \$2,800) a month for energy. Now with the solar panels, they only need to pay 800 JD (approximately \$1,100) a month for 3 years, after which they will own the system and drop the amount of their energy bill by 70%.⁴³

For Hotel Toledo, their green practices started for purely economic reasons. To save money the hotel cut down on solid waste, installed LED lights, adjusted the AC temperature, and reinvested in more efficient ovens. In fact, by the time Hotel Toledo discovered the Green Key Certification they had already completed 70% of the requirements through their cost saving practices. In addition to saving money and attracting more guests, there was also the added advertising value that came along with being a Green Key hotel, as they were the first independently run hotel in the Middle East to receive this certificate.

Similar to Hotel Toledo, the Intercontinental Hotel in Aqaba obtained the Green Key Certification due to their solar investment, in addition to other green practices. With this certificate, the hotel was able to advertise itself as green

and attract more guests. It also takes pride in representing Jordan at environmental forums and conferences around the region, to share stories of its success with being green. However, while they may have helped the environment, solar investment and all of these green practices took place to save money.

Feynan EcoLodge was distinct among respondents, as the environment was a huge motivator for its staff. Since the lodge is government owned, attracting guests is not a part of the staff's responsibilities. In fact, when I interviewed staff at the lodge, the most important motivator behind their green practices was to educate the community and staff who work at the lodge about the importance of the environment for the future of the region.

I was also able to sit down with one of the first residential users in Amman to install solar panels for electricity use on his roof. Not only can he afford to invest in solar, but he also views environmental issues as a priority. Solar makes him feel good about reducing both pollution and the health issues it creates. However, he has also seen the monetary benefits that investing in green energy can bring and acknowledges that they play a role. With a 25-year warranty and a 5-year payback period, he was so pleased with his current system that he encouraged all his family and friends to invest as well, and planned to look into increasing the number of panels on his roof as well. In addition, all of his cars are hybrid, which save him money on gas and make him feel more environmentally responsible.

Vermont

According to one residential user, investing in solar meant they would have to own their house for the rest of their lives to reach the 20-year payback period. However, this did not matter as the environmental benefits of the investment were much more important. For example, solar investment for Solar Haven Farm was meant to reduce emissions and slow climate change. Their solar array and electric car cut the carbon footprint of the farm in half. However, these environmental motivations can sometimes backfire as other respondents said they use AC more often, drive to and from work as opposed to taking public transportation, and use their electronic devices more often.

Climate change was one topic that was consistently raised with both users and installers in Vermont but never in Jordan, especially as more and more of these changes become irreversible. One respondent believed that the world is currently experiencing "death by 1,000 cuts" meaning that the effects of global warming and climate change are happening, whether we feel them or not. This sentiment was shared by many, however; solar serves as a viable long term solution to the environmental problems of our future.

Many Vermonters pointed out the fact that the economy and environment are not necessarily opposed to each other. In a green economy, improvements in the economy also benefit the environment. For example, over 200,000 people in the U.S. alone die every year from air pollution.⁴⁴ Reducing fossil fuel emissions diminishes the amount of air pollution, which decreases the number of people who get sick, which lessens the health care costs for the

entire country, which in turn helps the economy. Energy efficiency practices is another example of this positive relationship, reducing energy costs as well as energy usage which in turn reduces emissions and saves the environment. The concept of a green economy is becoming more and more popular in Vermont. One installer revealed that their business had a triple bottom line, “We measure success by communities/people, environment, and finances/economy.”⁴⁵ Another installer mentioned the Vermont Business for Societal Responsibility, a movement toward socially responsible capitalism and one of state’s most powerful lobbying groups for responsible energy policies.

Effects on the Future: Self/Business

In both regions, solar development is expected to have a positive effect on business and residential users as well as installers.

Jordan

In Jordan, all users experience a positive effect on their residence or business by saving money, especially as the price of electricity is expected to increase. For installers, it expanded their company. One business user used to operate just in Jordan, and has now merged with a larger company to have a more regional presence in countries including Dubai, Egypt and Turkey. For the hotels like the Intercontinental in Aqaba, green practices are reducing their water and electricity usage. In total, they are saving 300,000 JD (approximately \$420,000) a year, with 2,000 JD (approximately \$2,800) saved in their Aqaba hotel alone. If all intercontinental hotels around the world did the same, they could be saving roughly 3.4 billion USD a year.

Vermont

In Vermont, solar development saves money and leaves users with a good conscious due to their reduced carbon footprint. Users of a net metering system will never again have to pay an electric bill. It also makes people a lot more aware of their energy usage, gives them a feeling of self-sufficiency, and alters their energy consumption behavior. With solar people can track both their daily usage and production, to become a more intelligent energy user. One user admitted that the first thing he does when he gets home is check his meter. Another attested that he now turns off lights that he is not using and puts two dishes in the stove to cook at once instead of one after the other, because he is more aware his energy usage. Yet another emphasized that this investment would have a positive effect on teaching good practices for future generations, “I believe that my children will view energy consumption the way we view slavery and Jim Crow laws.”⁴⁶ For business users, solar has reduced their power bill and turned their business into a more proactive member of the community, something owners feel good about. For installers, solar is providing a disruption to the usual relationship between a user and their energy, increasing business.⁴⁷

Effects on the Future: Region

In both regions, solar development is lowering prices and creating local jobs. In Jordan, solar power is also bringing foreign investment. In Vermont, solar power is also effecting other industries. As solar development grows in both areas, innovation will naturally begin to lower the cost of solar and increases its accessibility to all. Government policies also have a large role to play in the future of solar. If these policies are encouraging solar development, respondents across the board think they will have a positive effect on the future.

Jordan

With rising energy costs, solar power development is giving Jordan the ability to provide more energy domestically, leading to a long term decline in energy prices. Because of this, all prices in Jordan are expected to decrease as reduced electricity and heating bills lower operational costs. This is extremely beneficial to Jordan's economy as their fall 2016 prices are comparable to prices in the U.S., but the average income is much lower.⁴⁸

As development increases, the job market in the solar power industry as well as in industries associated with solar will also grow. As Jordan makes efforts to become more solar friendly, there will also be an increase in foreign investment which will in turn create even more jobs. In addition, land like the Ma'an Development area is becoming more and more valuable as both domestic and foreign companies become interested in bidding on new development projects that bring high value to previously barren lands. The effects of solar development on Jordan will probably not be noticed by the average Jordanian; but, as hundreds of millions of dollars pour into the country, the economy will strengthen and quality of life overall will improve.

Overall, solar power development is expected to have a positive effect on the future of the region. With the right government policies, some believe that Jordan could become a regional hub for solar. Others dream that one day everyone in Jordan will have solar panels, and energy will be so abundant that it is practically free. Some hope solar will make people more conscious of and responsible for their energy consumption. Since solar can also be used to circulate and desalinate water, it can help alleviate Jordan's other problem of water scarcity. Increased solar development in Jordan could also raise the country's status in the eyes of the world, demonstrating that Jordan is developed enough to be taken seriously.

The most important effect solar will have on the region is reducing Jordan's energy budget deficit through lessened fuel imports, making the country more energy independent and secure in the future. However, solar power alone is not enough. In fact, investment in all types of domestic energy should be explored for Jordan to truly increase its energy security.

Vermont

With increased solar development, Vermont will be able to keep its energy development local as opposed to importing from Hydro-Quebec, which will keep wealth in the state. This wealth in turn will create jobs for the economy. With 80 solar companies throughout the supply chain and over 1,360 Vermonters employed, renewable energy is one of the fastest growing business industries in Vermont.⁴⁹ In fact, on a per capita basis Vermont has the third largest solar workforce in the country.⁵⁰

The increase in jobs leads to high levels of consumption, providing economic stimulus to the state. With cheaper energy, the cost of living at home will also decrease, increasing user's disposable income and further increasing consumption. This wealth can then be reinvested to develop technologies that make solar more accessible for everyone. This positive feedback loop not only impacts those directly related to solar, but also other areas of the labor force like civil contractors and engineers due to a trickledown effect from solar to other industries. It may also affect Vermont's tourism industry. Some respondents insisted that solar will have a positive effect as it attracts more tourists who view Vermont as green, crunchy, and progressive. Others argue that solar will negatively affect tourism as it is ugly and detracts from the scenery.

The booming solar industry also attracts other interrelated industries like architecture and design firms interested in incorporating solar into their work to Vermont. In addition, Vermont's positive investment climate for green energy will also attract other energy generation companies like geothermal, small scale hydro, or biomass to move to the state and flourish. Increasing the amount of solar power investment in state will also mitigate the future loss of jobs due to climate change. As world temperature continues to rise, Vermont industries like snow sports and maple sugar will be greatly affected. However, increased solar power development can both slow climate change and provide more jobs for Vermonters.

Like Jordan, solar will also increase Vermont's energy independence. This is extremely agreeable for many Vermonters, who have always placed importance on being locally self-sufficient. In order to achieve energy independence, Vermont must expand development by adapting existing buildings to accommodate solar, as well as designing new buildings with solar in mind. According to one respondent, Vermont could power itself with only solar by building upwards of 500MW on 4,000 acres throughout the state. The only issue is that there must be a feasible way to store energy for a long period of time. This is especially important for Vermont, as between October and April there is a lot less sunlight and a lot more clouds.

The future of the region also includes conflict between utilities and local developers, as local development puts energy production in the hands of small companies as opposed to large utilities, who are making large profits by selling energy credits from Vermont based solar array projects out of state. This out of state selling will only be exacerbated in 2017, when Vermont adopts a new set of taxes that lower return on smaller solar developments, encouraging

development for large utilities. In states like Massachusetts, similar policies have practically halted the solar industry overnight and would likely have a similar effect in Vermont. In short, the positive future of solar in Vermont depends on maintaining a healthy relationship between solar companies and existing utilities.

Country-Specific Questions

Jordan: National Energy Efficiency Strategy

Jordan has an Energy Efficiency Strategy with the goal to reach 10% renewable energy resources by 2020. However, 10% is not a large amount and Jordan plans to depend on a variety of resources to increase its energy security. Unfortunately, depending on renewable energy only in Jordan is impossible, as the country is too poor to afford batteries and renewables cannot always supply energy during every hour of the day. Policy makers also explained that it is important for the country to set an achievable amount. Given the large amounts of money already invested in renewable energy development, the government expects to exceed their goal by 2020 without much additional effort. For the Jordanian government, the National Energy Efficiency Strategy is not meant to protect the environment, but the environmental protection will be an added side benefit.

One criticism some respondents had of the National Energy Efficiency Strategy was that there was a lack of government transparency in the formation of these goals. In addition, during my interviews I discovered that the strategy seems to be known only in Amman, respondents in Aqaba had never heard of it, which may demonstrate another weakness of the government in terms of transparency and communication with its people.

Vermont: Physical Appearance of Solar

One of the biggest worries of Vermonters with regards to solar and renewable energy development was the physical appearance of the infrastructure. Over half of my interviewees felt that large solar arrays were ugly and should not be allowed in Vermont. The other half saw solar as a sign of progress, and had heard the other sides sentiment often but did not understand it. For example, SunCommon wanted to build a five-acre solar project next to a highway, with the arrays built right up to the edge. However, the town decided that they did not want to look at the panels every morning, and so the project was dropped. The Vermont ban on billboards is another example of Vermonters resistance to physical infrastructure. One respondent put this phenomenon with regards to solar perfectly when he said, "Vermont is the most conservative progressive state you'll ever live in. We have progressive solar opinions but we don't want anything to change."⁵¹ In essence, solar technology developed so quickly that Vermonters have not yet had enough time to become accustomed to it.

One respondent pointed out the fact that Vermonters dislike of the appearance of solar power might cause people to think more consciously about their

power usage. Another thought that putting trees and plants around solar arrays would be the best solution to the problem of aesthetics. In fact, many farmers interested in the profits from solar are planning on converting their land. To make solar more attractive for the community, some farmers have planted flowers for bees in between the panels. Another respondent suggested that sheep and livestock can easily graze underneath the large solar landscapes. Unfortunately, according to one respondent, developing solar on farmers' fields will be prohibited as of 2017 with a new policy prompted by peoples dislike of solar's appearance and fear of change.

Jordan: Foreign Investment

Practically all solar companies in Jordan depend on foreign companies to produce their solar technology. In my opinion, this is in direct opposition to the government's goals of achieving energy independence as Jordan now depends on technology imports to provide their energy. Most respondents agreed it would be great if Jordan could produce its own solar technology, but thought it would be futile as they would never be able to compete with the cheap prices of China and Europe. For example, Feynan EcoLodge got their solar panels from Germany. Others got their products from China. In fact, as of fall 2016, there was only one solar company in Jordan that produced its own solar panels. The fact of the matter is that Jordanian companies cannot yet compete on the global market, and so must rely on foreign companies to further develop solar power usage in the country. Perhaps it would be best for the government to create some trade laws as infant industry protection, to allow Jordanian companies to eventually compete with international ones.

At the same time, Jordan is working to attract foreign renewable energy investment by holding auctions for the rights to develop large renewable energy projects. In addition to the naturally conducive landscape to solar, these auctions have made Jordan an extremely attractive investment for foreign companies. Increased foreign investment has also caused a rise in environmental priorities for Jordan's government, yet another positive feedback loop demonstrating the benefits of a green economy.

Conclusion

In this project, I compare solar power development in two different regions of the world, Jordan and Vermont. Economic motivations and saving money played the largest role in Jordanians decision to invest in solar while the environment and climate change played the largest role in Vermont. However, it is undeniable that with solar development one does not occur at the price of the other, what helps the economy helps the environment and vice versa.

With regards to effect on the future, in both regions solar power investment is expected to have a positive effect on the individual and business. With regards to the future effect on the economy, solar development in both regions

is helping the locals by lowering prices and creating jobs. In Jordan, solar is also expected to have a positive effect by attracting foreign investment. In Vermont, solar is effecting other related industries in a generally positive way. Solar development in both regions also plays a large role in increasing energy independence, benefiting the government and all locals in the region.

With regards to the role of government policies, from both Jordan and Vermont it is undeniable to see that government policies played a large role in the success of solar development. Both Jordan and Vermont have energy goals, economic incentives, and policies that are incredibly friendly toward solar development and have helped to attract private investment. In Jordan, economic incentives created by the government and Jordan's political situation were the main driver for investment. In Vermont, even though I found that environmental motivations played a large role in investment, I believe that government policies also played a major role. It will be interesting to see how solar development in Vermont continues with the new restrictive laws.

"Solar power is becoming the cheapest way to generate electricity."⁵⁴ This statement holds true in regions as different as Jordan, a developing country with the perfect weather conditions for solar and Vermont, a developed region with less than ideal weather conditions. While motivations behind development differed, the success of solar in both regions is undeniable. It is my belief that the government policies, driven by the desire to increase energy security, protect the environment, and develop economically are the main reason for solar's success. From these results, I would argue that this success is possible anywhere in the world as long as governments enact policies that support renewable energy development over any other.

Appendix

Letter of Introduction: Jordan

Dear Participant,

My name is Karina Toy and I am a student from Middlebury College in Vermont, USA, studying the effects of solar power in Jordan. I hope to be able to interview and record you about your expectations and usage of solar power.

Please confirm orally if you agree to be recorded.

Thank you,
Karina Toy

يسعد يومك،
اسمي كارينا توي وأنا طالبة من جامعة ميدلبيري في ولاية فيرمونت في الولايات المتحدة وأنا أدرس تأثير الطاقة الشمسية في الأردن. هل يمكن أن أسألك عن الطاقة الشمسية وهل من الممكن أن أسجل الحوار؟
شكرا جزيلاً،
كارينا توي

Letter of Introduction: Vermont

Dear _____,

My name is Karina Toy and I am a senior at Middlebury College studying the effects of solar power development on Vermont. _____ recommended I speak with you. I hope to be able to interview you about your expectations and usage of solar power. This senior independent research is a culmination of two years of independently designed and conducted research on the political economy of solar power in Jordan and Vermont. The proposed final outcome of my independent work is a comparative essay of economic policies and their effects on solar power development in Jordan and Vermont, the final goal being to get it published in an undergraduate research journal.

In my essay or any future use of this research, you will never be identified by name, only by your relationship with solar (i.e., “homeowner,” “engineer,” “local politician,” etc.). If you have any questions after this interview is over please feel free to contact myself or Matthew Kimble, Chair of the Middlebury Institutional Review Board at irb@middlebury.edu. With your permission, I would like to record this interview.

I look forward to hearing from you,

Thank you,

Karina Toy
International Politics and Economics
Middlebury College '17
Email: ktoy@middlebury.edu
Phone: (206) 856-2651

Interview Questions

Jordan:

- Can you start off by telling me about your experience with solar energy?

Jordan Specific

- It is well known that Jordan has an energy crisis, do you think that solar energy is the best option for Jordan to invest in? Why or why not?
- What is your opinion on Jordan investing in Nuclear Energy?
- What is your opinion on Jordan's National Energy Efficiency Strategy?

Solar Power

- What effect do you expect investing in solar power will have for your business/home?
- What effect do you expect investing in solar power will have for the future of Jordan?

Economic Development

- What drove your decision to invest in solar energy? (saving money, saving the environment, other)
- In your opinion, in what ways will solar power effect Jordan's economy?

Environmental Awareness

- In your opinion, is investing in renewable energy resources important? If so, why?
- What is more important, the economy or the environment?

Vermont:

- Can you start off by telling me about your experience with solar energy?

Vermont Specific

- What are your opinions on solar energy development in Vermont? Is it a good thing or a bad thing? Why?
- What is your opinion on Vermont shutting down its nuclear power plant in 2014?

Solar Power

- What effect do you expect investing in solar power will have for your business/home?
- What effect do you expect investing in solar power will have for the future of Vermont?

Economic Development

- What drove your decision to invest in solar energy? (saving money, saving the environment, other)
- In your opinion, in what ways will solar power effect Vermont's economy?

Environmental Awareness

- In your opinion, is investing in renewable energy resources important? If so, why?
- What is more important, the economy or the environment?

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The Peace Movement:

The Beginning and End of Nuclear Disarmament Campaigning in Vancouver

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Abstract

The Peace Movement was an active political campaign promoting total nuclear disarmament during a period in history where the two most powerful nations in the world seemed to be just one step away from blowing each other up, and, subsequently, the rest of the world. In the last decade of the Cold War, during the 1980s, the Peace Movement in Vancouver, BC, gained an unprecedented amount of traction. However, support for the movement was short-lived as peace activists dwindled in numbers moving into the 1990s and beyond. Today, sentiments ferociously opposed to the existence of nuclear weapons are far and few between. What were the factors that caused the peace movement in Vancouver to fail? Is the legacy it leaves behind one that supports the value of political activism as a powerful agent for change?

Reporter Christine Kim seeks to answer these questions as she pieces together voices of students, professors, and activists from the Vancouver Peace Movement of the 1980s into an hour-long radio documentary about the forgotten legacy of an activism movement in Vancouver that mobilized the entire city.

The Peace Movement: The Beginning and End of Nuclear Disarmament Campaigning in Vancouver

April 27th, 1986 Vancouver BC

Over 115,000 people march from Burrard Bridge to BC Place Stadium in the Vancouver Walk for Peace. People hold up large banners that say phrases like “STOP STAR WARS” and “END THE ARMS RACE” in bold capital letters. The Vancouver Walk for Peace was an Annual Peace March advocating for the end of nuclear arms build-up. It began in 1982 but by 1986 became the largest annual peace event in the entirety of North America. The audio you are hearing in the background right now comes from video footage of the 30th anniversary of the Vancouver Walk for Peace. Vancouver was not alone in holding peace marches in the 1980s, though. The Great Peace March for Global Nuclear Disarmament in November 1986 was another notable peace advocacy event, promoting the elimination of nuclear weapons. It consisted of hundreds of people marching from Los Angeles, California all the way to Washington, D.C.

“We are marching from Los Angeles to Washington, D.C. Our goal is to take a message to the leaders of the world that we want to take down nuclear weapons in the world.”

Sentiments to put an end to the arms race during the 1980s were echoed by people all over the world in countries like Australia and Norway. These sentiments, whether in the form of marches, rallies, or protests to put an end to the nuclear age, amalgamates into what we now call “The Peace Movement of the 1980s.” My name is Christine Kim and you are listening to “The Peace Movement, the Beginning and End of Nuclear Disarmament Campaigning in Vancouver:” a documentary produced for CiTR’s “An Audio Evolution of UBC.”

Despite The Peace Movement having been a popular advocacy campaign in North America and other parts of the western world, it is a curious fact that the sentiments behind the movement have dissipated dramatically since the end of the Cold War. Curious, because nuclear weapons still exist to this day and there are still enough of them to destroy every living thing on the planet. Today, the fervor behind getting rid of nuclear arms programs and research is no more. No longer do we see or hear about political activist groups vying for nuclear disarmament. No longer are the horrors of the aftermath of a nuclear apocalypse or nuclear winter known or talked about among the general public. What was a determined and serious campaign for the end of all nuclear weapons has tacitly become an almost non-existent concern to some and nothing more than a distant memory of something long past to others. But why? Why did the peace movement in Vancouver falter and die so silently and steadily away from the minds of the general public conscience? What happened? To answer this question, I begin by exploring what drove The Peace Movement in the first place. For that, we turn to the historical context in which this campaign thrived.

Part One: Motivations Behind the Peace Movement

The 1980s was a decade in history marked by renewed acts of aggression between the U.S. and the USSR. After a hopeful thawing of relations between the two major superpowers in the 1970s, the Cold War strayed suddenly and rapidly from its previous course of détente. There were many catalytic events that propelled the sudden shift, not the least of which includes the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the inauguration of Ronald Reagan as the 40th President of the United States of America.

Golubev: “So that time dealt with the second escalation of the Cold War because the late 60s and the almost entire 70s were so-called détente.”

This is Alexey Golubev, a PhD student of History at the University of British Columbia. I spoke with him mid-November at a bustling coffee shop to gain some accredited knowledge about the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union during the 1980s.

Golubev: “By the late 70s, there is a growing mistrust between the Soviet Union and the United States and it’s interesting because both sides were interpreting themselves as primarily defensive. So, neither would admit that they would act as an aggressor. But, both rather feared that they would be an object of aggression. In this sense, what we see in the 1980s is a result of mutual misunderstanding.”

Kim: “So, there was a great build-up of defensive arms on both sides during the 1980s?”

Golubev: “Yes, and the reason for that build-up was that both sides feared that the other side would get a strategic advantage and would try to use this strategic advantage in order to attack. So in the 1980s, tensions were on the rise and allegedly in 1983, during one of the NATO operations, the tension among the Soviet leaders was so high that Yuri Andropov had his finger on the red button.”

The specific historical event Alexey is referring to here is what is known as the Able Archer Operation. It is arguably the closest the world has ever gotten to an all out nuclear war, next to the Cuban Missile Crisis that is. Here’s what happened:

Chowdhury: “The lead up to it was after Reagan’s election in 1980. He had taken on quite bellicose rhetoric versus the Soviet Union and he had promised a military build-up.”

This is Professor Arjun Chowdhury. He is a political science professor at UBC who specializes in issues of international security. Professor Chowdhury explains how badly shaken the sense of security was for both the U.S. and the USSR because of misunderstandings and misperceptions during the Able Archer Operation.

Chowdhury: “So what happened in 1983 was the Soviets were quite worried about the possibility of some kind of military attack. And in 1983, a standard NATO exercise called Able Archer went into play in Eastern Europe. The Soviets misperceived it as a possible first-strike and they stepped up their alertness level to a very high degree. At least on the Soviet side, there was some fear that this was the prelude to an all-out attack. It took a while for the Soviets to understand that this was actually just a military exercise.”

Kim: “How did they understand that?”

Chowdhury: “We are not entirely sure as of now. But, they stood down their forces and it took even longer for the Americans to realize that the Soviets were serious. So, this was a case of possible escalation through misunderstanding and misperception because what the Americans and NATO thought was just an exercise, the Soviets thought might be a preliminary strike and they stepped up their alertness levels. So,

that and Cuba are said to be the closest to nuclear confrontation that happened in the Cold War.”

Because state relations were this dangerously packed with suspicions and fears, so too was the outlook of ordinary citizens in Vancouver. Consider listening to a speaker talk about the aftermath of a nuclear bomb hitting Vancouver. Would you feel uncomfortable? Scared? That is exactly what Australian Peace Activist Helen Caldicott did back in November of 1983 during a presentation on the UBC campus.

“What I’m going to do now is drop a bomb on this tent here and it will come in over treetop level. You won’t even see it coming. And then, it will explode with the heat of the sun. It will dig a hole right here, three-quarters of a mile wide and eight hundred feet deep. And it will turn all of us and all of campus and the earth below to radioactive fallout, which will be shot up in the mushroom cloud up into the stratosphere. So, we’ll just turn into radioactive molecules. And out to a radius of six miles from here in all direction, every building will be flattened, every person killed, but many of them will be vaporized. In Hiroshima, there are photographs of shadows of people. That’s all that was left of them: shadows. Out to twenty miles from here in all directions, every person will be killed or lethally injured. Now, the injuries are specific. Winds are created of up to five hundred miles an hour. A hurricane is one hundred and twenty miles an hour. The winds just literally pick people up and turn them into rockets, missiles, traveling at a hundred miles an hour until they hit the nearest solid object and die. The overpressures enter the nose and mouth and get into the lungs and rupture the lungs. You’re dead. They rupture the tympanic membranes, producing deafness. They popcorn the windows, and the windows then fracture into millions of shards of flying glass at a hundred miles an hour, which will decapitate people and produce the most shocking lacerations and hemorrhages everywhere. Then, the burns . . .”

Helen goes on and does not spare the audience one single, gruesome detail. For us, this explanation most likely does not strike as much fear and genuine anxiety as it would have to those physically present during that presentation back in 1983. In fact, Min Price and Jocelyn Sampson, hosts of a CiTR radio talk show called “Youth Focus” featured a segment in 1984 entitled “Youth and the Peace Movement.” Take a listen.

“In BC, Susan Hargreaves, a researcher for the Public Educators for Peace Society has paralleled the American studies. In June of 1984, Ms. Hargreaves distributed questionnaires to 730 Burnaby students in grades 5, 7 and 9–12. Of the responding students, 80% feared nuclear death. Of the 5th–9th graders, more than 92% had known of nuclear weapons by age 13. Seventy-nine percent believed that a nuclear war

would occur in their lifetime. Although it is uncertain what effect the threat nuclear disaster is having on young people, the implications are obvious. Feelings of despair and anger contribute to a reluctance to form close relationships, work hard in school, and plan for the future.”

To bring these figure and numbers into a more personal perspective, I talked to Allen Sens, another professor at the University of British Columbia in the Department of Political Science. He was a student at UBC from the year 1982 to 1988 and he described for me what it was like attending UBC in the 1980s.

Sens: “There was a great deal of fear, a great deal of concern. It was the great existential concern of the day. There really was a sense that a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union was, if not highly likely, it was certainly a possibility. And, there was even some deep pessimism about the future. Remember, this was the 1980s. This was the arrival of Ronald Reagan onto the scene in the United States, and what some have called the “Second Cold War” followed after a period of relatively stable, reasonable relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. That all seemed to go downhill in the 1980s with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a subsequent increase in rhetoric, an increase in the arms race, the development of new weapons systems that were considered destabilizing and threatening. So, students really felt that. Even for students that really weren’t engaged in The Peace Movement, it was sort of an overall movement of fear about the direction the Cold War was heading and the feeling that a war was perhaps more likely than it had been since the Cuban Missile Crisis.”

Naturally, such intense fear fed into an intense desire for change. Due to the pervasive prevalence of nuclear weapons in the hands of the two most powerful nations in the world, and the anxiety that was attached to them given contentious foreign relations, Vancouver peace activists during the 1980s agreed that the nuclear arms buildup needed to be stopped. Thus, the backdrop to the advocacy campaign that was The Peace Movement, at least here in Vancouver during the 1980s was a pervasive public mood of anxiety and fear.

Part Two: The Debate Over Deterrents

Peace activists, galvanized behind the advocacy campaign, dedicated to seeing a complete disposal of all nuclear arsenals. However, in the 1980s, such a prospect went directly against the defense policies held by the superpowers. The arms race between the U.S. and the Soviet Union during the 1980s was based upon the theory of deterrence, and more specific to the Cold War, a doctrine of mutually assured destruction. Before getting into deterrence theory, first we take a deeper look into mutually assured destruction.

Alexey Golubev: “The doctrine of the mutually-assured destruction means that, if there is a war, this is the kind of war that is impossible to win, because both sides had so great nuclear arsenals that even the first

strike wouldn't give an advantage to any side. That's why for instance one of the important treaties signed in the 1980s was the treaty that explicitly banned the creation of anti-missile systems."

Kim: "Anti-missile systems? What is that?"

Golubev: "So, a system of interceptor missiles that would allow, in theory, to intercept nuclear missiles, nuclear ballistic missiles, and never let them reach the American continent, for example. If you have an effectively functioning anti-missile system, it means that the doctrine of the mutually assured destruction no longer works. It means that you might think, as a strategic analyst in Washington or wherever, that you might strike first, and intercept rockets launched in retaliation, and in this sense, the possession of this kind of anti-missile system would undermine this doctrine. And this doctrine has been fundamental kind of force that prevented any military engagement of the American and Soviet forces during the Cold War. It was perhaps the most important kind of, impeding factor, the factor that never led the third World War to break out."

As Alexey pointed out, mutually assured destruction ensured that the U.S. would not risk a nuclear strike on the Soviet Union for fear of a retaliatory nuclear attack. For both the U.S. and the Soviet Union, it was their capabilities in firepower that they relied upon to scare and deter the other from attacking. Trying to dissuade a state from a particular course of action through threats, like a nuclear attack, is what deterrence is. Deterrence is the underlying concept behind mutually assured destruction. To help us in our understanding of deterrence, Professor Chowdhury provides a helpful analogy:

"Think of two people, and this is the logic thrown out in the U.S. to justify the carrying of weapons, if somebody just has their fist, you're more likely to provoke them, to fight with them. Why? Because there's limited damage they can inflict on you. You know, if they have a gun, you're very unlikely to confront them; you're very unlikely to rob someone who has a gun, compared to the same person who's unarmed. So the basic idea here is, if the weapons are very destructive, the costs of war are very high. Nuclear weapons raise the cost of war to unimaginable levels. And therefore, that should make people think twice before fighting. So that's why you think of deterrence working, why, because the costs of war are so high people don't want to fight. They are better off talking to each other and figuring out a bargain that saves themselves the cost of fighting. Now if you're disarmed, you may not have nuclear weapons, but that means the costs of war are not very high. Now the costs of war are not high, then you become more and more likely to get into border disputes, you get more likely to get into smaller conflicts, which can then escalate into something bigger. But if you think that, oh my God, there's a possibility that if stuff gets out of hand

there'll be a nuclear weapon landing on one of our cities, you don't get into the initial fight."

Kim: "This wasn't a very popular understanding back in the 1980s, right?"

Chowdhury: "So, there was debate, I'll put it this way, there was much more debate over it than there is now. Now it's kind of taken for granted. Now it's taken for granted that yeah, you should have a general level of stability with deterrence. And that's because we think, oh, the more costly war is, the less likely. The other concern that was there though was what happens in the case of accidental nuclear war. And (sorry) this theory does not give us much comfort for that. For example, if, say you have some kind of error, some kind of misperception, and you have a nuclear exchange, then things can get out of hand very quickly. And if that happens, then the costs of war, even when neither side wants to fight it, will be unacceptably high. And through the Cold War that was a reasonable fear, as most of your confrontations had a fair amount of misperception and error, you think of the Cuban Missile Crisis, you think of the exercise in 1983 called Able Archer. So that was another fear, which is less of a fear now."

Thus, regardless of how effective we accept deterrence to be now in preventing large-scale, high-cost wars, deterrence was, like it still is today, vulnerable to fail through human error. This concern was simply magnified because the consequence of a mere fluke or slight mishap among the Soviet and U.S. generals during the Cold War was this: nuclear Armageddon. Nothing more, nothing less. As Professor Chowdhury pointed out, such flukes and mishaps were not at all that far-fetched, given events like the Cuban Missile Crisis and Able Archer.

So, let's summarize. Bigger guns mean less conflict, but especially in the case of the Cold War, bigger guns also meant harsher consequences if anything goes wrong. And so the debate lies in whether states should keep the big guns to avoid the big risks, understanding that getting rid of the big guns would lead to less risk but also more conflict. Confused? You're not alone.

Sens: "Few things have as much complexity as arms control."

If Professor Sens, who has a profession in teaching topics like this, says it's a complex topic, it's a complex topic.

Part Three: The Dialogue Within the Peace Movement

Do we overhaul a seemingly unreliable system of deterrence and mutually assured destruction or do we keep faith and just pray the odds are in our favor? Are there ways to partially improve the unstable circumstances of the Cold War? It is these questions that were being thrown back and forth in the 6th General Assembly of World Council of Churches in November 1983. A range of peace activists from all over the globe including Randolph Forsberg, John

Hadgood, Helen Caldicott, and Metropolitan Gregoris gathered at the University of British Columbia to talk about what needed to be done.

Forsberg: "The first step as you might guess is the nuclear freeze. The very first thing that we need to do to begin the process of moving toward a stable disarmed peace is to stop producing counterforce nuclear weaponry which is designed to back up conventional wars, while those conventional wars themselves are not defensive wars but interventionary wars. This is clearly the most absurd, insecure, imposing, construction of weaponry and type of military strategy there could be. That we should draw the nuclear tripwire tighter, by building nuclear forces designed to attack conventional military forces putting pressure on the two sides, both, to use their forces or lose them. That is the first thing that must be stopped."

Hadgood: "There has to be some system of deterrence in the world, whether this is nuclear or not. So, we do not escape from the problem of deterrence by saying that we do not like nuclear weapons. And it seems to me that the fruitful question in this area is not how can we get rid of this or that, but how can we make deterrence be more stable but we have to face the fact that there must be some deterrence."

Caldicott: "Britain's got nuclear weapons. Why on earth Britain has them I don't know; I think she still wants to be a great empire and can't understand why she isn't. And then India has tested one and South Africa has almost certainly gotten one and they say Israel has about 200. And so, that's called lateral proliferation of nuclear weapons, which destabilizes the balance of terror built up by the superpowers. And by 2000 there will be many many countries who can have nuclear weapons. The only way to stop it is by superpowers to start behaving themselves. They signed the non-proliferation treaty in 1968, promising that if no one else built nuclear weapons they would start to disarm bilaterally and they've done exactly the opposite. They can't please the world they have no moral leg to stand on without behaving responsibly and like adults themselves and they behave like children."

Gregoris: "We have agreed that the use of nuclear weapons is a crime against humanity. Everybody is agreed. We say; if the U.S. *Applause* Even if the other speakers like president Regan and Menachem Begin spoke in the assembly wouldn't oppose that. But, if the use of nuclear weapons is morally evil, then the intention to use is also morally evil, and therefore the doctrine of deterrence is not morally acceptable. This is the position which Phillip Porter has taken and which I think the World Council Central Committee has taken in the general debate that has ensued but whether the assembly has taken that position is one of the key issues but this would mean that we would condemn not only use, intention to use, but also

manufacture, stockpiling, testing, all the rest, trading, all these will have to be condemned as morally evil.”

Christine: About a year after this assembly was held, Vancouver peace activists of the younger generation spoke freely on CITR's youth focus program. They spoke specifically to the obstacles for youth involvement in the peace movement. Seventeen-year-old Negril Rogers, graduate of Vancouver's ideal school;

Rogers: “Lots of my friends, lots of people I've talked to have had nightmares about nuclear war. I think part of that is due to the fact for quite a few years now, the peace movement has concentrated on filing people in on the dangers of nuclear war which is good because it mobilizes people and makes people aware of what's going on but it has to be followed up by a means to take action and that I think has been lacking, there have been annual peace marches and stuff like that but hasn't been the constant opportunity to take action which is needed to relieve people to from feeling like sort of a pensive feeling where there is nothing they can do and there is things above their heads. So they haven't been taught to take personal responsibility and to take personal action and that is something people have to be taught and have to realize that if things are going to happen they have to do them.”

Jennifer Kinloch, Member of Vancouver's Youth for Peace action;

Kinloch: “Well it's really important not to be daunted by the information and sort of say, “oh I don't know enough I can't get involved.” The peace movement needs more and more people and more new and fresh energy to get involved so that we can be effective and that once you do get involved you begin to realize what you do and don't know, where your strengths lie. Many groups including Vancouver Youth for Peace Action have bibliographies that shorten those long lists of things you have to read to get informed about so there are shortcuts. And in speaking also with people who are informed in the peace movement and going to public events it makes the process of becoming more informed that much easier.”

Matthew Speir, treasurer of the Peace Education Coalition:

Speir: “When there are models, namely parents who are involved or concerned, those children usually show some interest and some concern themselves. However, most parents are not involved in this. In fact many parents, I don't know how many or what percentage, choose not to think about it. They push it out of their consciousness and they engage in what Robert Jay Lifton, the Harvard psychiatrist, calls psychic numbing, they allow themselves to be numbed because of the anxiety, which this kind of a problem creates. And examples of that include a parent saying, “well let's not talk about that it's too horrible to talk about,” “oh lets not even consider that as a conversation item

lets change the subject.” In other words, it’s a real concern to avoid considering the issue. I think there are a lot of adults who are in in those shoes. I think this is an obstacle.”

From obstacles ranging from apathy to feelings of being overwhelmed, Vancouver youths faced many challenges to getting involved with the peace movement during the 1980s. However, a common motivation that drove youths to join and galvanize behind the peace movement was a frustration and a growing sense of distrust in political figures.

Twenty-three-year-old Chris Corless, member of UBC’s Student’s for Mutual Peace and Disarmament speaking on youth focus;

Corless: “This is at UBC—I just happened to be walking through the student union building and they had a display setup. And I guess the issue had been in the back of my mind, that a-lot of these headlines had been in the papers and I was a little concerned and I just started walking through the display. I guess the thing that moved me the most was one quote I believe it was by General Graham, who happened to pass through Vancouver quite recently promoting the Star Wars proposal. There was a quote attributed to him where he was saying people had nothing to worry about if a nuclear bomb was launched. All they had to do was just take 5 minutes to walk to the nearest lilac bush and they could hide behind it to be protected from a nuclear bomb. I thought that was just so ludicrous and yet that scared me because here was a man that was a very strong influence in policy-making and so on. And it made me realize I guess, that a-lot of these people who are in the decision making process and who are making the decisions affecting our present time and also our future lives; here was a man who really didn’t understand the issue. I knew the effects of the nuclear bombs were just so incredible that millions of lilac bushes couldn’t protect you. The young people must come to understand that you cannot just trust in experts and unfortunately you cannot trust in our representatives the politicians. Many of the politicians are not very well informed on the issues. I don’t mean to really strongly criticize them and say they’re a bunch of bumbling idiots and that sort of thing. But I understand that their viewpoint in that a politician becomes elected and is elected on a number of issues and yet concern themselves with a number of issues. And there is so much information that many politicians don’t have the time or energy or effort to inform themselves on issues and they have to rely on other experts. But often they make the decisions based on being misinformed. So I think it’s very important for youth to become involved and gradually become informed of the issues and make the decisions for themselves and start becoming involved in the democratic process. No one else is going to do that for them, they have to do it themselves.”

Someone who had wholeheartedly agreed with Chris' views is Australian peace activist Helen Caldicott. She is the one who spoke at UBC during the World Council of Churches 6th general assembly and said this;

Caldicott: "What I'm going to do now is drop a bomb on this tent here and it will come here over treetop level you won't even see it coming."

And this;

Caldicott: "Britain's got nuclear weapons—why on earth Britain has them I don't know, I think she still wants to be a great empire."

Also, this;

Caldicott: "I spent an hour and a quarter with President Regan, alone with his daughter. He's not very bright. I say that because clinically as a physician it worries me immensely. Because the two people in America who have the authority to press the button are called the national command authority, the NCA. They are the president and the secretary of defense. I think the secretary of defense's IQ a little higher than Regan's but he doesn't know very much about defense. In fact, a reporter from the LA times went to Betchel, where Weinberger used to work, you know Bechtel builds nuclear reactors. And he interviewed George Shultz and Chester Weinberger and both of them independently said you could ask me anything you like, but don't ask me about foreign affairs or about defense because I don't know anything about those subjects. So we're in the hands of incompetent people who don't know anything. I repeat, who don't know anything. Practically everything president Regan told me was inaccurate. And when I tried to correct him he didn't really hear and when I tried to debate with him he had no background knowledge to support any statement he made. And he is the person who, if there's a nuclear war, is going to run to the helicopter, fly to Andrews air force base and then go up in the airborne command and fly in an airplane above the nuclear war as the explosions are taking place underneath and direct the nuclear war by computers. He said the other day he doesn't understand anything about computers. He doesn't. He's never done any science. Can you imagine? That man has four and a half billion people in the palm of his hand. I was there on the day the MX was defeated last year and in the halls of the Congress the Pentagon had 1500 lobbyists. They were for Raytheon, Rockwell international, GT, all making parts of the weapons and lots of subcontractors for the weapons who make screws for the MX and all sorts of things. The halls were filled with these characters they were like ants. I felt like bopping them on the head because they were medically conjure indicated. Where were the people? Where were the people and their children? They weren't there! Why weren't they there? Because they're very comfortable; all they care about is driving

their cars and getting their air conditioning going and I'm not talking about you, but the majority of the people in the United States are like that. They don't give a damn they don't even vote! Now, you don't have a democracy unless you vote. You don't have a democracy unless you accept responsibility. And there is not a working democracy. People in other countries are dying to have a democracy. In Afghanistan, right, South Africa, el Salvador, all over the world, and we've got one and we violate it. All of us."

Helen Caldicott was arguably the most outspoken and internationally recognized and peace activist within the peace movement in the 1980s. She featured in an Oscar winning short film called "If you love this planet." She's been awarded 21 honorary doctoral degrees and was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize in 1985. I had the honor of speaking with Helen Caldicott over Skype this past November;

Caldicott: "Here we are"

Kim: "Hi I apologize I do not actually have a webcam on me. Would it be alright if we—"

Caldicott: "Absolutely, I'll turn the picture off because we'll get a better reception. Okay lets go"

Our conversation progressed more smoothly after that slight technical difficulty and I started off by asking her about what initially got her involved in the peace movement;

Caldicott: "I was practicing global preventative medicine. I went to Russia in 1979 with a group of Americans, Quakers, and I learned that America was going to deploy cruise missiles in Europe which are undetectable and would end arms control by satellite verification and the Americans were going to- purging 2 missiles in Germany that hit Moscow in 3 minutes and I thought my god. And I went back to Harvard where I was on the faculty and thought I just can't keep practicing individual medicine, keeping these children with cystic fibrosis alive when all of the worlds children are at risk of nuclear war. That's when I was impelled to leave Harvard and to work full time on this political work to practice global preventative medicine to save all the children on the planet."

Kim: "It was that realization—"

Caldicott: "Yes it was, that was the turning point for me. During the 80s I led the peace movement really with the help of a publicist in Hollywood who put me on lots of television for free and worked for me for free and in Vogue and Life and Time. If you educate the public, that's political power. When I started in 1978 most Americans said it

was better to be dead than red, in other words they'd rather be dead in nuclear war than be communists and I thought "these people must be psychotic." So we started describing what nuclear war meant for the health, dropping bombs on the cities and they said, "oh my god nuclear war is bad for our health." So from that time on, they became involved and they learned so. And to get 80% of people behind you is enormous political power and I would always quote president Jefferson in America to say: "an informed democracy will behave in responsible fashion" so I would postulate or state that your democracy is totally uninformed about its enormous danger to the end of creation, as is America and every other country in the world."

The danger Helen is talking about here is the persistent threat of nuclear annihilation that Helen believes has not diminished in urgency in the least.

Caldicott: "The risk of nuclear war now is more pertinent than it ever was during the cold war because of two things. A: nobody knows that the weapons are still on hair trigger alert, ready to be launched with a three minute decision time by Putin or Obama. And B: because no one knows and C: because of the first time since the cold war, America and Russia are confronting each other militarily both in the Ukraine and in Syria and they're practicing nuclear war games and they probably put their nuclear weapons on a higher than normal state of alert. Things are really, really serious and no ones talking about it, including your politicians, including Trudeau."

Kim: "Does almost seem as though deterrence has been working in—"

Caldicott: "No it hasn't. If we have a nuclear war there's going to be no one around to write and say that deterrence doesn't work. we've just been bloody lucky. Bloody lucky to have gotten to this stage and if you read the literature Christine and you should do that, you'll be amazed at the number of close calls we've had, you know within minutes of pressing a button. Honestly, you know I've done the history and I've written it in my book, ohh I can't remember what its called, *The New Nuclear Danger*, yes. I mean if you look at the history I mean I really don't understand how we're still here. I don't, I don't understand how we're still here."

Kim: "Right so, its not an improvement until all nuclear weapons have been—disarmed—"

Caldicott: "Yeah"

Kim: "Right its total nuclear disarmament."

I was surprised to hear Helen speak so strongly about the need for a commitment to total nuclear disarmament then, and more significantly, now. If the

peace movement died away, even though the issues that propelled it to be still remained, did that mean Helen thought of the peace movement as a failure?

Kim: "Do you think that the peace movement has failed? Seeing as—"

Caldicott: "Yes"

Part 4: Why the Peace Movement Failed

Caldicott: "Yes, why? Um because there's no peace movement now, Christine. The peace movement died in 1989 when the cold war ended and everyone dropped their bundle because we thought, obviously, that the major nuclear powers would get rid of the weapons and they haven't. We thought, I mean we really did think, all of a sudden and the people in America were talking about a peace dividend; instead of spending all this money on weapons we'll spend it on peace. But you know we had gutless leaders and they didn't do that and take up the cajole of peace. And so here we are now, that's what the problem is, because nobody knows that the situation is more dangerous now than ever before. Yes the peace movement died; there is virtually no peace movement, now in the world."

For Helen Caldicott, the peace movement that she heralded with vigor and passion was a failure. It was a failure because it died away prematurely in her view and without having achieved its goals.

Professor Allan Sens echoes the fact that with the cold war having ended by the early 1990s, nuclear arms control was a topic simply not on the minds of the public as pervasively any longer.

Sens: "It's just not as prominent an issue. We can argue that it should be. But it's just not. Um, so right away I think a key difference is that you don't have the same amount of focus on nuclear weapons today as you did back in the 1980s, the fear, the threat of nuclear war is lower now, dramatically lower at least in a North American context than it was during the Cold War. So I think that's a big initial piece. I think there's also been a great deal of neglect on the subject of nuclear weapons. Um, and as a result I think the dialogue on nuclear weapons today is much more basic than it was in the 1980s because during the 1980s even if you know weren't interested in nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons were interested in you. Right? It was just everyone had some basic idea about what deterrence was and how nuclear war, what it would mean and so on. And now there's just, there's just less of that background and level of knowledge so you're starting I think at a lower baseline of basic knowledge for the most part and amongst today's population, it's not just students, that's broadly speaking. I think that's the case. So I think that, in that way, the dialogue has changed. I think also with a decline of the immediacy of the threat of nuclear war,

I think what we've seen as a bit of diffusion of the dialogue on arms control so the big arms control discussions over the last 10–20 years after the cold war has been proliferation.”

The topic of discussion around nuclear weapons today has changed, like Professor Sens said. To Professor Arjun Chowdhury, the discussion has changed quite significantly. Before explaining his perspective on exactly what the topics of discussion are surrounding nuclear weapons today, Professor Chowdhury first elaborates on two major differences between now and the 1980s. One of these differences, contrary to Helen Caldicott's beliefs, asserts the efficacy of deterrence;

Caldicott: “You can think of two broad differences between now and the 1980s. The first is that we've had another 30 years of nuclear non-use. And there's some reason to believe that or some evidence for the proposition that nuclear deterrence stops people fighting. The link between nuclear weapons and war is much less direct than people assumed in the late 70s early 80s and at the time people thought the cold war won't end unless it ends in an actual shooting war. But it turned out the Soviet Union folded for quite different reasons and deterrence was not breached. Deterrence worked. So that would be one reason—the argument that nuclear deterrence works. The second is the idea that the people you want to give up nuclear weapons are very unlikely to give them up. So disarmament, unilateral disarmament, is really not going to help much. Because now the concern is that regimes of that like Kim Jong Un in North Korea, and even if the United States gives up nuclear weapons, it is very unlikely that Kim Jong Un would reciprocate. The idea of disarmament in the cold war was to get both sides to disarm. It is quite clear that even if the United States and China and Russia disarms, North Korea will not give up its nuclear weapons. It is quite clear that if India disarms, Pakistan is very unlikely to give up its nuclear weapons. So disarmament is not a solution, for the problem of nuclear war that it was seen to be in the 1980s and secondly, going back to my first point it is not clear that disarmament in the abstract is a solution for war. Deterrence can quite easily work to prevent war.”

To add to these two points, Professor Chowdhury elaborates on the biggest fears surrounding nuclear weapons today and how none of these current fears can be currently dealt with through a policy of nuclear disarmament.

Chowdhury: “There are two issues there that people are worried about. One is the fear of the escalation of existing regional conflicts. The Korean peninsula—if you get into a shooting war it will escalate. South Asia—India and Pakistan might escalate to a nuclear war. So that's fear one: regional conflicts going nuclear. Fear two is proliferation and nuclear weapons winding up in the hands of non-state actors. So that

would be something like a nuclear weapon goes missing or is sold to Al Qaeda, ISIS, somebody like that and then that is used, it could be a small weapon but that is used by terrorists in a major urban center which would obviously inflate tens of thousands of fatalities. So those are the two major nuclear fears. And again you can see disarmament is unlikely to bring the odds of either of those down. Because disarmament, that is getting people who are likely to use or proliferate nuclear weapons to give up the nuclear weapons that they have, that is your Kim Jong Un or the government of Pakistan, is very low. Even if everyone else says they will give up our nuclear weapons, those regimes are unlikely to and those regimes are seen as the most likely sources of proliferation. The current concerns of regional war going nuclear and nuclear proliferation are unlikely to be addressed by disarmament.”

Thus, part of the reason why the Peace Movement dissipated is firstly because interest by state leaders and the general public declined dramatically with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Additionally however, the actual issues surrounding nuclear weapons today has shifted away from nuclear disarmament as a credible solution. That being said, simply because the Peace Movement subsided, does not mean the value of the impact the peace movement had then cannot be recognized and felt now. The peace movement in Vancouver contributed to the larger international peace movement of the 1980s and this larger international peace movement was a major source of pressure for the Regan administration in trying to find peaceful diplomatic ways to solve the cold war. Take a listen to this clip from Youth Focus:

“Is the peace movement making a difference? Those involved see the movement as a way to increase a level of public consciousness concerning the nuclear threat. And in turn, this public awareness has been effective in educating, pressuring, and changing the policies of government representatives.”

Chris Korles: “There have been government officials who have credited the peace movement as pressuring; well for example, the superpowers back to the bargaining table. For pressuring, for example, the Regan administration to initially to go to the bargaining table in Geneva in 1981 I believe it was or 82. When he first came in, he was very against arms control. Actually many people in the administration are still against arms control, they didn’t even want to talk, but the peace movement put pressure on the Regan administration and he realized a lot of people were concerned about it. And now he’s begun to address these issues and he developed himself in that he’s changed in a way in realizing a lot of people are very concerned and I think it has been pretty effective.”

Along the same lines, Alexia Gollebev reflects upon the integral context the global peace movement gave to negotiations between the Regan and Gorbachev governments during the 1980s;

Gollebev: "I think that was an important context of decision making in the United States. In the case of protest movements we saw the ability of western societies to organize themselves in the ways that were not entirely predicted or initiated by the government. So the protest movement as a sign of social self or galvinization and as a form of social self organization it pursued very different aims from those who that weren't on the political agenda, at least for conservative politicians. In this sense, and since we are dealing with participatory politics, those political opinions and those political sentiments had to be taken into account so I am not sure if Thatcher or Regan would refer to these peace movements like openly. But I would say that as democratic leaders, that wasn't their electors, but that was their populations and they had to look for compromises. In the sense, the reason why president Regan was so eager to meet Gorbachev was, it wouldn't be the core, protest movements but they were the conscious to that. In this sense we can speculate that if it hand been for these sorts of marches protests and demonstrations, the negotiation process would probably have been much more complicated and or at least more reluctant."

Of course, with the disillusion of the USSR in 1991 the need for constant pressure on the U.S. government to make peace with the USSR was no longer there. However there is something to be said to the impact the peace movement had in pressuring great powers like the U.S. toward peaceful negotiation in the first palace. Such an impact, only seen when considering the historical context that the peace movement gave in the 1980s, is a testament to what self-mobilized grassroots movements can achieve. Often times, as citizens of a representative government, we can undervalue the democratic freedoms we have to protest by underestimating the impact our protests can make. This idea is perhaps no more appreciated than when you consider the alternative of inaction. Professor Chowdhury;

Chowdhury: "I'm from India and I was in India when the nuclear testing occurred but in 1998 and overall there was not anything like that kind of peace movement. There were some objections but they were marginal, and this, despite the fact that nuclear weapons in India, do not add to Indians security in any way it just led to Pakistan nuclearizing faster and nuclear weapons in Pakistan are very dangerous for India. If something goes wrong, it's right on India's border."

Kim: "So that was a bad choice by the state too."

Chowdhury: "It was a tremendously bad choice by the Indian government. They gained nothing; they already had a conventional advantage. What they achieved was to just to raise the odds that some kind of horrible accident is going to get visited on India."

Kim: "So the protests should have been greater?"

Chowdhury: “There should have been, there should have been more. But you had very marginal protests and if you look back, 17 years all that they have achieved they have not gained anything in terms of Pakistan policy by getting nuclear weapons. If anything they just emboldened Pakistan to support these non-state actors they have frequently been supporting and there’s nothing the Indian government can do about it. It can build as many nuclear weapons as it wants, it has about 100 give or take, but they’re useless. So this was a really bad decision and it did not see anything like the popular opposition that it should have. So I’m not seeing the kind of popular opposition to nuclearization that the 80s might have led to. It’s almost like the sentiment of the 1980s ended there. Certainly in a place like India—India doesn’t need nuclear weapons but you know, there was no opposition there were few protests in the street but one of the protestors Arundhati Roy who’s a wonderful writer, she’s the author of the god of small things she was shouted down in a public meeting where she was saying this is a bad idea. And she made a very valid point where she said; India has all kinds of development issues: poverty, farming, debt, etc. and this is a complete waste of resources for the government of India which is a valid point but its not a point that a lot of people supported. Which in my view is unfortunate but that’s where it was. There was nothing like the peace movement. I mean that’s where it was. I wish there was more scrutiny of people in the street trying to get things spent properly and the nuclear weapons were apart of that and that’s my reason. I think the peace movement is not directly relevant for India but something—

Kim: “Kind of the spirit behind the peace movement.”

Therein lies the need for movements just like the peace movement. Movements to wake and galvanize the people of a democratic nation toward action. It is these movements that will paint the backdrop to nations decisions in the short and long run. It is these movements that are the defining markers of a democratic people and state. The success in the peace movement of the 1980s here in Vancouver lies in the very fact that regardless of outcome it was and remains to this day an emblem of self-mobilized political activism. The only true failure there could’ve been for is if it had not been at all.

Thank you for listening to “The Peace Movement: The beginning and end of nuclear disarmament campaigning in Vancouver.” A documentary produced for CiTR’s *An Audio Evolution of UBC*.

The Audio Version of the Podcast can be listened to here: https://drive.google.com/file/d/oBx1OUO_rwc9AZC1HZXpWUjdWNkU/view?usp=sharing.

Indianness and the Diaspora: *Seeing the World through Bollywood*

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Abstract

This paper examines Bollywood's representation of the Indian diaspora over a thirty-year period from post-independence to the period following the 1990s liberalization of India to explore how ideas of Indianness and India's relation to the world have changed. It uses the lenses of consumption, gender, and family in its analysis to conclude that there is a movement from a model of East and West as unmediatable opposites to one where Indianness can exist in the framework of globalization and territorial displacement as long as one is adequately committed to that goal.

Introduction

*Mera joota hai japaani/ Yeh patloon englistani/
Sar pe lal topi roosi/ Phir bhi dil hai Hindustani*

*My shoes are Japanese/ This trouser is English/
On my head is a red Russian hat/ But my heart is Indian*
—Shree 420 (1955)

The sentiment echoed in this song of an “unchanging, enduring Indian spirit, underneath a superficial garb of Westernization” is emblematic of larger national anxieties about maintaining Indianness under the pressure of globalization.¹ From a 1955 film, this popular song shows both that the concerns about consumption and global cultural flows are long-standing and that Bollywood is able to crystallize such issues.

Bollywood films are watched by millions of people, both within India and overseas, and for many non-South Asians they are a major source of information about South Asia. Conversely, their representation of the world outside South Asia is useful in understanding how the world is envisioned in the popular Indian imagination. Films are required to “capture the imagination of the spectator and also address them in a pertinent way” to ensure the economic success of the film.² Given the cultural importance of Bollywood, the relationship between the Indian diaspora and Bollywood has received much scholarly attention. However, most of the work concerning this relationship examined the ways in which the diaspora relates to and consumes Bollywood

and the meanings created by that consumption. In this paper I plan to flip this dynamic and examine the representation of the diaspora in Bollywood to better understand how Indians in India imagined the Indian diaspora, and themselves, over the course of the second half of the twentieth century. Through a study of Bollywood's representation of the diaspora over time, I hope to uncover changes in the way Indians have viewed themselves in the post-WWII era. Diasporic representation is a useful way to study this because the idea of "Indianness" is made most explicit in these films through the use of comparisons. Diasporic Indians and their values are placed in contrast to foreigners or to non-diasporic Indians, usually in an aim to elevate one as practicing true "Indianness." Additionally, the diaspora is also a way to understand where India places itself in relation to the world since it is one of the clearly visible ways in which India connects with the globe.

This paper will analyze three immensely popular Bollywood films about the diaspora, from three different time periods, as primary sources in the context of Indian history. With an accompanying discussion of changes in historical reality, it will draw conclusions about the reasons behind the changes in the representation of the diaspora, and consequently in the popular perception of ideas of Indianness. Bollywood's changing representations correspond to historical, economic, and cultural changes that India experienced during this period. The three main areas the paper concentrates on within the changing representation of the diaspora are the consumptive relationship between India and the West, the role of the Indian woman, and the ideal of the Indian family. While all fall loosely under the heading of social relations, these three areas most clearly articulate the way in which perceptions of Indianness change with shifting modes of consumption. Consumption is the driving force that gives rise to anxieties about change that are often expressed in terms of gender and family and so forms an important mode of analysis throughout. The paper explores how and why the representation of the diaspora changed by concentrating on three moments: the post-independence period, the period immediately after the 1990s liberalization, and a decade afterwards, that is, the early twenty-first century. Bollywood, the largest film industry in India, is technically defined as the industry based in Bombay, though it more broadly refers to all Hindi language commercial cinema. I use three Bollywood films, and exclude Indian regional cinema, independent cinema, and non-Indian South Asian cinema. This is because Bollywood has proven to have the greatest impact as the most popular and enduring representation of mainstream South Asian culture both in South Asia and abroad, playing a significant role in national identity formation.

Bollywood films may not reflect reality, but they do create a standard of acceptability for the viewership. They play a vital role in "creating, legitimising and entrenching identities."³ So while there is no way of conclusively knowing whether people identify with what they see on screen, the mass appeal of Bollywood ensures that they do understand it to be normatively acceptable behavior. Any significant deviation from the norm would most likely result

in low ticket sales, making it a failed commercial project. The films discussed here were all immensely successful and were predicted to be so, fitting into a model of using tried and tested actors and plot lines, making them trustworthy sources for an examination of Indian culture.

Many scholars agree that Bollywood has tried to “invent India and reify “Indian” culture and traditions,” and this is perhaps done most blatantly in movies featuring the Indian diaspora.⁴ The idea of Indianness is invoked in many Bollywood movies, usually through a prescriptive reference to Indian society or Indian cultural values. In the representation of the diaspora, though, these invocations are particularly numerous and explicit. Diasporic Indians are frequently compared to non-diasporic Indians and to the ideal of Indianness, and rarely also to Westerners, revealing in this process the dominant idea of what constitutes Indianness. While Indian values, usually figured as Hindu values, are held as superior throughout and constructed in comparison to the West, the relationship between Western and Indian values changes significantly as Indians’ relation to India and to the world changes.

Returning to Indianness

The idea of Indianness, which is unarguably presented as a virtue, is defined by tropes such as respectability and modesty, Hinduism, patriotism hinging on cultural elitism, and upholding of family and community values over individualism. The defining factors of Indianness remain fairly consistent over the thirty-three-year time period this paper discusses, with a return to Indianness being a solution to all the characters’ problems. What changes is how a return to Indianness is defined, with films in the 1970s asserting that a physical return to India is necessary, with dedication to service to the motherland, and later films in the 1990s suggest that it is possible to embrace Indianness while living abroad as long as one is adequately dedicated to the principle. In the 2000s films propose a mediation of the Indian-Western dichotomy that allows one to embrace elements of both identities. Increasing globalization, and specifically the economic liberalization of the 1990s allowed for this change since it made it possible for one to be Indian without residing in India through increased cultural, consumptive, and monetary flows.

East and West as Unmediatable Opposites

Purab aur Paschim (East and West), released in 1970, is one of the first Bollywood films shot abroad and the first one focusing on the diaspora.⁵ It opens with a sequence set in pre-independence India with the British colonial government searching for an Indian freedom fighter who is then captured and killed due to his neighbor’s treachery. After a short sequence sweeping through the progress India makes during the post-independence period, the film’s main narrative begins in earnest, showing the freedom fighter’s grown son, Bharat (Manoj Kumar), going to London to study. The bulk of the film then

deals with Bharat's experiences in London, including interactions with diasporic Indians, and his successful attempts to connect the wayward, Westernized diasporic Indians, including his love interest, Preeti (Saira Banu), to their Indian roots. These connections are created by introducing them to Hinduism and the purity of Indian values while in London, and completed through a physical return to India. The physical return to India is important since it reverses the "brain drain" that the film posits as a problem. This reflected popular opinion at the time that demonized immigration for monetary gain, with prominent economists even trying to calculate the exact cost of the "brain drain" so that diasporic Indians could be taxed accordingly.⁶

It is an inescapably patriotic movie, which based on its very title, one would presume sets up a dichotomy between the East and the West. But the conflict in the film is not between Westerners and Indians. Despite their limited time on screen, Westerners are portrayed positively. A white passer-by helps an Indian man gather up his fallen belongings. A British woman refuses to marry her diasporic Indian boyfriend when she is informed that he has a wife and child back in India, instead preferring to reunite the couple against the man's wishes. The villains in the movie are all Indians who have forsaken their ties to India and willingly embraced foreign culture as their own. Some of these diasporic Indians, such as a character named Orphan who renames himself this way despite having living parents because of his desire to forsake anything Indian, redeem themselves through an embrace of Hinduism and Indianness. Britishers are never criticized for not holding values similar to those defined as Indian values; it is only Indians who are criticized for betraying their own culture in favor of a foreign one. While the hierarchy of values is set up such that Indian values are superior to others, the film takes issue with people forsaking their own culture, not with a lack of Indian values in the West.

There was widespread cynicism toward the state because of the institution of a widely criticized state of emergency by erstwhile Prime Minister Indira Gandhi from 1975 to 1977, with the Bollywood hero no longer being as secure in his Indianness as a result. While themes of patriotism had been extremely popular in the immediate post-independence period (as seen by the success of films like *Purab Aur Paschim*, which was actually the fourth and final one in director-actor Manoj Kumar's series on various aspects of patriotism), they now became less relevant. The ideological shift led to an increase in the number and popularity of movies about class conflict and about working class anti-heroes in the world of crime, with little mention of the West.⁷ While there were a few movies here and there from the 1970s to the 1990s that vaguely dealt with Indianness through narratives about the military or sports, the next noticeable spate of movies dealing with Indianness and patriotism were seen in the 1990s after liberalization was implemented.

A Coexistence of East and West

In the early 1990s the Congress political party announced the end of Nehruvian socialism that had been in effect since Jawaharlal Nehru took office as the first Prime Minister of India, leading to the petering out of movies about class conflict.⁸ The end of socialism was accompanied by economic liberalization, expanding the role of both foreign and private investment and giving the members of the diaspora, many of them middle-class professionals earning comparatively better than their counterparts in India, a new role as “patriotic investors in their country’s future.”⁹

The liberalization led to a shift in how the diaspora was viewed by the state and how they were portrayed on film. *Purab aur Paschim* had assumed that Indians who chose to work outside India had betrayed India, robbing it of “a good mind and two working hands,” and showed them redeemed only once they returned. Post liberalization in 1995, *Dilwale Dulhania Le Jayenge* (*The Brave Hearted Will Take the Bride*), expanded its scope and considered “whether or not Indian identity can survive deterritorialization.”¹⁰ *Dilwale Dulhania Le Jayenge* (hereafter referred to as DDLJ) follows the love story of Raj (Shahrukh Khan), son of a wealthy self-made diasporic businessman, and Simran (Kajol), daughter of a diasporic shopkeeper who has a constant yearning for his homeland and a fierce determination to have his family retain Indian traditions and values even while living in London. Raj and Simran meet and fall in love after overcoming their initial dislike of each other, when they repeatedly run into each other on a month-long trip across Europe. The trip was Simran’s one chance at freedom before she heads to India to get married to her father’s friend’s son, a man she has never met but has been engaged to since childhood. While the first half of the movie shows Raj wooing Simran, the second half shows him wooing her unknowing family so that they give her to him with their blessings.

When Simran suggests that they elope, Raj categorically states that despite being born in England, he is Indian in values, choosing to follow what the film puts forth as the traditional Indian path of seeking her family’s permission. The movie demonstrated that it was possible for the diasporic Indian to retain Indian values while living abroad, for him to be “redeemed and validated not only as a possible national subject, but possibly one of the best.”¹¹ Such a positive representation of the diaspora cannot be read solely as a result of the increased respectability of the diasporic Indian, along with the film industry’s and the state’s ability to profit off them. These representations were also a result of the rise of a new urban class in India, with these movies lending “credibility to the cosmopolitan lifestyles of India’s urban middle class, which overlap[ped] with but [were] not the same as Indians living in the diaspora.”¹²

While in DDLJ Indian identity is formulated sharply in contrast with and in contradiction to a Western identity, movies in the 2000s, such as *Kal Ho Na Ho* (*Tomorrow May Never Come*), allowed a coexistence of these identities, though the hierarchy of identities remained the same. *Kal Ho Na Ho*

(hereafter *KHNNH*) follows Aman's (Shahrukh Khan) successful attempts to bring harmony and joy into his new neighbor Naina's (Preity Zinta) life, while hiding the fact that he is actually in America to seek treatment for his cardiac problems. He is successful in solving all the problems in her life, helping her family sort out their financial and emotional troubles, and as teaching her how to live and love while falling in love with her in the process. On discovering her love for him, he fakes being married and instead helps her best friend Rohit (Saif Ali Khan) successfully woo her and sees them married before succumbing to his disease.

The infiltration of Western goods and Western pop culture that had begun with the liberalization of India in the 1990s increased over time such that diasporic Indians could be seen as trendsetters, adopting those elements of Western culture that are not in violation of Indian values, and bringing them to India. The project begun in *DDLJ*, of imagining a diasporic subject who can remain Indian while living outside of India, is not only completed by the early 2000s but taken a step further by imagining a diasporic subject with a peaceful coexistence of both Western and Indian identities. In *KHNNH*, we see all the characters easily traversing the Western landscape of New York City while being Indian and speaking in Hindi, and the first song sequence shows the male lead comfortably beating a dhol (traditional Indian drum) to a Hinglish song in front of an American flag with other non-South Asian Americans.¹³ The song features the dhol alongside electric guitars, and even draws from hip hop and features some rap sequences, presenting a medley of Indian and Western as desirable instead of threatening. The film, with its assertion of the model minority stereotype, reflects the tastes of the urban middle class in India, many of whom aspire to the American dream while also erasing the struggles faced by diasporic Indians in 9/11 New York.

The Turning Point: Liberalization and Its Impact

The most consistent explanation of the change in the diaspora's representation, and of India's relationship with the West, is the liberalization and related globalization of the 1990s. The liberalization of India can be seen as symptomatic of a break from the values of India's immediate post-independence political period: the end of Nehruvian socialism, the rise of the right wing Hindu-nationalist Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) in opposition to the Congress, and an embrace of conspicuous consumerism. In 1991, Congress Prime Minister Narasimha Rao worked with Finance Minister Manmohan Singh (who later served as the Prime Minister for a decade himself) to respond to the external debt crisis by introducing a new liberalizing economic policy that deregulated most industries, reduced import tariffs, and expanded the role of private and foreign investment. This opened India to a significantly increased flow of goods from the West, allowing for foreign investment and bringing the two closer together.

Scholars have varying interpretations about what really caused the liberalization of 1991. The foreign exchange crisis, with the IMF's liberalizing loan

conditions, seems to be the most straightforward explanation. But economists argue that, historically, the IMF did not have enough clout to cause policy change to such a large extent. Adhia argues that while significant internal and external political pressure played a factor, the policy could not have been facilitated without a changed positive attitude toward the pursuit of private gain and individualism that developed in the 1980s.¹⁴ The evidence he uses is the changing view of the common dilemma of performing one's duty versus fulfilling one's desires in Bollywood films. Films initially showed the former as the only correct path but in the 1980s slowly moved to a model where businessmen and wealth were valorized instead of demonized. The films unproblematicized wealth in the 1980s, no longer portraying it as a result of immorality and a cause of sorrow, but rather as the legitimate result of work. The contradiction between being rich and being a good person was erased in these movies, with heroes, rather than villains, increasingly being members of wealthy industrialist families and participating in the business world.¹⁵ Even if the existence of such an attitude toward wealth and consumerism can be deemed suspect before liberalization, it is clear that the pursuit of material goods and of wealth is normalized and even deemed desirable after liberalization.

The increased flow of goods from the West and the positive attitude toward consumption together contribute to a more positive depiction of the diaspora that had previously been villainized, in part because of the consumption of Western goods and culture. Now that Indians in India were engaging in similar kinds of consumption, they could no longer be demonized for those reasons, instead becoming more relatable and creating economic ideals as aspirations. In the post-liberalization period, they were also called upon by the Indian government to save the country from a financial crisis through their remittances and deposits, and helped avert a serious foreign exchange crisis.¹⁶ Finally, despite the relatively small size of the diasporic market, the high ticket prices made the middle class Western diaspora a significant enough audience to be actively wooed by the Bollywood producers and distributors.¹⁷ All these reasons led to a narrative shift in the diaspora's representation from "the villain who needs to be saved from Western corruption to the new Indian aristocrat."¹⁸

Consumption as a Mode of Mediation between Cultures

Sharpe defines the "message of *DDLJ*" as mediating the Indian-Western dichotomy where "although the hero and heroine wear Western clothing and embrace youth culture, they have maintained their Indian values."¹⁹ The heroine, Simran, is able to code-switch perfectly, with languages, clothes and culture fitting into European locales by wearing Western clothing for the first half of the film and switching to salwar kameez (traditional Indian trousers and tunic) with no trouble or hesitation in the second half of the film, set in Punjab. Code-switching, a sociolinguistic term, is used here in an expanded cultural sense to include the notion of "changing from one form of behavior (or word choice) to another for the purpose of creating a desired social

impression” and “moving between culturally ingrained systems of behavior.”²⁰ An even more stark example of such code-switching is when Simran and her sister are dancing to swing music and, upon noticing that it was time for their father’s arrival, begin pretending to study to Bollywood music from the 1940s. This code-switching implies that being a good Indian woman did not just consist of consuming Indian media and dressing in Indian clothes, but was now a more complicated project, since one had to know what kind of consumption was appropriate at what time. This behavior is not unique to the diaspora, overlapping with and “lending credibility to the cosmopolitan lifestyles of India’s urban middle class.”²¹ The existence of similar behavior for these two groups of people can be attributed to the economic liberalization of India in the early 1990s, which led to the rapid flow of Western goods into India, leading to a similarity in consumption habits and consequently the need to code-switch between cultures.

Earlier Bollywood film could safely draw strict lines between East and West, between good and bad, since it was only possible for someone to consume one kind of culture at once. Either one was a good Indian, consuming Indian culture and upholding Indian values, such as Bharat was in *Purab aur Paschim*, or one was a bad Indian, consuming Western culture, automatically construed as a forsaking of Indian values, such as Bharat’s westernized heroine, Preeti. The dichotomy was simple enough to maintain when Indian culture was only available in India and Western culture was only available in the West with physical travel being a requirement to access the other. This dichotomy is portrayed in *Purab aur Paschim*, where the wayward diasporic Indians have to physically remove themselves from the corrupted West and position themselves in the purity of India. The liberalization and related globalization of India allowed for both an export of Indian culture abroad, creating easier access to India for diasporic Indians, as well as an import of Western consumer culture to India. Indians could remain connected to the nation through improved methods of communication, more easily facilitating long-distance nationalism but also allowing them to more easily continue consumption of Indian culture, since Indian media was now disseminated beyond the borders. First VCR technology, and then DVDs, dramatically increased access to Bollywood abroad in the 1990s with community movie screenings becoming themselves an opportunity to enact Indianness and speak Hindi.²²

Within India, the urban middle class, particularly the youth, were wearing Western clothing and consuming Western media while also consuming Indian media and wearing traditional Indian clothing. Following the economic liberalization of 1991, the government approved more than 10,000 investment proposals valued at \$20 billion in the space of less than a decade.²³ Though not all of these proposals reached completion, a significant number of significant consumer brands such as Honda and Ford cars, Samsung electronics, Nokia phones, and soft drinks by Pepsi and Coca-Cola did. The showrooms and advertisements of these international brands became a visible presence in major urban cities and crept into Indian homes with little modification from

the form in which they were consumed in the West. The “ethic of Gandhian austerity” that hung over the Indian middle class also was dispelled with the disappearance of the guilt formerly associated with consumerism.²⁴

The code-switching *DDLJ*’s Simran has to perform residing in London, from an admiration of swing music to one of 1940s Bollywood music to appease her father, would not be unfamiliar to urban youth in India at the time. They would have been expected to perform similar code-switches around their elders who still resisted Western consumerism and held onto the Gandhian austerity of the past. A decade later, this code-switching by the youth is made less necessary with the permeation of the use of Western consumer goods to an older generation that was slower to adopt them. While the older generation of *KHNNH* is still shown to be wearing traditional Indian clothing and consuming Indian media, they are also shown enthusiastically participating in cultural fusion such as the first song and dance sequence in Hinglish. The song, *Pretty Woman*, features Indians and Americans dancing together to a hip hop and rap-inspired sequence, with the protagonist’s great uncle contributing by way of playing the dhol, a traditional Indian instrument. The dhol and the electric guitars fit together seamlessly, much like the Indians and Americans do in this sequence and the East and West are supposed to in India. It is now the older generation that has to code-switch, to keep themselves relevant in changing times by figuring out how to fit their values and tastes with newer Western ones.

The nation’s changing relationship with Western goods is reflected through the changing depictions of the diaspora’s consumption patterns. In the 1970s there is a clear dichotomy with consumption of Indian goods and Indian media being the only way to be Indian. This is a legacy perhaps of the *Swadeshi* movement during the Indian freedom struggle where India sought to be self-sufficient in all production through an import substitution policy. This policy, along with limited availability of foreign goods in India, made it such that it was only Indians abroad (who were already looked down upon by the fact of their voluntary geographical displacement) who could consume foreign goods.²⁵ Following the influx of foreign goods in 1991, the diaspora, much like middle class urban youth, is shown consuming both Western and Indian goods but being mindful of the context in which they were doing so. A decade after the normalization of Western consumption and increasing ubiquity of Western media, it became possible for them to abandon this caution. It was instead the older generation that was required to adapt and find ways to be comfortable with a hybridization of cultures.

The Indian Woman in India and Abroad

India had often been figured as a nourishing and self-sacrificial mother in the arts but this imagery became particularly common and took a clearly nationalistic form during the Indian freedom struggle. The imagery had a Hindu tinge with narratives of Mother India often making reference to goddesses in

Hindu mythology, such as in the extremely popular and award winning 1957 classic film of the same name.²⁶ The ideal of a self-sacrificial woman who is dedicated to the family and nation remained constant through the twentieth century but the form of expressing this dedication evolved. India's first female Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, came to power in 1966. While she hardly conformed to the norm of Indian womanhood, she showed that it was possible to serve the nation in ways beyond just supporting and enabling the service of men. Globalization further complicated the ideals of Indian womanhood and women's roles in the nationalist project. It allowed Indian women to participate in Western consumerism as long as they conformed to strict standards of Indian morality and dedication to the motherland. Additionally, India's increased interaction with the West led to a slight relaxation of these conservative moral standards with exposure to more liberal Western standards of acceptability and a desire to be considered no less modern than the West.

One of the many ways narratives of nationalism and gender are intertwined is through the identification of the purity of the Indian nation with the purity of the Indian, though really Hindu, woman.²⁷ The "purity" of the Indian woman is defined largely through two metrics: sexual inviolability and cultural virtue. The goal of protection of the nation and the preservation of Indian womanhood get conflated. As a result, the diasporic Indian woman has the potential to pose one of the biggest threats to the nation, through a possible dilution of Indian values and forsaking of Indian culture. Women are traditionally held responsible for dispensing culture, and so an Indian woman's relationship with her culture holds relevance not only on an iconic level but also for the community to which she is meant to be dispensing this culture. The diasporic Indian woman's body also becomes a site where anxieties about cultural dilution and standards of acceptability play out.

In *Purab aur Paschim*, though not explicitly stated as such, it is the matriarch of the Sharma family who is posited as the reason for the family's lack of knowledge about India. Even though Mrs. Sharma had never even visited India and Mr. Sharma had grown up there, when Bharat enquires about the reason for his love interest Preeti's ignorance about India and Hinduism, it is her mother he is implicating. Further, in *DDLJ*, Raj's westernized character, complete with womanizing and disrespectful behaviors, can be attributed to the lack of a female figure in his life as there is no mention of his mother throughout the movie. Once he falls in love with Simran, and has an Indian woman in his life connecting him to the homeland and reminding him about what it means to be Indian, he rises to the occasion. Finally, in *KHNH*, the bread-earning matriarch of the family is frequently criticized by her mother-in-law for not being able to adequately represent Indianness as a Christian woman who could not perfectly cook traditional Indian food. Diasporic Indian women are idealized as the bastions of culture and shamed whenever they do not live up to this ideal.

The Body of the Diasporic Woman

The clothing worn by Indian women gives the viewer clear cues of their moral status, as temporary as it might be. In the 1970s, the East and West are figured as polarized opposites incapable of coexistence. This changes in the 1990s and beyond, when they can be located in the same person.²⁸ When Preeti is wearing mini-skirts, smoking and wearing a blonde wig, it appears that she is willingly putting herself up for scrutiny by the male gaze. She is not rebuked for this by her parents, who seem to accept this as perfectly normal. This is represented through many shots of just portions of her body, breaking her down to these constituent parts. While she is still seen as sexually pure, fighting off the premarital sexual propositions of other diasporic Indians, she is figured as promiscuous. The history of colonialism seems to be contributing to the “othering” of the Westernized woman as immoral and available.²⁹ This is accomplished in a trip to India where she is made to engage in pilgrimage and family gatherings till she finally purges the West out of her by giving up smoking and donning a sari (traditional Indian garment) that she had rejected earlier in the film. She proved her rejection of all things Western and an adoption of Indian modesty through this costume change, signifying to the audience and to her potential in-laws that she had become an acceptable wife and an acceptable Indian woman.

In *DDLJ* and *KHNNH*, Indian womanhood is constructed as more responsive to “the demands of flows of migration and late capitalism.”³⁰ The same woman is allowed to wear a sari and a mini-skirt at different points in the film without compromising her Indianness, though it is necessary that the woman wear the sari at some point in the film to confirm her Indianness. While Western clothing is tolerated and deemed acceptable, women’s bodies are still strictly regulated in other ways. In *DDLJ*, though Simran prances around Switzerland dressed in Western clothing, she displays the appropriately high amount of horrification when she is made to believe that she might have committed a sexual act while intoxicated. The diasporic Indian man, Raj, makes it clear that it was just a prank in bad taste on his part, as he would never engage in sexual relations with an Indian woman, despite admitting to freely doing so with white women. The entire concept of modesty is made to appear to be an Indian ideal, with Raj claiming after pretending to have slept with Simran that as a Hindustani (Indian) he knows how to respect the honor of an Indian woman, implying he would never consummate their relationship before marriage or breach her modesty in any way.

While *DDLJ* allows diasporic Indian men to engage in casual physical relations, in *KHNNH*, there is an even greater acknowledgement, though still a condemnatory one, of the sexuality of Indian women. A diasporic Indian woman, Camilla, woos one of the wealthy male protagonists, Rohit, through use of her sexuality, an act that the audience is meant to immediately condemn and use to identify her as a gold-digger. She always dresses skimpily, and is shown to lie about the extent of her Hindu devotion, telling Rohit she’s at a temple praying

for him when she is actually at a spa, pampering her body. This fits into the stereotype of Western(ized) women as sexually aggressive and a threat to the conventional gender dynamic of men as the pursuers and women as recipients of attention.³¹ On the other hand, the female protagonist, Naina, is dressed modestly even when in Western clothes and charms Rohit through her personality and not her body, waiting for him to pursue her. While the women are allowed to code-switch with respect to their clothing, the standards of female sexual acceptability remain constant no matter what they're wearing.

The Global Indian Family and the State

With over 30 million members, the Indian diaspora is the largest in the world and with its size and heterogeneity are associated ambiguities about its relationship with the state. The Indian state's relationship with the diaspora has gone through significant changes, from asking them to choose a single community to identify with post-independence to a call for a more global outlook at the turn of the century. A decade after independence, the first Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, declared:

We have left it to the Indians abroad whether they continue to remain Indian nationals or to adopt the nationality of whichever country they live in. It is entirely for them to decide. If they remain Indian nationals, then all they can claim abroad is favorable alien treatment. If they adopt the nationality of the country they live in, they should associate themselves as closely as possible with the interest of the people of the country they have adopted and never [...] become an exploiting agency there.³²

The Indian government has since then come a long way from Nehru's formulation of the ideas of citizenship and belonging for the diaspora in terms of a strict choice between home and adopted land. While still not really taking any responsibility for the well-being of diasporic communities, around the time of liberalization, the state began to evoke an unbroken link between "Mother India" and her "children abroad."³³ At the first iteration of a now annual conference held to celebrate diasporic Indians in 2003, erstwhile Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee declared that India was now willing to accept its "parental charge."³⁴ This manifested itself in the government trying to create more legal and economic links between the diaspora and the state starting in the 1980s,

"including the provision of tax incentives to facilitate domestic investment by overseas Indians, the establishment of the first High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora, the institution of a visa-free regime for diasporic subjects through the Persons of Indian Origin scheme, and an ongoing dialogue on dual citizenship" (a dialogue still fruitlessly ongoing decades later).³⁵

The state formulated the vision of a global Indian family that was together working toward the shared goal of uplifting India while having other interests and geographic locations. In defenses of liberalization, the financial and entrepreneurial support of the global Indian family was posited as part of what allowed India to move past its insular beginnings and compete and succeed in the global economy.³⁶

While this global family is constructed in vague terms that elide the geographic and socio-economic differences and consequently the very different lived experiences of the diaspora, it is also constructed along the Hindu joint family model. This model consisted of a governing patriarch with all the branches of his family traditionally living under the same roof, having different interests but coming together at critical moments such as celebrations or tragedies. Prior to this formulation, Indian families were seen as broken up by migration rather than extended by it. In *Purab aur Paschim*, the diasporic characters are shown as having no links to their families or pasts in India. There is a clear rift between families in India and their relations abroad, a rift caused by migration itself. For example, Harnam migrates to London with his infant son upon being rebuked by his wife for betraying their freedom fighter family friend. Another minor character is shown as having forsaken his wife and son in India and attempting to start a new one in London with a white woman. With limitations in communication technology and an ideological outlook in which migration was more permanent and traitorous, family was not seen as something capable of existing across global boundaries.

While never really absent from Bollywood, the particularly strong assertions of Hindu identity, and its related ideas of Hindu womanhood and family relations, can be linked to the rise of the Hindu nationalist Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP). The BJP gained 20% of the votes in the 1991 Indian general election and were gaining prominence outside the official political sphere as well around this time for their hardline Hindu nationalist policy. Accompanying this change is the replacement of the extended joint family with nuclear families among India's middle class, causing anxiety about the possible dilution of traditional Hindu family values.³⁷ The institution of the patrilineal Hindu joint family was idealized and naturalized in *DDLJ*, presenting the nuclear family as an incomplete anomaly.³⁸ Baldev, the patriarch of the Singh family, decides to move his nuclear family from London to India to reunite with their joint family in India that they have maintained strong ties with, and marry off his daughter. Traditional Hindu marriage ceremonies, organized and attended by the intact joint family, feature prominently in this half of the movie, with an almost normative quality. Baldev's daughter Simran rebels to the extent of loving someone her father did not choose for her, but does not have the courage, and maybe even the desire, to elope with him without her father's wishes. Instead the hero plans to work within the patriarchal, joint family framework to win over members of the family, working his way up to the patriarch to win Baldev's blessings and the hand of his daughter.

DDLJ shows a joint family spread across continents that must be reunited before any significant activities such as weddings, or even deaths are allowed to take place, with the wedding actually being hastened by Simran's grandmother's impending demise. *KHNH* shows a different family model, where a self-contained multi-generational family resides entirely in the diaspora and so normative family values can be successfully upheld without requiring a return to the motherland. The Hindu wedding with all its ceremonies is still a prominent feature of the film, but is now conducted entirely in New York, though there are no indicators to signal its dislocation from India. There is conflict within the Kapur family in the absence of a patriarch but the entrance of a mature male figure in the form of a love interest for the daughter of the family helps smooth out concerns and restore harmony. The nature of the Indian family changes greatly over the thirty-three-year period that the films cover, going from one where the Indian family can exist only in India, to one that exists across continents but is made possible only by strong roots in India to one that can successfully exist as an independent unit anywhere in the world.

Conclusion: Who Gets to Be Indian?

An analysis of the diaspora's representation over time shows India's slow but undeniable integration with the world economy and with global cultural flows. The post-independence era consists of a conscious isolation, which had cultural, economic, and political dimensions. There were limited foreign imports in a socialist government that wanted to be self-sufficient and politically neutral as expressed by participation in the Non-Aligned Movement during the cold war era. Over the 1970s and 1980s, India became more open to assimilation into global flows, though still intent on maintaining its own unique identity. This assimilating tendency was crystallized by the neo-liberal globalizing reforms of the 1990s, which the government presented as not a failure of the nation-state, but as a triumph. Officials argued that India had previously been afflicted by an "inferiority complex that made them suspicious of foreign investment" but were now imbued with a "national confidence" that convinced them that they were "global players."³⁹ Though this official narrative of greater confidence being the reason for India's entrance into the global sphere is debatable, with economic necessity being a highly probable cause, the fact of India's global assimilation is not. The representation of the diaspora shows an increasing acceptance of globalizing forces by Indians, while still holding onto a monolithic idea of what it means to be Indian in the diaspora.

Bollywood and the Indian state have presented a fairly monolithic view of the Indian diaspora, putting forth an urban middle class Hindu North Indian sensibility as the norm and ignoring the variety of struggles faced by the diaspora. While *DDLJ*'s Baldev does articulate the common diasporic fear of being left in between and without a homeland or national identity, other issues that plague the Indian diaspora like racial and class tensions are completely elided

in Bollywood's representation of the diaspora in these two films. Working class members of the diaspora are entirely eliminated from the representation, with the poorest of the featured diasporic characters being small business owners. The families of the protagonists of all three films embody the model minority stereotype, being self-made millionaires who came to the West from India with nothing, thereby upholding the myth of meritocracy. Descendants of indentured laborers and other marginalized groups find no representation at all in mainstream media, with no popular acknowledgement of these communities or of any diasporic communities not located in the prosperous West. While Bollywood provides an excellent archive to see what is prominent in the national imaginary, it also provides useful information in terms of what it hides. Hiding not just the differences in the diasporic experience, these movies also indicate an erasure of the Indianness experienced by groups that do not dominate the media even if they form a significant numerical majority, such as rural populations or non-North-West Indian populations. The experiences of Muslims, of the working class, and of South Indians are among some of the ones completely erased in favor of a normative wealthy Hindu Punjabi ethos.

Like Bollywood, the state uses the diaspora as a singular term that collapses the differences between the lived experiences of a large heterogeneous group, and relatedly does not offer them the specific assistance they need, having no obligation to do so. There are neither formal cultural nor legal links between India and its diaspora, with no consistently identifiable similarities tying them together. With no real "systems of social and cultural reproduction," the relationship between the diaspora and India is one lived within the imagination, though clearly occupying an important place in it if Bollywood is figured as a vessel of the national imagination.⁴⁰ Indian is the identity that one is meant to identify with over all others, linking people of Indian origin together across continents, yet the ideal of Indianness presented by mass media is not available to everyone.

Notes

1. Anjali Ram, *Consuming Bollywood: Gender, Globalization and Media in the Indian Diaspora* (New York: Peter Lang, 2014), 55.
2. MK Raghavendra, "Globalism and Indian Nationalism." In *Business of Bollywood: The Changing Dimensions*, ed. Anuradha Malshe (Hyderabad, India: Icfai University Press, 2009), 23.
3. Geetanjali Gangoli, "Sexuality, Sensuality and Belonging: Representations of the 'Anglo-Indian' and the 'Western' Woman in Hindi Cinema," in *Bollywood: Popular Indian Cinema through a Transnational Lens*, ed. Raminder Kaur and Ajay J. Sinha (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2005), 145.
4. Meena T. Pillai, "Post-National B(H)ollywood and The National Imaginary" in *The Magic of Bollywood: At Home and Abroad*, ed. Anjali Gera Roy (New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 2012), 42.
5. Two other films from this time, *Sangam* (1964) and *An Evening in Paris* (1967), feature Indians abroad but they are not explicitly named as members of the diaspora and neither is that identity a central theme of the films

6. Jagdish Bhagwati and William Dellalfar, "The Brain Drain and Income Taxation," *World Development* 1, no. 1-2 (1973).
7. Geetanjali Gangoli, "Sexuality, Sensuality and Belonging," 152.
8. MK Raghavendra, "Globalism and Indian Nationalism," 24.
9. Patricia Uberoi, "The Diaspora Comes Home: Disciplining Desire in DDLJ," *Contributions to Indian Sociology*, 32.2 (1998): 307.
10. Translated dialog from *Purab aur Pachhim*, directed by Manoj Kumar (1970; Sacramento, CA: Bollywood Entertainment, 2005), DVD.
11. Rini Bhattacharya Mehta and Rajeshwari Pandharipande. *Bollywood and Globalization: Indian Popular Cinema, Nation, and Diaspora* (London: Anthem Press, 2011): 1.
12. Jenny Sharpe, "Gender, Nation, and Globalization in Monsoon Wedding and Dilwale Dulhania Le Jayenge," *Meridians: Feminism, Race, Transnationalism* 6.1 (2005): 66.
13. Hinglish is a popular portmanteau used to refer the combination of English and other South Asian languages, a form of code-switching on its own.
14. Nimish Adhia, "The Role of Ideological Change in India's Economic Liberalization," *The Journal of Socio-Economics* 44 (2013): 104-6.
15. Adhia, "Role of Ideological Change," 109.
16. P. Mankekar, "Brides Who Travel: Gender, Transnationalism, and Nationalism in Hindi Film," *Positions: East Asia Cultures Critique* 7.3 (1999): 745.
17. Ticket prices in rural India would be well under a dollar whereas in urban India would still not be higher than a maximum of two dollars in the 1990s, and even now the highest price would be five dollars. In comparison, ticket prices for Bollywood movies average ten to fifteen dollars in the U.S.
18. Brian Hu, "Bollywood dreaming: 'Kal Ho Naa Ho' and the Diasporic Spectator," *Post Script - Essays in Film and the Humanities*, 25.3 (Summer 2006): 93-104.
19. Sharpe, "Gender, Nation, and Globalization," 65.
20. A. Molinsky, "Cross-Cultural Code-Switching: The Psychological Challenges Of Adapting Behavior In Foreign Cultural Interactions.," *Academy of Management Review* 32, no. 2 (2007): 623.
21. Sharpe, "Gender, Nation, and Globalization," 65.
22. Ram, *Consuming Bollywood*, 58.
23. Ramachandra Guha, *India After Gandhi: The History of The World's Largest Democracy* (New York: Harper Collins, 2007), 688.
24. Guha, *India After Gandhi*, 690.
25. Adhia, "Role of Ideological Change," 105.
26. It is one of the highest grossing Indian films of all time taking in almost one million USD at the time, played in theatres for three decades following its release, and was the first Indian film to be nominated for an Academy Award.
27. Jenny Sharpe, "Gender, Nation, and Globalization in Monsoon Wedding and Dilwale Dulhania Le Jayenge," *Meridians: Feminism, Race, Transnationalism* 6.1 (2005): 62.
28. Gangoli, "Sexuality, Sensuality and Belonging," 144.
29. *Ibid.*, 149.
30. Mankekar, "Brides Who Travel," 742.
31. Gangoli, "Sexuality and Sensuality," 149.
32. Jawaharlal Nehru, Lok Sabha Debates, VOL. 6. 2 Sept. 1957.

33. Bakirathi Mani and Latha Varadarajan, "The Largest Gathering of the Global Indian Family": Neoliberalism, Nationalism, and Diaspora at Pravasi Bharatiya Divas," *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies* 14, no. 1 (2005): 46
34. Mani and Varadarajan, "The Largest Gathering of the Global Indian Family," 57.
35. Ibid.
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37. Sharpe, "Gender, Nation, and Globalization," 61.
38. Patricia Uberoi, "The Diaspora Comes Home: Disciplining Desire in DDLJ," *Contributions to Indian Sociology*, 32.2 (1998): 332.
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Reconciling Post-Nationality with Post-Communism: *An Intermediary Account of Democratic Citizenship*

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Abstract

John Stuart Mill famously argued that a democratic society could not be comprised of more than a single nationality. This paper discusses post-national accounts of democratic citizenship in relation to the experience of ethnically fragmented states. In particular it focuses on the experience of the ethnically fragmented states of post-communist Europe in order to better explain the failures of democratization in that region. It then offers an intermediary theory that aims to help navigate between post-national theories and post-communist realities to improve the process of democratization.

Reconciling Post-Nationality with Post Communism: An Intermediary Account of Democratic Citizenship

Over the past half-century, dozens of formerly authoritarian states underwent the process of democratization. Many of these states, such as those of the former Soviet bloc, were characterized by ethnic fragmentation. Responding to the notion of diverse populations, John Stuart Mill famously expressed skepticism that a democratic society could be comprised of more than one nationality.¹ Post-national accounts answer Mill's claim by presenting a model of democratic citizenship that is blind to ethnic differentiation. However these theories of democracy, which emerged out of the Western imagination and in many cases motivated the developments of these new democracies, attempted to apply seemingly universal truths to incompatible circumstances.² Will Kymlicka characterizes this issue as a failure by Western thought to reconcile ideas taken from its own mature, liberal tradition with political situations that were unprepared to receive them.³ He argues further that "Western political theorists have yet [to develop] such a theory. One of the many unfortunate side-effects of the dominance of the 'ethno-cultural neutrality' model of the liberal state is that liberal theorists have never explicitly confronted this question."⁴ It is the aim of this paper, then, to respond to this incomplete discourse.

This paper proceeds in three parts. In the first part I outline the characteristics of universalist post-national models of citizenship. Here I defend the merits of the post-national model and present it as an attractive end for mature democracy. In the second part I argue that in turning to the process of democratization as experienced in post-communist Europe, post-national models fail to account for numerous obstacles that were fundamental to the region's political circumstances. I demonstrate this by examining two related problems of democratization as experienced by post-communist states: first, the role played by ethnicity in hindering universal enfranchisement for ethnic minorities, and second, the mobilization of ethno-cultural nationalism as a unifying force for societies. Finally in the third part I present an intermediary account of democratic citizenship, which aims to bridge the divide between post-communist realities and post-national aspirations.

Post-National Models of Citizenship

There are a number of desirable universalist frameworks of citizenship that are divorced from considerations of ethnic identity. Several of these accounts, such as Jan-Werner Müller's constitutional patriotism, Jürgen Habermas' post-national democracy, and Anna Stilz' legitimate state theory are noteworthy for their progressive approaches to citizenship. Müller's framework is motivated by civic ideals and a notion of shared understanding among whole populations regardless of differences in identity, ethnic or otherwise. Habermas' theory also operates with an indifference to identity politics, and focuses instead on universal concepts such as public opinion and the formation of a general will. Finally, Stilz' legitimate state theory too offers a non-ethnic model of governance, which is based primarily on the state's equitable treatment of territory claims along with a broad defense of liberal rights. In examining these accounts, my first goal is to affirm that the post-national model is indeed an attractive framework of citizenship, and one that should be aspired to as a democratic ideal.

Jan-Werner Müller's model of constitutional patriotism offers a highly developed account of citizenship that is free from the constraints of identity. Müller's constitutional patriotism updates Nietzsche's claim regarding shared experiences as a prerequisite for social understanding. Accordingly, this non-ethnic model offers a solution to the pitfalls ("the sources of moral danger," in Müller's words) of less developed models such as liberal nationalism and traditional patriotism.⁵ That is, Müller presents constitutional patriotism as a sophisticated model of citizenship, which guarantees both civil liberties and stable democratic life by way of its grounding in objective liberal ideals.⁶ Müller writes that constitutional patriotism is deeply motivated by "the idea of individuals recognizing each other as free and equal and finding fair terms of living together; in other words, to find enough common, mutually acceptable grounds to answer the question, 'How do we want to live together?'"⁷ The challenges of implementation aside, it seems a situation of mutual understanding and respect among an entire democratic population is a model worthy of aspiring to.

In addition to its dependence on mutual understanding and respect among citizens, Müller's constitutional patriotism model also relies on the presence of strong institutions and a well-established democratic tradition. While Müller acknowledges that his model is sensitive to the variance of political and social norms across states (what he terms "existing bounded schemes of cooperation"), he argues that a situation of constitutional patriotism aims to push these schemes in a universally inclusive and liberal direction.⁸ Müller explains that in this process of institutional transformation, the aim is not to rebuild institutions entirely, but rather to imbue existing ones with liberal values.⁹ However the apparent simplicity with which Müller characterizes this process betrays his own assumptions about a given state's ability and willingness to undergo this process. Again, Müller's notion of promoting inclusivity through existing institutions is desirable, detached though it may be from certain states' limitations.

Müller argues that his model of patriotism is distinct from nationalism of any sort. Describing the existing discourse of nationalism as "conceptually ambiguous, empirically misleading, and normatively problematic," he argues for the superiority of his model on the basis of its ability to unify citizens around liberal, rather than cultural or ethnic, values.¹⁰ Applying this rationale to the context of pan-European citizenship, Müller suggests that in a situation of post-national constitutional patriotism the traditional obligations of defending democracy could shift from the individual states to the adjoined states' respective civil societies, in turn facilitating the production of "ongoing civic learning processes."¹¹ Overall, Müller's argument regarding constitutional patriotism as distinct from nationalism raises a number of valid criticisms of the latter account. On the whole constitutional patriotism appears to be a more mature model of citizenship: one that is grounded in universal liberal ideals and is unconditionally accessible.

Like Müller, Jürgen Habermas offers a post-national account of citizenship. Habermas' model also assumes a shared system of rights and values in place of any unifying cultural or historical narratives. On this view the aim of citizenship is to unify people around "ethnically neutral" ideals in place of more rudimentary social bonds such as language or traditional religion.¹² Notably Habermas' non-ethnic conception of citizenship is, like Müller's, developmental in a sense, and requires a willingness to look past problems of ethnic differentiation. In this respect it is worth considering that Habermas' model of post-national citizenship gained traction in the European political discourse of the 1990s, as concerned the course of the European Union (which, despite recent developments, continues by all means to be a successful post-national democratic institution, and which was notably formed by states with strong democratic traditions).¹³ Accordingly, despite its assumptions about several key democratic preconditions, Habermas' model is admirable as a progressive, post-national theory of citizenship.

Donald Ipperciel explains that a Habermasian conception of post-national citizenship relies on the existence of a strong public sphere.¹⁴ This assumption

is critical to Habermas' framework specifically because of his model's reliance on related democratic concepts such as public opinion and general will to the construction of unity and social trust.¹⁵ By contrast Habermas' model of citizenship dispenses entirely with constructs of ethnicity and nationalism in its formation of unity.¹⁶ Notably Habermas characterizes his model as a civic approach to nationalism, perhaps differing from Müller's presentation of a post-national model of citizenship that is distinct from nationalism entirely. However it is clear that both Habermas' and Müller's accounts are characterized by a view of democratic citizenship that is more developmentally advanced than are any ethnic conceptions of unity and kinship.¹⁷

That Habermas' model of democratic citizenship is progressive is reflected in its belief that the world has entered a new phase of modernity. In his response to Habermas' 2000 book *The Postnational Constellation*, Klaus-Gerd Giesen characterizes Habermas' interpretation of international politics as reminiscent of the "end of history" thesis, in which traditional nationalist values erode and are replaced by overarching liberal democratic institutions such as the European Union.¹⁸ And despite contemporary anti-democratic developments, it appears that on the aggregate, Habermas' understanding of the globalization of international politics as an upward trend seems consistent with recent history (one is reminded in this case that the liberal international spirit of the post-World War II era was preceded by rampant ethnic nationalism). In sum, Habermas' progressive model of post-national citizenship provides a useful framework for thinking about the direction in which democratic citizenship ought to develop.

An additional model of post-national citizenship worth considering is Anna Stilz' legitimate state theory, which provides a universal approach to territorial rights in democratic states. Stilz characterizes her model as contrary to nationalist accounts of property claims. Further, she contends that the legitimate state theory is a more efficacious framework for the protection of rights and justice within the state, and pushes back on ethnically motivated conceptions of property rights as are offered by nationalist models of democracy. Stilz points to the two traditional strands of thought within nationalism as concerns territorial rights, which she describes as the (1) "identity" and (2) "settlement" arguments.¹⁹ Both schools are animated by the view that a group has a territorial claim if either its identity (category 1) or the occupied territory (category 2) has become substantively interrelated with the other.²⁰ In response Stilz offers her post-national model, which is comprised of four criteria:

On the legitimate state theory, a state's claim to territory is rightful if and only if (a) the state effectively implements a system of law defining and enforcing rights, especially property rights, on a territory; (b) its subjects have a legitimate claim to occupy that territory; (c) that system of law "rules in the name of the people," by protecting basic rights and granting the people a voice in defining them; and (d) the state is not a usurper.²¹

Evidently Stilz, like Müller and Habermas, envisions a democratic society that takes an undifferentiated approach to resolving rights issues and treating its citizens fairly and equally. As a theory of equitable government Stilz's model is commendable, and offers another useful framework for how democratic societies ought to develop.

The theoretical accounts of Müller, Habermas, and Stilz all present desirable models of post-national democratic citizenship. In Müller's constitutional patriotism, citizens are united through shared notions of liberal rights without the divisive limitations of identity. Similarly, in Habermas' post-national citizenship, traditional social bonds like culture and language are jettisoned in favor of universal liberties. And in Stilz's legitimate state theory, states are expected to treat territorial claims objectively and with sincere respect for the rights of all citizens. Accordingly, all of these models offer desirable frameworks of citizenship characterized not by conflicts of identity, but rather by profound social trust and peace. However, as we look to the realities of states that not only are hindered by issues of ethnic tension as concern their minority populations, but further are tasked with the construction of healthy civil societies after generations of Soviet occupation, these models of post-national citizenship appear incongruous and largely irrelevant.

Two Considerations for Post-National Models

While post-national models are admirable as progressive frameworks for democratic citizenship, the challenges involved in their application can be examined from two related considerations of post-communist politics. These considerations, while motivated by specific historical and geographic circumstances, nonetheless shed light on the general problem of applying mature frameworks to states that are in the earliest stages of democratization.

The first consideration takes the perspective of minority citizens. It argues that ethnicity is an unavoidable political reality in the situation of post-communist states, and that tension surrounding it must be resolved in order for democratization to succeed. In so doing this consideration challenges all of the post-national accounts to the extent that they eschew issues of ethnic differentiation. The second consideration takes the perspective of incumbent politicians. This case responds first to all post-national accounts in their disregard of the importance of prior democratic traditions to the generation of effective democratic politics. It then examines the unifying role played by ethno-cultural nationalism in lieu of the existence of civil society. As such, the second consideration responds directly to Müller's claim that his constitutional patriotism features a "different moral psychology than nationalism of any sort," arguing instead that nationalism ought to be seen as instrumental to the process of democratization and thereby accounted for in his post-national model.²²

Ethnicity as unavoidable. The experiences of ethnic minorities in post-communist states suggest that ethnicity is a central problem of post-communist politics, and that it must be sufficiently responded to if lasting democracies can be built in the region. Studies show that ethnic fragmentation contributes

to higher levels of corruption, diminished social trust, and fewer public goods, and that this is particularly the case in developing states.²³ The deep-seated and diverse experiences of ethnic minorities in post-communist states also suggest a necessary degree of nuance in resolving questions of ethnicity.

Multi-ethnic post-communist states face challenges of ethnic fragmentation that are intimately rooted in their histories. The experience of the Soviet Union in particular continues to animate many of the challenges faced by these states in the present day. From the foundation of the USSR, the Bolshevik regime deliberately manipulated ethnic relations across various territories in order to ensure its own consolidation of power.²⁴ Ethnic relations under the Soviet Union were further exacerbated by inconsistent and often contradictory policies.²⁵ National languages and cultures were subordinated to the Soviet Union's supranational ideology.²⁶ Accordingly, once that ideology was discredited in 1991, it was quickly replaced by the same ethnic sentiments that were originally exacerbated by the Soviet regime.²⁷

That the Soviets attempted their own post-national project complicated deeply the importance of ethnic identity in post-communist states. Kymlicka demonstrates that European communist occupations in general were defined by attempts to erase ethnic nationalities and cultures, and that "despite a complete monopoly over education and the media, communist regimes were unable to get Croats, Slovaks, and Ukrainians to think of themselves as 'Yugoslavs,' Czechoslovaks,' or Soviets.'" ²⁸ For all of these reasons ethnic identity remains profoundly central to the post-communist political experience. This in turn challenges models of citizenship that advocate for a seamless evolution past ethnic differences.

In addition to the difficult legacy of Soviet occupation, the politics of multi-ethnic post-communist states were complicated further by the peculiar circumstances of their ethnic minorities. André Gerrits explains that while these states were faced with the relatively common experience of "new" minorities (i.e., immigrants into Europe from across the globe), they were further characterized by the unique situation of "old" minorities who had historically settled within their borders.²⁹ This situation, which is sometimes described as regionalism, inspired a range of reactions in post-communist politics, though almost none that may be described as sincerely democratic.³⁰ Indeed, these "old" minority groups were often viewed with hostility and distrust by their states' ethnic majorities.³¹ As will be explained, the discrimination practiced by multi-ethnic post-communist regimes toward their ethnic minority groups was motivated almost entirely by issues of security, with little regard for civic ideals.

In the case of certain post-communist minority populations, such as those in the Balkans and the Caucasus, their political experiences were characterized by settlement on territories that became split between states against their wills, as well as by frequent subjugation and ethnic cleansing.³² However there is also the case of ethnic minority groups whose ethnicities were reflected in the ethnic majorities of neighboring states (e.g., ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia, ethnic Germans in Poland, ethnic Russians in the Baltics, and so forth).³³

Typically this category of ethnic minorities attained its territory through imperial occupation, which helps to explain Wolczuk and Yemelianova's description of ethnic majority groups of states with "old" minority populations as "double minorities."³⁴

Accordingly these states' ethnic majority regimes frequently crafted narratives of subjugation encountered at the hands of the empires to which their ethnic minority populations belonged.³⁵ Kymlicka describes this strategy as nearly unique to post-communist states (with a few exceptions such as Cyprus) and largely inevitable in their politics.³⁶ Consequently, issues pertaining to the enfranchisement and equal treatment of ethnic minorities were often subordinated to pretenses of security against the minorities' "co-ethnic" states.³⁷ While it is unlikely that these ethnic minority groups posed any serious threats to the ethnic majority regimes, their circumstances were repeatedly manipulated by politicians for purposes of power consolidation. It follows that in this context, problems of security must be resolved before models of ethnically neutral citizenship can conceivably be applied.

Moreover, "old" ethnic minority groups did not remain disenfranchised in the immediate post-communist period for lack of trying. Rather, their failure was due to fixed political realities that were out of their control. Indeed numerous ethnic minority groups such as ethnic Hungarians and Albanians in Serbia, ethnic Russians in Estonia, and ethnic Romanians in Ukraine mobilized after the liberal revolutions of 1989 in order to achieve greater enfranchisement, and were roundly met with resistance by the newly-formed ethnic majority governments of each of those states.³⁸ Vachudova and Snyder argue that the new regimes' rejections of minority enfranchisement claims reflected deep historical trends that, as discussed, dated back to ethnic tensions developed during Soviet occupation.³⁹ Additionally, possible alternative solutions such as federalism (instated in Russia) were viewed with skepticism owing to the collapse of the Soviet Union, a situation that Kymlicka describes as having "dealt a 'severe setback' to the very idea of federalism in Eastern and Central Europe."⁴⁰ These examples of attempted minority enfranchisement shed further light on the challenge of applying post-national frameworks to ethnically fragmented states.

Moreover, the diversity of responses demonstrated by ethnically fragmented post-communist states suggest a number of additional problems for the status of a universal approach to post-national citizenship. In his study of party competition in post-communist states, Jan Rovny concludes that the political status of ethnic minority groups depended on their proximity to the "center[s] of [...] communist federation," such that those close to federal centers were afforded rights while in the case of those who "[originated] from somewhere other than the federal center, left-wing parties [faced] strategic incentives to use ethnic nationalism and chauvinism to legitimize and resuscitate their compromised left-wing ideology."⁴¹ Moreover, the states' treatments of their ethnic minority groups reflected the sizes of their minority populations. Vachudova and Snyder demonstrate that in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic (states with

ethnic minority populations of less than 5%), incumbent politicians effectively marginalized nationalist rhetoric and in turn achieved a greater level of democracy.⁴² By contrast, states with more significant ethnic minority populations such as Romania (8% ethnic Hungarians), Bulgaria (10% ethnic Turks), and Slovakia (11% ethnic Hungarians) featured demonstrably higher levels of ethnic nationalist rhetoric in their mainstream politics.⁴³ While ethnic nationalism was available to the regimes of all six states in question, it is telling that the group with smaller ethnic minority populations (and thereby less significant ethnic fragmentation) embraced liberal nationalist rhetoric more in line with Western conceptions of citizenship.⁴⁴ Moreover, that variations in minority population characteristics affected the respective outcomes of post-communist democratization suggests a flaw in the “one-size-fits-all” approach to post-national democratic citizenship.

In one final consideration of ethnicity, the challenge of applying a post-national model of citizenship to developing democracies was sharply illustrated by the post-communist states’ early interactions with the European Union. To this end, Kymlicka describes the failures of EU projects that involved the education of politicians from post-communist states on subjects such as liberal norms and minority rights.⁴⁵ These training sessions ultimately failed to effect any serious implementations of the liberal program, largely as a result of either the political constraints of ethnic fragmentation at home or the overly general instructions offered by the EU curriculum.⁴⁶ In one such example, the norm of territorial autonomy for ethnic minority groups was roundly disregarded in practice by every post-communist state, demonstrating a privileging of security issues over liberal norms as previously discussed.⁴⁷

Wolczuk and Yemelianova recount a similar experience highlighted by the “Releasing Indigenous Multiculturalism through Education Project,” which was conducted by British academics from 2004–2006. This project invited post-communist politicians to engage directly with policy suggestions regarding minority rights, and similarly failed due to an incompatibility of concepts (or perhaps ironically, due to a lack of understanding in the Nietzschean sense).⁴⁸ Post-communist politicians struggled to accept notions of “multiculturalism” and “racism” in application to their respective political situations, rejecting such ideas as Western and irrelevant to their political circumstances.⁴⁹ It should be said that while this specific project endeavored to promote ideals of multiculturalism rather than ethnic neutrality, this anecdote nonetheless sheds light on the challenges of applying universalist, Western frameworks to the context of developing democracies in other parts of the world.

Stefan Auer identifies a related challenge to universalist models of citizenship in considering the different experiences of post-communist states with EU accession. Auer demonstrates that the embrace by Central European states of Western political norms resulted in their preferential treatment by Western institutions like the EU, which in turn had the effect of delegitimizing the progress of Eastern European states like Russia and the Balkans.⁵⁰ This in turn created an ethnically motivated “superiority complex” among Central

European states that in a broader sense contradicted the spirit of liberalism.⁵¹ This example, like the others, suggests the difficult nature of overcoming ethnic differentiation not only in the post-communist context but for governments in general.

To this end, Klaus von Beyme writes of the diversity of ethnic situations across post-communist Europe: "Ethnic claims and state borders anywhere are hardly identical: ethnic consciousness in some cases developed quickly. In the Czech lands most educated people were 'constitutional patriots' for the bi-ethnic state. The Slovaks about 1991 switched from statehood to a separate ethnic identity, grounded on the criterion of language."⁵² von Beyme's account illustrates further the importance of context to the development of an intermediary model of post-national democracy. This suggests that post-national models should be developed with a sensitivity to variation between ethnic circumstances prior to their evolution past those ethnic circumstances.

Nationalism as a unifying force. In Samuel Huntington's model of the "third wave" of democratization, formerly authoritarian states undergo the process of democratization rapidly rather than gradually, and are thereby characterized by periods of "hybrid" politics involving both democratic and authoritarian features.⁵³ In the case of post-communist states, this process was hindered by a lack of democratic traditions owing to the legacy of Soviet occupation. This in turn presents two "hybrid" but nevertheless legitimate circumstances of post-communist democracy: partially authoritarian politics on the one hand, and the presence of ethno-cultural nationalism as a unifying force on the other. These circumstances differentiate post-communist democracies from more mature ones on the surface, though they remain aimed at fundamentally similar ends (i.e., ethno-cultural nationalism as a unifying force maps onto Western conceptions of civil society). Accordingly, accurate models of democratic citizenship in post-communist states must be attuned to considerations of ethnic nationalism and, more broadly, the process of development in achieving democracy.

Levels of democracy consolidation in post-communist states remained considerably behind those of Western democracies in the years following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The majority of states who inherited the political norms of the Soviet Union featured almost no democratic institutions and by extension few traditions of liberalism in their political spheres.⁵⁴ Examples of democratic procedures that existed in the West but not in the post-communist sphere included universal enfranchisement and regular and contested voting.⁵⁵ These states were doubly challenged by aforementioned issues of minority mobilization, which Kymlicka argues came at the expense of whatever civil procedures did exist.⁵⁶

The experience of communism further instilled in post-communist politicians the belief that incumbency was inextricably tied to power.⁵⁷ This encouraged them to privilege the security of their own positions over engagement with democratic traditions.⁵⁸ Accordingly, Guido Tiemann points to the formation

of voter-party linkages in immediate post-communist politics that were not reflected in Western democracies.⁵⁹ Tiemann argues that for this reason post-communist politics differed from those of established democracies in the extent of their openness to political competition and to the volatility of their politics in general.⁶⁰ To this end, Bunce points to the fragmented nature of liberal oppositions in Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia as examples of the unfavorable but nonetheless inevitable realities of post-communist democratization.⁶¹ All of these circumstances developed out of the lack of liberal traditions in the post-communist sphere. As such they created an opportunity for a political mechanism not acknowledged in post-national models of citizenship.

Owing to the ideological vacuum created by the collapse of the Soviet Union, nationalism of an ethno-cultural character quickly took the place of civil society as a motivational force for the unification of post-communist societies.⁶² Von Beyme argues that nationalism in this context was not strictly negative, but rather that it often had a modernizing effect on the states in question.⁶³ Accordingly while in Western Europe the nationalism of the post-Cold War period developed in response to globalization and immigration, in post-communist Europe it frequently served as a tool for the eradication of communism's legacy and the reclamation of sovereignty.⁶⁴

The post-communist experience of nationalism also demonstrated the dialectical nature of identity politics, suggesting that a non-ethnic regime cannot realistically be instated without an element of political turbulence. As alluded to by Kymlicka, nationalist sentiment in a number of post-communist states developed in response to minority claims of enfranchisement (which by all accounts were liberal in nature).⁶⁵ Moreover, while the spirit of democratization may lend itself to conflict resolution between ethnic majority regimes and their ethnic minority populations, it may just as easily impel the regimes to adopt hostile views in an effort to better represent majority sentiment.⁶⁶ This further suggests that an accurate model of ethnically neutral citizenship should anticipate resistance along the path of its implementation, rather than presupposing an ambiguous readiness and willingness to set ethnic differences aside.

In addition to a consideration for the realities of ethnic tension (which was discussed at length in the previous subsection), Müller's constitutional patriotism in particular must anticipate the failures and abuses of nationalist politics, rather than rejecting it out of hand. While ethno-cultural nationalism for many states served as a mechanism of civil society with numerous beneficial outcomes, it was also abused by politicians in situations of weak breakage from communist regimes.⁶⁷ This was again demonstrated in the post-communist states' interactions with the EU: socially homogenous states with richer democratic traditions such as Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic experienced low "costs of complying with the EU's expectations" as pertaining to democratic norms.⁶⁸ By contrast, the politicians of states with poorer democratic circumstances (i.e., higher levels of corruption, fewer intellectual dissidents) found the barriers to entry into the EU to be considerably

higher, and focused on consolidating their own power instead.⁶⁹ Accordingly, an accurate updating of Müller's model should anticipate and respond to this reality (which in our day has extended to much healthier democratic states than those of Eastern Europe).

Despite the observable achievements of democratization from the 1990s, even the most successful post-communist states began to exhibit diminishing returns in their democratization processes by the mid-2000s. In 2008 Adrian Basora attributed this slowing trend to a number of factors including what he termed the "disillusionment of the post-communist states" themselves toward the process of democratization.⁷⁰ Basora posits that this sentiment stemmed from the failures of certain policies implemented by earlier post-communist politicians.⁷¹ Accordingly, in 2006 Bunce argued that despite demonstrating certain qualities of democratic life, many post-communist states continued to struggle to move past issues of gender inequality or their preferences for strongman rule, among others.⁷² All of this suggests a problem with the inorganic application of mature models of citizenship to states that are unprepared for them, for reasons of lack of experience, civil society, or other.

Post-national models revisited. Considering the challenges entailed in both (a) circumstances of ethnic fragmentation and (b) the mobilization of ethno-cultural nationalism as a unifying force, there appear to be numerous problems with the application of post-national models to developing democratic systems. For one, to the extent that models of democratic citizenship presuppose the existence of healthy democratic institutions and traditions of liberal rights, they are incompatible with democracies who are only beginning to develop these features. Moreover, the post-communist experience with ethno-cultural nationalism as a unifying force suggests that post-national models of citizenship must have a greater appreciation for the development of ethnically neutral nationalism as a precondition for successful democratic life (i.e., moving ethnic to civic). To this end, von Beyme in particular argues that many Western scholars failed to anticipate the modernizing element of post-communist nationalism in their prescriptions for democratization.⁷³

Further, Hungarian politician György Schöpflin takes a militant stance against universalist notions of liberal democracy for what he terms a "general undiagnosed difficulty [...] between consent to the exercise of power and democracy itself."⁷⁴ On this view Schöpflin asserts that post-communist states sought to develop democratic values through whatever means available, and could not adopt ethnically neutral concepts overnight.⁷⁵ He extends this reasoning to issues of ethnicity, arguing that universalists deny the legacy of "the ethnic underpinning of [post-communist] plausibility structures," and further that they "equate their own particularisms with universal norms and then [...] impose these on other cultures."⁷⁶ While in my view there exists greater space for reconciliation with the post-national model than Schöpflin's argument would suggest, it nevertheless sheds light on the importance of a sensitivity to context that post-national models seem to lack entirely.

Further it is worth looking to the post-national theorists' specific oversights as concern the interactions between their accounts and developing states. For one, Müller acknowledges that constitutional patriotism is an incomplete framework for ethnically fragmented states. He explains that while ethnic minorities could conceivably use the constitutional patriotic framework in constructing their own constitutional regimes, his model cannot respond adequately to the importance of "bounded political space," and that constitutional patriotism is rather better suited for "transnational norm-building."⁷⁷ He concedes further that inconsistencies "across ethnic, religious, and cultural communities [...] would point toward liberal (or even illiberal) nationalism, rather than constitutional patriotism."⁷⁸

Similarly, Ipperciel notes Habermas' incomplete critique of nationalism in his defense of post-national citizenship. He explains that "Habermas is unable to answer his own question regarding the borders of a constitutional state. He merely insists on minority rights and, when they are respected, on the illegitimacy of separatism. [...] This is paradoxical, considering his usual way of arguing based on principles."⁷⁹ Likewise, Katherine Verdery's findings regarding post-communist land as representative of ethnic kinship discredits as broad a universalist approach to territorial rights as the one put forth by Stilz.⁸⁰ Verdery argues that the politics of land in Eastern Europe are rooted in the history of that region, and that they were sharply amplified by the dissolution of the Soviet Union.⁸¹ Verdery's caveat, and more generally the nuances of the post-communist space, present a number of challenges of application to the universalist outlooks of the post-national models.

In sum, the experiences of post-communist states present a number of challenges to post-national models of democratic citizenship. Generally these challenges can be categorized into one of two groups, the first concerning issues of ethnic minority rights and their implementation (challenging generally the notion of ethnic neutrality), and the second concerning legacies of undemocratic politics along with the role of ethno-cultural nationalism therein (responding directly to Müller's rejection of nationalist considerations). This invites us finally to consider an intermediary approach to democratic development, which aims to bridge the divide between post-communism and post-nationalism.

An Intermediary Model for Developing Democracies

Given the range of region-specific challenges discussed, it follows that a developmental, rather than a mature, model of post-communist democratic citizenship is needed. Accordingly, the post-national model must be updated with an intermediary account of development, with considerations for the roles played by ethnicity and ethno-cultural nationalism. Further, while the model developed in this paper speaks to the constraints of the post-communist space, we can generalize certain conclusions for developing democracies on the whole.

It is fitting that in his treatment of democracy in post-Cold War Europe, Gerrits draws attention to the de-universalization of the umbrella term into

categories such as “illiberal,” “electoral,” and “guided” democracies.⁸² Gerrits poses a number of questions that speak to the need for an intermediary model of democratic citizenship in developing states: he wonders, “Can political democracy be solely based on individual or political rights, or does it need a collective cultural or ethnic awareness too? Does a civic concept of the nation suffice for a sustainable democratic state and society?”⁸³ In my view the answer in the case of post-communist states is an assured affirmation of the need for “ethnic awareness” as well as for an ethnically neutral (i.e., liberal) nationalism, though not as ends but rather as means to post-national citizenship. This is to say that post-national models can only replace coherent, ethnically neutral nationalisms, which in turn must first be achieved in developing states.

That the intermediary model of democratic citizenship must account for the context-specific role of nationalism is corroborated not only by the specific political circumstances of post-communist states, but also by numerous scholarly accounts of democratic citizenship. Political theorists such as Hannah Arendt and Yuli Tamir agree that contractual democracies depend on national myths.⁸⁴ Tamir in particular argues that the doctrines of liberalism and nationalism should be used to motivate one another.⁸⁵ By contrast it has been argued by other Western thinkers that, when applied in the Eastern European context, nationalism inevitably takes on a dangerous ethnic character.⁸⁶ Auer contends that this view is both historically inaccurate and overly general, and that a sensitivity to history must be employed for a proper understanding (as discussed in section II).⁸⁷ Liah Greenfeld further affirms the importance of context, arguing that the institutionalization of nationalism is always tied to historical legacies that must be duly considered.⁸⁸ Accordingly, a workable intermediary theory of post-communist democratization challenges post-national models to engage more closely with how ethno-cultural nationalisms can be carefully and appropriately replaced by civic ideals.

Multicultural models, such as the one generously outlined by Kymlicka, offer accounts of citizenship that both seek to mobilize nationalism for its benefits and are attuned to the importance of ethnic distinction. Kymlicka dispels the misconception that liberal multiculturalism and nationalism are incompatible systems, arguing instead that his model aims to update the status of nationalism in multi-ethnic societies.⁸⁹ Kymlicka further points to contemporary liberal democracies such as the United States, which today can accurately be said to feature civic nationalist cultures but nonetheless are characterized by tragic histories of illiberal policies pursued against their ethnic minority populations.⁹⁰ This suggests that peaceful multiculturalism can be achieved by all developing democracies, and offers a first glance at a general intermediary theory of democratic citizenship in ethnically fragmented states. Further, Kymlicka’s description of nationalism as a binding, non-marginalizing force accurately responds to aforementioned problems regarding the question of a developmental, progressive nationalism in post-communist societies.

Moreover, by examining criticisms of the liberal multicultural model, we may glean further insights about applying this model’s best ideas into a

realistic, intermediary theory of democratic citizenship. Auer identifies certain aspects of the Kymlicka's theory that need tempering. Specifically, he points to an important distinction within liberal multiculturalism between its "soft" and "hard" varieties, explaining that the former advocates for an accessible civic identity for all citizens, while the latter recognizes all ethnic groups equally and sanctions the explicit recognition of their cultures in lieu of a unifying one.⁹¹ Auer identifies a paradox involved in the "hard" variety, drawing attention to the fact that some ethnic minority groups must have "some cultural practices that are considered [...] incompatible with the demands of a liberal democratic state."⁹² In this case the imposition of a doctrine of ethnic equality appears considerably more interventionist than the multiculturalism of the "soft" variety.⁹³ (There is also, of course, the extent to which direct ethnic equality could even be pursued in a post-communist context, considering the challenges discussed in section II). Accordingly an appropriate model of multiculturalism reflects the goals of the "soft" variety in constructing an ethnically neutral nationalism.

Taking into account both liberal multiculturalism's strengths and weaknesses, the intermediary theory of democratic citizenship is formulated along several dimensions: (1) the existence of institutions aimed at reconciling ethnic tensions and soothing historical legacies; (2) relatedly, the construction of an ethnically neutral nationalism; and (3) an attention to context paired with a faith in the diverse course of democratization.

The first dimension is motivated by the conclusions of scholars such as Easterly, who suggest that strong institutions are necessary for the health of democratic systems with high levels of ethnic diversity.⁹⁴ Easterly argues that institutions help prevent ethnically-driven conflict such as genocide, and that ethnically diverse states with strong institutions do not suffer economic setbacks to the extent that those without them do.⁹⁵ Likewise, Charles King offers that ethnically diverse states could foster less confrontational relations with their minority populations through these institutions, for instance encouraging enterprise with their national states in the case of "old" minorities.⁹⁶ Such institutions would validate the presence of ethnic differentiation and ensure a greater level of societal engagement, without directly privileging any groups' rights or inviting conversations aimed at the embrace of multiculturalism (which, as demonstrated, were thoroughly rejected by post-communist politicians in the past). This in turn would allow ethnic minorities a degree of flexibility to identify past their ethnic identities, in addition to economic incentives that would foster cooperation and community.⁹⁷

The second, related dimension of an ethnically neutral nationalism, aims to better integrate the society and prepare it for a universal embrace of rights as formulated by post-national accounts. That the existence of non-ethnic patriotisms in post-communist states correlates with lower levels of radical ethnic politics has been demonstrated in the conclusions of scholars such as Vachudova and Snyder.⁹⁸ Further, it is paramount that earlier forms of ethnocultural nationalism be viewed not as dangerous (as has been communicated

by numerous Western accounts), but rather as modernizing, considering that for many post-communist states nationality is a massive point of pride as contrasted to their recent experiences of Soviet occupation.⁹⁹ For this second dimension Kymlicka's "soft" model of liberal multiculturalism seems sufficient, as previously discussed.

While the first two dimensions of the intermediary model can be somewhat easily reconciled with post-national frameworks to the extent that they are means to that end, the third dimension presents a more fundamental challenge to the universalist nature of post-national accounts. However at once this dimension, which concerns the importance of attention to context and faith in the diverse nature of democratization processes, is perhaps the most important, given the multifarious effects that historical circumstances have had on the various courses of democratic development. This dimension is motivated in particular by the work of Cheng Chen who, in her comparative study of post-Leninist states, concludes that the specific ways in which universalist ideologies were applied had extremely significant consequences for the development of those states.¹⁰⁰ This view is further supported by King's claim that "countries with more languages, more cultures, and more historical grievances obviously face a host of challenges unknown in less diverse polities," and that their challenges must be approached with nuance.¹⁰¹

King concedes that the attention to context is extraordinarily difficult, calling to mind the quote from Kymlicka cited in this paper's introduction, which claims that political theory has yet to offer a universal solution to differentiation.¹⁰² Accordingly the intermediary theory of democratic citizenship modestly advocates for an element of specificity and patience in approaches to the development of democracy in post-communist states, and in nascent democracies generally. While the ends of post-national citizenship may be quite similar for all democratic states, the roads taken may vary significantly. A careful developmental discourse will only benefit the process of democratization.

Conclusion

In sum, the post national models of Müller, Habermas, and Stilz are desirable models of mature democracy, which ought to be aspired to. In particular, their goals of ethnic neutrality and universal liberties are commendable, and indeed will hopefully be reflected in all democratic states someday. However in generalizing from the experiences of post-communist states undergoing the process of democratization, these post-national models appear to have a number of shortcomings when applied. For one, they fail to anticipate the importance of ethnic differentiation in post-imperial situations, particularly as concerns ethnic minority populations. Moreover, Müller's accounts especially is unaware of the positive role that ethno-cultural nationalism can play in motivating progress in developing democracies.

Accordingly, this paper's intermediary approach to democratic citizenship offers a solution to reconcile the differences between post-communist realities

and post-national aspirations, based on three dimensions: first, institutions aimed at resolving ethnic tensions through indirect means such as economic cooperation; second, the construction of an ethnically neutral nationalism (as described in Kymlicka's "soft" multiculturalism); and third, a need for appreciation of context, along with an openness to a diversity of political paths along the road to democracy. Moreover, while the post-national accounts of Müller, Habermas, and Stilz hold as developmental ends for democracy, it seems their universalist outlook is an overly simplistic approach to democratic citizenship in developing states, and must be updated with a renewed attention to detail.

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Photographic Exploration

Crafting a New Commons:

Universal Healthcare in Rajasthan

Amanda Walencewicz, *Photo Editor*

Within the global commons, barriers can be created or destructed. Through these acts of creation and destruction, resources can be shared or protected, and knowledge can flow freely or be withheld. Healthcare is one of these resources, less tangible than oil or water but just as essential to the well-being of people around the world. But access to healthcare is often restricted, with critical procedures and medications out of reach due to uncontrollable factors in a person's life. In the Indian state of Rajasthan, medical care has been deemed a common good, available to all those who need it. Barriers to access have been lifted, with medicine becoming a free resource within the commons of Rajasthan.

Beginning in 2011, the Free Medicines Initiative of Rajasthan, known formally as Mukhyamantri Nishulk Dava Yojana, seeks to provide medicine for the over seventy million people of the state. Rajasthan is the largest state in India, encompassing 342,239 km² of land, varied in terrain and local customs. There is no free, universal healthcare in India as a whole, but to implement such a system in even one state is no small feat. The Free Medicines Initiative, coupled with other healthcare initiatives in the state, provides free, generic medications and doctor's visits at no cost to all citizens of Rajasthan. As medicine originally accounted for nearly ninety percent of a household's health care expenses, the administration of free medicines reduces the total financial burden of healthcare drastically.

The following photos by Chris Hnin, a student in the Tufts University class of 2017, highlight the people at the center of this initiative; the doctors and nurses without whom the program would be impossible, as well as the patients navigating the relatively new system. All are taking part in this open exchange, participants in the expansion of medical care beyond limiting boundaries like class and location. These figures are never alone in the photos, but always surrounded by others. They may not all have the same purpose in the healthcare system, but they are all members, all required for it to work. Here the global commons as a concept is defined not through trade or security, but through community. Medicine becomes a point of connection for the members of the towns and villages of Rajasthan, and a means for the intersection of the various classes within those localities. They share this space, this space of hospitals and dispensaries, and cooperate and collaborate to make the healthcare of Rajasthan a true common good.

Chris Hnin, Tufts University



Many other schemes run parallel to MNDY, including cash incentives for pregnant women who are able to meet important checkpoints throughout the maternity process.



During a visit to Maharana Bhupal Hospital, Dr. Bhadoria stops to check in with Dr. Sanjeev and the pharmacist on duty.



A doctor at the Out-Patient Department of Satellite Hospital Hiran Magri Sector 6 sees approximately 200 patients a day during an 8 a.m. to 12 p.m. shift.



Reviewing prevalence of diseases, drug usage and localized patient problems are all items on a long list of agenda.



A young patient presents her prescription—the only required document—to collect free generic drugs from a Drug Distribution Counter on a rainy Saturday morning.



Mother and daughter duo waits anxiously for the onset of labor contractions at a Primary Health Centre along the Udaipur-Ahmedabad highway.

Interviews

Assessing Global Renewable Energy Infrastructure:

A Conversation with Dev Sanyal

Interview by Nandita Baloo

Biography

Dev Sanyal is Chief Executive, Alternative Energy and Executive Vice President, Europe and Asia Regions of BP plc. He is a member of the Group Executive Committee. He joined the BP Group in 1989 and has held a variety of positions globally and was Executive Vice President, Strategy and Regions prior to his current appointment on 31st March 2016. He has also held the positions of Group Treasurer and Chairman, BP Investment Management; CEO, Air BP International; CEO, BP Eastern Mediterranean amongst other roles.

He is currently an independent non-executive director on the board of Man Group plc, Vice Chairman of Centre for China in the World Economy at Tsinghua University, a member of the Accenture Global Energy Board and the board of advisors of The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, where he obtained a Master's degree (MALD) in 1988.

1. *Oil and geopolitics have been inextricably linked throughout the ages, and not all of these links are necessarily positive. How do IOCs handle this inherent geopolitical risk in their business?*

When you consider that BP began life over 100 years ago as the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, then you can see we have some experience of dealing with geopolitical risk. In a recent programme about the industry, the presenter began by referring to “the tantalizing uncertainty that flows through the story of oil.” Tantalizing or not, managing risks, of which geopolitical risk is one aspect, is an essential part of our industry.

Around the world you see many examples of international companies, including BP, operating in the confluence of politics, the economy and society.

Zero risk is not realistic. There are inherent risks in any large, dispersed and complex business. The important question is how do we manage risks, and mitigate it where appropriate.

To do this, we need a clear framework which I believe has four essential pillars.

The first pillar is a clear set of rules or principles. This enables and guides judgments about decisions and actions that result.

The second is capability—ensuring your people have the knowledge, experience and understanding to arrive at sound judgments.

Thirdly, governance, by which I mean the architecture of checks and balances to manage a dispersed organization. This also includes standardized and consistent mechanisms to ensure risks are understood, assessed and responded to in an informed way.

And fourth, and most important, is to know who you are, what you believe in, and what you want to be. In other words, to have a firm set of values. That is crucial in informing decisions and actions.

With these pillars in place, geopolitical risks, and indeed other types of risk, can be managed and may even provide a bridge toward solutions.

2. *Countries and companies are trying to move the supply side fuel mix more toward renewables. What are the projected challenges of switching to a low carbon world, and what is BP's role in the process?*

Energy is essential to human progress and economic prosperity. Over the next two decades, we see a growing global demand for energy that is affordable, around 30%, largely driven by rising incomes in emerging economies. The extent of this increase does not match global economic growth, which we expect to double over the next two decades. This is due to gains in energy efficiency, as the world uses energy more sustainably.

Meeting this demand will require many different energy sources. Renewables are the fastest-growing energy source. They are expected to increase at around 7% a year and account for 40% of the growth in power generation over the next two decades. In terms of total global energy demand, renewables currently contribute around 3% of the total and we estimate that, as a result of rapid improvements in their competitiveness, this will grow to around 10% by 2035.

Over the same period, oil and natural gas are likely to continue to play a significant part in meeting demand for energy. They currently account for around 56% of total energy consumption. By 2035, we anticipate oil will have around a 29% share, with annual growth slowing down over this period. Meanwhile we estimate the share of gas will go up to 25% of global energy, placing it ahead of coal and not far behind oil.

BP is gearing up to meet this shifting demand by increasing the proportion of gas in our portfolio. As we increase gas in our portfolio, we are taking action to reduce methane emissions. We are providing renewable energy and have the largest operated renewables business among our oil and gas peers. We are investing in start-ups because technological innovation underpins our efforts to make our operations and products more efficient and sustainable. We are pursuing efficient operations and set targets for our GHG emissions. And we are enabling our customers to reduce emissions by reducing the carbon content of many of our fuels, lubricants and petrochemicals products.

3. *What is the role of multilateral policies and global agreements in supporting the development of renewables worldwide? Are there specific policy tenets that you believe are critical to facilitate a low carbon world?*

Global agreements like COP21 in Paris are important in creating momentum which set the direction and pace of travel. They also provide a framework for international cooperation that will make the energy transition more efficient. Bottom-up agreements like Paris can potentially be more successful because they give each country the flexibility to choose its own path.

This places the emphasis on national governments to make progress on the ground, including for renewables. Countries have to develop their renewable sectors in line with the local characteristics of their resource base, which vary regionally.

BP believes that carbon pricing by governments is the best policy to limit GHG emissions. Putting a price on carbon—one that treats all carbon equally, whether it comes out of a smokestack or a car exhaust—would make energy efficiency more attractive and lower carbon energy sources, such as natural gas and renewables, more cost competitive.

We believe that in the long term renewables should compete with other energy supply options, including fossil fuels, supported only by a carbon price. In the meantime, emerging low-emissions technologies, such as carbon capture usage and storage (CCUS), may justify transitional incentives to help them overcome barriers to commercialisation and become competitive in the market. These incentives should be targeted at technologies with proven potential for cost and GHG reduction, and be time-limited only until competitiveness is achieved or shown to be unachievable.

4. *In the aftermath of the Paris Agreements, what changes do you believe countries and companies will need to make to meet their obligations?*

Countries and companies will need to change two things. They will need to reduce the amount of energy needed to produce goods and deliver services. And they will need to reduce carbon emissions from the energy they use. Reducing energy intensity will require a combination of demand management—including changing some behaviors—and energy efficiency, which will require improved technologies. Reducing carbon emission intensity will require using lower carbon resources such as natural gas and renewables.

Countries need to lead by providing clear, stable, long-term, ambitious policy frameworks. Within a clear policy framework, companies have a key role to play by deploying innovative technological and commercial solutions at scale.

There is a key role for consumers too. The lion's share of emissions from fossil fuels occurs when they are used or burned. Consumer choices about how much energy to use, and which sources of energy to use, will be just as important as the choices made by companies.

A carbon price would help everyone make lower carbon choices.

5. *When considering the collaboration between an IOC and a new country in creating a pathway for energy access or delivery, what are some of the important political, cultural, and economic factors that need to be taken into account?*

Each country is unique. Geography, culture and political systems vary as do each country's expectations and requirements of international investors. Before we do business, we spend as much time as we can learning about the country. We have teams that consult with a range of stakeholders in-country and with the international experts to assess both challenges and opportunities. This important work informs the business on how best to keep our people and assets secure and to engage constructively with the government, communities and wider society.

If the country is just starting out on oil and gas extraction, we look at how we can work with the local community to minimize the social and environmental impacts of the project. We also provide advice from our experience on models of managing the new rent. We try to source as much as we can locally. This means that we look at existing supply chains and assess where countries have skills gaps that we can bridge through, for example, technical training or professional education. We ensure that we abide by international standards of transparency.

Finally, you mentioned culture. It is essential that we work with the grain of local society and respect its traditions, while always upholding our values and code of conduct.

6. *Many national oil companies are looking outward for new resource centers and new market access. How do IOCs collaborate with these national oil companies and team up with them to influence sustainable development?*

This goes back to our first question, and the central importance of building strong relationships based on mutual benefit. Above all else, energy is a relationships business. Let me offer you an example.

In 2009 BP was the first IOC to return to Iraq after the Gulf War. We did so in partnership with two NOCs—Iraq's South Oil Company, and PetroChina. We went in to lead a partnership to restore the fortunes of one of the world's truly great oil fields, Rumaila, near Basra in the south of the country.

In terms of the partnership, the South Oil Company provided a workforce with 50 years of experience of the field. PetroChina brought drilling, manufacturing and engineering resources. And BP brought our advanced technology and our experience of operating excellence developed from leading operations across the world.

Since 2009 we have brought in specialized procurement tools, introduced advance seismic and digital reservoir management techniques, introduced the latest horizontal well drilling technology and applied our global safety and operating standards. The result is a transformation in production from around a million barrels of oil a day in 2009 to just under 1.5 million a day today, and we have recently produced the three-billionth barrel since establishing the

joint venture with our partners. That has generated significant revenues for the Iraqi government, which receives 98% of the proceeds from this operation.

We have breathed new life into the field itself, but that is just one part of the story. Alongside the revival of oil production, 100 million square meters of land have been cleared of mines and unexploded ordinance. Health clinics, a water treatment plant, an electricity generating station and a 24-hour ambulance service have been introduced to serve the local population. An academy has opened and more than 2.2 million hours of training have been delivered, supporting a workforce of 6,000 local staff, 12,000 contractors and 25,000 more in the wider supply chain.

As you can see, there is no one simple route to sustainable development, but there is a successful one if you are prepared to look at the broader picture, think long term and invest your energies in developing your relationships.

Harnessing Corporate Power to Fight Climate Change:

A Conversation with Woochung Um

Interview by Somya Banwari

Biography

Mr. Woochong Um is the Deputy Director General for the Regional and Sustainable Development Department (RSDD) of the Asian Development Bank. He is currently overseeing the ADB's climate finance program with particular focus on leveraging private sector and carbon market financing. His responsibilities also include sustainable infrastructure, gender and social development, governance and public management, environmental issues, and safeguards. Before his appointment as Deputy Director General, Mr. Um was the Director of the Sustainable Infrastructure Division of the RSDD. Mr. Um's portfolio of initiatives included clean energy, energy efficiency, transport, water supply and sanitation, urban development, and Information and Communication Technology. Prior to this, Mr. Um was a Specialist in the Infrastructure Division of the Mekong Department, in charge of managing infrastructure projects. Most notably, Mr. Um led a team to prepare the Nam Theun 2 hydroelectric project in Lao PDR in collaboration with the World Bank. He is also ADB's focal point for dams and development issues, as well as mega urban development projects. He was also involved in various Bank-wide initiatives including the establishment of ADB's accountability mechanism. Before joining ADB, Mr. Um worked at Pfizer and at Pitney Bowes Inc. Mr. Um, a Korean, has an MBA in finance and international business from New York University and a Bachelor of Science degree in Computer Science/Management from Boston College.

1. *How should renewable energy infrastructure tie into and be prioritized in the agendas of developed and developing countries? Do you think the West should be taking steps to help facilitate this development worldwide?*

ADB's official policy for its work in the energy sectors of developing Asian countries identifies renewable energy development as a key solution to the twin challenges of ensuring energy security and addressing the threat of climate change by mitigating greenhouse gas emissions.

For nearly a decade now, ADB has been tracking and supporting the growth of clean energy in developing Asia and the Pacific, and we've seen that the appetite for renewables among developing countries has only increased. ADB's own investments have responded to this appetite, and since 2011 our

annual investments in clean energy (combining renewables and energy efficiency) have not gone below \$2 billion. We've since declared a new target of reaching \$3 billion in clean energy investments annually by 2020 as part of a larger effort to double our total climate financing.

Over the course of this period, we have certainly seen renewable energy infrastructure development become integrated into the agendas of developing Asian countries. This follows a worldwide pattern—globally, at least 173 countries have renewable energy targets, and an estimated 146 countries have renewable energy support policies, at the national or state/provincial level.¹

A recent and clear example of this can be found in the intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs), which countries declared as part of the Paris Agreement. Out of 40 developing member countries of the Asian Development Bank, 38 have submitted INDCs, and 11 of those have set quantifiable renewable energy development targets ranging from increasing renewable energy's contribution to their power mix to above 20% to a few pledging ambitious shifts to 100% renewable energy generation by 2030.² ADB sees these INDCs as a guide toward any future reshaping of policy, and work has begun on assessing them, and seeking better integration on the declared targets with ADB's project pipeline.

Those same targets also reveal the role that the developing world hopes that the West will take, namely to unlock additional financing to reach these targets. Both the G7 and G20 have pledged to accelerate access to renewable energy and to advance energy efficiency, tying into the United Nations' General Assembly's adoption of a dedicated Sustainable Development Goal on ensuring access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all. The UNFCCC and Paris Agreement have put mechanisms in place in an effort to raise climate financing to \$100 billion a year by 2020, but recent estimates place climate mitigation costs in Asia and the Pacific alone at \$200 billion annually.³ This investment need is primarily from the power sector, which need important interventions to control pollutant emissions (including greenhouse gases) through investments in renewable energy, smart grids, energy efficiency, and cleaner transport.

Along with other sources of climate financing, ADB will be channeling these resources to developing Asia, and to priority actions, mainly clean energy development.

2. *What is the role of multilateral policies and global agreements in supporting the development of renewables worldwide? Are there specific policies that you believe are critical to facilitate a low carbon world?*

The major global agreements that are directly influencing the development of renewables would be the Paris Agreement, and Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 7 on energy, and Sustainable Development Goal 13 on climate action. The Paris Agreement and the NDCs that are integral to it show off the ambitions of countries in terms of renewable energy development, and this ambition is extensive, though subject to financing limitations. SDG7 states a goal to

substantially increase the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix by 2030. SDG7's operational component, the global Sustainable Energy for All Initiative—of which ADB is an important member—sets a definitive target: to double the amount of renewables by 2030, making renewable energy 36% of the global energy mix.

In terms of multilateral policies, one area that more focus is needed is the transfer of technology, and the transfer of knowledge. Often multilateral policies are found to be used against developing countries when they want to create indigenous manufacturing capacities. Finding a win-win solution that protects Intellectual Property is needed.

There are certainly specific policies that are getting in the way of climate goals. Certain trade policies are given precedence over achieving climate goals, but options such as carbon pricing and labelling of carbon contents in products may help in aligning trade and climate necessity.

The high level of fossil fuel subsidies that are national level policies, continues to create an unfair competitive field for renewable development. Ending these subsidies while protecting society from the “sticker shock” is one of the major challenges faced by many countries, developing and developed alike. One example of the difficulty level of this task is to note that in September 2009, the G20 pledged to phase out all fossil fuel subsidies. In 2013, this pledge was reiterated. Yet subsidy levels have not changed.

Closely tied to this is the need to phase out unnecessary retail price subsidies for fossil fuels in developing countries. Indonesia has been making some progress on this front, as the Government took advantage of a drop in global crude oil prices and associated prices for refined petroleum products to scrap subsidies on gasoline and place a cap on subsidies on diesel. Similar efforts have been made in India and the PRC, and ADB hopes to capture the lessons of these examples.

3. *Following the failure of the TPP, trade negotiations between the West and Asia have been cast in shadow and plenty of Asian-driven initiatives such as the AIIB have been filling the policy void. What are the implications of this region-driven development?*

For several years, there has been a consensus view that the global center of economic gravity is shifting to Asia. Although economic growth has slowed in some countries in Asia-Pacific, the combined economies in the region may have achieved a “critical mass” such that growth will be sustained in spite of any pending de-globalization. TPP was a U.S.-led initiative that excluded China, and this could conceivably be replaced by a new regional agreement that does include China but excludes the U.S. The new U.S. administration has indicated interest in negotiating bilateral deals, so the issue is more about economic efficiency of a regional deal versus a bunch of bilateral deals (and this is not a new concept in global trade agreements).

Back to the point about a critical mass of regional economic growth: China's “One Belt One Road” initiative is intended to foster greater economic

integration across the Eurasian land mass, and this will continue with or without TPP. AIIB was conceived with the One Belt One Road initiative and TPP in view, and AIIB became operational before the collapse of TPP (and last time I checked they are still in business). It is important to remember that AIIB was created to deliver more financing to the region and not to fill a policy void.

So the short answer is that we don't know the full implications of TPP's collapse but we expect to see sustained regional growth for the foreseeable future.

ADB will continue to promote cross-border infrastructure and inter-regional cooperation. In terms of Asia-driven initiatives, ADB and AIIB share goals and are partners in the continuing fight to eliminate poverty in developing Asia and the Pacific region. In 2016, ADB and AIIB signed a memorandum of agreement to strengthen our cooperation, at the strategic level and at specific technical levels, on the basis of our two organization's complementarity, ability to add value, institutional strengths and comparative advantages, for our mutual benefit, and the benefit of developing Asia.

Since the signing of that memorandum, ADB and AIIB have approved two major cofinancing projects, one for a highway project in Pakistan and a second for a natural gas project in Bangladesh. Our institutions are partnered in order to jointly meet the pressing infrastructure needs in developing Asia and the Pacific region, needs that are even greater than previously estimated.

ADB has been working closely with AIIB since their establishment process, and we will continue to do so.

4. *Many private sector development companies are looking outward for new resource centers and new market access. How do developing nations work with the private sector to influence sustainable development? What are the implications of these kinds of arrangements?*

Source: ADB. 2017. *Meeting Asia's Infrastructure Needs*. Manila.

ADB's most recent analysis of developing Asia's infrastructure needs revealed that the region will need to invest \$26 trillion from 2016 to 2030, or \$1.7 trillion per year, if the region is to maintain its growth momentum, eradicate poverty, and respond to climate change. Even after fiscal reform, the public sector would only be able to meet 40% of that investment need, leaving the private sector to fill the remaining 60%. This would mean an increase in private investments from about \$63 billion a year today to as high as \$250 billion a year over 2016–2020.

For Developing Asia to attract that investment, extensive regulatory and institutional reforms are needed to make infrastructure more attractive to private investors and generate a pipeline of bankable projects for public-private partnerships (PPP). A bankable project meets defined criteria of due diligence, structuring of debt and equity requirements, mapping of procurement processes, and ensuring that reports, clearances and other approvals are well prepared and quickly processed.

Options for developing countries, where ADB has been involved, include the implementation of reforms such as enacting PPP-specific laws,

streamlining procurement and bidding processes, and establishing independent PPP government units—in short, extensive institutional and regulatory reform that addresses issues of procurement, disputes, and permits, and defines the parameters that investors look at clearly—costs, bid parameters, and tariffs.

5. *Your responsibilities at the ADB also extend to social and gender development. Do you believe that there is a relationship between development of renewable infrastructure and a country's social development?*

Source: ADB. 2015. *Sustainable Energy for All Tracking Progress in Asia and the Pacific: A Summary Report*. Manila.

There is a clear relationship between improved infrastructure and social development because good infrastructure in any sector improves lives, eases burdens, and creates new opportunities. ADB has seen the impact of ensuring energy access at the community level, where there are huge net gains for social development, especially for addressing the vulnerabilities of women and children in terms of equity and opportunity. Policy needs to be strengthened especially in terms of recognizing and addressing women's specific energy needs, and to drive investment in energy access for social infrastructure that directly affects women and children, such as health clinics and schools.

When we specify “renewable energy infrastructure,” this marks a refinement of development goals. Where it was previously seen enough to provide energy now we have an understanding of how business-as-usual energy development through the fossil fuel pathway passes on costs to society through pollution and direct impacts on public health and ecosystems services. Renewable energy infrastructure is a new way—a low emissions path to development, which serves as win-win for social development by both meeting basic needs but doing so in an environmentally sustainable manner—all of which is elucidated in the SDGs and particularly SDG 7.

ADB has seen how at the household scale, limited access to energy affects women and children foremost. As they have to tend to the household, the burden falls to them to secure the household's energy supply, usually taking hours a day to gather fuel to burn. Women and children also suffer from the most exposure to the smoke and fumes from open fires and kerosene lanterns, and the WHO states that indoor air pollution of this type causes almost half a million women's deaths each year from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease⁴. The advancement of renewable energy technologies (and business models) has created an opportunity to address this problem directly, by providing households with affordable renewable energy services.

ADB's extensive portfolio of projects that have worked on rural electrification through renewable energy, such as supporting home solar panels in Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal, to household biogas in Viet Nam have been shown to improve women's well being, and empowered their role in the household, and led to higher household incomes. Easing the daily burdens of women through giving them reliable electric lighting, the energy for water pumps,

and sources of cleaner fuel for cooking and heating are a winning solution for society.

6. *Does the rapid urbanization and industrialization faced in Asian and South East Asian countries impact implementation of clean energy infrastructure? Is there a policy mechanism frequently used to combat the negative repercussions of urbanization that are growing in tangent to renewable investment?*

Source: ADB, 2016. *GrEEEn Solutions for Livable Cities*. Manila

Asia's cities are magnets for people seeking new opportunities and better lives, and Asia's urban population has risen 29% over the past two decades, with ADB projecting that by the year 2050, 75% of Asia's total population will be living in urban areas. [As I mentioned before, the global center of economic growth is shifting to Asia and more specifically to Asia's cities.] But this rapid urbanization is over-straining the provision of basic services such as housing, access to electricity, access to potable water and sanitation, and municipal waste management services. ADB estimates that there are more than half a billion Asians living in urban slums, where these services are largely absent. This creates a situation of severe inequality and vulnerability in many cities. The centralization of life in cities also means that urban buildings and transport account for significant energy consumption and pollutant emissions including greenhouse gases.

There is no single policy mechanism that can address the many facets of Asia's urbanization, but ADB promotes long-term planning and integrated solutions, guided by what we term the "3E" strategies of economic competitiveness, environmental sustainability, and equity. One policy initiative that ADB strongly recommends in developing livable cities, and which we've piloted in Viet Nam, Myanmar, Malaysia and Thailand, is the development of a GrEEEn City Action Plan—a time-bound action plan with initiatives consisting of short, medium, and long term actions for investments and measures to enable these investments whether through policy interventions or by building institutional capacity. This action plan is guided by a collective vision for the city, and an urban profile that assesses the cities characteristics across physical territory, the regulatory and institutional landscape and its economic, environmental, and social aspects.

Renewable energy can be integrated into the action plan based on available technologies and their appropriateness. The energy demands of buildings and transport have multiple opportunities for renewable "plug-ins," whether through on-site generation, utilizing "dormant spaces," such as through rooftop solar, which ADB features on its own Headquarters in Manila, or through transformative approaches like what we are seeing with the up-take of electric vehicles as a low-emissions transport solution. In line with the larger renewable energy sector, similar incentive and supporting policies can help these solutions take off, and cities can take the lead in establishing these policies as we've seen in the PRC, and the Republic of Korea.

Going forward, we can expect that advances in digital communications technologies will facilitate rapid deployment of “smart” infrastructure and facilitate the evolution of “smart cities” in the region but this is not yet business as usual.

Notes

1. REN 21. 2016. *Renewables 2016 Global Status Report*. Paris.
2. ADB. 2016. *Assessing the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions of ADB Developing Members*. Manila.
3. Source: ADB. 2017. *Meeting Asia's Infrastructure Needs*. Manila.
4. Source: WHO. 2016. *Burning Opportunity: Clean Household Energy for Health, Sustainable Development, and Wellbeing of Women and Children*. Switzerland.

Winner of the
2016 Building Bridges
Research Symposium's
Most Outstanding
Paper Award

Eva Kahan:

Winner of the 2016 Building Bridges Research Symposium's Most Outstanding Paper Award

Foreword by Nandita Baloo, Arman Smigelski, Rafael Loss,
and Suzanne Webb

Last year was the inaugural year of the Building Bridges Research Symposium, a collaboration initiative between the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and the Tufts Undergraduate community. This half-day symposium gave undergraduate students the opportunity to present their research and have it critiqued by peers, Fletcher students, Fletcher faculty, and staff.

Following the symposium, the editors of Hemispheres along with symposium chairs Rafael Loss and Suzanne Webb selected the following contribution as a combination of excellent primary research and engaging presentation, and awarded it with the Most Outstanding Paper award. Eva Kahan's paper "Teaching Civilizational Clash: Academic Study in Culturalist Political Theory" included extensive research and interviews to determine the different ways in which Samuel Huntington's famous piece "The Clash of Civilizations?" is integrated into undergraduate curricula.

The Building Bridges Research Symposium provided a platform for undergraduate and graduate students to collaborate with presenters to further refine already unique and insightful research. It is our hope that Tufts Hemispheres and the Building Bridges Research Symposium will continue to build on this initiative and strengthen the intellectual exchange across schools and programs.

Teaching Civilizational Clash: *Academic Study in Culturalist Political Theory*

Eva Kahan, *Tufts University Class of 2019*

Abstract

In the Summer 1993 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, Samuel Huntington published his [in]famous piece “The Clash of Civilizations?” arguing that “[t]he fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.”¹ This thesis, which began in an attempt to explain the conflict among cultures globally has had significant influence in discussions of democratization in the Arab world. In 1996, Huntington expanded his thesis into a full book entitled “*The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*,” and continued to promote his ideas through his teaching at Harvard until his retirement in 2007. Scholarship over the past decades has helped his thesis persist through teaching, citations, and responses to this work. Many of these responses are critical, going so far as to accuse Huntington of inciting aggressive American action in the Middle East and encouraging racist and Islamophobic thinking, and yet in a preliminary survey of Introductory International Relations courses this piece is taught in 41% of the courses.²

The direct contradiction between scholars’ desire to deny legitimacy to Huntington’s theory and the exposure it gains through their teaching leads us to ask what those in and those representative of academia think about the teaching of Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” thesis in the field of International Relations and the use of this theory to explain the purported pattern of Arab non-democratization. In this paper I have analyzed the teaching practices of American professors both qualitatively and quantitatively. As a quantitative measure, I have collected a large number of syllabi for Introductory International Relations Courses to see whether Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations is regularly taught and has been regularly taught over time. Qualitatively, I have also interviewed professors and scholars in the fields of History and International Relations, especially those with interests in the Middle East, to understand their opinions are on teaching Huntington’s work. I conclude that academics feel ambivalent about teaching Samuel Huntington’s “The Clash of Civilizations?” as an explanation of Arab non-democratization, but feel obligated to teach Huntington’s thesis due to its historiographic importance, their position as educators, and the degree to which this thesis provokes controversial thought.

Teaching Civilizational Clash: Academic Study in Culturalist Political Theory

“[It] is obvious to anybody the hatred is beyond comprehension. Where this hatred comes from and why we will have to determine. Until we are able to determine and understand this problem and the dangerous threat it poses, our country cannot be the victims of horrendous attacks by people that believe only in Jihad, and have no sense of reason or respect for human life.”³

—Donald J. Trump

Samuel Huntington’s (in)famous article “The Clash of Civilizations?” provoked conversations around the cultural roots of post-Cold War international politics with his thesis that “[t]he fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.”⁴ This argument began as an attempt to explain conflict between global cultures, but has endured the most in the politics of democratization in the Arab world, especially in the context of American intervention over the past few decades. Huntington taught at Harvard as this theory was published, first in *Foreign Affairs* and later as a full book entitled “*The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*,” and continued to teach there until his retirement in 2007. His work endures in the academic world through teaching, citations,⁵ and constant responses published to address the comments made years ago. While ubiquitously present in popular dialogue, this article seems criticized in every academic context in which it is discussed, and yet is continuously assigned in the lowest levels of International Relations courses for undergraduate students to read. Legitimization of the culturalist “us vs. them” argument seems today to have risen up to the new, severely anti-intellectual Trump regime and is already starting to influence policy choices. This contradiction between intellectual opinions of the piece and its use in the classroom and executive branch leads us to ask how and why those representative of academia teach the culturalist democratization theory in Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” thesis in the field of International Relations.⁶ Of late, the effect of this Orientalist discourse has been cited as the background of the toxic, anti-Islamic rhetoric deployed in American politics, and in the larger global commons of political dialogue.⁷ This can be observed through the teaching habits of American professors and their stated opinions on that teaching, which this paper studies both qualitatively and quantitatively. First, I have collected a large number of syllabi for Introductory International Relations Courses to see whether Huntington’s “The Clash of Civilizations?” is regularly taught and has been regularly taught. I have also collected data on how these syllabi discuss Huntington’s piece, and what they do and do not include on the topic of Arab democratization. I have also interviewed various professors whose fields overlap with that of Huntington’s paper and who teach it to undergraduate students, and attempted to gauge through these interviews how “The Clash of Civilizations?” is taught in the university

setting. Through this paper I attempt to address three major questions about the instruction of “The Clash of Civilizations?”: Is it taught, how and why is it taught, and what is the impact of teaching this piece? Through my work, I have concluded that those representative of academia feel ambivalent about teaching Samuel Huntington’s “The Clash of Civilizations?” as an explanatory piece for the patterns of Arab non-democratization, but there is still an obligation to teach Huntington’s thesis due to its historiographical importance, their position as educators and the degree to which this thesis provokes controversial thought.

Section I: Context

In order to understand the effects of Huntington’s “The Clash of Civilizations?” in academia, one must begin with the origin of the piece and its publication process, as well as immediate reactions to said publication. When Huntington’s “The Clash of Civilizations?” was published, American political thought was in a period of transition in the early 1990s, following the Cold War. On November 9, 1989, when the Berlin Wall fell and marked the end of Soviet control of East Germany and thus the end of Soviet power, the United States was established as the sole global hegemonic major power. Through this loss of dramatic international opposition in the symbol of the Communist enemy, American policy makers were driven into a frenzy, searching for a new target of our current national power in what appeared to be a comparatively non-confrontational world. The Cold War “conflict of ideologies,”⁸ as labeled by Huntington in his (brief) summary of history prior to the applicability of his theory, had created a national narrative for Americans to stand behind, within which they both had a strong stance and a firm enemy. With the removal of that enemy came a redefinition of the American, first and foremost with the prioritization of a new form of identity beyond the comparison of American capitalist spirit with Soviet communism.

Contemporaneously, various crises such as the energy crisis of 1973 and the Iranian revolution and hostage crisis in the “Middle East”⁹ had been drawing American eyes toward the Arab and Muslim world, culminating in the Iraq-Iran war from 1980 to 1988 and the following Iraqi and then American invasions of Kuwait. Following the constant ideological fear of and proxy conflict with the Soviet Union, many scholars sought out a similar clear and appealing framework that could explain American conflict with the Middle East with the same sort of imperative that the fight against Communism held. It was within this framework that the theories of Samuel Huntington rose in popularity. Reaching as far back as 1968, when Huntington published his book *Political Order in Changing Societies*, he was debating the connection between culture and potential for political organization, claiming that “modernization [and political organization] involves, in large part, the multiplication and diversification of the social forces in society” in which social forces are defined as “ethnic, religious, territorial, economic, or status group[s].”¹⁰ For years, however,

this conversation on various cultures had been overwhelmed by the solely major contrast between the Capitalist, Democratic West and the Communist East.¹¹ It was only after the fall of the Iron Curtain that Western thinkers were prepared for an argument that the “principle conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations,” extending beyond the Communist East into the rest of the non-Western world.¹² This thesis, although applied in the essay to what Huntington saw as the “seven or eight major civilizations . . . Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and possibly African civilization,”¹³ has been the most enduring in its application to the conflict between the West and Islam. Huntington describes this conflict as a “fault line” that “has been [in conflict] for 1,300 years.”

In the following summary of Middle Eastern history, Huntington refers to almost no countries by name and with specific citations. Instead, each state is simplified into “Muslim” and “Arab” and the conflict between them and the West is given appropriately blanketing descriptions such as “unlikely to decline” and “virulent.”¹⁴ Arab governments are labeled “humiliated and resentful” of the West and simultaneously incapable of “shap[ing] their own destiny.”¹⁵ Huntington ensures to elaborate on the cornerstones of Western liberal democracy as the “common experiences of European history,” thus deriving that Orthodox or Muslim peoples seem simply “much less likely to develop stable democratic political systems.”¹⁶ It is here that Huntington proposes his “Velvet Curtain of culture” that replaces the “Iron Curtain of ideology” in dividing both Europe and the whole World, emphasizing the power this divide has to split Islam from the “development” that was flourishing in the wake of the decay of the Soviet Union.¹⁷ Instead of analyzing the evolution of Muslim political thought, Huntington classifies the post-World War II Arab world as plagued by “Arab nationalism and then Islamic fundamentalism,” summarizing that even attempts at Western democracy “strengthens anti-Western political forces.”¹⁸

Arab secular regimes over the 20th century, which are historically significant, are disregarded by Huntington in exchange for a narrative of total non-Western anti-secularization, and Islamic fundamentalist movements are grouped as “universally” supportive of the war of “the West against Islam.”¹⁹ This “kin-country syndrome,” as Huntington describes it, holds countries back through their adherence to religion above the Western political philosophy.²⁰ By Huntington, the West is granted exclusive ownership over “ideas of individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets, [and] the separation of church and state.”²¹ In contrast, Islam is seen as failing to understand the “universal civilization” that the West dreams of,” and thus failing to accept Western “democracy and human rights.”²² The only states seen as possibly democratizing are those who are “torn” between a “bandwagoning strategy” with the West and the “history, culture and traditions” that are non-Western.²³

This attribution of non-democratization in the Middle East to Islamic culture would be reiterated repeatedly as the reasons for the failure of

democratization in Iraq and Afghanistan following American intervention. The root of this argument lies not in the qualifications, however, of what democracy should look like—as there are those that would argue that, depending on the variables examined, America is less of a democracy than the public believes—nor on the actual attributes of Arab governments, such as the current semi-democracy in Iraq or the period of consociational constitutional rule in Lebanon. Instead, Huntington's theory relies mainly on a broad, presumptive and essentializing narrative of conflict founded on (mainly religious) culture. Hereby in this paper, this theory will be labeled as a “culturalist” interpretation of politics, specifically in relation to the (non-)democratization process in the Arab world, such as this theory prioritizes the cultural variables in explaining history and minimizes all other explanations.

While Huntington is best known for espousing this theory on such a broad level, the aforementioned Middle East-U.S. crises of the time spurred up various levels of Islamophobic reactions, embodied in similar, more specific contemporary articles. While this paper centers on Huntington's work as the most well-read, it is important to note that Huntington's contemporaries were publishing on Islam in as inflammatory a way. These publications, and most importantly Bernard Lewis' work “The Roots of Muslim Rage” in *The Atlantic* in 1990, set a foundation upon which Huntington's work becomes both more believable and also highlights the sections of this work which would later influence greatly American public opinion and foreign policy.

Lewis highlights what he and other culturalist theorists see as potential for conflict with the Muslim world due to the Islamic “rejection of Western Civilization,” in which the so-called West is “seen as innately evil, and those who promote or accept them as the “enemies of God.”²⁴ Here, too, Islam's incompatibility with the West is framed in Muslim and Arab innate cultural inabilities to accept the purported cornerstones of democracy: here, “Western ideals” are defined through the work of a few philosophers, chiefly Jefferson's Enlightenment-based separation of church and state. By establishing repeatedly through his writing that he is an esteemed “scholar of Islam,” Lewis makes his interpretation of history unquestionable when he comes to the conclusion that, instead of shaped by their circumstances or history, Muslims are simply innately more religious than Christians and those of other, less Great faiths.²⁵ Despite the history of violent Christian hatred and oppression over the last century, Lewis insists that Islam is unique in having no preparation, “in theory or in practice, to accord full equality to those who held other beliefs.”²⁶ In this essentializing historiographical and ethnographical practice, Lewis validates any prior fears or confusion Westerners feel about Islam, reinforcing Huntington's simplified history.

Not all of Huntington's contemporaries agreed with his thesis, and the publication received major pushback from the academic world as soon as it was published as well as far into the future. Among the better-known direct retorts were Fouad Ajami's “The Summoning,” in *Foreign Affairs* as well a few months after Huntington's publication, and Edward Said's “Clash of Ignorance” in *The*

Nation in 2001, directly following the September 11th attacks on The World Trade Center.²⁷ Along with these, Huntington's article sparked enough conversation simply in the pages of *Foreign Affairs* to merit an anthology entitled "The Clash of Civilizations?: The Debate" and Huntington's expansion of his piece into the book "The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order."²⁸ While these articles directly called out Huntington's work for his simplification and polarization of history, it should also be noted that there were and are multiple other explanations for Arab (non-)democratization. While popularity and publicity favored Huntington's inflammatory views, others were writing on various explanatory variables from since the 1960s, when democratization was popularized as a framework for international political theory. These non-culturalist or counter-culturalist ideals sought out the aspects of history that, in his broad generalizations of culture, Huntington left out.

Seymour Martin Lipset, for one, was labeled one of (if not the) greatest political sociologist of his time, and sought to explain the presence and quality of a democracy by virtue of the social structure of a society and their ability to organize in a republican rather than oligarchic or totalitarian framework.²⁹ Lipset would later compile all of his work in political sociology in the book "The Democratic Century" in 2004, in which he examines trust as a variable of civil society and socioeconomics on a broad scale. He reserves 25 pages for culture, but dedicates them mainly to separating his definition of political culture—factors such as "rule of law, tolerance of opposition, respect for differences of opinion" and "attitudes about the relationship between state and society"³⁰—from the monolithic, immutable qualities given to religious societies by thinkers such as Huntington. Instead, Lipset emphasizes the "constantly and furiously changing"³¹ nature of culture, and the benefits of Gabriel Almond and Sidney Vera's "civic culture"³² which can permeate, he claims, in any religious setting with proper cultural evolution.

Lipset's ideas of political sociology and organization mirrored earlier theories proposed by Dankwart Rustow on the social patterns that enhanced or mitigated the effects of democratization, or as he put it, political Westernization. Rustow's view of Middle Eastern politics drew heavily on the village-to-nation levels of leadership, and the strength of that leadership in the civic sphere.³³ This theory was buttressed by Peter Bachrach's and others' critiques of democracy as an elite-led system in which the participation of the people and the dynamic between the higher and lower classes defined the success of the democratic framework.³⁴ These class-based ideals endure in economic political philosophy as well, and counter a cultural view of democratic evolution.

Alongside this discussion of social organization and political economy ran a discussion of the nature of democratization in the first place and the polarity of democracies. Although Huntington's piece seems to posit that once a state democratizes, it will stay democratic, Phillip Schmitter's work on "The Proto-science of Consolidology" calls into question the finality of these transitions. In contrast, Schmitter claims that

“Democracy is not inevitable and it is revocable. Democracy is not necessary: neither does it fulfill a functional requisite for capitalism, nor does it respond to some ethical imperative of social evolution.”³⁵

In other words, Schmitter’s democracy allows for ebb and flow from a scale of autocracy to democracy, thus validating ideas that the Middle Eastern failure to democratize that Huntington observes is much less concrete than he would like to claim. Redefinitions of democracy to consolidated and unconsolidated, with various states of transition in between, allow for yet more historical ambiguity. This continues to raise questions about the immutable nature of the “clash of civilizations” narrative of human evolution and Huntington’s student Francis Fukuyama’s idea of the “End of History.”³⁶ In this questioning, one can find more critical views not just of Middle Eastern history but of questions of our discourse around nations and politics overall.

These discursive practices have also been raised in more anti-establishment fields inspired by colonialism and empire. Noam Chomsky, for one, published extensively on the contrast between American rhetoric of democratization and true military action. Holding up examples of covert or overt interventions such as Iran in 1953, Guatemala in 1954, Chile in 1973 and others in which American action in fact discouraged a popular rising, Chomsky thus questions of the Enlightened, democratic purity of American values. These arguments depict American democracy as distant from the philosophy of which Huntington argues the West has exclusive ownership. Rather than the common-sense definition of democracy as allowing people to “participate in a meaningful way in managing their affairs,” Chomsky claims

“the doctrinal meaning of democracy is different—it refers to a system in which decisions are made by sectors of the business community and related elites. The public are to be only ‘spectators of action,’ not ‘participants[.]’”³⁷

This cynicism is a clear example of the various conversations surrounding democratization at the time of Huntington’s work, and depicts the deep variations in even very recent historiography as it pertains to the political evolutions of the rest of the world. This work, in a completely different ideological realm from Huntington’s, led to the variety of explanations academia has today for (non-)democratization in the Arab world, and reminds us of the importance of questioning why some of these explanations have become more commonly taught than others.

While “The Clash of Civilizations?” holds importance in its field due to the variation of ways it is addressed by others in the field of Middle Eastern democratization, it is also important to understand Huntington in his effect on American foreign policy. These theories of Arab culture as innately non-democratic and anti-Western extended the just use of power, influencing the discussion around the use of Western military force in changing political systems in the Middle East. As can be noted by observing the patterns of discussion

of Huntington's piece,³⁸ conversations of cultural explanations of Arab (non)-democratization have multiplied following the September 11 attacks in 2001 and the following American invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. This period of discussion depicts the multiplication of cultural thinking as Americans and others questioned and attempted to understand the conflict between America and certain Middle Eastern governments and sub-governmental actors. It is important to understand, however, that the American people were encouraged toward these culturalist explanations of conflict not only by the war, but rather in a cycle of threat explanation and inflation. To be more precise, it was these cultural explanations themselves that were fundamental in creating the conflict in which they became the topic and framework of Western conversation around the Middle East. The academic conversation reinforced the military action, which engaged more discussion on the conflict as it was originally framed in academia. This integration of academic discourse into policy is constant, circular and self-reinforcing in the fields of political science and international relations, and thus this essay will not attempt to nearly fully review this connection. Simply, this section attempts to summarize the situation so that the reader can be aware of the importance of academia not just in terms of collective patterns of thought, but also in American action abroad.

In order to understand the connection between academic thought and conversation and foreign policy, one must understand the structure of American military policy. In brief, due to the organization of American military authority under civilian leadership and oversight, military action is coordinated by a joint National Security Council, led by the President and intended to give him or her the best possible advice on military action. The sitting members of the council include the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the armed services, the Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and Directors of various intelligence and security organizations in the states. In addition to these highly-respected appointed officials, the National Security Council is informed on specific issues (as they are not regional or topical experts) by staffers assigned to study certain issues, often experts from think-tanks and academia.³⁹ Not only are these experts raised in the academic fields of their advising; much of the publications in these areas come either directly from universities or from think tanks, through which academics are paid to study their area of research and publish on it privately. I discussed with John Trumbour, an academic from Harvard who studied in their History department in his youth and is currently employed in the Labor and Development center, the influence of academia in foreign policy in following his editing of the book "How Harvard Rules: Reason in the Service of Empire," and he commented that the Harvard academic elite was strongly tied to the Council on Foreign Relations, the leading foreign policy think tank, with perhaps a quarter of the CFR staff affiliated with Harvard.⁴⁰ In essence, despite a societal or professional divide between the fields of academia and politics, academic ideals strongly influence foreign policy and have a heavy hand in creating our view of the international system upon which we act.

Academia and think tanks have been relevant in American foreign policy in the Middle East at the very least since the American invasion of Iraq in 1990 as part of the first Gulf War.⁴¹ This connection, however, has been more studied in its recent influence on the second Gulf War in Iraq. The American invasion of Iraq coincided with the rise of a neoconservative policy movement that advocated use of American power in order to promote democracy globally. This advocacy of democracy fit in well with ideas such as Huntington's that due to culture, the Arab world would not come to democracy on its own, and thus would require aid and intervention to bring democracy to the region. This viewpoint also assumes democracy as the paragon of political systems and rarely questions Western democratic superiority to all other philosophies, which is bolstered by Huntington's criticisms of other culture's failures in light of Western success. Although neoconservatism was born in the Cold War among intellectuals who carried a disdain for both Communism and counter-cultural movements, it evolved into an interventionist theory that claimed to promote advocacy of global democracy through whatever means necessary. The major proponents of this theory, moving into the early 21st century, were employed as think tanks such as Project for a New American Century (PNAC) and the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), which were closely administratively tied to the conservative American presidencies of Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush.⁴² By the term of George W. Bush, one of the leaders of PNAC, Paul Wolfowitz, who had served previously as Undersecretary of Defense for policy planning and spent seven years as an International Relations professor and Dean at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, stepped up as Deputy Secretary of Defense and began the architecture of the Iraq War.⁴³ This advisor is simply one of many plucked from a specific, administration-specifically partisan group of think tanks who brought in his experience in academic thought to the forefront of American politics and action.


This importance of academia in foreign policy can be seen to this day in Obama's appointments of national security staffers from more liberal think tanks, and the ways that these advisors have morphed our policy around the Middle East. In *The Atlantic's* lengthy summary of Obama's legacy of foreign policy, Jeffrey Goldberg alternates between discussing Obama's policy decisions and the theoretical ideas behind his staffer's choices, such as Samantha Power's adherence to the International Relations theory of R2P (Right to Protect).⁴⁴ This conservative principle, which advocates for (typically Western) hegemonic intervention against sovereign states committing human rights abuses against their civilian populations, encouraged advocacy of intervention in Syria by conservative thinkers in the Obama staff in the context of Bashar Al-Assad's use of chemical weapons on his civilian population. Although in 2012, when asked about these weapons, Obama seemed to adhere to the R2P principle and claimed he would interfere if Al-Assad crossed a "red line" of chemical weapons use, his failure to retaliate has been cited as a demonstration of weaknesses and criticized by those same scholars. One of my

interviewees described these cross-over individuals from academia and policy as “scholar-practitioners,” abundant in both fields and crucial in changing and shaping mindsets on theory and policy across the board.⁴⁵ Connections like these, between academia as it is written and policy in action, are important to study in order to fully understand the real-world implications of respected academic ideals on the policy of an administration, and the ability of academics to have an impact not just in their fields but in the world at large.

Section II: Is It Taught?

In order to understand the perseverance of Huntington’s paper in academia, I have chosen to focus on undergraduate education of History and International Relations. First, this research looks broadly at introductory International Relations syllabi from American colleges. These classes were isolated in order to see how and where Huntington’s “The Clash of Civilizations?” has been read as a serious academic piece, and what attitude professors on a broad scale have toward this piece. As I could only directly interview a limited number of academics personally, this wider-reaching data attempts to address the question of proliferation beyond the isolated Cambridge-area Harvard intellectual circle in which my subjects and I study and work.

In analyzing these syllabi, I looked for specific questions of use and treatment of this piece. My methods for choosing syllabi to analyze and specifics on that analysis can be found in Appendix I, at the end of this paper. My first question was simple: Is Huntington’s “The Clash of Civilizations?” read in Introductory International Relations courses? This data is summarized in the following graph:



In total, of the syllabi collected (two of which were not featured in the above graph due to an inability to find an accurate year of use) 41% of the courses featured Huntington's "The Clash of Civilizations?" and 59% featured Islam as a topic of conversation and education in International Relations. The data shows with relative confidence that at least a quarter of International Relations courses teach this piece, a frequency of instruction that I see as significant in the teaching of International Relations nationwide.⁴⁶

In order to best understand the thought processes of the professors represented in this data set, several interviews have been conducted with various professors in the Boston area in order to understand their experiences with this piece in their fields. To see the effect Huntington had on the historical and historiographical sides of International Relations, I interviewed two History professors at Tufts University (David Proctor and Ayesha Jalal), both of whom teach to the intersection of Islam and the West, and John Trumbour, a professor of Labor and Development at Harvard University who studied History under Samuel Huntington's History department. In speaking with these professors, I attempted to get at the same questions of my quantitative data analysis—Is Huntington's "The Clash of Civilizations?" assigned in their fields, and if so, when?⁴⁷

This question of whether the piece is taught was addressed quickly in interviews as well: in each interviewee's experience, Huntington's "The Clash of Civilizations?" was indeed a part of their curriculum. Professor Proctor, for one, taught this piece as part of his course on "International Relations in the Historical Perspective,"⁴⁸ and Professor Jalal taught it as part of her course on "Islam on the West," which mainly addresses the connection between South Asian Islam and the West but touches on the Arab world as well. Those speaking anonymously had taught the piece in courses on democratization, religion, geopolitics and introductory international relations.⁴⁹ In order to understand how these professors taught these works, I first attempted to gauge their opinions of the piece as contributing to their fields, in terms of accuracy and method. They were happy to share their opinions, and it seemed that each had a developed view of the way they saw this work in relation to the work around it in their individual fields. Each professor interviewed, however, was also critical of the piece in their own way, thus raising later questions of why these professors continue to teach the piece.

Section III: How Is It Taught?

As the aforementioned professors admitted that they taught Huntington's "The Clash of Civilizations?" they surrounded it with a buffer of the criticisms the paper tends to face. Attitudes toward the piece, despite its status quo necessity as a teaching tool, were mixed, and seemed to contradict the assumption that it is being taught in their courses without criticism. In speaking with professors about their experiences, I noted that they defended their teaching with different explanations of method, be it assigning contrary

pieces or asking students actively to criticize the work. The major pedagogical distinction I have chosen to focus on in the teaching of this piece is the discursive or instructional value that professors grant Huntington's thesis. Discourse here is defined as the practice of conversing with a piece as if it were a frame of thought rather than a summary of fact, much as one would read an op-ed in a newspaper as opposed to a piece of breaking news. This definition was reached through conversation with several of these professors who pursued understanding of their teaching practices through distinctions between the works they assigned and the conversation they created. Their attempts at a dialectic approach toward the literature in their classroom fit well within a frame of discourse, and has allowed both better quantitative analysis of the collected syllabi and an interesting understanding of individual teaching practices of my participant interviewees.

Quantitatively, I looked in the syllabi that had assigned Huntington's piece for evidence of a discursive rather than instructional intent. In the syllabi collected, of those that assigned Huntington, 36% assigned another piece alongside "The Clash of Civilizations?" that directly addressed Huntington's thesis as debatable,⁵⁰ such as Edward Said's "Clash of Ignorance," Fouad Ajami's "The Summoning," or Benjamin Barber's "Jihad vs. McWorld."⁵¹ This echoed Professor Jalal's practice, in which she assigned pieces alongside Huntington that either contradicted his words or showed a better side of scholarship in his area. In addition to this, 57% of the syllabi addressed the section as a discussion of varying opinions rather than factual analyses of current events and recent history in International Relations.⁵² This seemed like a direct route to discussing Huntington discursively rather than instructionally, with section titles such as "Competing Visions of International Relations."⁵³ One syllabus notes under the assignment "Huntington's article (and book) has provoked many heated debates. What are the counterarguments? Go around the globe's hot spots in your head. Is he right?"⁵⁴ This discursive, controversy-encouraging rhetoric shows the ambiguity of professors toward Huntington's piece, and allows us to understand better the reasoning behind professors who criticize a piece so still assigning it.

The professors I interviewed echoed this often negative, criticizing sentiment in their own statements. Professor Proctor labeled the piece "An interesting attempt at trying to find ways to divide up the world, but within that attempt an oversimplification."⁵⁵ Professor Proctor did not believe that Huntington's thesis on cultural difference was "the reality;" he believes that similar ideals have been and are used to incorrectly justify conflict, both by political Islamists and American policy-makers, following 9/11. He argued that Huntington's view of "inescapable realities that are unchangeable," such as a view of culture as a cause of conflict, is something he doesn't agree with.⁵⁶ This criticism was elaborated upon by Professor Jalal, who focuses on the issues of religion that Huntington brought up, disclaiming them as following in a late 19th century problematic trend of false constructs of religion. She scoffed, as well, at Huntington's analysis of culture, claiming that "if it were, in fact, true

culture that they understood” they would have come to separate conclusions, then calling their attempts a “sleight of hand.”⁵⁷ As for Trumpbour, who studied under Huntington, he labeled some of Huntington’s claims as “kookier” than others.⁵⁸ Another professor, having taught the piece, labeled it as “linear, binary . . . Eurocentric, Western-centric . . . has serious methodological weaknesses, and ultimately is filled with factual errors.”⁵⁹ They went on to say that this “undermines the credible and interesting aspects of the article.” This was accompanied by a methodological demand, that students have a basic knowledge of religion and criticize the way Huntington’s knowledge was collected even as they read the article and learn from it.⁶⁰ Personally, Professor Jalal said she “certainly wouldn’t teach him alone,” (alone meaning here without contradictory pieces to encourage discourse), as she feels that this would be “quite egregious.” This claim aligns with the high percentage of syllabus writing professors who chose to combine Huntington’s work with a controversial and oppositional work that would counter the “clash of civilizations” thesis.⁶¹

In looking at the discursive practices employed in these classes, professors seem to feel ambiguous in assigning this piece as part of an introductory International Relations curriculum. A majority of professors writing these syllabi allowed Huntington’s thesis to be questioned even as they encouraged their students to read it. To me, this raised several questions of legitimacy and respect, especially in contrast with the influence that this piece has had in its field. In these syllabi and presumably in International Relations courses throughout the United States for the last few decades, Huntington’s “The Clash of Civilizations?” is introduced but simultaneously questioned. With such high percentages of these syllabi either teaching Huntington’s thesis directly or referring to it through similar pieces on the influence of Islam, one wonders why so many of the courses and professors seem reluctant to fully endorse Huntington’s thesis of cultural explanations. In addition, the absurdly high number of citations this article gets yearly as mentioned earlier in this piece⁶² are typically seen as an indicator of academic respect and acknowledgement. In exploring the importance of this data, I began to question the validity of citations as a metric for the importance of a piece. It is here that it becomes crucial to directly analyze the thoughts of professors in the fields implicated in teaching this piece in order to begin to understand the ambiguity of their teaching methods and intentions.

Section IV: Why Is It Taught?

With the understanding that professors do choose to discuss Huntington’s *Clash of Civilizations*, and that this conversation varies between the discursive and the instructional due to the ambiguity professors feel about Huntington’s historiography, the focus of this research shifts to the purpose of learning Huntington’s thesis. Initially, professors defended this teaching through the same standards of importance of Huntington’s piece that I measured through citations and publishing-based parameters. Trumpbour labeled Huntington

as a respected “giant of political science,” and described the respect he got as he taught at Harvard despite his controversial topics.⁶³ Participant 1, as well, noted that Huntington, “one of the grandfathers of IR and comparative politics,” had a huge effect as “someone of his stature and renown” writing about the effects of culture and religion in International Relations.⁶⁴

The influence that Huntington had on other academics extends into a larger discursive trend of culture, history and ideology as they affect people on a mass scale. These professors recognized that similar work on culture and democracy has been done by other scholars, whom they felt were bettering the field while somewhat following in Huntington’s footprints. Despite Professor Proctor’s declamations of Huntington’s failure to write to reality, he claimed some historians are now doing a better job of embracing historical and cultural identity, especially in the wake of the failures of multiple American military adventures since 9/11 and in an extended way since World War II. In a similar vein, Professor Jalal stated that “there is so much more sophisticated work on Islam as well that Westerners have done,” allowing the various narratives of Islam and culturalism to coexist in the intellectual sphere and encouraging conversation on the benefits and failures of Huntington’s theory.

This effect that Huntington’s discourse had on other academics trickled down, as well, to the student body, with Trumpbour’s memories of Huntington’s “troubles with the student movements,” although these were prior to the publication of “The Clash of Civilizations?” and more based off earlier ideas of modernization Huntington published on the impetus for the Vietnam War. Later, however, Trumpbour described giving a speech on Islam and Huntington’s work, and noticed “educated lay-people” who were excited about Huntington’s ideals. This speech, which discussed the “age-old hatred” between Islam and the West that Huntington very much founded the conversation on, seemed to have encouraged sympathy among the public, especially following 9/11. This hearkens back to the literary spike in responses to Huntington since 9/11, and shows the popular appeal of this article in its high use in the everyday American’s understanding of the Middle East alongside its conversation. On a more personal note, Trumpbour responded to this audience reaction to Huntington’s storytelling by feeling he “couldn’t walk away” having known he encouraged discussing and potentially validating this cultural explanation of conflict between Islam and the West. He seemed to feel that this conversation, although academically interesting, was encouraging exactly the Islamophobic response to recent conflict that his work has attempted to prevent. Another professor mentioned the weightedness of teaching Islam as “incompatible with Western-style modernity” has “segued, very sadly, very neatly into the conversation on political Islam and Islamic terror,” thus reinforcing the growing Islamophobia in the collective American consciousness.⁶⁵ This ambiguity yet again shows the huge effect this piece has on the idea of teaching Arab world politics and democratization to a large audience, and the potential for conflict even if that teaching is widely appealing and appreciated.

When moving past the popular understanding and global response to the “clash of civilizations” thesis, many professors cited, in the impetus to teach Huntington’s work, a contentious academic conversation around the failure of democratization in the Middle East. They felt compelled to recognize and analyze this as a trend, at the very least in the way that multiple analysts such as Huntington have done over the years. Professor Jalal discussed the ways that Muslim writers in the historical field “do not adequately provide an explanation of Muslim decline,” thus pushing us toward a conversation of other explanations.⁶⁶ While Professor Proctor insisted that scholarship refuse “the simple answer” of culturalist explanations, he also claimed that perhaps those who deny Huntington’s thesis outright miss an important level of historical cultural influence on “peoples around the world.”⁶⁷ These desires to find a real answer to the questions that Huntington attempts to address, and not to ignore the “The Clash of Civilizations?” and thus shut off the conversation it began, point to an important push-and-pull in academia that can be observed in so little a thing as the assignment of this piece on a day-to-day basis in the classroom. The conversation around cultural influence in history, then, and especially democratization in the Arab world, is torn between the criticisms poured upon it and the potential it has to lead us closer to the truth. One interviewee found it a huge plus that Huntington legitimized “the importance for culture and religion in the processes of domestic and interstate change.”⁶⁸ Although that same speaker was vocally critical of the flaws of this article, the importance of the conversation it started felt necessary in their field.

This conflict between validity and critique is interesting in the way that it affects the way students and professors view the subject, not only in opinion but in its importance and the way it can be discussed. When Professor Proctor recalled his own education in History at Tufts University during the Gulf War, he too remembered seeing this conflict in how works were seen affecting the way they were taught and perceived. His teachers in his World Civilizations class, he claimed, were “vocally critical” of American action in Kuwait, and thus didn’t do a very effective job of “not letting their own personal perspectives come forward.”⁶⁹ This complaint seems to portray an advocacy of the neutrality of the academic eye, which is deeply distorted by the types of ambiguous feelings projected upon Huntington’s work since its publication. Professor Jalal portrayed her ambiguity as well, discussing the difference between Huntington’s essentializing culturalist viewpoint which, as another professor said, “occludes diversity,” and the “excellent scholarship from the West” on Islam which she feels builds upon our understanding of the religion.⁷⁰ Obviously the field in which Huntington worked cannot be ignored, and yet one feels obliged to ask: should professors choose to teach it when there is such difficulty in properly framing this conversation without encouraging a certain point of view?

Section V: What Impact Does This Choice Have?

In the context for this paper, one can begin to see the global impact of work such as Huntington's "The Clash of Civilizations?" on foreign policy, American attitudes and international conflict. While perhaps these trends can be traced easily on a global level with the advent of neo-conservatism, the immediate question raised here is that of how one can measure the impact Huntington's work has on an individual scale. This brings us to the crux of why the teaching of this piece matters to scholars in the field of International Relations: does the work that is done with culturalist explanations of non-democratization in the Arab world affect how one sees interactions between the West and Islam, and eventually how one acts within them? In teaching Huntington, there appears to be an active self-positioning on a spectrum between the West and the Arab world, both in the knowledge one gains and in orienting one's self toward the choices made in the field. This sort of mental framing that Huntington's work does is important in the way that it manipulates future conversations of the Arab world. In his International Relations in a Historical Perspective class, Professor Proctor noted that his students saw Huntington's view of the Arab world as simplified. Still, this piece was used within the class to understand a specific conception of the Islamic world in the context of the evolution of Islam and of Islamic political ideology, and so was inevitably part of the structuring of Islam in these student's eyes.⁷¹

Professor Jalal discussed this constant self-positioning by citing a review of Islam in the New York Review of Books from directly after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. She teaches said review alongside Huntington in her class on Islam and the West, and described it showing "people trying to locate themselves on one side or the other of the [Western-Islamic] divide."⁷² She claimed that the fundamental problem of Huntington's "The Clash of Civilizations?" is that "the West decided what Islam is," as Huntington's discourse became the instructional framework for East-West foreign policy through continued conversation.⁷³ This was best summarized by the statement that this piece, despite our best attempts to deconstruct it, "shapes the way we approach the questions" of democratization, reducing the region to "Islam or not Islam" in a Western-focused narrative.⁷⁴ These facts become even more embedded through political and military action, and each professor interviewed seemed to strongly believe this work and its cohort of ideas strongly affected our understanding of post 9/11—conflicts, as was discussed earlier in the relevancy of this article to the world at large. Professor Proctor described this structured dichotomy as allowing a misconception that in this "clash of civilizations," one side will win and the other will lose, much as policy framed the counter-terrorism conflicts and invasions in the Gulf since 2001. He continued by discussing the "failures in American policy, and especially invasive American policy" since 9/11 that this idea seems to back.⁷⁵ This seems to act as a warning against using these elements to fully explain current issues, even as academia attempts to warn with criticism and ambivalent reviews. This extends

to direct American actions that have been taken, with the revisions that academics make attempting to change what we could have or should have done on the ground.

Trumpbour attempted to address this immediate response by delineating in his paper Huntington's specific feelings toward the second Iraq War, which is often cited as a conflict that used a clash-of-civilizations-like argument in its origin. Trumpbour's attachment to and proclamation of Huntington's personal political views, which were more isolationist, seem to emphasize the effect he felt is seen of Huntington's work on foreign policy. Despite this anti-intervention personal policy, however, journalists and intellectuals latched on to Huntington's thesis to better understand the conflict in the Middle East, even when Huntington no longer supported this action. This popular convergence around a "clash of civilizations" hypothesis is the logical real-world extension of this academic reinforcement of Huntington's ideas. As a cultural divide is ingrained in our understanding of this conflict, it becomes less and less possible to forget.

Even as a supporter of discussing Huntington, Professor Jalal seemed critical of the wartime outcomes. Although she has taught this class over the course of from the beginning to the end of the Iraq war, she saw a change of the way the student body learned about Islam from the initiation of this conversation through the Iraq War period. She said that

"When I first taught it, it was in those days, there was really curiosity. After 9/11, you know, I went to the library and all the Islam books were off. People were curious. Then, the war came. Once the war came, and boys had feet on the ground, things changed. That's the difference, for Americans, that have to be able to understand that difference, that there is one thing about understanding a religion, but if you're going to understand a religion through the prism of war, in which your boys are involved, you're never going to be able to get to it."

It's this understanding of religion through war that Professor Jalal feels is so crucial in the (mis)education of Islam in context with the West through Huntington's "The Clash of Civilizations."⁷⁶ In the process of creating and recreating the clash of civilizations through study, each reader recreates his own culture and understanding, which will then be acted upon in academic and political life. This ultimate effect of the piece, no matter how it is studied or why, surpasses the control of professors in the classroom. A teacher cannot force the interpretation of a piece upon their students, only guide them to an answer through exposure, discussion, and sharing of their understandings.

If professors cannot understand how they are affecting the world, though, does that leave them with no options of working toward a better discussion and understanding of this issue and thus perhaps a better impact? Despite the lack of measurable outcomes without a long-term controlled study of these issues, and the ethical problems with manipulating education, the interviews conducted for this piece made me hopeful with the number of professors who

truly believe that they could try their best to make a positive difference with their teachings. In all the speculative proposals for how to teach in order to best prepare students in an unbiased way for the world ahead, I most preferred Professor Jalal's response, in which she insisted that all one can do is "question our own prejudices and biases."⁷⁷ Although there may not be an ideal way of teaching this mix between history and historiography, on the border between policy, theory, and action, simply the process of doing so in a curious and intellectual way may open up more doors for a better collective understanding. In this case, Huntington's thesis may be taught in more curious, discursive ways as we move toward understanding the mindset Western education creates on the Arab world, and perhaps truly can create a conversation that moves toward better scholarship and a better world.

Appendix I (Quantitative Data)

This appendix has been compiled to record the method in which the data mentioned previously was accumulated, in order to hold accountability for the information found, to allow repeatability of my collection, and to both show the legitimacy of the results and acknowledge the weaknesses in my findings.

First, I acknowledge that there were very specific and exclusive guidelines as to what I was reading as I searched for syllabi for use in this project. First, I only looked at Introduction to International Relations courses, which I defined as introductory courses in international politics for undergraduate students. I thus did not look at any seminar-size courses or grad-school level courses, as this was meant to examine what is taught in international relations courses on a very basic level. In addition, I narrowed my focus simply to undergraduate courses, and simply to the field of International Relations rather than History due to the way that International Relations theories are implemented (as mentioned earlier in this paper).

In addition, I had very strict outlines as to when a syllabus I found was useful. These syllabi were found through open-source Google searches, and were only examined if they were previously open to the public and had been published by either a professor or an organization. I went methodically through those results which were returned by Google, which can be replicated by going link-by-link through a Google search for “Introduction International Relations syllabus” and examining each result. Several attributes of a syllabus, however, ruled it out of participation in my survey. I did not have the time or resources to examine every textbook used, for example, in Introductory IR courses, considering the rate at which textbooks are republished and edited and the confusion around assigning a textbook. Thus, the only syllabi I used were those that listed articles assigned one by one rather than assigning chapters of a book. If the syllabus was a mix of books and articles, I designated it researchable if there were more articles than books on each class assignment. In order to ensure good resource practices, I made the decision of whether or not I would use a syllabus before I determined where it fit in my study (essentially, whether or not it assigned Huntington).

In addition, all of these syllabi were from American or English-speaking Western schools,⁷⁸ and I set certain guidelines to ensure I was not repeating syllabi. I came to the conclusion that syllabi are written by individual professors and that, as this research is meant to find the opinions of academics, professors must vary over the syllabi even if schools did not. I thus allowed repeats of schools as long as syllabi were written by different professors, but not when written by the same professor.

Next, I laid out my path to analyzing the data I had collected in a comprehensible way. At first, I looked into the significance of the presence of Huntington’s work in the syllabi, and found it significant with 95% confidence, as at that confidence level the percentage of syllabi that had Huntington’s work in them was still above zero—so the chance to include Huntington was not

random. Next, to understand the level of discourse included in the pieces, I measured how many of them used questioning framing and uncertain statements to summarize the importance and relevance of Huntington's work. Lastly, to understand the importance of Islam in these syllabi I measured whether the syllabi addressed Islam, most of which did.

The resulting statistics are explained within my paper. The percentages were found with a simple t-test model and the use of 95% significance, which does allow for 5% error but the author has deemed that, what with the short-term nature of this project, that error is insignificant. This was graphed on a scale of the years included along with the number of pieces including Huntington and the number failing to include him because I wanted to visualize for the reader this outcome. While this graph is somewhat deceiving in the years it shows, it gives an accurate portrayal of the fact that for the years in which more syllabi have been collected, there is more presence of Huntington, indicating ubiquitous presence on Introduction to International Relations syllabi.

Had I been able to spend more time and more resources on this project, there are many things I would have done to find a better set of data and get more information. For one, I would love to acquire more syllabi, potentially by working with specific elite academic institutions. I would love to see the explanatory variables, if there are any, for the variation in teaching Huntington (location, time, political environment, race, etc.). Unfortunately, due to my limited time to uncover these syllabi and to the limits on access, I did not have enough data to find a statistically significant difference between years in which this piece was read. Due to the limited data set, I chose as well to disregard the question of whether there was a domestic geographic distinction to the reading of this piece, although that is definitely a question that could be explored at a later date. Additional data could be useful on the attitudes of more relevant professors, access to textbooks which summarize or present the article, and the global reach of this trend; all of these sources are encouraged for further studies of these questions.

I also analyzed citations for the project using the database *Web of Science*, which does an excellent job of tracking first- and second-generation citations and showing how often and when a piece is cited. Below is the information for these citations. Unfortunately, the Web of Science doesn't hold every article, but it seems to be more thorough and better curated than the next-best citation tracker, Google Scholar. The figures below summarize my findings as they led to the results in footnote 2, and can be traced to the Web of Science for more information. All of these numbers were accessed between May 2 and 5 in 2016.

Web of Science compilation:

1. Huntington's most cited piece, "The Clash of Civilizations?" from 1993, was cited 1,367 times, with 609 second-generation citations per year.⁷⁹
2. Edward Said's most cited piece, "Representing the Colonized, Anthropology's Interlocutors," from 1989, was cited 265 times, with 118.3 second-generation citations per year.⁸⁰

3. Lipset's most cited piece, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy—Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," from 1959 and thus having been cited 34 more years (more than twice as many), was cited 1384 times, with 460.78 second-generation citations per year.⁸¹
4. Rustow's most cited piece, "Transitions to Democracy—Toward a Dynamic Model," from 1970 (23 more years, twice as many), was cited 460 total times with 176.8 second-generation citations per year.⁸²
5. Larry Diamond's most cited piece, "Thinking about Hybrid Regimes," from 2002, was cited 414 total times with 301.15 second-generation citations per year.⁸³
6. Philippe Schmitter's most cited piece, "Still the Century of Corporatism?" from 1974, was cited 464 total times with 199.5 second-generation citations per year.⁸⁴

Appendix II (Qualitative Data)

Briefly, I would like to summarize my practice in finding the qualitative interview data that I have, as I believe it is crucial that this research be clear and, if desired, repeatable. In order to interview the professors and speakers mentioned above, I have gone through an Institutional Review Board Exemption process, and upon request can supply the reader with examples of my Institutional Review Board required information.

In order to ensure consent with the interviewed individuals, I had each individual sign a form stating that they consented either to being directly quoted, to being interviewed and quoted without their name attached, or to being interviewed with no quotes. At this point, 3 of my interviewees consented to being interviewed with their name used and 2 consented without. In addition, I supplied them with a list of questions that would represent the types of questions I would ask in the interview that were cleared by the Institutional Review Board, and I then built off of those questions into a conversational interview style. Each participant was notified that they were allowed to terminate the interview at any time if they did not feel comfortable. During the duration of the interview, I recorded the words of the interviewee on my iPhone, and have now saved those recordings in a secure location on my computer with labels associating the speaker indirectly with their interview so as to maintain privacy for those who requested it. I have also taken notes in a notebook, which is stored securely with me as well. Quotes used in this paper, as well as background information, all comes directly from the interviews and is thus not mangled by my memory or poor handwriting abilities.

In the choices of who to interview, I do feel that this project has so far been incomplete and am confident it will expand over time. A majority of the professors quoted here are from Tufts University and the surrounding academic area, as those were the most accessible to me at the time of writing. In the future, this project will expand to professors more broadly who work both within this field, and who have worked with Huntington's ideas and works and can speak to its evolution. In addition, many of the professors interviewed here are not as strictly designated to one field as the syllabi are, but I feel that for the purposes of this research that strict nature in the interviews is not necessary. The variety in the experiences of the speakers allows us to see various sides of the impact of Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations*, and to better understand its full impact. Over time, I hope to develop this project to give a well-rounded perspective of the effect of this piece in the study of Arab World (non-)democratization from the various fields in which it is observed, and to move my hypothesis from the observational and presumptive into the knowledgeable and prescriptive.

Appendix III

Interviews

- Jalal, Ayesha. Interview by Eva Kahan, April 5, 2016.
Participant 1. Interview by Eva Kahan, May 4, 2016.
Participant 2. Interview by Eva Kahan, May 4, 2016.
Proctor, David J. Interview by Eva Kahan, April 4, 2016.
Trumpbour, John. Interview by Eva Kahan, April 10, 2016.

Syllabi

- "International Politics." Syllabus, Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, 1998.
"International Relations." Syllabus, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN, 2009.
"Introduction to International Politics." Syllabus, Columbia University, New York, NY, 2013.
"Introduction to International Politics." Syllabus, Emory University, Atlanta, GA, 1998.
"Introduction to International Relations." Syllabus, Brandeis University, Waltham, MA, 2015.
"Introduction to International Relations." Syllabus, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, 1998.
"Introduction to International Relations." Syllabus, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, 2014.
"Introduction to International Relations." Syllabus, Dickinson College, Carlisle, PA, 2013.
"Introduction to International Relations." Syllabus, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, 2013.
"Introduction to International Relations." Syllabus, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, England, 2012.
"Introduction to International Relations." Syllabus, The Maxwell School at Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY.
"Introduction to International Relations." Syllabus, Northeastern University, Boston, MA, 2013.
"Introduction to International Relations." Syllabus, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, 2010.
"Introduction to International Relations." Syllabus, Reed College, Portland, OR, 2014.
"Introduction to International Relations." Syllabus, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ, 2014.
"Introduction to International Relations." Syllabus, Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA, 2011.
"Introduction to International Relations." Syllabus, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, 1998.
"Introduction to International Relations." Syllabus, Tufts University, Medford, MA, 2012.
"Introduction to International Relations." Syllabus, Tufts University, Medford, MA, 2014.
"Introduction to International Relations." Syllabus, United States Military Academy at West Point, Highland Falls, NY, 2013.
"Introduction to International Relations." Syllabus, University of California, Merced, Merced, CA, 2013.
"Introduction to International Relations." Syllabus, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, 1997.
"Introduction to International Relations." Syllabus, University of Connecticut, Mansfield, CT.

- "Introduction to International Relations." Syllabus, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, Urbana-Champaign, IL, 2009.
- "Introduction to International Relations." Syllabus, University of Miami, Miami, FL, 2013.
- "Introduction to International Relations." Syllabus, University of Missouri, Columbia, MO, 2011.
- "Introduction to International Relations." Syllabus, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC, 2011.
- "Introduction to International Relations." Syllabus, University of Oregon, Eugene, OR, 2016.
- "Introduction to International Relations." Syllabus, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY, 2010.
- "Introduction to International Relations." Syllabus, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, 2015.
- "Introduction to International Relations." Syllabus, University of Washington, Seattle, WA, 2010.
- "Introduction to International Relations and Global Politics." Syllabus, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Canada, 2012.
- "Introduction to International Studies." Syllabus, Boston College, Boston, MA, 2012.
- "Introduction to International Studies." Syllabus, University of Texas, Austin, Austin, TX, 2009.

Notes

1. Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (1993): 22.
2. This statement derives from a preliminary survey done for a first stage of this article, allowing 95% confidence that the percentage of syllabi using Huntington's thesis is between 25% and 57%. Hopefully this summer will allow for more and better examination of this trend, and the confidence interval will narrow as data becomes more abundant.
3. "Donald J. Trump Statement on Preventing Muslim Immigration" *DonaldJTrump.com*, December 7, 2015.
4. Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (1993): 22.
5. Through the *Web of Science* database, one can find that Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations* has been cited 1,367 times in the years since its publication, with approximately 609 net second-generation citations per year. In contrast, articles by authors in the same field published around the same time have been cited in Appendix I to indicate the degree to which Huntington's piece has been more recognized. *Clash of Civilizations* has been second-generation cited at least 50% more than all of these articles in net citations per year since publication, and has a total of at least 3 times as many citations as a whole.
 Web of Science Core Collection. (2016). *Citation Report* [data file]. Retrieved from http://apps.webofknowledge.com/summary.do?product=WOS&parentProduct=WOS&search_mode=CitationReport&qid=20&SID=4CwZwUmJxVDFJgbZx7C&colName=WOS&page=1&action=sort&sortBy=PY.A;LD.A;SO.A.en;VL.A;PG.A;AU.A.en&showFirstPage=1.
6. For stylistic consistency, in this piece the article itself published in *Foreign Affairs* will be referred to as "The Clash of Civilizations?" while the theory posited in said article of culturally explaining international political phenomena will be referred to as "clash of civilizations."

7. Noah Millman. "Walt, Bannon, and the Clash of Civilizations" *The American Conservative*, January 30, 2017. <http://www.theamericanconservative.com/millman/walt-bannon-and-the-clash-of-civilizations/>.
8. Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (1993): 23.
9. Here used to define the land generally thought of by Americans as Arab and/or Muslim, stretching from Mauritania and Morocco to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Several authors do a better job noting the disparities in these definitions, see Mahmood Mamdani, *Good Muslim Bad Muslim* (Afghanistan: Pantheon Books, 2004). This paper refers repeatedly to the Arab world in the same way that Huntington did, with a vague understanding of boundaries based off of popular education at the time rather than Arab ethnicity, and thus any further reference to the Arab world should be seen in this context created by the piece I am attempting to understand and examine.
10. Samuel Huntington, *Political Order and Political Decay* (New Haven: Yale Press, 1968), 8.
11. Ibid.
12. Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (1993): 22.
13. Ibid., 25.
14. Ibid., 32.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid., 30–31.
17. Ibid., 31.
18. Ibid., 31–32.
19. Ibid., 35.
20. Ibid., 36.
21. Ibid., 40.
22. Ibid., 41.
23. Ibid., 42.
24. Bernard Lewis, "The Roots of Muslim Rage," *The Atlantic* 266, 3 (1990): 48.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid., 56.
27. Fouad Ajami, "The Summoning," *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 4 (1993). Edward Said, "Clash of Ignorance," *The Nation* (October 22, issue, 2001).
28. Foreign Affairs, *The Clash of Civilizations? The Debate* (Tampa: Foreign Affairs, 2013); Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).
29. R. Archer "Seymour Martin Lipset and political sociology." *The British Journal of Sociology*, 61 (2010): 43–52. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-4446.2009.01298.x.
30. Seymour Lipset, *The Democratic Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2004), 185.
31. Ibid., 196.
32. Ibid., 198.
33. Dankwart Rustow, *Politics and Westernization in the Near East* (Princeton: Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1956), 20–28.
34. Peter Bachrach, *Theories of Democratic Elites* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967).
35. Philippe C. Schmitter "The proto-science of consolidology: can it improve the outcome of contemporary efforts at democratization?" *Politikon*, 21, no. 2 (1994): 15–27, DOI: 10.1080/02589349408705006.

36. Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992).
37. Noam Chomsky, *What Uncle Sam Really Wants*. Berkeley, CA: Odonian Press, 1992: 49.
38. In the database *Web of Science*, one can observe that while Huntington's article was not cited in more than 64 publications per year before 2001, it was cited into the 100+ times in the last decade, with exponentially more citations per article.
Web of Science Core Collection. (2016). *Citation Report* [data file]. Retrieved from http://apps.webofknowledge.com/summary.do?product=WOS&parentProduct=WOS&search_mode=CitationReport&qid=20&SID=4CwZwUmJxVDFJgbZx7C&colName=WOS&page=1&action=sort&sortBy=PY.A;LD.A;SO.A.en;VL.A;PG.A;AU.A.en&showFirstPage=1.
39. Alan G. Whittaker, Shannon A. Brown, Frederick C. Smith, & Elizabeth McKune. "The National Security Policy Process: The National Security Council and Inter-agency System. (Research Report, August 15, 2011, Annual Update)." Washington, D.C.: Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, U.S. Department of Defense. (2011).
40. John Trumbour, *How Harvard Rules: Reason in the Service of Empire*. (Brooklyn: South End Press, 1989.) John Trumbour, interview by Eva Kahan, April 12, 2016.
41. Melani McAlister, *Epic Encounters* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2005).
42. Terence Ball, "Neoconservatism," *Encyclopedia Britannica*, May 1, 2016.
43. Sahana Kumar, "Paul Wolfowitz," American Enterprise Institute, May 2, 2016. <https://www.aei.org/scholar/paul-wolfowitz/> Wolfowitz is now, unsurprisingly, a leader at AEI.
44. Jeffrey Goldberg, "The Obama Doctrine," *The Atlantic*, April 2016 (2016).
45. Participant 1, interview by Eva Kahan, May 4, 2016.
46. I completed this t-test with an assumption that there are far many more syllabi out there to be mined to the fullest (I estimates at least 1000), and these 36 are a random sample of that population. I have calculated a 95% certainty that somewhere between 25% and 57% of Introductory International Relations courses in the last 2 decades have taught Huntington's piece. Although this is a large confidence interval, its resting above 0% is enough to validate the significance of these results. It should be noted that this claim is made with 95% certainty.
47. As with my quantitative research, additional information on the practicing of these interviews can be found in Appendix II.
48. Notably, this course is labeled by the university as History 0001, or the introduction to world history, and is a core requirement for the International Relations major.
49. Participant 1, interview by Eva Kahan, May 4, 2016; Participant 2, interview by Eva Kahan, May 4, 2016.
50. This claim, as it is made off of a smaller sample of only the syllabi that assign Huntington's piece, is yet again made with the assumption that these are a random sample of a larger collection of syllabi, which I assume consists of over 500 others. With this data, I can say with 95% certainty that somewhere between 16% and 56% of these syllabi also assign contradictory pieces alongside Huntington, with 37% as the most likely percentage. Because these numbers rest above 0%, I believe they are still significant, as they project that at the very least a sixth of the syllabi would assign another, contradictory piece alongside Huntington's.

51. "Introduction to International Relations." Syllabus, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, 1998.
 "International Politics." Syllabus, Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, 1998.
 "Introduction to International Relations." Syllabus, United States Military Academy at West Point, Highland Falls, NY, 2013.
 "Introduction to International Relations." Syllabus, University of Connecticut, Mansfield, CT.
 "Introduction to International Relations." Syllabus, The Maxwell School at Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY.
 Note: Syllabi will not be cited here with the last names of professors in order to avoid the derivation of any personal attacks or comments from this research.
52. This claim also assumes the larger population consists of over 500 other syllabi assigning this piece. With this data, I can say with 95% certainty that somewhere between 37% and 77% of these syllabi assign Huntington's piece with discursive phrasing and diction, with 57% as the most likely percentage. Because these numbers rest above 0%, I believe they are still significant, as they project that at the very least a third of the syllabi assign this piece discursively.
53. "Introduction to International Relations." Syllabus, Tufts University, Medford, MA, 2014.
54. "Introduction to International Relations." Syllabus, University of Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame, IN, 2009.
55. David J. Proctor, interview by Eva Kahan, April 4, 2016.
56. Ibid.
57. Ayesha Jalal, interview by Eva Kahan, April 5, 2016.
58. John Trumpbour, interview by Eva Kahan, April 12, 2016.
59. Participant 1, interview by Eva Kahan, May 4, 2016.
60. Ibid.
61. Ayesha Jalal, interview by Eva Kahan, April 5, 2016.
62. Web of Science Core Collection. (2016). *Citation Report* [data file]. Retrieved from http://apps.webofknowledge.com/summary.do?product=WOS&parentProduct=WOS&search_mode=CitationReport&qid=20&SID=4CwZwUmJxVDFJgbZx7C&colName=WOS&page=1&action=sort&sortBy=PY.A;LD.A;SO.A.en;VL.A;PG.A;AU.A.en&showFirstPage=1.
63. John Trumpbour, interview by Eva Kahan, April 12, 2016.
64. Participant 1, interview by Eva Kahan, May 4, 2016.
65. Ibid.
66. Ayesha Jalal, interview by Eva Kahan, April 5, 2016.
67. David J. Proctor, interview by Eva Kahan, April 4, 2016.
68. Participant 1, interview by Eva Kahan, May 4, 2016.
69. David J. Proctor, interview by Eva Kahan, April 4, 2016.
70. Participant 1, interview by Eva Kahan, May 4, 2016. Ayesha Jalal, interview by Eva Kahan, April 5, 2016.
71. David J. Proctor, interview by Eva Kahan, April 4, 2016.
72. Although Professor Jalal cited this piece as Ernest Gellner, it appears to be Clifford Geertz's piece "Which Way to Mecca," which begins "We are, in this country right now, engaged in the process of constructing, rather hurriedly, as though we had better quickly get on with it after years of neglect, a standard, public-square image of "Islam." Clifford Geertz, "Which Way to Mecca," *New York Review of Books* 50, no. 10 (2003).

73. Ayesha Jalal, interview by Eva Kahan, April 5, 2016.
74. Participant 1, interview by Eva Kahan, May 4, 2016.
75. David J. Proctor, interview by Eva Kahan, April 4, 2016.
76. Ayesha Jalal, interview by Eva Kahan, April 5, 2016.
77. Ibid.
78. The two non-American schools were in England and Canada.
79. Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (1993).
80. Edward W. Said, "Representing the Colonized, Anthropology's Interlocutors" *Critical Inquiry* 15, No. 2 (Winter, 1989), pp. 205–225.
81. Seymour Martin Lipset "Some Social Requisites of Democracy—Economic Development and Political Legitimacy" *The American Political Science Review* 53, No. 1 (Mar., 1959), pp. 69–105.
82. Dankwart A. Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy—Toward a Dynamic Model," *Comparative Politics* 2, No. 3 (Apr., 1970), pp. 337–363.
83. Larry Jay Diamond, "Thinking About Hybrid Regimes," *Journal of Democracy* 13, No. 2 (April 2002), pp. 21–35.
84. Philippe C. Schmitter, "Still Century of Corporatism," *The Review of Politics* 36, No. 1 (Jan., 1974), pp. 85–131.

Editorials

The Tragedy of the Conflict

Ria Mazumdar, *Tufts University Class of 2019*

The “tragedy of the commons” stipulates that the demand for a resource overwhelms the supply when individuals act to maximize their self-interest. When applying this theory to the global commons, this implies that states must increase the supply side of the equation to counteract the growing demand of resources. However, geopolitical motivations block access to resources on a much greater scale than diminishing supply. Dictators, for example, may choose to instigate famines in their own countries to reduce the ability of a populace to conduct an uprising; there are many such instances of political incentives controlling the distribution of goods. This phenomenon may be dubbed “the tragedy of the conflict.” Although mainstream narratives surrounding the global commons and natural resources primarily analyze scarcity in the context of the global commons, political incentives and power dynamics more strongly impact resource allocation than simple issues of supply alone.

This rings particularly true in the Gaza Strip; where the current humanitarian crisis reflects a tragedy of the conflict, rather than a tragedy of the commons. Policies by the Israeli state have created systematic de-development in Gaza, where physical security, food security, and employment opportunities have been broken down in the name of national security. Rather than scarcity causing a lack of resources, it is these policies that have actively fomented conflict and the deprivation of rights. It is first important to describe the historical context of the Gaza blockade, to analyze its effectiveness in terms of broader security concerns, and finally to discuss the humanitarian imperative of just resource allocation.

In 2007, when Hamas seized control in the Gaza Strip and established an independent government, an Israeli blockade was imposed to prohibit sea or air access and sanction Gaza from the rest of the world.¹ While Israeli security concerns are legitimate, measures to address security threats must be “proportionate, temporary, and [not punitive],” and it is clear that in these circumstances this wasn’t the case.² The blurred distinction between “civilian” and “target” incurs problematic policies that leave thousands of helpless individuals in a state of crisis. These Israeli sanctions on the Hamas regime, designed to restrict the movement of people and reduce the supply of fuel, electricity, and potentially weaponry, has left Gaza with a poverty rate of 39 percent compared to 16 percent in the West Bank.³ While military supplies are restricted, so are medical supplies, foodstuffs, and construction materials.⁴

The severity of resource restrictions in Gaza has not merely stagnated its economic growth, but has pushed it into substantial de-development. After

the escalation of violence in the summer of 2014, the estimated cost of relief was \$4 billion, but a mere \$954 million out of pledged \$5.4 billion in international aid was disbursed, stifling efforts at post-conflict reconstruction.⁵ Additionally, the Israeli government's authority to collect tax revenues on behalf of the Palestinian Authority fueled a financial crisis that "deprived the PA from more than two-thirds of its money budget, excluding foreign aid, and prevented it from paying [employees]."⁶ The PA, therefore, faces structural hindrances that prevent it from providing basic services to civilians. This systemic barrier precludes political questions of whether the PA ought be in power to begin with. Although many argue that the PA is unqualified to govern because it is unable to provide for its people, the critical question is *why* they have failed so spectacularly in doing so.

The effects on resource allocation clearly demonstrate that the Gaza blockade is neither effective nor proportionate. Trade restrictions have prompted a vast underground trade through Egypt dubbed the "tunnel trade,"⁷ and have made it impossible for civilians who want to study or travel to the West Bank for personal reasons to move freely.⁸ Thus, the blockade only serves as a political scapegoat for militant groups in Palestine, while driving trade underground and punishing civilians. It fails to put targeted political pressure on Hamas, and civilians bear the costs instead. A clear repercussion of geopolitical strategies, therefore, is the disproportionate burden placed upon civilians. This renders such punitive measures completely moot; sanctions and blockades can only be effective if the targeted body itself bears the costs and is thus incentivized to change its behavior.

The punitive nature of the blockade is disproportionate. Half of Gaza's population is under 18,⁹ and 70 percent of households are vulnerable to food insecurity while 80 percent of the population is dependent on international aid.¹⁰ Moreover, the healthcare system is on the brink of collapsing, with 27 percent of essential medicines are zero stock and patients who are unable to travel outside Gaza for treatment.¹¹ 95 percent of the water does not even meet the standards of the World Health Organization.¹² Electricity and fuel shortages leave areas with power outages for up to twelve hours a day.¹³

Given the severity of the status quo, it is imperative to consider solutions to this systemic problem. Expanding access to resources in Gaza will take more than just increasing supply. The blockade has created substantial humanitarian concerns, and yet many argue that its removal is not the answer. Since the quantity of disbursed aid remains far below the total amount of pledged aid, the "global commons" are being exploited insofar as political incentives stifle humanitarian agendas. Palestinian Authority president Mahmoud Abbas has vocalized opposition to lifting the blockade for fear of empowering Hamas, and instead advocates the gradual increase of humanitarian supplies and construction in the Gaza Strip.¹⁴ However, this solution presupposes that humanitarian efforts can actually succeed. As another important aspect of a solution, the link between Gaza and the West Bank must not be cut; since Gaza exported the majority of its goods

to the West Bank, this connection is critical to Gaza's economic survival.¹⁵ However, this will be impossible without wider accountability and awareness. The international community must both visualize the ongoing crisis and take measures to act.

Forces such as U.S. lobbies largely prevent substantive accountability from developing. Nonetheless, unjust resource allocation is a global matter, and all actors have the imperative to act when the global commons are being misused. Although many argue that it is in the best interest of the United States and liberal democratic values to support the blockade and other policies, perpetuating systematic denial of basic resources cannot truly be in anyone's self-interest, because punitive measures that target civilians are both ineffective and inhumane.

A solely economic perspective on resources is overly simplified. The humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip is not a result of scarcity or the tragedy of the commons. Rather, it is a tragedy of the conflict that has persisted for decades and shows no sign of improving in the years to come, with people around the world stating that Gaza will be uninhabitable by 2020. Global actors must understand how political barriers affect the distribution of resources on a daily basis, and must act to remove those barriers and ensure that the global commons is being used appropriately. When humanitarian aid fails to be disbursed, the intentions of entire nations are being disrespected. Respect for the global commons is not merely about sustainability, but justice as well.

Notes

1. Gisha, "A costly Divide: Economic Repercussions of Separating Gaza . . ." Gisha. February 2015.
2. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. "THE GAZA STRIP: The Humanitarian Impact of the Blockade." July 2013.
3. Euro-Med Monitor for Human Rights. "Strangled: Gaza Collapsing in the Grip of a Humanitarian Crisis." Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Monitor. May 2015.
4. Shackle, Samira. "Israel tightens its blockade of Gaza for 'security reasons.'" Middle East Monitor. January 22, 2014.
5. Euro-Med Monitor for Human Rights. "Strangled: Gaza Collapsing in the Grip of a Humanitarian Crisis."
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Gisha, "A costly Divide: Economic Repercussions of Separating Gaza . . ."
9. Euro-Med Monitor for Human Rights. "Strangled: Gaza Collapsing in the Grip of a Humanitarian Crisis."
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. "THE GAZA STRIP: The Humanitarian Impact of the Blockade."
14. Ravid, Barak. "Abbas to Obama: I'm against lifting the Gaza naval blockade." Haaretz.com. June 12, 2010.
15. Gisha, "A costly Divide: Economic Repercussions of Separating Gaza . . ."

Space Debris:

An Impending Tragedy of the Global Commons

Jared Sawyer, *Tufts University Class of 2019*

“Space: the final frontier.”¹ With the vastness of outer space, it is easy to forget that it is a finite global common. With a limited number of advantageous orbits, crowding from space junk is slowly leading to the inoperability of our final frontier.² In the past decade, the amount of space debris has doubled to around 20,000 softball-sized pieces and around a million more that are smaller or too small to be tracked.³ Every space launch creates more debris during deployment, such as the 104 satellites recently launched into orbit on February 22, 2016 by the Indian Space Research Organization. Past anti-satellite tests such as the Chinese test in 2007, where they destroyed one of their own weather satellites, and past collisions, such as when a private satellite crashed into a defunct Russian satellite in 2009, have also exponentially increased the amount of debris in finite orbit real estate.⁴ With every space launch, test, and collision skyrocketing risks of future impact, it is quickly becoming imperative to find a cooperative clean-up solution to the problem of space debris to avoid impending calamity.⁵

With the amount of space debris exponentially snowballing there are rapidly increasing risks of devastating collisions with satellites. Beyond simply abstract risk, there have been recent concrete incidents with near misses or damage to satellites from debris proving that the threat of collision is real and impending. In 2011, the International Space Station had to take an emergency maneuverability mission to avoid a piece of debris and in 2016 a debris particle, just a few millimeters long, damaged one of the European Space Agency’s radar satellites.⁶ Because debris in orbit is moving extremely fast, even a collision from the tiniest of debris, just one centimeter in diameter, could break a satellite. Additionally, debris particles are carrying electric charges that can short circuit satellites even without direct impact escalating the risk of space asset disruption.⁷

This increasing risk of satellite destruction or space asset disruption is a global security threat. Within the modern world, satellites have taken a uniquely key role in the functionality of society. For example, a disruption to the Global Positioning System satellite network could interrupt or cripple global banking systems that rely on them for precision timing signals.⁸ The United States military capacity is also now dependent upon functioning space assets and will be crippled by plausible damage or disruption of satellite capacity. Satellites provide essential facilitation of land, sea, and air operations by providing remote sensing data, targeting information, and battle damage assessments.⁹ Specifically, the United States’ Defense Support Program

satellites are crucial to providing early warning systems for missile launches on earth, in space, and for nuclear detonations.¹⁰

External to the risks from disruption, the impending collisions from space debris may trigger future world conflict. Vitaly Adushkin at the Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow argues that impacts from space debris on military satellites can spark international escalation due to the inability to quickly distinguish the cause of satellite impact, be it from either an accidental debris collision or from a military attack.¹¹ A nation may be immediately forced into a decisive judgement call predicated on momentous panic which may spark escalated conflict off of a miscalculated false alarm. Even if the probability of such a false alarm sparked conflict is low, due to the extreme magnitude, the outcome should not be ignored.

With such ever present and looming dangers from orbiting space debris, solutions are becoming increasingly necessary. Postponing a solution only further endangers space usage. Orbital space is now moving toward becoming a classic story of the tragedy of the commons as old and new spacefaring nations attempt to reap the benefits of space usage while harming current assets and crowding out future utilization. This is uniquely true in the context of outer space due to the Kessler syndrome which posits that even with an end to further space usage, exponential growth of debris is unavoidable due to the inevitability of random collisions. Once one random collision occurs, the amount of existing debris will exponentially surge which will have a cascading effect leading to an even higher frequency of random collisions and eventually a tipping point of irreversible cascades of collisions.^{12, 13}

Therefore, even if all future anthropogenic debris creation is halted, due to the Kessler Syndrome, orbital space will exponentially become more and more inoperable. Only solutions that provide a direct and physical clean-up method can be effective. Specifically, solutions that take a two-pronged approach with physical clean up tied to cooperation are best. One plausible solution is space lasers which can push debris back into the atmosphere to burn up.¹⁴ The Research School of Astronomy and Astrophysics at the Australian National University has already begun investment in an Adaptive Optics Tracking and Pushing system which uses laser beams to displace and remove debris.¹⁵ However, even though research and development exists now, international cooperation tied to solutions for space debris is also vital due to possible fears of space-based arms races. While a country develops capacity to remove space debris, a security dilemma is created such that spacefaring nations may fear a dual-use capacity.¹⁶ Fears that the solution mechanism which can remove debris could also eliminate critical satellites or other space assets will provoke spacefaring states into creating and augmenting their own space warfare capacities in order to bulwark against fears of losing access to space. Once one nation starts building up space warfare capacity, other nations will follow suit, leading to a downward spiral toward space militarization and conflict.

An internationally cooperative strategy predicated on the removal of space debris is therefore necessary. With increasing amounts of human induced

orbiting debris tied to the Kessler syndrome of future exponential growth, the risk of space activity disruption is swiftly proliferating. With global banking system and national security systems, among others, tied to space activity, even a small disruption could be devastating. Therefore, while outer space clean up missions get placed on the bottom of the docket, it is time to reconsider the importance of solving the current space debris crisis.

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