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# HEMISPHERES

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
"Indian Foreign Policy"  
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H E M I S P H E R E S

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The Tufts Council on International Affairs is a student organization consisting of members of the Tufts community with a disciplinary, scholarly or practical interest in international politics and economics, the structure and function of international organization, and international law. The purpose of the Council is to sponsor wide-ranging activities of interest and appeal to students concerned with the many aspects of international relations.





## Arms Control in Europe:

### A Process Towards Increased Security

John Packs

Willy Brandt's enunciation of "Ost Politik" began the movement toward "European detente" in 1969. The resulting relaxation of tensions led to negotiations on security and cooperation in Europe (CSCE) as well as on arms control. In the following essay, Tufts junior John Packs examines the current state of European Arms Control, focusing primarily on the discussion of mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR). Pack's chief concern is with the problems of European security as seen from both the Eastern and Western perspectives.

Currently, Packs, an Economics major, is studying Soviet foreign policy toward Europe and East European perspectives on European security.

The author wishes to acknowledge Professor Robert Legvold's encouragement, direction, and time, in the undertaking of this paper.

In this era of detente, East-West relations have improved significantly. Cultural exchanges, economic cooperation and a general communication of political issues have increased. Perhaps the greatest benefit of detente has been the formation of institutions to deal with arms control in today's complex nuclear world. Thus arms control, has become a major hinge of detente. Yet to pursue arms control solely to further the process of detente underscores the larger question of arms control: can it increase perceptions of security? This larger, although inter-related, focus of arms control can best be measured by investigating the primary theatre of East-West detente, Europe.

To justify the hypothesis that arms control can increase European security this analysis will explore three general areas are: 1. Psychological-political realm. 2. The Military balance and 3. Arms control negotiations. Before defining these areas, several underlying premises must be identified.

First, the majority of this analysis will present both the Eastern and Western perspectives. By identifying both sides, a truer understanding of the problems of arms control and security will be revealed. Thus the concept of European security will deal with the security of both alliances. A problem of the Nixon doctrine was its view of European security as West European security. This unidimensional framework merely underscores the failure of American foreign policy to deal with Europe as a whole structure. This is not to decrease the importance of



investigating Europe in its Eastern/Western micro elements. The failure is in the integration of the parts into the whole. This will provide an analytical framework more conducive to the investigation of the problems of arms control and European security.

Secondly, the concept of security has taken on new meanings in this era of interdependence. Economics have become high politics and thus an important focus of security. Yet, in this paper, the concern is with the more traditional sense of security. Therefore, a nation will be viewed as secure if the following conditions are met: 1. A Nation's territorial integrity is not undermined by military threat, 2. A Nation is free of undue influences on its structure and 3. The values by which that society lives are not endangered. These are the basic goals which any nation pursuing arms control must recognize and insure. Having discussed these underlying premises, the three general areas of investigation must now be more fully defined.

In the psycho-political realm we will explore the psychological and political factors which can effect arms control. What are the current perceptions of European security? What are the politico/military objectives in pursuing arms control? Is the state of intra-alliance relations conducive to arms control?

The second area will focus on the military balance. Is it currently balanced or unbalanced? What will be the effect of new technologies? Are present doctrine and deployments suited towards deterrence/defence? And if not, how must it be re-structured?

The third area will investigate arms control negotiations. What is the current state of MBFR? What strategy will best suite the Western alliance? From this strategy, what proposals should the West make? Finally, how have the proposals set forth in this analysis increased European security?

Let us turn, then, to defining current perceptions of European security. Because arms control must also recognize insecurities, these perceptions will also be identified. We must also remember that detente underlies the Eastern/Western perceptions will also be identified. We must also remember that detente underlies the Eastern/Western perceptions of security.

The security of Western Europe rests of the policy of flexible response. This doctrine is based on the premise that the West can deter/defend along a broad spectrum of aggression. The ultimate guarantor of this policy, and thus of Western security, is the American nuclear deterrent. Thus West European security is linked to American security. The addition of the linkage between West European security perception and East-West detente further strengthens the West's security perception. Yet, the West's security is also interconnected with the military balance. This linkage is where Western insecurities will be identified.

The investigation into the West's insecurity perceptions is not to evaluate the military balance, this, to be done later, but to identify Western scenarios of the Soviet military threat. These scenarios are where perceptions of Western insecurity are to be found. The first scenario is the threat of a full-scale military assault on Western Europe. This scenario has decreased in saliency, but the threat of an expansionist Soviet Union has not been disregarded. Secondly, the West fears that a small



incident either in Europe (Yugoslavia) or off the continent (possibly Africa) could escalate into full-scale war in Europe. Thirdly, the West perceives Soviet conventional superiority in the military balance. This insecurity is strengthened by the Soviet's achievement of nuclear parity with the West. Although they have discounted, although not dismissed, a full-scale Soviet attack the West perceives this conventional superiority can possibly translate into political influence. Thus, this scenario deals directly with the threat of Finlandization. Because of the increasing awareness of Finlandization, a more detailed discussion of this conception is necessary.

The concept of Finlandization is widely used, but rarely defined. Before analyzing this concept, we must first understand its meaning. Finlandization is defined as a situation where a nation's government is run by consideration of Soviet interests and adjustment to them; the existence of a Russian party in domestic politics; in foreign policy a marked neutrality tilted towards the East; and Soviet suzerainty legitimized both in the public law of Europe, and de facto by outside powers accepting Europe as a Soviet area of special interest.<sup>1</sup> It must be recognized that Finlandization can vary in degree. Some states may possess all of these characteristics while others may only be subjected to one or two of these elements. The insecurity of Finlandization is especially felt on the flanks. While Soviet military power grows, some states on the flanks (Norway, Greece, Turkey) are hesitant to commit more resources to defense. This lack of commitment was always compensated for by the American strategic deterrent. Yet today the states of Western Europe (all of whom have been hesitant to recognize a defense commitment) fear the threat of a lessened American role in European defense. This is our fourth, and last, scenario of insecurity.

The threat of a decreased U.S. role in NATO can be traced to the Mansfield Amendment. This amendment called for the reduction of 165,000 U.S. troops in Europe. Although the amendment was eventually defeated, the defeat was not caused by a strong sense of American commitment to Western Europe. Paradoxically, the West European's greatest sense of insecurity, the Soviet Union led to the continuation of its security. The Soviets helped defeat the Mansfield Amendment by announcing their willingness to negotiate MBFR a week before the vote. The Senate's willingness to reduce U.S. troops unilaterally, when the negotiations provided a forum for multilateral reduction, was thus stymied.

The perception of insecurity attributed to this incident is easily explainable. The West Europeans felt that a reduction of U.S. troops in Europe would result in a weakening of the nuclear guarantee. Europeans thus received a decrease in their security. While MBFR has served to reduce the threat of a lessened U.S. role in NATO, the nations of Western Europe are aware of their large security dependence on the U.S. This dependence is an important insecurity, yet when coupled with the West's increased perception of Soviet military power, it takes on even greater weight.



## Eastern Perceptions

To discuss Eastern security is to generalize the security concerns of each of its states.<sup>2</sup> For our purposes, a generalization is adequate for understanding East European perceptions. The security of Eastern Europe is obviously guaranteed by the Soviet military commitment. However, this guarantee does not really identify East European security concerns. A more important question is: what does the Soviet military commitment secure against? Surprisingly, Eastern Europe does not perceive its primary threat to be a NATO attack. These nations have reduced the military threat from the West to three basic points, which are quite similar to those of Western Europe. These threats are:

1. Internal changes, like those in Czechoslovakia, in leading to war.
2. War outside of Europe, between the two super-powers, finding its way to Europe.
3. Development of more nationalistic feelings in both East/West Germany leading to conflict.

The main security problem of Eastern Europe is thus not one of East/West confrontation, but in the dangers of ideological softening up and Soviet intervention.<sup>3</sup> Thus as Bender points out, "It is hardly the territorial status quo that needs protection but the political!"<sup>4</sup> Therefore, a military dimension does exist. The states of Eastern Europe feel great insecurity over the police role of the Soviet military. This military dimension is furthered by detente. The Soviets fear Western ideological penetration in the East will weaken Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. To counter this inferior ideological penetration, the Soviet Union has strengthened its grip on Eastern Europe. One can conclude that while the Soviets are the guarantor against a decreased Western threat, the Soviet military predominance in Eastern Europe comprises the greatest threat to these nations' security.

The Soviet definition of European security is political rather than military because the threats to its security are political, not military. The Soviet Union does not perceive the military balance as a threat to its security. The Soviets are more concerned with creating institutions to further political and economic detente, (contextual security), than in shifting the military balance (basic security).<sup>5</sup> In reality the Soviets seem to prefer "armed detente,"<sup>6</sup> to any dismantling of the balance. Although the Soviets prefer "armed detente" one must recognize that the Soviets do perceive a military threat to their security. The primary military threat is the West's Forward Base Systems (FBS).

Soviet concern over FBS was first advanced at SALT I. Although discussion of FBS at SALT I was implemented by the Soviets as a "joker" designed to force U.S. concessions, and as a tactic designed to create descension within the Western alliance, FBS truly merits a Soviet concern. The definition of FBS is rather ambiguous, but it "seems to refer to weapons that can be brought to bear against strategic targets in the rear of

a potential European battlefield."<sup>7</sup> Thus the forward deployment of F-4's, F-111's in Britain, the carrier based A-6's and A-7's in the Mediterranean and nuclear capable F-4's (based in Turkey), constitute a strategic threat to the Soviets because they could strike targets within the USSR, on a two-way mission.

Recognizing the current security and insecurity perceptions of the major actors in European arms control negotiations, we must now identify these actors objectives in pursuing arms control. More specifically, what must arms control achieve?

The West's objectives in pursuing arms control can be broken down into short-run and long-run objectives. In the short-run, the West views MBFR as a process through which they can negotiate multi-lateral troop reductions. The MBFR negotiations are thus a tool to guarantee that United States troop reductions do not occur unilaterally. The long-term objectives of MBFR takes on a character which strikes at the heart of Western insecurity. In the long run, arms control, is aimed at regulating the military balance, (the achievement of basic security).

The objectives of the East can also be broken down into short and long term. Because the Soviets do not perceive any disadvantage in the military balance, their objectives are quite different from the West's. In the short-run, the Soviets will attempt to negotiate an agreement that will appease the West, while not drastically shifting the balance. Thus, in the short-run, the Soviets are attempting to minimize any loss of military advantage. We must remember that the Soviets view their military power as essential to their diplomatic success. Any substantial decrease in military capabilities would consequently effect the diplomatic pursuit of contextual security.

In the long term, the Soviet's may pursue arms control in Europe as a means of furthering Soviet objectives in Europe. These objectives are:<sup>8</sup>

1. To erode the U.S. will to "stay in the game" of European security, and to encourage U.S. tendencies to withdraw forces from Europe.
2. To erode the confidence of Western Europe in U.S. will and competence in all areas.
3. To regulate the U.S. withdrawal of troops from Europe, so as to lower the threat of West European defence integration.
4. To fragment the NATO alliance and inhibit political and economic intergration of Western Europe.
5. To erode the will of individual nations to resist Soviet influence and exploit anti-American attitudes. (e.g., Sweden)



6. To "Finlandize" Western Europe in order eventually to incorporate Western Europe into the Soviet sphere of interest, ideally as a part of the "Socialist Camp" under Soviet Camp" under Soviet domination.

The Soviets pursue these objectives towards achievement of their security ideal. According to Robert Legvold, this system "implies a loyal Soviet-East European alliance system, impermeable to everything but external goods and capital, facing a loose constellation of West European states whose major members would be less and less attached to the United States, whose neutral members would be increasing deferential to Soviet interests, and all of whom would be dealing basically for themselves."<sup>9</sup> Arms control can serve as a vehicle towards attainment of this security ideal. Therefore, it is necessary to recognize pursuit of these objectives as the Soviet Union's long-term strategy in arms control.

### The Military Balance

Before any consideration of arms control is possible, we must understand the current military balance in Europe. The purpose is not to compare specific quantitative deployments<sup>13</sup>, but to identify, in general terms, whether deployments (both conventional and nuclear) are balanced or imbalanced. Yet, to truly understand the military balance, we must also identify the underpinnings of deployments. This base is found in the military doctrines of East and West.

Soviet military doctrine<sup>14</sup> is based on the concept of a short, rapid offensive (blitzkrieg) in Europe. Although Soviet doctrine also possesses a defensive quality, the current deployments to be discussed are far larger than necessary to defend the USSR. Consequently, the offensive context of Soviet doctrine holds the greatest saliency. Current doctrine has returned to recognizing the separation of conventional and nuclear war. Yet, Soviet doctrine continues to contend that any war in Europe will be one of utter destruction. This belief can clearly be seen in Soviet tactical nuclear doctrine.

Soviet tactical doctrine calls for the mass employment of large, indiscriminate nuclear weapons. The use of these weapons may come in response to NATO breaking the nuclear threshold or in a fashion such as to enhance the attainment of a rapid, offensive conquest. Consequently, the Soviets recognize no difference between tactical and strategic war. Thus, once the threshold is broken, all out nuclear war will occur.

The blitzkrieg doctrine is readily seen in Soviet deployments in Europe. Two-thirds of the large Soviet army is forwardly deployed in East Germany. The majority of these divisions are tank divisions, which reinforces the offensive nature of these troops. Furthermore, the high ratio of combat-to-support troops and employment of unit reinforcement illuminates the Soviet short war doctrine.



The Soviet deployment of air and naval forces also stresses the Soviet blitzkrieg doctrine. The air forces of the Warsaw Pact are currently designed less for air defense and more towards battlefield support of ground troops. Consequently, the air forces of the East are coming into line with current doctrine. The Soviet Navy has currently achieved blue-water status and is perceived by some in the West to have achieved naval parity. The Soviets deploy their fleet in a forward, offensive posture so as to influence its capabilities on the flanks. A further goal of Soviet submarine deployments is to control the sea lanes so as to impede U.S. supplies and/or reinforcements from reaching Europe as a hedge against protracted conflict. Currently the Soviet Northern fleet is causing great insecurities on the northern flank, while the passage of the Kiev through the Bosphorus has not increased security on the Southern flank.<sup>15</sup>

Soviet nuclear deployments in Europe are of a large yield, with low accuracy caliber. These weapons are largely in the form of medium range ballistic missiles located within the Soviet Union. Thus the vulnerability of these weapons, in the initial stages of conflict, are not very great. This invulnerability assures the use of nuclear weapons, if necessary, towards achievement of Soviet domination of Europe.

NATO military doctrine is based on the premise of a protracted conflict in Europe. The current doctrine is that of "flexible response." This theory, adopted by NATO in 1967, calls for a small conventional option reinforced by tactical and strategic nuclear weapons. Flexible response is conceived as serving the dual purpose of deterrence and defense along a broad spectrum of aggression. It is important to recognize that Europeans view doctrine more in light of its deterrent capability, than for its defensive aspects. Because of this belief, and the historical reluctance of the alliance to commit large numbers of troops to NATO, the nuclear, rather than conventional, aspects of flexible response are stressed. The conventional deployments that exist are based on the doctrine of forward defence. This concept calls for Europe to be defended as far east as possible. Yet, what makes Western doctrine credible is the linkage of conventional war to tactical nuclear war, and the further linkage of tactical nuclear war to the American strategic deterrent. This reliance on technology to replace manpower places great emphasis on nuclear deployments. The nuclear doctrine of the West is therefore one of great saliency.

The tactical nuclear doctrine of NATO is one which calls for selective use of nuclear weapons to deter and defend against Soviet conventional aggression and/or a Soviet employment of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons of small yield and high accuracy best meet the needs of this doctrine. If this deployment is unsuccessful in halting aggression then current doctrine calls for increased reliance on larger yield nuclear weapons. This greater dependence on nuclear weapons becomes decreasingly selective as it moves toward employment of the American strategic arsenal. The doctrinal emphasis on small conventional option and protracted war are illuminated by ground deployments. NATO deploys fewer troops and tanks than the Warsaw Pact. Yet NATO's ground forces are deployed in West Germany, which is illustrative of the concept of forward defenses. Whereas, the low ratio of



combat-to-support troops and dual-basing of a large number of U.S. troops committed to NATO further exemplify the Western doctrine.

The tactical air doctrine of NATO also illuminates the belief of protracted war. The main emphasis of NATO air forces is to achieve air superiority. Thus NATO possesses multi-purpose aircraft that are capable of offensive penetration, rather than providing close air support of ground troops.

The nuclear deployments of the NATO alliance are obviously much larger than those of the Warsaw Pact. The main mode of delivery is NATO tactical air forces. Some of these forces based in the German theatre (i.e. F-4's) while others are part of forward base systems (F-111's, F-16's). Tactical nuclear weapons are also deployed in the form of the Lance missile and in the naval forces, which defend the flanks.

The asymmetry of doctrine which exists between East and West explains the current nature of deployment. The Warsaw Pact with an emphasis on short conventional conquest of Europe reinforced by its indiscriminate nuclear weapons, and NATO with an emphasis on protracted war and technology as a substitute for manpower. These asymmetries alone are capable of causing perceptions of insecurity. When one weighs the quantitative advantage of the East with the qualitative advantage of the West the result is that military capabilities are seemingly balanced. Yet the Soviets have made qualitative improvements in their conventional capabilities, such as strengthening conventional artillery, improving ground attack capability of its tactical airforces and increasing mobility of its air defense systems. This face lifting has furthered Western apprehension of Soviet military power. Thus, ~~conventional capability may provide the Soviets with an intervention force which can execute a limited political objective.~~ NATO must show the will to respond to the Soviet improvements if the state of military capabilities are to remain "balanced."

The doctrinal asymmetries of short vs. long war and conventional vs. nuclear deployments have justifiably caused adverse psychological affects throughout the NATO alliance. Before the West is able to proceed with arms control, these insecurities, stemming from the increasing Soviet build up of conventional capabilities, must be reduced. The West is currently attempting to use arms control as the method for countering this increased capability. A more feasible, likely and effective method would be for NATO to restructure its forces to meet this threat. If NATO restructures its forces to counter short, conventional Soviet aggression, the greater resources of the West will have an opportunity to be mobilized in the necessity of a protracted war. Current NATO doctrine and deployments would force the Western alliance into accepting conventional defeat and/or early use of nuclear weapons. Let us investigate what mode of restructuring will best serve the West.

Because of NATO's emphasis on technology and the reduced willingness (and increased cost) of committing manpower, restructuring must strive for achieving the greatest defense within the resource and cost limitation currently facing NATO. NATO can best meet these needs by restructuring in the chequerboard technique suggested by Steven Canby.<sup>16</sup> This deployment will increase the number of NATO divisions without increasing the current number of Western forces. As Canby points out the



chequerboard is an excellent defensive concept for countering Soviet armoured and ground forces. This technique also provides an excellent method for deploying the new defensive technologies discussed above. These technologies would not be as effective under current deployments for when new technologies are ready to be deployed, doctrine must adapt to these innovations. If the West deploys these technologies without adopting the proper doctrine for their use, this deployment will be counter-productive.

The Nunn amendment of 1974 has already begun the process of restructuring U.S. forces in NATO. This amendment calls for increasing the ratio of combat to support troops, realigning U.S. nuclear posture in Europe and for an investigation into the possibilities and costs of weapons standardization. Although this amendment does not advocate a defensive posture, much-the-less the chequerboard technique, it is a step in the right direction.

Other improvements are necessary to increase NATO's conventional capability. The repositioning of U.S. forces into the North German Plain, the expected theater of conflict, would both enhance defense and serve as a reinforcement of the American commitment towards European defense. Furthermore, the U.S. forces in NATO would thus become better suited to defend against Soviet aggression, while at the same time becoming closer to attaining a chequerboard deployment. For realistically, chequerboard will not be achieved in one large step but by carefully planned measures which increase NATO short-war capabilities in pursuit of this ultimate deployment.

This restructuring to meet the threat of short, conventional war is not meant to ignore the possibility of protracted conflict. Yet because NATO has historically depended on its nuclear capabilities as its insurance in protracted war, this restructuring should not have a detrimental effect on its long war capabilities. Any possibility of long war can also be insured by proper training of reserve forces for a European war. If NATO has the proper doctrine and deployments to defend against a short, conventional war, the probabilities of the conflict becoming prolonged are minimal. Consequently restructuring will allow NATO to enter into arms control negotiations from a position of increased strength, security and unity.

#### Arms Control Negotiations

Currently the negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions is the primary theatre of European arms control. As illustrated in the above discussions on security, arms control holds greater saliency for the West than it does for the East. Since the formal talks have begun in Vienna in October, 1973 different positions have been taken by East and West. Before discussing, it is useful to identify these positions to see where MBFR lies.<sup>17</sup>

The West has used these talks to stymie unilateral U.S. reductions and as a method to correct their conventional inferiorities. To achieve this end, NATO has taken a fractional and restrictive approach in MBFR.<sup>18</sup> The West initially broke down the problem into manageable parts and attempted to restrict the



negotiations to ground troops in the Central Region. The initial NATO proposal of unequal cuts in ground forces to a common ceiling of 700,000 is an outgrowth of the fractional/restrictive approach. Thus in the initial agreement NATO focussed on limiting the aspects of Soviet military power which created perceptions of insecurity to the West.

The Eastern response to these proposals must be viewed in light of the Soviet approach to MBFR. In contrast to the West, the Soviets approach has been global and comprehensive. The East strives to deal with a wider geographical focus and with the whole spectrum of forces. The East thus reacted to the West's initial proposal by calling for national subceilings (to control the Bundeswehr, West German Army) and for more comprehensive reductions. The call for subceilings was quickly rejected by the West for they did not wish to limit European forces. Furthermore, these subceilings were viewed as an avenue by which the East could control NATO defensive capabilities. The East also had an proposal of their own: equal percentage cuts. The total unacceptability of this proposal by the West occurred because equal percentage cuts would not correct the balance. Consequently, negotiations became stalled.

In the latest Western proposal, NATO took Soviet insecurities and belief in comprehensiveness more into account. This proposal, "option III", would trade 1,000 tactical nuclear weapons, 36 Pershing missiles, 54 F-4 nuclear capable aircraft and 29,000 American troops for a Soviet tank army comprising of 1700 tanks and 68,000 men. Although the Soviet's yielded to the Western position that reductions should come initially from the U.S. and Soviet Union, they turned option III down. The factor which had the greatest effect on this rejection was the fact that it was linked to the Western concept of common ceilings. This concept is totally unacceptable to the East for it would mean greater reductions in Soviet manpower. One can understand this unacceptability for the USSR has placed great emphasis on ground troops. The Soviets will not so easily negotiate away this powerful force until they assured that they are gaining Western reductions which will truly increase their security and preserve hegemony in Eastern Europe.

To have meaningful arms control each side must be prepared to recognize and deal with the other insecurities. The question is: what Western strategy towards European arms control can make agreements meaningful? This is the strategy which we will now seek to identify.

As we have seen, the West has begun to view the balance of forces in a more comprehensive fashion. Although a step in the right direction, the West must also link the strategic and naval balances with the European balance. This approach will also necessitate the U.S. consciously linking SALT and MBFR. These linkages will take the Forward Base Systems, which comprise the major Soviet military insecurity, and naval forces into account. This is important for if the West does not view European arms control in a comprehensive and integrated fashion arms control will be counterproductive towards achieving any form of increased security.

Just as important is a coherent West-West position in the negotiations. The West must shape its positions in, and goals



from, arms control before entering into negotiations. Currently the West views MBFR more for its short-term product than as a long-term process. This suggests that the West is pursuing its short-run objectives of correcting the balance, rather than viewing MBFR as a vehicle through which increased security may be attained. The West must revise its strategy to one of incrementalism in pursuit of the long-term objectives of a reduced and stabilized balance of forces. If policy is truly coherent, comprehensive and integrated, this incrementalism, is focussed on manageable elements, will not be haphazard.

A coherent Western strategy will also entail the United States consulting with its allies before undertaking negotiations on strategic and/or naval forces. Therefore, the U.S. must face up to the need to deal with the balances in multilateral fashion. This commitment will lead to a stronger Western alliance, while also allowing Europeans a more complete voice in its security.

Having identified the strategy which the West must pursue we must now concern ourselves with turning strategy into proposals. Let us first investigate what type of initial proposal is within reach.

The current Western proposal, option III, is the type of agreement which must be pursued. To reach an agreement, with this proposal, one basic element must be changed. The West should reconsider its call for a common ceiling on ground troops. Restructuring of NATO forces will allow this type of ceiling to be employed. In its place realistic, unequal, ceilings should be considered. This measure will recognize the Soviet emphasis on conventional forces while also showing interest in MBFR as a process. Yet these ceilings must represent a true reduction in capabilities for the ceilings set at SALT were larger than existing forces, thus serving as floors rather than ceilings.<sup>19</sup> If ceilings set at MBFR provide for "leveling up" arms control will lose its emphasis on providing a reduced and stable balance.

After achieving this initial agreement in the Central European theatre, the West should begin to widen the geographical focus of MBFR and to begin negotiations of FBS in SALT. SALT only accounts for that portion of FBS which is dual-capable, it may be necessary to bring FBS into MFR and/or create a "European" SALT. When entering into this phase of the process, the West should negotiate the removal of FBS and move the nuclear deterrent out to sea. Not only are these planes which comprise FBS, susceptible to Soviet attack, they are also not functional in a short war scenario. Moving the deterrent out to sea may have a psychological effect on our allies. Not only will West-West agreement on this concept be necessary but it may also be necessary to continue the deployment of tactical nukes in Europe. The number of tactical nuclear weapons the U.S. deploys on the European continent should be equivalent to the number necessary to visibly show the American commitment.

We have now seen the types of defence proposals (restructuring) and arms control proposals necessary to increase European security. All that is left for discussion is how these proposals will increase the security of both East and West. To this we now turn.

The West obviously increases its security by undertaking arms control in the manner suggested. Its insecurities were all

out-growths of the military balance. Through restructuring and recognition of arms control as a process the West's insecurity perceptions will be drastically reduced. An improvement in American commitment to European defense will further increase the security of the West Europeans.

Eastern Europe stands to increase its security by a reduction of Soviet troops on its territories. Thus arms control will not only decrease the Soviet threat to the West, but it will also decrease the effectiveness of Soviet troops as "policemen" in Eastern Europe. This "side-effect" of arms control could also facilitate greater cooperation between the peoples of Eastern and Western Europe. Consequently, Eastern Europe does positively gain from arms control although it has little voice in its current configuration.

It would now seem necessary to conclude that arms-control has been a zero-sum game in which the USSR has lost. What the Soviets are losing in arms control is the power of their forces, not their security. Not only can arms control discard Soviet insecurity of FBS, but it can also serve as a forum for the pursuit of contextual security. For it is possible that the Soviets may realize that reduced military capabilities will be necessary before they can achieve their security ideal. Even if this does not occur, arms control will show the Soviet Union that the West is striving for a peaceful world. Therefore, any military threat from the West will greatly diminish, thus increasing Soviet security.



FOOTNOTES

1. R.J. Vincent, "Military Power and Political Influence: The Soviet Union and Western Europe," Adelphi Paper, No. 119 (Autumn 1975), p. 16.
2. For a detailed discussion of Eastern Europe's security needs, see Peter Bender, East Europe in Search of Security, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1972).
3. Ibid, p. 138.
4. Ibid, p. 138.
5. R. Legvold, "The Problem of European Security," Problems of Communism, (January-February, 1974).
6. I believe a phrase of Michael Tatu's.
7. Lawrence T. Caldwell, Soviet Security Interest in Europe and MFR, (Research Paper No. 72, California Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy, April 1976, p. 33.)
8. The U.S. and Demands of Detente Diplomacy, Research Monograph, (Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1973).
9. Legvold, p. 17, "Problem of European Security".
10. B. Weintaub, "North Europe Fears Lessening Of U.S. Role Nato," New York Times, May 14, 1976, p. A3.
11. See Survival, (Sept. -Oct., 1976), p. 226.
12. Legvold, p. 17, "Problem of European Security".
13. For a detailed analysis of Quantitative deployments see The Military Balance. (1975-6)
14. The discussion of Soviet military Doctrine is based on Wolfe and Erikson in Pipes, Soviet strategy in Europe, (New York: Crane, Russak, 1976) p. 127-210.
15. See Survival, (Nov.-Dec., 1976), p. 242.
16. S. Canby, "The Alliance and Europe: Part IV: Military and Doctrine," Adelphi Paper, 109 (Winter 1974-5)
17. The various proposals of east and west have been clearly identified in the paper by J. Sharp, "MBFR as Arms Control?" (unpublished paper, Harvard Program for Science and International Affairs, 1975).
18. Caldwell, p. 22 (see footnote 7).



19. Sharp, p. 2 (see footnote 17).

## The United States Role in Indian Development:

### A New Beginning

Ira Cohen

International attention was again focused India last month when Indira Gandhi's reigning Congress Party was defeated by a progressive coalition after months of "emergency rule." Whether the new government will be able to address the sub-continent's pressing needs remains to be seen. Meanwhile, American analysts are beginning to reassess the U.S. role in the development of India and other Third World nations. In the following article, Tufts Senior Ira Cohen examines current economic conditions in India and their implications for American involvement there and in other poor countries of the world. Cohen, a Political Science major currently engaged in teaching assistance for Department Chairman Frank Colcord's Introduction to the City course, originally wrote his paper for Ambassador Francis Russell's Foreign Policy Formulation class.

Now that some time has passed since the sudden rise in world oil prices had its devastating initial effect on the development programs of the world's less developed countries, it is time to reassess the economic status and potential of the world's "poor." Development strategies are continually changing as new problems are perceived and confronted. It has become clear that the participation of the world's affluent, such as the United States, is essential in plotting the direction of such changes. One country with whose development the United States must be particularly concerned is India. Both the magnitude of India's economic problems and the significance of India's role on the world political stage mandate that America now look towards participating in a new beginning in the development of the Indian sub-continent.

### India's Needs:

India is in many respects synonymous with underdevelopment. The manifestations of retarded development are immediately apparent to any visitor to India - widespread malnutrition, famine, mass unemployment, poor housing, disease and insufficient social services. The average Indian endures an undeniably miserable lifetime, often sick and always hungry. The United Nations estimates that as many as 450 million of India's 570 million



people may be classified as severely malnourished. Among these over 50 million are reported to be blind or partially blind due to Vitamin A deficiency. Indian children are particularly affected by the tragedy of malnutrition - the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) declared an international emergency recently to mobilize food aid for India's young.

Hunger is nothing new in India. Famine has been documented as early as 1291 A.D., when thousands of Indian families reportedly drowned themselves to avoid starvation. In this century, a 1943 famine in West Bengal took the lives of more than three million Indians. More recently, massive floods after the monsoon rains of 1965 and 1966 meant starvation for several hundred thousand in India, despite massive foreign relief efforts. The food problems of India are clearly far from transitory.

But the problems of India's underdevelopment transcend those of only hunger. India's per capita national income remains among the lowest in the world at approximately \$102 per year. Unemployment rates habitually exceed 20%, but this does not account for the majority that is severely underemployed, working only at seasonal planting and harvest times. Inflation is another major Indian problem, with the annual rate recently exceeding 30%. The Indian trade balance is traditionally disastrous, and is showing signs of getting still worse. Production of most major export commodities (primarily textiles, tea and jute) is down, and the OPEC oil price rises have restricted 80% of India's foreign exchange to payment for petroleum and its products.

Most of India's vital signs appear discouraging. Social services (particularly education and health care) remain rudimentary or non-existent in the villages and rural areas, where most Indians live. Sociologists consistently point out that population problems are never solved without a significant increase in such services. It is clear that all of India's problems must ultimately be viewed in the light of its overwhelming population problems.

#### India's Future:

If the present picture of India may be described as depressing, the outlook for India's future can only be called frightening. Despite, or more precisely, because of India's inability to feed or adequately care for its present population, its numbers continue to grow at an alarming rate. The Indian population is now increasing by more than 13 million people annually the highest growth rate in the world. At this rate, 100,000 workers are being added to the Indian labor force each week. India, when combined with China, is responsible for almost 40% of the world's total annual population explosion. Experts feel that this type of population growth can only result in mass starvation, regardless of any advances in food production.

And the prospects for future Indian food production are bleak. Despite the fact that almost 85% of all Indians devote themselves to agriculture, the nation is still unable to feed itself. In fiscal year 1975, India imported over eight million tons of food to keep its farmers alive. The highly touted Green Revolution has failed in India for the most part. While the introduction of high-yield grain varieties has doubled and



tripled food output in many Third World nations, production in India has stagnated. The surpluses that were achieved during the late 1960's were utilized during the disastrous crop year of 1973. India now has no grain reserves of any importance, and will be entirely dependent on foreign sources of food should its crops fail in any future year. This dependence is an extremely dangerous one, as international grain reserves are now estimated at twenty-seven days, and would probably not be available at any price during a bad crop year.

#### The United States and India's Underdevelopment:

The American people have long been concerned with the severe troubles of India. Since 1946, the U.S. has provided India with 7.6 billion dollars of economic and military assistance, making India the largest single recipient of American aid other than South Korea and South Vietnam. This figure does not include the aid that India has received from international organizations, such as the World Bank and the International Development Association or from relief agencies such as CARE, all primarily funded by American dollars. In all, American aid to India over the past 25 years totals more than 13 billion dollars. Much of this aid has come under the auspices of Public Law 480, the "Food for Peace" program that, it has been said, "saved India's life" after the disastrous floods and famine of 1965-6. In the three years of floods, American PL 480 shipments to India totaled 27 million metric tons of grain, more than 80% of India's total food imports. In all, the U.S. has donated, or loaned at virtually gift terms, 59.4 million metric tons of food to India, at an estimated value of \$4.3 billion.

In addition to outright food aid, the United States has played other major roles in India's development. American dollars entirely financed an education and medical service program that had virtually wiped out India's epidemic malaria by 1972, after a tradition of millions of malaria deaths annually. The U.S. has contributed \$651.8 million to the Indus River Development Project, which will bring power and irrigation to much of northern India and parts of Pakistan. Such programs, and many others like them, have represented selfless attempts by Americans to improve the quality of life of their far-away neighbors.

#### The United States and India's Development - the Results:

Indications of meaningful resolution of India's major problems are regrettably not evident as yet. Despite the massive U.S. aid between 1964 and 1972, India's real per capita income rose by less than 1%, from \$97 to \$98 annually. The effect of U.S. aid on food production efforts was even less apparent. From the 1964-65 to 1972-73 crop years, per capita food production actually decreased significantly, from 398.2 lbs. to 378.1 lbs. annually. Statistics for the latest crop year are unable as yet, but reports indicate that the trend is getting worse. Clearly, massive U.S. aid has had little effect in resolving the major



problems of India.

### India's Development Failure - the Reasons:

The explanations for India's slow economic progress are undeniably complex, including environmental as well as political and economic factors. India's rainfall is often erratic, causing floods in some areas and droughts in others, and varying greatly from season to season. But such problems have been overcome in other similar tropical regions through irrigation, flood control, cloud-seeding, and other methods. It is often argued that India lacks natural resources, and so is hampered in the development progress. Yet this argument is disputed by the facts. India has significant proven quantities of iron ore, uranium and petroleum, and greater coal resources than all of North America (World Bank ). India's agricultural resources are similarly plentiful according to most experts. Our former ambassador Daniel P. Moynihan, has estimated that India's fertile plains are capable of helping not only India, but the entire world. Most important yet most often neglected, is the value of India's most abundant resource, human energy. In the words of Senator Clarence Long, "the unused time of hundreds of millions of Indians offers an enormous source of real savings if it can be harnessed." It is clear that a lack of resources is not the cause of India's continued underdevelopment.

According to most development experts, the answer lies not in natural, but in political impediments. A consensus of expert opinion shows that the development strategies of the Indian government have been distorted, misapplied, and unsuccessful. A comparison of recent Indian fiscal expenditures reveals the basic problem:

<u>Fiscal expenditure sector</u>	<u>1970-74 expenditures</u>
Industry, transportation, communications.....	\$11,100,000,000
Military.....	\$ 9,800,000,000
Agriculture, irrigation, flood control.....	\$ 4,600,000,000
Education.....	\$ 1,000,000,000
Health care and family planning.....	\$ 750,000,000

In short, the Indian government has placed its priorities in developing large-scale, capital-intensive, heavy industry. It has followed the development strategies of the already-industrialized world, relying on large inputs of capital to hopefully stimulate aggregate demand, increase production and employment, and improve India's status in the world economy.

The result has been what may be called a "dual economy." In one respect, India's policies have fostered the growth of the seventh largest industrial state in the world. Yet outside of the Indian industrial-infrastructure complex, there



remains another "economy." Most of India's people live as their ancestors did, attempting to feed their families by working still-unproductive fields. The government has done relatively little to help the peasant farmer. The primary reason for the failure of the Green Revolution in India has been, according to most scientists, the unwillingness of the government to supply its tools to the small farmer. The hybrid seed, fertilizer, and pesticides necessary for the doubling and tripling of outputs have gone to those who could afford them, serving to make the rich farmers richer and the poor majority worse-off than before. The recent devastating price rises in fertilizer (due to its petroleum and nitrogen requirements) have probably spelled death for India's food production. But still the Indian government refuses to shift "valuable industrial resources: to the domestic production of fertilizer, so that fertilizer shortages of one-million tons annually (30-40%) are predicted indefinitely. India's elite has to this point had no change of heart towards confronting the problems of India's masses.

So, India appears as a country where most people have little control over their life situation, and where those who do have control are doing little to relieve the nation's enormous problems. In this light other countries of the world which have greater resources at hand, and hopefully, a wider perspective, must be called upon to do what they can to influence the direction of Indian development toward rational and constructive plans. To analyze the possibilities and limitations of the United States' influence, one must analyze American values and goals as they relate to India's problems.

#### India and American Goals

It should be clearly established that the successful social, economic and political development of all nations is a meaningful goal for the United States. The events of this decade have already demonstrated the need for devotion of underdevelopment, economic instability, and the maldistribution of resources. The nature of international conflict is increasingly focusing attention on these problems. Experts in these subjects report that this decade is the crucial time for cooperative action on world underdevelopment. The computer study of Mesarovic and Pestel for the Club of Rome concluded:

There must be realization of the overriding importance of the long-term global development crises, and willingness to place this highest on the agenda of the issues to be dealt with specifically by national governments. Precisely because the symptoms of these global crises might become fully visible only towards the end of the century, the time to act is now; when the symptoms become clear, action will no longer be possible.



The same study elucidates one of the global crises that must be faced - at present growth rates, there will be a 110% food deficit in India by the year 2025. Changing present trends to avert disastrous future developments in Third World nations such as India must be seen as a primary goal for Americans.

### India and American Values

A comparison of the lifestyle of Indians and Americans challenges the premise that moral values must be excluded from international affairs. The ethical implications of U.S. development assistance policies can no longer be easily ignored. It is apparent that an increasing number of Americans are voicing concern for global problems of underdevelopment on moral grounds. Many Americans have changed their past consumption habits in the hope of releasing more resources for the world's poor. Many education programs have recently been initiated in the U.S. in attempts to teach Americans about the problems of their world neighbors. A multitude of privately-financed political groups and research institutes have recently been established to explore similar issues. Citizen donations to relief agencies have increased dramatically in the last two years, despite the sluggish domestic economy. The White House recently reported that the single most discussed subject in mail received by the President last year was world hunger and underdevelopment. Similar public concern about issues of foreign aid, often called "the issue without a constituency," has been reported by members of Congress. It is apparent that the successful development of the Third World is increasingly being seen as an important American value.

The Indian situation may be uniquely appropriate to consideration to this context. Because the problems of the global future are at least in large part political in nature, the wide diversity of ideologies and structures of government among nations presents a continual obstacle to progress. In the case of India, such an obstacle should be minimized by close correlations in India's structures and ideologies and American values of free enterprise, popular representation in government, individual freedom, and responsibility for self and family should provide a vehicle for our cooperation in development. The development problems of India present a special challenge to America's most basic values.

One conflict of values does arise in considering Indian development. It is a long-established value of the United States that every people should have the right to control their own destiny. India alleges that it is simply asserting this right in attempting to dictate the nature of its development programs. It may be argued in reply that this policy is not truly the will of the Indian people, in that a relatively small educated elite makes all the important decisions for India. Democracy in form may be only oligarchy in practice when the vast majority have no education or input into the political process. It is hardly likely that the Indian peasant prefers nuclear power development in Bombay to increased rice production on his one acre. Yet a



presumption by the United States that it can make this determination for India may be a gross distortion of America's own national values.

In any case, respect for India's official wishes must be weighed against the value of policies believed better for the interests of the majority of India's people. India's present development strategies have been seriously criticized by experts in the field. After twenty years of experience, we have determined that the answers to India's problems of rural poverty and inadequate food production lie in increasing the productivity per acre of India's millions of small-acreage farmers and in facilitating the marketing of that increased production. The answers to India's problems of exploding population lie in improving India's social services, education and general economic welfare. The answers to India's mass unemployment lie in developing labor-intensive, rather than capital-intensive, means of agricultural and industrial production. We have determined that the answers to India's problems do not lie in continued devotion of precious resources to the creation of large industry, infrastructure, or military power. We must weigh the value of acting upon this determination in the context of the other important American values relevant to U.S. policy decisions.

#### India and American Security

The future of the Indian sub-continent undeniably affects many U.S. interests. It has been a long-standing determination of U.S. policy-makers that an American presence in Asia is necessary for the construction of a permanent Asian peace based on national self-determination and international non-interference. The Communist take-overs of South Vietnam and Cambodia may pose a threat to this tenuous peaceful situation. It would appear to be in the interests of all Asian nations that the continents' powers not attempt to enlarge their spheres of influence through aggressive action. This path towards peace will best be achieved by continual negotiation and interaction among the major forces in Asia. It is therefore essential that the United States maintain constructive relations with India, particularly at a time when India appears to be emerging as the most aggressive force in South Asia, even as the political situation in Southeast Asia undergoes dramatic changes.

In superpower diplomacy, India plays a significant potential role. As an ostensibly non-aligned nation with huge untapped natural and human resources, located in the heart of Asia, India may be prized by the U.S., Soviet Union, China, Japan or Iran. The Soviets appear to be taking the most direct route, recruiting India as a potential weapon against the Chinese, and developing a friendly power on their southern border. The Chinese, troubled by cultural and political differences, appear to be staking their claim in South Asia in Pakistan. Japan presumably sees a threat to its economically-advanced but militarily-vulnerable nation in the expansion of any power on mainland Asia, and is remaining mostly neutral. Iran sees a potential threat to its hegemony in the Persian Gulf coming from a strong India to the east, and has



issued hostile attacks on Indian policy. The essentially unstable nature of this situation seems to mandate that the U.S. maintain an influential hand in the future course of events. Many American allies look towards Washington for support amid this potential power struggle. The nations of SEATO and ANZUS (Australia and New Zealand) have enjoyed commendable economic progress since the second World War, for the most part, and have little interest in playing dangerous games of cat-and-mouse. Healthy Indo-American relations must be considered to be in America's best interest.

### Indian and American Economic Interests

The extent to which many American policy makers see India as a crucial factor in the complex Asian political situation is reflective of the constrictions limiting American flexibility in influencing India's developmental strategies. This flexibility seems to be further constricted by U.S. economic concerns. It is understandable that powerful interests in the U.S. - based international business community look toward India with great hopes and will thoroughly oppose any apparent political trouble-making on the part of the United States government. The potential market of a nation of 600 million that endorse free enterprise is just too tempting.

But it is questionable whether continued tolerance of India's distorted policies will benefit American business in either the long or the short run. Certainly, the prospect for significant private direct investment by American firms in India is not a likely one. The political situation is too unstable, and American influence too limited to justify such risks. The Indian government clarified the risk for foreign investors during the 1974 Indian Congress, when it issued a proclamation declaring India's unequivocal right to nationalize any industry "for the sake of India's good." This development added to the already

Further, it is questionable to what extent the economic motivations for traditional aid to India still exist. As outlined in the original PL 480 program, food aid serves U.S. interests by creating potential markets overseas, and by ridding American farmers of price-deflating surpluses. But grain surpluses no longer exist, and it is likely that there will always be ready markets for all American food production in the future. Any surpluses that are created may readily be contributed to the international grain reserve that is being initiated by the members of the United Nations. Similarly, there is likely to be no significant market for U.S. agricultural products in future India, as India must soon become self-sufficient in food production, or face dire alternatives. India no longer has much foreign exchange to devote to food imports, and an attempt on our part to encourage such action would certainly counteract our other intentions vis-a-vis India's proper development. Finally, it may be noted that the economic benefits to the U.S. from imports of Indian commodities are not particularly significant. India

ranks 25th among world suppliers of American imports, and its competitiveness in the world market for its primary exports (textiles, tea and spices) is decreasing.

#### A New Beginning

In analyzing American goals, values and interests vis-a-vis India, a dramatic conflict of interest emerges. On one hand, the United States cannot afford to antagonize the government of the world's largest democracy by arrogantly interfering with that nation's development policies, however distorted they might be. Such a policy would violate our beliefs in national self-determination while threatening the continuation of a meaningful U.S. role and in maintaining Asian peace. On the other hand, American disregard of India's frightening economic situation is still more threatening. It is clear that American goals and values dictate that we not stand by idly and observe the continual deterioration of a huge nation beset by incomprehensible human misery.

It is time that diplomatic measures of whatever sort are necessary be taken to encourage an immediate new beginning for India. A restructuring and subsequent increase in foreign aid, some trade concessions and transfer of appropriate technical development assistance can be included in such a program. Such diplomacy will be most credible and least offensive if it is made clear that it reflects an impartial, apolitical concern for the basic needs of India's people. It can be supported by an impressive accumulation of international expert opinion that offers rational alternatives to the development strategies which are presently being employed, with such meager success, in India. The government of India, and others of the desperately poor "Fourth World" in general, should now be increasingly amenable to well-intentioned involvement by more developed nations in their development. The recent food shortages and oil price rises and their effects have made it clear that the world's poorest peoples will have to rely on the help of others, even if that assistance challenges their established national power structures. India's government must respond to an international call for a new beginning, a call that should be trumpeted by the United States.



"Soviet Jewry & The Political Elite"

Robert Gibbs

The stringent Soviet emigration policies toward Soviet Jews have long been a source of international concern. Recently, with the Carter Administration's human rights declarations, international attention has focused on the plight of Soviet Jewry and dissidents. In this paper, Robert E. Gibbs, a senior majoring in history, traces Soviet Jewry from its ethnopolitical origins to current treatment under the Soviet regime. Gibbs wrote this paper for Professor Legvold's course, Government and Politics of the Soviet Union.

Gibbs' interest in this subject derives from the fact that his ancestors emigrated from the USSR. He hopes to teach in an international school in Russia after graduation.

Soviet Jewry presents a unique problem in political management for the ruling elite in the Soviet Union. "Socialization" of the Jew was and is a two-fold proposition: religion and nationality must be expunged from the life of the Jew and replaced by the Russian Socialist Ethnic. Thus, Soviet Jewry suffers from double jeopardy, a state of antagonism between party and people, virtually unmatched in scope by the experience of other minority groups in the USSR. The purpose of this paper is to explore the nature of the relationship of Soviet Jewry to the political elite. By examining the relationship of Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist thought effecting Soviet Jewry, one is able to analyze the quality of life for the Soviet Jew during the Khrushchev and Brezhnev regimes, and in a broader sense, understand the relationship of the Party to all peoples of the Union.

The Soviet Jewish experience has its roots in what some refer to as "traditional Russian anti-semitism." For many Russian Jews, especially members of the intelligentsia, eradication of anti-semitism was equated with the downfall of tsarist society by means of democratic institutions. "Marx adjudged anti-semitism a by-product of capitalist relationships inevitably destined to disappear under the new order."<sup>1</sup>

Revolutionaries realized the necessity of involving the Jewish population in the struggle. Julius Martov, speaking of the Bund (League of Jewish Workingmen), said, "Our aim



is to found a specifically Jewish proletariat in the struggle for economic, civil, and political liberation."<sup>2</sup> That Martov chose to oppose the Bund is indicative of the dilemma facing the Jewish advocate of democracy. For some, a denial of their Jewish religious and national heritage was in itself an anti-semitic act. Trotsky, on the other hand, simply saw himself as a communist and not as a Jew.

Cast into the Diaspora, the Jew attempted to coexist with his neighbors, assimilating as much as possible into the daily life of the surrounding society. Lenin viewed the decline of anti-semitism in terms of the successful assimilation of the Jew into Soviet society. However, the Jews of Russia, having lived within the Pale of Settlement, were not as receptive to assimilation as were their German brethren in Western Europe. Religion was antithetical to the tenets of Marxist-Leninist thought, and the shtetl Jew, who saw the Jewish People as a nation dispersed over the face of the Earth, embraced a dangerous vision of national consciousness; a homeland.

After the October Revolution, the Jew was confronted with a regime that disallowed religious education, abolished their community councils, (Kehilash), and in theory, rejected any proposal of a Jewish national consciousness. In 1913, Stalin theorized, "...a nation is an historically evolved stable community of language, territory, economic of culture."<sup>3</sup> Lacking territory, the Jews must, Lenin argued, assimilate into Soviet Jewry sought an answer that did not exist. The Party, seeking to march on, sought to indoctrinate the Jewish community with the precepts and the ideals of the Revolution.

The Party's mode of inculcation developed into the form of the Jewish Sections of the Communist Party. The "Evsektzii," according to Zvi Gitelman, were charged with the task of bringing "the Revolution to the Jewish street." The October Revolution was a betrayal of the democratic coup of February in the eyes of the Jewish community and its political representatives. As the Party would not tolerate factionalism and competition, the Evsektzii were compelled to refute and dismantle any opposition encountered on the Jewish street. Whereas the Bund was areligious, the Evsektzia was a devout proselyte of Marxism-Leninism. To the Jew on the street this was an act of deception unequivocally portrayed by the "trial" of the Jewish religion in Kiev by the Evsektzii.

"In 1927, one out of every ten civil service positions in Moscow, one out of every five in the Ukraine, and almost one out of every three in Byelorussia were held by Jews, in percentages roughly four times their respective percentages of the population readily assimilated into Soviet society in the 1920's, Soviet Jewry at-large was reluctant to do so. Lenin, and his heirs, miscalculated the appeal of a state free of anti-semitism which concurrently sought to destroy the foundation of Jewish life. The Soviet political elite viewed Jewish dissent as the actions of men who like "...the Bundists had become nothing more than Zionists afraid of sea-sickness."<sup>5</sup> The equation of Yevrei (Jew) with Zionism signified a lack of compassion for the Soviet Jew and foreshadowed the fate of the Jew through-



out the Soviet epoch. By the mid-1920's, Jewish splinter groups were no longer viable political entities. Unable to cope with the pressure of Party agitation, the Bund was destined to involuntarily hand over absolute control of the "socialization" of the Jewish populace to the Evseksii.

Adhering to Stalin's definition of national consciousness as "socialist in content and national in form," the Evseksii vigorously pursued the assimilation of the soon to be "Soviet Jew." The essence of Lenin's denial of Jewish nationality, the absence of territory, rendered the Evseksii a failure; Jewish proletarian culture could never fully evolve into Soviet culture, for, although it might become socialist in content, it was, by Lenin's definition, incapable of ever being national in form. Consequently, the Evseksii sought to destroy Jewish culture by phasing out Hebrew and Yiddish in the life of the man on the Jewish street.

The ascendancy of Stalin witnessed the liquidation of the Evseksii, an act preceding the consummation of Stalin's will to power, and marked the beginning of the end of any political autonomy or independence in the Soviet Union. "...the Evseksii failed to associate Yiddish with progress, prestige, and modernization...the Party saw the Jewish Sections as a transient instrument through which the Jewish masses could be socialized, transformed, and integrated into the society as a whole, and if that integration meant the loss of a separate ethnic identity so be it..."<sup>6</sup> Integration of the Jew regardless of ethnic identity, as unstated Party policy, is illustrated by the failure of the Jewish Settlement experiment in Biro-Bidzahn.

Stalin's commitment to the slogans of "Technology is Decisive" and to "Socialism in One Country" exacerbated the declining quality of Jewish life in the Soviet Union. The Jew found it particularly difficult to fit into the mold forged by rapid industrialization. Most Jews were uneducated in the ways of factory work and trade unions, and were prevented from pursuing the traditional small business activity endemic to the Jewish lifestyle in Russia. This lack of adaptability to modernization was indeed a great failure of the Evseksii. (Although Jewish peasants participated in the agricultural revolution in the Soviet Union, they comprised a very small segment of the Jewish population).

"Socialism in One Country" seems to have been amongst other things a stimulus for Russian chauvinism and a base from which to develop a program of Russification. By focusing the efforts of building socialism in but one nation, Stalin gave credence to the strengthening of the state along nationalist lines: these were as distinctly and inexorably Russian as was Stalin's power absolute in degree. Jewish nationalism is discouraged by the Soviets, and yet the process of integration of the Jew into Soviet society seems to have been tempered.

Nikita Khrushchev, once in power, manipulated Soviet Jewry in much the same manner that did Stalin. It is safe to speculate that the anti-semitic campaigns of the Zhdanovshica\* were a prelude to another great purge of the old Soviet leadership. Similarly, Khrushchev disguised political maneuvers in



a cloak of anti-semitism. The Jews he said, "...are interested in everything, want to get to the bottom of everything... in the Soviet Union there are nationalities which are less numerous than the Jews or who are less gifted. But these non-Jews are better at organizing a common existence. That is why it is possible for them to build durable national institutions."<sup>7</sup> Once again, Soviet Jewry was denied a national consciousness by the ruling elite.

Khrushchev's secret speech of 1956 while condemning the Stalin legacy, did little to rectify the record of anti-semitism compiled by the former dictator. Picking up on the process of divestiture of Jewish elites within the Soviet institutional hierarchy that Stalin initiated during the Andanovschina, "Khrushchev declared that anti-semitism would grow if Jews were to occupy too many high positions."<sup>8</sup> Such convoluted thinking typified Khrushchev's policy concerning Soviet Jewry.

He impeded the integration of the Jew into society by introducing "Yevrei" into the passport lexicon, a label that categorized and characterized the Jew not as a product of the republic in which his parents were born, but as a rootless individual.

Embarking on a road to "scientific atheism", Khrushchev attacked the Pentacostals, Jehovah's Witnesses, the Jews, and other religious groups. Peter Grose of the N.Y. TIMES tells us that although "Jews were deprived of the Passover matzoh, the Orthodox Church was unable to give the wafer of Communion." But, the escalating Soviet commitment to the Arab world coupled with the vacuum of Soviet Jewish nationality elicited accusations that questioned the "loyalty of Zionists." An Armenian Orthodox Christian world simply not be faced with this paradoxical diatribe. The level of toleration of literature at this time also points to Khrushchevian anti-semitism. He chastised the poet Yevteschenko for his memorial to the slaughtered Jews of "Babi Yar" and permitted the author Kichko to publish a blatantly anti-semitic work of scientific atheism entitled "Judaism Without Embellishment." The linkage of anti-semitic sentiment with policy implementation proved a useful combination during Khrushchev's drive to eliminate "economic crimes" (undesirable financial and business endeavors). That 50% of these "economic criminals" were Jewish best exemplifies the political and social inertia in which Soviet Jewry is placed. The Soviet elite was not ready to engineer the Marxist-Leninist assimilation of the Jew, for the builders of the extensive construction of communism conceptualized Soviet Jewry in terms not conducive to a process of integration.

Soviet Jewry has been greatly influenced by foreign affairs during the Brezhnev era. Events of the late 1960's, including the '67 Arab-Israeli War and the Czech conflict of 1968, supplied the energy source for anti-semitic rhetoric. Kichko surfaced again, this time stating that "Judaism and Zionism educate the Jews in a spirit of contempt and even of hatred for other people." Jew became Zionist and Zionist Jew. Czechoslovak delinquency and dissident hooliganism at home were often "fashioned" by Zionists (= Jewish) plotters.



However, in the 1970's, the manipulation of Soviet Jewry has been tied to the future of US-USSR relations. During the negotiation of the 1974 US-USSR Trade Bill, Senator Henry Jackson coupled US trade concessions with the relaxation of Soviet emigration policy. Unwilling to compromise the integrity of their rule of power, the Soviets rejected the Trade Bill in 1975. President Carter has apparently committed himself to the fusion of policy implementation and the issue of human rights. In doing so, he has nobly extended the franchise of human rights beyond the secular boundaries of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. Whether or not Carter's adoption of the "rights" issue becomes an effective policy lever remains to be seen; the rights of Man and Woman Kind cannot be compromised, and yet, will we apply the same degree of "rights" pressure on Chile, South Korea, or Rhodesia as we do the superpower Soviet Union? Clearly, the interaction of foreign policy and human rights may produce an untenable relationship.

To what extent has Soviet Jewry been assimilated? Faced with the prospect of frustration surrounding the practice of their religion or their chances to emigrate, Soviet Jewish youth apparently are abandoning the Jewish religion. "Nine-tenths of all Soviet Jews, ages 14-28, belong to the Komsomol."<sup>9</sup> However, religious worshippers are declining in numbers throughout the Soviet Union. No doubt the Jewish religion has been repressed, but I agree with William Fletcher, "...on balance, Judaism has received par treatment from Soviet anti-religious policy--a bit worse than some (Orthodox, Baptists)--a bit better than others--(Pentacostals, Buddhists)."<sup>10</sup> Culturally, Soviet Jewry is denied any expression of ethnicity. There are no Yiddish-Hebrew schools in the USSR. However, there appears to be a strong interest amongst young Soviet Jews in their heritage, in the Jewish experience as a whole. To a large extent, this is a reflection of anti-semitic policies initiated by Stalin and continued by Khrushchev and Brezhnev. The resistance of the ruling regime to fully integrate the Jew has been one of the saving graces of Soviet Jewish life.

Discrimination in the educational and government markets has also prevented the Jew from achieving total integration. Harry Schaffer states that "...Jewish enrollment has increased in numbers and percentage of the Jewish population of the USSR but, as a percentage of total enrollment in Soviet institutions, it has decreased." Applicants to universities must list their citizenship and nationality. The aspiring Jewish student is most probably subjected to higher standards of admissions compared to the Russian applicant. There is only one full member of the Central Committee who is Jewish (Veniamin Dymshits). The foreign service, referred to in Lenin's day as "The Synagogue" employs a handful of Jews. For obvious reasons, Jewish members of the Science and Technology communities have not been barred from service to the state.

The future of Soviet Jewry is linked to a number of key issues. The successor(s) of Brezhnev shall be faced with the prospect of an increasingly disenchanted group of diverse nationalities who shall be less inclined to acquiesce on issues of national autonomy and representation in Soviet institutions.

Whatever policy is established, Soviet Jewry will be deeply affected. However, the manipulation of the Jewish community in the Stalin-Khrushchev mold shall, I believe, continue in the future. Thus, the Jews of Russia shall remain an isolated community of people who happen to live in the Soviet Union rather than citizens of the USSR who happen to be Jewish.

In the light of the growing nationality question and the Carter advocacy of the rights issue, the US-USSR relationship shall be linked to the border issue of Human Rights, be the oppressed Jewish, Ukrainian, or dissident. The Soviet Union's standing amongst the Arab nations in the Middle East shall also effect the plight of Soviet Jewry. The assimilation of the Jew envisioned and demanded by Lenin has not taken place. Lenin's successors chose to isolate the Jewish community, inadvertently creating an invisible Pale of Settlement. Thus, Soviet Jewry has become and shall continue to be a focal point of political management in a future marked by the politicization of all Peoples of the Union.



FOOTNOTES

\* page 25: Pale of Settlement- Catherine the Great established "the Pale," or area to which Jews were restricted.

\* page 26: Zhdanovschina- Period after WW II during which Andrei Zhdanov directed censorship of all Soviet culture and life that deviated from the Marxist-Lenist line defined by Stalin's Russian chauvinism.

1. Harry G. Schaffer, The Soviet Treatment of Jews, Praeger Publishers, New York, N.Y. 1974. Page 5.

2. Zvi Y. Gitelman, Jewish Nationality and Soviet Politics, Princeton University Press, Princeton N.J. 1972. Page 25.

3. Lionel Kochan, Editor, The Jews in Soviet Russia Since 1917, Oxford University Press, 1970. Page 49.

4. Op cit #1, page 6.

5. Op cit # 2, page 55.

6. Ibid, page 11.

7. Ibid, page 484.

8. Op cit # 3, page 88.

9. Op cit # 1, page 32.

10. Ibid, page 41.

The Organization of African Unity:

"Political Kingdom" or Political Illusion?

Stephen M. Davis

The OAU, is the only recognized institutionalized representation of Pan-Africanism. African Unity, it is an extremely important institution to an Africa beleaguered by internal tensions, external pressures, and contamination from international political economic instability. Precipitously balanced on what could be seen as a crossroads of the North-South and East-West dialogues, the effectiveness of Africa as a cohesive integrated entity in the international arena is significantly dependent on the stability of the OAU. Similarly, the OAU is a potentially effective vehicle for averting the eruption of volatile regional conflicts festering in areas such as South Africa, Rhodesia, Zaire, and Uganda.

This paper, written for Professor Robinson's African Politics course, discusses the strengths, weaknesses and prospects for the OAU and African solidarity.

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Perhaps the most remarkable characteristic of the organization of African Unity is that after thirteen years it still exists. Despite at least six serious boundary disputes, five major inter-African feuds, six civil wars, innumerable military coups, the formation of five sub-continental associations, the introduction of superpower confrontation, the quadrupling of oil prices by the organization's Arab members, and the wide spectrum of African ideologies, the OAU has not lost a single member. In fact, quite the opposite has occurred. When the organization was formally established on May 25, 1963 it included 30 independent countries. In July of 1975, with the incorporation of all the former Portuguese colonies into the OAU, the organization was 47 nations strong. It continues to be recognized world-wide as the legitimate voice of black and Arab Africa.

Nevertheless, it is questionable whether the OAU can ever be something more than a voice. The recent past has provided ample evidence of political situations where the OAU can be a force for change, and where it cannot. During the summer of 1976, for example, the OAU Heads of State sponsored a successful boycott of the Montreal Olympic Games in protest against the attendance of New Zealand, which had sent a rugby team to the



white minority regime of South Africa. Through this dramatic move the OAU hoped to demonstrate its unified opposition to apartheid. Unfortunately, however, almost half of the states party to the OAU were and are continuing to engage in extensive trade with the Republic of South Africa. The organization's resolute condemnation of apartheid was clearly not having the desired impact on substantive African policies toward South Africa.

But if the OAU's Olympic boycott was at least an effective illusion of unity, the organization's handling of the Angolan civil war was a public admission of paralysis. In a situation that required strong central guidance, the OAU failed to unite the three liberation movements, failed to deter external intervention, and failed to provide for a peaceful transition to black majority rule. The organization was stalemated by its own internal divisions.

Nevertheless, the OAU must be evaluated on its own terms: it cannot simply be dismissed. This paper will attempt to probe the origins of disunity within the OAU, as well as the institutional mechanisms of the organization that promote continental coherence. It will compare the achievements against the failures, and suggest the course the OAU is likely to follow through the rest of the organization's second decade.

### The Emergence of the OAU

Ever since the Berlin Conference of 1885, when the European powers required concrete political control of African territories as proof of colonial ownership, Africa has been led to independence in bits and pieces. Parts of black nations and ethnic groups were thrown together arbitrarily into single administrative units. The colonies of one European power could have virtually no contact with the colonies of another. Each imperial slice of Africa was a closed political/economic/cultural subsystem of London, Paris, Brussels, Berlin or Lisbon, but not of Africa.

The French, the Belgians, and the Germans tended to practice what is termed "direct rule." The black African colonies were considered integral parts of the metropolitan power. The Europeans cultivated their own indigenous political elite whose thoughts, policies and aspirations were oriented toward assimilation with the home country rather than independence. In addition, the economic and political development of the colonial bloc was almost totally dependent on the metropolitan power.<sup>4</sup>

The British, South Africans, and sometimes the Germans tended to prefer the system of "indirect rule," whereby the African traditional elite would be co-opted into administering the colonies on behalf of the imperial power. The philosophy behind indirect rule was that the Africans could never be expected to assimilate the Anglo-Saxon tradition, and so could only be trained to syncretize their own cultures with modern European standards. Therefore, although the colonies were economically dependent on the metropolitan power, the indigenous elite was Africa-oriented. The eventual goal was understood to be independence.

So Africa was split. Not only did the emerging black elites



reflect entirely different aspirations for their continent, not only did they have linear connections with separate European systems, but they also had next to no contact with each other. The concept that Africa was one, seemed only to refer to a geographical accident.

Yet that concept, which came to be called Pan-Africanism, did indeed take root. As might be expected, given the nature of colonial administrations, Pan-Africanism began in British Africa following initial efforts by American and British West Indian blacks to promote world-wide Negro solidarity. The National Congress of British West Africa led the way at its 1920 meeting in Accra, Ghana when it called for African unity.<sup>1</sup> Then in 1945 the first Pan-African congress took place in Manchester, England. At that meeting, hints of future conflicts between the nationalism and continental unity came to the surface. Nevertheless a united African continent was viewed as the most promising method of resisting racism and imperialism, developing the African economy, and achieving strength in a world populated with great powers. It remained to be seen how independent African states would regard this aim, and what institutional arrangements would evolve to create African unity.

The race to independence began with Ghana in 1957. Guinea followed in 1958, and the rest came in throughout the sixties and early seventies. By 1975 only South West Africa (Namibia) remained in colonial hands, while Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) was celebrating its tenth year of white minority rule as an illegal nation.

As Africa freed itself from colonial rule, Pan-Africanism initially took the form of regional associations. The Brazzaville Group, consisting mainly of the former Francophone colonies of West Africa, Camerouns, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Gabon, Cote d'Ivoire, Niger, Senegal, Upper Volta, Mauritania and Madagascar was closely linked with France. It shied away from continental unity, preferring rather to seek economic cooperation with each other and with France. In 1961 the Brazzaville Group was partially merged into a larger Monrovia Group, in which Liberia, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Togo, Sierra Leone and Libya joined the former French colonies. The Monrovia Group represented the conservative, pragmatic wing of Africa which leaned more towards national sovereignty than continental unity, although it still favored some type of cooperative interstate structure.

On the other end of the spectrum was the Casablanca Group, which was also formed in 1961. Ghana, Guinea, Mali, the UAR, Morocco and Algeria made up the radical wing of Africa. The Casablanca conferences consistently called for an institutional framework to bring about African political unity, aid to liberation movements, and a break with the neo-colonial powers of the West.

So before any substantive action was taken even to consider realizing some form of African unity, the continent was beset with a series of major cleavages. First there was the "three-way division between political "unionist," pragmatic "territorialists," and metropole-oriented states."<sup>2</sup> There was the split between British African and French/Belgian African experiences; there was the submerged but traditional division between black and



Arab Africa; there was the difference between capitalist and socialist methods of going about political and economic development; and finally, there were the often intense rivalries between prominent African personalities.

Four black leaders clearly represented the problems involved in uniting a continent. President Felix Houphouet-Boigny of the Cote d'Ivoire stood against the concept of African unity if it meant a commitment of anything other than economic cooperation between sovereign states. On the other hand, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana promoted the idea of an African "political kingdom," a continental United States of Africa. The followers of Franz Fanon, the West Indian Marxist psychologist who died before the establishment of the OAU, mocked Nkrumah's African nation as an exercise in "neocolonial subservience to imperialism."<sup>3</sup> They accused it (and the OAU) of being a trick to maintain the exploitation of the proletarian and peasant classes by the European-trained comprador bourgeoisie. It was Tanzania's President Julius K. Nyerere, however, who presented the view closest to what the OAU eventually turned out to be. Nyerere foresaw that especially in the early stages of unity (20 years) there would be constant tension between nationalism and continental integration."<sup>4</sup> After that, Nyere suggested that Africa would grow into one, for individual nations would find it virtually impossible to go it alone. Nyerere favored unity, but recognized that the process would be slow, and the outcome only a result of compromise.

On May 25th, 1963 two years of rivalry between the Casablanca and Monrovia groups came to an end with the establishment of the Organization of African Unity. Or at least, that is what happened on paper. Both alliances were indeed formally disbanded. However the very nature of the OAU Charter was an uneasy compromise between the two that allowed each general alignment of nations to pursue their old group interests but without their old institutional umbrellas. Even then, the Francophone countries of the defunct Brazzaville Group later reorganized themselves within the OAU into the Organization Commun d'Afrique et Malgache (OCAM) because they were dissatisfied with the political character.

The essence of the OAU compromise charter was that the radicals got the form of African unity, while the moderates secured recognition of the inviolable sovereignty of each African state. Of the five OAU purposes listed in Article II of the Charter, only one is a substantive concession to the radicals. That is the political aim of eradicating "all forms of colonialism from Africa."<sup>5</sup> The other purposes reflect radical influence only in the pan-continental form of their expression. The first goal of the organization is the promotion of unity among "African States." Nowhere does the charter suggest that Africa will or should ever become a single political entity. In fact, the Charter specifically calls for the defense of the "sovereignty," "territorial integrity," and "independence" of each African nation. Another goal is the coordination of "efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa."<sup>6</sup> This gives license to the Monrovia Group nations to continue their attempts at economic partnership. Finally, Article II gives the OAU the job of promoting international cooperation within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal



### Declaration of Human Rights.

The Charter of the OAU was adopted not because it eliminated ideological cleavages, but because it institutionalized them. The tensions between races, colonial experiences, ideologies, definitions of "unity," and leaders were brought into the OAU, rather than left behind.

### Structure of the OAU

The highest decision-making body in the OAU is the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. The Assembly meets once each year to adopt resolutions which have no legal binding effect on African states. Outside of the operation of the OAU itself, the Assembly may only recommend a course of action to its membership. A two-thirds majority is needed for passage of any policy decisions.

Attendance at the annual Assembly meetings has fluctuated widely during the thirteen years that they have been held. Kenya's Jomo Kenyatta, one of Africa's elder statesmen, went to his first OAU Assembly in 1975. The Cote d'Ivoire's Houphouet-Boigny has never been to an Assembly, while Malawi's President Banda rarely shows up at the annual meetings. Julius K. Nyerere of Tanzania missed six years of Assemblies between 1966 and 1973. Although in 1968 barely half the Heads of State attended, almost all arrived for 1973's tenth anniversary of the OAU. Only nineteen showed up at 1975's conference.

The second ranking institution in the OAU is the Council of Ministers. The Council, which is composed of foreign or any other ministers selected by the member governments, meets bi-annually. Its role is one of implementing Assembly decisions (although it has no means of doing so), preparing the Assembly agendas, supervising the OAU Secretariat and the Commissions, and sometimes acting as a decision-making body in its own right. It can meet in extraordinary sessions to deal with emergencies, and serves as a kind of flexible diplomatic club that facilitates communication between governments. The Council has proved to be one of the more active and effective institutions in the OAU, although it took some time before the ministers got better acquainted with African realities. One of the Council's early failures, for example, was its 1965 call on all continental governments to break off diplomatic relations with Great Britain over Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence. Only ten states complied.

The bureaucratic arm of the OAU is the Administrative Secretary General and the Secretariat. As the title deliberately implies, the Secretary General is to be more than an apolitical clerk. His job is one of archivist, treasurer, secretary, supervisor, reporter and civil servant.

The Secretariat has had difficulty maintaining an adequate, trained staff. Qualified administrators are often either kept at home or sent as African representatives to UN bodies. Sometimes governments use the OAU Secretariat as a dumping ground for troublemakers, incompetents, or political opponents.



The Secretariat has also found it difficult to organize the OAU's budget. In the past thirteen years, OAU annual budgets have ranged from \$2.5 million to \$4.5 million.<sup>8</sup> But very often poor or angry governments will simply not contribute their assessed dues. In 1965, for example, only half of the agreed upon financial resources for the fiscal year ever turned up.<sup>9</sup>

The only other permanent institution specifically provided for in the OAU Charter is the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration. Its purpose was supposed to be the resolution of inter-African conflict through peaceful means. However, its duties appear to have been taken over largely by either the Council of Ministers or the Assembly.

In addition to the permanent organs of the OAU, the Charter provided for the establishment of any specialized commissions necessary for the implementation of the organization's goals. The Economic and Social Commission, along with the Education and Cultural Commission, the Health, Sanitation and Nutrition Commission, the Defense Commission, the Commission of Jurists and the Transport and Communications Commission, works toward promoting intra-continental cooperation in a wide range of fields. Meanwhile, the Bureau of Documentation and Information, the Scientific, Technical and Research Commission and the Pool of Experts all serve as resource, data and skilled manpower banks for AOU member states.

The main problem the commissions encountered was the fact that numerous international institutions such as the UN, World Bank, EEC and the African Development Bank (which is entirely separate from the OAU), were already working on the same issues. For many years the OAU had to negotiate either to declare these problems the exclusive responsibility of African commissions, or to have the organization represent African interests on those international bodies. Immanuel Wallerstein has observed that the OAU was largely successful in this effort. It "was able to develop its role as a collective agent of Africa on the international scene and as an intermediary between international agencies and individual African states."<sup>10</sup> The commissions were, however, still burdened by crippling budgetary restrictions.

Finally, the AOU resolved at its first meeting in May of 1963 to establish an African Liberation Committee (ALC) of nine member states to coordinate recognized national liberation movements in the remaining colonies and white minority ruled states. The ALC has had tremendous difficulty in assembling an adequate budget. As Richard Bissell has noted, "In any one year until 1970 the Liberation Committee was unable to collect more than 58% and generally collected some 35 to 40% of its assessments."<sup>11</sup> Not surprisingly, the liberation movements tend to rely on the ALC for only about 10% of their total financial needs.<sup>12</sup>

### The OAU's Achievements and Failures

As already stated, the mere fact that the OAU still exists is a real achievement. No member has ever resigned, nor has any member ever been expelled. In fact membership has gone up by



almost two thirds.

The main reason for this admirable record is that despite its deviations the OAU has served as an arena for the release of tensions, and for a limited amount of continental policy formation. The OAU has proved useful in the development of inter-African transport and communications, although only a start has been made. It has successfully negotiated on behalf of Africa for economic development arrangements from the African Development Bank, the EEC, the World Bank and the UN.

As might be expected from an organization with no powerful central authority, decisions are more effective and meaningful when they involve non-controversial issues so that a consensus is reached. It is only when the OAU discusses divisive questions that it most often fails.

Curiously, foreign policy is one area in which the OAU has so far made significant progress in presenting a relatively united African front to the world. Colin Legum suggested in a 1975 article that there is a very sense in which it is possible to speak of the OAU having developed an "African foreign policy." Although it is obvious that not all 42 (now 47) OAU member-states adopt an identical foreign policy, their policies nevertheless have sufficient points of common interest over a significant number of crucial questions to constitute a continental approach to international affairs. This continental approach is determined, in part, by majority the dominant view. In this way, positive and negative forces operate to produce either voluntary or reluctant support for policies on issues considered to be of vital concern to the continent as a whole.<sup>13</sup>

While Legum is correct to the extent that he refers to foreign policy that directly affects Africa, the OAU has not in fact taken positions on world events peripheral to the continent, such as the Vietnam War. Yashpal Tandon has pointed out that by remaining silent on these issues, the OAU forfeits a measure of bargaining power, and thereby "diminishes the international stature of a whole continent."<sup>14</sup>

Nevertheless Africa has succeeded, largely by virtue of the fact that it represents 32% of UN membership, in internationalizing its campaign against colonialism and racism in southern Africa. But because the OAU has little practical bargaining power, it cannot convert this political capital into substantive results. The West still openly trades with the Republic of South Africa, despite the fact that it concurs with the OAU's moral position on apartheid.

The OAU has succeeded in garnering for itself the role of legitimizer in Africa. Whether or not a liberation group rebel organization secures OAU recognition may mean a great deal in terms of financial, military and diplomatic aid from African and extra-continental sources. The black insurrection in southern Sudan received little international attention because the OAU ignored it. Now that the OAU has recognized the MPLA government in Angola, the UNITA/FNLA movements have been largely forgotten by the world community. On the other hand, the South West Africa Peoples Organization (SWAPO), by virtue of its exclusive recognition by the OAU, has achieved a greater degree of international legitimacy than any of the other black groups in Namibia. It could never have secured this on its own.



Similarly if during the Nigerian civil war the OAU had abandoned its position of territorial integrity based on colonial borders and recognized Biafra, the rebel province might have attained a measure of political equality with the Federal Government in the eyes of the world. Nigeria might come under greater pressure to negotiate a settlement instead of pressing ahead to military victory.

The OAU has also boosted the concept of regionalism as an alternative to universalism. By dealing with its own internal problems, the OAU hopes to avoid the introduction of Cold War alignments into Africa. If conflicts arise among member-states, African governments generally prefer OAU mediation to UN involvement, which necessarily places the crisis in a world politics dimension, or single power intervention, which inevitably brings in selfish external interests. The question then is to what extent has the OAU succeeded in policing itself.

### The Algeria - Morocco Dispute

In the 1963 border dispute between Algeria and Morocco, the governments of Mali and Kenya were able to halt outright hostilities between the two countries in the name of the newly established OAU without involving the Arab League. The 1964 conflicts between Somalia and both Kenya and Ethiopia were resolved at OAU Assembly meetings upon the urging of not only African states, but also the Soviet Union and United States. The Niger-Dahomey border disputes of 1965 was settled peacefully by the mediation efforts of Gabon, Togo and Nigeria under the auspices of the OAU. And a specially formed OAU peace-keeping force replaced British troops in Tanganyika in 1964 when a mutiny in the nation's armed forces threatened to topple the government of Julius Nyerere.

In addition to the success the OAU achieved in the above cases of conflict management, the organization also served as a vehicle for improvement of inter-state relations. Simmering feuds between Chad and the Sudan, Ghana and Guinea, Congo (Kinshasa) and Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Kinshasa) and Rwanda, and Congo (Kinshasa) and Uganda were resolved usually in the name of the OAU but by third or fourth parties. As B. David Meyers has observed, "the pattern of conflict management can best be characterized as that of settlement within the organization rather than by the organization."<sup>15</sup> But there are also important cases in which the OAU has failed to resolve inter-African disputes.

In the West African conflict between Guinea and the Ivory Coast, the OAU was accused by Sekou Toure of encouraging subversion during unsuccessful mediation efforts. But a more frequent charge against the Organization was for inaction in, for example, The Congo Crisis, where lack of unity prevented the OAU from heading off superpower intervention by resolving the bloody 1964 Civil War on its own. OAU involvement in the Nigerian Civil War was similarly characterized by indecision born of political division. And the Organization did no better



in the Rwanda-Burundi dispute, which was only settled by complementary corps in both countries. Recently the OAU has also been unable to temper the hostility between Tanzania and Uganda. In fact, when the OAU Assembly was scheduled to meet in Kampala in 1973, Dar Es Salaam reacted by stating that "Tanzania cannot accept the mockery of condemning colonialism, apartheid, and fascism in the headquarters of a murderer, an oppressor, a black fascist and a self-confessed admirer of fascism."<sup>16</sup>

### The Liberation Committee

The African Liberation Committee of nine states was formed, as previously suggested, as a concession to radical governments who were concerned with giving the OAU a political, as well as economic coloring. Its function was the coordination of certain designated liberation movements in colonies or the Republic of South Africa for the purpose of attaining political independence under black majority rule in these territories. From the outset, the ALC has suffered from budgetary difficulties, a lack of OAU unanimity, and the difficulty of actually uniting the liberation movements.

Even though the ALC budget has been relatively low (about \$2 million recently) considering the task to be set about to do, only half of that amount can ever be counted upon to show up. And even then, the ALC allocates 50% of the money they do get to travel expenses instead of weapons and ammunition.

The problem of OAU disagreements is one that constantly, the embarrassingly undermines the ALC's formal objectives. Of the nine representative members of the ALC, for example, four (Zaire, Nigeria, Senegal and Zambia) all maintain extensive trade links with the Republic of South Africa. They are joined by Angola, Botswana, the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Gabon, Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire, Lesotho, Liberia, Malagasy Republic, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique and Swaziland.<sup>17</sup>

The magnitude of under-the-table contact between two-fifths of the OAU and South Africa makes it difficult for the ALC to be taken seriously by the outside world.

As if it were not enough, the ALC has also had singularly little success in coordinating liberation groups for the overthrow of minority or colonial governments. Richard Gibson has noted that "all efforts to impose unity on the squabbling, even fratricidal, movements of various countries have so far ended in dismal failure."<sup>18</sup> Certainly this was painfully obvious in Angola, but it remains to be seen whether the OAU can reverse its record in Zimbabwe.

### Conclusions

Despite the progress the OAU has made during the past thirteen years, Africa is not united. The cleavages that split the continent before the establishment of the organization still persist.



There are signs that the traditional cleavage between black and Arab Africa is not as absent as the OAU structure makes it seem. Now that the "have-not" nations of Africa are paying to the Arabs four times the amount of money they used to pay for petroleum and petroleum-based Western products, there appears to be a greater degree of tension between black and Arab nations. The divided black vote on the "Zionism equals racism" issue in the UN was one indication that resentment against the Arabs is growing.

Certainly there is no suggestion that personal rivalries among African leaders have disappeared. Presidents Amin and Nyerere, as well as King Hassan and Colonel Qaddafi are only two examples of bitter personal feuds that serve to further divide Africa.

The Francophone/Anglophone split also seems to be just below the surface in African inter-state relations. In 1974, for example, the OAU found itself embroiled in a strictly French Africa versus British Africa conflict over the appointment of choice settled the matter, it was clear that colonial experiences still figured prominently within the OAU.

Ideology, of course, is another divisive factor that has not disappeared with time. Beyond the basically different approaches that characterize internal African national development, there also cleavages between those who attributed an ideological purpose to the OAU and those who do not. It is clear that the OAU has tried to steer a course in between these two positions, but it seems just as obvious that both sides consider their arguments to be mutually exclusive. Ever since the organization was deadlocked over the Congolese civil war, humiliated in the Rhodesian UDI challenge, and helpless in the Angolan crisis, the "radical rump" of the OAU i.e. (Angola, Mozambique) has flirted with the idea of largely ignoring the organization and going outside Africa for support. On the other hand, the right wing of the OAU (i.e. Malawi, Ivory Coast) has already made a habit of only hearing from the organization what it wants to hear. Most of these countries were furious with the OAU's endorsement of guerrilla war in South Africa, and with the organization's inability to condemn Soviet and Cuban involvement in Angola. They disregard the Liberation Committee and continue to trade with the Republic of South Africa.

The legitimacy of the OAU is therefore under fire internally from both the left and the right. Paradoxically, however, the organization's international status has grown rather than diminished. The OAU has made progress in encouraging united African stands in international forums, and it has come to represent the entire continent (except the RSA) on the functional organs of the UN, on the World Bank, the EEC, and the African Development Bank. Although the OAU is known to come apart on controversial issues, it does seem to have achieved a measure of success in international economic negotiations, in non-ideological conflict resolution, and in promoting African development.

The reason for this is that the center holds States such as Kenya, Zaire, and Zambia which have so far acted as the fulcrum in the uneasy balance between right and left wings of the OAU still have not withdrawn their support for the organization. Should they do so, the concept of the OAU as the legitimate voice



of Africa would have to be abandoned. But the center states are not likely to desert the OAU in the near future. In fact, they will probably grow more influential in the very near future. In fact, they will probably grow more influential in the very near future due to the developing situation in southern Africa.

The imminent independence of Namibia (South West Africa) and Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) will rob the left wing of the OAU of the one remaining political issue it promoted that also enjoyed widespread support throughout Africa. Very few African states have trade relations with either of these countries, so most give unqualified support to the left's drive for black majority rule. But when independence is finally achieved for Namibia and Zimbabwe, the radicals will have only one more anti-racist issue to deal with: the Republic of South Africa. And as this paper has noted, the OAU is far from united on how to deal with the RSA.

The pressure is therefore likely to mount to concentrate on building Africa rather than liberating it. Surely for appearances sake the OAU would continue its half-loyal opposition to South African apartheid: given the political divisions in Africa, and the economic and military power of South Africa, nothing more substantial could be achieved. But the center and right-oriented states may well elect to ignore the radical's only exclusive institutional organ, the Liberation Committee, and become more concerned with the non-ideological aspects of African unity.

The left in this situation might find itself alienated from mainstream OAU politics, and would face two choices. One would be to join the centrists while continuing to keep the issue of South African apartheid alive. The other would be to remain within the OAU in name only, and to seek ideological, financial and military support from extra-continental sources. By choosing the second option, the left might not only compromise African unity as well as African self-reliance in conflict resolution, it might also lead the continent into a war it does not want.

The likelihood in either case is that the center will not only balance the OAU, it will control it. The result may be a greater degree of overall unity than has yet been achieved. With a mandate to develop Africa, the OAU should be able to work toward economic integration. It should be able to negotiate more favorable trade arrangements, such as the Lome agreement with the EEC, without being fearful of losing its independence to any external power bloc. And by finally concentrating on an issue that does indeed unite Africa, the OAU might succeed in muting the cleavages that split the continent.

The rivalry between African personalities, of course, can only be resolved by the growth of political stability and maturity. But the increased legitimacy of the OAU, while not directly capable of bringing this about, might well aid in creating the necessary conditions for the advent of institutional stability.

The arab/black split also could not be completely obliterated by the OAU. However, if the OAU had a clear mandate to negotiate with oil producers on behalf of almost all of Africa, it might be able to work towards a better deal for the continent in terms of petroleum prices or development aid. This type of reconciliation would surely mute the resurgent anti-arab mood in sub-Saharan Africa, and the 1977 Afro-Arab conference was a first step in this direction.



Similarly, if a united OAU continued to negotiate trade agreements with a united EEC, it might help quiet the Francophone/Anglophone split by weaving together the traditional economic ties that now divide Africa. Nothing the OAU can do will eliminate different colonial experiences. But the OAU can do a great deal to harmonize the present and future experiences of independent African States so that a real foundation for unity is created.

The key is for the OAU to deal with issues that unite instead of those that divide. Only then will it become an effective institution. Up to now, the organization has tried to do both, and as a result neither effort has been particularly successful. As the war against colonialism subsides, the OAU will probably seize the opportunity to build Africa's future. The problem of South Africa, however, will not be resolved in the near future. It will haunt African unity for a long time to come. In the meanwhile, the OAU will probably be trying to make of itself something more than a mere voice.

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The Multinational Corporation:positive or negative?

Larry Stollar

Problems associated with multinational corporations have recently dominated international political discussions. In the following piece, sophomore Larry Stollar, a Tufts political science major, assesses some of the criticisms and defenses of modern multinational corporations.

Multinational Corporations, are those business enterprises with headquarters in one nation that engage in business activity in foreign countries. These sorts of operations have existed in various forms for some time, but it has not been until recent years that they became the prominent international actors that they are today. The exponential growth of international corporate activity in the past two decades has made the multinational corporation one of the prime vehicles for expanding the interdependent and intertwined political and economic relationships that characterize our current international system. The multinational has been a target of both praise and criticism as a result of the effects it has had on world politics and the international political system. In the first part of this essay, we will see the series of effects that multinationals have had on the various actors that it effects. In the following sessions, we shall examine how these results of multinational can be construed as positive or negative factors from the point of view international politics, first from a radical point of view, and then from a more moderate outlook. After considering these two "consensus" views of the multinational, I will present my own thoughts on the overall effects on international politics brought about by the growth in importance of the multinational corporation.

Many of the effects of the multinational corporation which will be presented may seem to be limited in scope-confined to what might seem to be purely economic or domestic issues, as opposed to "political" concerns. In the modern world, as we shall see in the later discussion of interdependence, economic issues are intermitely bound up with political concerns. This phenomena is described at length by Blake and Walters, as is the role of so-called "domestic" concerns. As domestic actors such as labor unions, business firms, and environmental lobbies are becoming involved in the international policy formation process in defense of their respective interests, it is important that we consider the effect the multinational has had upon them, as well as upon the more conventional, "political" actors.



A first and very evident effect of international investment is the growth and development it can lead to in the host country. In a north-south alignment, this can mean the formation of totally new industries and businesses, which could not have been developed on the basis of local capital or technology. The excavation of mineral resources in South America or the sinking of wells in the Persian Gulf nations are examples of operations which could not have been carried out without large amounts of foreign investment, as local capital and technological resources were insufficient. In the west-west framework, where a capital market may previously exist, direct foreign investment can contribute to a more efficient pattern of capital use when the local markets are limited or poorly functioning. The investment of Citreën in Maseratishas helped keep the Italian manufacturer in business during Italys economic crisis. American capital and technology developed much of Canadas mineral and oil reserves, which Canada had been unable to do herself, as a result of her small population and limited capital base. In either the North-South or East-West frameworks, foreign investment can have a positive effect on the magnitude and efficiency of a host nations economy.

Foreign investment can bring on several other, beneficial, results. The industries and services created by the multinational often lead to increased employment opportunities for host state workers. The technological and managerial skills brought in by the multinational can be transferred to the less advanced nation, as her own citizens work with representatives of the multinational company. The rise in economic output may provide a source of new tax revenue for the host nation government, as it takes a share of the profits and salaries generated by the multinationals investment. Finally, the products and services produced by the multinational corporation which are sold internally, along with the potential increase in employment and salary levels can cause a general rise in the host countrys standard of living. This higher standard may serve to narrow the gap between poorer hosts and richer parents, lessening potential friction between the two sides. Canada could not have achieved her present standard of living with out the enormous investment American firms poured into her economy. Without the benefits of United States multinational corporate activity, Canada might well have remained a rather underdeveloped nation, her oil, mineral and timber resources unexploited or developed to a far lesser extent than they are presently. A poor Canada existing alongside a relatively wealthy America is a situation which could produce political and military friction among two nations who presently enjoy good relations and the worlds longest undefended border.

The above are the major direct positive effects of economic growth and development in the host nation. There is, in addition, a series of negative aspects arising from foreign investment growth generated in a host nation. As described above, the multinational corporation can develop previously unutilised or underdeveloped sectors of a host countries economy. This growth may, however, be misdirected and exploitative in nature- detrimental to the welfare of the host nation. A few years ago, an American baby food company in sales of its product



in that area. Processed baby food is extremely expensive relative to its nutritive value, and African mothers who purchased the product unnecessarily spending money which would have been better used to buy locally produced unprocessed food for their children. The Coca-Cola company has been a target of criticism along similar lines, detractors charging that money spent on the highly advertised soft drinks could better be used for other things. This sort of misdirected growth can cause injurious shifts in consumption habits, and deflect labor and money away from priorities which the host nation would prefer to pursue.

A second negative factor involved in the economic expansion process is the fact that the multinational producer can often sell its product in the host nation without regard to local market forces and true costs of production. If a hypothetical multinational operator was the sole producer of a particular product in its host nation, it could sell this product at a price higher than it would have to if it faced competition in the marketplace. Monopolistic (or oligopolistic) situations such as the above exact a higher price from host nation consumers that is theoretically necessary, and thus, the multinational can sometimes be justifiably accused of taking advantage of host state citizens.

The question of exploitation also arises in the case of multinationals which engage in extractive operations. Multinationals in enterprises such as mining and forestry are seen as stealing the natural resources of the host country and exploiting them for private profit. There is economic development but again, it is most likely not compatible with the needs and goals of the host state.

The expansion of multinational business activities within a nation usually involved participation on the part of host country citizens. Participants may be unskilled laborers, local managers or trained technocrats. In any case, those at the top of the ladder, being more closely affiliated with the management of the multinational corporation, tend to benefit more greatly from the multinationals' operations, through their link to the outside economic system. These higher level personnel come into contact with foreign philosophies and living standards. Often adapting their own lifestyles to a more "advanced" international orientation. Those host country citizens at the bottom of the scale remain fundamentally untouched by international ideas and fashions, their lives not being significantly changed by international contact. The overall result of the factors described above is the perpetuation of an economic and political elite within the host nation, expanding the gap between rich and poor segments of society, a gap which the host nation government is often working to eliminate. In listening to a student from Kano, Nigeria, the resentment on the part of members of less developed segments of a society toward those who profit from multinational operations was strongly brought to life. He spoke rather bitterly about the foreign oil companies operating in his country, who, he claimed, operated to the benefit of a handful of technocrats and politicians in the national capital, Lagos, these being the only Nigerians who really profited from the multinational corporate activities. An internationally oriented elite had been created, and served to widen the gap between rich and poor in Nigerian society, according to one observer.



We have seen some of the direct positive and negative effects of multinational investment which involve the results such investments can directly generate in a host nation. The growth of the multinational corporation also has a variety of secondary effects that it can bring about in a host nation. Before proceeding to evaluate the overall effect of the multinational corporation on the international political system as a whole, it is important that we look at these other key aspects of multinational corporate expansion.

In a world where economic matters are also vital governmental concerns, the economic expansion of the multinational company has affected both host and parent country control over issues of political importance. First, we will look at the idea of control and the multinational corporations it affects the host nation.

The operations of a large multinational company in a given second country often constitute a relatively major percent of the nation's economic activity. The actions of the multinational, therefore, have far reaching repercussions on the host state society, which are often completely beyond the control of and contrary to the goals and aspirations of the host state. A decision by a multinational firm to shut down a minor third world branch may be a minor matter to the corporation, but it could, in the host nation, cause widespread unemployment, reduced export earnings, lowered tax revenue, and a reduction in living standards. The host nation has little control over these economic setbacks, and thus suffers a loss in its own sovereignty, in its ability to pursue its desired policies and effect the welfare of its own citizens. A host nation can then, often be at the mercy of decisions made far away by those whose interests are different than its own. This is a definitive example of loss of governmental control in a host state.

The privately owned multinational corporation has the ability to move its capital and staff between nations relatively easily, and therefore need not be drastically affected by the restrictions and regulations that may be placed upon it by any one host country. If a host nation proposes to tax a multinational manufacturing firm within its borders at a level it feels would be more equitable, it may find itself faced with a countermove on the part of the corporation, in the form of threats of relocation and withdrawal.

Blake and Walters provide an example of this aspect of the multinational's operation. They describe a situation in which a multinational automaker, faced with what it felt to be an unprofitable environment, threatened to move its operations to a neighboring nation. The transnational mobility of the multinational corporation effectively defuses many host nation tactics for attempting to control corporate profit level, national employment, rates of reinvestment and degrees of economic growth. If a host nation desires to retain the benefits of a given multinational corporation's activities, it may have to bow to the corporation's wishes on the key issues listed above, under threat of corporate relocation. Thereby eroding a degree of host country control over economic and political matters.

As described previously, multinational activity can per-



petuate an existing rich-poor gap in a host nation, a gap which the host government may be working to minimize. This serves as another example of host country sovereign control being reduced by the multinational corporation.

A final illustration of multinational corporate effect on host nation control is the interference the multinational can generate in the processes of international relations. The host nation can find itself on the receiving end of parent state manipulation through the instrument of the multinational corporation. An example of this is the role that International Telephone and Telegraph States high level policy in the overthrow of the Allende regime. The presence of multinationals also complicates relations within the European Economic Community, political squabbles having arisen over the operations of multinational agricultural and automobile manufacturing firms.

We have looked at the key effects of multinational operations on host nation political control. We now shall look at the opposite perspective, the effects of such operation on the political and economic control of the parent state.

As stated above, the parent country can sometimes intentionally use the multinational as a tool of its own foreign aims. There are situations, however, when the roles are reversed and the multinational corporation functions as an unintended instrument of parent nation policy, bringing about results not to the liking of the parent nation government. Northrup and General Dynamics, in their appeals to the government of Iran to purchase advanced jet aircraft, are propagating arms sales in an area that the United States would prefer to see at a lower level of military strength. The activities of American computer firms in the Soviet Union have also been questioned by those in government, in as much as sophisticated technological information may be being transferred to the Soviets by these companies. American designed integrated circuits have turned up in Soviet weaponry, according to government sources which remained unnamed. If these sources were correct, the implications of such a transfer are apparent. The American firms involved in this technological turnover may be guilty of aiding a potential battlefield enemy, a situation which would obviously displease the United States government. The personnel of U.S. companies in the Soviet Union are also potential targets of Soviet intelligence operations, covert or otherwise, again a situation beyond immediate host nation control.

Another example of the multinational acting as an unintended conveyor of host nation policy arises in the case of South Africa. Polaroid and other large American firms have significant holdings in South Africa, to the detriment of Americas' image in much of Black Africa. While the United States does not intend to be a supporter of the Pretoria government and its policies, Black African nations see Washington as being guilty of precisely such a change, in as much as U.S. companies are permitted to operate in South Africa. Again, we see how multinational activities have complicated parent country policies, presenting their home government with problems that it might not otherwise have to deal with. Such activities can defeat



attempts at international accomodation and cooperation on the part of the parent nation. Again using the above example, the United States is not likely to be able to achieve a successful working relationship with the majority of African nations until it can extricate itself from the "image" problems caused by American multinational corporations operating in South Africa, another example of control erosion.

We saw previously how a host country can be a victim of parent state manipulation through multinational activity. The reverse situation can also occur, when the parent nation is similarly controlled through the host state. The actions of OPEC nations in raising oil prices were transmitted to the parent states through the submission of the multinational oil firms to the demands of the cartel. The repercussions of this manipulation of the multinational by a set of host nations were severe. The parent nation can also become a victim of multinational operations, as these corporations can serve as policy tools of the host country.

To sum the effects of the multinational corporation in the area of political and economic sovereignty and control, it appears that both the host and parent nations lose some measure of control over foreign and domestic policy goals. Whether this is "good" or "bad", along with the other effects detailed on previous pages, we shall see later on.

Another group of important results brought about by the multinational is the effects that it has, as a foreign entity, on the societies of the nations in which it does business. The multinational corporation can serve as a vehicle for transmission of alien customs, morals, and business structures from the parent society to that of the host. In an underdeveloped country, this can lead to the advancement of that countries institutions, as local entities such as business firms, banks and cargo handling facilities are modernized and made more efficient as a result of exposure to the multinationals more advanced ways of doing business. Culturally, also, the multinationals corporation can help to open a "backward" nation to the world around it, enabling to participate more effectively in that world. This issue cuts in another direction, however. The multinational can often be justifiably accused of transmitting negative aspects of the parent society to that of the host nation. American businessmen, in pursuit of speed and efficiency, have upset traditional modes of doing business in the Middle East where commerce was previously conducted amidst ceremony and formality, showing that the business being done was being carried out among friends. To many in the affected nations, this is a negative development, as their long standing customs are sacrificed to the standards of the modern corporation. The employees of international companies have been accused of propagating their "neon and plastic" lifestyles in the Persian Gulf countries, upsetting the traditional modes of life in these states. Criticism has been leveled at multinationals operating in Japan, Canada, and other host states, residents of these nations feeling that their cultural distinctivness and independence is being compromised by the influences of the multinational. One cannot help but sympathize, for example, with the McDonald's



restaraunt! On a more mundane level, Canadians often object to what they see as the "homogenization" of their national distinctivness as a result of the high degree of American investment in their country. In any case, one can see how the operations of alien multinational coporations can affect, for better or for worse, the cultural and social surrroundings in which they are carried out.

I have detailed a series of key effects brought about by the existence of the multinational corporation. All of these effects, taken in sum, produce a large part of the most important phenomena that charecterises the current world economic and political situation, the phenomenia of interdependence. Each of the above aspects of the multinationals activities are pieces in an immensely complicated interlocking puzzle, with the factors generated by each individual piece of affecting the other pieces and the puzzle as a whole. A series of examples serve to illustrate this metaphor of international interdependence.

When OPEC countries forced multinational oil firms to hike their prices to extreme levels, the repercussions built up, drastically affecting a variety of actors. Many of these repercussions were directly passed on through the multinational corporation. When Western industrial concerns, dependent on multinational oil company supplies, found the cost of this crucial raw material rising, they were forced to cut back on their own operations, raise prices and lay off workers. Third world manufacturing subsidiaries were shut down, affecting labor forces, living standards and export earnings in these nations. The governments of both developed and underdeveloped nations saw their political control eroded, as plans for industrial development were hindered by the scarcity and cost of oil. Third world nations dependent on petroleum based fertilizers were beset by the skyrocketing price of this essential product, leading to a drain in foreign currency holdings payed out for this indispensable item. The oil rich nations found themselves with vast amounts of hard currency, which they began spending on station wagons, Loarjets, and other items previously alien to their way of life, fundamentally affecting the nature of their societies. Political conflict arose, as the less well off third world states demanded aid from their now rich "brother" states. These sorts of indirect repercussions ranged far afield, from the world wide increase in the price of petroleum based phonograph records to the lowering of the highway speed likits in the United States to defaulted loans on the part of third world borrowers caught in a balance-of-payments drain. Thus, the actions of a handful of host nations, carried out through the offices of the multinational corporations involved, had worldwide implications. It is not essential to discuss whether the situation would have turned out differently if the multinational corporation had not existed. It is sufficient for our purposes to realise the results that the multinational helped carry throughout the entire world, the series of concentric consequences that the multinational cooperation played a vital role in distributing and magnifying.



the phenomena of interdependence is the key sum product of the multinational corporation, the total of the numerous separate effects of multinational corporate activity.

The above section can now serve as a base for the final section of this paper, my personal views on the impact of the multinational corporation and its growth on the international political system. Dealing with the various issues as they were laid out earlier, I shall present my evaluation of the overall effect of the multinational corporation. I think that on balance, the growth generated by multinational corporations acts as a positive factor in the international political system. The ability of the multinational to move capital, hardware and management talent to areas which would not normally benefit from these items helps increase the size of the "pie" that the nations of the world must share among themselves. A larger pie is a far desirable solution to the problem of resource distribution than having to redistribute an already divided one, the latter method being a route to conflict confrontations and violence. As the activities of multinational corporations expand, the world can enjoy what economists would term an extended "production-possibility" curve; we are better able to utilize the resources we have at hand to produce and distribute a wider variety of goods and services throughout the world. Without multinationals such as Bic, Mitsubishi, or Nestles, to name but a few, we in the United States would be faced with a smaller selection of goods and services. In a smaller, less developed nation, the situation is even more serious, as local capital and production facilities are often insufficient to guarantee a satisfactory level of national income, consumer products, and industrial development. The multinational is the most efficient, and usually the most effective means for developing the growth needed to raise such a nation's standard of living. Efficient and well directed growth in a previously poor nation can make a major contribution toward relieving the pressures felt in today's international political system which result from the inequality of income distribution in the world. The narrowing of the income gap will enable the nations of both developed and less developed worlds to regard each other with less of the misunderstanding and aversity that often characterizes their relations today, in as much as the pervasive feeling of "haves" competing with the "have-nots" will be reduced.

While the above may sound rather idealistic and unrealistic, it is meant to apply to an ideal situation, where corporations are able and willing to cooperate with the goals of the governments in whose nations they operate. It is necessary in the world, to recognize the negative factors that come with the multinational corporation, and to discuss the steps that must be taken before the positive picture outlined above can become a widespread phenomena.

The profit motive, while efficient, is also generally blind. Misdirected, costly economic development, or expansion in areas a host government would prefer to see left alone by a profit seeking company can lead to a set of negative



effects on the international system. Cooperation between host and parent nations becomes more difficult as suspicion and opposition arises on the part of the former, forced to deal with corporations working contrary to its aims. This complication of cooperation again makes the international pursuit of stability and equity that much more difficult. The multinational and the government in whose country the corporation has its home must, through dialogue and consultation with the receiver states, attempt to control the direction and cost of growth in the host state, in order to facilitate both an improved business atmosphere and a better climate for international cooperation.

On the topic of political control, the multinational corporations and their parent governments must be conscious of the repercussions that their actions can have in host nations. Through an increased sense of awareness and responsibility, the company and parent state can again create conditions conducive to both mutual host and parent economic benefit as well as an improved atmosphere for international cooperation. The host nations must also, to the degree possible, attempt to take control of their relations with the multinationals through the means open to them; regional partnership, international dialogue, restrictions on the conditions of doing business in their respective nations, etc. With both sides dealing out of "strength", the prospects for one way domination of one side by the other are reduced, and host and corporate are able to work in a cooperative relationship, rather than potentially explosive dominant-submissive situation.

Socially and culturally, the operation of the multinational has, in my opinion, both the positive effects covered on the liberal view, and the negative ones described in the radical perspective. I think that both the positive exposure process and the negative homogenization are inevitable results of the multinational's expansion. Neither of these aspects need have, however, a negative effect on the international system. Host nations have it within their power to preserve national cultural distinctiveness, if this is an overriding concern, as occurred in the case of Saudi Arabia, where in spite of extensive multinational activity life still goes on in much the same manner it did prior to the expansion. Much of the criticism directed in the multinational for "cultural dilution" is, I feel, an excuse for ineffective parent state action and political capital for domestic consumption.

On the final, encompassing issue of interdependence, I believe that the multinational corporation, carefully managed by host, parent, and its own controllers can be a positive influence on the international political system. There are those who would point to the multinational and accuse it of "complicating" the world, of setting up vast amounts of new relationships in the world order, and making the struggle order more difficult. I feel that this is a misconception. As the world population increases and a growing number of interests become involved in the competition for resources,



new and more efficient ways of international production and distribution must be found. The multinational, as one of these ways of producing a more efficient and equitable system, acts to reduce some of the crucial tensions that develop in the struggle for order. In a shrinking world, interdependence would have become an important factor regardless of the presence of the multinational corporation. In tandem with the immediate economic benefits that the multinational can, on balance, bring about, it has also served to focus our attention on the issue of interdependence, enabling us to deal with the issue and its problems and solutions at the current time, rather than at some later date when the situation could be far worse. This is, in my view, a very positive contribution to the current and future international systems, helping us define and deal with a problem far earlier than might occur otherwise.

Party Institutionalization  
and the Problem of Succession in Cuba

Raymond E. Morales

CIA documents recently made public show that even after the Bay of Pigs fiasco, the Kennedy administration underestimated the strength of the Castro government. Under Johnson and Nixon, U.S. - Cuban relations steadily deteriorated. In the late 1960's and early 1970's, the Castro government was seen as completely dependent on Soviet aid. Cuban involvement in Angola was generally considered to have been commanded by the USSR, possibly at the expense of Cuban interests. Yet under Jimmy Carter the United States carefully has been trying to improve its relations with the Castro government.

On the following paper, Raymond Morales argued that the Castro revolutionary government is firmly entrenched, and that the Cuban political process has become gradually institutionalized. Morales not only believes that Cuba has a will of its own, but that even without Castro the present governing structure would be sustained.

Morales a political science, wrote his article for Professor Smith's Politics of Developing Countries in the fall of 1976.

The Cuban Revolution was produced by a generation of men dissatisfied with the course of the political history of Cuba. Since its "independence" in 1902, affairs in Cuba had been controlled directly by a political elite whose interests were closely associated with U.S. interests on the island, and indirectly by the U.S. Ambassador in Cuba and the U.S. President. The United States had secured the right to intervene militarily in Cuba through the infamous Platt Amendment to the Cuban Constitution added by the U.S. Congress, and did so at various times between 1902 and 1936. Political dissatisfaction and alienation in Cuba reached their peak as a result of extensive corruption and mismanagement during the dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista. Widespread opposition from almost all sectors of Cuban society created a power vacuum which made it possible for a relatively few men led by Fidel Castro to defeat Batista's demoralized army and overthrow the government in January 1959. Under the circumstances, the new leaders did not have the backing of a political organization ready to operate after the takeover. Instead, the new regime operated under Fidel's personal rule backed by the guerrilla and the support from the peasant population which he had been able to



attract during the years of preparation and fighting at the Sierra Maestra mountains. Since then, the political organization of the regime has been modified in response to changing conditions in Cuba and has moved towards the path of increasing institution and stability. These changes have not altered the predominant role played by Fidel and his trusted comrades from the guerrilla (fidelistas), but the emerging Cuban Communist Party PCC) has expanded the level of political participation of the population and has attracted much needed professionals and experts to leadership positions in the party and government. As a result, the Cuban Revolution is experiencing today a level of stability and success greater than ever before, and this favorable outlook is likely to remain unaltered even in the event of the death of its founding father, Fidel Castro.

The purpose of this essay is to examine the role that the PCC is likely to play in the succession process, as an indication of the stability and success of the Cuban Revolution. The thesis in the essay is that the PCC is likely to play an increasingly major role in this process, despite these characteristics of Cuban political rule which have set it apart from other communist regimes. Those leaders which seem most likely to succeed Fidel at present are also likely to continue and even accelerate the permanent institutionalization of the PCC at the expense of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) which, at present, is the strongest institution in Cuba. The increasing strength of the PCC will be measured by a set of criteria developed by Harvard Professor Samuel P. Huntington, and generally accepted in academic circles. This criteria consists of four points: (1) the party's organizational complexity and depth, (2) the importance attached to it as a source of power by the leaders of the regime. (3) its success in mobilizing the population for various ends, especially as demonstrated by voter turnout in an election (the recent referendum on the new Cuban Constitution will provide the basis for this analysis), and (4) its ability to survive independent from its founder (which will be shown implicitly as it is part of the main thesis).<sup>1</sup>

The Cuban Revolution was not inspired by Marxist ideology. It was the product of a new generation led by nationalistic ideals and a strong political and social conscience. The conditions under which the revolution took place made necessary a centralized organization under the leadership of Fidel, similar in structure to the traditional Latin American "caudillo" rule. This organization made possible the survival of the revolution in the face of strong opposition from the upper and middle class elements in the Cuban society, which were not willing to accept the social and economic reforms being implemented by Fidel. It also succeeded in overcoming the foreign threat originating from the United States by such actions as its successful diplomatic pressure on the members of the Organization of American States (OAS) for a general embargo against Cuba, its organization and support of the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, and the CIA's plots against Fidel's life.

Fidel's personal rule was successful to a great extent because of his direct appeal to the mass of the Cuban population, particularly the peasants and workers. Such mass organizations as the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution,



the Confederation of Cuban Workers and the Federation of Cuban Women provided the framework for the mobilization of the population and the legitimacy of the revolution. These organizations were under the central direction of the original PCC, which was heavily dominated by the fidelistas. Fidel had purposely left out most of the "old Communists" of the People's Socialist Party (PSP) which existed in Cuba before the revolution but did not support him until the last minute, when Batista's fall was imminent. Since then he has appropriated the PSP's organization to consolidate his own rule and has also courted a few of the party's leaders to attract the support of the Soviet Union. Fidel also strengthened his own position by assuming the top posts of the army, government and party organs, a position which he maintains to this day. His titles after 1960 have included Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, Prime Minister of the Revolutionary Government, President of the National Institute of Agrarian Reform, and recently President of the Council of State (similar to the Politburo in the USSR) and First Secretary of the PCC (after its founding in 1965).

The turn towards the permanent institutionalization and expansion of the PCC resulted from the changing internal and external conditions in Cuba. Successful mobilization of the population through the mass organizations had eliminated the reactionary threat of those who wanted to reverse the policies of the revolution, and thus allayed some of Fidel's fears of a more open structure. Serious economic problems had resulted from the unrealistic policies of loyal fidelistas with a lack of experience, expertise, and management ability to direct the national economy. The inability of the regime to succeed in its drive for a 10 million ton sugar harvest in 1970 provided the catalyst for a change in political structure to incorporate some of the elements in the society which had previously been left out.

Furthermore, institutionalization along Soviet lines became imperative in order to secure the economic, military and political support from that country. After severing all ties with the U.S. in 1961, Cuba increasingly turned to the U.S.S.R. for support for fear of an attack from its neighbor. Fidel sought to convince the U.S.S.R. of the socialist character of the revolution to guarantee Soviet support for the revolution in the spirit of proletarian internationalism. The economic problems which Cuba faced as a result of mismanagement and the OAS embargo increased Cuba's economic dependence on the U.S.S.R. Technical intergration with the Soviet Union after the 1970 harvest failure has also provided a definite impetus to the goal of institutionalization. Among the recent developments pointing to this dependency are the establishment of a Soviet-Cuban Intergovernmental Commission for Economic, Scientific and Technological Cooperation (1970), Cuba's admission to the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (1972), a mutual agreement to postpone the repayment of the Cuba debt to the U.S.S.R. until 1986 (1972), and the coordination between Cuba's and the Soviet Union's Five Year Plan for 1976-1980 (1976). Thus the Soviet Union has acquired a greater stake in the survival of the Cuban Revolution and has consequently exercised political and economic pressure for more institutionalization.



The move toward institutionalization of the revolution took on a new emphasis in 1970 with the replacement of fidelista officials in the government with more qualified civilian and military personnel. In 1972 the government structure was reorganized into more efficient supercabinets which resulted in the delegation of more authority in the domestic economy to President Dorticos (a former PSP leader with strong ties to Fidel). An experiment in local government (Poder Popular), which provided for decentralization through the election of local officials responsible for certain government services, was initiated in 1974 and has recently been adopted nationwide. The party's role has been strengthened through increased differentiation from the government, new and expanded leadership, an increase in the general membership, and classroom instruction for the members. And, most importantly, the recent First Congress of the PCC and the adoption by referendum of the new socialist constitution have served to legitimize all the changes that have taken place since 1970. This has demonstrated the increasing complexity and depth of the PCC and its favorable impact in the structure and function of the Cuban government, an important indication of party strength in terms of the criteria previously discussed.

The second part of Huntington's criteria for measuring party strength, the importance of the party as a source of power for the leaders of the regime, is shown in the new official documents such as the Cuban Constitution and the program of the PCC. The first chapter of the constitution defines the role of the party as:

"the highest leading force of the society and the state, which organizes and guides the common effort towards the goals of the construction of socialism and the progress towards a communist society."<sup>2</sup>

The Platform of the PCC Program adopted by the delegates to the First Congress states that the PCC legitimacy resides in its exercise of the dictatorship of the proletariat, so that the working class must predominate in its membership. The party operates under the principles of democratic centralism, which combines elections by popular suffrage, accountability, collective leadership and central authority exercised by the higher organs of the party. The Platform stresses the party's power over the state, armed forces and organizations exercised by:

"the method of persuasion and conviction (based on) the prestige and authority which it enjoys amidst the entire people and through the free and conscious conformation of these organizations and organs to its leadership role."<sup>3</sup>

The increasing importance of the party has also been asserted by Fidel himself as early as 1973:

"In the uncertain times of the 26th of July and in the early years of the Revolution, individuals played a decisive role, a role now carried out by the Party. Men die, but the



Party is immortal."<sup>4</sup>

The importance given to the party by other key leaders and competitors for power can be demonstrated by analyzing their background and likelihood to succeed Fidel. Among these, the heir designate is Raul. He is the Second Secretary of the PCC with dual membership in the Political Bureau and Secretariat, First Vice President of the Cuban State and Government (with authority to succeed to the Presidency in case of the President's absence, illness or death as stated in Article 92 of the Constitution), and Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR). Although his main ties have been with this last organization, he has favored and stressed the importance of the party's role and may insist that the party legitimize his own ascension if it happens. As an institution, the FAR has been stronger than the PCC due to Raul's shielding it from Fidel's intervention during the 1960's, and to the increasingly important role it has played both in military operations (as in Angola) and in providing technical skills for civilian jobs. Thus it could play a major role in the succession struggle, but such a role is likely to diminish over time as the process of institutionalization continues and the PCC gains in strength. Raul himself is likely to support these changes as he asserts himself more predominantly in the PCC. Within the party he will presumably have the support of the fidelistas in the Political Bureau (most important organ), which number 8 of 11 (not counting Fidel and Raul), in the Secretariat (4 of 7), among the Provincial First Secretaries (5 of 6), and in the Central Committee (which is apparently also composed of a majority of fidelistas, although not as predominantly as in the old Central Committee).<sup>5</sup> Thus, an increased role of the PCC in the succession struggle is likely to benefit Raul's chances, and he is, in turn, likely to favor such a role for the party.

The other most likely contenders at this time are Osvaldo Dorticos and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez. Dorticos had occupied the position of President of the Republic since 1959 and had become trusted fidelista since then. Additionally, he is a member of the Political Bureau of the PCC, Vice President of the Cuban State, and Minister for domestic economy. His main ties are with the government bureaucracy, which is not likely to play an important role as an institution in the succession struggle. Outside of this, his support comes from within the same ranks of the party as Raul's (the fidelistas), and is thus not likely to rival him except in the event of a strong movement for collective leadership. The power balance between the competing leaders, and the spirit of the changes recently instituted seem to point towards the likelihood of such a movement appearing after Fidel's death, especially if the institutionalization of the party continues over the years along the same path.

Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, whose original ties were with the PSP, has nevertheless acquired the confidence of Fidel and his followers in light of his role after the economic disaster of 1970. His main ties are with the technocrats both in the party and government, but he has the weakest position in relation to the other two from within Cuba. Yet his strongest support may come from the Soviet Union, which favors him for his past ties



with the pro-Moscow PSPS as well as his strong organizational skills. The Soviet Union which, as previously stated, is likely to play an important role in the succession struggle, is nevertheless likely to support, or at least tolerate, both Raul and Dorticos. There is also a strong possibility that the Soviet Union may favor the emergence of a genuine collective leadership from within the ranks of the PCC. This seems to be, therefore, the most likely possibility, with Raul playing the dominant role in such an arrangement, but not as strong as Fidel's present role. All three contenders have an important stake in the continued institutionalization of the party and its ability to play an increasingly important role in the succession struggle, attesting at the same time to the increasing strength of the party.

The third point in Huntington's criteria for measuring party strength in the party's success in mobilizing the population. Political participation in Cuba has been incorporated into such institutions as the mass organizations and the PCC. This has made the Cuban political system more stable than it had ever been before the revolution. A measure of the party's ability to mobilize the population was provided by the recent referendum on the new constitution. According to Raul Castro, six million (out of a total population of nine million) Cuban citizens participated in discussions held prior to the referendum, and 95.7% of all citizens over 16 years of age took part in the actual vote. The constitution was approved by 97.7% of the voters.<sup>6</sup> This demonstration of support demonstrates the increasing strength of the PCC.

In conclusion, I have attempted to show three main pointers in the preceding essay: (1) that the PCC has emerged out of the recent changes in Cuba as a strong political institution, (2) that it is likely to play an increasingly major role in any future succession struggle, and (3) that the process of institutionization that has taken place in Cuba is likely to continue in the future, whether or not there is a change of leadership arising from the death of Fidel. The revolution has achieved today a level of stability which virtually guarantees its success.

## FOOTNOTES

- <sup>1</sup>Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1968, pp. 402-3 and 409-10.
- <sup>2</sup>Granma, "Constitution of the Republic of Cuba", March 7, 1976 (Supplement), Article 5
- <sup>3</sup>FBIS, Daily Report: Latin America, "Cuban Communist Party Program Platform", December 4, 1975 (Supplement), Sections 108, 111 and 112.
- <sup>4</sup>Quoted in Edward Gonzalez, "Political Succession in Cuba" Studies in Comparative Communism, Spring-Summer 1976, p.86
- <sup>5</sup>Edward Gonzalez, "Castro and Cuba's New Orthodoxy", Problems of Communism, January-February 1976, pp. 16-8
- <sup>6</sup>FBIS, Daily Report: Latin America, "New Constitution Proclaimed, Raul Delivers Address", February 25, 1976, pp.Q2



Spanish Sahara:Powers and the Pawn

Andrew B. Walworth

In what Professor Robinson described as a "good piece of detective work," Andrew Walworth weaves the tale of an international dispute over the Spanish Sahara that has more twists than an Agatha Christie novel. Walworth perceptively describes the roles of a dying Franco, an autocratic Hassan, and the new monarch, Juan Carlos in working out the terms of a settlement for the Spanish Sahara dispute. Walworth's article is an excellent account of international power (and pawn) politics.

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In November of 1975, world attention focused briefly on a small strip of roadway 10 km. south of the Moroccan border. Ten thousand unarmed Moroccan civilians faced a number of Spanish troops in what appeared to be the first step to yet another war in Africa. The fate of two kings and their countries seemed to hinge on what would transpire. Why did the Spanish Sahara become the object of an international dispute that bordered on war, and how did the Spanish and Moroccan governments resolve the conflict while avoiding major bloodshed?

The 105,448 square miles of land known as Spanish Sahara lie south of Morocco on the Atlantic coast. The area shares borders with Morocco, Algeria, and Mauretania. Spanish influence dates back to 1476, when the south-western portion of Morocco known as Infi was occupied by Spanish troops. The Saharan interior was left uncharted for centuries, and no attempts were made to bring the inhabitants under any type of governmental control. In 1884, Spain annexed the territory, declaring it an integral part of Spain. The treaty of Fez, signed in 1912, guaranteed European recognition of Spanish sovereignty in the Sahara, the Infi, and two smaller enclaves on Morocco's Mediterranean coast. France gained control of Algeria, Mauretania, and Morocco. No significant resistance to Spanish rule was met before Moroccan independence, except a few tribal clashes. Before 1956, no boundaries were enforced between Spanish Sahara and its neighbors, and nomadic people migrated freely between the French and Spanish colonies.<sup>1</sup>



The 75,000 native inhabitants of the Spanish Sahara can be divided into three groups. The people in the north are mountain Berbers, who lead a settled life, and are most closely related to the Moroccans. The middle region is populated by partial nomads, who have houses and till the earth, but migrate south at certain times of the year. In the south and west, desert nomads roam freely, often crossing into Algeria and Mauretania. The capital city of El Aaiun had a population of 24,000, before Spanish withdrawal. Most of the 10,000 Spanish settlers lived in Aaiun, and 20,000 Spanish Foreign Legion soldiers were stationed around the city and at smaller outposts.<sup>2</sup> It seems improbable that a modern society could develop in the Spanish Sahara, due to the nomadic nature of most of the population, and lack of natural resources. In recent years, Spain had made efforts to improve the medical and educational facilities available, but the population is so spread out that only the urban dwellers could easily gain from such efforts. Spain also tried to diversify the economy by introducing a tourist trade, but it had not been a very successful project.

Throughout history, the Spanish Sahara has been generally regarded as a veritable "sand box," void of natural resources. Other than a rich fishing coastline, no profitable resources were found until 1947, when a Spanish geological survey discovered the presence of phosphates. It was not until 1963, when an American team searching for oil found the extent of the phosphate reserves, that the Spanish Sahara became an economic prize as well as an honorary one. At Bu Craa, 100 km. inland from Aaiun, 1.6 thousand million tons of high grade phosphates were discovered. The phosphates were believed to be 31% pure, making the Bu Craa reserves the most valuable found so far in the world.<sup>3</sup> In addition to phosphates necessary to the production of fertilizer, aluminum, copper, zinc, titanium, and iron have been found. Spain stepped up plans for exploitation immediately, including the construction of a conveyor belt that would carry the phosphates to Aaiun, the nearest port. Roads and communication systems were improved. Any plans for the construction of facilities in the desert are expensive, as the top ten feet of sand constantly are moving. Sand storms and high temperatures further complicate any project. By 1975, Spain had spent over 617 million dollars on the extraction and transportation network.

The three Arab countries that border Spanish Sahara were all interested in removing Spanish presence from the continent. Morocco and Mauretania ultimately decided that joint control was desirable, while Algeria maintained that an independent government should be established. Morocco had agitated for the elimination of Spanish control over its West African colonies since 1956, when Morocco was granted independence from France. In 1957 and 1958, Moroccan troops pushed as far south as Mauretania, where a combined Spanish and French effort finally stopped them. Spain regained the Sahara, but Morocco has never rescinded its claim. Until 1961, Morocco had claimed territory as far south as the whole of Mauretania, including part of Algeria. Such claims are based on the fact that the Moroccan empire once covered all of Northwest Africa, including parts of Mali and Algeria.<sup>4</sup>



Morocco controlled 60% of the world's phosphate supply, and in 1974 was sufficiently impressed by OPEC's ability to dictate trade with the developed countries that raised the price to five times its previous price. The latest figures on the Moroccan phosphate industry show that it was suffering from competition with the Bu Craa mines. By gaining control of the Saharan phosphates, Morocco would control 2/3 of the world's supply, gaining an even better bargaining position with the more developed countries. King Hassan II, the last remaining king in West Africa, had made a national cause out of annexation of the Sahara. By encouraging anti-colonial sentiment in his country, he gathered national support for his continued monarchy. The growth of leftist political parties had led to the abolishment of parliament in 1974, and the elections slated for 1976 that would re-establish a parliament were post-poned by the king. Observers of the Moroccan political scene felt that if Hassan could not deliver on the issue of Spanish Sahara, he was in danger of losing his throne.<sup>5</sup>

Algeria has been at odds with her western neighbor ever since the war for independence began. The two countries differ ideologically. Algeria being a radical Marxist state and Morocco being a conservative monarchical state. Moroccan control of the Sahara would extend the already disputed border between the two countries. Algeria has large reserves of oil and natural gas, but lacks a diversified economy. Phosphates would be a welcome addition to its list of exportable commodities. Algeria has discovered large iron ore deposits at Tindouf in the Algerian interior, but so far, it has not been economically feasible to extract the ore and transport it to Algerian Mediterranean ports. The development of the phosphate industry will lead to better roads and communication networks through the Sahara, and it is possible that the ore could be profitably shipped through the Sahara to the Atlantic coast. However, Algeria never claimed the Sahara as its own. Instead, Algeria backed the radical polisario group, in hopes of the establishment of a progressive state that would be dependent upon Algeria for security and aid. This would give Algeria the appearance of successfully exporting its revolution without having to resort to outright annexation. Prestige would be gained among other radical Arab states.

Mauretania had always claimed the Spanish Sahara as its own, largely as a response to the Moroccan claim on the territory. Mauretania was granted independence from France in 1960, and was greeted by skepticism by the rest of the Arab countries. Morocco's claim to the former French colony blocked recognition by members of the Arab League, but President Ould Daddah has steadily improved his country's relations with the Arab world. In 1963, Mauretania gained a degree of legitimacy by becoming a founding member of the OAU. Its resignation from OCAM over aid to Tshombe in the Congo established it as a "progressive state", and relations with Algeria were cultivated.<sup>6</sup> In 1967, Mauretania adopted a common position with Algeria calling for self determination for the inhabitants of the Sahara. However, as Morocco increased its push for control of the Sahara, Mauretania reverted to its original position, and in 1975, agreed to divide the Sahara with Morocco.



Mauretania was in no position to assert its claim on the Sahara. The Sahel drought of 1974 had dealt a crippling blow to Mauretania, which many observers felt was the worst affected country.<sup>7</sup> 90% of the nation's livestock perished in the drought. The prospect of sharing a border with Morocco after the removal of the buffer created by the presence of Spanish troops was enough to bring Ould Daddah around to Hassan's side. In return, Mauretania could count on at least a portion of the phosphate revenues, plus Moroccan recognition of the new Mauretanian/Moroccan border.

In December of 1965, the UN General Assembly called for the liberation of the Spanish Sahara. Ifni was recognized as a part of Morocco, while the Spanish Saharans were to have a referendum vote to determine their future, supervised by the UN. The Saharans were to have three options: continued links with Spain, independence, or integration into one or more of the surrounding countries. Spain managed to hold on to the Spanish Sahara and the prized phosphates through a series of concessions to the UN resolution. In 1969, Equatorial Africa was granted independence, and Ifni was turned over to Morocco.

In August of 1974, Generalissimo Franco fell ill, and Juan Carlos II stepped in for the first time as a temporary leader. Clashes between Moroccan troops and the Spanish Foreign Legion increased, along with burgeoning world pressure. The combination of pressure led Spain to promise a referendum vote on independence. They reiterated their promise of self determination for the Saharans. Hassan replied that he did not oppose the referendum, but that an independent Sahara would be unsatisfactory to him. Late in that same year, the UN General Assembly asked the International Court of Justice for a consultive verdict concerning the validity of the Moroccan claim on the Sahara, based on historic evidence. Spain objected to the request, but all three of the African countries involved supported it.

On May 23, 1975, the Spanish government declared that they were prepared to yield sovereignty "as soon as possible", and that there was no desire to prolong their involvement. The statement went on to say that Spain accepts the UN resolution calling for self-determination, but "at the same time...that if, for circumstances beyond its desire, the possibility for carrying out this transfer of sovereignty (involves) terms that seriously compromise Spain's presence in the Spanish Sahara...it reserves the right, following due warning to the United Nations, to precipitate this transfer of powers and put a definitive end to its presence in said territory".<sup>8</sup> Spain guaranteed self determination, with the above reservations, but in a statement to the Yema's the indigenous ruling body of the Spanish Sahara, Spain guaranteed unqualified territorial integrity.

A fact finding mission from the UN visited the Sahara in mid-May of 1975. Spanish inhabitants tried to convince the mission that continued Spanish presence was desirable, and the visitors were somewhat impressed by the apparent freedom enjoyed by the Saharans, despite the overwhelming Spanish military presence. Demonstrations by the Polisario, and the Moroccan backed National Union indicated the presence of a dissident faction. On October 11, the mission made its recommendation to the General Assembly for a



referendum vote in the Sahara.

On October 16, the International Court of Justice released its consultative verdict. Sahara was said to have no ties with either Morocco or Mauretania before Spain established colonial control. Morocco was said to have had ties with some of the northern Berber tribes, but that such ties were insufficient to merit a whole-sale annexation to Morocco. Again, self determination was called for.

On the same day as the ICJ ruling, Hassan took an unprecedented step in his campaign for control of the Sahara. He announced in a national T.V. and radio broadcast that 350,000 volunteers were needed, a tenth of whom would be women, to march into the Sahara and claim it for Morocco. The marchers were to be unarmed, and Hassan claimed that he would lead the march personally. The detailed nature of the plans reveal that they had been drawn up well in advance of the ICJ ruling. Hassan left the question of the use of arms hazy. The speech held no of self defense if the marchers were attacked by the Spanish, and Hassan made it clear that he did not want Spain to view the march as an act of aggression. However, the Moroccan Army would accompany the marchers as supervisors, and there was a clear warning against Algerian intervention in the Statement, "If we meet forces other than Spanish, we will have recourse to self defense."<sup>9</sup> The Spanish reaction was termed by one observer as "incredulous".<sup>10</sup> By the 19th, Spain requested an emergency session of the UN Security Council stating that the march was a direct threat to the Spanish Saharans' right to self determination.

Morocco drew support for its march from all the Arab states except the most radical, Algeria and Libya, and claimed that "popular and official delegations from Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Syria, Sudan, and Kuwait were taking part".<sup>11</sup> National support for the "Green March" spanned the political spectrum, and quotas from urban districts were quickly filled. Mauretania announced "great satisfaction with the World Court Ruling."<sup>12</sup> interpreting it as recognition that Mauretania had certain ties with the people of the Sahara, and supported the Moroccan march.

Spain drew support from Algeria, the Polisario, and the United Nations. Internally, Spain was united against relinquishing the land to Morocco. The right wing viewed such action as a humiliation to the Spanish Military, and the left was determined that the UN demand for self determination would be satisfied.

The threat to world peace was eminent enough to warrant a special mission by the Secretary General of the UN. Kurt Waldheim visited all of the countries involved with little initial result. The march was slated to begin on October 28. Direct talks between Morocco and Spain began on the 24th. Ahmed Larki, foreign minister of Morocco, visited Madrid, accompanied by a Mauritanian delegation. A tentative agreement was announced on the 28th, but no details of the terms were revealed. It is probable that no details were resolved, but that talks had reached a point where Morocco no longer needed to threaten Spain with the march.

The Green March seemed to be a brilliant if unorthodox act of political gamesmanship. The plan was based on the premise that Spain would be too involved with internal affairs to offer any resistance. Any aggression against the unarmed marchers



would be viewed by the world community as another example of Spain's ruthlessness in the face of opposition, especially in the wake of the Spanish execution of five Basque terrorists, who were shot without a trial earlier that fall. The ambiguous nature of the ICJ ruling and Franco's declining health made October the most opportune time for an undertaking of this scale and dimension. However, it was just these factors that turned the tide against Morocco, and brought the area of the Spanish Sahara that much closer to becoming a battleground.

On October 27, Franco was reported to be in critical condition. Spanish internal unrest increased, and Western European democratic parties were reported to be intensifying relations with their underground counterparts in Spain. By the 29th, it was widely believed that Franco was on his death bed. Confusing and conflicting medical reports led western observers to believe that Franco might already be "brain dead".<sup>13</sup> Morocco and Mauritania were anxious to continue talks, as all parties seemed near agreement. The Spanish Premier was acting as the spokesman for the Spanish government, but it was becoming apparent that a higher authority would be needed if Spain were going to negotiate terms that would maintain its world prestige and guarantee its investment in the phosphate industry. The situation was complicated by the anger of Algeria at being left out of the negotiations up to this point. The Spanish government was put in the uncomfortable position of trying to acquiesce the two Arab countries at a time when domestic circumstances made it difficult to ascertain exactly what their own position on the issue was. Both Spain and Morocco had reason to fear an Algerian reaction. Although Morocco had garnered the support of the Arab world against Spain, conflict between the two Arab states would be another matter. Relations with Algeria had always been strained, including a brief border war in 1963. Since Algeria shares a long border with Morocco, any fighting would be costly to Arab solidarity, as well as Moroccan lives and property.

Spain relies on Algeria for oil and natural gas, and although they could easily win a war with Algeria, the continuation of guerilla activity against Spanish troops and civilians in the Sahara would be difficult to prevent. Spain had nothing to gain from this conflict, because they wanted nothing more than to wash their hands of the Saharan property as soon as possible, while protecting Spanish investments in the area.

Franco's deteriorating health and the accumulation of internal strife, along with foreign pressure to resolve the Saharan conflict, caused the Spanish government to name Juan Carlos II the temporary chief of state on October 31, 1975. Spain immediately began plans for the evacuation of all Spanish civilians from the Sahara, and began consolidating its troops around the city of Aaiun. The few indigenous troops in the Foreign Legion were disarmed, in fear that they might join the Polisario in an attempt to stop the marchers. By abandoning the outposts close to the Moroccan border, Spain could allow the marchers a symbolic entrance into the Sahara, and avoid needless bloodshed. The real threat seemed to be that the Polisario would attack the marchers or attempt to provoke a confrontation between the Spanish and the marchers.



The situation changed dramatically when Waldheim arrived in Madrid from Algiers with a report that the Algerian government was ready to go to war to defend the Saharans' right to self determination. Waldheim further stated that, based on UN mission report and the ICJ ruling, he opposed the accord. Negotiations continued between Spain and Morocco, concerning an agenda for Spanish withdrawal, and tentative divisions of the phosphate revenues. When the talks broke for what was considered to be just a weekend break, an Algerian delegation arrived in Madrid with the announcement that "There can be no bilateral negotiations over the Sahara".<sup>14</sup> On November 2, the Security Council held an emergency meeting, and appealed to all parties involved to avoid any action that might heighten tension. They requested that Waldheim "intensify" his role as a mediator, and urged the General Assembly to come out with a definite position on the matter. Spain announced that it would "assume its responsibilities in the Sahara", and broke off the Moroccan talks. This was generally regarded as an indication that the Spanish troops would open fire on the marchers if they crossed into Spanish held territory.<sup>15</sup> Juan Carlos was reported to be considering asking Saudi Arabia or Jordan to serve as an intermediary between Morocco and Algeria, in hopes that an Arab country would be more able to avert violence between the two Arab states. This would end Spain's involvement as the middleman with nothing to gain, and place it in the more desirable position of appearing to be the most compliant member of a three way negotiation.

On the day following the announcement, Carlos flew to Aaiun and promised to protect the "legitimate rights" of the inhabitants and the "honor and prestige" of the Spanish Army.<sup>16</sup> The about face by the temporary chief of state can be attributed to several factors. By complying with the Security Council's appeal, Spain could perhaps gain support from the U.S. and other major powers, which had up to now been noncommittal. The Algerian threat of war against Morocco would almost certainly carry with it economic sanctions against Spain, and any damage done to the phosphate industry would diminish Spain's share of the revenues. Domestically, the ever mounting resistance to a return to a monarchical system was leading Carlos to rely heavily on the army for support, especially for the transitional period between Franco's regime and his own. Throughout Spain, veterans were asked to report to local headquarters, ostensibly to make plans for Franco's funeral. Identification badges were being handed out to the vets, and it is possible that the operation was also a call for support if mass violence did break out. By hardening Spain's position in the Sahara, Carlos appealed to the right wing and the army. Herein lies the crux of the matter. The leaders of both countries did not fear each other as much as they feared the reaction of their own people if they compromised their positions.

Morocco responded to the new Spanish position with outrage. The march was to continue, but the king was not going to lead it after all. Spain began sending in reinforcements, and it seemed that war was inevitable. Spain could not back down because to do so would jeopardize Carlos' chances for a peaceable transition. Hassan could not afford to lose face after years of building national solidarity behind his campaign. Even if



the two forces could agree on a compromise, Algeria loomed angrily in the background.

The crisis was resolved through an arrangement of symbolic gestures that maintained both leaders' prestige within their respective countries. About 40,000 of the marchers actually marched across the Saharan border on November 6. 10,000 continued marching into the interior, but stopped after about 10 km. They camped there, within 4 km. of the Spanish "dissuasion zone", a fortified line of Spanish soldiers behind what was reported to be a heavily mined area. Spain made no attempt to remove the marchers from their "liberated land", and the marchers did not try to circumvent the mine field, nor did they risk marching into it. King Hassan instructed the marchers to "Greet every Spaniard you meet, and ask him to enter your tent and share your rations. We do not want any blood to flow. If they fire on you, advance peaceably." Spain cautioned, "You can be sure the march will stop at the exact military border. If they go one step further, they will be met by terrible minefields."<sup>17</sup> The mines had only been placed within a mile of the existing road, and could have been avoided by changing the marchers path and braving the desert. Confrontation was successfully avoided. Hassan had made at least a symbolic entrance into the Spanish territory. By yielding only a token 10 miles, Spain had not disgraced its military establishment.

Negotiations between the two countries resumed, and on November 9, the march was suspended, pending results from the new round of talks. Two days later, Hassan announced that the march "had achieved its objective", although no official agreement was announced in Madrid. Spanish Parliament quickly passed a bill authorizing the decolonization of the Spanish Sahara. Juan Carlos made no attempt to stop the parliamentary action.

The terms that were ultimately reached between Spain, Morocco, and Mauritania did not differ much from the agreement that had almost been passed before Algerian and UN intervention, or at least the terms that were speculated at that time.<sup>18</sup> Administrative duties would be shared by the three countries until the end of February, 1976. Spanish military presence would be phased out by February 28, to be replaced by a Moroccan/Mauritanian alliance. The inhabitants would only have to be "consulted" about their future, and the Yema'a would not be eliminated. Operation and profit gained from the phosphates would be split between the three countries, with Spain and Morocco taking the lion's share. The 617 million dollar Spanish investment would be respected. Spain would retain fishing rights, sharing them with both the other countries.

On November 19, the marchers who had been residing in Tarfaya were ordered home. The next morning, Franco died. Spain entered a twenty day period of mourning, but not before coronating its new king, and approving the final version of the agreement on the Sahara. This final act in the long and arduous struggle for Moroccan control of the Spanish Sahara fell on the same day as the twentieth anniversary of Moroccan Independence. The modern sector of the capital city of Rabat was decked out with lights and posters celebrating the day as the "greatest in Moroccan history".

"I do not want to frustrate my subjects." said King Hassan



before embarking on his Green March to the Sahara. "A people", he pointed out, "is not a toy."<sup>19</sup> Yet the use of 350,000 unarmed civilians as a political tool is not the mark of a compassionate leader. The marchers came caught up in a feeling of holiday. Few Moroccans can afford to travel, and the prospect of a government paid trip, even to the desert, was greeted by many as a free vacation. The outside world was justifiably shocked, yet no major power would take measures against the king, and the UN proved ineffective in its attempt to mediate the negotiations. Perhaps the march could have been stopped. If Franco had remained healthy, it is doubtful that such a bold measure would have been taken. But contrary to Spanish popular belief, De Caudillo was not immortal. Neither Spain nor Morocco is blameless for the incident. Spain's reluctance to give up the last vestige of its one time empire led the Moroccans to resort to desperate measures. Juan Carlos' attempt at switching policy when negotiations seemed close to an end only served to further anger the Moroccans. The twenty day lack of leadership within Spain, caused by the lack of constitutional apparatus necessary for a smooth transition of governments, further complicated matters. Also, the importance of the affair was heightened because it was the new King's first crisis. A precedent was being set, and the eyes of his nation were upon him.

The fact remains that the people who initiated the trouble in the Sahara ultimately reached an agreement that avoided war. Hassan's risky march proved to be successful. But it very well could have proven to be a bloodbath for the marchers, and ended Hassan's reign as the last monarch in North Africa. The decision to postpone elections that would re-establish parliament were cancelled, supposedly because of the Saharan crisis. In the fourteen years of his reign, there have been three known leftist plots to overthrow Hassan, and at least two military assassination attempts. The march, as grandly theatric and successful as it turned out, seems to be a desperate, calculated attempt by the king to hold on to his power.

The major powers' reluctance to act on the issue may be morally reprehensible, but it is economically understandable. All of the developed world has need for the phosphates, and no country wanted to choose sides before a victory, one way or another, was assured. Any support for Morocco would go against the almost sacred notion of self determination for former colonies. Western support for Algeria was not palatable, because of ideological differences. The USSR was equally reluctant to take a stand. Russia was on good terms with both Arab countries before the outbreak. Following the agreement, Morocco broke ties with East Germany, the only member of the Soviet bloc that was not sending economic aid to Morocco at the time. This seemed to be the most painless warning possible to the Soviets to not get involved.<sup>20</sup> However, by January of 1977, the Algerian-backed Polisario movement was reported to be using Czechoslovakian arms supplied by Algeria and Libya. Finally, the major powers' attention was focused on the building Angolan crisis which was quickly becoming a serious threat to world peace. The Spanish Sahara was just not worth risking another breakdown of detente.

The true losers of the entire incident are the 70,000 inhabitants of the Spanish Sahara, whose rights have been compromised in the interest of an expedient end to the trouble. Polisario guerillas pledge to continue the fight for independence, probably with Algerian aid. An independent government was established in exile and has been recognized by the OAU, but any skirmish to date seems to have been perpetrated by the Algerians, and not by the indigenous population. At present, it seems we can disregard any real threat to the new territorial order, except for Algeria, which so far has not made any real attempt at renewing the conflict. The Spanish Sahara has always been a pawn for the more powerful countries, and will probably remain so in the future.




FOOTNOTES

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