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THE TUFTS UNIVERSITY UNDERGRADUATE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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Letter from the Editors

The past issues of *Hemispheres* have dealt principally with novelties altering and recasting the international system in unprecedented ways: new crises and new tensions. This year, the journal sets aside the new to reflect on the *continuities* between the world affairs of today and those of the past. International relations are conditioned by certain perennial questions that pronounce themselves quietly—questions whose answers manifest discretely in individual trends and events but, under scrutiny, disclose themselves as reactions to the same uncertainties. This 46th issue of *Hemispheres* seeks to understand what is being asked. What are some of these age-old questions that underpin the changing global dynamics in our midst, and how do they shed light on new answers being advanced?

February 23, 2023, marked not only the somber one-year anniversary of Russia's invasion of Ukraine but also a conflict that renewed an old division between two nations with tangled histories. This past year also saw intensified saber-rattling on all fronts by Xi Jinping and the People's Republic of China against Taiwan in an attempt to advance Beijing's long-term goal of political reunification. Other enduring issues, such as tensions over the West Bank, international trade and supply-chain security, and climate change, echo some of the oldest questions confronted by foreign policymakers and international affairs scholars around the world. Entering an era of new normal, the world is witnessing new and bold answers to many of the oldest troubled questions.

This 46th issue deals with a wide range of international developments that our contributors situate in old questions. The efforts of East Asian governments to combat severe air pollution, for one, become a novel response to the externalities of the region's rapid industrialization, while the gap in multilateral cooperation remains unresolved. Uncertainty in the South China Sea becomes an issue around which Vietnam has rallied Southeast Asian nations, exercising its rising regional influence. In some Nordic states, the rise of a populist radical right and ensuing reductions in welfare renew questions surrounding state-society relations in countries once hallmarked as robust social democracies. One author frames war rape in the Russian invasion of Ukraine within the more transregional problems of chauvinism and militarized masculinity within armed troops. Another examines gendered discourse across years of United Nations Security Council meetings, grounding contemporary nuclear disarmament talks in a more mature tradition of feminist scholarship. Our editorialists cover coordination failures in responses to the Venezuelan refugee crisis; neo-Ottomanism in Turkish foreign policy; and the role of extant legal restrictions in China's suppression of Hong Kong. In the interviews, Dr. Amr Adly places Egypt's privatization efforts in a history of shortsighted liberalization reforms, while Dr. Kelly Greenhill showcases her theory of weaponized migration.

Amid what is considered a new normal, the *Hemispheres* staff discovered the older, underlying questions and fresh perspectives in our work to complete this 46th issue. The collaborative nature of this work inspired discussion, debate, and deliberation on pressing international issues. Our team identified great merit in the dozens of submissions from undergraduates across the world, indicating innovative research within a number of interdisciplinary and original topics; the articles published here represent just one window into our peers' spectacular recent work on international affairs. This year's issue would not exist without the combined efforts of our dedicated staff editors, executive board members, and the participation of the contributing authors. We would like to give special acknowledgment to our interviewees, Dr. Kelly Greenhill and Dr. Amr Adly, for their insights and engagement. Most importantly, we thank our readers who opt to participate in the thought-provoking discourse found in the journal and their pursuit of answers to these critical global issues. On behalf of the 2023 editorial team, we are delighted to bring you the 46th issue of *Hemispheres*.

Yours,
Riya Mehta, Stewart James, and Jason Wu

Articles

Feminine States and Masculine Arms: How Gendered Discourse Prevents States from Nuclear Disarmament

Noora Chandasir, *University of Georgia*

Abstract

Feminist perspectives in international affairs firmly establish the link between gender, nuclear weapons, and non-proliferation, associating states' possession of nuclear arsenals with masculinity. Such research is vital to recognize that nuclear disarmament is often seen as an emasculating act by the state. This article considers two case studies; the first seeks to determine whether the US uses different gender language when discussing nuclear weapons, with feminine language used when discussing nuclear disarmament for other nation-states and masculine language used when referring to itself. The second analyzes how two Global South states, India and Pakistan, use gendered language when discussing nuclear disarmament both regarding themselves and in reference to other Global North and Global South states. This article codes gendered language used in United Nations (UN) Security Council (UNSC) meetings regarding non-proliferation between 2004 and 2017 to answer this question. The results of this article coincided with previous feminist literature that associates the possession of nuclear weapons with the masculinity of a state, promoting an international order built around Western proliferation. The results show that states use gendered discourse when discussing the disarmament of other states but refrain from using such discourse when discussing their own disarmament. Future research should explore if gendered discourse surrounding disarmament exists in different environments and among states that are not in the unique position as a hegemon in the global sphere.

Introduction

In 1966, members of the Indian National Congress, a prominent political party in India, impelled the government to renounce its "nuclear celibacy" policy, arguing that nuclear weapons symbolized a militarized nation that "boast[ed] of its 'manliness' and 'virility' and thus proved to the world the superiority of Hindu civilization."[1] Thirty years later, similar sexual axioms arose surrounding

India signing the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Brahma Chellaney, an Indian author and public intellectual, vehemently opposed the non-proliferation treaty and debated that "accession to these 'self-castration measures' would leave India as a 'nuclear eunuch.'[22] Chellaney compared India's 'nuclear option' to 'chronic impotence' and criticized national leaders for leaving the nation 'naked.'[3] He also argued that 'India cannot allow its nuclear option to be vasectomized at the fissban's (fissile material production ban) even before it has procreated enough fissile material to secure itself."[4]

The overt masculinization and sexual undertones of discourse surrounding nuclear weapons have existed for a long time and permeate many spaces of global politics. In America, the concept of a "white, hegemonic, militarized masculinity" has been closely associated with the strength of the military-industrial complex and American nationality, tracing its existence as far back as World War I.[5] Leading into the Cold War, this "structure of hegemonic masculinity that was contingent on nuclear weapons" established the foundation for a security discourse in America that uses prominent gendered terminology in discussions of weapons of mass destruction.[6] This security discourse continues today and shapes the way nuclear order is conducted. The US, the hegemon of the nuclear order, carries norm-making behavior, and is able to shape how the rest of the world frames security and nuclear power.[7,8] US discourse surrounding nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation thus carries important global implications.

Analyzing the US discourse around nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation offers valuable insights into the way in which nuclear weapons are associated with gender norms. This study defines nuclear disarmament as "the progressive marginalization of nuclear weapons," and nuclear non-proliferation as "the controlling of the spread and/or amount of something, especially nuclear or chemical weapons."[9] Reflecting on the literature on both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, it is clear that as long as the US continues to use gendered discourse in the international community, a chorus of other states will echo this framework, and disarmament will be portrayed as a weakness of a state. The result: a vast reduction in the possibility that other states will disarm, or even deploy their nuclear weapons.

Security intellectuals humanize the nuclear weapon while dehumanizing those affected by their deployment, shifting the focus from the emotional aspect of war and future victims of nuclear weapons—the "human bodies and their vulnerability, human lives and their subjectivity—all of which are marked as feminine."[10] The underlying phallic nature of security discourse permeates the naming of bombs and missiles. For example, the names of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Little Boy and Fat Man, enhance such "masculinist bias of the technocratic sphere."[11] Additionally, the "phallocentric military-industrial complex" is riddled with instances of men whom the nuclear community regards as powerful "father figures."[12] For instance, Robert Oppenheimer, the leader of the Manhattan Project and father of the atomic bomb, was named "Father of the Year" by the *National*

Baby Association, displaying how "this masculinist bias also percolated into the public domain."[13] By associating these blatant masculine attributes with nuclear weapons, security discourse reinforces masculine social norms with the view that disarmament is an insult to the strength and ability of the masculine state to gain traction in the public eye.

This view extends to how the state frames militarization for its population as it promotes the idea of the state needing to shield its citizens. The state is seen as the powerful, masculine defender of its inhabitants, primarily women and children, who inherently adopt gendered feminine characteristics as they are unable to protect themselves and must rely upon the state.[14] This enforces a gendered perspective, thereby associating the state with masculine ideals, and in turn reinforcing conventional feminine ideals that are seen as inferior, reestablishing protector vs protected roles in society. [15] These gender norms and principles are not only enforced by the state, but also reinforced by those within to encourage and maintain such images of a masculinized state to other states. These associations between gender mold collective identities that construct the state, and in turn are the root of gendered security discourse. This concept provides further reasoning that states would see nuclear disarmament as an affront to their masculinity and their role of protecting their citizens.

Gendered discourse also shapes how states interact on the international stage. It is no coincidence that the five permanent members of the UNSC have nuclear weapons as "the bomb itself is a social institution."[16] When states in powerful positions reinforce the idea that nuclear weapons are given to the states with the most strength, pro-nuclear masculinity seems appealing to the more "feminine" state, discouraging the abandonment of established mores of security and masculinity set up by other states.[17] This creates an obstacle when promoting nuclear disarmament among states since the abnegation of nuclear possession would be associated with the emasculation—and subsequent weakness—of a state.

As conversations on nuclear disarmament have diminished in the public sphere, so too has research into nuclear disarmament discourse.[18] However, states with nuclear weapons have shown "clear indications that the reductions that have characterized global nuclear arsenals since the end of the Cold War have ended."[19] In addition, other experts state that, "all of the nuclear-armed states are increasing or upgrading their arsenals, and most are sharpening nuclear rhetoric and the role nuclear weapons play in their military strategies."[20] Given these trends, it is crucial to analyze how nuclear disarmament is discussed today. As such, this article asks two questions: a) What role does gender play in the public discourse on nuclear disarmament? and b) What differences exist in the utilization of gendered language regarding nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament between countries in the global North and the global South?

This research contributes to the literature as it reanalyzes Carol Cohn's work in a post-Cold War, post-9/11 world and focuses on the US's discourse on

disarmament and the lasting impact it has on the international community. Since "performances of masculinity and femininity (and the binary relationship between them) have been central to dominant narratives of threat and violence in global politics," this research explores whether (and how) the US uses gendered language when discussing disarmament for itself since it would be perceived as emasculating and reducing its realized global power.[21] Simultaneously, this article demonstrates that the US uses gendered discourse when discussing disarmament in *other* states to maintain current power dynamics and reinforce itself as a masculine hegemon.

This article begins by discussing the range of existing literature on gendered discourse in national security and how post-colonial structures shape national security dialogue between states. With this background, the article delves into six hypotheses followed by the methodology, which entails examining UNSC meetings regarding non-proliferation. The article then discusses the background of the case studies of the US, India, and Pakistan. Afterwards, this article will deduce results, discuss implications, and examine further research. Finally, the article ends with a conclusion concerning the impact of these findings and avenues for future research.

Overview of Gendered Discourse in National Security

Previous research has demonstrated that gendered discourse exists in current security discussions, impacting nuclear policy. Feminist scholars have explored how the US nuclear policy makes use of "technostrategic language" that promotes an association between masculinity and militarization.[22] This specialized vocabulary, distinguished by abstract language, is used by security intellectuals to divert the public focus away from the impacts of war on civilian populations and instead humanize nuclear weapons. Eschle supports this notion, arguing that sexual metaphors relating to nuclear weapons afford greater status to the weapons themselves.[23] Here, the idea is that the discussion and nomenclature of nuclear weapons, reinforced by their shape, bolster ideas of the state's masculinity since such weapons are equivalent to penetrating the feminine mass of another, weaker state. A recent example of those within a state reinforcing the masculine-protector archetype is seen after the 9/11 attacks, "which included appeals to the US government to 'bomb 'em back to the Stone Age, and then make the rubble bounce' . . . [These statements imply] that being willing to employ nuclear weapons is to 'have the balls' or to be 'man enough' to 'defend' your country."[24]

Whiteness in National Security Dialogue between States

While there is limited research on the exact question posited by this paper, general research into the US nuclear disarmament policy does provide valuable insight into the dependent variable. Contemporary global politics have adopted a stance that nuclear weapons are imperative to national security. In

2021, the P5 nuclear weapon states are looking to "expand or modernize their nuclear arsenals and appear to be increasing the salience of nuclear weapons in their military strategies."[25] This increasing proliferation of weapons is especially dangerous as it "maintains US military and economic dominance well into the 21st century."[26] To conserve such dominance, the US, "prescribe[s] restrictive measures on the rest of the world, such as strengthening non-proliferation measures, achieving new arms control treaties and new stringent fissile material controls, and securing stronger commitments from those states that do not possess nuclear weapons to refrain from doing so, all for the stated purpose of making the world universally more secure."[27] Previous studies in disarmament discourse have shown that Western media uses language against "wielding nuclear weapons" only in reference to non-Western countries; therefore encouraging an Orientalist narrative when discussing countries who can wield nuclear weapons.[28] The West's main "discursive strategies" to legitimize its leadership in nuclear proliferation is fear-based arguments in the media, with no compelling scientific evidence or data to support its claims; instead, American newspapers use "linguistic, stylistic, and argumentative maneuvers" that will "create a selective focus" on countries that have violated nuclear norms while "conveniently obfuscating the failure of the US and other nuclear powers to meet their own obligations."[29] Historically, the concept of security has always favored Western, imperialist countries, as they legitimize interference in developing countries through often-exaggerated security risks that the West deems important.[30] As a result, the West will continue to have agency over nuclear weapons while "the rest" will continue to be harmed by them. Not only does nuclear technology affirm the masculinity of men, but it asserts the power structures and institutions created by and favor white men. Such structures have existed since World War I, when "contemporary ideologies of hegemonic masculinity, which were beginning to equate militarized (white) men with hypermasculinity . . . such gendered capital . . . remasculinized the American man."[31] The re-emphasis of such white militarized systems after the Great Depression continued into the construction of the nuclear bomb during the Cold War. When discussing the importance of "remasculinizing technology" through the Manhattan Project on American nationalism and gendered militarism, Roy declares, "Although ideals of hegemonic masculinity have indeed existed . . . long before the Manhattan Project, the bomb became symbolic . . . which would lead to the emergence of a remasculinized and invigorated American body politic."[32] This Western, militarized structure based on nuclear masculinity gave "rise to a very specific set of masculine anxieties: thereby shaping the narrative of nuclear proliferation" that has prevailed in security discourse today.[33]

The creation and initial use of white nuclear technology has proved that the bomb is not only gendered but is then also constructed around the concept of race. In his "The Whiteness of the Bomb" essay, Ken Cooper discusses the link between race and the nuclear bomb, remarking, "To put the matter bluntly, the bomb was built by people like me for the protection of people

like me."[34] He further adds that "white cities" are the ones that have extensive atomic influence and capacity compared to those around the world.[35] Today, this translates into how security discourse favors global North countries over global South countries. In an imperative study that looked at discourse analysis in both the UN Security Council and speeches given by the US administration, Schnurr et al. further support the use of an "us-versus-them" dichotomy by the West. Schnurr provides an example from Obama's speech: "Some countries break the rules.[36] That's why we need a structure in place that ensures when any nation does, they will face consequences." Here, Obama's arrangement of the phrase "*some countries*" creates a "*they*" that includes North Korea and Iran which is in opposition to a "*we*" that includes the UNSC and the US administration.[37] This framing clearly divides the world and creates different operating standards for each country.

Obama's speech creates the notion of a rule-following "we." Despite being a part of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the most accepted arms control agreement, the US expects other states to disarm while it retains its own nuclear stockpiles. In addition, President Trump violated the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran; yet Iran has consistently been labeled as a danger to the global community by US leaders and in UN Security Council discourse.[38] The US's continuous hypocritical disregard and inconsistencies for following international norms and rules regarding disarmament cast doubt on this "good vs. evil" narrative and shows a clear double standard. This literature showcases the use of gendered language as a means of creating a strict dichotomy between global North and global South states wherein the global South is perceived as a submissive and irrational actor. In turn, this supports preexisting relationships between who owns nuclear weapons, the global North, and who has less agency over their control, the global South.

Theory and Hypothesis

Language-Based Constructivist Approach to History

Feminist scholars such as Carol Cohn in the 1980s have explored how the US nuclear policy uses "technostrategic language" that promotes an association with masculinity and militarization.[39] Understanding how states approach foreign policy and address other states requires knowledge of the language that results in dynamic power plays, which can be analyzed through trends in prose. Such language depends on what and whom is being addressed. For example, the US uses similar gendered, masculine language terms when addressing states that defy global norms, such as Iran and North Korea. Such states "share certain family resemblances—all labeled 'rogue' states . . . each game resembles the other, allowing for linkages and comparisons" and often, the exact same phrases and words are used when addressing these states, with slight variations made based on historical context.[40] As Howard indicates, the language used by states to discuss nuclear disarmament or non-proliferation

is the byproduct of historical interactions between states and a reflection of their sentiments toward one another, as well as the connotations attached to these ideas. Ultimately, due to the historical advantage that states of the global North have, they set nuclear language rules. The relationship between language and states in security discourse does not exist without the historical power differences between the global North and global South. It is vital to recognize that "issues of identity and culture are just as, if not more, important sources of state conduct."[41]

Theory

This project theorizes that states use gendered language when discussing nuclear disarmament for other states as a form of emasculation. However, they do not use gendered language when talking about their disarmament so as not to emasculate themselves. Specifically, the US will not use gendered language when discussing its disarmament, as doing such would be considered emasculating.

However, the US uses gendered language when discussing disarmament in other states as this language reinforces the US's global power. This theory draws on Cohn's articulation of gendered discourse in national security and its ramification for nuclear disarmament. It also draws on England's view of an increasingly hostile tone adopted by the US as it grows its nuclear stockpile. The theory also considers Roy's findings on hegemonic hypermasculinity with the nuclear bomb and its link to proliferation discourse. Suppose the US almost solely discusses disarmament in the context of adversaries. In that case, it follows that the US will try to adopt emasculating language to further its power and assert its dominance.

Hypothesis 1: In UNSC meetings regarding non-proliferation, when global North countries, specifically the US, discusses nuclear disarmament of other states, it will use gendered language. The US uses gendered language to reinforce power dynamics and encourage the endurance of such structures. Literature indicates that nuclear disarmament is perceived as an emasculating act. States can weaponize this understanding to assert their dominance.

Hypothesis 2: In UNSC meetings regarding non-proliferation, when the US discusses its own nuclear disarmament, it will not use gendered language. The US will not use gendered language when discussing its nuclear disarmament not to appear emasculated and violate its hegemonic power in the global sphere. Given that the literature shows that states understand themselves as masculine or even hypermasculine actors and that disarmament is seen as an emasculating act, states will try to avoid emasculating themselves when discussing disarmament.

Hypothesis 3: Gendered language will not vary between political parties of the Bush administration and the Obama administration in the US when discussing non-proliferation to maintain power perceptions of the state in the international

community. Gendered language in nuclear disarmament discourse will not shift between different political party administrations, as the role that gender plays in nuclear power dynamics will stay consistent throughout different administrations. Literature shows that the perception of disarmament as an emasculating act is a long-standing belief withheld for many centuries and relies on social understandings of femininity and masculinity.

Hypothesis 4: In UNSC meetings regarding non-proliferation, when the global South countries discuss nuclear proliferation of itself, they will not use feminine-gendered language but instead masculine-gendered language. States will only use masculine-gendered language when talking about themselves so as not to emasculate themselves. In using masculine-gendered language, these states will want to assert their power as a state and protector.

Hypothesis 5: In UNSC meetings regarding non-proliferation, there will be fewer instances of global South countries using feminine-gendered language when discussing the global North. To maintain current power structures, global South countries will use standard, masculine-gendered language when talking about global North countries, reinforcing the post-colonial dynamic in the security sphere.

Hypothesis 6: In UNSC meetings regarding non-proliferation, when the global South countries discuss nuclear disarmament of other global South countries, they will use feminine-gendered language. This dynamic of Global South countries using feminine gendered language when discussing other global South countries does not disrupt the global North-global South power dynamic in the security sphere but instead, reinforces the idea that global South countries are a group that will outwardly always be perceived as less masculine than global North states.

Methodology

The data collected for this research was compiled by analyzing a total of 54 UNSC meetings with "non-proliferation" in the title. To control for the potential impact of US political parties on the use of gendered language by different administrations, UNSC meetings from the last four years of George W. Bush's presidency (2004–2008) (2005 was skipped from data because there were no UNSC meetings regarding non-proliferation. Instead, 2004 was used as a substitute.) and Obama's presidency (2014–2017) were analyzed (H3). Each meeting was analyzed to determine which of the three case study countries (US, India, and Pakistan) spoke during the meeting. When analyzing UNSC meetings for the US, only statements given by the representative of the US within those meetings were examined for gendered language in this study. A comprehensive examination of 40 UNSC meetings occurred for the US case study, consisting of 18 UNSC meetings from the last four years of George W. Bush's presidency and 22 UNSC meetings from the previous four years of Obama's

presidency. Concerning the case study for India and Pakistan, 14 UNSC meetings regarding non-proliferation were analyzed between the years of 2011 and 2013. These years not only allowed a comparison of India and Pakistan's use of gendered language in a close timeframe but both India and Pakistan had representatives on the UNSC in 2012.

Each meeting was then coded for whether gendered language was used, the gender of the representative speaking, and who was being discussed. If gendered language was identified, the speech was coded for whether said language was masculine or feminine. The specific masculine or feminine language was also noted. These coding guidelines will establish if the case studies use gendered language when speaking about non-proliferation for themselves (H1 & H5) or if states use gendered language when discussing non-proliferation regarding other states (H2, H5 & H6).

After analyzing all UNSC meetings, all gendered terms were written down, and specific masculine and specific feminine language were noted for each meeting. Text mining functions in R were then used to determine the frequency of the top 10 masculine/feminine root words used across all meetings.

To determine what constitutes gendered language, Carol Cohn, Felicity Hill, and Sara Ruddick's list of dichotomous adjectives from "The Relevance of Gender for Eliminating Weapons of Mass Destruction" (Figure 1) was employed as a baseline to determine which words used in the discourse in UNSC meetings constituted masculine or feminine language. Specifically, each report was observed for gendered key terms that the US uses to be "associated with masculinity (e.g., strong, rational, prudent, active, objective)" while associating the other state it referred to with adjectives that are associated with "femininity (e.g., weak, irrational, impulsive, passive, subjective)."[42]

Figure 1: Dichotomous Adjectives.[43]

Male	Female
Thought	Emotion
Active	Passive
Rational	Irrational
Strength	Weakness
Mind	Body
Courage	Fear
Intelligence	Cunning
Self	Other
Primary	Secondary
Serious	Playful
Concrete	Abstract
Doer	Done
Reality	Appearance
Science	Humanities
Philosophy	Myth
Order	Disorder
Permanent	Ephemeral
Dominate	Subordinate
Confident	Fearful
Simplicity	Complexity
Truth	Fiction
Classical	Romantic
Centre	Margin
Master	Slave
Teacher	Student

Results and Discussion

As discussed in Carol Cohn's novel research probing the discourse among American defense intellectuals, many weapons experts dickered language embedded in sexual dominance and masculinity:

> Vertical erector launchers, thrust-to-weight ratios, soft lay downs, deep penetration, and the comparative advantages of protracted versus spasm attacks—or what one military advisor to the National Security Council has called "releasing 70 to 80 percent of our megatonnage in one orgasmic whump."[44]

The increasing prominence of sexual metaphors to legitimize the use of nuclear weapons, as well as to challenge leaders to take a stance to protect their states has been closely tied to the construction of masculinity and warfare. As a result, a lubricating link exists between bearing nuclear weapons and establishing perceived power and militarized masculinities in the global sphere.

Case Study: The United States

Traditional Security Framing post 9/11

The US presents a unique case when discussing security rhetoric and discourse. After 9/11, the discourse around disarmament drastically shifted from what it used to be after the Cold War. Less focus was given to decreasing nuclear stockpiles for states that already had nuclear weapons, and greater attention was given to preventing states and non-state actors from acquiring nuclear weapons. 9/11 showed many in the security world that "the greatest threats to US security come not from Russia or other world powers, but from terrorists who strike without warning or rogue states that seek weapons of mass destruction."[45] The 9/11 attack pushed disarmament to the periphery, focusing efforts on preventing non-state actors and enemy states from acquiring nuclear weapons.[46] While disarmament did not completely vanish from the international stage or states' security priorities, it was seen as one of many different facets of establishing and maintaining security, as opposed to the relative prominence it enjoyed in the Cold War: [47]

> Disintegration of the Soviet Union kindled a gentleman's non-proliferation salon. The Clinton administration discovered rogue states, anthrax, and terrorism—and in doing so, found its own post-Cold war national security voice. The domestic WMD consequence management business was born, paving the way for the post-9/11 homeland security industry. The ballistic missile defense industry was reinvigorated by claims that fanatical nuclear rogues were immune to the calculus of mutual assured destruction. Proliferation replaced disarmament in the nonprofit world. WMD was always good for a front-page story.[48]

Previous research concludes that a new challenge existed for the US after 9/11: the presence of non-state actors. This challenge would warrant a new approach regarding proliferation as opposed to the previous strategies used with the Soviet Union state during the Cold War and before 9/11, which entailed a power struggle between states. Despite the shift of the association of nuclear weapons from state actors to non-state actors, the traditional security framing around disarmament did not change. Fueled by the growing influence of the Internet, propaganda that emphasized the need to combat American enemies spread across the country. Cartoons asserted American masculinity to the public after it was violated in the 9/11 attacks. For example, the destruction of the towers came to stand in for the violent destruction of the American phallus since the attack signified a "closely sequenced double act of penetration/rape."[49] As a result, to retaliate against such emasculation, the American media's need to demoralize its enemy was essential to reestablish control. Cartoons that portrayed punishing terrorists through "anal penetration" displayed the homophobic threats that many in the nation echoed:

> "The Empire Strikes Back . . . So you like skyscrapers, huh, bitch?" (The legend on posters that appeared in midtown Manhattan, only

> days after 9/11, depicting a turbaned caricature of Osama bin Laden being anally penetrated by the Empire State building.) . . . the invocation of the terrorist as a queer, non-national, perversely racialized other . . . sexual deviancy is linked to the process of discerning, othering, and quarantining terrorist bodies.[50]

By reconstructing "iconic American structures into masculine symbols," the US also transformed itself into a masculine "Empire" fighting and defending itself.[51] The way the US combats terrorist entities is through "anal penetration," exactly two skyscrapers that were, at one point, the two tallest buildings in the world.[52] The assertion of the length of the penetrating object with the analogous anatomical imagery, combined with reducing the adversary to a female creature, completely emasculates the transgressor.[53] The use of homophobic imagery and diction also played into the homophobia of the audience, further entrenching the idea of emasculation through disarmament. The intersection of sexuality, gender, and sex used as the basis of humiliation and torture tactics has long existed in the US's construction of masculine and heterosexual favored institutions. Numerous instances of targeted homosexual abuse by American patriarchal institutions (such as the military) toward supposed terrorists, such as Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, have occurred after 9/11, an example of how heteronormativity has always been congruent with Orientalist values.[54] Such abuse significantly represents a direct masculine attack through the emasculation of another. Examples of sodomy in such propaganda are necessary for understanding the role such depictions of violations play in supporting American masculinity within the security sector.[55] These archetypes reveal the gendered, heteronormative power dynamics among defense intellectuals at the international level.[56] Sodomy in heteronormative societies performed between men is often seen as a form of humiliation and punishment, used to attack another's masculinity, as there is a clear subordinate male who is being penetrated and the one who is doing the penetration.[57] The period after the 9/11 attacks were crucial for America's need to reassert its masculinity—its need to display its power through nuclear arms was less about the calculated measure of nuclear attack and strategy but rather a need to express a benchmark of the explosive power of the state.[58] It was easier to control and uphold the legitimacy of the sovereign American state and the democratic values it was founded on if authoritarianism was painted as barbaric.[59] The public both controls and is influenced by the social sway of nuclear weapons. As Shampa Biswas explains, "[w]hat makes nuclear weapons so valuable are the social and political processes through which they are endowed with certain meanings. The weapons themselves don't provide material protection or security; indeed, the weapons may make one more vulnerable and insecure."[60]

The masculinization of nuclear weapons, and its social ramifications, are exported across the world through gender discourse on the global stage. Traditional security discourse following 9/11 is indicative of the US's use of gendered language to emasculate its enemies and assert its dominance. Since the

US is often considered the head of nuclear order, security discourse discussion in the global sphere by the US can influence how other states frame nuclear disarmament and proliferation.

Case Study: Pakistan and India

Language between India and Pakistan and Its Influence on Foreign Policy

India and Pakistan are not only contentious with one another but are also located right next to each other. As a result, issues such as border disputes could not amount to anything less than dangerous. The brutal partitioning of India resulted in two states built around many different institutions and norms, including religion. Pakistani writing and text characterize India as a dangerous other. Furthermore, India's depiction as a dangerous enemy is echoed in the Pakistani education system that inflates differences in religion.[61] Likewise in India, the state of Kashmir, a Muslim-majority region controlled under militarized rule by India, is used to perpetuate the fear that Pakistan is a threat. As a result, Pakistan's security discourse is centered around the theme of deterrence. Within this discourse, gendered and sexual metaphors are blatant. During the US supervision of Pakistan's nuclear supplies, "Pakistani technical experts said: 'Intrusive or not, who likes monitoring devices in one's own bedroom?'" placing nuclear weapons in the private sphere and establishing an association of nuclear weapons with a country's honor as a possession in need of protection.[62] In Pakistan and India, where the protection and integrity of women is held in high regard, the nation-state is heavily associated with the female archetype that must be insulated and defended. However, the nuclear facilities that both India and Pakistan hold have an additional associated connotation that the West does not have: the nuclear bomb's association with religion. As mentioned earlier, the partition of India in 1947 created Pakistan, a state that was founded based on religion. In Pakistan, possessing a nuclear arsenal is associated with re-achieving the historical golden age of Islam.[63] There must be a distinction created between terrorist motivations that use religious radicalism and state religious motivations which are driven by the perception that "nuclear weapons are . . . essential for Muslim Pakistan because of Hindu India's expansionist designs in South Asia.[64] This idea is further enhanced by the belief that the West has "made a systematic effort to prevent Muslim countries from acquiring this technology."[65] As a result, the acquisition of nuclear weapons is associated with masculinity and religion.

The media often exacerbates issues between Pakistan and India as Pakistani and Indian media sources use gendered language to provoke audiences and in turn shapes domestic dialogue around nuclear weapons. Often, media discourse can heavily impact foreign policy and vice versa. Analysis of media and foreign policy conducted by Ahmad Saffee, a research fellow studying political economy in Pakistan, concluded that both states have distinct media patterns: "Pakistani media functions according to the action-reaction principle, whereas Indian print media operates in a calculated and sustained manner, shaping public opinion in an intended direction.[66] The cancellation of

talks and a punitive approach toward Pakistan is supported by public opinion in India. Therefore, Narendra Modi, the Indian Prime Minister, undoubtedly benefits domestically [politically] when taking this approach." Likewise, Pakistan's foreign policy toward India is shaped by the media's portrayal of India and the two states' relationship. In South Asia, it is evident that India holds regional power in the nuclear space, especially with the backing of Western powers such as the US.[67] With such power comes responsibility, which requires that India be cautious of who it labels as being unsympathetic to its nuclear cause. When examining the importance of language in nuclear security discourse, Nizamani explains how India will cater to itself as a worthy influencer to others, especially the West, in its retention of nuclear arsenals:[68]

> The dominant security discourse is based upon the dictum of assigning evil nature to the Other and considering the Self as a custodian of goodness. The lines between the external and internal become blurred in this narrative when the domestic troubles are reduced to external intervention. In the name of secularism and democracy, an effort is made to create an India which suppresses, often violently, claims to other forms of identity. Externally, India is promoted as a genuine great power. If such an India instills fear among its smaller neighbors, especially Pakistan; the standard line is to dismiss such fears as figments of imagination of paranoid neighbors.[69]

As such, this language influences alliances for both India and Pakistan. In the media and on the international stage, Pakistan is seen as an emotional and reactive state instead of a more stable, strategic India. Such language can harm Pakistan's image as a reliable nuclear power and instead make it appear untrustworthy, radical, and aggressive. As a consequence of this harmful rhetoric, a binary relationship between India and Pakistan is exacerbated through language, whereby India is a "responsible" nuclear power while Pakistan is "unwieldy." This binary bleeds into security discourse and nuclear power-play in the global circle.

Hypothesis 1, 2, 3

Table 1

Gender of U.S representative speaking	Amount of times masculine language used	Amount of times feminine language used
M	18	15
F	21	16

Table 2

Gender of U.S representative speaking	Number of total representative
M	19
F	21

For hypotheses one, two, and three, 40 UNSC meetings regarding non-proliferation, including 18 meetings from George W. Bush's presidency and 22 meetings from Obama's presidency, contained instances where gendered language (either masculine or feminine language) was used. Of these meetings, there was variation in the gender of the US representative speaking. However, there was no significant correlation between the use of gendered language and the gender of the representative. As shown in Table 1, the amount of times masculine and feminine language is used does not vary significantly between male and female representatives. The total number of US representatives who spoke at UNSC meetings was similar across administrations, as portrayed in Table 2. This indicates that the gender of the representative does not impact whether gendered language is used. Generally, this speaks to the entrenched nature of gendered language within security discourse and negates the notion that simply having more women in a given space will completely disrupt established gender norms.

Of the 40 UNSC meetings examined for hypotheses one, two, and three, nine were regarding non-proliferation. In these meetings, the following resolutions were adopted:

a. Resolution 1540: adopted on April 28, 2004, aiming for States to establish domestic measures to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons.
a. Resolution 2310: adopted on September 23, 2016, calling for States to sign or ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and to uphold moratoriums on nuclear weapon tests.

These meetings were not about a specific state and, instead, discussed non-proliferation for all states. In the adoption of these resolutions in the meetings, the US used gendered language when speaking about non-proliferation However, it did not attach any femininity to non-proliferation. Furthermore, in these nine meetings, the US did use masculine language when referring to non-proliferation for itself. This finding is incongruent with Hypothesis 2, which hypothesized that the US would not use any gendered language in non-proliferation meetings when referring to itself. In addition, these meetings included instances of the US critiquing the UNSC or other States on the Council using masculine language. The fact that this finding is incongruent with Hypothesis 2, is less indicative of a shortcoming within the underlying theory and more indicative of a limited hypothesis as the United States did avoid gendered language that would emasculate it (i.e., feminine language) and instead used masculine language as a means of strengthening its global power. The association between what state is classified as feminine in opposition to the US is seen most clearly in the UNSC meetings which focus specifically on a particular state. Out of the 40 UNSC meetings analyzed, 31 primarily discussed one of two states: Iran or North Korea. Of the meetings analyzed, gendered language was used in all. The US referred to the other states with feminine adjectives in 29 of examined meetings, and in all 31 meetings, the US used masculine language when referring to its own nuclear weapons or its actions regarding other states' nuclear weapons.

In any given conversation about nuclear proliferation, the US used feminine words when discussing other states' actions while using masculine words to describe its own actions. These words exist in pairs and don't make sense without the other. In addition to the words themselves, the connotations of the phrases used by the US created a masculine-versus-feminine dichotomy. This dichotomy was identified in Table 3, identifying the sample's most common masculine and feminine words. For example, when the US would describe itself using "clear," "strong," "urge," "implement," and "robust," it depicted itself as being the rational actor that maintained order, using its strength to assert command. In the same vein, the state being discussed as the focus of the meeting was classified with: "reckless," "destabilizing," "dangerous," "instability," "violation," and "provocative." These terms framed the state as an irrational and emotional agent in the global sphere, breeding disorder in an organized system, while also portraying the state as violating its masculinized role of protecting their citizenry. These collocations are not affiliated with a specific state. However, states that opposed the US either in the security council meetings or more broadly on issues of foreign affairs were more frequent targets of feminized language.

This data shows that the language used by the US reveals the disproportionate power structures that underlie global institutions. Specifically, the masculine language used by the US enforces its role as a leader in the global sphere by adopting a domineering and bullying disposition toward others. Among the terms or phrases used to accompany such tactics of domination is a language wherein the US regards itself as a state that could do no wrong and lead the way for others. The outcome of such techniques naturalizes an inexorable, hierarchical social structure that reinforces cohesion and adherence to global mores. Such imperial arrogance develops from the possession of nuclear weapons. Specifically, in possessing nuclear weapons, the US is in a position to utilize language that emasculates other states with limited immediate consequences to its security. Further, the use of masculine language to reinforce the US's sensibility and responsibility with its possession of nuclear weapons is used to paint other states, mainly in the Global South, as irresponsible actors. This creates a sharp line between the global North and the Global South that touches on previous literature surrounding the whiteness of the bomb.

Lastly, an analysis of the 40 UNSC meetings concludes that gendered language does not vary across presidential administrations. Much of the language and gendered terms were constant throughout the two administrations, confirming the notion that gendered language surrounding non-proliferation has less to do with who is in office and more to do with the greater US security apparatus.

Table 3

Top 10 Masculine Root Words Used	Top 10 Feminine Root Words Used
implement	destabilizing
clear	violation
ensure	rejects
urge	dangerous
action	disregard
robust	instability
strength	reckless
strong	provocative
act	calculated
demand	unnecessary

Hypotheses 4, 5, 6

For Hypothesis 4, 5, and 6, 14 UNSC meetings regarding non-proliferation from 2011–2013 were evaluated to determine if gendered language was used in reference to Global South states of India and Pakistan. Of these meetings, all three hypotheses were confirmed as having a correlation between the usage of gendered language. The gender of the representative stayed consistent in all meetings. In all 14 meetings, Hypothesis 4 was confirmed when India or Pakistan within the years of 2011–2013 used masculine gendered language when discussing nuclear disarmament for themselves. The top ten words used by both India and Pakistan are listed in Table 5. While there was no dichotomy or hierarchy established between any of the Global South states in the language used in the UNSCl meetings, the language was not as masculine when compared with a global North state which did use a dichotomy to further emphasize its gendered terms. The most common words used by the global South states of India and Pakistan in the UNSC meetings were "consistent," "commitment," "implement," "support," and "ensure." Hypothesis 5 established that the global South would not use feminine language when referencing global North states. This hypothesis was supported as both Pakistan and India used masculine language when referring to the global North. Language such as "grounded," "central," "impartial," and "objective" were used in the UNSC meetings analyzed. Finally, Hypothesis 6 was also supported when looking at whether global South states would reference other global South states using feminine, gendered language. Specifically, during these years, both India and Pakistan referred to Iran in the non-proliferation U.N. Security Council meetings with language including "delicate," "volatile," "tension," "confrontation," and "threatens." Referring to Carol Cohn's list of dichotomous terms, these feminine words are used to describe an unpredictable state in reference to

nuclear arms. To maintain nuclear order, both India and Pakistan used feminine, gendered language when referring to other Global South states.

Table 4

Hypothesis 4	*Hypothesis 5*	*Hypothesis 6*
Top Masculine language used by Global South state	**Top Masculine language used by Global South state for Global North state**	**Top Feminine language used by Global South state for Global South state**
Consistent	Grounded	Delicate
Commitment	Central	Volatile
Implement	Impartial	Tension
Support	Objective	Confrontation
Ensure	Pragmatic	Threatens
Intensification	Independently	Escalation
Stand	Transparently	Complex
Strong	Confidence	Destabilize
Partner	Neutrality	Exacerbation
Prepared	Professionalism	Heated

Overall, these results echo previous literature that identifies the existence of gendered discourse in current security discussions. The language used among states is highly influenced by the notion that nuclear weapons are associated with masculine strength and power. States who have more outstanding agency over the ascendancy of nuclear stockpiles will seek to retain weapons while preventing other states, specifically non-Western states, from proliferating. The aggression and virility of the Western state are seen as respectable when it comes to the possession of nuclear weapons since it is the ultimate protector against the instability created and perpetuated by non-Western states. This logic resides in the integral idea that global institutions that exist today are a product of the West's missionary and savior efforts to maintain global peace through the prevailing nuclear power structures visible today.

Conclusion

This article investigated how states use gendered language to emasculate other states during conversations of nuclear disarmament . This article was based on the critical assumptions that gender, sexuality, and power are interrelated with disarmament and nuclear power structures that uphold today's major global institutions. This article hypothesized that: 1) the US will use gendered

language when discussing the disarmament of other states, 2) the United will not use gendered language when discussing disarmament for itself, 3) gendered language will not vary across different US presidential administrations, 4) global South states will use masculine, gendered language in reference to themselves regarding disarmament, 5) global South states will have fewer instances of using feminine, gendered language when discussing the global North, and 6) global South states will reference other global South states using feminine, gendered language. These results mostly coincide with the previous literature that associates the possession of nuclear weapons with the masculinity of a state, validating an international order built around Western proliferation. These results advance the literature by discovering a link between gendered discourse and disarmament; this link culminates most prominently regarding how states view disarmament for themselves versus others.

Future research could expand on the relationship between gendered discourse and disarmament and expand the scope of study to states in different positions of power. This analysis was conducted on the discourse of case studies involving the US, India, and Pakistan—specifically the discourse of when the state refers to itself versus other states regarding disarmament. The US is in a unique position as a hegemon in the global North, so future research should consider another global North state. Investigations into the use of gendered language by states such as Canada, Germany, France, or the United Kingdom could prove useful to disentangle the effects of global North states on gendered discourse from any unique effect the US may have. Notable attention should be given to whether there is a difference in gendered discourse when observing how other states in the global South assert access to nuclear weapons. This study could also consider different settings where nuclear disarmament and gendered discourse could overlap outside of UNSC meetings. The gendered language in these meetings was not as overt as some discussions that Carol Cohn alludes to states having. The potential that disparate environments have on gendered disarmament discourse could potentially contribute to the formulation of nuclear policy of different states. Further, a more detailed timeline could be examined to determine if gendered disarmament discourse has varied over a more extended period or if it has stayed consistent.

Dismantling the gendered view of nuclear weapons is imperative for states to achieve global disarmament. At the root of security discourse lies the construction of an order founded on gendered archetypes that endorse the acquisition of these weapons. Disseminating the idea that pacifist actions among states are emasculating and feminine is crucial to prioritizing human security and reducing the nuclear arsenals states possess. These recommendations for future research can identify the erroneous connotations between masculinity, power, and weapons.

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Explaining Nordic Inequality: Toward an Integrated Theory of Differences in Welfare State Regress between Sweden, Denmark, and Norway

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Abstract

Despite the resemblance between their social democratic welfare regimes, the Nordic states of Norway, Sweden, and Denmark have displayed surprising differences in economic inequality trends. While Denmark and Sweden have witnessed marked increases in Gini coefficients, Norway reports little change. In a comparative study, I consider how different political environments and priorities have shaped welfare regimes in the Nordics, reconciling key factors underlying welfare state regress: national ideological contexts, domestic political competition, and the exogenous forces impacting each. Facing increased electoral competition from the populist right, traditionally pro-welfare parties in Sweden and Denmark have faced a new sort of socialist electoral dilemma as initially proposed by Przeworski. These parties have relented to pressures toward welfare regress, as supported by growing neoliberal sentiment, in order to withstand right-wing competition. In Norway, with a populist right party that is relatively centrist, social democrats have accordingly avoided an ideological shift toward welfare retrenchment. I break down the mechanisms behind these political trends in each state and discuss the negative implications of Nordic welfare regress on inequality and welfare policy more broadly.

Introduction

Esping-Andersen's seminal framework of welfare state types underpins this research project; he provides three broad categories of welfare regimes: liberal, conservative, and social democratic.[1] The Nordic countries are most prominently and paradigmatically characterized as social democratic welfare regimes.[2] Key elements of the Nordic model include universality, high decommodification, general tax financing, high labor market participation, equality, generous welfare benefits, and high levels of public service provision.[3] They

are characterized by a universal and well-defined right to publicly-financed, tax-funded, high-quality services.[4] The goal of social democratic or Nordic welfare regimes is "equality of the highest standards, not an equality of final needs" per the other models.[5] The Nordic model is traditionally lauded as the most successful for redistribution and social equality, something these states still boast at high levels, yet differences in levels of income inequality, measured by Gini coefficients, between Nordic states have grown in recent years.[6]

Counterintuitively, income inequality has risen dramatically in Denmark and Sweden over the past twenty years—compared with little change in Norway.[7] Whereas the Gini coefficient in Sweden in 1995 was 21.50, by 2013, it had risen to 28.23; in Denmark over this period, we see an increase from 22.38 to 25.39; and in Norway, the Gini coefficient was 24.23 in 1995 and 25.19 in 2013.[8] Figure 1 shows data on Gini coefficient trends from these countries, with slightly different time horizons.[9] Of course, it is important to note both that the Nordics are still among the most equal of OECD states, and that these trends have taken place in the midst of a general trend of rising inequality within advanced democracies.[10] Some of the largest increases in inequality among advanced economies, however, have occurred in the Nordics.[11] Given their common approaches to welfare provision with disparate results, it is worth considering these countries comparatively. Indeed, these trends raise an important question: how have political environments and priorities shaped welfare regimes in the three Nordics, and what does this mean for their differing trends in economic inequality since 2000?

Figure 1. Gini coefficients for Norway, Sweden, and Denmark, 1995–2020



In each of the cases considered, different underlying mechanisms contribute to increases in economic inequality as measured by Gini coefficients. In Sweden, inequality has been augmented by an increasingly neoliberal ideology underpinning political decision-making surrounding welfare policy, promoting privatization and free choice often at the expense of universality. Denmark has shifted instead toward a dualization of welfare provision, with an increasingly multi-tiered welfare state and declining tax progressivity—but here, an entirely new perspective on the role of welfare states is beginning to take hold. Both Sweden and Denmark also face a liberalizing pressure from EU membership that has contributed to decreased social spending. In

Sweden and Denmark, with traditionally pro-welfare left-wing parties facing increased electoral competition from the populist radical right (PRR), a new sort of socialist electoral dilemma has emerged, and these parties have succumbed to neoliberal pressures toward retrenchment in order to withstand right-wing competition. With a relatively centrist PRR party, Norway has not faced this same contestation, and the social democrats have accordingly avoided welfare retrenchment.

Literature Review

Data does show a shift in welfare provision in recent years: there is rising privatization, a general decline in the number of benefits provided, and some services are no longer universal.[12] Traditional scholarship argues that decreases in social spending lead to higher inequality; a power resources perspective would attribute changes in inequality either to differences in welfare state structure itself or to political mobilization.[13] Yet this perspective is incomplete: spending is a crude measurement of welfare benefits, and it fails to account both for factors exogenous to the state and for the reasons *why* spending has decreased.[14]

Much as early scholarship pointed to diminishing popular support as a reason for welfare state endurance,[15] recent work suggests that ideological and discursive shifts in recent years have altered the political landscape—in which the Nordic model once prospered—toward regress. The welfare state remains a highly salient political issue in the Nordics, and electoral competition continues to be structured around welfare platforms.[16] Kuisma contends that rising neoconservatism and neoliberalism have reframed welfare provision, effectively conditionalizing what was once universal and ultimately restricting the ability of the state to enact egalitarian social policy. With the rise of new interests, political demands, post-materialist values, and a transnationalization of politics, social democratic parties have largely failed to expand their traditional voting bases. Accordingly, the neoliberalization of social policy has reframed welfare, conditionalizing the Nordic model's universality and fortifying the ideological landscape against a pure social democratic welfare state.[17]

Given these ideological changes, the electoral landscapes in the Nordics have likewise transformed since the 1990s; long the staunch proponents of welfare policy, social democratic parties may now face growing electoral uncertainty and a subsequent need to forge coalitions with parties less favorable to welfare policy. In light of the radical right's successes, these parties have been forced to make concessions to centrist parties to retain ruling coalitions, leading to liberalized welfare; this is the case in Sweden and Denmark, as Kuisma outlines, while the Norwegian social democratic coalition fully lost its majority in 2013.[18] This "new politics" perspective, Korpi writes, attributes welfare state retrenchment to the necessitation of austerity measures by post-industrialism, with political parties being forced to renegotiate the social contract under which the Nordic model was originally instated, although between-country differences in electoral competition among the Nordics are

still under-studied in relation to the welfare state.[19] Indeed, Arter finds that party politics in the Nordics have been characterized by fluctuating support for traditionally dominant parties and increased intra-bloc mobility in recent years, with a higher number of parties becoming electorally relevant.[20] Some suggest that inequality tends to reinforce a rightward ideological shifts among left parties, though this line of thought has hardly touched on the case of the Nordics.[21] In general, it remains unclear how Norway may have escaped these traps to which Sweden and Denmark have seemingly capitulated.

Another school argues that instead, it is the European Union that has fostered welfare regime liberalization. As member states (MS) of the EU, Denmark and Sweden would therefore be subject to this pressure. Without a specific mandate to create social policy, EU policy focuses on the single market, which has undermined the ability of MS to prioritize welfare policy.[22] Simultaneously, as the EU has gained competence over a wider range of policymaking in general, there has been a tacit acceptance of EU authority over aspects of social policy that are tied to the single market.[23] Scharpf shows how this manifests in the European Court of Justice: given its inability to create higher standards for social policy, the Court can merely block regulations detrimental to EU treaty goals (namely, the single market).[24] Thus, retrenchment is the sole possible outcome of its decisions. The setting of minimal standards creates a deregulatory pressure across policy areas such that integration especially undermines the ability of social democratic regimes like the Nordics to prioritize their welfare states over the single market.

From another perspective, European integration has created competition between welfare regimes, further putting downward pressure on social democratic welfare states. The welfare tourism argument, as outlined by Martisen and Rotger, asserts that freedom of movement within the EU has incentivized mobility within the EU to gain comprehensive benefits from more generous welfare systems since provision of social benefits was mandated for all EU residents in any member state. This, too, most heavily impacts Nordic welfare states with the highest levels of social provision, which are incentivized to avoid being overly attractive destinations for welfare tourism and are subject to pressures to converge around the "lowest common denominator" welfare regimes with the lowest levels of welfare benefits.[25] But if deregulatory pressure from the EU explains increased inequality in Denmark and Sweden, it is hard to quantify and fails to account for differences between the two, and for differences relative to Norway.

Given that welfare state regress is inherently policy-driven, it is also useful to consider governments' strategies in justifying retrenchment, as well as how these strategies relate to and rely upon political discourse in explanations of welfare policy change.[26] Indeed, Kuisma and Nygard suggest that new policy paths are the result of actions taken by "strategic political actors during challenging political and economic times."[27] In order to mitigate potential electoral backlash from welfare retrenchment—which has the potential to be particularly strong in the Nordics given the popularity of the welfare

states—governments must, as Green-Pedersen contends, convince the electorate that there is some other justification for regress. As parties have emerged and retreated from electoral competition and ultimately altered political landscapes,[28] the discourses surrounding welfare policy change have varied considerably since the late 1970s, and so have their consequences for the generosity of the different Nordic welfare states. Surely this has implications for levels of inequality in each.

Ultimately, increasing inequality in the Nordics likely depends on a variety of common and country-specific factors. This paper employs Green-Pedersen's framework for examining welfare state retrenchment and primarily examines differing political contexts among the Nordics, as well as how they impact the diverging strategies of political actors in the contestation over welfare state change. Accordingly, I attempt to reconcile the influences of multiple forces as they relate to the politics underlying welfare state retrenchment—national ideological contexts and domestic political competition, as well as the exogenous shocks that have impacted each of these—to provide a more complete picture of trends in economic inequality in the Nordics.

Sweden: Electorally Driven Ideological Sacrifices of Redistribution and Equality

Among the Nordics, Sweden experienced the greatest increase in its Gini coefficient between 1995 and 2013: a seven-point rise in inequality.[29] I consider the role of dwindling Swedish welfare generosity amid increased electoral pressure from right-wing parties—as well as its interaction with demographic change and capital income shares—in contributing to increased inequality.

Demographic trends and top income shares have driven inequality, widening the income dispersion in Sweden. Pareliussen and Robling find that, although its effects are minor, aging has increased relative poverty in Sweden since the late 1980s; changing household structures have likewise increased poverty; and an increased share of foreign-born people has also contributed to rising Gini coefficients.[30] In total, they find that demographic trends are associated with an increase in the Gini coefficient by 0.6 points in Sweden.[31] Top income shares have only further facilitated the rise of inequality in Sweden.[32] Indeed, not only have top income shares risen sharply since the mid-1990s, but employment rates in middle-paying occupations have simultaneously declined—and both figures are higher in Sweden than in the other Nordics.[33] It is worth noting the stable correlation between top income shares and overall inequality throughout history.[34] However, these trends must be placed in the context of broader changes to the Swedish macropolitical environment as it relates to welfare provision.

The basic tenets of Swedish social democratic corporatism have broken down, with consequences for its universalistic welfare state. This is the result of Iversen's "trilemma" in which, facing a tradeoff between earnings equality, full employment, and a budgetary ceiling, social democratic welfare states

must forgo one of their paradigmatic goals. Sweden's prioritization of budgetary austerity has necessarily decreased its capacity to pursue the goals of a social democratic welfare state. Specifically, it has sacrificed solidaristic wage policies and full unemployment in favor of austerity.[35] The breakdown of these systems undermines a core pillar of the welfare state—the socialization of unemployment—which threatens the redistributive capacity of the Swedish welfare state. Not only does Sweden have a higher rate of unemployment than the other Nordics (and especially higher than Norway),[36] but its replacement rate for the unemployed has decreased and the progressivity of its taxation systems has likewise been reduced.[37] Several mechanisms underlie this shift in welfare policy.

Indeed, reforms to the Swedish welfare state since the early 1990s have left provision markedly less generous and comprehensive; the goals of universality and high-quality services have often been set aside in favor of efficient, market-oriented welfare provision.[38] Whereas the 1970s replacement rate was 90% of the average net wage for sickness insurance and 85% for unemployment insurance, by 2010, the replacement rate for sickness insurance had dropped to below 80% and that of unemployment insurance to less than 60%.[39] Meanwhile, benefits have failed to keep up with higher prices and salaries. Though public social expenditures as a percentage of GDP decreased by only 3 percentage points between 1995 and 2014,[40] it is the declining relative value of social spending that has affected inequality most dramatically. Unsurprisingly, these changes have contributed to higher rates of relative poverty for those dependent on transfers (3.7 in 1995 versus 9.1 in 2015[41]).

These changes have themselves been augmented by shifts in the political environment and in political discourse surrounding welfare provision. I suggest that this is a reaction to a perceived variation on the socialist electoral dilemma described by Przeworski,[42] whereby increased electoral competition from right-wing parties has drawn socialist parties toward the center, encouraging the implementation of retrenchment. Przeworski suggests that in order to see electoral success, socialist parties must appeal to non-worker allies by compromising their ideals; I apply this framework to explain how traditionally welfare-supportive parties have come to facilitate Nordic welfare retrenchment. In Sweden (and Denmark, as I describe later), a rise in right-wing competition has detracted from social democratic voting bases, leading these parties to increasingly shift their platforms to recapture voters.

After years of social democratic dominance, the Swedish conservative party came into power in 1991 during an economic recession. It encouraged deep cuts in social spending, the layoffs of public employees, and privatization—despite a lack of evidence that privately-provided services offer qualitative advantages.[43] By the early 2000s, the right-wing populist Swedish Democrats increasingly succeeded in elections as voters abandoned the Swedish Social Democrats (SAP) in favor of sacrificing social expenditures to finance tax cuts and incentivize work.[44] These policies inherently undermine the universality of Swedish welfare provision, which has been bolstered by

growing political support for the idea of free choice in providers spearheaded by Swedish right-wing parties. Notably, it is not necessary that these parties gain an electoral majority in order to sway policy; their presence in elections and in government suffice.[45] In the face of voters leaving the SAP for parties further to the right, the Social Democrats have been forced to accordingly shift their own platform toward the center to maintain their ability to remain competitive in elections.

Deregulation, decentralization, and contracting have abounded as opposition from the Swedish Social Democrats has dwindled, and a newfound emphasis on neoliberal ideas increasingly guides the state's prioritization of efficiency. Since its return to power, the SAP has "given up" on stopping privatization.[46] This has prevented the equitable redistribution of resources that formerly characterized the Swedish welfare regime. Resources are no longer allocated solely according to need but are instead contingent on the beneficiary's decision-making; the responsibility to ensure one is receiving the most optimal services likewise falls on the individual. As Ranci and Pavolini describe, "cuts and restructuring [have] paved the way toward a hidden road of partial privatization" as well as cutbacks in expenditures and service provisions.[47] This has not always taken the form of a public attack on universality and redistribution, but its consequences have nevertheless left welfare provision for less advantaged individuals out of the state's hands, subject increasingly to the competitive pressures of the market that privilege those already economically advantaged. Szebeheley and Meagher find strong evidence that this shift has diminished the class-equalizing abilities of the Swedish welfare state.[48] It is hardly surprising that, in this environment, levels of redistribution have decreased since the 1990s.[49]

Sweden's integration into the EU has only reinforced such prioritization of the market, which further constrains the state's willingness to create policies toward full employment. Although it has not joined the European Exchange Rate Mechanism, the requirements of the EU's freedom of movement inherently undermine Sweden's focus on full-employment policies and equitable income distributions.[50] These freedoms necessitated institutional reforms that have similarly pushed the welfare regime toward an increasingly neoliberal framework. Such reforms align with Martinsen and Rotger's description, from the previous section, of a desire on the part of states to disincentivize welfare tourism, resulting in convergence toward the lowest-common-denominator benefit generosity. Given the incentives to avoid shouldering increased financial burdens from providing welfare to more recipients than is strictly necessary, Sweden has naturally faced perverse incentives to downgrade its welfare regime. There are, however, practical constraints that inevitably come from tying macroeconomic policies and welfare spending to external decision-making and exogenous financial circumstances, all of which restrict the state's ability to create full employment policies and maximize redistribution.

Further contributing to Sweden's liberalization is a discursive shift stemming from its accession to the EU and the growth of the political right,

both of which have abrogated welfare policies. Blyth notes that since joining the EU, the SAP have had a platform of macroeconomic policy with the objectives of "deficit reduction, inflation control, and balanced budgets."[51] In other words, employment and equity no longer guide social democratic policymaking in Sweden. This, in turn, has created a tendency toward a sort of strategic welfare policy framework that sets aside equity and redistribution to reorient policy toward efficiency. Liberalizing pressures from EU accession, in light of increased electoral pressure from the right, have only contributed to the politicization of welfare policy in Sweden. New calculations of economic efficiency and electoral necessity have thus come to dictate the priorities of institutions. Given that institutionalized ideas such as these tend to promote path dependency, the SAP's discursive emphasis on these economic ideas has prevented the full implementation of the Nordic model in Sweden as it is traditionally conceived.

The welfare state's unwillingness to respond to changing needs by altering redistributive policies has compounded with the impact of demographic trends and top income shares, failing to mitigate inequality. As transfers account for most of the reduction in inequality from redistributive policy,[52] the deprioritization of transfers has inherently contributed to rising inequality. Calculations along the lines of electoral viability have combined with liberalizing pressures from EU membership, leading to diminished SAP support for equity and redistribution as the standards guiding welfare policy, with the perhaps unsurprising result of increasing economic inequality in Sweden.

Denmark: Populist Party Growth and Acceptance Facilitating Welfare State Restructuring

Denmark, like Sweden, has seen a rise in economic inequality in recent years, with an increase in its Gini coefficient by over 3 points from 1995 to 2013.[53] As with Sweden, I focus my discussion of Denmark on developments in the income distribution, redistributive policy, and how politics and electoral competition have interacted with each.

Danish inequality is similarly marked by developments in the top income share. Søgaard notes that real incomes grew faster at the top of the income distribution, which also received a disproportionately large share of both interest income and especially of total dividends.[54] Income has become increasingly polarized, with a diminishing proportion of the population in the middle of the income distribution and growth occurring largely at either end of the distribution, particularly since the early 2000s.[55] Just as in Sweden, this trend is particularly concerning as it signifies that inequality is being driven in particular by one sector of the income distribution. As Pareliussen and Robling contend, the resulting increases in inequality have been "amplified by weaker distribution at the top," thus contributing to increases in the Gini coefficient in Denmark.[56]

Like Sweden, the potentially mitigating impact of redistributive policy in Denmark has been attenuated by declines in levels of redistribution, which have driven rises in income inequality. Since the 1990s, reforms to Danish taxation systems have resulted in both diminished average tax rates and diminished progressivity, and therefore a reduced redistributive effect of income taxes as a whole. Tax policy has thus been characterized by lower income taxes, and reduced unemployment and retirement benefits have likewise been implemented, reducing the redistributive effect of unemployment insurance.[57] Reforms to incentivize employment have further undermined the generosity of such policies.[58] Accordingly, the generosity of welfare benefits has diminished, especially for unemployment insurance benefits and pension policies—if not in actual size, then in real value—and a dualized system has emerged.[59] In effect, these weaker insurance and taxation policies have neglected to offset rising inequality.

The Danish welfare state, like that of Sweden, is increasingly characterized by growing dualization, with services conditioned along the lines of labor market participation, resulting in what is effectively a multi-tiered welfare state.[60] Naturally, as in Sweden, growing privatization has distributional consequences. While strengthening redistribution could reduce Denmark's rising inequality,[61] doing so is only politically viable where sufficiently incentivized, and the political climate in Denmark has not been favorable to such action since the 1980s.

Shifting ideological currents underpin these changes. As Kvist and Greve point out regarding political discourse surrounding the welfare state, "recent years have seen a change in the wording from free and equal to easy and equal access"; in other words, welfare has been conditionalized and universality is no longer guaranteed in Denmark.[62] As political parties have transitioned into dualistic policies, the equality that formerly characterized the Danish welfare state has likewise been undermined. Because the increased emphasis on choice in dualized benefits is reliant upon an equal access to free choice that does not exist in reality, the ability to opt into private and market-based welfare benefits has ultimately resulted in increasing inequality; likewise, because citizens now receive different benefits depending on things like employment status, equal benefits from the welfare state have similarly diminished.

However, the political mechanisms behind these shifts have not precisely mirrored those seen in Sweden. Denmark's right-wing populist party, the Danish People's Party (DF), was accepted by mainstream parties relatively early on and thus gained legitimacy essentially from the outset of its electoral success in the late 1990s.[63] Their rapid acceptance by the Danish political mainstream has given them a relatively strong position to leverage in the policymaking process. Likewise, to the extent that the DF is less on the fringes of domestic politics, their discursive impact has become practically significant in enabling them to translate their political success into concrete welfare policy successes. Like many PRR parties, the DF advances xenophobic anti-immigrant narratives, which has formed the basis for their support

for welfare chauvinism—retrenchment policies that do not explicitly target immigrant populations, but ultimately impact these populations most significantly.[64] Thus, the Danish welfare state has come to be one wherein benefits are restricted only to those in the community the DF considers to be "real" Danes. As a result of their electoral success and bargaining power, the DF has been able to translate their policy preferences (namely, xenophobia-driven welfare regress) into concessions from other parties in the political arena.

Although high levels of public support for the Danish welfare state pose some challenges for the implementation of retrenchment policies on the part of left-wing parties, it is once again the normalization and acceptance of the DF that has allowed the social democrats to circumvent the electoral dilemma their counterparts in Sweden have faced. Because of the widespread acceptance of the DF as a genuine political player in the policymaking arena, making concessions along the lines of their preferences is less of a taboo. Moreover, the electoral history of Denmark in recent years, with coalition governments distributed across the ideological spectrum,[65] has normalized regress. As a result, there has been a shift toward marketization and liberalization since around 1970.[66] In fact, Klitgaard and Elmelund-Præstekær find that left-wing governments' pursuits of retrenchment actually received support from across the political spectrum and throughout parliament, more so than the attempts of right-wing governments.[67] Ultimately, it has been the social democrats that have encouraged the acceptance of the role of the market as a mechanism for achieving some of the social outcomes that the welfare state had previously worked toward.

In some ways, therefore, the social democrats have almost entirely redefined the goals of the Danish welfare state, with the resulting rise of neoliberal welfare state change ultimately not unlike those in Sweden. Stahl goes so far as to suggest that parties on the left have played a "central role" in the neoliberalization of the welfare state; the left's acceptance of the basic tenets of neoliberalism have allowed it to prevail as an accepted ideology guiding welfare policy in Denmark.[68] Ultimately, macroeconomic strategy in Denmark has shifted around the rise of neoliberal thought and came to be seen as common sense "reforms"[69]—because of the normalization of neoliberalism, it has become so depoliticized that there is no longer even a substantial need to justify retrenchment in policy formulation. Consequently, with the ideological support of neoliberalism, deregulation and privatization have increased, leaving the redistributive capacity of the state highly diminished, with consequences for inequality.

Norway: Exceptionalist Populist Discourse Facilitating Welfare State Stability

Norwegian inequality differs from both Sweden and Denmark. Changes in its Gini coefficient have been minor, limited to a mere 0.96-point increase from 1995 to 2013 with occasional dips over this period,[70] and there is no general

trend of inequality. Contributions to Norwegian inequality vary widely, and the political environment has likewise created a unique setting for contestation over welfare policies highly unlike the other Nordics.

Top 1% income shares today are similar to those of the late 1990s, despite some limited fluctuation over this period.[71] The impact of demographics has been relatively minor, although the declining population share of 18–35-years-olds and assortative mating in Norway have both had equalizing effects.[72] Whereas Sweden and Denmark have seen marked decreases in levels of redistribution, especially in cash transfers, and are now near the OECD average, Norway's redistributive policy has not seen the same drop—in fact, redistribution has slightly increased in Norway since the 1990s. Similarly, Norway has not seen a significant decrease in tax progressivity.[73] Inequality in Norway is highly attenuated relative to the other Nordics, and likely presents less of a challenge for welfare policies to contend with. Nonetheless, the Norwegian welfare state is unique and worth deeper consideration; we turn, then, to why welfare policy, as it relates to stable levels of inequality, has differed in Norway relative to Sweden and Denmark. Differing inequality patterns in Norway mirror differing dynamics in the political arena between right-wing populist and mainstream parties.

The Norwegian political environment is unlike those of Sweden and Denmark; the Norwegian PRR party is an outlier in comparison with those of the other Nordics. In accounts of Nordic populist party families, in fact, the Norwegian FrP (Fremskrittspartiet, or Progress Party) is often excluded to allow for more neat sub-groupings that its position on the centrist fringe of the right-wing would otherwise disturb.[74] The FrP is both less authoritarian and more economically liberal, although it, too, is anti-establishment and anti-immigration. Furthermore, the FrP does not cooperate with the other three Nordic PRR parties on the international stage, and instead often criticizes them, preferring contact with conservative parties such as the Danish Liberals.[75] Its position on welfare policies, in particular, sets the FrP apart from other PRR parties: it is "significantly centrist" on the economic dimension due to its demands for increased welfare spending—which it believes should be financed by the state oil fund as opposed to increased taxation.[76] Instead, the FrP's welfare platform differs from the social democrats more so in terms of its prioritization of policy aimed at the elderly, as opposed to services for children.[77] There has not, in the absence of a party advocating for such shifts, been the same normalization of retrenchment as a viable or reasonable policy choice as in Denmark, for example, nor a strong ideological debate around efficiency tradeoffs in welfare provision.

Relatedly, early disengagement with the FrP in Norway, as well as fragmentation in right-wing party positions toward the FrP have meant that they have encountered difficulty in joining coalitions at various times since the 1980s, as the PRR parties in Sweden and Denmark were growing.[78] The FrP has gained growing acceptance, especially since the beginning of the 21st century, and mainstream parties now increasingly work with them across various

policy areas.[79] Thus, the electoral and policy pressures that the Norwegian social democrats face from the right and throughout the policymaking process are and have long been very different from what the Swedish and Danish left face. Instead of contending with arguments for austerity and ensuring the efficacy of the welfare state in policy contestation with the FrP, Norwegian social democrats have elected to engage with the FrP, structuring ideological debates instead around other issues, like immigration. This has enabled welfare policy to remain largely untouched by political debates, and thus less prone to regress.

Political factors disincentivizing welfare retrenchment have only been bolstered by a very substantial public resistance to privatization,[80] which has hindered parties' willingness to allow market signals to guide welfare policy. Public support for universality has helped to ensure that welfare generosity has not weakened; the national debate over privatization has not yielded results that would indicate the electoral viability of movements toward a more neoliberal welfare state as in the other Nordics. Consequently, Szebeheley and Meagher contend that in terms of marketization, Norway is "closest to the ideal type" of social democratic welfare state.[81] Without both electoral incentives and public support, a transition toward dualization, privatization, or even simply retrenchment more broadly has proven more difficult and less justifiable in Norway relative to Denmark and Sweden. In balancing between the costs and benefits of equality as a goal of welfare policy, Norway's left parties have seemingly calculated that privatization is not worth its political costs—in contrast with the social democrats in Sweden and Denmark.

The Norwegian welfare state has also historically benefited from attenuated exogenous shocks and has been able to adjust where necessary to ensure that welfare provision is not diminished and that low inequality can endure. For example, the same shocks that impacted Sweden and Denmark in the 1990s and contributed to a crisis of faith in the welfare state were less harsh in Norway, and a reliance upon oil supported the state's maintenance of welfare generosity.[82] Furthermore, the welfare state has more successfully adjusted to both endogenous and exogenous factors, and modernization efforts have been largely successful in terms of allowing benefits to remain high and stable; benefits and expenditures have actually grown in Norway.[83] Whereas the benefit levels in the other Nordics have been cut and generosity is diminishing, Norway remains the exception and is still distinctive in its higher income mobility, exit rates from poverty, and unemployment rates; Sweden and Denmark have slipped and are now more comparable with the rest of Europe.[84]

It is not, however, clear that the stable levels of economic inequality in Norway will persist, particularly in the face of challenges stemming from increased immigration. Hints that this may impact economic inequality appear in a slight uptick in the Gini coefficient of Norway beginning in about 2014 with the migrant crisis in the EU, as shown in Figure 1. Pareliussen and Robling find that the impact of immigration on inequality and relative poverty in Norway has been positive,[85] and increasing immigration poses further

issues for welfare state support—both for welfare chauvinistic attitudes and for preferences surrounding welfare spending—in Norway, as shown by Cappelen and Midtbø.[86] Given the correlation between immigration and rising populism,[87] the rise of immigration is likely to threaten the generosity and universality of the Norwegian welfare state.

As Norway's left-wing parties have not, to date, had to overcome a significant challenge from the FrP, it is likely that they would be poorly equipped to deal with a surge in populist and xenophobic thinking among the electorate, and as we have seen in Sweden and Norway, a challenge from the populist right is especially concerning for maintaining the historically stable levels of inequality that Norway has boasted thus far. Likewise, because economic inequality has not risen to the same extent in Norway in comparison with Sweden and Denmark, the welfare state—and thus the political arena—has not yet been forced to respond to this challenge as in the other Nordics. With high in-flows of immigration in recent years, this contributes not only to increases in economic inequality in Norway, but will also likely bolster the electoral position of the FrP, and create new challenges for the social democrats' traditional stance as defenders of the welfare state.

Discussion and Conclusion

Inequality is an apt measure of welfare state success in the Nordics given their traditional aims of high decommodification and universality. Rising inequality in Sweden and Denmark, then, is a concerning development speaking to the diminishing efficacy of their welfare states in equal and high standards for citizens. While the path of each toward welfare state retrenchment differed slightly, the general trend is the same with each: rising competition from the right pushed the traditional social democratic bases of support for the welfare state to liberalize their own platforms. Ultimately, the prevalence of neoliberal thought in response to growing contestation from populist parties led to welfare provision that is increasingly market-based and liberalized while less and less universal. Unsurprisingly, retrenchment appears correlated with rising economic inequality in both Sweden and Denmark, with each seeing substantial rises in Gini coefficients over the past 30 or so years. These trends toward retrenchment present the question of the extent to which inequality in paradigmatically universalist welfare states can persist if the true aim of the state is to ensure equity. To date, it appears that political parties in Sweden and Denmark have responded to this issue by restructuring the goals of the welfare state toward efficiency at the expense of generosity.

Although Sweden and Denmark still rank well among OECD countries in terms of inequality, welfare provision levels are now similar to the OECD average and inequality is trending toward the same;[88] with the Nordic social democratic welfare state often lauded as paradigmatic examples of effective welfare provision, these currents point to the potential dangers stemming from welfare regress in terms of economic inequality. There is also some

implication from this pattern that retrenchment has been a circular process: economic grievances lead to a loss of trust in ruling social democratic parties, resulting in increased voting shares for PRR parties, with the resulting liberalization of welfare policy only creating further inequality to reinforce economic grievances. The endless pursuit of austerity driven by neoliberalism would therefore be a particularly concerning spiral in terms of its consequences for inequality, and the divergence between the ideal of welfare state generosity and universalism and its implementation in practice is likewise concerning for the future of the Nordic welfare states. This is in line with the hypothesized political reinforcement theory, whereby left party platforms move to the right in response to increased inequality.[89]

As populist right-wing movements continue to rise, bringing with them an increasing acceptance of neoliberal thought and policy, it would follow that Norway, without a significant rise in inequality and less welfare regress than the other Nordics, should serve as a model for escaping the reactive welfare state retrenchment seen in Sweden and Denmark. Norway has had success in avoiding both heightened inequality and welfare state retrenchment, particularly relative to trends in Sweden and Denmark. Yet, whether Norway has avoided regress *deliberately* is less certain, which presents an issue for treating the Norwegian welfare state as a paragon. The relatively centrist position of Norways' PRR party is essentially exogenous to the actions and influence of the country's social democrats—and the social democrats' success in circumventing the liberalizing pressure that lends itself to increased PRR ideology is attributable to the lack of electoral and discursive competition from the FrP, rather than the result of a particularly strong or influential left-wing party. It is unclear, in other words, that stable economic inequality in Norway is the result of some deliberate strategy; instead, for a welfare model that maintains stable low levels of inequality, it is likely that in the future we may have to look beyond the Nordics.

In light of this, it is important to recognize a more recent development in the normative conversation about best practices in welfare policy more generally—as the Nordics face challenges despite universal welfare provision, the question of whether another approach might better foster economic equality has naturally arisen. Without means testing, the capacity of the state to redress between-group differences in needs and outcomes—which may arise from institutional and individual factors—is diminished in universal welfare states. And while the long-standing success of the Nordic social democratic welfare state has supported the idea that universalism best upholds equality, the increases in inequality in Sweden and Denmark and the uncertain future of equality in Norway may imply that perhaps some elements of selectivist welfare provision within universal welfare state may actually be necessary to support the broad societal equality in the Nordics while it still exists. Indeed, the popular perception of the Nordic welfare model as inherently superior misses the vulnerability these states are currently demonstrating in the face of ideological threats. Sweden, Denmark, and even Norway may be forced to

undertake serious restructuring projects in order to ensure that the generosity and inequality reduction their welfare states are known for can persist given these new challenges.

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Air Pollution Issues and Treatment Strategies in East Asia

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Abstract

As one of the most economically vigorous regions in the world, East Asia has experienced severe air pollution due to its rapid industrialization and urbanization. Addressing the environmental effects of this transformation is complicated because of its diverse sources such as the undue burning of fossil fuels, the frequent sandstorms from inland deserts, and the spread of pollutant discharges from neighboring developing economies. The three economic powerhouses of the region, namely China, South Korea, and Japan, have suffered from the various negative externalities brought by industrial and urban air pollution, causing worsened public health conditions and substantial economic losses. Facing the widespread repercussions of air pollution on their respective societies, their governments have introduced a variety of pro-environmental policies and regulations, aiming to enhance their citizens' well-being through the betterment of domestic air quality. Their current adaptation and mitigation-based strategies for treating air pollution, however, can still be improved on account of their irregularity, exclusivity, and vulnerability to geopolitical rivalries. In the near future, possible measures for the development of air pollution treatment in East Asia include the increased international distribution of pollution-inducing production as well as the multilateral sharing of information and costs for emission reduction.

Introduction

The past few decades have seen a considerable worsening of air pollution around the world due to rapid industrialization and urbanization. The three aforementioned economic powerhouses are also subject to such an increasingly pressing environmental concern. The origins of air pollution in this region are rather diverse, ranging from the exorbitant use of hydrocarbon deposits and the regular dust storms from the deserts in North and Central Asia to the spread from neighboring emerging markets. Several unpriced negative externalities occur when industrial and urban air pollution brings about unintended and uncompensated harmful impacts on the immediate interests of ordinary citizens, leading to the emergence of public health issues and serious economic damage in East Asia. Facing the grave reverberations of air

pollution on their society, governments of all three countries have launched various pro-environmental policies and regulations, aiming to enhance their populations' well-being by improving domestic air quality. In view of the limitations of their current adaptation and mitigation-based strategies, air pollution in East Asia can be further treated through the increased international distribution of pollution-inducing production and the multilateral sharing of information and costs for emission reduction.

Origins of East Asia's Air Pollution

The origin of air pollution in East Asia is known for its complexity and multiplicity. The frequent burning of fossil fuels such as coal and petroleum in energy consumption contributes to the massive emission of toxic gasses, which are a critical source of the acid rain that severely contaminates the atmospheric environment of the region's three economic leaders. In China, coal and petroleum are considered indispensable sources of energy as they generated 76.4% and 19.2% of the country's total power respectively in 2001.[1] The notably higher sulfur content of the Chinese goal compared to other nations in East Asia results in higher emission of poisonous sulfuric gasses.[2] As China evolved into the world's second-largest energy consumer by 2017, the status of fossil fuel use in its gross energy consumption becomes progressively important.[3] Although the amount of energy used in South Korea and Japan fall farther behind China's, the proportion of fossil fuels in their energy consumption still exceeds international levels. For example, fossil fuels in 2001 made up roughly 82% and 73% of total energy supplies in South Korea and Japan respectively, as opposed to the world average proportion of 67% in 1994.[4] The extensive consumption of high-polluting energy sources in these three countries increases the likelihood of acid rain by releasing several toxic gasses. Since the late 1970s, coal-burning in China has represented "the major source of ambient sulfur dioxide (SO_2), nitrogen oxides (NO_x), and soot," all of which are highly detrimental to physical health if inhaled in small amounts.[5] These substances can easily enter the atmosphere and play a vital part in generating air pollution in East Asia with the help of acid rain.

Moreover, it is worth noting that sandstorms caused by eastward prevailing winds are instrumental in developing air pollution in East Asia. Originating from the inland deserts of North and Central Asia, these yellow dust storms engage in long-distance transport and can reach as far as North America when they are delivered downwind across the Pacific Ocean.[6] In East Asia, they are a factor in producing low air quality and adverse weather conditions. Xi'an, the largest city in northwestern China, is one of many that suffers from this extreme meteorological occurrence. Apart from local emissions generated by human activities, the city and the area that surrounds it are frequently afflicted by the dust storms from the Gobi Desert and other barren regions just hundreds of kilometers north of them.[7] Seoul, the capital of South Korea and home to more than 9 million residents, is similarly affected by these

sandstorms. Every spring, yellow dust from the Gobi Desert on the border between China and Mongolia combines with smog, creating a poisonous gray cover that enshrouds the city.[8] Under the recurrent intrusion of sandstorms, numerous East Asian cities have fallen victim to severe weather phenomena and the rampant air pollution that they engender.

The rapid economic development of China in the past decade has also raised the alarm among its neighbors as such a process is inevitably accompanied by the mass emission of industrial pollutants that affects the air quality of the region. South Korea, for example, has filed multiple complaints about the impacts of China's excessive energy consumption on its environment. In March 2017, Seoul's environment ministry claimed in a report that 30 to 50% of South Korea's $PM_{2.5}$ (i.e., fine particulate matter with diameter of 2.5 microns or less) on normal days and 60 to 80% on the severest days came from China, an issue that forced the central government to contact Beijing for the joint effort to reduce industrial pollution.[9] In that case, it stands to reason that Seoul regards the unpolluted air in East Asia as a *res nullius*, namely an unregulated open-access resource whose availability for South Korea is limited in light of the overconsumption by Chinese polluters through preemptive industrial emissions. Nevertheless, this self-victimizing interpretation overlooks the fact that as high as 50 to 70% of ultrafine dust in South Korea is produced at home through channels such as diesel vehicle exhaust, windborne fugitive dust, and unlawful waste burning.[10] Additionally, the widespread stricture on China among the Korean media fails to take into account the contribution of foreign investments in China, many of which come from South Korea, to the emergence of industrial pollution that disturbs the Korean public.[11] It is likewise worrisome that South Korea's assignment of the responsibility of domestic air pollution solely to China, whether official or not, has "decreased Koreans' satisfaction with their neighbor's efforts to combat the problem," lowering the prospect of effective transboundary pollution treatment between the two countries.[12]

Behind East Asia's Air Pollution: Industrialization and Urbanization

Similar to the situation in the West, East Asia's air pollution is closely associated with its course of industrialization and urbanization. The postwar economic miracle in East Asia has been accompanied by rampant air pollution as the anthropogenic emission of hazardous gasses soared under mass industrial development, making the region "responsible for the largest emissions of sulfur dioxide (SO_2) and nitrogen oxides (NO_x) in the world" by the end of the 20th century.[13] From the 1950s to the 1960s, Japan experienced an upsurge of SO_2 emissions as the war-torn island country embarked on rapid industrial reconstruction, a trend that culminated in 1969 and then quickly diminished.[14] The SO_2 contamination in Japanese metropolises worsened dramatically in the 1970s, as evidenced by the deficiency of epiphytes, that is, plants employed

as yardsticks for SO_2 pollution in their urban and industrial zones.[15] Likewise, in China, economic reform since the late 1970s has stimulated large-scale industrialization, resulting in the increased emission of pollutant-carrying gasses. Between the 1980s and the 2000s, the country saw a leap of roughly 8 kg of nitrogen per hectare in its mean bulk deposition of nitrogen, yielding a total increase of about 59.8% compared with the 1980 level of 13.2 kg of nitrogen per hectare.[16] Behind the hike in anthropogenic emissions, China's overall energy usage skyrocketed "from 571 million tonnes of coal equivalence (Mtce) in 1978 to 4300 Mtce in 2015" largely because of its extensive industrial expansions.[17] Therefore, air pollution from excessive emissions resembles an environmental byproduct that the remarkable postwar industrial growth of East Asia has unintentionally created.

In the last half a century, massive urbanization has also contributed to the rise of air pollution in East Asia. As urban population and consumption both surge, the air quality worsens in many cities because they encourage high emission activities. The higher demand for motor vehicles, an important mark of economic prosperity and urbanization, constitutes a primary cause for the increased emission of hazardous gasses. From 1985 to the end of 1996, South Korea had its number of registered motor vehicles soaring from 1 million to 9 million, among which diesel trucks and buses released the most nitrogen oxides.[18] In 1990, the number of motor vehicles in Japan was higher than 35 million.[19] It is also believed that by 2030, China, a populous developing country, will have 150 million motor vehicle users as its economy further burgeons.[20] Moreover, urbanization can increase average driving distances through the expanded city size and add to the degrees of traffic jams through the increased population, both of which are crucial contributors to nitrogen oxide emissions.[21] China's rapid urban growth in the last two decades gives credence to this argument. From 1996 to 2011, Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou, three megacities of China, saw their urban built-up areas expanding by 197%, 148%, and 273%, respectively and their populations growing by 87%, 65%, and 25%, respectively.[22] In the meantime, the tropospheric columns of NO_2, a toxic gas that contaminates urban air ephemerally, over the peripheries of the three megacities rose by 82%, 292%, and 307%, respectively.[23] Under such circumstances, air pollution in East Asia emanates to a large extent from the region's wide-ranging urbanization over the past semicentennial.

Air Pollution's Societal Repercussions: Health and Economy

With strong connections to industrial and urban emissions, air pollution has incurred a series of unpriced negative externalities in East Asian countries by concerning various aspects of their social development and common people's livelihood in an unintended, uncompensated way. Among them, public health problems and economic losses from decreased welfare and output are arguably the two most noticeable repercussions. On one hand, the negative effects of air pollution on East Asians' physical and psychological health are disastrous as this

environmental issue has caused significantly higher disease and death rates. In China, air pollution on bad days can bring about health impacts equivalent to the harm of smoking 40 cigarettes (two packs) each day for every individual, almost a hundred times as high as the damage done by the mean air pollution level in the United States.[24] This soaring degree of contamination has drastically increased the numbers of early deaths and life-year losses across the country. In 2006, 299,700 persons died prematurely on account of the undue concentrations of PM_{10} in almost all of China's 113 major cities.[25] In 2010, outdoor air pollution in China led to 25.23 million disability-adjusted life-year losses (DALY) (i.e., number of years lost because of illness or disability), a 4.0% increase compared to the 1990 level.[26] Meanwhile, in South Korea, the health effects of air pollution vary between different social groups. In Seoul, a higher air pollution-related overall or cardiovascular mortality was detected among "males, those 65–74 years, and those with no education or manual occupation for some pollutants."[27] Such a finding demonstrates that people with low socioeconomic status may have a higher susceptibility to air pollution due to various health or nutrition-related factors.[28] A quantitative study about the connection between ambient air pollutant levels and suicide risk in Tokyo offers an additional example of the negative impacts of air pollution on public health. In the data analysis, a 10.55% and 11.47% rise in suicide mortality among widowed persons for average exposure on the first four days of suicide death was identified with an interquartile range (IQR) increase in $PM_{2.5}$ and SO_2, respectively.[29] This research further elaborates on the adverse health effects of air pollution by pointing out that such an environmental concern may be more harmful to people with higher vulnerability as it can worsen pre-existing illnesses "which could lead to depression and subsequent suicide."[30]

On the other hand, air pollution has acutely damaged East Asian countries' economies by lowering the amount of national well-being and production. Between 1990 and 2013, China experienced a gross welfare loss from US$126.6 billion to US$1589.8 billion and a total labor output loss from US$12.5 billion to US$44.6 billion as a result of the negative impacts of ambient $PM_{2.5}$.[31] Contamination by particulate matters caused an aggregate economic loss of US$29.18 billion among the country's 111 cities in 2004 with Beijing (US$2.77 billion), Shanghai (US$2.52 billion), and Tianjin (US$1.20 billion), the top three cities on the list, representing over one-fifth of the overall costs.[32] In South Korea, by interfering with production activities, air pollution in 2017 resulted in annual economic damage of approximately US$9 billion, a figure that would likely increase twofold by 2060 according to local studies.[33] It is also alarming that South Korea's monthly retail sales can be reduced by about 0.1% for every extra day in which the PM_{10} level goes beyond 80 $\mu g/m^3$.[34] Japan has a relatively better situation in comparison with its two more recently modernized neighbors, but is still confronted with a high well-being loss from ambient air pollution. By 2060, such an environmental issue is expected to incur per-capita welfare costs from diseases of more than US$300, around US$500, and almost US$600 in Japan, South Korea, and China respectively, leaving the economic damage

in these three countries much worse than in most developed and developing markets.[35] Since air pollution in East Asia has social costs considerably higher than the private costs for emitters, as revealed by the grave reverberations on public health and economic development, the phenomenon itself can also be regarded as a noteworthy negative externality on the billions of residents living in this region.

East Asia's Combat against Air Pollution

In response to the rampant air pollution, governments of all three East Asian countries have taken strict measures to minimize the harm of this problem to their citizens and society. As the first Asian economy that advanced into the developed world, Japan takes the lead in improving domestic air quality through a series of technological innovations and policy regulations. As early as the 1970s, the country managed to significantly reduce air pollutant emissions by adopting stack gas technology, a mechanism only employed by a few coeval Chinese and Korean power plants; ultimately steering its industries toward less intensive energy usage.[36] Such a practice extended to the upper echelons of Tokyo's policymaking circles in the following decades. In 1993, the Japanese government introduced the Basic Law on the Environment, a statute that symbolized "the legislative expression of the government's commitments toward sustainable development."[37] Along with the Basic Law came the National Strategy for Environmental Protection, a binding government action scheme that aimed to ensure the united and consistent implementation of environmental policies such as the aforementioned one.[38] Furthermore, the long-term diesel emission regulation enacted by the Tokyo Metropolitan Government (TMG) in the city's 23 special wards in April 2006 was proven effective in controlling urban $PM_{2.5}$ levels by lowering diesel vehicle-related elemental carbon emissions by 44%.[39] Thanks to the TMG's and the central government's regulations, between 2000 and 2010, the Greater Tokyo Area saw a significant decline in the net PM discharge by motor vehicles from 3,180 tons to 710 tons.[40] Under the guideline of these innovative policies, Japan has successfully treated its air pollution issues at home, setting a paradigm of environmental protection in East Asia.

A relative latecomer to industrialization and modernization, South Korea has also undertaken various pro-environmental projects on the official level and achieved some positive results in lowering air pollution. The 2005 Clean Air Act (CAA) introduced by the South Korean legislature, for example, was a statute that sought to decrease the country's annual mean ambient concentration of PM_{10} below 50 $\mu g/m^3$ by 2011, a level that complies with the WHO guideline.[41] Similar to the TMG's 2006 regulation, the CAA targeted diesel vehicles by requiring all of them registered in the areas of pollution treatment "to be regularly checked for emission levels."[42] Its limit on the discharge of diesel fuel, a primary energy source known for its high emission of nitrogen oxides, was conducive to the reduction of particulate matter in South Korean

cities. By lessening the quantity of atmospheric pollutants that could raise the infant mortality rate, the CAA succeeded in improving South Korea's public health conditions, making Seoul's policymakers aware of the advantage of taking more rigorous actions to enhance air quality.[43] Under President Moon Jae-in, South Korea, a signatory to the 2016 Paris Agreement on climate change, embarked on a national campaign for clean air through the mass curtailment of coal power plants and the decrease of pollutant emissions by 30% by 2022, aiming to reduce the country's heavy dependence on traditional fossil fuels.[44] In February 2019, Seoul's Ministry of Environment enacted a special law that obligated local governments to "impose mandatory restrictions on coal power plants and other heavy emitters of dust particles," including urgent reduction measures in case the average level of ultrafine particles surpassed 50 $\mu g/m^3$ in two consecutive days.[45] These regulatory strategies have played an instrumental role in South Korea's ongoing combat against air pollution and endeavor to improve people's well-being at a time of mass consumption.

In addition, as the newest and so far the strongest economic powerhouse of East Asia, China has been engaging in a constant and arduous nationwide battle against air pollution since the beginning of its economic take-off. In 1992, the same year when Deng Xiaoping, the country's retired paramount leader, recommenced the reform and opening-up policies, a charge system for sulfur emissions was established in nine Chinese cities.[46] Unfortunately, since its charge rate was "not high enough to be effective in controlling the emissions," this system did not achieve its original intention of diminishing pollution discharges.[47] In the subsequent decades, Beijing's policymakers realized the imperativeness of adopting rigorous environmental protection measures as the country, especially its economically prosperous littoral cities, became gradually overwhelmed by pervasive air pollution. In September 2013, the Chinese State Council promulgated the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Action Plan (APPCAP), the first national scheme to increase each year's blue sky days through the reduction of urban PM_{10} levels by ≥10% by 2017 relative to their 2012 equivalents.[48] Besides, the APPCAP demanded that $PM_{2.5}$ concentrations in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei, Yangtze River Delta, and Pearl River Delta region, China's three major coastal city clusters, should be lessened by ≥25%, 20%, and 15% respectively, making enhanced regional cooperation indispensable for effectual environmental improvement.[49] More importantly, the APPCAP advocated a decrease of fossil fuels like coal and an increase of alternative power sources in China's total energy usage.[50] Nevertheless, such a proposal is highly difficult to fulfill because the proportion of coal in China's electricity generation is so high that in 2012, 95% of thermal power, or 79% of the country's electricity, was produced by coal.[51] This problem was also reflected in the Beijing Municipal Government's treatment of air pollution since 2013. In response to the central government's APPCAP, the Chinese capital introduced its own clean air action program that aimed to reduce the annual mean concentration of $PM_{2.5}$ below 60 $\mu g/m^3$ by 2017.[52] Although this localized version of the APPCAP managed to lower pollutant levels significantly in the megacity inhabited by more than 20 million

people, several systemic obstacles, among which "the use of coal for heating and domestic cooking" by a large number of citizens stood out most prominently, interfered with the smooth reduction of $PM_{2.5}$ concentration in Beijing.[53] In that case, China's struggle against air pollution, even in the country's most developed regions, still has a long way to go before reaching safe emission levels.

Policy Evaluation and Future Trends

From a methodological perspective, all aforementioned measures regarding air pollution treatment fall into the two major categories of adaptation and mitigation strategies. With a focus on the modification to governance systems, the former intends to minimize the economic and health damage of air pollution and has been well incorporated into the policy framework of all three governments. Meanwhile, the latter, a blueprint that endeavors to relieve air pollution by reducing emissions under improved technology, still has not been fully put into practice on account of the limitations of real-world conditions. Apart from the inadequacy of technological progress, the current patterns of transboundary environmental management in East Asia still have plenty of space for further enhancement. As early as the 1990s, China, South Korea, and Japan established many bilateral cooperation mechanisms for international air pollution control, but only a few of them yielded adequate results given the "constraints inherent in the bilateral cooperation."[54] Under this framework, other countries involved in cross-border environmental concerns like acid rain are excluded from negotiations among stakeholders, leading to a suboptimal situation of prisoner's dilemma.[55] East Asia's transnational cooperation in air pollution reduction has additionally been complicated by the long-standing political rivalry between Beijing and Tokyo for a dominant position in the Asia-Pacific region.[56] Therefore, for the effective protection of the atmospheric environment, East Asian countries should set up multilateral, inclusive institutions guided by the cause of improving people's collective welfare in the long run instead of the scramble for short-term political gains. Between individual countries, it is also essential to create regular air pollution control measures to address environmental problems that cause international reverberations. The inordinate column concentration of nitrogen oxides over the Yellow Sea, the water that divides China and the Korean peninsula, can be easily transported downwind to neighboring regions and worsen their air quality.[57] However, South Korea's President Moon started approaching Beijing about potential solutions to the issue such as "the use of cloud-seeding to create artificial rain over the Yellow Sea" only after his approval ratings fell amid the public health crisis at home.[58] Such an impromptu action for transboundary environmental management needs to be transformed into a perennial mechanism between policymakers of the two governments for the complete solution of air pollution issues.

In the upcoming decades, East Asian countries will likely have the potential to facilitate their air pollution treatment through a variety of vehicles,

particularly the enhanced division of labor involving pollution-inducing activities as well as the sharing of information and economic costs for discharge mitigation. According to the Coase Theorem, private bargaining, especially among highly interdependent stakeholders, can "overcome negative externalities, without the need for government intervention" and lead to efficient outcomes.[59] Within the current framework of globalization, the detrimental effects of high energy consumption, including carbon pollution in the atmosphere, can be remarkably lowered by a rise in "international production fragmentation-induced trade in intermediate goods."[60] Based on this reasoning, the three economic bellwethers of East Asia should spontaneously deepen the division of labor among themselves through trade and specialization to avoid the excessive concentration of pollution-inducing production within one country. This objective can be achieved by increasing the share of fuels trade in intermediate goods trade and employing techniques that decrease pollutant emissions in the fragmentation of international production.[61] Besides, East Asia's transnational cooperation in pollution treatment should be expanded and reinforced according to each participant country's experience and situation. Under the global trend of preserving common goods through environmental regulations, policymakers of China, South Korea, and Japan need to engage in a more frequent multilateral exchange of information regarding existing effective environmental pricing systems to bring air pollution, an unpriced negative externality, into appropriate control.[62] Since South Korea's and Japan's consumption-based market economies have flourished partially at the cost of raising the emission levels in China, the two countries can consider sharing the costs of treating air pollution in China through "multinational cooperation programs to mitigate or capture the Chinese $PM_{2.5}$ emissions," such as the transfer of payments and technologies required for environmentally friendly industrial production.[63] With these improved treatment strategies, East Asian countries will have a better chance of alleviating their air pollution in a more efficient manner.

Conclusion

East Asia, one of the most economically vigorous regions in the world, undergoes severe air pollution throughout its process of industrialization and urbanization. Such an environmental matter is further complicated by its diverse sources that range from the exorbitant burning of fossil fuels and the frequent sandstorms from inland deserts to the spread of pollutant discharges from neighboring developing markets. The three economic powerhouses of East Asia, namely China, South Korea, and Japan, have all suffered from the various negative externalities brought by industrial and urban air pollution, such as worsened public health conditions and substantial economic losses.

As a response to the severe societal repercussions of air pollution, governments of the three countries have endeavored to enhance air quality at home through a series of environmental protection measures, including decreasing

the use of nonrenewable energy in industrial production, regulating diesel emission by motor vehicles, and transitioning to cleaner alternative power sources. However, these strategies, most of which are based on adaptation and mitigation methods, still have additional room for improvement. In the future, the three East Asian countries have the prospect of diminishing air pollution in the region by promoting the distribution of pollution-inducing manufacturing practices and by sharing the information and costs of reducing pollutant emissions, especially when managing transboundary environmental concerns.

It is also worth noting that all three East Asian powerhouses are constantly dedicated to developing new techniques for treating air pollution issues. From China's Three-North Shelter Forest Program (also known as the Great Green Wall) along the Gobi Desert and the extensive application of nuclear power in South Korea's and Japan's electricity generation to the recent dominance of alternative fuel vehicles in their automotive industries, numerous approaches are helping the three countries gain cleaner air and achieve sustainable development. If policymakers from all three countries can join together in managing pressing environmental matters of the region, it is likely that East Asia will be able to solve its air pollution issues in the near future.

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Soft Power in Security Cooperation: Vietnam's Efforts toward ASEAN Unity amid the South China Sea Conflict

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Abstract

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been deeply divided in the South China Sea conflict, especially after the 45th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in which countries failed to announce a joint statement regarding the issue. This was due to multiple reasons, such as fundamental differences between member countries, lack of elements allowing for multilateral cooperation within ASEAN, and Chinese political and economic influence over several organization members. However, recent developments have pointed toward emerging ASEAN solidarity. By observing and qualitatively analyzing ASEAN-led multilateral security cooperation from 2012 to 2022, this paper has found that Vietnam's soft power has played a major role in countering the internal division of ASEAN. The country has increased its relational power through improved relations with regional partners and internationalizing the South China Sea territorial disputes. Meanwhile, it also shaped the political agenda of ASEAN by bringing the South China Sea issue onto the table. These soft-power mechanisms have somewhat reunified ASEAN, while improving Vietnam's position in the South China Sea dispute and its overall regional status.

Introduction

As the South China Sea's strategic importance gradually increases, more and more disputes have risen between countries with overlapping regional territorial claims. The conflict for this strategic maritime region has turned into a maritime battleground as coast guard forces from different countries clash with each other and a strategic confrontation arises between multiple countries with varying levels of power and corresponding claims, from a powerful China wielding an aggressive display of forces to a tiny Brunei with limited claims against its Malaysian neighbors. Significant diplomatic events have also arisen in connection to the conflict, from the 2014 standoff between Vietnam and China when China placed an oil rig inside Vietnamese waters, which

led to multiple clashes between Chinese and Vietnamese forces and a strong anti-China movement within Vietnam and the international community, to the 2016 ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration which rejected China's assertive claims and was met with strong Chinese opposition.

When facing a major superpower like China in a complicated geopolitical conflict with overlapping claims, we would expect small and middle-sized Southeast Asian members to unify and balance against China through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its corresponding security cooperation initiatives. Yet, the prospects for ASEAN-led security cooperation have long appeared to be problematic, as ASEAN countries were divided and having trouble reaching a consensus regarding their maritime disputes.[1] As the country with one of the most intensive claims, Vietnam has been proactively uniting ASEAN countries toward addressing this regional security issue through numerous soft power mechanisms within ASEAN-led security cooperation initiatives.

By observing Vietnam's ability to influence ASEAN members regarding this major security problem, the evolving role of Vietnam within Southeast Asia will be revealed, as well as the effectiveness of security cooperation initiatives within ASEAN in uniting member states and working against security threats, especially those following China's assertive actions. Studying this topic also allows us to observe the manner in which a middle power, rather than a superpower, could exercise influence in regional security cooperation initiatives.

This paper will first discuss the research design, methodology, and case selection of this research. It will then introduce the historical background regarding the South China Sea disputes and the division of ASEAN countries regarding this issue. Then, the paper will discuss how Vietnam has led ASEAN toward a consensus against the Chinese threat in the region using soft power mechanisms within ASEAN-led security cooperation: the improvement of relational powers and the agenda-setting ability. It will be concluded with several policy implications regarding the ability to express the influence of a middle-sized power in multilateral cooperation.

Research Design and Case Selection

To explore Vietnam's influence that led to ASEAN solidarity in the South China Sea conflict, I use a qualitative approach through a case study that observes multilateral ASEAN-led security cooperation initiatives. I will observe the role of Vietnam in these initiatives during a ten years period, from July 2012, when ASEAN countries failed to reach a consensus for a Joint Communique after the 45th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting due to a dispute regarding the conflict on the South China Sea,[2] to December 2022, when member countries have seemed to reach a state of solidarity toward addressing the regional security issue, as reflected in the commitment "to the maintenance and promotion of peace, security, stability, safety, and freedom of

navigation in and overflight above the South China Sea" stated in the 2022 Joint Declaration of ASEAN Defense Ministers.[3]

Within this research, I have identified both the independent and dependent variables as a foundation for me to conduct the case study. The independent variable is Vietnam's influence within ASEAN multilateral security cooperation. This would be defined as Vietnam's actions to influence ASEAN members toward unity within any initiatives, dialogue, treaties, forums, and multilateral cooperation mechanisms organized by members of the ASEAN, including, but not limited to, the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM), ASEAN Defense Minister Meeting Plus (ADMM+), and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). I will not include military alliances or coalitions, which Vietnam has officially stated that it is against.[4] The solidarity status of ASEAN members regarding the South China Sea issue is the dependent variable in this research. This includes any act of solidarity from ASEAN members toward resolving the South China Sea conflict, from official statements, joint declarations, and diplomatic actions to put the South China Sea problem into the ASEAN agenda or even denouncing Chinese military actions in the region.

To measure such variables, I employ different strategies due to the different natures of the variables. For the independent variable, I qualitatively observe Vietnam's influence efforts (including diplomatic actions, statements, and attempt to set agenda within ASEAN security cooperation initiatives, etc.) recorded in academic sources, news articles, and official documents from ASEAN and governments of member nations (e.g., press releases or official joint statements). The dependent variables are measured by qualitatively identifying indicators of ASEAN solidarity throughout the South China Sea conflict. These indicators varied from improvements in relations between ASEAN members or between ASEAN and its external security partners,"[5] to the ability to reach a consensus in bringing the South China Sea issue onto ADMM's agenda amidst the non-preference of several members.[6] The unity of ASEAN could also be reflected in the inclusion of the South China Sea issue within official statements or joint declarations, or a stronger commitment of ASEAN members to resolve this regional security issue.

The Division of Asean in the South China Sea Conflict

ASEAN members have been deeply divided regarding the South China Sea conflict. Despite all member nations viewing China as the largest threat to the region's collective security,[7] there have been weak signs of ASEAN unity toward balancing this power asymmetry. Rather, numerous indicators of disunity have appeared. These range from the 2012 failure to reach a consensus at the 45th ASEAN Ministerial Meetings, which, coincidentally, also hindered ASEAN's progress in drafting the regional Code of Conduct in the South China Sea with China,[8] to disagreements between Cambodia and Philippines over the internationalization of the South China Sea conflict.[9] This division among

ASEAN members has not only weakened ASEAN centrality and hindered the ASEAN way of consensus, but also strengthened China's national interests.[10]

Looking at the fundamental differences between ASEAN member nations as well as their strategic interests regarding the South China Sea issue, one could easily identify the reasons behind ASEAN disunity. The organization is comprised of states with different political, economic, and social systems, and thus with different worldviews.[11] Moreover, clashing security interests have manifested between four claimant states, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei, and six non-claimant states, as these two groups faced different security risks, and thus possess different strategic considerations when it comes to balancing between ASEAN's collective security interests and their bilateral relationship with China.[12] The distribution of threats is uneven among claimant states themselves, as front-line states like Vietnam and the Philippines face more pressure toward their territorial claims than Malaysia and Brunei.[13] Moreover, ASEAN's members also have overlapping territorial claims among each other and thus have both diplomatically and forcefully clashed on several occasions.[14] These fundamental differences in strategic preferences have led to internal division among ASEAN members.

In addition, the lack of unity also comes from the manner in which ASEAN itself hinders multilateral cooperation. According to John Ruggie, ASEAN's current situation lacks two major principles for successful multilateralism: "the indivisibility of the threat to the collectivity" and "the requirement of an unconditional collective response."[15] Besides the dissimilarity in threat levels between ASEAN members as discussed above, the lack of actual commitments and binding regulations within ASEAN-led security cooperation initiatives has led countries to act differently in favor of their strategic preference and hinder multilateral cooperation—which claimant states needed to balance against Chinese threats.[16] Given the fact that only four of its members are involved in the South China Sea disputes on top of lacking mechanisms for multilateral cooperation, it is understandable that some have argued "that ASEAN is an improper forum for addressing an issue that only affects some of the member states" and thus cannot be relied on in resolving the conflict.[17]

Undeniably, Chinese economic power and political influence have also been a major source of disunity among ASEAN members. China has been the largest trading partner with the majority of ASEAN members, and economic interdependence, especially for countries which are highly dependent on trade relations with China for survival, has been a strong barrier that prevents multilateralism cooperation against China.[18] Moreover, there exists strong evidence of Chinese influence through foreign aid and development projects in ASEAN countries, especially those with lower development levels. China has been Laos' largest foreign investor, pouring 5 billion US dollars into the country's major industries,[19] while deepening its influence in Myanmar by protecting the military government and investing heavily in infrastructure projects.[20] Yet, China's economic influence appears to be most effective in Cambodia. The Chinese government provided Cambodia with $2.85 billion of foreign aid

and loans from 1992 to 2014, plus $9.6 billion in Chinese foreign direct investment during the 1994–2013 period, giving them great influence within Hun Sen's aid-dependent government.[21] China's investments eventually transferred into enormous strategic advantages when Cambodian foreign minister, Hor Nam Hong, rejected the inclusion of mentioning either the Philippines' confrontation with China at the Scarborough Shoal or Vietnam's claims to exclusive economic zones in the draft communique after consulting what appeared to be Chinese advisors outside of the meeting room at the 45th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in 2012. This incident resulted in ASEAN's failure to reach a consensus on developing a policy toward China, and deeply divided ASEAN members in the years afterwards.[22] Further Cambodian attempts to prevent multilateral cooperation and the internationalization of the South China Sea issue, as well as its refusal to support the Permanent Court's Decision against China in 2016, have been regarded as indicators of Cambodian acts as China's proxy within ASEAN on the South China Sea dispute.[23] These actions have greatly destabilized ASEAN and hindered any prospects of multilateral cooperation, and could be regarded as a Chinese success in dividing ASEAN members to serve its national interests in the South China Sea, developing into a perennial problem of ASEAN disunity.

Vietnam's Soft Power Influence in Reunifying ASEAN

Vietnam has actively pushed to counter ASEAN disunity in addressing the South China Sea issue, gathering more regional support against China's dominating power. Since 2009, the country has expressed its desire for multilateral cooperation with ASEAN as well as external powers in the Indo-Pacific region. It has also emphasized the importance of "strengthening of defense cooperation with ASEAN countries on the basis of defense-security cooperation mechanisms in the process of building the ASEAN Community,"[24] as clearly mentioned in the country's 2009 Defense White Paper. Vietnam was also credited by fellow members for its successful ASEAN chairmanship in 2010, which marks the increase in ASEAN's external partnerships as well as the initiation of ADMM+.[25] Following the 2012 diplomatic breakdown, Vietnam has utilized soft-power mechanisms to influence ASEAN members toward a firmly united organization that strongly favors multilateral approaches in resolving the South China Sea issue. These mechanisms include the improvement of relational power and the ability of agenda-setting within ASEAN-led security cooperation.

Relational Power: Vietnam's Influence through Improved Relations and Internationalization

The concept of relational power rests on the argument that power is not a possession, but rather a connector that links parties within a "network of power that they influence and are influenced by."[26] An actor's level of relational power can be measured by observing its relational circle. "The denser

the network nodes/relations are, the more powerful actors are,"[27] and thus the more significant their influence. Considering Vietnam's efforts in improving and expanding its network of relations with its fellow ASEAN nations and external partners, as well as its attempt to internationalize the South China Sea problem, we could see the country's attempt to influence by strengthening its relational power.

Vietnam has focused on improving its relations with ASEAN members to increase ASEAN multilateral cooperation in the South China Sea issue as well as to reduce Chinese influence in the region. Regarding the Philippines, the other front-line state who also faces enormous Chinese pressure, Vietnam has strengthened the two countries' defense cooperation with numerous activities, including the signing of naval cooperation and information-sharing agreement,[28] joint patrols in the Spratlys Islands, and port calls.[29] The two countries also established a strategic partnership in November 2015,[30] thus significantly improving the relations between two of the most active South China Sea claimants. Vietnam has also established strategic partnerships with major ASEAN countries, such as Indonesia and Thailand both in June of 2013, Singapore that September, and Malaysia in August of 2015.[31] These improved relations, especially with major non-claimant countries, have increased Vietnam's relational power within the region while helping foster multilateralism within ASEAN.

Less noticeably, Vietnam has also invested heavily in improving its relations with Laos and Cambodia, not only to strengthen ASEAN unity, but also to mitigate Chinese influence within these countries. The country has been the fifth largest foreign investor in Cambodia while deepening its economic interdependence with Laos through a 13 percent growth in trade volume.[32] Vietnam has also utilized Cambodia-Laos-Vietnam Development Triangle Summits to assist Laos and Cambodia's development and to have informal discussions with their leaders, asserting its influence in the sub-region.[33] The three countries have remained diplomatically active elsewhere. In 2018, Prime Minister Hun Sen and King Norodom visited Vietnam while Cambodia hosted Vietnam's Prime Minister and Defense Minister. In the same year, around 300 visits occurred between Vietnam and Laos, involving the highest representatives from both countries.[34] By strengthening its relations with Laos and Cambodia, Vietnam has not just strengthened ASEAN's solidarity, but also partly swayed the two other countries out of Chinese influence.

Beyond ASEAN, Vietnam has also improved its relational power by strengthening its relations with external partners and internationalizing the South China Sea issue. After the HYSY 981 oil rig standoff against China in 2014, Vietnam has significantly increased its defense cooperation with major external powers, including the United States, Australia, Japan, and India.[35] The country also facilitated external partners' participation in ASEAN-led security cooperation initiatives. The United States, for example, was given signals to actively discuss the South China Sea issue in the ARF,[36] while key non-regional partnerships between ASEAN and Russia, India, or the EU have

been strengthened thanks to Vietnam's dynamic diplomacy.[37] Vietnam has also attempted to legally internationalize the South China Sea issue much to Chinese dissatisfaction, by portraying itself "as the aggrieved party" toward the international community,[38] reaching for assistance from international organizations and external powers, and attempting to bring the issue in front of an international tribunal.[39] These improved relations with external partners, as well as the internationalization attempts, not only give Vietnam a significant boost in its relational power, but also act as confidence-building measures toward other ASEAN nations, thus greatly persuading them to take action in a more comprehensive and internationalized multilateralism.

The improvements in Vietnam's relational powers have significantly influenced Southeast Asian nations toward a stronger ASEAN solidarity, thus bringing interesting shifts in the South China Sea conflicts. During the 2016 ASEAN—China Special Foreign Ministers Meeting in Yuxi, China, all ASEAN members rejected Wang Yi's attempt to "bully the ASEAN states into accepting" a 10-point consensus prepared by China and instead opted for a joint statement with implied condemnation toward Chinese actions, despite the heavy pressure that China has put on Cambodia and Laos to reject these criticisms.[40] Despite the meeting ending with no joint communique, this is undeniably an indicator of strengthened solidarity among ASEAN members. In addition, other countries, such as the Philippines and Singapore, also followed Vietnam in supporting "ASEAN's solidarity, unity and centrality."[41] Several non-claimants within ASEAN have also rejected China's excessive claims in the region in 2020, and have "sent notes verbales (diplomatic notes) to the UN rejecting China's maritime claims in the South China Sea."[42] These actions have demonstrated Vietnam's success in influencing Southeast Asian nations toward a unified ASEAN, and thus the effectiveness of its relational power mechanism in doing so.

Agenda-Setting: Bringing the South China Sea onto the Table

Besides the pure attractiveness of a nation's culture or values, the ability to set agendas within international institutions is also considered by Joseph S. Nye, who articulated the concept of soft power, as an important indicator of soft power in international politics.[43] In the South China Sea conflict, Vietnam has also impressively displayed soft power influence through its agenda-setting ability by attempting to bring the issue onto the discussion agenda of ASEAN-led defense cooperation. Considering that ASEAN operates on the basis of consensus and that no country, even the ASEAN chairman, has a significant advantage in agenda-setting over one another, Vietnam's success in facilitating discussion on this issue in ASEAN-led initiatives, as well as putting the issue onto the joint declarations, demonstrates the massive amount of soft-power influence exerted by this middle power.

Along with the Philippines, Vietnam has been actively bringing the South China Sea conflict onto the ASEAN's discussion agenda, despite opposition. Since 2011, and especially after the incident in 2012, ADMM joint statements

have continuously mentioned the South China Sea, with a strong emphasis on "implementing the DOC [the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea] and adhering to international law." It also incorporated important documents regarding the topic, such as the Joint Statement of the 15th ASEAN–China Summit on the 10th anniversary of the DOC, the ASEAN's Six-Point Principles on the South China Sea, and the 22nd ASEAN Summit's support for the early conclusion of the COC.[44] The following joint declarations have gotten more and more comprehensive in their language, from only underscoring "the importance of freedom of navigation in, and over-flight above, the South China Sea as provided for by universally recognised principles of international law"[45] in 2012 to a commitment "to cooperate in a constructive and peaceful manner for the South China Sea to become a sea of peace, stability, and prosperity" and a reaffirmation of "the importance of maintaining and promoting peace, security, stability, safety and freedom of navigation in and overflight above the South China Sea"[46] in the 2020 ADMM Joint Declaration under the chairmanship of Vietnam. The changes which imply that China is a threat to the maintenance of the freedom of navigation are remarkable, considering that these joint statements require the consensus of all ASEAN members during a period of division. Also, when taking into account China's efforts to shift the South China Sea issue toward bilateral discussion, as reflected in Cambodia's attempt to classify the issue as a bilateral matter which should not be included in ASEAN's joint statements,[47] the inclusion of this issue into the agenda of ASEAN-led security initiatives and their joint statements have further demonstrated the soft power influence of Vietnam over Southeast Asia. Clearly, the influence of Vietnam has created progress in resolving ASEAN disunity, which has been a problem for at least the last decade.

Vietnam has also been an active member in the collective effort of building the legally-binding Code of Conduct on the South China Sea (COC). Despite China taking advantage of the disarray within ASEAN in 2012 to delay the discussion about the Code of Conduct, Vietnam and ASEAN countries pushed forward after agreeing on "ASEAN's Six-Point Principles in the South China Sea."[48] Since then, Vietnam has been an active member in fostering the discussion process between ASEAN and China, and thus has been continuously making progress in building the Code of Conduct. In 2014, Vietnam hosted the 12th ASEAN-China SOM where agreements regarding the "nature" of the COC, its design approaches, as well as the "guidelines for a hotline to respond to urgent incidents at sea" were reached.[49] Vietnam, along with ASEAN members, continued to pressure China to accelerate the consultation process in 2016.[50] Despite China's attempt to replace the COC with a 10-point consensus in the ASEAN—China Special Foreign Ministers Meeting, the parties have finally committed to "working substantively toward the early adoption of a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC) based on consensus."[51] Today, the commitment to work toward an early conclusion of the COC is still being reaffirmed by Vietnam and all other ASEAN nations, as reflected in the 2022 ADMM Joint Statement.

Considering that "establishing a 'substantive and effective' COC has been a target for Vietnam,"[52] the accelerated negotiation process as well as the commitment toward an early conclusion for the COC has also confirmed Vietnam's ability to set the agenda of ASEAN, thus influencing ASEAN members toward addressing the South China Sea issue multilaterally.

Conclusion

Despite facing a significantly disunified ASEAN after the 2012 failure to reach consensus, Vietnam has successfully reunited ASEAN members to constructively address the South China Sea conflict. This significant shift in regional politics was achieved mainly with the country's soft power mechanisms, such as improved relational power and agenda-setting capability. On one hand, Vietnam has been expanding and improving its relation network toward both ASEAN members and external security partners, thus enhancing its relational power to influence other ASEAN members. On the other hand, the country has been actively setting the ASEAN agenda, creating a suitable environment for ASEAN members to engage with China multilaterally and address important issues related to the South China Sea conflict. These actions have proven to be effective in creating a unified ASEAN, strengthening ASEAN centrality, and benefiting Vietnam in strengthening Vietnam's regional status as well as its position in the South China Sea conflict.

Moreover, this extraordinary feat also marks several important implications for international relations. This case study has demonstrated the effectiveness of how multilateralism and internationalization of a major issue, through a security cooperation initiative, could strongly support multiple smaller nations against imminent threats from a superpower like China. It has additionally proven that a middle power could also demonstrate a high level of influence in regional security cooperation initiatives using soft power mechanisms, as Vietnam has done to unite ASEAN members. Having observed the effectiveness of a unified ASEAN, it is expected that Vietnam would spend significant efforts in keeping ASEAN solidarity as the conflict remains in the near future. This could lead to a strengthened version of ADMM, ADMM+, or even new security cooperation initiatives that allow for more effective cooperation between ASEAN members or between ASEAN and external security partners. Multilateralism and internationalization, on the other hand, remain effective instruments for Vietnam and middle Southeast Asian members in restraining China's aggressive actions and for pushing toward conflict-resolving solutions, such as the establishment of the COC. The future of the South China Sea conflict, therefore, would strongly rely on the unification of the ASEAN middle power under the influence of Vietnam to balance the Chinese threat. As for middle powers beyond Southeast Asia, the employment of soft-power mechanisms, multilateralism and the internationalization of regional conflicts would be greatly beneficial in balancing potential threats from regional hegemons.

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Identities Founded on Hierarchies of Power: A Preliminary Analysis of the Causes of Systematic War-Rape in Ukraine

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Abstract

Rape has consistently been used as an instrument of war during conflicts, but not much is heard about successful trials against it due to its difficulty to prosecute. This paper accordingly addresses the reports of rape being used against Ukrainian civilians in 2022 to develop a preliminary framework for investigating the Russian Forces' intent to harm through sexual violence. Given that the conflict is ongoing and communications in Ukraine are not always reliable, the evidence in this paper has been limited to witness accounts reported by reputable media as well as historical and social research on involved parties. The paper is divided into two parts. Part one constructs a framework for developing the case study, highlighting two main causal factors of rape being used as a war strategy: (1) hierarchy and social power dynamics and (2) military socialization. The second part is a case study of the Ukrainian crisis, an analysis conducted by applying the previously developed framework to available evidence. This case study finds that the rapes occurring in Ukraine are driven by antagonistic national attitudes, as the central role of militarized masculinity within Russian Armed Forces causes the pursuit of social and personal dominance through sexual degradation. Evidence of coordination with intent to rape within the military has also been found. I suggest that understanding the driving factors of rape as a war tactic in Ukraine is relevant for eventually developing frameworks of identification that can highlight the intentions behind war-rape in other conflicts.

Introduction

Since the Russian Armed Forces invaded Ukraine in February of 2022, images of the destruction within Ukraine and narratives following the human rights abuses occurring during the conflict have been burned into the minds of news watchers across the globe. Homes lie in rubble, military tanks dominate the landscape, and civilian and military bodies lay strewn across the ground. These are no longer unfamiliar scenes.

However, there is another dimension of human casualty within the war that, while largely omitted from popular media, demonstrates a sinister wartime culture. Take a closer look at the Ukrainian victims: a woman is found dead in a cellar in Bucha, a gunshot wound through her head; torn condom wrappers and used condoms are found in an upstairs room. In Kharkiv, a one-year-old dies of his injuries after being raped. The body of a woman is found in a potato cellar wearing nothing but a fur coat, with bodily evidence pointing to her having been a sex slave.[1] These offer a snapshot of the unreported crimes of the Ukraine war.

The lack of attention to the sexual abuse and rape occurring in the conflict is not surprising. Discourse around rape as a weapon of war largely occurs within feminist spheres and is thus gender-coded, painted as a woman's issue despite directly threatening international security.[2] In fact, war-rape has been officially recognized as a weapon of war for over a decade, defined by its employment in pursuit of wider goals.[3] More specifically, it is used to "accomplish genocide . . . forced impregnation and political intimidation and demoralization [or be] linked with military/political objectives and that . . . (intend to serve) a strategic aim."[4] Though Article 7 of the Rome Statute defines war-rape as a crime against humanity, the International Criminal Court (ICC) has difficulty prosecuting it since proving its intent is difficult.[5] International security and feminist spheres of influence must focus on identifying characteristics and patterns, both individual and institutional, in these war-rapes that can identify concrete markers of intent to cause harm. Expanding this field of study will help construct frameworks that can be used to help courts prosecute these crimes and improve the overall security of women in war.

Thus, this paper seeks to conduct a preliminary study of the Ukraine crisis to determine the potential causes of rape being used as a war tactic by bringing attention to the origins of destructive intent. There is very little information or professional analysis regarding the Ukraine war currently available, for reasons including telecommunications disruptions,[6] the stigma around rape, and the fact that this is a relatively new conflict. Therefore, this paper privileges previous scholarship to discuss incentives and systems of rape in war while engaging with witness accounts of the conflict that have been reported by news outlets and UN spokespersons.

Through a qualitative analysis of existing scholarly work on war-rape, this paper builds on existing scholarship by developing hypotheses on the causes of rape being used as a strategic practice in Ukraine. I use the first part of my paper to highlight common theories developed by scholars in fields regarding feminist issues and political violence. My grouping of these observations is not meant to develop a full typology, but rather to illustrate key factors of systematic war-rape discussed in the existing literature. As such, I identify two themes that create a framework for evaluating the factors contributing to systematic war-rape in Ukraine: (1) the inner workings of hierarchical power dynamics, which include societal manifestations of gendered vulnerability

and reinforcement of nationalistic identity, as well as (2) military socialization. These themes don't necessarily apply equally to the case.

The second part of this paper applies the framework to the Ukrainian war, drawing on Ukrainian and Russian gender dynamics, as well as Russian history, nationalism, and militarism to contextualize witness accounts reported by reputable news outlets. The goal of this analysis is to demonstrate how socialized norms and institutional practices create hierarchies of power that lead to harmful patterns of behavior. I propose that military socialization and the integrated Russian nationalist notions of militarized masculinity are key points that necessitate further study to develop a more concrete identification process for the use of strategic rape in the Ukraine war.

Framework: Rape in Times of War

There is no singular factor that scholars have agreed on that creates conditions for sexual assault to occur in war. The literature on this subject is vast and diverse, and many causal factors such as gender, military presence, culture, and internal displacement have been brought forward as catalysts for rape being used as a war tactic. The framework created in this paper does not seek to definitively state why war-rape occurs systematically, but rather to collect main, recurring themes in the scholarship that can construct interconnecting lenses through which we can investigate causal factors in empirical cases. Applied to the case study, the paper uses this framework to formulate a hypothesis on why there have been so many reports of sexual assault in Ukraine. This focused analysis of events is a first step to developing tailored identification methods (and perhaps even solutions) for specific occurrences of rape as a war tactic.

To offer a well-rounded analysis given the informational limitations of this paper, the proposed framework focuses on broad themes of personal, communal, and national identities within the involved parties in different contexts. My research, therefore, condenses the themes in war-rape scholarship into two large categories. The first is hierarchy and social power dynamics, explored through two subcategories of gendered vulnerability and group re-enforcing identities. The second is military socialization defined by conceptions of militarized masculinity and hierarchical relationships and influences.

Hierarchy and Social Power Dynamics

Gendered Vulnerability

Traditional gender roles often socialize boys to be aggressive while girls are socialized to be more passive, a dichotomy that encourages the male domination of women.[7] Rape exploits female fear, as women are not taught to be assertive and therefore lack the temperament to fight back.[8] Sometimes, systematic social and economic inequalities are to blame as women become dependent on men to provide for their lives and for social status.[9] If a country is experiencing a new war, structural violence that predisposes women to a

weak, dependent social position is exacerbated and makes women easy targets, making rape and sexual assault effective conflict strategies to destabilize the community—especially if they are part of a culture that strictly regulates sexual relations and will ostracise an "impure woman."[10] Thus, some researchers conclude that "intentionally inflicting shame . . . by raping women is a major goal of those who are at war."[11]

War-rape can also be an extension of peacetime norms.[12] If the nonconsensual satisfaction of male's sexual needs from women is culturally accepted, rape in times of war may also be employed on an individual basis based on sexual impulses.[13]

Perceptions of masculinity are just as important to consider since rape can also be systematically used in war to reinforce masculine gender roles.[14] The aggression that commonly accompanies socialized masculinity breeds hostility toward women as a class, leaving women even more vulnerable in times of conflict.[15] War disrupts normal cycles of life and leaves many men without work, without any ability to provide, and powerless to protect their families. If men feel as though they cannot live up to the imposed standard of masculinity, there is an incentive to rape since those who feel humiliated or victimized become more prone to violence.[16] Thus, war breeds an environment for men to act on aggressive tendencies inherent in socialized masculinity, especially since an assertion of masculinity may necessitate the devaluation of other groups, whether by gender, race, or sexuality, making women the targets of their frustration.[17]

Reinforcement of Group Identities

Since gender norms can create a hierarchy of power within a culture, men will generally be socialized as the "dominant group." Members of a dominant group ascribe to ideologies that allow them to support group-based inequality. So, men or the attributed "masculine" group indulge in behaviors and ideas that legitimise their power over women or the "feminine," who become an out-group.[18] This phenomenon transcends gender to include culture, race, and sexuality; stereotypes of different groups can be used to justify the legitimacy of the dominant group's supremacy on the basis of the out-group having "a moral, psychological, or social deficiency."[19] The result is a collective identity formed by rallying against an "other" that is perceived as inferior or as a threat—or sometimes both.[20]

These unified groups often use violence during conflicts to cause mental or physical distress or to gain power or control as a way to enact revenge or retaliation on people or groups.[21] This could mean aiming to "affect change in social relations and/or authority structures by 'targeting bodies in so far as they affect . . . action available to individuals or communities.'"[22] Rape affects these changes by altering the foundation and cohesion of society, thus weakening the enemy as a whole.

Women are also likely to be targeted should there be an incentive to eliminate a racial, cultural, or ethnic group through forced pregnancy that will

produce impure offspring since women are often viewed as culture bearers.[23] The children born from this rape will not be accepted as part of their mother's culture, ostracizing the mother and the child from the remaining community.[24] The community therefore finds itself losing its women, and sees an end put to their bloodline. A group can also seek to gain the upper hand through systematic rape not just because it hurts women, but also because it humiliates enemy men by "sullying" their nation.[25] Attackers thus give the message that those men are inadequate protectors and that the enemy is the stronger, dominant group. These strategies can destroy the nuclear family and thus the foundation of the victims' society, particularly if it follows traditional values.[26]

Military Socialization

Research has proven that central tenants of socialized masculinity are exacerbated in the military to encourage violent impulses and consequently train soldiers that are able and willing to kill to protect their nation. This creates the conception that masculinity is made for the purpose of waging war.[27] It capitalizes on the archetype of the masculine protector and devalues any notion of race, sexuality, or gender that contrasts with this traditional masculinity.[28] The command structure and hierarchy of the military lead to the quick dissemination and acceptance of these attitudes, allowing rape to be considered a possible strategy.

Relationships within the institution are also a contributing factor. Research shows that if there is a lack of cohesion in the unit, if recruits were taken forcibly through abduction, if the combatants are unsupervised, or if they have been deployed for a very long time or far from home then they are more likely to engage in sexual violence.[29] In light of personal suffering, fear of not fitting into their cohort, or in developing the mindset that the enemy is more at fault for the conflict and thus deserving of torture,[30] soldiers can also adopt personal preferences for violence, including rape, as a way to deal with the circumstances of the conflict. Acts of violence can thus be acts of rebellion or retribution against the military institution, while also becoming a pattern of action that, if left unpunished, can lead to rape becoming standard behavior within the military.

Moreover, combatants are typically trained to obey their commander, so rape can vary depending on who occupies leadership positions and what values they disseminate.[31] Sexual violence will occur most often when it is driven from below and then tolerated or encouraged from above. Thus, rape can still strategically occur without a policy explicitly ordering it.[32] If simply tolerated, it is difficult to prove intent at high levels of command and therefore will not be identified as an official strategy. If these rapes occur unhidden, however, a strategy may been formed even without explicit orders. The integrated military structure, therefore, leaves room for values of masculinity and violence to not just be tolerated and acted upon, but directly disseminated through the command structure by affirming or creating conditions that foster the perpetuation of these beliefs and behaviors.

A Preliminary Case Study: Ukraine 2022

Notes on Methodology

The stories used in this paper were reported by the media based on accounts from civilians who managed to escape the conflict or who live in recently liberated cities or villages, with other stories having been told on social media. The UN Human Rights Office has received 124 allegations of conflict-related sexual violence as of June 3, 2022.[33] Of the 78 allegations of rape that the OHCHR had received by June 29, 2022, it has documented 9 official counts of rape—the most common form of sexual violence used by Russian forces.[34] Most of the victims are women, but children and men have also reportedly suffered from sexual abuse.

The lack of information on the ground is attributed to the stigma around sexual assault, trauma, the displacement of civilians in the war, and the lack of proper communications technology. It is unlikely that we will fully understand the scope of the sexual violence in Ukraine, nor can we identify which witness accounts constitute the 9 confirmed rape cases. Therefore, this paper will privilege all witness stories that are available from reputable news outlets such as *NPR, New York Times*, and *Globe and Mail* among others. However, as there are not enough of these stories to build a focused and well-rounded analysis, the historical and social contexts of involved parties and regional tensions are heavily depended upon in the analysis. This paper operates under the assumption that all information received from witness statements and general reports can only lead to hypothetical conclusions. The latest witness account report used in this paper dates to November 2022.

Hierarchy and Power Dynamics

Gendered Vulnerability

When discussing previous Russian military sexual abuses, Katherine R. Jolluck concluded that "neither nationality nor politics were critical . . . — only the fact that the victims were female."[35] As reports of rape continue to be investigated in Ukraine, however, it is becoming clear that gender itself is not the sole factor determining rape. Besides the fact that men and boys have also reportedly been assaulted,[36] many factors related to gendered socialization and institutional structures contribute to rape being used as a war tactic.

Targeted exploitation of women occurs especially where women are in an economically and/or socially vulnerable position within their society. While victims of rape suffer long-term effects of rape such as PTSD and a fear of seeking help due to a fear of reliving trauma and facing social stigma, Ukrainian culture specifically does not pose any notable structural barriers that ostracise sexually abused women.[37] Indeed, a woman has the means to be self-sufficient even if estranged from her male relatives, and married women hold the same property rights as their husbands.[38] Women are also not normatively ostracized due to a notion of impurity regarding sexual acts, though it is reported

that cases of sexual abuse are vastly underreported and kept quiet due to fear of retaliation or judgment.[39]

According to the 2007 Demographic and Health Survey data, 24% of married women in Ukraine reported abuse, with 3% reporting sexual abuse—numbers that are not statistically more pronounced when compared to the global average.[40] While these statistics show that women do face gendered disadvantages that are probably more significant than what is currently recorded, violence against women is not an issue unaddressed or encouraged by the state. In fact, Ukraine became the first post-Soviet state to adopt a law "with specification of legal and institutional bases of preventing and combating violence in a family" with 2001's "On Prevention on Domestic Violence."[41] This law has gender equality as a goal, as well as eliminating gender-based discrimination.[42] Therefore, though negative attitudes and gendered disadvantages toward women are prevalent in the country, women's social position within Ukraine is unlikely to be a main strategic factor for the invading force.

However, the particularities of wartime change everything. War disrupts the foundation of any region that it strikes—ending jobs, separating and destroying families, and leaving many without shelter. Sons, fathers, and husbands may leave to go fight on the front. It goes without saying that everyone in war is less safe; this reality exacerbates women's vulnerability that already exists in peacetime. Some of the rapes in Ukraine, according to witnesses, took place after women were forcibly removed from their homes and brought to an isolated location, such as a Russian-occupied building or a locked basement.[43] Rape often took place in homes where the woman was alone, with her children, or after her husband was killed. Women were also raped with the promise of their child being hurt if they did not comply, usually after the husband had been murdered.[44] Situations such as these indicate that women are seen as easier targets when men are not present, illustrating that their perceived vulnerability is strategically considered. If further research shows that soldiers are purposefully removing men from women's spheres of access, then this may point to a strategy whereby soldiers take advantage of established gender roles and the absence of men to purposefully destabilise women who are assumed to be less able to fight back. As more information becomes available, research must be done to determine how prevalent and widespread rapes that have removed women from male protection are in the conflict.

Compared with Ukraine, Russia provides much more evidence that suggests its society is specifically structured against women. Russia has an elevated rate of domestic violence; in a 2005 study of 2,200 people, 70% of women said that they were subject to abuse by their spouses.[45] Yet, some forms of domestic violence that did not cause serious injury were decriminalized by the state in 2017. This reform was condemned by the CEDAW committee in a 2021 report[46] after the committee had already ruled that the Russian state failed to fulfil its obligations with regard to protecting women from domestic violence.[47] The decriminalization further exacerbated the "weakened state response to such violence."[48]

The normalization of and lack of punishment for these actions likely affects the attitudes of Russian soldiers in Ukraine, especially since cultures of violence and discrimination against women are exacerbated during war times. Cultures of violence against a group indicate feelings of superiority from the attacker(s), so this conflict may show signs of soldiers using rape as a way to assert a form of dominance that hinges on the degradation of women. As more information comes out from the field, it will be easier to analyze whether the reported sexual abuse cases point to a more organized effort or to multiple counts of individual opportunism. The latter is hinted at in one witness account in which an 18-year-old Russian soldier told his victim that he was raping her because he hadn't had sex in two weeks.[49] This case could be indicative of a conception of masculinity that normalizes sexual release and aggression toward women. However, for rape to truly be intended as a war crime there needs to be a unifying factor that expands the scope of opportunity for the enemy, one that currently cannot be properly confirmed through considering women's positions in Russia alone.

Another gendered factor could be at play in Russian attitudes against women: Russia's "remasculinisation" under Russian President Vladimir Putin. Since the 2000s the national standard of hegemonic masculinity has been to be a "muzhik," an identity acquired by proving that "you are not a woman, a child, or a homosexual . . . the muzhik is sturdy, tough, and strong . . . [and] makes his deeds speak for him."[50] This masculine identity is cast in opposition to the feminine (thus socializing femininity as weak), as well as positively associated with sexism and homophobia.[51] When considering that the word "condom" is also considered one of the worst insults in the country due to it pointing to "a complete lack of masculinity,"[52] one can see how forceful attitudes toward sexual activity can brew quickly in the Russian population to promote an aggressive and dangerous conception of masculinity and eventually contribute to collective sexual abuse. No witness accounts available at this time detail any comments by soldiers that could confirm or deny this hypothesis.

Group-Reinforcing Identities and Nationalism

When analyzed through a feminist lens, language reveals itself to be used both strategically and incidentally to perpetuate gendered status.[53] Social groups culturally construct their identity and expression of that identity around the normative language that they choose to use.[54] Within male spheres of discourse, masculine language and its links to gendered stereotypes such as strength, aggression, and other cultural particularities tend to lend themselves to a dominant position within that rhetoric, thereby creating an opposition with the feminine that subverts it to the submissive, weaker position.[55] Language attributed to women confirms their subordinate position in society.[56] These socialized conceptions of gender can therefore be weaponized to confirm and defend the perpetuation of gender roles, even those constructed or manipulated by the social group.

It is therefore unsurprising that gendered language is often employed in the development of national identity. When sentiments of nationalism intertwine with gendered roles or expectations, it is difficult to separate the notions of "honour, patriotism . . . , bravery, and duty" from masculinity.[57] Power is already traditionally viewed as "male" in conjunction with the submissive "female." Therefore, embodying traditionally male attributes legitimizes power and facilitates a narrative that pits the dominant group (the masculine) against the out-group (the secondary and subordinate feminine). Thus, when attributed to a nation, a departure from gender norms and traditional masculinity can be seen as a national security threat.[58]

Russia's hypermasculinisation is an example of this. Putin gained popularity in the early 2000s as his image became synonymous with masculinity, his tough handling of the Chechen war and subsequent militarized patriotism defining his leadership and legitimising Russian militarized masculinity.[59] Indeed, Putin fought to reinstate Russia's power and glory, as well as defend territorial sovereignty, by turning public and political support toward the Armed Forces.[60] This strategy was deeply tied to national notions of masculinity in many ways.

Firstly, reforms in post-Soviet Russia re-established traditional gender and family roles, including men's role as the breadwinner, one that many men could not reach under the Soviet Union due to the economic status of the country.[61] This reality bred a collective sense of national de-masculinisation that expanded to the international sphere as well, as their defeats in the Cold War and in Chechnya, as well as the collapse of the USSR, reduced Russia to "a woman of easy virtue."[62] Moreover, Russia's dependence on foreign aid, or its lack of independence, fuelled its perception as being a feminine and weak nation.[63] Indeed, male dignity and sexuality had become "inseparable" from national pride and de-masculinisation was widely attributed to the decline of the Russian state.[64]

Putin introduced the reinforcement of sovereignty as a main way to mitigate Russia's dependence on external organizations and remedy its "feminized" status. Sociological surveys also showed that Russians wanted their country to be perceived as strong with the ability to defend itself, leading to the re-emphasis on the military.[65] Consequently, the masculine became irrevocably intertwined with Russian nationalism and subsequent military activities. Putin has declared on multiple occasions that Russia can never let itself be perceived as weak, and any reference to Ukrainian politics and its diplomacy with the United States has been met with language feminizing Ukraine.[66] Thus, Russia has established itself as a masculine in-group and Ukraine a feminine out-group. This ideology of an inherent weakness in Ukrainian identity legitimizes the notion of Russian superiority and dominance, and the necessity of dominating and conquering Ukrainian land.

There is therefore reason to believe that rape against Ukrainian women is fuelled by both nationalism and politics legitimated by gendered language. Ukraine officially joining the Western sphere through NATO would be "a final humiliation and the retreat from great power" as the former Soviet republic

aligned itself with the enemy ideology—a re-emasculation of the Russian state.[67] As previously mentioned, rape can be seen as a way to regain and reinforce one's masculinity. Applied at the national level to re-feminize the enemy and assert Russia's legitimacy and dominance, the rape of an enemy country's women can fulfil a retributive role. As such, rape becomes a strategy to degrade and destroy Ukraine for the benefit of Russian identity, which becomes masculinized in turn.

Indeed, Russian military history contains "reports and testimonies [from World War 2 that] show that . . . rapes . . . reinforced the bonds between Soviet soldiers, and sent a signal to German men, [that they were] unable to protect women."[68] It is not implausible that this is a strategy used by the Russian army today, and it may be possible to more definitively say that some of these assaults are an attempt to shame Ukrainian men as more information becomes available. For example, reports of women being assaulted in front of their children and families can be interpreted as soldiers trying to assert dominance over the supposed protectors of these women and children. It can be an "attempt to show . . . power and 'that you can destroy'; it is an attempt to traumatize the community."[69] It emphasizes the powerlessness of not just men, but of the entire nation in the face of the invading force.

In applying gendered power dynamics on the national level, inflicting sexual harm hints at a goal to display Russia's power over Ukraine to break down Ukrainian society. Indeed, there are many witness accounts on the ground that point to a clear power-play on not just women, but men as well. In the Kyiv region, in March 2022, two Russian soldiers entered a home, raped a 22-year-old woman several times, sexually assaulted her husband, then forced the couple to have intercourse in front of them. Then, one of the soldiers forced their four-year-old daughter to perform oral sex on him.[70] In Chernihiv, an 83-year-old woman described how a Russian Armed Forces serviceman raped her in her house where her physically disabled husband was present.[71] While some witness accounts document husbands being murdered, the fact that some soldiers have men watch as they take advantage of their female relatives—or even hurt the men themselves—hints at disempowerment and humiliation as their main goal. The mental anguish of these dehumanizing actions can break the victims and their families apart—putting entire communities in danger of being overpowered by the invading force. Of course, there is always the possibility that some of these events are driven by a desire to assert individual masculinity. More research must be done to weed these cases out of the larger lens of rape as a war tactic. However, if many soldiers participate in one assault or engage in many different assaults in the same regions and at the same time, it becomes more likely that there is some level of collaboration and tolerance within the Russian Forces, which may be attributed to the nationalistic masculinity rooted in the state.

Historically speaking, however, the fact that Russian soldiers have committed similar crimes in many other key areas during a power struggle between Ukraine and Russia illustrates that there is already an antagonistic

pattern in Russian behavior toward Ukrainians. In Donbas, Russian soldiers raped women and displayed them in public while naked. This purportedly "destroyed the fabric of society," threatening the stability of the community through shame.[72] Similarly, a witness account of a gang rape in Ukraine states that Russian soldiers told their victims that they would rape them to "the point where they wouldn't want sexual contact with any man, to prevent them from having Ukrainian children."[73] While there cannot yet be any confirmation that this is an official goal of the invading force, there exists within the invasion the clear intent to not just assert Russian dominance but to eliminate Russian-resistant cultures and take away power from their people. Whatever the case, Russia's invasion of Ukraine has repeatedly been described as a genocide by Ukrainian officials.[74]

Military Socialization

The Ukraine conflict is not the first conflict in which rape has been identified as an issue within Russian forces. The Russian military has committed rape in Chechnya every year for seven consecutive years since the 2000s, and sexual violence against men and women in detention has been reported in three years of the conflict in eastern Ukraine prior to the February 2022 invasion.[75] Rape is also among the human rights abuses reported in Russian-occupied Crimea.[76] Considering this, it is not unlikely that the sexual violence occurring in Ukraine is systematic at the level of the Russian military.

It is widely accepted that Russia's ranks foster a violent culture based on hypermasculinity.[77] Their military is a hybrid contract/conscript format, and the role of conscription is central and based on upholding the notion of militarized masculinity promoted in Soviet times, with positive male socialization tied directly to their service in the military.[78] There is a state re-education program to revive military patriotism and compliance with the draft, though it is contested.[79] This resistance has proved disastrous for the Russian army, now highly conscription-based due to the Ukrainian conflict, to the point that some recruits were abducted off the street.[80] Additionally, hazing young conscripts by having senior members of the army "encouraged to beat, brutalise or even rape new recruits" is a popular practice.[81]

Besides hazing, living conditions are notoriously bad for Russian soldiers and have incited many draft-dodging attempts.[82] Perhaps concordantly, early reports from Ukraine illustrate "that many soldiers were not motivated to fight," were "confused about the purpose of their mission," and were "asking for food and looting Ukrainian stores."[83] These less-than-favorable conditions can trigger violent reactions in the form of sexual abuse, sometimes even becoming the sole unifying factor for those units.[84] Indeed, Dara Kay Cohen's research suggests that there is an alarming lack of internal cohesion within Russian forces, which correlates with wartime sexual violence.[85] It is possible that rape is being strategically used as a bonding ritual for combatants who are disillusioned with conditions in the military,[86] though this case may not lend itself to the goal of destructive intent. It remains unclear how many

soldiers suffer from low morale and how many higher-level authorities within the military consider ordering or tolerating rape with the goal of encouraging cohesion. More statistics need to be collected to determine what percentage of these rapes, if any, are related to this.

Rather than breaking apart morale within the army, violent or dehumanizing actions that are common within the army normalize extraneous violence in conjunction with military values of protection and patriotism. Violent practices of abduction and hazing can worsen the culture of violence in young men who feel angry and victimized, while also normalizing actions of aggression and humiliation.[87] This dynamic can encourage brutal practices as common ground within and between military units, making the army more likely to engage in sexual violence. Especially considering that hegemonic masculinity is perpetrated in the military with the assumption that soldiers ought to embody a higher ideal of masculinity, humiliation—whether through sexual practices or otherwise—is a threat to their social position.[88] Humiliated soldiers can therefore use the same tactics to re-assert their masculinity and their status.

Reports of the Russian army from World War II show that rapes did indeed reinforce the bonds between Soviet soldiers since it separated them from "all German women" and established a sense of masculinity by showing off "adequate performance."[89] Rape allows for an impression of dominance and thus imposes the hierarchical separation of Russian soldiers from Ukrainian women as well as men and children, ensuring the devaluation of the enemy. Whether fulfilling the notion of militarized masculinity perpetrated in the military or a more retributive goal, widespread and coordinated rapes perpetrated by soldiers can point to an organized ideology based on these entrenched military values.

As of now, however, there is no confirmation that rapes in Ukraine have encouraged camaraderie within Russian ranks. Only one account of gang rape has actually been reported, but rapes have occurred in buildings occupied by multiple Russian soldiers, and some rapes occur in close proximity to each other and may therefore be subject to coordination between soldiers.[90] Rapes have also been reported in a Russian detention facility,[91] where coordination or tolerance is likely. It would therefore be beneficial to continue conducting research as information becomes available to see not only if strategic planning and coordination has occurred, but exactly how aware higher command is of these offences and whether they are directly encouraging it, or simply turning a blind eye.

Based on accounts gathered on the ground, we can begin to assume that there is a high level of awareness of the rapes being committed between soldiers, though attitudes toward these occurrences are harder to pinpoint. The OHCHR reports that "a Russian armed forces soldier entered the house of a 50-year-old woman . . . [and] took [her] to a nearby empty house where he raped her until another Russian Armed Forces military unit arrived and took him away."[92] It is unclear whether this crime was interrupted because the unit was opposed to rape, which would indicate a dissonance of values within the

forces, if they were ordered to stop him, or if the soldier was needed somewhere else. Regardless, the fact that other soldiers knew where he was is notable and raises a question for further research: how many members of the forces are aware of what other soldiers are doing when sexual violence is occurring? Are high-ranking members aware of soldiers' behaviors and actively encouraging or participating in these crimes?

There are more assumptions that rape has become a part of Russian military strategy as evidence is uncovered on the ground. Pramila Patten, the Secretary-General's Special Representative, suggests that commanders must be aware of what is happening given that witnesses and victims are not being killed.[93] Since the soldiers are so brazen, she believes that commanders are tolerating and potentially even ordering these rapes.[94] The notable number of reports that document men and family members being killed with no intention to hide the body aligns with this hypothesis. Moreover, as reports have arisen that Russian soldiers are being equipped with Viagra on the battlefield, she additionally notes that "when you hear women testify [about the Viagra], it's clearly a military strategy."[95] The widespread possession of this product insinuates a clear, pre-mediated plan to rape that may involve higher levels of command. More notable reports include one by the New York Times that details a 21-year-old commander named Oleg raping a woman after killing her husband and taking her to Russian headquarters in Kyiv. A woman named Viktoriia told the CBC that a Russian soldier ordered her to put a white flag outside her house and came back later that evening with two other men and let them rape her. She believes he was a commander since that is how the two other men referred to him.[96] In reports from the Chernihiv region, 31-year-old commander Ruslan Kuliyev was found guilty of war crimes in absentia for assault on locals in November 2022.[97] These reports clearly show that commanders are not just tolerating, but encouraging and participating in violence against civilians—sexual assaults included.

Multiple units of soldiers being equipped with Viagra as well as the white flag identification suggest pre-mediated and organized intentions to rape, and the additional news that at least three commanders have already been accused of rape in Ukraine points to involvement of a high level of command in these crimes.[98] The full scope of their influence remains to be seen, and must be analyzed as more information becomes available and lists of alleged rapists are investigated. However, the strategic use of rape in the military is also suggested by Russia's past use of rape as a strategy for sexual torture; in 2017 "beatings and electrocution in the genital area, rape, threats of rape, and forced nudity were used as a method of torture . . . to punish, humiliate, or extract confessions" in Russian government facilities in Crimea.[99] Higher-ups in the chain of command would be aware of these occurrences, potentially ordering such violence in many cases. With evidence mounting in Ukraine as well as Russia's history of enacting sexual crimes on their enemies, it seems that socialized masculinity fosters violent, retributive action in the form of rape in the current conflict.

Conclusion

Reported instances of sexual violence by Russian forces in Ukraine are still under investigation, but the evidence mounting on the ground points to many different factors contributing to the systematic use of rape as a war tactic in the conflict. This war has brought to light many of the hierarchies and power dynamics existing in both Russian and Ukrainian society as well as in the Russian military, all of which may signal intent to harm through sexual violence. Societal gender norms leave both women and men vulnerable to rape strategies as war exacerbates gender roles such as masculine aggression and female submission to men. Moreover, militarized masculinity became a central tenet of Russian nationalism as a protective measure for the country, lending itself to Russia pursuing a retributive goal within Ukraine. Previous instances of sexual abuses occurring in areas of tension between Russia and Ukraine, coupled with witness accounts of terror tactics and genocidal attitudes, give tentative proof that the notion of Russian superiority—and their focus on degrading their enemy—is a driving factor for the sexual abuse in Ukraine. The Russian military has institutionalized this militarized masculinity to support hazing and violent conscription tactics that victimize its recruits, causing low morale and a predisposition to violence in soldiers who are seeking ways to reinstate their masculinity. The chain of command is also used to disseminate practices that encourage sexual violence. While the possibility of more self-affirming goals incentivizing some of these rapes remains, antagonistic national attitudes against Ukraine and the important influence of militarized masculinity within the Russian military are prevalent in the conflict and directly link to pursuits of personal and larger-scale social domination through force and degradation of the enemy.

While this case study has been limited by the lack of information and scholarship on rape occurrences in Ukraine, it is crucial to begin discussing these crimes even in the early stages of investigating the conflict. There can be no official diagnosis as to the cause of these rapes, nor can intent within the Russian Forces be proven without more systematic and tangible evidence. However, this paper has brought forth the notion that evaluating recorded history, both past and present, as well as weighing elements that contribute to war such as nationalism, militarization, and socialization are essential for developing a well-rounded foundation to begin analyzing intentions behind sexual violence in this conflict. Once the driving factors behind the weaponization of rape are better understood in Ukraine as more reliable information becomes available, the process of understanding causal factors of war-rape and the intentions behind it can be applied to other situations and inspire similar academic processes. Unless individuals and institutions of the international security community include war-rape in their list of essential topics to cover, no notable change will occur in international judicial processes. The consequences of the international community's inaction to address crimes whose effects are heavily felt once the conflict ends are detrimental to women

and vulnerable communities across the globe—their war continues even once the fighting stops.

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Interviews

Embeddedness in Liberalizing Egypt: A Conversation with Amr Adly

Interview by Stewart James

Amr Adly Biography

Dr. Amr Adly is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the American University in Cairo. He has published three major books in the fields of development studies and comparative political economy focused on the Middle East—particularly Egypt and Turkey. Among them is *Cleft Capitalism: The Social Origins of Failed Market Making in Egypt*, which won the 2021 Roger Owen Book Award.[1] *Cleft Capitalism* discusses the failure of Egypt's market liberalization reforms since 1974 to generate substantial and equitable growth, drawing expertise from economic sociology and institutional economics to explain why. The subject remains very much contemporary as Egypt moves to partially privatize 32 state companies as of February 2023.

1. *A slew of economists, from neoliberal institutionalists to dependency theorists, have tackled the question of Egyptian underdevelopment after Anwar el-Sadat's* infitāḥ.[2] *What is "cleft capitalism," and how does it challenge such approaches?*

I like to think of myself as a scholar in the tradition of institutionalism, but one that is critical to *neoclassical* institutionalism. That, I think, overstates the role of *formal* institutions—especially in areas of private property, protection, and rule of law—as the preconditions for any market-based development. What I have been trying to say here is that if we introduce a perspective of economic sociology, we might understand the broader array of *informal* and *semi-formal* institutions that could offer the kind of coordination needed for markets to emerge and to thrive.

Cleft Capitalism tries to study Egypt as a case with the aim of creating a model that might apply to other cases in the Global South, where you think of business subsystems that operate according to different rules . . . that govern their access to capital (physical capital as well as financial capital). The argument is primarily that in a country like Egypt (but so many other cases, by the way, at least in North Africa and the Arab world), [among] the rule-based private sector firms, some significant *market-making* happened. They became more oriented toward the market, we have commodification of labor . . . The issue is that the

rules governing their access to capital were or remained very much an obstacle, to the extent that you eventually ended up with what has been undermined [according to] the literature on business: the missing middle.

The missing middle is that you have some large enterprises (either state-owned or privately owned) that are concentrated mainly in energy-intensive and capital-intensive sectors, but they have no link whatsoever with the broader base of the private sector—one that is very undercapitalized and, hence, not really tempting to squeeze or exploit. My read is that this has impacted negatively the ability of an economy like that of Egypt, which has an abundance of semiskilled labor, to press its comparative advantage.

To answer your question, this was a departure from neoclassical institutionalism clearly. That school has long dominated academia but also policymaking, so I tried to engage with it. On a minor scale, I also tried to engage critically with leftist approaches—especially those in which I see some form of neo-dependency, where there's this assumption that capitalism in the periphery cannot deliver. I don't think that this is accurate.

2. *On that note, you draw influence from Gilbert Achcar, a Marxian who doesn't quite align himself with neo-dependency. He argues that the Middle East's "fettered development" results from a combination of rentierism and weak public investment, the latter owing to neoliberalism's ideational ascendancy.*[3] *Where does your model diverge from his?*

I build significantly on Gilbert Achcar's work. It was Achcar's earlier work that did not subscribe to the explanation that the problem of capitalist development in this part of the world was *cronyism*. He didn't actually pay much attention to this at all because he took it as a defining feature of capitalism and, especially, cases of capitalist transformation in the Global South. The issue is that this did not work. Instead of going into the area of crony capitalism, he went in the other direction by looking at more structural features. So the issue of rentierism is quite defining. Then he talks about the centrality of the role of the state in cases where capitalist transformation happened most successfully in the Global South. Of course, he cites China, Southeast Asia, and even South Asia as better performing than the Middle East and North Africa, Africa, and Latin America: and, in this, he has a point.

My main issue here was that this is a symptom of many problems with accumulation, the need to accumulate, that finds its way into low savings rates and low investment rates (public as well as private). The root of this requires explanation in its own right. I don't think it's just because they were subject to conditionality by international financial institutions or that they subscribed to neoliberalism and wanted the state to pull out. There was a basic inability of these states, especially in non-oil-rich countries, to contribute much to the increase of the capital stock at the national level. So this is one of the things where I engage critically with my colleagues.

Neoliberalism is not uniform. How it is shaped exactly in national and regional contexts depends on the historical trajectories that many of these

institutions (not only economic but also social and political) have taken. Neoliberalism in Egypt is not exactly neoliberalism in Syria, is not exactly neoliberalism in Morocco, even though these are all countries—with many others—that have been operating under pretty much the same system by being integrated into global capitalism. Yet there are so many different trajectories that deviate from a uniform power presented by neoliberalism: either in the guise of conditionality or in the guise of debt or the guise of ideological hegemony. So this is one of the issues where I disagree; this is not a problem with Achcar, by the way, but with people more to his left. Neoliberalism becomes the explanation for the lack of development in the periphery. This gets you back into some version of dependency—the idea that you have the periphery that is short in capital, and so on—which has many of its merits, but the key issue is: how did some manage to break away from that pattern while others did not? How did some manage to perform better than others?

3. *Yet you are also challenging the varieties-of-capitalism approach in its "methodological nationalism."*[4] *Cleft* Capitalism *identifies three "business subsystems" at play within post-Nasserite Egypt:* baladi*, dandy, and crony capitalisms.*[5] *Now, this schema builds upon your expertise as an economic sociologist. On what grounds do you differentiate these three?*

The varieties-of-capitalism literature is extremely useful, and the whole idea of trying to understand how things are done is traced back to what Hall and Soskice started over twenty years ago, definitely. I like to see my contribution as an attempt to adapt and qualify the varieties-of capitalism approach in the context of the Global South. The original guys never claimed to represent anything other than the more developed and capitalist "market democracies."

But if we assume that a country like Egypt has all of the market actors, integrated according to the same rules or modes of governance . . . that would be lacking, simple as this. It's not really clear whether those actors would even belong to the same market, which is extremely *segmented*, and part of this segmentation is institutional. You have firm size or access to capital as consequences of the institutional rules that evolved as of *infitāḥ*: that's basically my argument.

So the idea of breaking down by firm groups or firm populations into subsystems is a departure from methodological nationalism. We are not in the business of trying to identify an Egyptian variety of capitalism or an Arab variety of capitalism because that would be very futile; it would ignore the segmentation you have within these national markets themselves. This is already captured in the literature on formality and informality. What I tried to do is to capture this in an institutionalist way and, hence, talk about these three subsystems defined by rules concerning

1. ownership and control
2. access to different inputs and market outlets
3. relations to the state

These are the three criteria that allow us to talk about three different subsystems in Egypt. And crony capitalism is not dismissed at all; I am not downplaying its existence but saying that it does not tell us much about the outcome. There is something that is institutional and that goes beyond a rather idealist perception of the market.

4. *Would it be fair to assess that Egypt's "cleft," as it figures in the book's title, is one between* baladi *and dandy enterprises?*

The cleft comes in two senses. One of them is institutional—exactly, the idea that we have different populations subject to different governance rules, especially when it comes to accessing inputs or market outlets. There is another sense which results from the perpetuation of that institutional segmentation: the missing middle. Egypt is cleft horizontally where you have the broad base of the private sector operating according to rules that don't allow it to grow beyond an extremely small size—usually subsistence level.

5. *Let's discuss two of those "different governance rules" at the root of this institutional cleft. Why is it that bank-based financing and desert lands, two of Egypt's richest and most important capital markets, have historically excluded small-scale enterprises (SSEs)?*

The puzzle in the book was that Egypt has a fairly well developed banking system compared to many of the other low-middle-income countries, yet access to financial capital is very restrictive. With land—desert land, specifically, for non-agricultural purposes—that becomes even more absurd, because the only thing that exists in abundance in Egypt is desert land. I mean, it's everywhere, yet it is scarce. So what I am saying here is that institutions are everything when it comes to this. These are institutions not in the tradition of rational choice institutions but that evolved historically, according to certain power dynamics. In *Cleft Capitalism* I tried to provide an institutional history of both markets: land and money.

I don't think it's a problem with having preferred cronies because the state remained the biggest consumer of both forms of capital (having to do, in my view, with the sustaining of a certain social coalition that was deemed crucial for the stability of the authoritarian state in Egypt amid problems brought about by the fiscal crisis and market liberalization). So you ended up with rules that were designed for the very big [firms], and hence you got being rich in capital as a prerequisite in order to access capital. The point is that I try to show how the institutional link was made first for state actors. It was taken over later by private industry . . . and taken back by state actors as we speak.

6. *You cite examples of private, family-owned businesses throughout* Cleft Capitalism*, many of which are both dandies and cronies. Certain crony families should not be regarded merely as rent-seekers, that is, but as "*entrepreneurial *cronies." The Sawiris are one illustrative example. Could you tell me about their story?*

The Sawiris are the wealthiest family in Egypt. They are typical of what Alfred Chandler called—when he was talking about the economic history of the US—the entrepreneurial phase of capitalism . . . where you have individual entrepreneurs and their family members that own, control, and manage assets. The Sawiris family belong to that generation. They have early roots that you can trace back to the 1940s and 50s with their father (who is recently deceased) in construction. They were not that big, and then they started their way up with *infitāḥ*. The story could not be reduced to their being cronies, though their cronyism could not be denied either.

I build on a literature—economic history—where *capital accumulation is basically political*; you have an element of political arbitration which defines property rights. That's, like, *t0*. How these families ended up getting their huge amounts of capital had to do with their relations to the state, but that is not new. The accumulation of large amounts of capital is usually done, initially, by political acts. Privatization schemes in the 1990s were those that created market actors, and privatization is always corrupt, by the way. (One of the things I subscribe to is the idea of accumulation by dispossession. This is how Marx caught how capitalism emerged.)

The point here is that we have many examples of predators that used and abused power, but there are also many like the Sawiris who were cronies but were primarily market actors—producing some good or some service for exchange so that they could accumulate further for more capital.

What I also tried to show empirically is that they have always had private sources of accumulation, which sets Egypt apart from other, more stark examples of post-communist transitions in which there was no formal private sector, and hence the very creation of the private sector involved the mass transfer of state assets into private hands. This is the case in East Europe and in the post-Soviet world that created so many trajectories: some of them worked, some of them were disastrous, and some of them were extremely disastrous. This is not the case in Egypt, where you have more continuity—especially among small-scale enterprises that have been family-owned and socially embedded.

7. *To that last point, you emphasize "familiarized markets" as one site that could have witnessed greater capitalization among small-scale enterprises (SSEs) over the past forty years. Could you expound on this and the state's role in its manifestation?*

With familiarized markets, I wrote about a "market-oriented embeddedness" that, empirically, you can see out in the fieldwork. (Embeddedness, of course, is a term that was first coined by Karl Polanyi in his key contribution *The Great Transformation*.) One of the most dominant interpretations of Polanyi is that market-making required this embeddedness historically: you had the rules for value exchange and value distribution taken from the social and political spheres into an area deemed the free market, where people are allowed to be selfish. There is another interpretation; we know by the work of people like

Granovetter that *markets do not exist in a disembedded manner*. Many social and cultural practices, existing relations and networks, structures of kinship, etc. have been interfaces to markets and, hence, a mode of embedding social actors into a market setting. That, itself, remained very much informal because it developed away from the state—especially for *baladi* capitalism, the broad base of private establishments that developed these alternative sources of capital.

Here comes the role that I think the state could have played. In my view, the path that Egypt took when it comes to state-economy relations since independence did not attempt at mobilizing the large number of very small capital owners. These were excluded: they were not organized, were not part of the Nasserite coalition, and that proved a disadvantage later on because that base kept expanding in numbers as of *infitāḥ*. We were caught in a situation where the institutions that the state inherited from earlier times made it possible to deal with big actors or for the state to do stuff itself, but not really to coordinate with the broader base of the private sector. The key issue here is that this was not prioritized as an area for institution-building, either.

8. *In the book you draw comparative examples from Turkey, China, Malaysia, Taiwan, and others as models for market integration and globalization. What do you make of the labor exploitation that pervades some sectors of their economies—i.e., the sweatshop conditions among small-scale enterprises that do integrate, that successfully link industries with larger firms? How do such experiences of market making square with Egypt's development aims?*

It has to be made very clear: there is nothing necessarily good about having a more "successful" capitalist transformation because, at the end of the day, it's based on the extraction of surplus value. But you already have many other, earlier forms of exploitation that exist without that ability to compete, to accumulate, itself. I'm not saying here that the ability to exploit the broader base of the public sector is necessarily good, but it opens the way—in a very traditional Marxist sense—for what you might call the upgrading of the social conflict.

It might make people immediately better off, but we know that it's not so simple as that people materially feel better then become happier. On many occasions, they materially feel better and then need more stuff, so they become less happy. This appears to be, for instance, the case as we speak with China. The point is that we have a model that has failed in making itself sustainable, so what I am talking about here is the kind of institutional changes that could have made it more competitive and, hence, addressed its fiscal and economic viability.

Notes

1. Amr Adly, *Cleft Capitalism: The Social Origins of Failed Market Making in Egypt*, Stanford Studies in Middle Eastern and Islamic Societies and Cultures (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2020).

2. For an overview of the *infitāḥ*, see Adly, pp. 2–4.
3. "Rentierism" refers to a state in which national production depends substantially upon foreign rent, typically in exchange for that country's natural resources.
4. See Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, *Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
5. *baladi* comes from an Arabic word meaning "folk," or literally, "of the country."

Discussing Weaponized Migration: A Conversation with Kelly Greenhill

Interview by Hannah Cox

Kelly Greenhill Biography

Kelly M. Greenhill is a scholar of international relations and security studies. Greenhill's research focuses on foreign and defense policy; the politics of information; the use of military force; and what are frequently called "new security challenges," including civil wars and insurgencies, the strategic use of migration as an instrument of statecraft, and international crime as a challenge to domestic governance. She holds a Ph.D. and an S.M. from M.I.T., a C.S.S. from Harvard University, and a B.A. from the University of California at Berkeley. Greenhill is the author of *Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement, Coercion and Foreign Policy*, winner of the 2011 International Studies Association's Best Book of the Year Award—an updated and expanded second edition of which is forthcoming; and co-author and co-editor of *Sex, Drugs and Body Counts: The Politics of Numbers in Global Crime and Conflict; The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics; and Coercion: The Power to Hurt in International Politics.* Greenhill is preparing for publication a new book, a cross-national study that explores why, when, and under what conditions, "extra-factual" sources of political information—such as rumors, conspiracy theories, myths, and propaganda—materially influence the development and conduct of states' foreign and defense policies. The book is provisionally entitled *Fear and Present Danger: Extra-factual Sources of Threat Conception and Proliferation.*

1. *Your award-winning book* Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement, Coercion, and Foreign Policy *analyzes the utilization of weaponized migration as a state-level coercive tactic. What is weaponized migration and what criteria are utilized to identify situations in which migrants are weaponized as a coercive tool?*

The term "weaponized migration" (or in more academic, less emotive language), strategic, engineered migration refers to cross-border population movements deliberately created, manipulated, or, in some instances, just threatened, to achieve political, military, or economic objectives. The coercive variant—which is just one of four distinct variants of strategically engineered migrations—are those in which migrations are threatened or initiated in order to induce political, military, and/or economic concessions from a target state or states. In some instances, states may also promise *not* to induce an

outflow—and keep a population in place—in exchange for political, military, or economic concessions.

In order for me to code a population movement as a case of coercive engineered migration (CEM), three questions must be answered in the affirmative: (1) First, was the (threatened) outflow (largely) controlled by the principals? If yes, second, was it strategic? And, if yes, then third, was it coercive?

Put another way, I deem a case to be a bona fide coercive attempt, and include it in my CEM database if and only if there is evidence of:

1. orchestration and/or overt control over the size, timing, and destination of a real or imminently threatened population movement;
2. strategic motivation; and
3. perception of coercive intent by the target. These are strict criteria and, to be clear, many real and threatened internal and international migrations do not meet them.

2. *The theme of this year's journal is "Old Questions, New Solutions" and it is clear that weaponized migration is not a new problem, as you identify over 50 instances of coercive engineered migration in your book. How have state and non-state actors historically utilized migrants as weapons and are we seeing the same tactics today?*

Per my previous answer, there are multiple ways in which actors may weaponize migration. In addition to the aforementioned coercive variant, there are three other kinds of strategically engineered migration, distinguishable by the objectives for which they are undertaken. In addition to CEM, the other three variants are as follows:

> *Dispossessive engineered migrations* are those in which governments and/or non-state actors displace a group or groups to acquire the territory or property of those displaced or to eliminate them as a threat to its own ethnopolitical or economic dominance. This class of events includes what is commonly known as ethnic cleansing.
>
> In contrast, *exportive engineered migrations* are those migrations engineered either to fortify a domestic political position—by expelling political dissidents and other domestic adversaries—or to discomfit, humiliate or (in extremis) destabilize foreign government(s).
>
> *Finally, militarized engineered migrations* are those engineered in the midst of armed conflict to gain military advantage against an adversary. This could happen by using population movements to disrupt or destroy an opponent's command and control, logistics, or movement capabilities and/or by dragooning the displaced into military service and/or seizing their resources for use in the war effort.
>
> With regard to objectives sought by the dozens of coercers identified in *Weapons of Mass Migration*, as is true of traditional military coercion, coercers' goals have varied dramatically across space and time. On one end of the spectrum, some coercers have sought straightforward simple

and straightforward financial payoffs in the form of money or in-kind aid, while on the other end of the spectrum, others have sought full-scale military intervention and regime change, and everything in between.

The forthcoming second edition of the book identifies another four dozen or so cases of CEM beyond those identified in the first iteration of the book. The goals of coercers in these newly identified cases are as varied and diverse as those featured in the first edition. However, there have been some noteworthy developments. In recent years, we have seen greater involvement of smugglers in some of these coercive exercises than was the case decades ago. We are also increasingly seeing suggestive signs of potential real-time transnational cooperation and coordination between potential and actual coercers.

3. *How have countries who are victims of weaponized migration historically responded to threats or exploitation of mass migration as a coercive tactic, and how have some actors capitalized on fears of migration in recent years to justify tightening borders?*

As discussed in the final chapter of *Weapons of Mass Migration,* target states faced with the threat of coercive engineered migration have several options, but none is a panacea nor guaranteed to work in all situations.

One commonly chosen option is to concede to coercers' demands. However, concession can carry the risk of recidivism. Like successful hostage takers, coercers may return to the strategy time and again, as a variety of "serial weaponizers" around the globe historically have.

Alternatively, targets can respond to threatened flows by abrogating their humanitarian commitments, closing their borders, locking their doors, buck-passing responsibility to neighbors, and/or by attempting to externalize the problem—as they have with ordinary migration flows— by partially or completely outsourcing the handling of the influx and asylum claims, But while warehousing tends to serve the needs of potential target states, it can cause significant political problems within the states doing the warehousing and inspire resistance by states that fear destabilizing consequences of influxes. Furthermore, sometimes willing warehousing countries become weaponizers themselves; thus, creating a new and expanded set of problems and vulnerabilities.

Inveigling and/or buying off others to keep migrants and asylum seekers out of sight and off-target state territory may also come at a high political and moral cost. Contravening humanitarian and legal obligations can reinforce anti-immigration sentiment domestically and further undermine human rights and normative values many targets ostensibly hold dear. Moreover, such behaviors by one state can trigger cascades of problematic copycat behavior by others.

A third policy option for target states is to take military action to change conditions on the ground in the coercing country. But wars can be costly, and their outcomes uncertain. For instance, while foreign-imposed change sometimes achieves its primary objective of removing the "problematic" incumbent

leadership, no such venture in the last three decades has gone wholly according to plan. Moreover, in every case, the military incursion cost more and generated more refugees and internally displaced people, than was expected at the outset.

A fourth option available to target states is short- or longer-term accommodation or absorption of the displaced. By embracing the displaced, targets essentially say, "do your worst, I will take them all," and in turn effectively remove the strategic leverage of the coercer(s). However, accommodation is far more easily accomplished if the refugee or migrant group in question is seen as "one of us" vs. "one of them"—however defined in a given context. Indeed, as the findings of *Weapons of Mass Migration* make clear, racial/cultural/religious identity has been far more significant than the number of migrants or refugees and/or geography in predicting coercive success or failure.

With respect to capitalizing on immigration fears, as I argued in the spring 2022 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, one thing that has become more common in recent years is what I refer to as "the weaponization of the weaponization of migration," wherein politically expedient claims that adversaries are engaged in weaponized migration are deployed and used as political cover for the adoption of illiberal and possibly illegal immigration policies and to help justify an array of policies that might otherwise generate more pushback. In effect, this means that both real and potentially unfounded claims of migration weaponization are being strategically wielded in the service of other political goals and policies. This "weaponization of weaponization" is quite interesting as a political phenomenon, albeit not in a positive way.

4. *Fake news is hardly a novel phenomenon, but it has been a popular topic of conversation in the news recently, with fears mounting that misinformation is an imminent threat to democracy. In what ways has fake news been persistent in society and how has the dissemination of misinformation evolved in recent years?*

Before answering your excellent question, I would note that I am not a fan of the term "fake news," which while in widespread use for some time, is not to my mind especially analytically useful. Misinformation and disinformation are better terms and thankfully have been more commonly employed of late. However, in my own work, I often use a broader blanket term, namely, extra-factual information (or EFI), which encompasses not only both mis- and disinformation but also other kinds of unverified and unverifiable information. I define EFI as "information that is unverified (or unverifiable using secure standards of evidence) at the time of transmission, but which nevertheless may serve as an actionable, and emotion-activating source of knowledge about the world both for those who believe it to be true and for those who exploit the fact that others believe it to be true." Common sources of EFI include but are not limited to rumors, conspiracy theories, myths, propaganda, and some forms of entertainment media.

I favor EFI over alternative terms for several reasons, but two are particularly worthy of note. First, different types of unverified information are often

employed (or deployed) in tandem as instruments of persuasion, and their concomitant use often increases their efficacy because of a variety of cognitive and psychological biases that come into play when individuals are repeatedly exposed to the same information and exposed to it from different sources. Second, our brains don't process different kinds of EFI differently, so understanding how they are interconnected is not only analytically profitable but also more reflective of the scope of the informational issues we face.

As to your question about what is special about "now," as I detail in my next book, the strategic use and misuse of EFI is not remotely new, nor is individual vulnerability to it. While technology has changed in important ways in recent years, the way our brains process information has not. Thus, contrary to the claims of some, at heart, what we're facing is not a technology problem; rather, it is a ubiquitous and omnipresent human cognitive and psychological problem, which ebbs and flows in terms of its significance in political affairs based on the prevailing level of anxiety, uncertainty, and distrust in key segments of society.

What is new and different now is that, in many parts of the globe, we're currently facing an (arguably unprecedented) perfect storm and the confluence of a diverse array of uncertainty- and anxiety-inducing phenomena. These include the following: 1) historically low levels of trust in governmental institutions; plus 2) historically low levels of support for democracy, while authoritarianism is on the march; added to 3) growing economic inequality and fragility of employment; fed by 4) a technological seismic shift, in terms not only of the internet and social media—which unseated many traditional communications gatekeepers and opened myriad new channels—but also of AI, automatization, and robotics; and coupled with 5) an international security situation that is in flux, with the reemergence of great power rivalry and interstate war; not unrelatedly to 6) nearly 100 million people involuntarily displaced from their homes and on the move due to security, political, economic and environmental drivers and disruptions; and 7) a strikingly large number of public figures willing to unapologetically and unabashedly deploy EFI to play on peoples' fears, uncertainty, and anxiety to activate fear and other emotions to further the public figures' own agendas. Taken together, these seven factors make the situation today unusual and dangerous, albeit perhaps not unique. (For students of history, while the details were different, the 1930s featured most, if not all, of these characteristics.)

What these seven disparate factors share in common and why they are collectively so problematic is that each helps fuel and exacerbate the uncertainty, anxiety, and, in some cases, fear I previously noted. And it is in times of upheaval, uncertainty, and flux that EFI can be, for better and for worse, particularly influential. Rumors, like other forms of EFI, can help fill holes in people's knowledge and provides explanations for events and developments that are hard to understand and sometimes even seemingly inexplicable. On the upside, EFI can provide psychic relief for anxiety, even when individuals are unconscious of their discomfort. On the downside, EFI can be—and often

is—strategically deployed and manipulated in order to create scapegoats and others who can be blamed for these self-same inexplicable and unsettling developments. Added to all of this is the fact that sometimes EFI can feel more true—or "truthy"—and may in fact be more desirable and psychologically preferable to verifiable facts. When public figures then seek to "sell" the truthy over the truth, as is all too common today, the aforementioned perfect storm can become a full-scale hurricane.

5. *What strategies and solutions are the most useful for combatting misinformation today and how might today's solutions resemble or differ from strategies that have historically been employed?*

As I expect may come as no surprise given the nature of my previous answer, there are no silver bullet solutions to the problems we face. Although if we don't solve the institutional trust problem, all other tools in the toolbox become even harder to successfully deploy. Indeed, I've found in my research that three factors affect the likelihood that individuals will view a particular piece of security-related EFI as true or plausibly true, irrespective of their income, education, age, sex, gender, nationality, or other commonly hypothesized variables. These three factors are: 1) an individual's level of (dis)trust; 2) an individual's level threat perception tied to the EFI on offer; and 3) (apropos of my earlier answer about the importance of repetition), whether an individual has been exposed to the EFI previously.

Nevertheless, there are some tactics and tools that can be used and that can work some of the time, today as in the past. These include but are not limited to the following responses, all of which I have shared elsewhere, and which are explicated, with an accounting of their advantages and disadvantages, in *Fear and Present Danger*. One option is to try to "engage and defang," a term I use to describe the process of active engagement with those who believe EFI is deemed to be "problematic." In such circumstances, it is worth asking EFI adopters: a) why they believe what they believe?; 2) *what* kinds of evidence (if any) would change their minds?; and 3) *where* their beliefs came from? As it is by now broadly understood that the very act of listening/engaging—in that people feel respected and taken seriously—can itself have salutary effects, such engagement can be fruitful on a number of levels. At the same time, of course, if mishandled, engagement can also go horribly off the rails and lead to hardening of positions and bolstering of belief in mis and dis-information and other forms of EFI.

A second option, if one that is not always available, is the strategic use of "killer facts." Killer facts are facts that on their own can "kill" EFI, such as a false claim that someone is dead can be "killed" by evidence of their being alive. Likewise, claims that actors are engaged in a certain behavior at a particular place and time can be "killed" by verifiable evidence that they are not/were not there. Although to be sure, as "deep-fake" technology gets better, it may become harder to persuasively kill fake facts with real ones.

A third option is the use of "counter-narratives," which are narratives that provide an alternative (positive) set of fact-based explanations to the prevailing

(or dominant) EFI-inflected narrative. They can also highlight holes in the prevailing narrative. Put another way, counter-narratives are important because it is rarely enough to say the other side is misinformed. It is also rarely enough to simply say, "here are the facts you've been missing." Instead, to compete, one needs a complete (and better) story to fight the emotion-activating story that is already out there. And these counter-narratives need to be repeated, repeated, repeated in lots of different venues. Finally, because it is easier to get individuals to change their behavior than it is to get them to change their minds, concrete steps—such as laws, regulations, sanctions, as well as an array of positive inducements—can also be employed to drive behavior change first, with persuasion coming later—as happened with attitudes towards smoking as well as drinking and driving, for instance.

Editorials

An Ottoman Past, a Neo-Ottoman Future: The Challenges of Nationalism and Secularism in Turkey

Turan Tashkin

A century after Turkish independence and the establishment of the current status quo, Turkey continues to unravel the tension between its Ottoman and Kemalist legacies. Since the 1980s, Turks have considerably challenged the state's foundation due to the growing consensus that Turkey has yet to complete its political transformation. The consequential leaders of this period, from Ataturk to Özal and Erdoğan, have offered varying visions in response to the problems of modernity, though these reforms have not been enough to ease the collective grievances from all aspects of society. However, these challenges are necessary to deliberate what Turkey's political philosophy and values should be and to realize its identity and role in the region.

In the aftermath of the First World War and the Ottoman Empire's defeat, the victorious Allies, namely Great Britain, France, Greece, and Italy, planned to partition the Turkish heartland in Anatolia.[1] This agreement called the Treaty of Sèvres, would only leave a rump state in northern Asia Minor and Istanbul under Turkish control. However, this was prevented by the initiative of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, later called Ataturk, and the national resistance movement as they reunited Anatolia under a new Turkish government and established Turkey's modern borders by 1922.[2] The legitimacy and popularity Ataturk gained from his victory permitted him to design a new Turkish state in his vision and implement transformative reforms known as Kemalism, aiming to westernize Turkey while renouncing its Ottoman legacy. One of Kemalism's core tenets was isolationism, caused by a societal fear of Europeans and Turkey's neighbors. From the Turkish perspective, Europe desired to divide them through the failed Treaty of Sèvres, and Arabs and Armenians abandoned them during World War One, causing many Turks to feel as though the world was against them. Ataturk appealed to these sentiments by focusing his reforms on domestic modernization and distancing Turkey from the international community, adopting his "zero problems" foreign policy which aimed to maintain cordial relations with its neighbors.

Kemalism is summarized by its "six arrows": republicanism, secularism, nationalism, populism, statism, and revolutionism, all based on European

works.[3] Ataturk adopted these Western ideologies at the expense of Turkey's Islamic heritage, evident when he abolished the caliphate in 1924 and secularized the state and public life, and he abandoned the Ottoman Empire's multiculturalism by enforcing Turkish nationalist policies, such as banning the teaching and the public use of Kurdish.[4] After Turkey's first democratic transition in 1950, Kemalism clearly remained ingrained in Turkish political culture, as successive governments continued the precedents set by Ataturk. However, a new debate emerged in the 1980s to challenge the Kemalist status quo, often called neo-Ottomanism.

Neo-Ottomanism is the selective use of various aspects of the Ottoman Empire in the modern context and often contradicts Kemalist values such as secularism and nationalism and at the center of neo-Ottomanism is nostalgia for the Ottoman Empire. According to Lutfi Doğan, the former head of the Directorate of Religious Affairs, "the entire post-Ottoman system of secularism, nationalism, and nation-state . . . is an imposition by European powers. [Turks] never had the chance to heal [their] polity and [their] historic wounds, and mourn for the world that [they] lost."[5] Ataturk's reforms outpaced Turkish society's ability to address the trauma caused by a decade of war and population shifts since conservatives, nationalists, liberals, and social democrats all reminisce at the loss of their Ottoman heritage. With neo-Ottomanism, many Turks look to history to address the problems of modernity in the domestic space which has had great foreign implications. It is worth discussing the three foreign concepts Doğan identified—secularism, nationalism, and the nation-state—because they represent the transformation Turkey made in the 20th century and why Kemalism has become insufficient to address Turkey's problems today, especially the "Kurdish question."

Ataturk's reforms focused on creating a homogenous, secular nation similar to those found in Europe and he did so by denying any non-Turkish group their culture and language rights, including Kurds.[6] From the Kemalist perspective, any group could become a Turk if they accepted the Turkish language and culture, and they were expected to. In the early years of the Turkish republic, millions of Muslim refugees from the Balkans and the Caucasus arrived in Anatolia due to population exchanges and displacements, most of whom assimilated because their communities lacked coordination.[7] This contrasts with the experience of the Kurdish population, as they were not refugees and they had developed institutions separate from the central government during the Ottoman era. Therefore, Kurds organized against the state's policies because they believed the Islamic and Ottoman social contracts had been broken after the state discarded the cosmopolitanism and the religious aspect of the empire, which was more tolerant of differences than the new nation-state.

The first to experiment with a return to traditional forms of identities was Turgut Özal in the 1980s, who rose to prominence as the architect of Turkey's liberal economic policies.[8] He eventually formed the Anavatan Party, which won a majority in the assembly in 1983 and the presidency in 1989. Domestically, the 1980s and 1990s were characterized by the politicization of identity,

as Turkish and Kurdish nationalists and Islamists demanded greater freedoms of expression.[9] Internationally, the end of the Cold War resulted in the independence of the Balkans and the Caucasus and the recession of the Russian threat, which tested the Kemalist status quo since the new opportunities to expand Turkish influence tempted many.

To resolve these societal and political struggles, Özal drew from the Ottoman Empire's multiculturalism and openness. The neo-Ottoman policies Özal implemented were not only out of pragmatism but also rooted in his beliefs; he, like many other Turks, never fully accepted the secularist republic which distanced itself from Islam and its Ottoman past.[10] In this aspect, his public statements and actions broke drastically from Kemalism: Özal was the first sitting Turkish president to go to Hajj, the pilgrimage to Mecca that is required of all Muslims, and advocate for greater territorial autonomy and cultural rights for Kurds.[11] Yet, he committed to the secularist and westernizing vision of Kemalists, evident when Turkey applied for European Union membership in 1987, a step he saw as crucial for Turkey's Westernization and liberalization.[12] In other words, his goals were to move past the Kemalist era into a liberal, cosmopolitan society with neoliberal economic practices. Özal reconciled Turkey's Ottoman identity in a way Kemalism was unwilling to: as one that was Islamic in heart and European in mind, emphasizing Turkey as a bridge between these societies.[13]

Özal adjusted his foreign policy in reaction to the new realities as well. The new emphasis on Turkey's Islamic characteristics brought newfound attention to the Balkan and Caucasusian Muslims and they could now pursue closer relations on Ottoman terms. Some in Özal's administration even began to articulate a broader, non-ethnic definition of the Turkish identity, in which Bosnians and Azerbaijanis were Turks based on their common Ottoman heritage.[14] Economic considerations were more prominent in relations with the Arab world, though Turkey's relationship with the Middle East improved because Özal advocated for Turks and Arabs to mend ties after 70 years of disengagement. Turkey's close connections with Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Azerbaijan increased the economic cooperation between Turkey and its neighbors, in turn carving a new cosmopolitan foreign policy based on economics. However, there was an expansionist undertone in Özal's policies. He, for example, desired to invade northern Iraq during the Gulf War and expand Turkey's influence on Iranian Azeris, but the Kemalist establishment and the army did not permit him to pursue these foreign ventures.[15]

Özal's conception of neo-Ottomanism as a pluralistic society contrasts with the neo-Ottomanism under Erdoğan, which has changed drastically throughout the reign of Erdoğan's Ak Party. Erdoğan, like Özal, has been pragmatic yet idealistic from the beginning of his career. The Ak Party won the 2002 elections in a landslide by presenting itself as an economically liberal, pro-Western party advocating for conservative values, similar to Özal's Anavatan Party.[16] During his time as Istanbul's mayor, Erdoğan became famous for the Islamist rhetoric that he pushed, which worried the Kemalists because

of the threat it posed to the secularism of the state.[17] However, they were not completely opposed to him because he implemented many reforms in hope of joining the European Union during his term as prime minister, though one of the motivations for these reforms was to use them to weaken the Kemalist establishment.[18] The first decade of the Ak Party was similar to Özal's tenure in many aspects, for example, he granted greater rights to Kurds, though gradually Erdoğan would begin implementing policies solely to maintain power, evident from the descent of Turkey's democracy rating from Freedom House since 2002.

Neo-Ottomanism in Erdoğan's first decade was influenced by the architect of his foreign policy, Ahmet Davutoğlu, who was active in the Ak Party from 2002 to 2016. Davutoğlu envisioned a Turkey that would lead the Muslims of the Middle East, Europe, and the Caucasus, who would be followers of Turkey, not its equal, which emphasized Turkey as the head of the Islamic world. Though Davutoğlu did not like the use of neo-Ottomanism for his policies (since his views are pan-Islamist), he provides a transition between Özal's cosmopolitan conception and Erdoğan's, which is defined by anti-Western and nationalist ideologies.[19] Davutoğlu's Islamist vision with Turkish nationalist undertones evolved into Erdoğan's Turkish-Islamic nationalism. The multiculturalism present under Özal has diminished considerably with each following iteration.

The neo-Ottomanism of the 2000s was defined by the worsening of Turkish-Western relations. After the US invasion of Iraq, Erdoğan criticized the close relationship between Iraqi Kurds and Americans and the independent Kurdistan that has formed in Iraq since. Additionally, after it became apparent Germany and France were stalling European Union ascension talks, Turks realized Europeans did not see Turkey as a part of the same cultural and geographical space as they did.[20] Though Turkey maintains close relations with the Balkan Muslim states, Erdoğan's animosity towards the West continues as they have become more critical of his government.

Meanwhile, Turkish involvement in the Middle East characterized neo-Ottomanism in the 2010s. Though Turkey initially enjoyed popularity during the Arab Spring protests as the sole Muslim democracy in the Middle East, its aftermath damaged Turkey's foreign relations greatly. Before the Arab Spring in 2011, Erdoğan enjoyed a close relationship with Syrian president Bashir al-Assad, as they had come to an understanding to give Turkey privileged economic access to Syrian markets while it provided the pariah Syrian state greater international connections.[21] The Syrian uprising caused irreparable damage to this partnership, however, as Assad's unwillingness to concede to the Syrian protesters resulted in Erdoğan's support for the people. This has now led to a disastrous Turkish military intervention in northern Syria to combat the Kurdish militias that filled the power vacuum and Assad has now aligned with Russia and Iran.[22]

While many in the Arab world desire a closer economic relationship with Turkey, especially in Iraq and Palestine,[23] Erdoğan's cultural and political

neo-Ottomanism does not hold the weight it had under Özal. Since the 2013 Gezin Park protests, Erdoğan has cracked down on all opposition, beginning the Ak Party's transition to a police state rife with exclusionary Turkish-Islamic nationalism.[24] The failed 2016 coup attempt led to further crackdowns as Erdoğan suspended the constitution and consolidated his power, turning Turkey into an autocratic state.[25] The cosmopolitanism of Turkish domestic and foreign policy is all but over, as Erdoğan continues to repeal the rights of Kurds. Furthermore, Turkey's endeavors in Syria and Libya resemble a Turkish empire rather than that of the Ottomans. Turkish democracy was viewed as a model for an Islamic democracy during the Arab Spring, though the Ak Party's government now resembles those of other Arab states—autocratic and anti-democratic.

However, neo-Ottomanist ideology does not have to end with Erdoğan's definition. There is clear discontent with the Kemalist foundation of Turkey, among Kurds and Turks alike. Özal presented an interpretation that reconciled Turkish society's nostalgia by embracing Islam and Turkey's diversity, backed by economic modernization and societal liberalization. A new iteration of neo-Ottomanism can revive and modify Özalian ideologies by promoting tolerance and cooperation domestically and regionwide. The failure of the nation-state model in the former-Ottoman space is apparent. Bosnia, Lebanon, and Iraq have teetered on the edge of becoming failed states since their independence, partially due to their failure to implement a fair system of governance that accommodates their diversity. Through cooperation, the region can transition from the ethnonationalism of the 20th century to a more equitable system, perhaps a federation or a supranational union akin to the European Union. A multicultural nation or organization may be difficult to imagine, and even more difficult to realize, but Iran presents an alternative to the nation-state model. Iran has stronger internal unity than the other multi-ethnic states in the region because it maintained the traditional Middle Eastern idea of unity, formed around their shared Iranian history and Shia identity.

Concentrating on spreading tolerance like Özal had could form a new conception of what a modern Middle Eastern state should be. Rather than focusing on the ethnic and sectarian differences as Kemalists and other nationalists do, neo-Ottoman attitudes of the Özal era may provide the paradigm shift that is necessary for Turkey and its neighbors. The exclusionary policies of Ataturk and Erdoğan only sow greater divisions as Anatolia continues to diversify with refugees from the Middle East and beyond. Though Erdoğan's neo-Ottomanism is now considered a tool for imperialism, it is important to remember the origin of the definition, as it may provide what Turkey needs to succeed in the 21st century.

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Venezuelan Refugee Crisis

Hannah Cox

Since oil was discovered in Venezuela in the 1920s, decades of government mismanagement and corruption led to economic catastrophe beginning in 2014 marked by hyperinflation, soaring debt, and a plummeting GDP. President Nicolas Maduro has thrown basic tenets of democracy out of the window, leading to a humanitarian crisis leaving 3 in 4 Venezuelans below the poverty line in 2021 and shortages of basic goods like medical supplies and clean drinking water. As a result, over 7 million Venezuelans have fled the country culminating in one of the largest external displacement crises in the world today. Fleeing economic and political volatility at home, the majority of Venezuelans arrive in neighboring Latin American countries often destitute, without documentation, and with few resources for survival. Moreover, host communities tend to be overstretched, often lacking the financial capability to meet the refugees' needs for basic human needs, social services, and protection from discrimination, exploitation, and other dangers facing asylum seekers.

Colombia has received the majority of migrants, who now make up about 5% of Colombia's population. Chile, Ecuador, Argentina, Brazil and Peru also received sizable amounts of migrants. Smaller countries like Aruba and Curacao have stepped up for their part, welcoming Venezuelan migrants who now make up nearly 9–15% of their respective populations. Many countries opened their doors to their Venezuelan neighbors when the crisis reached a crescendo before the COVID-19 pandemic and have continued open border policies after a period of decreased migration during the pandemic as the crisis becomes more manageable. Colombia, for instance, offered 10-year visas to Venezuelan migrants in 2021 and now hosts approximately 2.45 million people, the largest number of Venezuelan migrants hosted by an individual country.[1]

Each country, however, offers varying levels of support to the influx of migrants despite various attempts to unify Latin American support for Venezuelans. The Quito Process, for example, aims to promote communication and coordination between host countries and the UNHCR has released various calls for a unified response. Nevertheless, as refugee applicants surge, neighboring countries are increasingly tightening restrictions due to fears that the continuation of liberal border policies will attract more refugees. Deterrence theory, as it is referred to, posits that if irregular migration (migration that is not explicitly sanctioned by the receiving country) is not deterred, increasing amounts of refugees will follow suit and overwhelm host countries.[2] Countries like Ecuador, which has some of the most progressive human rights and asylum laws on paper, have imposed politically motivated policies such as requiring passports and performing criminal background checks in response to growing

xenophobia that erect barriers to access to regular refugee status. These requirements slow the process at best and completely prevent migration at worst due to the logistical and financial complexities of obtaining a passport in Venezuela as a result of bureaucratic disarray and extensive wait times.

However, tightening borders in response to an influx of Venezuelan migrants may not prove as fruitful an endeavor as predicted. Increasingly restricting lawful means of migration could lead to a sustained market for licit border crossings, forged documents, and visa overstays that culminate in high human and financial costs for host countries.[3] Not only is it costly to maintain a strict immigration apparatus, but the dangerous border crossing alternatives that migrants resort to increase feelings of xenophobia within host societies. As a result, citizens push for stricter border controls, reinforcing this vicious cycle of tighter, more dangerous borders that will only become more volatile as migrant populations increase as we head into 2024.

This cycle of xenophobic sentiments that lead to tighter border policies is compounded by a lack of technical capacity amongst host countries. Despite aid from humanitarian agencies like the UNHCR and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in tandem with host governments, NGO's, and volunteer organizations, responses from Latin American countries have varied widely. The main host countries, including Columbia, Ecuador, and Peru, have little or no experience hosting migrants, have domestic corruption and volatile welfare systems, and lack the technical capacity to apply many of the humanitarian, open arm immigration policies they held close to at the outset of the crisis. Because countries utilize a range of policies, some countries become overwhelmed with unmanageable surges of migrants in their attempts to maintain open border policies while others do not partake in their share of aid efforts. However, there is a promising and up til now underutilized tool that could help unify regional aid efforts for Venezuelan refugees in Latin America in the long term: The Cartagena Declaration of 1984.

The nonbinding declaration was signed by 10 Latin American countries and defines refugees collectively based on their country of origin as opposed to on a case by case basis. The document defines refugees as "persons who have fled their country because their lives, security or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order."[4] Regardless, there has been no regional, comprehensive application of the doctrine to Venezuelan refugees despite the potential for long term, indefinite protection for refugees that guarantees access to basic social benefits.

Despite successful application of the doctrine in Mexico and Brazil, countries are reluctant to apply the doctrine to Venezuelan migrants and have instead opted for various migratory regulation measures. The UNHCR has recommended that countries in the region coordinate a unified and systematic application of the doctrine so as to disperse migrants at manageable levels instead of offering refugee status on a case by case basis or based on

criteria that require hard to meet demands like background checks. Many countries in Latin America have expressed solidarity and a willingness to help their neighbors, however the logistical burden of millions of migrants integrating into new countries is a seismic challenge for a country to overcome on its own. As such, increased regional coordination in Latin America would reduce tensions of xenophobia, illfunded integration programs, and overburdened host communities by dispersing the burden more appropriately across host communities depending on factors such as capacity, funding, and integration capabilities. What's more, increased international support is required from countries like the United States who publish rhetoric about their solidarity with Venezuelan migrants and host communities alike, yet have not contributed their share of aid considering the 15 years of sanctions imposed upon Venezuela regardless of the projected humanitarian impact of broad US sanctions.

Moreover, hosting Venezuelan migrants has the potential to be economically fruitful for host countries in the long run if migrants are integrated into their host countries' societies and given access to job markets, healthcare and education. In Columbia, for example, the government spends about $600 for each immigrant it hosts, but if integrated and given proper rights as refugees, this influx of migrants has the potential to raise Colombia's GDP by 4.5 percent by 2030 according to the International Monetary Fund. Moreover, the cost of hosting each migrant would decrease over time as more migrants join the labor force, in turn broadening the tax base and stimulating economic activity.[5] As such, if host countries bear the initial economic burden of integrating migrants at the outset aided by humanitarian support and regional collaboration, not only will they uphold their moral obligation but they will benefit from an increased workforce.

The Venezuelan refugee crisis requires coordination between Latin American host countries, humanitarian aid organizations, and funding sources from the Global North in order to manage the crisis. The Cartagena Doctrine provides the framework for protecting Venezuelans under a broad definition of Refugees that, if uniformly applied across Latin America, would strengthen refugee protection in the region and maintain the spirit of Cartagena in the face of one of the world's largest external displacement crises.

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A City Unrecognizable: Reflecting Halfway through Hong Kong's Handover Period

Chasya Cohen

Twenty-five years ago, Hong Kong was promised 50 years of a "high degree of autonomy" as set forth in Article 2 of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR).[1] It was granted "special" status under the policy of "one country, two systems," meaning Hong Kong would be a part of China but retain its own culture and way of life through its laws.[2] Hong Kong culture is unique because it is influenced by British globalism, politics, and religion, but rooted in Chinese traditionalism and ideology. International businesses have also found a home in Hong Kong's prospering economy and brought with them their respective cultures to add to the city's amalgam.[3] Diversity blended with a common love of Hong Kong, and so the city thrived in its "two system" state.

But everything began to change at the turn of the 21st century. In 2003, Hong Kong faced the deadly effects of the SARS pandemic largely resulting from China's attempts to keep the virus confidential. Then followed the 2014 Umbrella Movement in response to Beijing's reforms to Hong Kong's electoral system. Later, the 2019 Extradition Bill amendment sparked raging protests before eventually being silenced by the withdrawal of the amendment and by repressive COVID-19 measures in early 2020. Just six months later, Beijing implemented the sweeping National Security Law which overruled the existing one-country, two-systems arrangement. Now, after just the first half of Hong Kong's handover period, China has already reneged on its promises of autonomy. With every hardship Hong Kong has faced, China has taken the opportunity to tighten its reins on the city's freedom and autonomy using the rule of law. The last twenty-five years in Hong Kong should be a lesson of how modern China can and will exert its power on any society that diverges from its regime.

In February 2003, SARS silently crept into the bustling streets of Hong Kong. It started when a medical professional from Guangdong brought his illness to Hong Kong and unknowingly infected dozens of others who spread the virus around the whole city.[4] Hong Kong residents panicked amongst mass sickness and death from the epidemic while officials tried to mitigate the crisis. SARS' deadly effect was largely due to a delay in communication from mainland China about the virus.[5] SARS came to China in November 2002 but information about the virus was deemed "top secret" by Beijing, so

they initially withheld this information from the general public and thus from Hong Kong.[6] Disillusioned, Hong Kong residents began to leave the city. The virus shed light on the government's lack of transparency in healthcare policy. Residents no longer trusted the government to keep them safe. Eventually, to comply with the World Health Organization, the Hong Kong government imposed strict public health measures that sacrificed certain freedoms for residents' safety.[7] The virus was alleviated but residents of the city still lived in fear of the virus; many felt unsafe and fled because of it, and there remained a general distrust in the government in times of crises.[8]

Hong Kong was able to economically and socially rebuild after SARS. This was until 2014 when the Chinese legislature ordered a mandatory pre-screening of candidates in the 2017 election for Hong Kong's Chief Executive.[9] The act signified the beginning of the Chinese government's integration of Hong Kong back into China through law. Hong Kong residents were enraged by this breach of their quasi-democratic rights afforded to them in the two-system paradigm. Tens of thousands of individuals—mostly students and young professionals—peacefully took to the streets in what started as *Occupy Central* but became the *Umbrella Movement* or *Umbrella Revolution*. They fought for election transparency and for China to respect their dwindling autonomy.[10] Protestors used umbrellas as shields from tear gas fired by the police, which quickly became a tragically iconic emblem of the movement. The *Umbrella Movement* proved to Hong Kong residents that a "high degree of autonomy" did not imply their protection and freedom from China's authoritarian rule. One of the protest signs read: "Without democracy, how can we have the rule of law?" This continues to be the biggest threat to Hong Kong's political status.[11]

This question of autonomy was revisited when the 2019 Extradition Bill amendment was introduced to Hong Kong's Legislative Council. The amendment outlined mechanisms for extraditing Hong Kong persons to mainland China, an act that was formerly illegal as Hong Kong's territory had a separate legal jurisdiction from that of the Chinese legal system.[12] Local Hong Kong citizens once again erupted into protest. The Hong Kong police responded by ruthlessly and violently suppressing the protests, attacking protestors with tear gas, rubber bullets, and pepper spray. In the name of "the rule of law," protestors were harassed, beaten, and jailed for their "civil disobedience'[13] Though the Extradition Bill amendment was formally withdrawn and never enacted, the unrest continued.[14] In the end, the protestors' power could not triumph over the police's use of brute force.

Later in January 2020, COVID-19 first surfaced in Hong Kong.[15] In a post-SARS city, residents became reluctant to protest for fear of catching the new virus. With the combined threat of COVID and the police force, Hong Kong residents became further worried about their autonomy. Hong Kong authorities took this opportunity to begin enforcing a more aggressive public health policy in line with China's authoritarianism: the *zero-COVID Policy*. Within Hong Kong, masks were mandatory, public groups were fined, and

close contacts were sent to government quarantine centers. The government imposed a mandatory 21-day isolated hotel quarantine for those trying to enter the city. The conditions of isolated quarantine also had severe mental repercussions on Hong Kongers: in only 24 hours, four suicide attempts were recorded in the government quarantine center.[16] Hong Kong saw a mass exodus of people and businesses escaping the city's strict laws.[17] Those with the privilege seized the opportunity to seek refuge in another country, but those without were forced to make peace with staying in a changed Hong Kong.

Just 6 months after COVID-19 hit Hong Kong, the National Security Law (NSL) was imposed by Beijing. The law was listed under Annex III of the Basic Law, which meant it bypassed Hong Kong approval. Essentially, it established four new acts that were considered a breach of national security: secession, subversion, terrorism, and foreign collusion.[18] The NSL effectively represented an early end of the 50-year handover "period'—almost 30 years early. Moreover, the law was China's official response to pro-democracy protests: strong protests were met with an even stronger legal counter. The NSL codified a loss of freedom which immediately shifted the atmosphere in the city. Local Hong Kong citizens erupted into protest, once again. The Hong Kong police, joined by the CCP's People's Liberation Army, ruthlessly and violently upheld the security law's clauses. There were 183 arrests and 113 charges under the National Security Law from July 2020 to March 2022,[19] and many more arrests under other colonial laws like sedition. Many of those arrested were denied bail and have remained incarcerated without trial for periods upwards of 10–20 years.

One of the most notable arrests was that of billionaire and founder of pro-democracy news outlet *Apple Daily*, Jimmy Lai. Lai's arrest signified not only a crackdown on anyone who advocates for their rights but a more encompassing crackdown on any medium on which these rights are advocated, like *Apple Daily*.[20] Ultimately, the law was a strategically crafted move by the Chinese government to reflect their own security policy and execute Hong Kong's integration back into China. Unfortunately, in this respect it has been successful; China's lawfare has suppressed the once-prosperous city of Hong Kong.[21]

The first half of the handover period did not just drastically change Hong Kong but also had significant implications for China's use of power in Taiwan. Mark Clifford, the President of the *Committee for Freedom of Hong Kong* believes that "what happened in Hong Kong shows China's blueprint for dealing with free societies." Unlike China's other exertions of power in Xinjiang and the South China Sea, China "destroyed a civil society through lawfare, and the result was chilling" in Hong Kong. In relation to Taiwan, this means that China "will invade if they feel that it is necessary, but they will use this more gentle version of totalitarianism" as a way to gain control through law force. China aims to control Hong Kong by any means necessary, and China "will never release [this] control." When asked what there is to be done to prevent China's possible invasion of Taiwan, Clifford responds with: "we [the US] need to make it clearer that we are in alliance with Taiwan, we need to ensure that

deterrence works this time." Because if not deterred, China's lawfare can overcome Taiwan, as it has in Hong Kong.

The once diverse and socially prospering Hong Kong is now ruled by political repression and fear. China's powerful use of lawfare has defeated Hong Kong and, if not deterred, could do the same in Taiwan as well. Law as a tool has been weaponized to increase China's hegemony and its power over Hong Kong. As the city approaches the expiry of its autonomy in 2047, the world must stand behind Hong Kong in its efforts to preserve its "special' status.

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