Hemispheres

The Tufts Journal of International Affairs

FALL-SPRING 1987—1988 VOLUME11

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FROM THE EDITOR

Hemispheres now enters its second decade of publication. In the past, *Hemispheres* has offered undergraduate students the opportunity to present their opinions on a wide range of topics relating to International Relations. This issue continues that tradition. In addition, however, we are fortunate to have a contribution from a member of the Tufts faculty. Professor Gardner-Feldman's introduction serves to unify the diverse topics in this edition and place them in the context of International Relations as a whole.

Since its inception, *Hemispheres* has encouraged students to expand the boundaries of the study of International Relations. Issues considered primarily domestic are fast becoming international in their scope in our increasingly interdependent world. We hope that the diverse opinions and origins of the articles in this edition encourage students to explore these new directions.

The Editorial Board congratulates Ken Regan on his receipt of this year's Gibson Award. Also, we would like to thank Professors Laurent and Gardner-Feldman for their advice and efforts without which *Hemispheres* would have suffered. We greatly appreciate the cooperation of the TCU Senate, The Tufts Daily and ADCO Printing. Of course, any errors or omissions remain solely the responsibility of the Board.

Hemispheres welcomes any correspondence for publication that expounds on material previously published; *Hemispheres* also encourages submissions for next year's issue. Please send correspondance to: Editorial Board, *Hemispheres*, Student Activities Office, Tufts University, Medford, MA 02155.

D. Filmer V. Stults

Introduction: Tradition and Innovation

Professor L. Gardner-Feldman

In the preface to the third edition of *The Analysis of International Relations* (1980), Karl Deutsch, one of the celebrated architects of modern social science, acknowledges dramatic changes in the global arena during the two decades since his book was first published:

> Possessing unprecedented instruments for national action in the form of ideologies and weapons, the nation-states have become ever more dangerous vehicles of international conflict, carrying the potential for its escalation to mutual destruction and ultimate annihilation. The nation-state holds the power to control most events within its borders, but few events — or even its own actions — beyond them. International relations is that area of human action where inescapable interdependence meets with inadequate control.

Deutsch's reappraisal of international relations recognizes the disappearance of the frontier between "high politics" and "low politics" and the emergence of diverse issues and multiple actors beyond the nation-state and beyond traditional diplomacy and security.

The essays in *Hemispheres* reflect the complexity of international relations as we approach the last decade of the century. They demonstrate student sensitivity to changes in reality and conceptual thinking. They expand on Deutsch's redefinition of international relations by identifying issues (such as environmental questions) and actors (such as states within federal systems) he has ignored. Yet, they retain his focus on the duality of inescapable interdependence and inadequate control. Moreover, in their depth and breadth, these essays adhere to Deutsch's central dictum: "International relations are too important to be ignored, but they also are too complex to be understood at a glance."

Issues

The contemporary study of international relations must embrace dynamic changes in world affairs, and must explain the traditional Morgenthau concept of *Realpolitik*. The essays on Soviet intentions in South Africa, the U.S. invasion of Cambodia and the American-engineered 1953 coup in Iran all

center on the more traditional concerns of the discipline — the projection of political and military power. Other essays vary themes with the same concerns. The distinction between the possession of power and its exercise is emphasized in the articles on Kennedy's nuclear policy and on the British Labour Party's opposition to nuclear weapons. The latter essay, moreover, confronts the reality of power asymmetries — between Britain and the U.S. — as a result of American strategic superiority, a theme further highlighted in the examination of the obstacles to the expansion of Japan's relations with the Soviet Union and China.

Economic power is a newer but well recognized dimension of internaitonal relations. It is the theme of essays on Japan and Argentina, contrasting its impact on independence. Much of Japan's economic success has derived from protectionism and the deliberate insulation of the Japanese economy from the vicissitudes of the international environment. Argentina, by contrast, cannot escape the international economic system because of its external debt, yet internally powerful protectionist thinking and practice aborted Argentine attempts at trade liberalization.

Third World debt is no longer viewed merely as a self-induced problem of debtor nations, as demonstrated in the Tropical Rainforest Act that encourages the exchange of debt for rainforest conservation. In addition to the economic and medical losses incurred by tropical rainforest degradation, the essay on the Act points to climatic disasters, such as the "greenhouse effect," and reminds us that the study of international relations today cannot ignore environmental concerns.

Some of the challenges to fragile Third World ecosystems derive from First World megaprojects aimed at economic development. A similar importation of a First World hazard into a susceptible Third World is considered in the article on the World Health Organization's efforts to combat smoking in developing nations.

In describing the essays in*Hemispheres*, I have noted the traditional and the new in international relations: political and military power, economic challenges and environmental tragedies. In "The Sikhs of the Punjab,"the recipient of the John Gibson Award has attempted to link the oldest (yet least analyzed) forces in international relations, namely religion and culture, with the newest concerns, namely arbitrary violence or terrorism. The author also has proven by powerful example that Karl Deutsch's conceptual claim — nation-states can exert adequate control at home — is unwarranted.

Actors

A number of the essays in this collection explain international relations from traditional levels of analysis: the monolithic nation-state and international organizations. Others, however, appreciate the need to augment this

perspective with attention to additional actors. Several essays refer to the difficulty in arriving at a unified foreign policy because of competing bureaucratic positions within one government. Others direct us to the increasing importance of territorial sub-units and their demands for automonous or independent policies abroad, in the case of the Punjab manifest in a drive for secession. And the focus is not restricted to governments: multinational corporations, non-profit organizations and political parties all play critical roles in international relations, either as complements or as challengers to the sovereignty of nation-states.

The Geographical Center of Gravity

International Relations, once stepchild of diplomatic history, used to concentrate almost exclusively on great powers and later the superpowers. This collection of essays reflects some of the fundamental shifts in the international system's configuration. Direct relations between the superpowers are analyzed, but attention is also paid to their interaction with the Third World, which itself is viewed not only through the East-West prism, but also in light of its own political, economic and cultural imperatives.

The focus on Japan fits neatly into the current American and Soviet preoccupations with the Pacific Rim. Yet, to answer some of the fundamental questions posed by the authors, we are forced to return to Europe, the traditional object of American analysis and the most neglected area in these essays.

The neglect of Europe is important in at least three respects. First, a logical outgrowth of success in the new East-West detente will be more vigorous superpower attempts to resolve regional conflicts. In the Middle East, Central America and Africa, regional participants increasingly look to Europe (and specifically to the European Community) to balance superpower involvement. Some national leaders in these regions apparently believe a regional power is more sensitive to indigenous roots of conflict, and Europe alone outside the United States and the Soviet Union projects diplomatic, economic and military power. Hence, the U.S. and the Soviet Union may force challenges in the Third World as much from Europe as from each other.

Second, if we are to understand when and under what circumstances Japan might become a regional political and military power, the best precedent can be found on the European continent; the Federal Republic of Germany. Moreover, the reemergence under American tutelage of Japan and West Germany as integral members of the "family of nations" alerts us to a theme only hinted at in these essays; the role of morality in international relations. For no matter how much West Germany and Japan may be rehabilitated economically, politically and militarily within the next decade, the nature

of their historical misdeeds and the power of memory will continue to circumscribe their regional and global influence.

Finally, the preponderant global influence of the superpowers assumes their common control of immediate spheres, the U.S. over North America and the U.S.S.R. over Eastern Europe. The European Community's success is a lure to East European countries, who may be encouraged to diversify under glasnost. By contrast, the success of free trade between Canada and the U.S. may offset both the attraction of Europe that periodically has defined Canadian foreign policy objectives, and the looming volatility of Mexico on the southern border. Hence, Europe may be the fulcrum that weakens the Soviet Union while the U.S. is strengthened in North America. This plausible scenario demamds greater attention to Europe, East and West, and to Canada.

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1987—1987 Recipient Of The Gibson Award

Identity Crisis: The Sikhs of Punjab

Ken Regan

The John S. Gibson Award, named after the first Director of the International Relations Program at Tufts University, is given annualy to the most outstanding, in-depth and analytical piece written by an undergraduate and submitted to *Hemispheres*.

Identity Crisis: The Sikhs of Punjab.

Ken Regan

Punjab, a state in northwest India, has been a hotbed of tension for hundreds of years. In recent years, the crisis in Punjab has placed severe strains on Indian democracy. Thousands of lives have been lost in communal fighting. Political parties and institutions have been forever changed. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was assassinated by Sikhs as a direct result of the crisis. Simply put, the Punjab crisis posed and continues to pose serious threat to the viability of democracy in India.

This paper will trace the roots of the crisis that still rages in the Punjab. The first section of the essay will discuss the development of Sikh identity and the effects that this identity has had on the politics of the state. The development of Sikh identity raised serious questions for Sikhs about their relations with fellow Indians. Would Sikhs be safe in a pluralist, but Hindu-dominated India? In a partial answer to this question, the Sikhs called for Punjabi Suba, a Punjabi speaking state within the Indian union. The second section of the essay will deal with this Sikh demand on the Central government. The third section will delve into the reasons why the attainment of Punjabi Suba did not satisfy the Sikhs' goals. Why were the Sikh hopes left unfulfilled by a Sikh majority state? The fourth section will deal with the post-1984 period of acute crisis in India, elucidating the reasons for the failures that have occurred. It will explore both the government mistakes and Sikh community problems that brought on crisis. Finally, this paper will discuss the implications of the crisis for Indian democracy. Does the Indian state hold legitimacy for the Sikh community? Can the crisis be solved by non-violent, moderate means? In the end, the Punjab crisis can be seen as both a regional and national crisis with profound effects and importance on both levels.

PART ONE: THE DEVELOPMENT AND EFFECT OF SIKH IDENTITY

The strength and clarity of Sikh identity have fluctuated since the birth of Sikhism. Several periods in Punjab history were marked by a strong and secure Sikh population. These periods also featured a healthy and prominent Sikh identity. When Sikh leadership was weak or challenged, Sikh

identity often became muddled and even absorbed by Hindu or secular influences. The vulnerability of Sikh identity throughout Sikh history has affected the conduct of politics in Punjab.

Since the times of Guru Nanak, the Sikh religion has encountered identity shifts. When Guru Nanak founded Sikhism in the fifteenth century, his thoughts had roots in both Hindu and Muslim teaching. Nanak created a religion which has survived for five hundred years by carefully avoiding domination by Muslim, Hindu and Western challenges. Throughout its history, Sikhism's identity has changed to protect Sikh religious independence.

At its foundation, Guru Nanak's Sikhism preached strict monotheism and a casteless society. Nanak spoke of the one god as 'truth'. He rejected both idol worship and asceticism. Sikhism at this time called not for conflict but for peaceful conduct of one's affairs within society. As Khushwant Singh has said of the teachings, Nanak preached that "A good Sikh therefore must not only believe that God is One, Omnipotent and Omniscient reality, but also conduct himself in such a way towards his fellow beings that he does not harm them..."[1]

At the time when Nanak's Sikhism preached these cohesive tenets, Sikh identity was clear and easy to recognize. As the number of Sikhs grew, Nanak's concise message encountered two challenges. His idea of a casteless society convinced many low-caste Hindus to jointhe fold. As Sikhism expanded, it became more difficult to guard the purity of Sikh beliefs and identity. At this time (and throughout Sikh history), Hindu practice, custom and belief began to intrude upon Nanak's original message. The second challenge to Sikh identity was more political. The influx of new Sikhs into the fold caused the traditional powers, secular and Hindu, to become nervous. They felt threatened by the growth of Sikh power in the Punjab. In fact, the fifth guru, Arjun, as put to death by the secular Mogul Emperor from Delhi.

Guru Arjun's death caused a marked shift in Sikh identity. Under the first five gurus, Sikhs were generally non-violent. After Arjun's death, Sikhism adapted to its environment and became more militant. Hargobind, the sixth guru, proclaimed the need for a call to arms. On his own body, Hargobind wore two swords, symbolizing the shift towards increasing militancy. During the sixth guru's life, "Some followers of the gurus were beginning to be transformed from being pacifist members of a purely religious sect to a highly organized body, militant in spirit and oriented towards meeting any challenge to their new faith."[2]

Through the reign of the next three gurus, Sikhism again underwent an identity crisis. As before, Sikh identity was challenged on two fronts. The Mogul emperors constantly sought to keep the temporal power of Sikh

leadership in check. Towards this end, they sent armies to the Punjab and combined with local leaders in the area to supress Sikh religious and temporal power. The second challenge occured in religious areas. As it had earlier, the preponderance of Hindus threatened the purity of Sikh identity. Hindu practice again creeped into Sikh customs. The massive Hindu influence made it difficult to accept all religions passively (as Nanak had instructed) without being swallowed up by Hinduism.
agreement to protect 4 million acres. Later that week, Bolivia rescheduled $1 billion of debt, without any easements. "If this kind of write down is going to occur, we should use this leverage to protect valuable natural resources."

Linking these issue Sikh identity was later to become more defined again thanks to actions of the tenth and final guru, Gobind Singh. After the violent death of the ninth guru, Teg Bhadur, at the hands of the Moguls, Gobind Singh perceived the need for the rejuvenation of Sikhism. Gobind Singh regarded God not only as the protector of good but also as the destroyer of evil, thus adding another dimension to Sikhism. Concurrent with this belief, Gobind Singh founded the Khalsa (Community of the Pure), which formed the basis for the Sikh martial tradition. All members of the Khalsa kept five emblems to outwardly illustrate their beliefs and membership: 1. Unshorn hair and beard, 2. Carrying a special comb, 3. Wearing of military breeches, 4. Wearing of a steel bracelet, 5. Wearing of a sabre. While the Khalsa did not adopt a directly confrontational approach to other religions, members did keep the protection of Sikhism as a priority. "The creation of the Khalsa aimed at the combination of spiritual excellence and militant valor of the highest order."[3] Each male who joined the Khalsa also adopted the name Singh, meaning 'lion'. The combination of these five symbols and the name Singh molded and changed Sikh identity forever. Guru Gobind Singh's new brotherhood invigorated Sikhism in an area that eight previous gurus had not: it gave Sikhs an exclusive identity.

The formation of the Khalsa strengthened the religious identity of the Sikh community. This increased identification with Sikhism in turn bolstered the strength of Sikh cultural identification with their fellow Sikhs. Instead of being an offshoot of Hinduism, Khalsa Sikhs were now a distinct group in appearance and belief. Gobind Singh's religious innovation had positive effects on the development of Sikh cultural and later Sikh political identity.

The Khalsa was not solely external symbols and markings. Gobind Singh's followers believed in a re-purified form of Sikhism. The tenth guru stressed the equality of men, prayer and God as 'truth'. As Nanak had succeeded earlier with the same formula, Gobind Singh strengthened Sikhism. By giving greater definition to Sikhism as a distinctive faith, the Khalsa at-

tracted many new adherents. Unfortunately, the popularity of Gibind Singh's message also induced those already holding power to act against him. Because they feared Gobind Singh's religious attraction would find expression in temporal matters, the hill rajas of the area combined with the Mogul emperor to attack the Khalsa. Though Gobind Singh escaped them several times, he eventually met his death at the hand of assassins. The life and teachings of Gobind Singh marked a new era in the development of Sikh religious and cultural identity. Because Khalsa Sikhs carried external symbols of their membership, group consciousness and political identity grew out of Gobind Sing's innovation. On his instructions, he was the last of the gurus. His legacy lives on today as Khalsa Sikhs stills protect the purity of the religion with their martial skills. More than any other Sikh leader, Gobind Singh solidified the identity of the Sikhs as a distinctive religious community in northwest India.

In 1707, the last great Mogul emperor died, leading to the decline of the Mogul Empire. Ninety-two years leater, the first and only Sikh kingdom rose under the leadership of Ranjit Singh. Singh shared some power with Hindu and Muslim leaders, but they were his subordinates. Though Singh saw all religions as equal, his Sikh-ruled kingdom greatly influenced later Sikh identity. Though Ranjit Singh did not rule in a theocracy, no Sikh had ever ruled such a large and united kingdom. After the collapse of Singh's kingdom, Sikhs looked longingly for the re-emergence of a sovereign Sikh state. To this day, claims to Khalistan, a separate Sikh country, use Ranjit Singh's rule both as a precedent to cite and as a rationalization to explain separatist actions. The greatest effect of Ranjit Singh can be seen in his influence on political identity. The memory of his kingdom stands gloriously alone in Sikh history for all politicians to cite in their quest for prestige and precedent.

As Ranjit Singh's kingdom collapsed, the British easily used their force and guile to conquer the Punjab. Sikhism during this time was at another low point. No strong leader or reformer appeared to rejuvenate Sikhism and clarify the Sikh identity. After some time, the Sikhs joined to help the British in their bureaucracy and army. The 1857 Sepoy mutiny and adjoining rebellion provided Sikhs with a new possibility to gain influence and power. After siding with the British during the rebellion, Sikhs were rewarded with large-scale irrigation projects in the Punjab. They also received good-sized portions of land to farm. In the short run, these rewards boosted the Sikhs' economic position. In the long run, these rewards enhanced Sikh dominance of the agriculture base in a state that is now called the breadbasket of India. In effect, British rule gave the Sikh community considerable leverage for use in what later became arguments for increased autonomy of the Punjab.

British rule had several effects on the Sikh community. Firstly, the gains that Sikhs made under British rule helped strengthen Sikh political identity. As a group, the Punjabi Sikhs received political patronage resulting from their loyalty to the Raj. Their increased group fortunes produced a clearer sense of the possible advantages of Sikh solidarity. This development in the Sikh political identity influenced later politics in Punjab. The second effect of British rule lay in the fact that the Sikhs were living well within a larger society. Because the Sikhs were given special treatment, they realized the positive possibilities of belonging to two societies: Sikh society and the larger Indian society. From this time on, Sikhs understood that they could derive benefits from a larger political community, provided they could somehow assure themselves special treatment.

However, British rule also had some negative effects on the Sikh community. Under late 19th century British rule, the Sikh movement lost much of its clarity and momentum. A lack of powerful Sikh leadership once again allowed Hinduism to gain a foothold in Sikh practice. By 1900, many of the gurdwaras (temples) were controlled by mahants (priests) who had brought Hindu practice and corruption into Sikhism. Idols filled many gurdwaras, and in some cases prostitution was not uncommon on holy grounds. Because Sikh political strength was built on a strong sense of religious identity, this challenge from Hinduism had deep political implications. The Sikh religious and political leadership could not allow an erosion of the strength and clarity of the religious identity. To reverse Sikhism's slide towards both Hinduism and moral laxity, the Singh Sabha movement was inititiated. This "society" crusaded against corruption and Hindu practices by the mahants. Singh Sabha asserted the importance of education and opened up schools to teach a pure Sikhism and thereby reform the religion. The Khalsa College in Amritsar was a direct result of this reforming movement.

Gurdwara control remained an unsolved issue into the 1920s. The British sided with the mahants because they feared the growing power and possible unity of the Sikh community. Like the Mogul powers before them, the British perceived threat in a united Sikh community. In November of 1920, Sikh leaders formed the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC) to regain control of the gurdwaras. One month later, with the SGPC as its foundation, the Shiromani Akali Dal was formed. The Akali Dal was the political party that undertook a non-violent campaign to regain control of the gurdwaras. These two vital and inter-linked organizations have been providing representation and leadership for the Sikhs since that time. With the formation of the SGPC and the Akali Dal, the political identity of the Sikhs was in full bloom. For the first time, the Sikhs had their own political party to express Sikh grievances and demands. The Akali Dal took a high-profile position involving non-violent agitation to achieve Sikh control of

the gurdwaras. After almost five more years of protest, the British conceded and allowed elected bodies to replace the mahants.

This SGPC/Akali victory had lasting effects on politics in the Punjab. Sikh identity had a resurgence and took on an increasingly political tone. Because Hindus had sided with the mahants, Sikh identity clearly separated itself from Hindu custom and practice. The issue of gurdwara control drove a wedge between Sikh and Hindu that has never really been removed. Today, many Sikhs feel that their political and religious expressions are threatened by the overwhelming Hindu influences on Indian society. Sikhs have become very uneasy about their dual allegiance. Sikh nationalism and Indian nationalism can no longer go hand in hand. As will be discussed below, the alienation that Sikhs feel as Indian citizens has contributed to the crisis situation in Punjab.

Unfortunately for the Sikhs, the increasingly politicized nature of their community could not, in itself, give them strong influence in the larger politics of India. In the decade before independence, the Sikhs' weak strategic position enabled them to be disregarded in the most important pre-independence discussions. "Barely one percent of the population of undivided India, and only a scattered 14 percent of undivided Punjab, they found themselves on the sidelines of the greate debate of the decate — to divide or not."[4] While Congress and the Muslim Leage argued about future political arrangements, the Sikhs were comforted by neither option being advocated. A partitioned India would surely split Punjab. As Khushwant Singh has observed, "If it [partition] were conceded, the Punjab would have to be divided; the carving knife was firmly placed on the Sikhs' jugular vein."[5] On the other hand, an undivided Indian Union would leave the Sikhs in a numerical minority which would effectively diminish their political influence, even within Punjab. Unfortunately, the Sikhs had little to say in the matter. Moreoever, because the Sikhs only tepidly supported the British war effort, they forfeited any help they might otherwise have received from the Raj.[6] When, belatedly, the Sikhs did make a proposal for Sikhistan, their numerical and political weakness blocked the proposal's chance for serious consideration. In fact, the Muslim League saw the demand for Sikhistan only as a Congress ploy to block the attainment of Pakistan. In the context of Congress-Muslim League discussions on independence, Sikh interests simply did not merit much discussion or interest.

On the whole, the development of Sikh identity on the religious, cultural and political fronts had great effects on the fortunes of the Sikh community. Strong leadership has always produced the identity necessary to achieve gains for the Sikh community. The Sikh minority position in India placed the Sikhs in an unenviable position. They knew that they needed a place where Sikh identity and leadership could flourish. Unfortunately, they were

in no position to achieve this goal.

PART TWO: THE QUEST FOR PUNJABI SUBA

India finally gained independence on August 15, 1947. The partition of the territory into Muslim Pakistan and secular India caused massive upheaval in both lands. Though the Sikhs sat on the sidelines in earlier discussions about partition, the geographic position of Punjab placed them in the middle of the turmoil. The Congress party promise to safeguard minority rights in the new Indian union brought many Sikhs streaming towards India. The migration of Sikhs from Pakistani territory produced many bloody memories. However, violence was not the only result of partition. The migration of Sikhs consolidated the somewhat scattered population into a more compact geographic area. This concentration improved subsequent Sikh claims for power, especially in their quest for Punjabi Suba, a Punjabi-language state within the Indian union.

Partition also influenced politics at the center in India. The communal horrors of partition caused Congress Party leaders to reaffirm their commitment to the secular state. They rejected the idea of a religious state. Communalism became the ultimate dirty word and the demand for a PUnjabi state within the Indian union was seen as a Sikh communal attempt to create a state on religious grounds. For the Sikhs, this development was most distressing. "In 1948 close to half of all Sikhs were refugees, who had just seen a religiously-based state — Pakistan — take shape before their eyes and then drive them from their homes. Now they were told that religion and politics were an illegitimate mixture."[7] Given the overwhelming Hindu complexion of Indian society, this may have brought some comfort to the Sikhs. A pluralistic and tolerant India reassured this minority group. However, Sikh political identity was firmly grounded in the strength of religious identity. For a religiously-based political group, the separation of religion and politics could be fatal.

The Akali Dal and its leader Master Tara Singh regarded religion and politics as inextricably mixed. Throughout Sikh history, religion and politics had been linked. Guru Nanak and Guru Gobind Singh both fought off political challenges with religion. Tara Singh wished to carry on the tradi-

tion of grounding political support in religion. In fact, Tara Singh believed the survival of Sikhism would be dependent on a strong political position. Tara Singh knew well the threat of religious and cultural assimilation that Sikhism faced from the large Hindu population. One can see parallels between this worry and Guru Gobind Singh's concerning threats to Sikh identity. Yet, while Gobind Singh's solution was spiritual and militant, Tara Singh's solution was political. In 1955, Master Tara Singh proclaimed, "I feel we can not saver our religion without the attainment of political power."[8] Though Hinduism provided the largest threat to Sikh beliefs, the scientific and industrial revolutions also threatened the religion. Secular values and lifestyles challenged the purity of the Sikh belief system, and young Sikhs could be seen practicing fewer Sikh traditions than their parents. Tara Singh viewed Punjabi Suba, a Sikh-dominated state within India, as essential to the protection and invigoration of Sikh religion and culture.

On a similar theme, many Sikhs looked to Punjabi Suba to protect them from what they claimed to be anti-Sikh discrimination. Though they provided few concrete examples, Sikh leaders employed skillful rhetoric about discrimination against their community. With the discrimination complaint implanted in the public mindset, Sikh leaders used it in their campaign for Punjabi Suba. Sant Fateh Singh, the leader who succedded Tara Singh, charged that "No status is given to the Punjabi language, because Sikhs speak it. If non-Sikhs had owned Punjabi as a mother tongue then the rulers of India would have seen no objection in establishing a Punjabi state."[9] Sikh leaders found it useful to highlight the cleavages between Sikh and non--Sikh against the background of larger secular society. By emphasising the 'discrimination' against the Sikhs by the larger secular system, Sikh leaders manipulated the good nature of those who believed in the protection of the minorities. Skillful cultivation of the discrimination issue allowed this weapon to be used against opponents of the Punjabi Suba, including Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, who openly dismissed it as a communal and therefore illegitimate demand.

Power politics also played a role in the reasons for Punjabi Suba. In the immediate post-independence period, Sikhs numbered only 35 percent of teh Punjab's population as Hindus comprised 62 percent and Muslems 3 percent. Sikh leaders realized that their political power was limited by their minority status. Historically, the Sikh community had prospered under strong leadership. In the democratic framework of modern India, Sikh's would not even be able to lead. Many Sikhs longed for another Sikh kingdom like Ranjit Singh's in the 1800's. Underneath all of the discrimination charges, political control and the perquisites that power brings can be seen as important reasons for wanting Punjabi Suba.

Sikh political leaders were forced to use an indirect strategy to achieve

their objectives. The legacy of partition precluded any direct communal claim for a Sikh state. In secular India, a state organized around religion would not be tolerated. Instead, Sikh leaders focused their claim for a new state on the Punjabi language. In 1953, Sikhs were encouraged by the creation of Andhra Pradesh after Telegu-speaking people organized disturbances for their cause. Sikhs realized that, while communal claims would not work, language claims would. Therefore, they obscured their claim for statehood in the Punjabi language terms. Sikhs called for the protection of both Punjabi language and culture. Their demand, however, encountered resistance on both national and local levels.

Nationally, Sikh claims for Punjabi Suba met resistance in the nationalist Congress Party. In the post-partition period, Congress struggled to bring unity to the strife-torn country. The last issue that Congress wanted to deal with during power consolidation was a Sikh 'separatist-type' movement. As Baldev Raj Nayar points out, "The Congress Party — with their commitment to the secular state and their determination to avoid the communal politics which had dominated pre-independence India — could not bring themselves around to accepting such demands."[10] Congress also wished to block any independent group which might later secede from the Indian union. Though the Sikhs only called for a linguistic state, Nehru and others did not wish to give the Sikhs a stepping stone for secession. The reorganization of states along linguistic lines had succeeded in diffusing crises in other parts of the country. Nationalist politicians did not see Punjabi Suba in the same light. Congress leadership felt that Punjabi Suba would initiate further problems for the Indian union rather than solve them. Because Punjabi Suba had communal roots, it evoked greater fears from Nehru and the rest of the leadership. Politically (then and now), it was also more advantageous for Congress not to risk losing Hindu sympathy. Because India is 70 percent Hindu, most political leaders would not wish to upset the vast Hindu population for the sake of a two percent minority. Although wisdom might actually lie with accomodation, short-run political strategy served to block this path. As will be discussed below, a similar dilemma now haunts the crisis of the 1980s.

Locally, the fear of losing political power motivated anti-Punjabi Suba forces. Naturally, Punjabi Hindus did not look forward to relinquishing their comfortable majority in exchange for a minority position. Punjabi Hindus in the Congress Party and Jan Sangh both campaigned forcefuly against Punjabi Suba. High-caste Hindus were joined by Sikh harijans, Hindu harijans and Muslims who feared the loss of privileges they had gained under Congress rule. All of these local forces joined together against Punjabi Suba. During the 1951 census, each of the Hindu groups declared itself to Hindi speaking. This tactical ploy served to undercut Sikh claims for a Punjabi-speaking state and certainly had a strong polarizing effect between Hindu and Sikh.

For years, a combination of nationalist Congress forces and the local

Hindu-harijan alliance prevented the acceptance of Punjabi Suba. In 1955, the States Reorganization Committee turned down the bid for Punjabi Suba. Although this decision sparked the first of two agitation campaigns for Punjabi Suba, the request was not granted until 11 years later.

By 1966, both Nehru and Punjabi Congressman Pratap Singh Kairon were dead and their fervent pro-nationalist, anti-communal sentiments no longer dominated the party. The Akali Dal had also undergone a leadership change. Master Tara Singh, the dynamic Sikh leader, had fallen into political disgrace after an aborted fast-to-the-death attempt. When Sant Fateh Singh replaced him, he steered the Akali Dal on a less confrontational course. "The new Akali Dal, under his leadership, made a final successful drive for Punjabi Suba while separating the demand as far as possible from its previous communal associations."[11] Sant Fateh Singh worked to make the Punjabi Suba demand acceptable to the nationalists. (Parallels to the crisis of the 1980s are immediately apparent and will be discussed below.) His success on this front was also aided greatly by Sikh contributions in the 1965 war against Pakistan. Not only did the Sikh population demonstrate loyalty to India during this conflict, Sikh officers and enlisted men fought with distinctive and much appreciated bravery.

Creation of a Punjabi-language state occurred the following year, in March 1966. In dividing Punjab, Hindi-speaking plains districts were given to the new state of Haryana. Several hill districts adjacent to Himachal Pradesh were appended to that state. What remained in the new, smaller Punjab were those districts with Punjabi-speaking majorities. Within this area, the Sikhs held a meaningful, but precarious 53 percent majority over the Hindu population.

By this time, the Sikhs were acting as a distinctive group striving to achieve its goals. Normally, group action would not threaten the well-being of a multinational democratic state. However, the development of a Sikh national identity began to rival the pluralism of the Indian state. When an ethnic group aspires to nationhood, threats to the national integrity develop. At this point, Sikhs only had a weak sense of national identity. The disappointments of the following decade increased Sikh desires for nationhood.

PART THREE: FACTIONALISM, CONGRESS MANIPULATION AND EXTREMISM IN PUNJAB

Many Suba proponents had believed that a Sikh majority would result in permanent Akali Dal rule in Punjab. They believed that they finally had an area where Sikh political rule would protect religious and cultural identity. Within the new Punjab, many Sikhs felt that they could finally feel comfortable with their dual allegiance to Sikhism and India. This Akali dominance, however, did not develop. In fact, the Akali Dal was forced into a coalition government in the very first election in the new Punjab. The lack of Akali dominance in Punjabi politics during the next

18 years has many interrelated causes. The three principal causes are factionalism, Congress party manipulation, and the rise of extremism in Punjab.

As Robin Jeffrey shows in *What's Happening to India*, Punjab is permeated with factions. Even at the village level factions thrive, and this both propels and taints political life. "If your [personal or family] enemy already has links with a political party, you can thwart him only by lining up with his rivals within that party or with another party altogether."[12] The factional nature of Sikh society at the local level affects the unity of Sikh political behavior on district and state levels as well. Generally, factions serve to split the Sikh vote and weaken Akali dominance. The fissures, however, have also been skillfully manipulated by Congress party officials at local, state and national levels. Between 1967 and 1980, Congress leaders played one faction against another, ultimately weaking overall Sikh unity and therefore Akali electoral strength. In one example, it is reported that Congress leader Giani Zail Singh, a former President of India and Chief Minister of Punjab, encouraged and set up Darshan Singh Pheruman's 1969 fast unto death to embarrass Akali leader Sant Fateh Singh (who had previously aborted several such fasts).[13] This was only one example of many Congress manipulations which ultimately damaged Sikh unity.

Other factions split the Sikh community: Differences between rural Jat Sikhs and urban Sikhs further served to divide the community. Since the 1960s and Sant Fateh Singh's rise to power, the Akali Dal derived most of its support from the rural Jat population. Congress, however, attracted urban Sikhs because it could offer more benefits within the city in exchange for political support. As Paul Brass states, the group in power could "tap a great reservoir from which a man could irrigate his followers."[14] While the Akalis controlled the power and patronage distribution in rural areas, their influence was much weaker in the cities. Therefore, the rural-based Akalis could not effectively 'irrigate' urban Sikhs and their political appeal and electoral strength in those areas were curtailed. Moreover, Congress attracted scheduled caste Sikhs with its equal-opportunity promises and programs. In this zero-sum game, the Sikhs' small majority lost ground every time Congress gained support. Unfortunately, the exclusively Sikh nature of the Akali Dal did not attract comparable numbers of Hindu crossover votes, if any at all. Rural, urban and caste differences among Sikhs allowed Congress to make significant inroads on Akali strength in the years following the attainment of Punjabi Suba.

The erosion of Akali dominance forced the Akalis into coalition in all but one of their governments until 1985. Ironically, the Akali Dal was

forced to pursue coalitions with the Jan Sangh, a predominantly Hindu party with a strong Hindu-chauvinist orientation. Instead of achieving Sikh rule, the Akalis were relegated to coalition with a Hindu-based party. The Akali-Jan Sangh coalition was smart electoral strategy. While the Akalis were strong in rural areas, Jan Sangh's strength was concentrated in the cities. This marriage of convenience proved effective as a measure to counteract Congress in Punjab. However, this was surely not what Tara Singh and other proponents of Punjabi Suba pictured when they dreamed of their goal. The Akalis could not attain dominance in their new Punjabi state.

The Green Revolution also had an effect on Akali strength and Jat dominance in the rural areas. Increased prosperity brought on by better crop yields gave land-owning Sikhs markedly higher incomes. Also, the Green Revolution brought on an educational expansion which provided Sikh farm workers with greater skill and confidence in communication. These communication skills left them with less need of factional leaders to speak for them, thus slightly weakening the Akali stronghold on rural Sikh farm workers.

From an Akali point of view, Sikh divisions had to be surmounted. In 1973, the Akalis attempted to unify Sikhs around a statement called the Anandpur Sahib Resolution. This resolution was to provide the framework of Sikh demands on the Congress-dominated center. The resolution contained 45 demands, some of which were demands for Sikh religious purity and others being demands on the national government. Politically, the Akalis asked for: 1. Pre-eminence of the Khalsa (vaguely worded); 2. a 'softer' border with Pakistan to facilitate Sikh travel to see shrines in both countries; 3. reorganization of center-State relations leaving Delhi responsibility over defense, foreign affairs, currency and communications; 4. absorption into Punjab of several adjoining Punjabi-speaking territories; 5. sole possession of Chandigarh, the capital of Haryana as well as Punjab; 6. settlement of the dispute over water rights between Punjab and its neighbors. In religious matters, the Akalis wished to assert SGPC control over gurdwaras throughout all of India (an All-India Gurdwara Act). There were other demands, although these were the important ones. Overall the resolution represented the most comprehensive and daring demands that the Akalis had put forth up to that time.

Unfortunately, several different versions of the resolution appeared, and no Sikh leader could clarify the true thrust and content of the resolution. At a time when the Sikhs needed clear leadership to achieve their goals, the factions within both the community and the Akali Dal precluded such leadership.

The Congress party's leadership during these years provided still more

reason for the lack of Akali dominance in Punjab. Indira Gandhi's style and tactics caused many problems for any attempt at a powerful, united state government. During the late 1960s, Mrs. Gandhi successfully consolidated power in New Delhi as she weathered challenges to her leadership. Fearful of independent power centers, especially in the states and even in her own party, Mrs. Gandhi relied increasingly on the centralization of power. Her quest for political control mandated that all power must flow from the center (and herself). The center "became increasingly dependent for its own political stability on controlling the states and state chief ministers in turn became increasingly dependent on the favor of the center."[15]

In this environment, Mrs. Gandhi certainly did not want the Akali Dal to rule in Punjab; a unified Sikh community under the Akali Dal was unthinkable. Because the Akali Dal was an exclusively Sikh, communal party with well-articulated demands on the Congress central government, Mrs. Gandhi did everything she could to keep the Akali Dal out of power. To her, any non-Congress ruling party was automatically seen as a disloyal adversary which could only cause problems for Congress and the center's capacity to guide and control the country. The Akali history of agitation against Congress only made Mrs. Gandhi more nervous. With this in mind, Mrs. Gandhi and other high political leaders began intervention on behalf of Congress in Punjab. Although these interventions were used throughout the 1970s, they became especially intense in the later period of the Emergency (1975-1977) and the immediate post-Emergency period, when Sanjay Gandhi, the Prime Minister's younger son, played a leading role in Indian politics.

Both Sanjay Gandhi and Giani Zail Singh manipulated local politics in Punjab. "Zail Singh, the ex-Chief Minister, first attempted to use Bhindranwale [a militant extremist, see below] as a pawn capable of dividing the Akali Dal government...he prevailed on the police superintendent, who was an ally, to issue as many gun licenses as Bhindranwale asked for."[17] The Sant that was chosen and then cultivated was Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, who preached a fundamentalist Sikh message with a machine gun to back it up. At first Bhindranwale preached forcefully, but only as a religious purifier. As his appeal grew, his militant theology turned into deadly theology. In the reforming tradition of Guru Gobind Singh, Bhindranwale called for religious purity — but took it one lethal step further. He said, "The most important thing to me is Amrit Pracher [the preaching of purity]. If a true Sikh drinks, he should be burnt alive."[18] With Congress party protection, Bhindranwale's power grew and his extremist message spread.

Why did Bhindranwale's extremism catch on? Throughout Sikh history, appeals for a pure Sikh identity have always been popular (witness the impact of Guru Gobind Singh). Bhindranwale offered strong leadership with

a familiar and comfortable message. Though his methods were extreme, few Sikhs could reject his hope for a pure, strong Sikh community. Much of Bhindranwale's support came from rural Sikh youth and Sikh students. As many radical and militant movements had done before him, Bhindranwale tapped the idealism and courage (or naivete) of the young.

The Green Revolution also provided fertile ground for Bhindranwale's extremist movement. The technology that Green Revolution revenue brought to Punjab gave greater access to the outside world. Among the information tha 'unjabis now digested was news of Islamic Fundamentalism. Young Punjabi Sikhs could look to Iran and say 'Why not Sikh fundamentalist rule?' Also, "Messages now moved faster and reached more people, who could, if they wished, mix the exhortations of Guru Gobind Singh with the methods of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Italian Red Brigades or the Irish Republican Army."[19] Bhindranwale did just that, and as time went on his political motives and ambitions rose to the surface.

At the same time, Sikhs in foreign lands boosted the cause of extremism. Through verbal and monetary support, expatriate Sikhs fueled the fires of militant extremism. While a Sikh national called Khalistan was not pupular will in Punjab, expatriate Sikhs championed secession. Jagjit Singh Chauhan, a Sikh in London, went so far as to declare Khalistant, complete with currency, stamps and national passports. Extremism not only flourished outside India even more than in Punjab, it supplied a steady stream of money which could be used to purchase arms and thus further add to the rise of militant extremism within Punjab.

Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale's initial rise to power pleased Congress party leaders because of the weakening effect he had on Akali Dal unity. Akalis found it difficult to challenge his message and watched as his support grew at their expense. While Bhindranwale once dealt only with religious issues, his militance became increasingly political. It was these political overtones that threatened Congress. Bhindranwale's militance also began to cause problems for Congress. The Frankenstein that Congress had 'created' and protected demanded concessions from the central government. Bhindranwale's demands, backed up by terrorist force, began to put fear in the national leadership (especially the insecure Mrs. Gandhi). Although extremist rhetoric had not greatly damaged Congress interests earlier, the increasing amount of terrorism did threaten their authority. National leaders feared a religious leader in the state of mind to say, "I would like Sikhs to rule; rule Delhi, rule the world."[20] Though Bhindranwale himself never seriously threatened national Congress power, the extremist actions from those that Congress had helped cultivate now threatened the well-being and power of their creator within the Punjab context (and with possible escalations to a crisis of national proportions — see the discussion below on the post-

Bhindranwale era).

Extremism had a great effect on the political situation in Punjab. The message of Sikh religious purity that Bhindranwale and others preached was increasingly difficult to reject for any Sikhs, moderate or radical. This placed the Akali Dal in a tenuous position. They did not wish to support terrorist extremism with its violent assassinations and bush hijackings, but were forced to watch their leadership role erode before their eyes. Extremist power grew as the Akalis stood on the sidelines. Though they did try to rejuvenate the Anandpur Sahib Resolution, the non-reaction of national Congress leaders to moderate Akali demands caused the moderates to lose even more ground to extremism. This situation seemed very similar to the 1960s, but this time the results were not positive. Moderates did exist in the 1980s but they were weakened, not legitimized, by Mrs. Gandhi. As Sant Fateh Singh had produced a palatable Punjabi Suba proposal for the Center, the moderates led by Harchand Longowal provided a non-extremist, non-violent, reconciliational mode of demand-making. Unfortunately, Mrs. Gandhi preferred the short-term political benefits of a weak Akali Dal to a possible long-term solution involving a strong, moderate Akali Dal. By pulling the rug out from under Longowal's moderate Akalis, Mrs. Gandhi cleared the way for the expansion of extremist power.

Another effect of extremism further weakened the Akalis. The violent methods of the political extremists intimidated the moderates, thus preventing any major concessions in negotiations with the Center. As Paul Brass states of Bhindranwale, he was "an independent political force feared by all politicians in the Punjab, who ultimately reached such a pass that they were will to take no action that Bhindranwale might oppose and became incapable of participating effectively in a political process gone completely out of control and dominated by violence."[21] It is important to realize that the extremists regularly practiced their assassinations and terrorism with religious shrines as their base. Gurdwaras provided extremist Sikhs with a refuge where they could be safe from the Punjab police. In one reported case, a constable was tortured with impunity while he was visiting the Golden Temple to pray. Because the Golden Temple is a holy religious shrine, political considerations blocked any possible action.[22] Weapons were routinely stockpiled within the gurdwaras, especially within the Golden Temple, the most holy Sikh shrine. With these havens, extremist power grew to incredible proportions, thereby affecting the balance of power in Punjab politics. This shift in the political spectrum coupled with the Congress party's rigidity ultimately fueled the crisis that occurred in 1984 and still rages on in 1988.

Punjabi extremism parallels the situations in Northern Ireland and within the Palestine Liberation Organization. In all three cases, moderates who

bargain with the respective authorities are dealt with severely. As moderate West Bank mayors are shot and accomodationist Northern Irish Catholics are branded traitors, moderate Akali leader Harchand Singh Longowal too was gunned down by Sikh extremists after concluding a political settlement with Rajiv Gandhi (covered later in this text). Extremism has certainly shifted the focus and parameters of discussion in Punjab. Though many Punjabi Sikhs do not support the extremist Sikhs, the capacity for extremist violence has caused an acceptance of their presence. The voice of the gun outshouts the voices of accomodation.

The lack of action by national Congress leaders also fueled the fires of extremism in Punjab. "Instead of cooperating with the Akalis to isolate the extremists, Delhi unwittingly played into their hands."[23] Congress leaders in New Delhi and Punjab were restricted by Mrs. Gandhi's premium on central control. The short-sighted decisions and power-hungry attitudes of Mrs. Gandhi's ruling clique eliminated the possibility of working with the Akalis until it was too late. Mrs. Gandhi's strong personality was one major reason for the inaction, which ultimately led to sharpened polarization, increased violence and crisis. The memory of Akali Dal agitation against her and the Emergency did not fade fast for Mrs. Gandhi. In fact, "the only sustained agitation movement against the Emergency regime was carried out by the Akali Dal..."[24] Almost immediately, the Akalis had labelled the Emergency as 'fascist', "a rape of democracy and a great step towards dictatorship."[25] With this in mind, Mrs. Gandhi chose to exploit Harchand Singh Longowal's tenuous political position as a moderate, thus splintering the Akalis even further. In the short run, this attack on the moderate Akalis helped Congress fortunes. In the long run, neither Mrs. Gandhi, Congress nor India benefitted from this divisive strategy.

On the whole, Punjabi Suba was certainly not the success it was hoped to be. Akali leaders and Congress leaders each took actions which caused friction in Punjab. Both parties can share the blame for the current crisis. Factionalism split the Punjab community, which Congress manipulation did everything possible to accentuate and exploit. Out of the wounds of factionalism, extremism rose to further complicate the situation and any possible solution. Each of these factors played a part in forming the crisis in 1984, which was ultimately sparked by Operation Bluestar, the storming of the Golden Temple.

PART FOUR: THE PERIOD OF ACUTE CRISIS

On June 5, 1984, Indian army troops entered the Golden Temple in Amritsar and battled the extremist Sikhs in their most holy shrine. The ramifications of this event shook Indian politics at the time and continue to effect the crisis to this day.

There were good reasons for Operation Bluestar. What had once solely been a religious shrine had begun to play a second role. The Golden Temple provided sanctuary for several extremist terrorist groups who used it as a base. Terrorist raids and assassinations were frequently being planned from within the temple complex. The extremists had also fortified their sanctuary. When they were finally defeated at the Temple, the government "seized a large quantity of weapons including medium and light machine guns, rocket launchers, rifles, Sten-guns and large quantities of ammunition and hand grenades."[26]

The Congress government had another reason for its action at the Temple. The large Hindu population of Northern India affected Mrs. Gandhi's decision to send in the army. As M.J. Akbar points out, "A feeling had begun to grow...that since independence the minorities had been pampered at the cost of the Hindu majority."[27] Indirectly, Mrs. Gandhi's tough stand against Sikh extremism could help her garner support for Congress in Hindu-dominated North India. With 41 percent of the seats in the National Parliament situated in North India, Mrs. Gandhi knew that the audience for this action would be far larger that Punjab.

One immediate result of the Golden Temple incident was the death of Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale. Previously, Bhindranwale had been the most outspoken and charismatic of the Sikh extremists. Though many Sikhs had not agreed with his means, few argued with his attractive message of a pure Sikh identity. "In death, Bhindranwale was seen not as a terrorist but more as a defender of 'Sikh values, Panthic unity and communal identity'."[28] Bhindranwale's death brought him martyr status, encouraging further comparison with the Sikh gurus for those who wished to use these images. Extremism, thus, did not die along with this charismatic leader. As *India Today* stated, "Bhindranwale or no Bhindranwale, terrorism in India has come to stay."[29]

Another result of the government attack on the Golden Temple is evident. The attack left many Sikhs in disbelief and awe which soon replaced by isolation, frustration and anger. Sikhs all over the world reacted angrily to 'Mrs. Gandhi's storming of the Golden Temple'. A street flyer in New York appealed to Americans for help and understanding. "The Golden Temple is to the Sikhs what Vatican is to the Catholics, what Mecca is to the Muslims, what Wailing Wall is to the Jews. It is the symbol of centuries

of sacrifices, martyrdoms, blood, sweat, tears and hopes of labor of love for one almighty God."[30] Sikhs everywhere saw the attack on their most holy shrine as unforgiveable. Operation Bluestar unified the Sikhs and strengthened Sikh political identity like no leader could have.

Revenge was not long in coming. On October 31, 1984, Mrs. Gandhi was assassinated by two Sikhs in her own bodyguard contingent. This event then threw the country into a week of communal strife that had not occurred since the worst days of the partition. In much of northern India, Hindu butchered Sikh and Sikh butchered Sikh in a whirlwind of violence. When the terror subsided, thousands of Sikhs had been killed. After the November riots, the Sikh community in India possessed a helpless feeling in the country that had always protected its minorities. Typifying the mainstream Sikh response, one Delhi Sikh asked, "Why were we the victims? We earned our bread by our sweat. We were never political people. We always thought the Khalistan business was nonsense. We always thought India was our home."[31] The extent of anti-Sikh violence, coupled with the storming of the Golden Temple, produced a Sikh alienation which has yet to be and may never be healed.

Against the background of Sikh alienation, Rajiv Gandhi succeeded his mother on a wave of Hindu sentiment. Mrs. Gandhi's death produced a Hindu martyr and Congress skillfully rode the communal wave to landslide victories throughout Northern India (excluding Punjab, whose elections were suspended). Congress manipulated the Hindu chauvinist sentiment and isolated the Sikh minority in the national political process. As James Manor said, "This campaign gained great dividends, since a Hindu backlash undoubtedly swung many votes for Congress (I) — but it represents a sharp reversal of the long Congress tradition of tolerance and secularism, and it may have stirred up some grave post-election dangers for the government and the nation."[32] This blatant and successful appeal to Hindu chauvinism only added to Sikh feelings of frustration and isolation. These feelings then fed the cause of extremism, which by this time was very powerful. Sikh extremism was in turn met by the ascendancy of Hindu chauvinist groups (Hindu Suraksh Samiti, Hindu Brahmin Sabha, Punjab Shiv Sena — to name a few) that met Sikh terrorism with a force of their own.

Rajiv Gandhi, however, used his newcomer status to break his mother's deadlock with the Sikhs. Mr. Gandhi acquisced on many of the moderate Sikh demands and on July 24, 1985, the Gandhi-Longowal agreement was signed. The agreement included provisions to: 1. transfer Chandigarh, Punjab's capital, to Punjabi control; 2. compensate Haryana for the loss of Chandigarh; 3. solve the water distribution problems between Punjab and her neighbors. Generally, the accord acceded to earlier Sikh demands in return for Sikh promises of peaceful existence within the Indian union.

In conjunction with the accord, Mr. Gandhi shrewdly decided that the Akalis should be in power to clean house in the Punjab. He acted on this decision in the election that followed the signing of the accord. "Indeed, it was widely claimed that Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi saw an Akali victory as the best possible outcome and that his party had purposely chosen weak candidates in some constituencies."[33] In theory, this probably would have been a smart move. Unfortunately, moderate Akali strength was cut further by the assassination of Harchand Longowal. Longowal was killed by Sikh extremists who objected to his accord with the Congress government. The assassination provided a reminder of the standing threat against those who would compromise what the extremists see as the ideal of Sikh politics. To some extent, these extremist goals are muddled and confused. Many extremists simply oppose any accomodation with New Delhi and have resorted to assassination to protect their 'position'. Many young extremists seem to participate for the sake of violence, of which Longowal's assassination is only a small sample. The murder of Longowal left his lieutenant, Surjit Singh Barnala to run for election and rule the stormy Indian state of Punjab.

Unfortunately, Hindu pressure made (and continues to make) it difficult for Mr. Gandhi to implement the accord which he signed. The lack of movement on the agreed concessions, together with a lack of judicial action against Congress members implicated for inciting anti-Sikh riots (November, 1984), has only played into the hands of Sikh extremists. A great void remained between the majority of Sikhs and the Central Government. The moderate Akali Dal was thus put in the position of trying to fill the void. Unfortunately, Akali efforts were undercut by Congress inaction — bolstering the extremist position even further.

In May, 1987, Mr. Gandhi's conciliatory approach collapsed totally with the removal of Surjit Singh Barnala's Akali government and the implementation of President's rule. President's rule was implemented for two reasons. First, the Barnala government had little or no success stopping the extremists' terrorist action. "Home Minister Buta Singh charged after the dismissal that the 'Barnala government was only on paper. Extremists were running a parallel government, and we did not want to run away from our responsibility'."[34] While this statement is an exaggeration, the extremists were acting with impunity and the Barnala government was not in a position to effectively calm the situation. The second reason for President's rule lay in neighboring Haryana. As noted above, Hindu chauvinism was an effective vote-getter, especially in Hindu-dominated Haryan. Mr. Gandhi surely realized this and accounted for the effect Punjab President's rule would have on the upcoming elections in Haryana (five weeks later). When asked why his government was dismissed at that time, Barnala correctly replied,

"Because of the Haryana elections. The Congress (I) has already lost in Kerala and West Bengal. The Prime Minister has to face the Haryana elections. So Punjab's interests were sacrificed at the altar of Haryana."[35] Mr. Gandhi had learned the power of Hindu chauvinism in the national elections, and with his tenure as prime minister being threatened he needed to take the initiative. Adding to this, Mr. Gandhi has separated himself from all past prime ministers by refusing to criticize the violent extremist Hindu group Rashtriya Swayamsevek Sangh (RSS), again setting a dangerous precedent for the future of minorities in Indian politics.

President's rule, however, has not exactly had its desired effects. Terrorism and communal strife rage on in Punjab. While the Punjab police have capture over 40 terrorists, these arrests only scratch the surface and certainly do not deal with the roots of the problem. As Punjab's Director General of Police said, a solution to the problem is possible (but certainly not easy). "If you win the hearts and minds of the people, they [the terrorists] will have to go. They will no longer have a base."[36] At present, Mr. Gandhi has done nothing to even approach winning the hearts and minds of the people. To begin this process, Gandhi should make another courageous move: he should implement his accords. Unfortunately, Gandhi is caught between Hindu sentiment and Sikh demands. Thus far, he has not shown enough political skill to achieve a solution to the crisis. The Punjab crisis, however, is clearly not Gandhi's only problem. Sri Lanka and Gandhi's own tenuous leadership position surely effect his scope of movement in Punjab. As *Newsweek* has pointed out, "Gandhi's failure to solve the Sikh challenge is only the latest of his problems. His early popularity has evaporated; many Indians now see him as arrogant and ignorant of political realities."[37]

PART FIVE: THE IMPLICATIONS OF CRISIS

The strife and strains that the crisis has brought to India raise several important questions about democratic techniques for dealing with minority complaints and agitational movements.

One of these questions deals with how Indian democracy should handle minority challenges to national unity. In the Sikh case, the crisis has taken on a great deal of meaning because the demands have principally become the demands of one state on the union. The communal backdrop to Punjabi demands make them even more threatening in the eyes of national Congress leaders. These state-based demands have produced fears of secession within Central government circles. In earlier times, few if any credible voices advocated secession, or Khalistan. Occasional veiled threats had been used by Punjabi Suba proponents, but secession certainly had no broad-based support. Though secession still does not carry widespread support, its appeal has grown. Operation Bluestar, the November riots and President's

rule all changed attitudes within the Sikh community. The alienation factor has taken its toll in Punjab and the result has been an increased willingness to listen to, if not wholly accept, extremist doctrine. The environment of alienation has spawned an era in which calls for Khalistan are increasingly gaining credibility. As time has progressed, a Sikh nationalist identity has gained more strength. Extremists have taken over the SGPC and their secessionist mindset has begun to spread throughout the Punjabi Sikh community. One has begun to hear sporadic calls for a separate 'Sikh nation' emanating from SGPC meetings. With power in the hands of the extremists, it will not be surprising to hear increased calls for Khalistan.

The effect of secession would be devastating to the Indian union. Since Independence, the Central government has presided over a diverse nation with many cultures, languages and religions. The history of independent India has been marked by communal strife and sub-national movements. Besides Punjab, Tamil separatists once also provided difficult problems for the Central government. Having achieved Tamil Nadu, there are still some calls for a separate Tamil nation. The largest effect of Khalistan would most likely by the precedent set for other aspiring secessionist movements. The danger and fear is that any Indian government that allowed Khalistan would be faced with at least a half dozen other secessions in no time. For this reason, Khalistan is beyond the realm of possibility in the Delhi mindset.

Khalistan also provides threats to India with regard to Pakistan. Because of its location on the Pakistani border, an independent Sikh state would be a great strategic loss for India. A pro-Pakistani or neutral Sikh state is not something that the Indian government could allow. Its geographic location would also cause problems for India with respect to Jammu and Kashmir. A Sikh state would virtually cut off this already troublesome territory from Indian control. Because Jammu and Kashmir is already a subject in the Indo-Pakistani dispute and the Sino-Indian border dispute, the cost of Khalistan would once again prove too high for India.

As a final reason for fearing secession, one must look at the legacy of partition. Though the violence of partition occurred 40 years ago, the horror of communal bloodshed remains in the minds of India's leaders. As a result, religiously-based expressions of independence will not be tolerated within the Indian union. This factor, combined with the surge of Hindu chauvinism, produces an environment in which any Sikh secession claim would be crushed as soon as possible.

Indian fears of secession clash directly with Sikh wishes for greater autonomy. As a proud people, Sikhs desire control of their own destiny. The events of the 1980s have humiliated and alienated the Sikh community. Whereas once Sikhs had believed in dual nationalism with an overriding loyalty to India, they now speak of betrayal and distrust. On the political

side, Sikh leaders also wish to possess the patronage that accompanies power in India. Sikh politicians regard Punjab as their home and they wish to distribute to their supporters the rewards of political power. To some extent, the Sikhs exalt Punjab's 'breadbasket of India' status and claim responsibility for it. Now, they wish to reap their own special benefits in their own land. Additionally, the Sikhs now look for a place where they can receive full government protection. The fact that anti-Sikh riots were allegedly led by Congress politicians has caused many Sikhs to aspire to a more protected environment. A sharply polarized feeling has arisen, and increased autonomy is seen as a precondition of greater security.

Even if secession is not yet in the forefront of Sikh politics, the threat of communal agitation still worries India's leaders. No actions taken in Punjab have been able to calm the situation. Violence, sabotage and assassinations still occur frequently and the government seems powerless to conquer the terrorists. Unless the government can eliminate the violence, or more importantly, attack the root causes of violence, extremism will continue to thrive in Punjab. With extremist strength growing, the idea of secession will also continue to gain adherents.

Perhaps a solution lies in the appearance of a new leader in the mold of Sant Fateh Singh of the 1960s. This new leader should be someone who can deal with Congress by making Sikh demands more palatable to the leaders of the Indian union. A new, more moderate leader is probably not possible in a Sikh community dominated by extremists who can ultimately rule by force. Any Sikh moderate would be forced to walk a fine line, always wary of the example of Harchand Longowal, who was assassinated by the extremists. The fortunes of a moderate Sikh leader could be greatly improved by the actions of the Central government — especially Rajiv Gandhi. If Mr. Gandhi were to carry out the accords, this would certainly improve the chances of the emergence of a strong moderate leader.

The discussion of Central government actions brings up a second important question in the discussion of the Punjab crisis. How should minorities and minority demands be treated by the Center? At the heart of the matter, the government must choose between commitment to reconciliation and commitment to the appeal of Hindu chauvinist politics. Throughout most of the twentieth century, the Congress movement and the Congress-dominated government had exhibited a reconciliational approach in dealing with minorities. Under Mohandas Gandhi's influence, the Congress was an inclusive movement willing to accept anyone who would work nonviolently for independence. In the post-independence period, Congress remained an inclusive and tolerant party by enacting constitutional guarantees to freedom of religion, speech, and minority representation in both party and government. Congress' special treatment of the scheduled classes can

be seen as another inclusive approach to minority and tribal rights.

In the post-independence period, Congress could always afford to repsect minority rights. As the one dominant party in the Indian system, Congress rarely needed to use short-run, religiously-based ploys to gain votes. By 1977, however, Congress strength had eroded and an opposition party finally governed India. In the post-Janata rule period, Congress can no longer view governing as a sure thing. When Congress lost to Janata, leaders realized that Congress had lost its political dominance outside of the northern Indian 'Hindi heartland'. Now, Congress apparently believes that it must appeal to the Hindu majority in India or again be turned out of office. After 1977, Congress became an exclusive party, playing mainly to the Hindu majority audience, sometimes at the expense of the minorities. Hindu chauvinism was used by Congress in the 1985 elections and in the decision for President's rule in Punjab. This exclusivist approach poses great dangers for the future of minorities and minority demands in India. If Hindu sentiment will be the backdrop for every decision about minorities, prudent decisions about political demands will not always be possible and further crises will surely erupt.

A third question presents itself after careful study of the Punjab crisis. How should Center-state relations be conducted in India? As illustrated above, Mrs. Gandhi found it necessary and convenient to consolidate much of India's political power in New Delhi. She subordinated and removed Chief Ministers and micromanaged many of their political decisions during her tenure as Prime Minister. This centralization of power exacerbated the tensions in Akali-Congress relations. Rajiv Gandhi tried to change this management style when he took office. After realizing that this tyle had helped lead to the crisis, logic dictated that Mr. Gandhi should follow a different course. Though the strategy succeeded for a while, Mr. Gandhi has begun to fall into the same traps as his mother. As local, regional and bureaucratic powers slow Mr. Gandhi's plans for progress in India, his political position has become more tenuous. This vulnerability has shortened Mr. Gandhi's political sight from long-term goals to the short term — and political survival. Paralleling his mother's earlier situation, Congress victory has seemingly become more important than the health of the nation. Mr. Gandhi has had a difficult time doing what would be correct with regard to Punjab and the rest of the Indian union: He has not shown the political capacity necessary to implement the accords.

At the same time, the Sikhs continue to desire protection of their identity. The Sikhs have always had strong links with their past and symbols of the better days. In a continuum including Nanak, Gobind Singh, Ranjit Singh and even Bhindranwale, the Sikhs have found leaders who exalt Sikhism and the power that can emerge from a pure Sikh identity. As the

Sikhs face what they fear to be another Hindu onslaught, calls for a purified Sikh identity will be supported.

The Congress party is now seen by many Sikhs as an instrument of Hindu India. This characterization is dangerous for Congress interests and dangerous for India as a whole. With no pro-union party to turn to, Sikhs will increasingly be drawn to the extremist (separatist?) message of pure Sikh identity. In this scenario, an exclusivist Congress party will not rule an undivided India for long.

The answer to the crisis lies with Rajiv Gandhi. If he can look past the short-term political advantages of accomodating and nurturing Hindu chauvinism, perhaps the situation can be normalized. Mr. Gandhi should not deal with extremist terrorists, but his implementation of the accords would go a long way towards strengthening what is left of the moderate position in Sikh politics. On the Sikh side, a strong leader has always produced a healthy Sikh identity. A strong moderate leader who refrains from preaching hatred would be most healthy for the minority. On the national side, a strong moderate leader would be what Congress needs to begin solving the crisis. Considering the possible alternative endings to the crisis, Mr. Gandhi should act quickly to implement the accords to boost the cause of the moderates in Punjab and in India. Though it may be too late for Mr. Gandhi's move to help oust the extremists from political power, actions taken in the near future will be crucial to the outcome of the crisis in Punjab.

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Very special thanks to professor John O. Field for his help and patience.

The Soviet Union, South Africa and the ANC: Why Worry?

Nicci Young

In view of both the influence the Soviet Union has gained in Southern Africa by helping the national liberation struggle and the exploding situation in South Africa, the objectives of the Soviet Union in the region are of much interest and concern to both South Africa and the West. The Soviet Union has provided aid to insurgent groups and outspoken support to the anti-apartheid movement. The existence of a Soviet threat is included in much of the discussion concerning the national liberation struggle and the political future of South Africa. Yet there is not much understanding about the dynamics of Soviet foreign policy in South Africa nor the degree of influence the Soviets have over the leading national liberation group, the African National Congress (ANC).

In trying to evaluate the extent of the 'Communist threat,' this paper will analyze the Soviet Union's interest in South Africa, its view of and ties with the ANC, as well as the ANC's perception of the Soviets and relationship with the South African Communist Party (SACP). Lastly, looking towards the future, should the ANC take over, this paper will draw some conclusions about the position of the Soviet Union in such a situation. Basically, it will try to determine if there is reason for such fear.

The Soviet Union is preparing its total onslaught in order to enslave us here in South Africa. (P.W. Botha, South African Prime Minister, 5 January 1983)

The South African government's and, to some extent, the West's theory of a 'total onslaught' is based on the fear of Communist infiltration through the bordering states and through the African National Congress. It is widely believed in South Africa that the Soviet Union, through its ties with independent black states, especially the avowedly Marxist governments in Angola and Mozambique, and through its aid to black nationalist movements, is pursuing its expansionist designs. The government's 'White Paper on Defense and Armaments Supply, 1982' states that

The ultimate aim of the Soviet Union and its allies is to overthrow the present body politic in the Republic of South Africa and to replace it with a Marxist-orientated form of government to further the objectives of the USSR. therefore all possible methods and means are used to attain this objective. This includes social and labour unrest, civilian resistance, terrorist attacks against the infrastructure of the RSA [Republic of South Africa] and the intimidation of Black leaders and members of the Security Forces. This onslaught is supported by a world-wide propaganda campaign and the involvement of various front organizations and leaders.[1]

Within the country, opponents of the government are said to be either in league with the Soviet Union, being used by Moscow, or assisting revolutionary forces.

One of the major preoccupations of the South African government is the very real resurgence of the African National Congress, both regionally and internally. The ANC has been the umbrella organization for African nationalism in South Africa since 1912. It was officially banned in 1960, and has been engaged in 'armed struggle' against the regime for almost three decades. The ANC has become a well organized liberation movement with wide ranging international connections, most of its military support coming from communist sources. African support for the ANC has become nationwide, "cutting across tribal or ethnic groups, classes, regions, age and education."[2] During recent years, moreover, its sabotage and guerrilla attacks have become more frequent and sophisticated.

The resurgence of the ANC has both a nationalist and a communist dimension in its contribution to the South Africans' fear. According to Thomas Karis in foreign affairs, the main importance of the ANC's "campaign of sabotage and guerrilla attacks...is its impact on national popular consciousness, black and white." This 'armed propaganda' has greatly increased the confidence of the blacks. He notes that "the opennes of explicit support" for the ANC "is a remarkable feature of South Africa, especially since 1980." For the white population, "there is a growing atmosphere of siege, especially for whites who believe South Africa is the object of Communist inspired 'total onslaught,' and deep anxiety that a smoldering, sputtering surface may erupt."[3] Jan du Plessis, a South African publicist, believes that "at present, Soviet strategy against South Africa is carried out by the ANC and the SACP."[4]

In much of the literature dealing with Soviet policy in South Africa there are warnings of Soviet influence and control over the ANC and the SACP. It is sometimes suggested that the former group has been infiltrated and subverted by the latter and that both are mere instruments of the Kremlin. Despite its anti-apartheid stance, the United States has also taken on Pretoria's theory of 'total onslaught' and the reactive policy of 'total strategy.' "Each successive American administration," affirms Boris R. Asoyan of

the USSR Academy of Sciences, "made its own contribution to the consolidation of relations with the racist regime and build-up of anti-Soviet and anti-communist hysteria."[5] The U.S. Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 does argue that the ANC has been "infiltrated by communists," and asks that the ANC's "commitment to a free and democratic" South Africa be made known![6] However, as this paper will prove, the South Africans' and the West's belief that the ANC is a communist controlled organization rather than an independent nationalist movement that accepts aid from the Soviet Union is unsubstantial.

Our assistance is provided to the national liberation movement in order to free the oppressed peoples of South Africa. (Anatoly A. Gromyko, Director of the Institute of African Studies, USSR Academy of Sciences, 21 April 1984)

The belief in a Soviet threat to South Africa rests on various assumptions concerning the motivations and goals of Soviet foreign policy. It would therefore be interesting to examine the strategic, commercial and ideological interests influencing Soviet activities as well as the actual ties the USSR has with the ANC.

South Africa is of strategic importance to the Soviet Union because of the military bases it can offer, the Cape route, and its rich minerals. Although there is an East-West dimension to the South African situation which cannot be ignored, the strategic interests of the USSR in South Africa have generally been exaggerated. "Southern Africa," says Seth Singleton, "is not important to Soviet security in any way and thus is not worth much financial commitment or risk. Soviet policy has always put the security of the motherland and of the contiguous empire first."[7] The USSR has witnessed that the strategic advantages gained from its involvement in Southern Africa, to date, have been modest, as both Mozambique and Angola have resisted Soviet requests for bases. In addition, Soviet support for national liberation groups and Marxist governments in Southern Africa does not prevent these actors from following a foreign policy which is independent of the USSR (e.g. the Nkomati Accord between Mozambique and South Africa).

The strategic gains for the Soviet Union which would result from a future black regime in South Africa are by no means guaranteed. Thus, although the possibility of one day establishing "naval, air, communications, or intelligence facilities"[8] in South Africa and of controlling the Cape route and the world's supply of chromite, platinum and much of its manganese, gold and diamonds is not overlooked, it is not the basic motivation for the Soviets' present day activities.

Commercial factors in Soviet foreign policy toward South Africa are perplexing. Indeed, despite the overall hostile political relationship, the KGB illicitly channels "sophisticated Western technology, ultimately bound for the USSR, through South Africa."[9] Most importantly, there exists a clandestine commercial relationship between the two countries for the marketing of diamonds, gold and platinum, which is profitable to both and known to very few.

How does the Soviet Union justify the contradictions in its policy toward South Africa? Kurt Campbell explains that cooperation with South Africa is necessary to strengthen the Soviet Union ("...and thus in the long term, to help further the victory of communism and the final defeat of capitalism...") and therefore has never been ruled out or made taboo in Soviet Marxism-Leninism.[10] This strengthening of the Soviet Union is seen to benefit the revolutionary forces that it supports and to "promote the ultimate national liberation of South Africa because of the identity of interests between the USSR and the world revolutionary movement."[11]

The United States and South Africa see the primary threat of Soviet policy as attempting to disrupt the supply of South African minerals to the industrialized democracies.[12] It is termed the 'strategy of resource denial.' However, such a policy, as one aiming to control the Cape route, is not an overriding objective as it would backfire for the Soviet Union and a future black South African government.

Assuming that a major Soviet objective in the region is to obtain access to its enormous resources, the West would be faced with two distinct worries. According to Larry W. Bowman,

> one concerns the fear of being beholden to the Soviet Union in the event of a disruption of the South African supply; the second has to do with the fear of a Soviet/South African cabal to control mineral prices and supplies if a revolutionary regime aligned with the Soviet Union were to achieve power in South Africa.[13]

These fears should be tempered by the realization that South Africa, no matter what government, is highly dependent on the United States and its allies for selling its industrial raw materials. A radical government would need the resources to satisfy the social welfare demands of the population, and the Soviet Union, as often witnessed in the Third World, demonstrates "neither the willingness nor the ability to subsidize an economy like South Africa's;"[14] the new government would probably have to turn to the West for most of the needed capital, technology and managerial skills.

As for concern about a future minerals cartel between a future South Africa government and the Soviet Union, "the USSR," assures Campbell, "has a commercial interest, albeit an uncertain one, in the preservation of the

status quo and the continuation of the clandestine marketing contacts...In this sense, it is possible than an avowedly Marxist regime in South Africa would not be in the best economic interests of the Soviet Union."[15]

Rather than strategic or commercial, the Soviets' objectives in promoting the national liberation movement are political and ideological. Most of Soviet literature on South Africa deals with Marxist-Leninist interpretations of South African society; with the oldest communist party on the continent and a large proletariat, it possesses the 'objective conditions' for a socialist revolution. Though Soviet observers are cautious and skeptical about South Africa's revolutionary potential, they do not rule out the possibility that future developments might fulfill Marxist-Leninist prophecy.[16]

Our support of the ANC is longstanding. The revolutionary alliance of the SACP and the ANC will continue to receive Soviet assistance in the struggle for national liberation. (Boris R. Asoyan, Deputy Director, Institute for African Studies, USSR Academy of Sciences, 1984)

It is in line with the predominant ideological objective that the USSR supports the struggle for national liberation in South Africa via the ANC and the SACP. Reporting on the meeting in the Kremlin on Nov. 4, 1986, between Gorbachev and Olivier Tambo, President of the ANC, *Pravda* reported:

In greeting the ANC President, M.S. Gorbachev expressed solidarity with the South African patriot's courageous struggle against the inhuman system of apartheid and said that the Soviet Union views the ANC as the voice of the genuine interests of the people of South Africa and the acknowledged leader of the national liberation movement in that country.[17]

Despite the fact that the ANC has been outlawed since 1960 (the SACP since 1950) and the covert nature of Soviet foreign policy, one can assess the general Soviet tools of involvement, which it has committed itself to continue, with the ANC: diplomatic relations, moral support (including propaganda), financial support and, of course, military support. Indeed, soon after its creation in 1961, 'Umkonto We Sizwe' (Spear of the Nation), the fighting wing of the ANC, was assured of the material support of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. This includes not only arms and ammunition but also training personnel from the Soviet Union and training of South Africans in Soviet universities and military centers.[18]

Soviet support of the ANC does not mean that the ANC is capable of fulfilling the mentioned Marxist-Leninist prophecy and that therefore the ANC is communist or Marxist-Leninist; rather the Soviets support the ANC

because they realize that national liberation has to be achieved first (immediate goal) and the ANC accepts the support in need of attaining its objective of national liberation establishing majority rule. With this in mind, let us see why the ANC turned to the Soviet Union for aid and determine if the ANC-SACP alliance means that the ANC is communist controlled.

The socialist community countries have sided consistently with the movement against Apartheid. They have shown themselves to be allies we can always rely upon, a secure rear base without which our struggle would be even more difficult and protracted. The forces of reaction are always trying to detach us from these countries, hoping that if they succeeded, they would weaken our position and defeat us. As a movement, we need to be conscious of this all the time and protect our friendship and cooperation with the socialist community of nations very jealously. (Olivier Tambo, President, African National Congress, *Storm Over South Africa, World Communist Review*, January, 1986)

The ANC is an example of a liberation movement which turned to Moscow because it was "spurned by the West."[19] Indeed, the difficulty in obtaining international assistance explains in part the affinity of the Soviet Union among ANC leaders. Through its link with the SACP, the ANC, explains Tom Lodge, "was assured continual source of funds, equipment, training and diplomatic support — resources of a scale and quality its rivals could not hope to match."[20] Lodge continues to clarify that, given the stability and continuity of the Soviet regime, Soviet aid has, on the whole, been more "consistent and less subjective to sudden changes of attitude than say the Chinese, American or African assistance."[21] Moreover, its modest price has been attractive. It costs African liberation movements little to align themselves loyally in favor of Soviet foreign policy.

Apart from the material advantages of the aid it receives, Lodge adds another interest: "the fact that the ANC has had such a powerful external ally has meant that it has been able to steer clear of dependent relations in African countries which have hosted it"[22] and thus avoided the dangers of local political entanglements. Finally, and of use to the point of this paper, one must realize that Soviet support does not mean that the ANC has to be aligned with the USSR or necessarily accept its influence.

The official South African position is that the ANC is controlled by the communists through (white) members of the SACP. The United States Senate Sub-Committee on Security and Terrorism chaired by Jeremiah Denton, after interviewing several former ANC members in 1982, came to the same conclusion. Reported Dalton:

We may well sympathize with the original goal of the ANC....We cannot however delude ourselves that their purpose now is the achievement of those praiseworthy objectives. They have...been deeply infilitrated by those who seek to advance the imperialistic ambitions of the Soviet Union.[23]

It is the belief of this paper that Soviet influence over the ANC has been overestimated and that despite the influence the Soviet Union may have, it certainly does not control the liberation movement. It would therefore be useful at this point to challenge the apprehension that the pro-Soviet South African Communist Party, being one of the ANC's allies, dominates or controls it.

There are indeed a few interlocking membership or "organic links between the ANC and the SACP, but the ideological differences between them are vast."[24] The ANC's goal is a democratic, nonracial and undivided South Africa, and its economic goal is a moderate one. The SACP is a Marxist-Leninist party, and its program is rigidly ideological and pro-Moscow. Beginning in the late 1920s, a few African communists did join the ANC. And at this stage of the struggle for national liberation, Communists and non-Communists within the ANC had no significant differences in policy or strategy. However, "the Communists' ideological convictions and long-range agenda distinguish them from many in the ANC."[25]

In his article "South African Liberation: The Communist Factor," Thomas Karis traces three rough stages of the ANC's attitude, and that of most blacks towards the Communists: "distance from the Communists" from the 1920s through the 1940s; "joint action with them and all races;" and increasing reliance on groups within South Africa.[26] The first change was largely a reaction to the policies of the new National Party government, which came to power in 1948, and a realization of the need for allies and unity. The 'Freedom Charter' which advocates "that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white," was adopted in 1956. It is not socialist or Marxist, nor is it anti-capitalist; it envisages a democratic welfare state and a mixed economy. According to Karis, the ANC's acceptance to nationalize "the mineral wealth beneath the soil, the banks and monopoly industry," is not a sign of radicalism today "in light of the South African's state control of the economy."[27]

In the third phase of the ANC's relationship with the Communists, starting roughly in 1960 when it was forced underground and into exile, the change was marked more by an increase in the importance of aboveground groups based in South Africa than by a different attitude toward the Communists. "At present," says Karis, "the Communist factor is in many ways less significant than the other groups supportive of the ANC."[28] These include white businessmen and journalists, the Progressive Federal Party, which is the official opposition, delegations of Dutch Reformed, Roman

Catholic and Anglican clergymen, the United Democratic Front (UDF), the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and many others representative of certain interests.

In challenging the speculation about Communist influence on the ANC, it is useful to note the opinions of a few significant actors. In addressing the Communist Party's 65th anniversary meeting on July 31, 1986, chairman Joe Slovo saw "a protracted conflict" in South Africa of increasing complexity and no need for the Party to "seek to occupy the dominant position in the liberation alliance." Walter Sisulu, former secretary-general of the ANC, now in prison for life, would say about critics who assumed that Communists would dominate any collaboration: "cannot these people see that we might be using the Communists?" Olivier Tambo said: "It has often been said that the ANC is controlled by the Communist Party...by Communists. Well I have been long enough in the ANC to know that that has never been true."[29] The assumption of domination is seen as insulting and underestimating the nationalist leaders.

As for the ANC's anti-imperialist stance and rhetoric, it is not that surprising, proposes Karis, "in the light of the U.S. and Western complicity in bolstering the South African regime." Karis even goes to say that "despite much of its rhetoric, the ANC historically, politically and culturally is more attuned to the United States and the West than it is to the Soviet bloc."[30] As explained earlier, one cannot jump to conclusions that the ANC accepts the Soviet Union's political system as a model or that an ANC-led government would be aligned to the Soviet Union.

Given class formation internally, radical regimes regionally, and intensifying pressures globally, the national liberation movements under ANC leadership may yet instigate a revolution in South Africa. (Timothy M. Shaw, *South Africa, Southern Africa, and the World System*, 1983)[31]

In view of the current period of crisis South Africa has entered since 1984, let us look toward the future, in particular, at the probability of a black majority government assuming power through the ANC. To appease South Africa's and the West's fears, several factors which prevent the Soviet Union from expecting an influential or dominant position in a future South Africa, will be drawn together.

The prospect of a revolution establishing black majority rule in South Africa is often denied and feared by white South Africa, hoped and pragmatically accepted by the Soviet Union and black South Africa. Put aside reactions, everyone should be aware of the likeliness of such a prospect. Indeed, despite the fact that South Africa is a rather solid regime

with considerable political, economic and political power, as B. Asoyan explains:

> The deep crisis gripping the system of apartheid, the upsurge of the liberation struggle of the non-white population of the country, and the growing foreign political isolation of the racist regime show that a revolutionary situation is gradually maturing in South Africa.[32]

Moreover, Colin Legum adds that changes in power relations in the states bordering on South Africa have "encouraged the spirit of resistance among black South Africans by raising their morale and enhancing their capacity for organization of the radical forces, as exemplified by the ANC, the PAC [Pan African Congress] and various groupins within the BCM [Black Consciousness Movement]." He also explains that the "success of the method of armed struggle in overturning the status quo in Angola, Mozambique and Rhodesia" contributed to the idea of taking up arms.[33]

This predicted revolution will be led by the ANC, the leader of the national liberation movement, symbolizing unity and action. Olivier Tambo speaks of the "four pillars of revolution:" the underground structures, operating illegally within the country; the legal UDF; Umkhonto We Sizwe, the ANC's military wing and the "mobilization of the International community and world public opinion."[34] The ANC's strategy for assuming power and establishing majority rule in South Africa is defined by Karis:

> The ANC pursues a multifaceted strategy backed by international pressures, that links sabotage and guerrilla warfare with mass politicization through demonstrations, boycotts, strikes and confrontation. While emphasizing the need for pragmatic flexibility, the ANC envisions preparations for a mass-based, armed insurrection aimed at seizing political power. It persists in believing that violence may be minimal, that by mass action the wheels of the political system and the economy can be stopped from turning...Important ANC leaders still hope the Afrikaner nationalists can be brought to the negotiating table and that a genuine national convention can be convened to define the change that will bring armed struggle to an end.[35]

If and when the revolution takes place in South Africa, many reckon that the Soviet Union is going to step in. Even though the Soviet Union will play a supportive role in the process of national liberation by furnishing military and moral aid — in the fulfillment of its 'internationalist duty,' this belief is challenged because of the limits of Soviet policy, the hierarchy of their interests, lessons from countries in the region which have had a similar experience to the one predicted and the independence of the ANC.

In terms of limits, economic factors are quite determining. Drawing on general Soviet experiences in the Third World, and Africa in this case, one can agree with Peter Clement's statement: "The Soviet economy has failed

to serve as a successful model for African development plans, and Moscow is perceived as unable or unwilling to provide meaningful economic assistant to most Third World states."[36] This along with a South Africa, no matter the regime, dependent in large part on the US and its allies for development and commerce, as we have seen, will make the West "the natural ally"[37] for economic development.

The Soviets and their allies have not been able to provide effective help to Mozambique and Angola in rebuilding and developing their ravaged economies. The USSR provides technical assistance but not much food, money, oil or consumer goods.[38] Perhaps South Africa will not be considered as a 'marginal client' or a 'basket case,' receive the aid it seeks more than them and, if the government has enough affinity with the Soviets, receive membership to the CMEA. Nevertheless, without entering the debate about neo-colonialism and despite the fact that the future majority government will be socialist in some form and committed to a redistribution of wealth,[39] I think the West, in particular the United States, Europe and Brazil, will be more relevant to the future government in terms of capital, technology and commerce.

There are a few other factors that limit the implementation of Soviet foreign policy, especially concerning Soviet influence in the national liberation struggle. Distance is one! South Africa is over 5,000 miles away from the Soviet mainland. This limits the choice of policy instruments available to Soviet leaders. Indeed, as Campbell notes, "to date, the USSR has provided qualified diplomatic, military and moral assistance to the ANC, but it has avoided a direct commitment towards the attainment of black majority rule in South Africa."[40]

A further constraint could be the cultural differences between the Soviet Union and black South Africa, in terms of history, philosophy, religion and languages. This could pose an obstacle to cooperation. In addition, although the Soviets support the struggle for black equality, racism is not unknown in the USSR.[41] What the ANC thinks, for example, about the issue of Soviet Jewry for and, in terms of 'Soviet imperialism,' the invasion of Afghanistan, are questions to consider. Lastly, one must not forget the differences in ideology and goals between the ANC and the pro-Soviet SACP.

These limiting factors along with other conditions of the state of the Soviet Union domestically and abroad, have placed South Africa, as a part of Southern Africa, relatively low in the hierarchy of Soviet foreign policy interests. Clement says that "compared to other regions of the world, southern Africa ranks relatively low as a Soviet foreign policy priority. This can be seen, in concrete terms, in the figures for Soviet economic and military assistance. These figures generally reveal a direct correlation between a region's geographic proximity to the USSR and the amount of aid extend-

ed to it."[42] Campbell, too, sees that the Western assumption that the USSR will establish a zone of influence in Southern Africa will not be realized too soon or easily, for Southern Africa has 'rescinded' in importance to the USSR, especially since 1980, because of challenges in Poland and Afghanistan and domestic difficulties "arising from repeated political successions."[43]

It is perhaps necessary to reiterate that the similar experiences and situations of other states in Southern Africa serve to undermine Soviet hope for influence in Southern Africa, the South African national liberation fighters' and possible future rulers' confidence in Soviet aid and cooperation and, Western contention that the Soviets are going to take over. The expectations for economic assistance on the part of the Marxist mode states of Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Angola have not been fulfilled. This, together with another problem stated in an issue of *Problems of Communism* in January, 1986 — "the absence of direct Soviet involvement" — "entitles the newly independent African states to forge positions of non-alignment without sacrificing their revolutionary credentials."[44] This position of non-alignment is one the ANC already seems to have adopted. Despite its acceptance of aid and cooperation from the Soviet Union and the SACP, the ANC has demonstrated and will surely demonstrate in the future, a desire to be independent of or disassociated from them.

This paper has challenged conventional wisdom in the West concerning Soviet aspirations in Southern Africa, particularly South Africa — the fear of Soviet-Communist influence in the national liberation struggle and over a possible future majority government. It has come to two conclusions. Firstly, on the Soviets' side, the USSR does not really have an economic or strategic interest in waging a 'total onslaught' against South Africa and acknowledges that developments in Southern Africa are peripheral to Soviet national interests. There are clear indications of a continued Soviet interests and involvement in the region but Soviet policy operates with caution and constraint. Secondly, on the ANC's side, although the probability is that any majority government in South Africa will be socialist in some form, committed to a redistribution of wealth,[45] and that it will have relations with the USSR, the ANC if and when in power, will not irrevocably imply that a red flag has been raised in South Africa.

ENDNOTES ANC WHY WORRY

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The British Labour Party and Defending NATO

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This paper was written in April, 1987. In June, 1987, Margaret Thatcher's Conservative Party overwhelmingly defeated Neil Kinnock and the Labour Party, returning the Torys to Parliament with a 100-seat majority. According to post-election polls, five percent of British voters stated that they did not vote Labour because of its radical, unilateralist nuclear policy. A five percent shift in voting could have greatly reduced Thatcher's majority and even, perhaps, have given Labour a thin victory. Kinnock, as a result of Labour's crushing defeat, has called for a complete re-evaluation of the Party, including, he implies, rejecting unilateralism. Nevertheless, many of the issues I deal with in this paper are still pertinent, inasmuch that I discuss NATO strategy, American isolationism, European neutralism and other issues. Those issues will remain with us so long as the Atlantic Alliance exists.

In the Fall of 1986, the Atlantic Alliance witnessed the unfolding of a dramatic, potentially dangerous, spectacle in the British Labour Party. At the party conference in Blackpool, Labour unveiled a concrete defense platform which called for the unilateral denuclearization of the British Isles. Embraced by the lefts Labour leader Neil Kinnock, this policy is not simply an advisory plank like a Republican or Democratic Party platform, but represents a specific policy manifesto for a Labour government. Since Labour is the major opposition party in the United Kingdom and is running strong in the polls, what are the political and military implications for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should the Labour Party come to power in the next election and implement its defense platform?

Labour's defense policy is explicit: 1. Close down all United States nuclear bases in Britain within one year while allowing non-nuclear bases to remain open; 2. Remove all nuclear weapons from British soil within one year, corresponding to the shutting down of the nuclear bases; 3. Permit nuclear-armed American warships to have access to British ports and naval installations; 4. Scrap Britains independent nuclear deterrent, including cancelling the modernization program of replacing the obsolescent Polaris deterrent with Trident D-5 missiles purchased from the United States; 5. Devote

the resources saved from eliminating nuclear modernization to conventional forces; 6. Increase Britain's support for and contribution to NATO[1].

The implications for Western security of this program are enormous and transverse all military and politcal facets of the NATO alliance. Next to West Germany, Britain is in many ways the lynchpin of the Alliance. While West Germany is the front line and the most likely invasion target, England is the strategically vital rear echelon and bridge between the fighting front on the continent and reinforcement from the United States. Tactically, Britain is the staging area for air-lifted troops from the U.S. as well as headquartering the central air command to coordinate the battle for air supremacy in a war situation. Because internal decisions concerning British defense policy will have a profound effect on the defense of the Alliance, the prospect of a Labour government concerns all of NATO and must be considered in that context.

Labour's Defense Policy

History

The history of the British Labour Party's disarmament philosophy reaches back to the 1920s when the major powers sought to control the doomsday weapons of the time: battleships. While even then certain factions called for unilateral disarmament, the Labour Party leadership of Arthur Henderson, Ramsey MacDonald, and Philip Snowden rejected such calls as dangerously naive. When in power, Labour pursued disarmament but in conjunction with other major powers, including Fascist Italy, Imperial Japan, and later on, Nazi Germany. Other British political parties also had adopted a disarmament policy in response to the horrific destruction caused by the First World War. In the 1930s, a British unity government, composed of the Conservative, Liberal and Labour parties, pursued to its later regret arms limitation with Hitler's Germany[2].

While the Second World War obviously precluded any thought of disarmament, the idea resurged in Labour during the late 1950s when Britain had become a nuclear power. In 1957, under the vigorous leadership of Hugh Gaitskell, Labour rejected overwhelmingly a proposal that would have made Britain a non-nuclear power. Nevertheless, by 1960 the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), an anti-nuclear political organization, had developed significant strength in the Labour party and was agitating for the adoption of a unilateralist position. In July, 1960, prior to the Scarborough party conference, the Labour executive council called for the support of NATO and measured steps toward mutual disarmament in Europe. But when the conference convened, delegates approved a motion that called for unilateral disarmament and stated that a Labour government would reject any defense based

on nuclear weapons[3].

Despite the policy setbacks at Scarborough, Gaitskell was confirmed as party leader and immediately went to work to reverse the defense decisions taken at the conference. The Labour executive issued a new statement that distanced itself from Scarborough. The document advocated disarmament and a test ban treaty but accepted the West's need for nuclear defense, though it did call for a no first use doctrine. Britain, the statement went, should be a non-nuclear power while permitting American nuclear bases to remain on British soil. Gaitskell went on to rally his supporters at the Blackpool conference in October, 1961, persuading a new set of delegates to reject unilateral disarmament as a threat to world peace.[4] The battle was far from over, however, as Labour's left vowed to continue the fight.

In 1962, the conservative MacMillan government ordered the construction of the Polaris deterrent over the strong objections of Hugh Gaitskell and the Labour Party. After the suddent and tragic death of Gaitskell in 1963, Labour's mantle passed to Harold Wilson who carried the party to power in the 1964 election. Once in office, Wilson argued against an *independent* British deterrent, but claimed the purchase of an reliance on American missiles, technology, and materials made Polaris in reality a joint venture with the United States. In this way the moderate Labour leader hoped to give Britain more leverage in the international arena while scoffing at notions that Britain might fight a nuclear war with the Soviet Union. Accordingly, the Labour government cancelled the military's request for a fifth Polaris sub in 1965, arguing that four were more than adequate to fulfill their *political* mission. With a Labour government's support for British nuclear weapons, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament waned in strength and had become meaningless by the late 1960s.[5]

The Wilson governments of 1964-1970 and 1974-1979 continued to pursue a nuclear policy. In 1974, Wilson decided to move forward with *Chevaline*, a warhead program to replace eventually the growing obsolesence of the Polaris system. Labour intended only to maintain the viability of Britain's deterrent in the face of Soviet anti-ballistic missile and civil defense programs. Questions arose whether Chevaline was the right program for the job, but Labour's commitment to the nuclear deterrent was firm.[6] After Margaret Thatcher's conservatives swept into power in 1979, Labour renewed its march towards antinuclear unilateralism.

In 1980, the Labour Party produced a policy statement which renounced "the production of a successor to the Polaris nuclear force" and "the manufacture and deployment of cruise missiles and the neutron bomb" in Britain.[7] Still, James Callaghan, successor as party leader to Wilson, opposed a non-nuclear policy. But the political left's antinuclear policies continued to gain momentum within the party. At the Blackpool conference

in October, 1980, the delegates adopted a unilateral disarmament statement, "opposing British participation in any defense policy based on the use or threatened use of nuclear weapons."[8] Yet, despite this proclamation, Labour had not adopted unilateral disarmament as part of its official manifesto, which would have been binding on a Labour government. As a result of Labour's growing unilateralist orientation and major domestic policy differences, serious breaches between the left and right intensified. When Michael Foot, darling of the political left and devotee of disarmament, was elected party leader in November, 1980, Labour's right broke away to form the new Social Democratic Party, taking with it several dozen dissident Members of Parliament and a major barrier to Labour's creeping unilateralism.[9]

Moreover, at the same time the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament reemerged as a victorious force within the Labour Party. In the 1983 general election, CND tried to make deployment of American cruise missiles in Britain a major issue as Labour ran on a platform of opposition to the missiles as well as in favor of deep cuts in conventional forces. Nevertheless, Thatcher's immense popularity as a result of the Falkland Islands victory swept her back into office, delivering Labour its most crushing defeat since 1922.[10] Despite the massive election losses, the CND anti-nuclear forces, who many considered partly responsible for the crushing defeat, continued to dominate Labour.

Disputes within Labour erupted between Foot and Deputy Party Leader Denis Healey, one of the few remaining moderates in the leadership. The party manifesto now appeared to commit a Labour government to complete unilateral disarmament within five years of achieving power. Relying strictly on non-nuclear defense, a Labour government would refuse American cruise missiles and cancel the Trident modernization initiated by Thatcher after her election.[11] Healey, however, attempted to resist Labour's unilateralist wave, telling Foot that he would withdraw his political support for Labour if the party leader firmly pledged to scrap Polaris.[12]

But Healey's efforts only delayed the inevitable. In October, 1984, the party conference chose leftist Neil Kinnock as the new party leader over Healey. On October 3, Labour adopted a manifesto for complete unilateral nuclear disarmament. The new defense policy would require a Labour government to expel American nuclear missiles, cancel the Trident modernization, dismantle the Polaris deterrent, close American F-111 bomber bases, and oust the Poseidon missile-carrying submarines from their bases in Holy Loch. At the time, Labour also called for conventional defense spending cuts. This comprehensive policy was adopted by an 80 percent majority of the conference delegates. *The New York Times* reported that Kinnock "smiled broadly when the vote was announced."[13] Labour's march to a policy of unilateral nuclear disarmament was complete.

Kinnock's Conceptual Design

Kinnock challenges NATO's flexible response doctrine as politically unsound and militarily ludicrous. He argues that this doctrine requires NATO and Britain to commit suicide by using nuclear weapons to defend the very country Britons are trying to protect. In a speech to the Kennedy School of Government, Kinnock criticized the NATO doctrine: "Flexible response by any other name, and for all the fancy verbal footwork with which it has been defended...[is] a strategy of limited nuclear war."[14] Kinnock adds that "There is no fallacy more dangerous than the view that military strength alone is all that is required for security [especially] when military strategy is dominated by overwhelming dependence on nuclear weapons."[15] The Labour leader considers the use of nuclear weapons to be an insane policy because no nation is prepared to destroy itself to save itself. Such a strategy, Kinnock asserts, is not credible. "The scientific and strategic fact is that, whatever may be claimed for them in terms of balance, deterrence and security, nuclear weapons cannot be used to defend Britain...The size and location of our country means thatusing nuclear weapons would always be either pointless or self-destructive."[16] Kinnock also rejected the protection of the American nuclear umbrella whether it is represented by Tomahawks, Minutemen or Poseidons.

In fairness, while Kinnock criticizes NATO's strategic doctrine, he does propose an alternative. In a speech to the National Press Club, Kinnock argued forcefully for a shifting of NATO's flexible response doctrine to one of conventional deterrent powerful enough to deter a Soviet attack.

> I am far from alone in considering that NATO's strategic doctrines have not responded sufficiently to the great changes in the political and economic condition of Europe which have taken place since 1949 when NATO wwas formed. And it is these very considerations of ensuring that our policies for security and defense relate to the modern conditions of the modern world which produce the *dual* elements of the policy that will be implemented by the Labour government. That policy is to get rid of British nuclear weapons, and instead be able to make qualitative and quantitative improvement in our conventional forces and — consequently — our NATO contribution by land, sea, and air. The policy is to deliberately combine nuclear disarmament with increased conventional force credibility. It will be put into full effect.[17]

The difference between Labour and Conservative defense policies is not, Kinnock states, a choice between weak and strong defense. Rather, he argues that Britain's participation in Alliance defense is not necessarily limited. "The comparisons must be between that defense policy which accept two Allied tasks and can fulfill neither satisfactorily because the expense and

emphasis of one deprives and weakens the other, and Labour defense policy which takes on one Allied job and does it full, effectively, and convincingly."[18] Kinnock believes that the Thatcher government program to replace Polaris with Trident missiles is a fundamental mistake in defense priorities and a waste of defense expenditures. He states:

> The choice that the Conservative Government in Britain is making by its decision to increase the nuclear commitment and consequently decrease conventional force provision is the wrong one for Britain and for Europe and for NATO. The fact is that neither Britain nor the Alliance actually need British nuclear weapons, but both we and the Alliance definitely need British conventional forces. That adequate provision will not come from the current administration; it will come from the next Labour government. For these reasons it is entirely wrong to regard the decision to get rid of British nuclear weapons as a decision to diminish British defense and security responsibilities.[19]

Labour's position is best summed up by Member of Parliament Kevin McNamara: "We do not believe in sacrificing the weapons of first resort in order to pay for the weapons of last resort."[20]

The *Times* of London, however, looked at Kinnock's proposals differently: "What [Kinnock's defense policy] really means is that he is prepared to risk the balance of power and the NATO alliance which has preserved the peace for 40 years, but that he hopes the country will not notice the true significance of his policy."[21] Despite the *Times*' observation, Labour's defense policies have the support of Britain's major opposition party as well as many serious intellectuals. They deserve consideration.

Implications for NATO: Military and Political

Collapse of the INF

The Economist, a London-based news weekly, stated quite firmly that "Mr. Kinnock cannot give up nuclear weapons without changing Britain's position in NATO and the world, enormously and probably irrevocably."[22] In reality, the full implementation of Labour's defense policies would shatter the political and military structure of the Alliance. Withdrawing the 160 Tomahawk cruise missiles stationed in Britain as part of the 1983 INF deployment would send shock waves through NATO. It is possible that Britain's withdrawal from INF would lead to similar unilateral actions by other NATO governments. Because INF has become the political and military lynchpin of the Atlantic Alliance, its loss would create severe political tensions within NATO. The consensus over Alliance defense policy would collapse and with it transatlantic unity. To demonstrate this potential outcome, one must examine the weakest links in the INF chain — West Germany,

the Netherlands, and Belguim — and how they handled their deployments.

West Germany

With the largest compliment of INF missiles, 108 Pershing IIs and 96 cruise missiles and the most powerful NATO army, West Germany is the keystone of the Alliance. The ruling center-right coalition led by Chancellor Helmut Kohl staunchly supports the double-track decision of 1979. His election victory in March, 1987, virtually assures four more years of stability for this vital ally. The Social Democrats are, however, decidedly anti-nuclear and a Labour government in Britain would provide considerable encouragement to anti-nuclear sentiment within the West German Social Democratic Party (SDP) not to mention the profoundly anti-nuclear and anti-NATO Green Party.

At the SDP conference in November, 1983, the Executive Committee of the party voted 27-5 against the INF deployment, marking the ascendancy of the left anti-nuclear faction supported by former Chancellor Willy Brandt over Helmut Schmidt's more moderate supporters.[23] A 1985 report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee stated:

The resolution before the SDP conference urged no deployment of the missiles and, if deployed, their removal as slow as possible; and called on the Soviet Union to reduce its SS-20s. The vote was 380 in favor of the resolution and 14 opposed, with three abstentions. With the passage of the resolution, the earlier SDP balance achieved with some difficulty by Helmut Schmidt to support equally both tracks of the 1979 decision fell apart.[24]

In the 1983 election, the SDP and its would-be chancellor, Hans-Jochen Vogel, opposed the deployment of cruise and Pershing missiles outright. Soviet interference to back the SDP's cause backfired and contributed to an overwhelming mandate (by German standards) for Chancellor Kohl. When another Social Democrat, Johannes Rau, decided to seek the chancellorship, the party tried to come up with a clear defense policy for the March, 1987, general election. It failed. The SDP's opposition to INF became pointless as the missiles moved in. Despite the objections of the SDP's left wing, Rau did not call for their ouster in the election and supported arms control negotiations as the best means of achieving INF's removal from German soil. But while the SDP moved considerably to the left since Helmut Schmidt's tenure, it does not yet advocate a unilateralist stand like British Labour.[25]

It appears, however, that this may not last. The SDP's left is uncomfortable with the moderate Rau's refusal to adopt a unilateralist stand as well as his insistence in not dealing with the rabidly anti-nuclear Green Party as potential coalition partners. Oskar Lafontaine, the popular premier of

the Saarland, is in a strong position to be the SDP's candidate for chancellor in the next general election. Lafontaine favors removing Germany from NATO's integrated military command. He, too, wants INF out of Germany but has not yet called for their ouster. Where the Social Democrats go from here on the question of nuclear weapons remains to be seen.

The Netherlands

While the center-right government in Amsterdam secured initial support for the NATO communique in 1979, many officials shared reservations about deploying more nuclear weapons in the armed camp of Europe postponed a final decision on deployment. After the May, 1981, election a center-left government came to power and again delayed a decision on deploying INF. New elections in September, 1982, — called as a result of disagreement over economic issues in the ruling coalition — solved nothing. A center-right coalition formed the government, but the people and the parliament remained deeply divided. The new government, "accepted the 1979 decision with the same reservations as earlier and acknowledged the decision as the basis for negotiations. The coalition agreed to await the outcome of Geneva negotiations, doing nothing in the meantime to undermine the negotiations [by refusing its allotment of cruise missiles] and leaving open the final decision on deployment."[26]

In June, 1983, an advisory committee to Ministry of Foreign Affairs recommended that the Dutch government prepare to implement deployment in light of the likely failure of Geneva negotiations and the importance to Alliance stability of carrying through with INF. Pressures on the government from the right and left mounted. Opposition to deployment grew as reflected in opinion polls and the decision of the Netherlands Council of Churches to comes out against the missiles.[27]

Finally, in June, 1984, the government reached a compromise with its critics. The decision to deploy would be made in November, 1985, depending on further Soviet SS-20 deployments and the progress of negotiations. Specifically, if INF negotiations produced an agreement, then the Netherlands would abide by the traty or if the Soviets halted further SS-20 deployments, the government would rethink its position. The Dutch Parliament, considering for the first time an actual deployment decision even though it was conditional, ratified the government's position 79-71 in a chamber of 150 Deputies.[28] Thereafter, deployment moved forward with little challenge.

Belgium

The 1979 decision allocated 48 cruise missiles for deployment in Belgium. A coalition cabinet met on December 12, 1979, to decide the question of

whether Belgium would in fact accept the missiles; however, the actual meeting resulted in some confusion. The Belgian Foreign Minister Henri Simonet interpreted the consensus of the cabinet to mean that the Belgian government would confirm accepting the missiles in six months time while other ministers stated that the Cabinet only agreed to make the final decision six months later. New elections in April, 1980, resulted in a Belgian request for additional time to decide the missile question.[29]

In September, 1980, a new cabinet issued an ambiguous declaration that both supporters and opponents of deployment accepted. While stating that Belgium hopes negotiators will resolve the matter, the document provided that if arms control talks collapse, the government "will take all the measures agreed upon by the NATO partners."[30] The ambiguity was in the key line, "...the government will examine the state and progress of negotiations every six months in conjunction with its allies and draw the necessary conclusions in the context of the Alliance."[31] This statement preempted a firm declaration in favor of deployment while arms control negotiations continued, forestalling crisis in the coalition cabinet. Both sides had reason to hope that their views would eventually prevail.

A new government formed in December, 1981, supported the 1979 decision within the bounds of compromises outlined in the September, 1980, declaration. In the meantime, opposition to the cruise missiles mounted. The Flemish Socialist Party consistently opposed deployment. A demonstration in October, 1983, against the missiles attracted 400,000 people, despite an earlier statement by the influential Belgian Catholic Church that supported INF in the event negotiations failed. The Fall of 1983 was the most critical period for Brussels as well as other European capitals. The threatened 'Hot Autumn' by peace activists was a reality.[32]

Neverthelesss, the Belgian coalition led by Prime Minister Wilfred Martens firmed in its commitment to deploy the missiles. Martens stated: "Any deployment decision will be communicated by the government to parliament, where it will be put to a vote of confidence. If it is turned down, the government will resign. But the decision on the missiles will stand."[33] In November, 1983, parliament supported the government's claim that a deployment decision was a cabinet prerogative and not a parliamentary one, defeating repeated motions to require parliamentary approval before deployment proceeds. Finally, on December 30, the government "announced that the programme for deployment would, in the absence of a negotiated agreement at Geneva, proceed according to schedule. The decision, it was said, was not irreversible, but without an agreement on intermediate range nuclear forces the missiles were considered essential to Belgian security."[34]

* * * *

In light of the difficulties the West German, Dutch, and Belgian governments faced in building a consensus for INF, a unilateralist British Labour Party would be a source of considerable destabilization in those countries. If Labour's efforts were perceived by Europeans as sincere and successful peace-making, calls to follow its lead would resonate in a thunder across the continent. The close decisions in Holland and Belgium and public opinion polls prove that the ground supporting INF is soft and subject to even the most mild tremors, much less the earthquake of a Labour government in Britain. For instance, in 1983 75 percent of West Germans opposed INF. A poll in March, 1984, found that 63 percent of Dutch voters opposed the deployment.[35] Another 1984 poll revealed that 46 percent of Europeans are in favor of unilateral disarmament and 47 percent favor a policy of equidistance between the United States and the Soviet Union.[36] While it is difficult to assess what polls mean in foreign policy-making, these particular figures demonstrated that INF does not stand on solid ground. Democratic governments could not hold out long against an antinuclear public even if they doubt the wisdom of Labour's policies. The relative tranquility within the Atlantic Alliance should not be overestimated or taken for granted. It probably is the result of battle fatigue after four years of debate over INF. That could quickly terminate. As Congressman Stephen Solarz wrote in *The Wall Street Journal*,

> Were Labour to implement its antinuclear policy, it would inevitably generate powerful political pressures in other NATO countries, Belgium and the Netherlands above all, to enact comparable bans. If one or two found it impossible to resist these pressures and adopted non-nuclear policies of their own, even a conservative government in West Germany would find it difficult to avoid a similar step.[37]

Despite the bumpy West German, Dutch, and Belgian road to INF, a recent article in *The Economist* revealed some interesting sentiment of other European socialist parties in response to Labour's defense policies. Not only have the conservative European parties rejected British Labour's defense stand, but the socialists are distancing themselves from Kinnock's position as well. *The Economist*'s reporter writes:

> There is certainly a degree of sympathy for the desire to de-emphasize nuclear weapons in plans to defend the West. But almost the entire socialist camp of Western Europe outside Britain — the French and the West Germans as well as the Italians and the Spaniards — regards the Kinnock solution as unrealistic and a threat to the security of the Alliance.[38]

In addition, while the Dutch socialists initially intended to support Labour's position, their losses in the May, 1986, national elections have caused them

to reconsider their position. "Now they are backing away from unilateral rejection of cruise missiles."[39]

Apparently, the major reason for this change in European socialist thinking lies in budget considerations. While the Left in Europe agrees that a robust conventional deterrent constitutes a sound defense strategy, building it would require substantial new outlays in spending that their parties and prospective governments would be unwilling to support. Moreover, the socialists fear Soviet military strength and do not want to reject the American nuclear umbrella. Now that INF is in place, nuclear protection has now become desirable.[40]

Nevertheless, *The Economist*'s report must be considered only in today's context. Kinnock is not in power and is not implementing his defense policies. An actual Labour government fulfilling its platform could leave other socialist parties little choice but to support a similar policy. They risk losing credibility as socialist parties with their constituencies if they are perceived as supporting INF. Plus, they would have to confront strong popular sentiment against NATO's nuclear missiles if the people believe that an allied government has 'successfully' removed its INF complement. *The Economist* concedes that should Kinnock implement his defense program, the position of other European governments and socialist parties could change considerably:

> The non-solidarity [of European socialists] with Labour is built on what the other Europeans see as greater realism. The only hint that this might change came from West Germany's Social Democrats. If Mr. Kinnock won Britain's election, and actually began putting his proposals into practice, some Social Democrats think other Europeans of the left might feel encouraged to take the same direction.[41]

But even *The Economist* underestimates the full political pressures that would be brought on allied governments. Prime Minister Kinnock would receive indirect support from a most likely source: the Soviet Union. Through subtle and not-so-subtle propaganda, the USSR could appear to be encouraging and rewarding Kinnock's efforts and thus manipulate European public opinion in favor of his antinuclear policy. Soviet efforts to make Kinnock's efforts seem as though they are a major contribution to European peace is quite conceivable. For instance, prior to the June, 1984, decision of conditional deployment made by the Dutch government, "the Soviet Ambassador to the Hague told an audience that if the Netherlands refused deployment the Soviet Union would guarantee that Holland would not suffer a nuclear attack."[42] Moreover, most observers of international affairs admit that the Soviet Union under General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev is considerably more adept at public relations than any other Soviet govern-

ment in history. It is convincing that in all of Europe and America, the only congratulations British Labour received for its new defense stand came from *Pravda*. This type of Soviet manipulation should not be overestimated, but it is quite real. Considering the close vote in the Dutch Parliament, the Soviets and Holland's peace activists nearly succeeded in preventing the Netherlands from accepting its INF commitment. Carefully crafted Soviet propaganda and public relations initiatives might convince large numbers of Europeans that Kinnock's policies are indeed the path to nuclearr peace all the while never yielding on long-standing Soviet objectives of decoupling Western Europe from the United States.

American Reaction

The response by Washington to Labour's defense policies was sharp and immediate. In a recent interview with the BBC, Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger suggested that "Labour's antinuclear policies risked breaking up the North Atlantic Treaty Organization."[43a] At the very least, the Alliance would be "severely weakened" and Britain's special relationship with the United States would be "particularly weakened."[43b] When Labour tried to shrug off Weinberger's comments as unrepresentative of President Reagan's views and those of the Washington establishment, U.S. Ambassador to Britain Charles Price replied that "The things Cap Weinberger expressed are fully supported by the Administration." confirming that Weinberger was indeed speaking for the Reagan Administration.[44] Moreover, the Defense Secretary's criticisms enjoy wide bi-partisan support in Washington and the Congress. In an article for the *Wall Street Journal*, Congressman Stephen Solarz, a liberal Democrat who sits on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, wrote that, "[i]t would be a mistake for the British to dismiss [Weinberger's] comments as the rantings of a right-wind ideologue. On this issue Mr. Weinberger speaks for most Americans."[45]

Two issues that relate to Alliance security most concern American politicians and generals. On the one hand, American Atlanticists fear that unilateral disarmament by Britain would probably unravel the Atlantic Alliance. If other allied governments are compelled to follow Labour's lead, no American president or Congress will allow American troops to remain in Europe without nuclear protection. And it is precisely those troops which have long demonstrated the U.S. commitment to Europe and NATO. Senator John Warner was explicit: "The policy of unilateral disarmament would unravel NATO and compel the United States to withdraw its troops. We should have to bring them home, because in good conscience we could not leave them there undefended."[46]

Kinnock intends to make sure that the British Isles are no longer nuclear targeted by the Soviet Union. Therefore, in the eyes of many Americans,

Kinnock is asking the United States to accept the risks and responsibilities of nuclear deterrence while Europe enjoys the benefits. High-ranking Americans realize that neither the American people nor the Congress will accept such an arrangement. They expect either Britain will play its part in nuclear deterrence or the United States will withdraw its troops from Britain and probably all of Europe.

Yet, Kinnock cannot fathom the idea that American officials want U.S. troops to have nuclear protection and will not leave them in Europe without it. He does not believe the United States would withdraw its troops, ascribing such an event to "the realms of political science fiction."[47] Kinnock maintains that the U.S. would not withdraw its troops under any circumstances:

> If we are in the situation of the GIs moving out, it could only come about because the U.S. administration decided they were not part of a democratic system to defend Europe but that Europe was the front line and that it was because of the failure of the front line that they eliminated their presence.[48]

But Kinnock is begging the question. *The Economist* asked, "Would America continue to keep forces in Britain without nuclear protection?"[49] In an interview with British television, Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle provided the American answer:

> The one circumstance in which one can imagine serious degradation of the American nuclear commitment is that you should have in power in the U.K. a Kinnock government committed to the denuclearization on the part of the U.K. I do not think that one can expect the American people to accept the risks entailed in offering nuclear guarantees to a country that is not prepared to accept any risks itself, and indeed would be pushing the U.S. out of the U.K.[50]

Thus not only is Kinnock advocating a military posture that the U.S. asserts threatens the political and military stability of the Alliance, but he denies the very possibility that his policies will jeopardize NATO. At the least, that is showing political naivete.

Nevertheless, if Labour's defense policies did not directly cause the breakup of the Alliance through political instability, the indirect military results of Kinnock's program would. The denuclearization of the British Isles would require the withdrawal of at least some American conventional forces. The controversy revolves around dual-capable aircraft — specifically, 150 F-111 strike bombers — stationed at bases in Britain. While Labour agreed to allow these weapons to remain in Britain in a non-nuclear capacity, military requirements would demand their removal so that they may still be used for nuclear missions. The F-111 is the "most effective tactical

delivery system in any NATO air force"[51] and neither the United States Air Force (USAF) nor the American government will permit the denuclearization of such an effective aircraft; that would be a senseless and inefficient use of a superb weapon. But at the same time, F-111s are part of NATO's conventional force when they are not slated for nuclear missions. Hence, their withdrawal to maintain their dual-role capability would weaken NATO's conventional forces. The entire Third Tactical Air Force would have to be withdrawn to the United States. "No other European NATO country has the space for it, so nearly 300 aircraft and 30,000 men — a large conventional force — would probably be withdraw to the United States."[52] It would be far more advantageous for the U.S. to let Labour suffer the full consequences of its decisions and wait for the return of a more agreeable British government than to try to accomodate Kinnock by reorganizing large military units.

Thus, even if Labour comes through with proposals to increase Britain's conventional forces, NATO's posture would already have suffered irreparable damage from American forces moving out as a result of Kinnock's nonnuclear policies. It would be ironic indeed if thos policies actually weaken the conventional posture of the Alliance when Kinnock seems to desire its strengthening.

American Isolationism

Aside from the problem of European unilateralism, Labour's defense policies would inflame isolationist sentiment in the United States. All of the old arguments about Europe not doing its fair share or taking all the benefits without wanting to share the risks would resurface with a vengeance. Surprisingly, that attitude has a significant following in intellectual and leadership circles as well as the American public. If one considers briefly the strength isolationism has just under the surface, a Labour government would fuel that emotion like pouring gasoline to quench a smoldering fire.

One could trace isolationism back to George Washington's Farewell Address. More recent examples include the America Firsters of the two world wars and the semi-isolationist Taft Republicans in the early years of the Cold War. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this paper, I shall consider only NATO as the object of recent isolationist feelings. The first major expression of this attitude was the Mansfield Amendment of 1966-1974. Authored by then Senate Majority leader Mike Mansfield, this piece of legislation was the first significant proposal to reduce the American troop commitment to Europe. It called for the withdrawal of 50,000 American troops to reduce the expense of Alliance defense and to encourage Europeans to assume a greater burden. Introduced each year between 1966-1974, the amendment never passed and its continued re-introduction was halted when Mutual and

Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks began. Still, the proposal struck a responsive chord in the U.S. and it may have eventually passed if not for the MBFR talks; indeed, although it was not the only consideration, those negotiations were initiated because NATO feared that Mansfield would push his amendment through.[53]

In 1982, Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia proposed a similar piece of legislation that was designed to get the Europeans to increase their conventional defense spending. While it was not intended as an expression of isolationism, it did garner 44 votes in the Senate in the face of intensive lobbying by the Reagan Administration and the foreign policy establishment. The Nunn Amendment had also become the focus of American isolationist attitudes.[54]

These two different generational but similar pieces of legislation have not been the only sources by which dissatisfaction with our European allies has been expressed, especially more recently. Specific policy differences with Europeans are a source of increasing frustration for policy elites and the American people. Many sectors in American politics react angrily when Europeans seemingly go out of their way to differ with the United States. Examples are numerous: France's unwillingness to join the Moscow Olympic boycott; Europe's condemnation of the Grenada invasion — Margaret Thatcher's criticisms particularly grated after the U.S. provided, at the expense of its policy in Central America, crucial support to British forces in the Falkland Islands war; general European disagreement with U.S. policy in that region makes some writers question the value of the Alliance; the reluctance of Europeans to support sanctions against the Soviet Union and Poland after Solidarity's destruction in 1981; and most recently, the nearly unanimous refusal of America's NATO allies to allow overflight of American planes to bomb Libya.[55]

In many of these cases, Europeans had (or have) legitimate and respectable policy differences with the United States. Yet, it is the perception here that matters. If the Europeans are perceived as ungrateful allies and unwilling to share the risks of a tough foreing policy, then the reservoir of good will for the Alliance will continue to dwindle.

The danger is not that Americans are ready to jettison the Alliance tomorrow (though clearly some are), but that these disputes are ripening, undermining Alliance cohesion, waiting for a British Labour Party to come along and shake the tree till everything drops. If a Labour government comes to power with its unilateralist stand and anti-American rhetoric — the party blames the U.S. and the Soviet Union equally for the arms race and other world problems — there would be considerable cause for the isolationists to claim a major voice in policy-making. If the unilateralism then spreads to other NATO countries, problems between Europe and America would intensify. Finally, if Europe denuclearizes — or Britain does alone — thus

requiring the withdrawal of American troops because they lack the nuclear protection talked by Messrs. Warner, Perle, and others, it seems inconceivable that NATO would continue as an effective organization. Those consequences should not be taken lightly. As expressed by Richard Burt, former Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs:

> Our presence in Europe is an essential component of the global balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union remains the preponderant military power in Europe. The Soviet Union also continues to employ its military power to achieve political objectives, including the intimidation of Western Europe. In such circumstances, the withdrawal of American troops and the American security guarantee would...leave European leaders with no realistic means to provide for their national security except through accomodation with the dominant regional power, the U.S.S.R....while driving the U.S. into increasing international isolationism.[56]

Ironically, it was Lord Peter Carrington, the British Secretary General of NATO, who put his finger on the raw nerve of American isolationism. Considering all American military and political commitments, "once all the figures and percentages were added up, it might emerge that there was nothing left for the defense of the United States. That, of course, would be absurd."[57] Indeed, it is likely that Labour's policies would be interpreted as a reduction of the British commitment to Europe — despite Kinnock's pro-NATO statements. Right or wrong, a large percentage of Americans — perhaps a majority if Labour comes to power — are more than willing to sever the transatlantic relationship if differences in policy and actions like the Libyan bombing are compounded by serious policy disputes over Alliance defense. (One could also include the transatlantic tensions over treade as another problem that is bracketing the Alliance, not including a British Labour government.) Even a strong Atlanticist like William F. Buckley, Jr. remarked: "There is probably ahead of us a grave historical fork in which we find ourselves forced to go in one direction, leaving Europe to go in another."[58]

Nevertheless, Kinnock dismisses out of hand comments and queries about the future of the Alliance and the American commitment to Europe if a Labour government comes to power in the next election. Kinnock is correct when he asserts that it would be foolish for America to pull out of NATO if Britain becomes "yet another non-nuclear power." But that does not mean America will not be foolish. It is the height of stupidity for Kinnock to dismiss summarily warnings about American isolationist sentiment, especially given his desire to strengthen the Alliance. That American isolationism may be something more than a paper tiger is a point Kinnock must consider in any radical change of Britain's defense policies.

Arms Control

Another major consequence of a Labour government's unilateral denuclearization would be the probable breakdown in arms control negotiations, ending the two-track decision of 1979 and any hope of signing an equitable arms control treaty with the Soviet Union on intermediate-range nuclear weapons. The USSR would understandably wait and see how many advantages it might acquire by simply doing nothing. If other European countries follow Britains denuclearization path, then the Soviets will have achieved the nuclear disarmament of Western Europe at no cost to themselves. By unilaterally rejecting its complement of cruise missiles, a Labour government risks undoing the INF deployment which Soviet pressure and propaganda tried to forestall in 1983, all the while Soviet SS-20s remain targeted westward.

While Europeans like Kinnock have an almost insatiable desire for arms control, they often fail to grasp the reality that treaties are not made in a day and ought not to be built on sand. Kinnock has not given a satisfactory answer as to why the Soviet Union would sign an arms control treaty with the West limiting intermediate range nuclear weapons if the Alliance disarms unilaterally. The apparent, though unstated, answer lies in the paradox discussed briefly above. Kinnock has made nuclear war his priority, while seemingly only to hope for the best with the Soviet threat.

In light of Gorbachev's recent arms control proposal, it is apparent that INF is giving Europe its best chance of removing the threatening SS-20s. Gorbachev's proposal is remarkably similar to President Reagan's original zero-option plan of 1981, but without the foiling SDI claus that hampered agreement at Reykjavik. While a number of issues ranging from verification to shorter-range nuclear weapons to treaty details still must be worked out, both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have never been closer to reaching agreement on theater nuclear forces. Without INF it is difficult to imagine what incentive the Soviets would have had to bargain fairly. Thus one fault in Kinnock's program is that nuclear peace is not better served by unilateral disarmament. Perhaps the best single comment about the importance of the 1983 INF deployment for arms control came from *The Economist*'s editorial headline: "It gave peace a chance."[59]

This particular point, however, also has a facet in Kinnock's favor. In a recent shift in policy, Kinnock states that American cruise missiles can stay in Britain pending an agreement between the superpowers to remove all intermediate-range nuclear forces from the continent. This change provides an incentive for the United States to conclude a deal with the Soviets before British Labour can begin rocking the boat. In Labour's view, it is a legitimate point. If INF gave the Soviet Union the incentive to negotiate seriously,

then Labour's nuclear policy puts equal pressure on the United States to do the same. A long-standing contention of many leftist European parties, including British labour, asserts that the U.S. has been equally remiss in not negotiating in good faith. Whether the Soviets would accomodate this forced change of heart in the manner Kinnock hopes is uncertain.

Feasibility of Kinnock's Conceptual Design

If one were to set aside the practical problems with Labour's defense policies, an examination of Kinnock's strategy for the defense of Europe would be appropriate. According to the Labour leader, NATO would rely on a strong conventional defense to deter a European war while America's strategic nuclear forces would continue as they have for 40 year to deter general nuclear war. Is this a viable alternative to the way things are?

As I mentioned earlier, Kinnock rejects nuclear deterrence as immoral to defend the West. "It is a contradiction to risk the destruction of that which one is supposed to defend."[60] On this score, Labour can count on some high-powered support. In a 1982 report to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator Sam Nunn argued that using nuclear weapons to defend Europe in an era of strategic parity and theater nuclear inferiority is senseless. If a war breaks out, the only choices the West have are nuclear suicide or surrender, and that is not credible deterrence.

> Under conditions of strategic parity and theater nuclear inferiority, a NATO nuclear response to a non-nuclear Soviet aggression in Europe would be a questionable strategy at best, a self-defeating one at worst. Thus major responsibility for continued deterrence in Europe has shifted to NATO's outnumbered, out-gunned, and mal-deployed conventional forces. Flexible response in theory has become inflexible response in practice.[61]

Recently, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger stated: "How can one go on, decade after decade, telling a democratic public that its extermination is the best guarantee of its security? It is a nonsensical proposition."[62]

Fair enough. But Kinnock's plan also calls for rejecting the American nuclear umbrella while Soviet SS-20s remained in Eastern Europe. He rejects the use or threatened use of nuclear weapons on Britain's behalf. On the BBC television program, *This Week, Next Week*, Kinnock stated: "If we are not prepared to use the weapon system ourselves, we certainly would not be asking anyone else to jeopardize themselves by the use of that nuclear weapon. I think it would be immoral to do so."[63] Kinnock is trying, however feebly, to ensure that the Soviet war planners do not target the United Kingdom. He hopes that a lack of nuclear targets precludes a Soviet nuclear attack in a war situation. What Kinnock is talking about, therefore, is not

no first use of nuclear weapons, but no use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances whatsoever. He has never explicitly stated that he would favor their use even in retaliation to a Soviet nuclear strike. That is playing a dangerous game indeed. The Soviets do not necessarily recognize the non-useability of nuclear weapons and they do train their military for operations in a nuclear environment. Kinnock has not said how he would counter a nuclear threat with only conventional forces. *The Economist* glibly presents this scenario:

> War has broken out in Central Europe, God and summitry forbid, and on the eighth day NATO's ordinary non-nuclear soldiers, doing surprisingly well, are still holding the Russians. Mr. Mikhail Gorbachev then tells Britain's Prime Minister, Mr. Neil Kinnock, that unless British troops stop fighting he will order two SS-23 warheads to be dropped on Britain's main field headquarters and one of its main reserve formations in West Germany, thereby breaking the NATO front without causing much radioactive fallout. The Americans offer to tell the Russians not to do that, or they will suffer an American nuclear strike in reply. Mr. Kinnock says no thanks: Britain is a non-nuclear country, and will not shelter under anybody else's nuclear umbrella. The Russians, blushing, retire across the East German border, and Western Europe is saved. Plausible?[64]

While *The Economist* is somewhat sarcastic, it does emphasize the point. Kinnock's proposed lack of nuclear protection does not seem credible. If conventional defense becomes strong enough to resist a Soviet *blitzkrieg* but does not have nuclear protection, what will prevent Moscow from employing the nuclear card in a war situation? Ultimately, this means Kinnock and like-minded Labourites will capitulate before engaging in nuclear battle and are even willing to structure their forces to prove they will not employ nuclear weapons. This invites nuclear blackmail, and successful blackmail at that.

In addition, Kinnock confronts a fundamental contradiction within his proposed defense policy. Britain's army in Germany number 55,000 troops, the bulk of the Northern Army Group, and is commanded by one of NATO's Deputy Supreme Commanders in accordance with standard NATO command structure (the West Germans also have a Deputy Supreme Commander). The problem: NATO's strategy is a nuclear one and the national militaries are deployed in a nuclear structure, meaning that army groups possess large numbers of battlefield nuclear weapons and could be ordered to use them by the Supreme Commander in a war situation. But how could the British commander and his army continue to operate in this nuclear structure while their national government, to which they are ultimately subordinate,[65] adopts a non-nuclear policy? Either a Labour government must withdraw British troops from the integrated structure and give up all important positions in the NATO command or the denuclearization of Britain's military would not have been carried out. Hence, if in a war the Soviets are hit with a battlefield nuclear weapon fired from British continental forces, they may not be willing to distinguish where the nuclear strike came from in calculating a response.

Yet, if Labour withdraws its forces and commander from NATO's nuclear structure, it would lose all influence in changing the flexible response doctrine. Kinnock has stated that he would ease the process of changing Britain's role in NATO, primarily by making the British Ambassador to NATO a political heavy-weight of the Labour Party. But any easing of policy would still leave Labour with the contradiction of a non-nuclear defense policy and a nuclear British army on the continent in the interim. Besides which, Labour's policy is predicated on successfully achieving a change in NATO's flexible response strategy. If a Kinnock government fails in this task, it still would be confronted with the choice of implementing only a partial denuclearization policy, which it is unlikely to allow, or weakening NATO's conventional defense posture, which it hopes to strengthen.[66]

While Nunn argues that improving European conventional forces is sound strategy, the problem is in overcoming a European political mindset that considers it impossible. Concern that NATO strategy lacks credulity has not been met with a determined commitment to remedy the problem. Nunn explains why:

> The answer is two-fold. First, the conventional force gap between NATO and the Warsaw Pact has been described as so large for so long that a viable conventional defense is believed by many to be hopeless. Second, the cost of matching Warsaw Pact forces one for one — in tanks, troops, artillery and aircraft — is seen as prohibitive, particularly under current economic conditions.
>
> NATO is thus faced with a dilemma: there is growing consensus that less reliance should be placed on use of nuclear weapons in response to a conventional Warsaw Pact attack, but there is a widespread feeling that a viable non-nuclear defense is not attainable. This paradox, coupled with political and economic differences within the Alliance, is causing frustration in America and is threatening the very fabric of the Alliance itself.[67]

A change in defense doctrine, however, could move mountains in reaching the goal of a credible defense at minimal cost. The major innovation in NATO tactical thinking that is being examined in NATO military circles is the doctrine known as "Airland Battle."[68] According to U.S. Army experts, this new strategy is a doctrine of defensive counterattack. By using existing forces and new technologies more effectively, NATO forces would exploit vulnerabilities in Soviet military doctrine and force posture. Specifically, Soviet armies in attack are deployed in echelons behind the point of assault. As the first echelon is destroyed by NATO defenses, the second echelon moves up to continue the furious assault that was begun by the first. This continues theoretically till the NATO line is broken and Soviet forces can break through to German cities, the industrial Ruhr, and the surrounding countryside. Airland Battle seeks to attack the rear echelons before they

cross the inter-German border and "seize the initiative."[69] It is a new concept in defense planning, but "if NATO succeeds in isolating the attacking first echelon from reinforcing echelons — through attacks on the latter — the momentum of the invasion would be destroyed, and, with it, any reasonable prospect of an irreparable and strategically decisive Soviet penetration of Western Europe."[70] Thus, by using high technology weapons and improving procurement to support the requirements of this new strategy, Nunn argues, a credible conventional defense can indeed be deployed — if the political leaders of the Alliance can escape from the vacuum of only looking at the present, overly pessimistic conventional imbalance.

On paper, the strategy seems sensible and effective. The problem NATO nations must confront if the Alliance adopts this new doctrine is insufficient conventional military power. Most experts agree that to defend successfully the front line against the first Soviet echelon, to attack and neutralize reinforcing echelons and to wage the battle for overall air supremacy require more military strength, particularly air power, than the Alliance currently has available. The importance of waging the battle for air supremacy is to ensure that NATO's own reinforcements being transported from the United States and Britain are not disrupted by Soviet air and naval forces. Hence, while Airland Battle provides NATO with its best vehicle for raising the nuclear threshold, it will require a reorganization of Alliance forces and additional expenditures — more, perhaps, than member states are prepared to pay.[71]

In reality, however, estimates of increased defense spending to meet the requirements of the new strategy are quite reasonable. NATO Supreme Commander General Bernard Rogers asserted that the new doctrine "would require an annual real increase in defense spending of four percent Alliance-wide."[72] Indeed, as part of the 1979 dual-track policy, NATO members agreed to increase defense spending by three percent per year. These figures are definitely affordable for wealthy industrialized nations. Still, as Nunn states, it is important to remember that "Many of the new efforts do not require additional money, but instead focus on reorganization and revitalized strategic and tactical doctrine. The primary cost of such changes would be in shattered preconceptions and broken traditions."[73]

To his credit, Kinnock has publicly called for increasing conventional defense spending. Yet, there are reasons to doubt his grandiose plans for increasing Britain's conventional forces. Labour's defense platform in the 1983 election called for unilateral nuclear disarmament *and* cutting conventional forces by 30 percent.[74] Despite pronouncements from Labour's leadership, it is difficult to believe that the average Labour activist or parliamentary candidate has fundamentally changed his thinking. Even so, looking at Kinnock's overall political program, there is no clear answer as from where

the funds for increased conventional defense will come. If we are to believe Kinnock's policy pronouncements, Labour plans to shift the 10 billion pounds slated for the Trident modernization program to a conventional defense build-up. Labour's *non-defense* platform, however, calls for an increase of 10 billion pounds in social spending. That the Trident program and Labour's social spending proposals both cost 10 billion pounds is perhaps coincidental. In addition, if Labour carries through with its plan to reverse Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's program of denationalization of industries, then the British economy will undoubtedly suffer from yet another shock caused by changing national economic policies.[75] In an economic downturn, increasing defense spending for expensive conventional weapons will be a politically untenable position for a Labour government, even if sincere, to hold.

Despite all these considerations, implementing a new defense policy requires NATO to consider carefully the process by which nuclear deterrence is replaced by conventional deterrence. The Alliance must perfect the Airland Battle strategy before abandoning Flexible Response; otherwise, one could seriously endanger the NATO defense in that interim. Kinnock said he would get rid of all nuclear weapons within one year of his election. Yet, building a credible conventional deterrent would take at least four to five years. Ensuring NATO's conventional forces could deter war with a high degree of confidence requires that changes in NATO's non-nuclear posture be made before politicians begin fiddling with the balance of terror. Altering NATO doctrine before deploying the necessary forces to carry out its tenets is the functional equivalent to a no first use policy. And without the threatened first use of nuclear weapons, Soviet conventional forces could be concentrated and thus undermine NATO's conventional posture. "In the pre-nuclear era, concentration of ground forces on the battlefield was common practice to achieve a decisive breakthrough of a defender's line."[76] Without first improving its conventional deterrent, NATO risks returning Europe to that 'pre-nuclear era.' That is the danger that comes with no first use. Nunn writes: "...I believe that a viable conventional defense, together with mutual arms control guarantees, should be pre-conditions to any move towards a no first use policy. Simply declaring a no first use policy in the hope of stimulating greater investment in conventional defense will not suffice. The conventional horse must be in front of the nuclear cart."[77]

Conclusion

In an article for the *Times* of London, Professor Michael Howard outlined a situation in which deterrence could be overwhelmed by an unstable political situation leading to a new European war:

Peace in Europe is only likely to be threatened by a combination of three circumstances. First, growing instability in Eastern Europe might drive a desperate Soviet Union to take the gamble of a *fuite en avante*; much as the bleak prospects in the Balkan led the Central Powers in 1914 into the actions which precipitated the First World War.

Second, growing instability and political divisions in Western Europe might make the Soviets believe they would run a negligible risk in taking the offensive.

And finally, American impatience and disgust with their European allies might make the Soviets misread the signals, as they did so fatally at the time of Korea, and assume that the United States now regarded Western Europe as expendable.[78]

Assuming one accepts this, one can see that Labour's defense platform risks creating Professor Howard's unstble political situation. While little is relevant to the first development. Labour's defense program could very well move the Alliance headlong toward reaching the second and third. The potent strain of neutralism that underlies Labour's defense policies and infests the party itself have the potential to realize the second of Howard's circumstances. The igniting of a new wave of anti-nuclear sentiment may be perceived by the Soviets to be fertile ground for conquest. In addition, the strong isolationist sentiment that might resurface in the United States in response to a Labour government could be the realization of Howard's third circumstance. Waiting around for Eastern Europe to provide the first would be fool-hardy.

Essentially, Labour is proposing to risk increasing pacifist, neutralist sentiment in Europe, to risk resurgent American isolationism, and ultimately, to risk war. In presenting his case for unilateral nuclear disarmament, Ken Booth stated that he feared nuclear war: "The risks [of nuclear war] are small, but even a small risk is worrying, given the circumstances."[79] I would turn the tables on Mr. Booth. The risk involved in Labour's defense platform is one we could all do without.

Footnotes

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The Tropical Rainforest Act of 1987; Trading Debt for Rainforest

Michael Karsch

(Speaker pro tempore)

"Gentlemen, the House will come to order. Under a previous order of the House the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Porter) is recognized for five minutes."

(Mr. Porter)

"Mr. Speaker, the world is now at an environmental crossroads. The coming crisis will be of international importance: the future of the rainforests. To most, these forests are remote territories that are the responsibility of the nation in which they are located. It is generally assumed that the impact would be localized and limited only to esthetic losses. Such assumptions could not be further from the truth. Our inaction, coupled with continued forest degradation, will result in adverse environmental and economic losses that may only be noticed after it is too late." (Congressional Record 4/23/87 Vol. 133)

Indeed, time moves slowly but the destruction and degradation of the world's most valuable resource moves at a devastating rate. Every hour, another 3,000 acres of tropical rainforests are destroyed. At this rate most of Latin American, Asian, and African forests will be gone within 25 years.

Unrealized by many, rainforests have a profound impact on each of our lives. Stabilizing our environment, providing plants for important medical advancement, and aiding our farm industry are among several contributions taken for granted by many Americans. By destroying the forests, not only do we lose the source by which our climate's stability is regulated, but also a mechanism capturing, storing and recycling rain; thus preventing floods, droughts, and soil erosion. Moreover, when the forests are burned, the car-

bon released plays an important role in the build-up of atmospheric gasses producing the 'greenhouse effect' which is causing a warming trend on the planet. This trend could result, according to *New York Times* editorialist Robert Stone, in the conversion of America's corn belt into a subtropical region, while the melting of the polar ice cap could cause sea levels to rise and lead to drastic losses of coastal land.

Although only a tiny fraction of the rainforest's plant resources have been examined, many plants have significantly furthered medical advancement. Mark Plotkin, Director of the World Wildlife Fund's plant program, has spent many months living with the Trijo tribe on the Surinam-Brazil border, searching for undiscovered forest plants which may be sources of countless new natural drugs. His respect for the wealth of the forest is depicted in his statement; "Every time one of the native medicine men dies it is as if a library has burned down."

A significant number of plants already have had an impact on medical science. Seventy percent of all plants identified by the National Cancer Institute as having anti-cancer properties grow only in rainforests. This is impressive considering only one percent of the forest's plants have been analyzed for chemical compounds. Specifically, through proper utilization of plants there has been substantial progress made in treating several diseases through plants such as the Rosy periwinkle which offers a 99 percent chance of remission for cases of lymphomatic leukemia, as well as a 58 percent chance for recovery from Hodgkin's disease. Diosgenin, derived from wild yams from Mexico and Guatemala, is an active ingredient in birth control pills and is considered an important raw material for steroids. A West African vine provides the basis of Strophanthin, a heart medicine.

Our suffering agriculture industry would be further devastated without by-products of forests. Farmers rely on imported insects as efficient biological pest controls. For example, in Florida three types of parasitic wasps saved citrus growers $30 million annually in crop damage. Plants, considered part of American sustenance, require genetic fortification from forests. Plant pathologists have found that strains of plants such as corn, rice, and wheat need this fortification to protect against blight and disease. Modern rice plants contain a gene resistant to grassy stunt virus, a major rice disease. This gene was discovered 25 years ago in rainforest plants and has added five million dollars in farm revenues annually (Statistics given by the New York Rainforest Alliance).

As Porter continued his call on the floor of the House for recognition of this international crisis, Senator Kaston was finishing his words in the other chamber on Capital Hill; "...the bill which I am setting forth links two pressing problems; tropical rainforests and debt. With Senator D'Amato of New York joining me as an original cosponsor, we announce the important first

step in creating a comprehensive program to protect the world's tropical rainforests and wetlands. Without objection the bill was ordered to be printed in the Record as follows: "Tropical Rainforest and Protection Act of 1987."

Senator D'Amato in a written interview expressed hope "that through this legislative act we will reverse this disastrous trend of tropical forest and wetlands destruction and foster a new global ethic that will elevate environmental conservation into the forefront of global economic planning." Its first provision is directed toward the Secretary of the Treasury, who, with assistance from knowledgeable professionals in park development, fish and wildlife, cultural resources, geology, soils, and ecology, will perform several functions. First, determine which tropical rainforests and wetlands are likely to be unsuitable for agriculture and could, with assistance from multilateral development banks and private donors, be established as reserves for scientific research, tourism, indigenous people, and non-consumptive uses. Second, examine measures improving the effectiveness of governmental and non-governmental agencies in which tropical rainforests and wetlands are located. Third, consult with other U.S. officials and appointed non-governmental agencies on the preservation of forests. Members of this group include; Secretary of State, head of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), African Development Bank, Smithsonian Institute, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Finally, within 12 months of passage of the bill, a report shall be prepared based on the above findings and submitted to appropriate House and Senate Committees. Among those included are committees on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs.

The World Bank plays a significant role by spearing two-three year pilot programs aimed at easing massive deforestation and developing programs encouraging long-term sustainable uses of tropical forests and their surroundings. One program's objective is to create a structural adjustment lending program to be made available to any country with a sincere commitment to natural resource conservation. Its other program extends to those nations with outstanding debt held by the World Bank. Under this program, in exchange for setting aside tracts of land, suspension of some or all outstanding loans will be negotiated. Providing debt service payment has resumed, countries can end their involvement after three years. Suspension of debt does not start until actual implementation of the terms of the easements have been certified.

Exchanging suspension of debt for rainforest conservation is practical, especially considering the Third World's bleak history for repayment of loans. Many Third World nations borrowed heavily in the '70s and early '80s, but defaulted after severe recessions affected the world economy. Senator Kasten's reaction to Bolivia's debt rescheduling highlights the program's benefits. In June, 1987, Conservation International completed the

first "debt for conservation" exchange. In this agreement they purchased $600,000 of Bolivia's debt in exchange for an agreement to protect 4 million acres. Later that week, Bolivia rescheduled $1 billion of debt, without any easements. "If this kind of write down is going to occur, we should use this leverage to protect valuable natural resources."

Linking these issues is beneficial from the World Bank's standpoint, it is also favorable to rainforest countries. According to Barbara Bramble, lawyer for National Wildlife Fund, "this pilot program gives countries breathing space and incentive to do what many want to do anyway." Speaking at New York Rainforest Alliance's seminar, "Tropical Rainforests: Interdependence and Responsibility," on October 16, 1987, Porter said; "Debtor nations have little incentive to protect their forests in many situations, exploitation is the means through which they meet their debt payments." In an effort to reduce cumbersome external debt, nations often try to increase exports by clearing forests for cash crops and agricultural land. Day to day existence is hard enough, what happens when these resources are exhausted? This frightening prospect is quickly becoming a reality in Costa Rica. In 1940 rainforests occupied 65 percent of its land, now only 26 percent of the land is covered by rainforest; and, each year an abundance of this land is lost to cattle grazers, loggers, and small farmers. Despite this economic activity, few improvements have taken place because nearly 75 percent of Costa Rica's export earnings go to paying back banks.

Bolivia's exchange of 'debt for conservation' was coordinated by Thomas Lovejoy, of the World Wildlife Fund. His work allowed Conservation International, a private Washington organization, to finalize the purchase of the first such debt of its kind. This debt was purchased from banks eager to dump the mostly uncollectable loans. Conservation International has agreed to pay off $600,000 of Bolivia's external debt provided the country sets aside 3.7 million acres of Amazon River country around the existing Beni Biosphere Reserve, home to endangered species of cats and monkeys. In exchange, Bolivia retained ownership and management of the land (*Newsweek*, "Buying Debt Saving Nature"). In an effort to show their dedication toward conservation, Bolivia agreed to endow a fund worth $250,000 in local currency to pay for management of their newly-protected lands. Further, these new reserves are protected by congressional law as opposed to administrative decrees formerly covering the Beni Reserve. This law aims to discourage poachers.

Costa Rica has also been involved in a swap deal. On July 25, 1987, Costa Rica opened Guanacaste National Park, located on the Santa Elena peninsula in the northwest corner of the country. Guanacast includes 32,500 acres obtained as part of a prorgram run by Costa Rican National Park foundation to purchase Costa Rican debt in exchange for enlarging and managing

national parklands (*Nature*: "High Finance Approach to Protecting Tropical Forests"). Currently, the World Wildlife Fund is working with Costa Rica to strike a deal similar to Bolivia's. While the above projects will not eliminate external debt in Bolivia or Costa Rica, people feel linkage of these two urgent problems facing Third World nations merit Congressional attention and support.

Under instructions from the Secretary of the Treasury, the World Bank shall prepare an annual report during the duration of the pilot programs. After three years a final report will be distributed to all multilateral banks and lending institutions with outstanding loans to tropical nations, providing information about exchange of debt for conservation easements as an alternative to forgiveness of such debts. At this time, establishing these programs on a permanent basis at World Bank will be considered.

Extension of the latter pilot program to other banks depends on potential benefits for investors. Since historical indications show Third World nations unlikely to repay most debts, other incentives must be offered. Gary Caesar, head of International asset sales at Bank of America Corporation in New York, said; "Swapping for national parks will only work where the banks have written debt down to next to nothing and can claim some real benefits from a tax or political perspective." Ironically, a country's credit rating will have an inverse effect with its attractiveness as an investment. A country having a low credit rating is considered a good investment because their debt prices are well below face value. Bolivia is considered a good investment. Its debts have been discounted to between 10 cents and 15 cents since its economy collapsed in the early 1980s because of low tin prices and high inflation. By contrast, Brazil's debt is rated at 60 cents, substantially decreasing its investment value.

Presently, U.S. tax laws do not promote buying debt. A bank donating a discounted a loan can only deduct the loan's market (discounted) value, rather than its face value. As a result, a coalition of environmental groups are seeking support in Congress for a tax law change allowing donor banks to receive full benefits of a donation of bad loans for conservation. Senator D'Amato feels that this proposal is valid; however, "in order for this change in tax law to have a chance of becoming enacted it must be added to the Tropical Rainforest Act before its final drafting. "This," he said, "will not be an easy task."

"World Bank's long history of environmentally destructive policy must be stopped, this is a primary reason why I [D'Amato] sponsored the bill. This bill helps put World Bank values in proper perspective by forcing the Bank to reassess the status of all outstanding debt and begin to formulate strategies for distribution of future loans. The Bank's programs have not been life-saving; rather, they have been life-threatening. Engaging in ran-

dom projects without concern for their ecological ramifications is reprehensible."

The first two financial agencies created by the United Nations were the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD or World Bank or Bank) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IMF discussed later). These are conservative agencies, run by hardheaded bankers and financial experts, and controlled by the affluent states through weighted voting based on quotas of capital. Both organizations came into being in December, 1945, when 28 countries ratified the Bretton Woods Agreements of the previous year. Currently, the World Bank is the largest multilateral source of funds for world development. By 1981, the aggregate of all loans made by the Bank passed the $60 billion mark for more than 2800 projects. Since 1946 the volume has increased steadily and for the fiscal year 1981 it reached $8.8 billion.

Originally, the World Bank's loans were not supposed to require substantial outside funding. From its capital of $10 billion the banks could make loans for postwar reconstruction and economic development. Capital for future loans was supposed to be generated by payments of outstanding loans. However, after 1968, under Robert McNamara's presidency of the bank, the agency's philosophy became the development process, particular of Third World nations. Attention to the effects of projects on the total economy was intensified while little attention was paid to their environmental impacts. Bank projects included development of dams, industrial facilities, and transportation (*International Organization* by A. Leroy Bennett).

Two examples, illustrating World Bank's blatant disregard for the environment are the Indonesia and Brazil projects. The Indonesia project was designed to resettle hundreds of thousands of natives from the island of Java to the Indonesian parts of Borneo and New Guinea. This project would destroy millions of acres of rainforest while placing the settlers in an environment that would not sustain a long-term development. Bruce Rich, a lawyer for the Envornmental Defense Fund, said, "This project is only the latest example of systematic World Bank environmental negligence that has been documented by 17 Congressional Hearings over the past three years." Norman Meyers, author of *The Primary Source*, called this transmigration policy "reprehensible."

Brazil's project brings out a major point for ratification of this bill. U.S. tax dollars are providing basic capital for the bank as well as guaranteeing their loans. Presently, the United States is responsible for funding one-quarter of their capital. However, these payments often are spent on unfavorable projects. Despite U.S. members voting no, the World Bank was able to approve a $500 million loan to Brazil for large-scale hydroelectric projects because the united States holds only one-eighth of World Bank votes.

Ratification of a loan agreement requires a majority of votes. This loan was the first of three, totaling over $1 billion the bank is planning to invest in this project. As a result of these programs, Congress sees the bank as a highway to despair, disease, displacement, and a cycle of accelerating destruction. (*The Boston Globe*: "A new run on the World Bank's policies")

Opponents feel that planning should start with protecting the resource base of a country to assure long-term security of the people. This entails turning away from financing huge dams, large single-scale crop farming for export, deforestation for redevelopment, and other projects customarily financed by the bank, all of which destroy land, grass, trees, and water on which indigenous people depend for their survival (*The New York Times*: World Lenders Facing Pressure From Ecologists). In recent years, the World Bank has made some improvements, responding to pressure and specific directives from Congressional Committees. After the House Appropriation Committee on Foreign Operations expressed concerns over environmental practices at development banks, World Bank responded in May, 1987, by creating an environmental impact department and environmental offices within the bank's regional departments. According to a spokesman, these changes show, "that environmental protection is being elevated amongst the bank's priorities."

Designating World Bank a major role in this conservation bill maximizes United States leverage over the agency. It is not coincidental that Senator Kasten is the ranking representative on the Senate Appropriations subcommittee on foreign operations, which oversees U.S. funding for the Bank. D'Amato conveyed Congress' intentions through a simple analogy, "When a father gives his son money he doesn't want him to spend it foolishly; he wants to see something positive done with it. Likewise, when we give money to the Bank we expect them to spend our money carefully; taking into account the lives and welfare of others."

In the bills last subsection, the Secretary of Treasury is instructed to conduct an analysis of programs and policies of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to assess the potential for adopting pilot programs to the operation of the IMF. The Secretary shall submit the results of his findings within 12 months of the act's passage.

The laudable objectives of "The Tropical Rainforest Act of 1987" cannot be denied. Linking 'debt and rainforests,' and more closely regulating World Bank activities will work to slow the pace of rainforest destruction. In a limited sense, these measures will ease the pace of our own destruction. We can't afford to test the magnitude of deforestation. Loss of climate control and coastal land, rising sea levels, droughts, soil erosion and disintegration of our corn belt are frightening prospects affecting all of us. It is disturbing to think that plants such as rosy periwinkly lie in these forests but will be

extinct before discovered. Farmers already owing millions of dollars to banks shudder at the thought of business if pest controls and genetic fortification were no longer available to protect their crops. Short-term profits may no longer be made at the expense of our long-term welfare.

Yet, no hearings have been scheduled on this bill. According to D'Amato this bill would not be ratified if voted on today. He offered two explanations for this. One problem lies in a lack of knowledge both on the part of the politicans and their constituents. "If I walked up to 10 representatives and asked their opinions on the Tropical Forest Act I don't think more than three would be able to give me an answer." A second problem is that other issues are overshadowing Third World debt, namely the issues of deficits and budgets. "Most politicians say to me, 'How can I ask my constituents to rally behind a bill calling for the easing of Third World debt, when we are having enough problems trying to solve American debt problems?'" The budget issue takes first priority in Congress. "Our inability as a group of 535 [members] to find a workable budget is disturbing. Until we find one, other issues will take a back seat."

Although the bill will not be voted on in the near future, an important alliance has already been forged between conservationists and economists resulting from the attachment of the Third World debt issue to the bill. Historically, the two groups' interests have conflicted with economic interests prevailing in most cases. However, this time conservationists have the banker's attention because economists see this bill as an opportunity to work for the reduction of debt in these nations. From a political standpoint, selling this bill based on its impact on foreign debt is more feasible than promoting it based on its effects on the rainforest. D'Amato said, "bills don't get passed until the critical masses see the midnight oil burning." Unfortunately, in this case, by the time people smell the oil it may not be burning anymore.

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Failed Diplomacy: Japan's Relations with the Peoples Republic of China and the Soviet Union

Betsy Rigby

Japan's postwar economic success is easily demonstrable, but Japan has yet to achieve a comparable success in its diplomatic relations. Japan is an anomaly in international politics in that, while maintaining close relations with the democracies of the West, it is constrained in its actions by its lack of an autonomous military force and its close ties to another country. As one scholar has stated, "Changes in the international environment have impressed upon Japan the need to assume a more independent position in world affairs which would be commensurate with its economic importance and wish to be regarded as a state of some consequence." (Mendl, p. 215) By examining Japan's relations with the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), based on the 1978 Peace and Friendship Treaty (PFT) and the stagnation of relations with the Soviet Union because of the Kurile Islands dispute, one can measure the extent of Japan's diplomatic weaknesses. Given the different circumstances surrounding each situation, they are informative in demonstrating the sources of Japan's foreign policy maladroitness.

As defined by Morganthau (*Politics Among Nations*), diplomacy is the "art of bringing different elements of national power to bear with maximum effect upon those points in the international situation which concern national interest most directly." (Morganthau p. 159) As will be examined, Japan has demonstrated power by influencing others to behave in ways they would not have otherwise, but almost exclusively in economic relations. In fact, Japan is often criticized for putting its economic considerations ahead of its foreign relations. In the postwar period, Japan has been unable to conclude diplomatic negotiations in its favor with either China or the Soviet Union, despite pursuing trade relations with both.

Japan's economic success, in contrast, is easily demonstrable. In 1986, Japan exported almost twice as much as it imported, $205.6 billion compared to $112.9 billion (Economist Intelligent Unit, p. 2). In 1985, 37.2 percent of Japan's exports went to the U.S., while China received the next highest amount, or 7.1 percent (ibid). Today, Japan has become the largest

creditor nation while the US has become a debtor nation. Six years ago, Japan's net overseas assets were $11 billion. By contrast, US international holdings amounted to $141 billion. Today, this ratio has been reversed (Ashbrook, p. 1). At the end of 1986, Japan's long-term foreign assets totaled nearly $397 billion, surpassing by $17 billion the holdings of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries at their peak in 1983. Ten years ago, BankAmerica and Citicorp were the world's two largest banks. Today, nine of the world's largest banks, measured by market capitalization, are Japanese. Citicorp ranks 29th, BankAmerica, 58th. (ibid, p. 16)

As Japan's economic power has increased relative to the US, so has its political standing among industrialized nations. In the past decade, while becoming more active in international politics, Japan has reaffirmed its alignment with the US and its allies. Japan is now a part of the 7-nation summit meetings of industrialized democracies as well as the only Asian member of the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development). Prime Minister Nakasone, in confirming Japan's allegiance to the Western industrialized nations, stated, "The basic goal of breathing new life into the Western alliance should be our top priority." (Nakasone, p. 1). And yet, there is still some ambiguity about Japan's place in international affairs. Some call on Japan to play a greater and independent political role while others believe Japan cannot be a great force in world affairs. "The problem of Japan's position between Asia and the West is unresolved. This is reflected in the debate between those who want a more independent Japan and those who want greater integration." (Mendl, p. 208)

In acknowledging this conflict and Japan's diplomatic weaknesses, Nakasone has consistently struck a nationalistic tone and favored Japan asserting itself in the political sphere. "When I assumed office of prime minister in 1982, a vast gap still existed between Japan's reality and what the rest of the world expected of Japan. I advocated that we shift from a passive posture of responding to events, to an active posture of influencing events positively." (Nakasone, p. 213) For instance, in 1971, he stressed the importance of Japanese relations with China for Japan's "existence" but also insisted that in Japan's dealings with China, Japan "must not harbour a feeling of subordinating ourselves to a big power." (Mendl, p. 209-10)

Japan's present relations with the PRC are based on the 1978 Peace and Friendship Treaty. The conclusion of this treaty, three years after the first negotiations began, can be seen as a diplomatic defeat for Japan because of the inclusion of a clause stating the China and Japan were opposed to "hegemony by a third nation." Though Japan did not at the time wish to ally itself with or against another nation, this clause, when included in the treaty, was taken as a clear indication of Japan's alignment with China and

against the Soviet Union. Thus, in the end, Japan agreed to the very thing it objected to from the beginning.

Relations between the two countries, which had been hostile since World War II, began to thaw following President Nixon's surprise visit to the PRC. emerged from the upheavals of the Cultural Revolution, it was willing to experiment with different forms of political expression and welcomed foreign investment to help with its needed modernizations. Despite this general relaxation of tension with other nations, it remained hostile to the Soviet Union. "If there was any sector of the PRC state policy that escaped the sweeping changes which followed 76, it was China's antipathy toward the USSR." (Bedeski, p. 59) Continued military buildups on the Sino-Soviet border had led to a mutual distrust, and already in 1960, China had regarded the USSR as a dangerous superpower.

For China, a main counterattack to Soviet imperialism was a treaty with Japan and normalization of relations with the US, two major industrial nations. The PRC was similarly interested in preventing close relations between Japan and the Soviet Union. "Once hostility had reentered the Soviet-American relationship, the PRC found it advantageous to become part of a trilateral relationship with the US and Japan to offset the growing Soviet influence in Asia." (Scott, p. 52) Thus, China's main motiation in seeking a treaty of peace and friendship with Japan was a response to the PRC's relations with its northern neighbor. Therefore, China's primary goal in the PFT negotiations was the unqualified inclusion of an anti-hegemony clause.

Japanese motivations for bettering relations with the PRC were numerous, but were primarily influenced by American policy in Asia. "The treaty may have been inevitable, but its timing was linked to specific international circumstances, including the new American strategy." (Bedeski, p. 16) America decreased its military presence in Asia by removing its troops from Vietnam and was moving towards normalization of relations with the PRC. In fact, with the rapid improvement of Chinese and American relations, Japan had to move fast or lose out in the subsequent economic competition which also included Western Europe. "The hostile relations between the US and the Soviet Union coupled with friendly relations between the US and PRC created a situation favoring the treaty as well as the anti-hegemony clause." (Scott, p. 65) Other motivations included the guilt Japan still felt over the brutality of its soldiers during Japan's imperialism, which the Chinese did not discourage, Japan was further moved by the opportunity to establish peaceful coexistence and thereby contribute to the stability of Asia.

In marked contrast, Japan's primary goal in negotiations was to avoid the anti-hegemony clause altogether, to mitigate its effect with additional wording so as to assure the Soviets that it was not directed at them. (Scott, p. 52) Japan had renounced the use of armed force and therefore was not in

any position to oppose hegemony by any nation by military means. They also felt that such a clause, directed as it was against third parties, had no place in a bilateral treaty. This conflict over whether to include the anti-hegemony clause was really the only point of difficulty. "It mst be seen as a genuine political issue, not one of mere form or semantics, with far reaching potential consequences for the power balance in the entire Asian area, and was perceived as such by both sides." (ibid, p. 54)

Negotiations stalled over the differences surrounding the anti-hegemony clause, "a clause which had become an important part of Chinese foreign policy, but which Japan felt would have a significant negative impact on their own 'equi-distant' foreign policy, particularly as it related to the Soviet Union." (Scott, p. 52) Although in negotiations, China found other ways of expressing the thought, their basic insistence on the unqualified inclusion of the anti-hegemony clause remained unchanged from their initial statement until the last moment before negotiations concluded. The first period of negotiation, in 1975, saw a major concession by Japan which was unreciprocated by the PRC, so negotiations ended without an agreement. The second period, in 1978, saw concessions by both sides and resulted in the conclusion of the treaty, but with language that quite clearly favored the PRC. The final draft of the treaty, as accepted by both sides, contained the anti-hegemony clause desired by the PRC, modified only slightly and without significant effect on its political impact. Moscow's reaction to the perceived threat posed by Sino-Japanese tie was to build up its military power in order to conduct its foreign relations from a position of strength. Thus Japan faced not only greater hostility and tension, but also a greater Soviet military presence in the Pacific.

The PFT did succeed in eliminating friction between China and Japan and established a foundation for stable relations. It also widened the base of Japanese diplomacy and even facilitated consultation with China on the Korean problem. But the irony of the treaty is that it destabilized Asian relationships and has stimulated a greater Soviet presence in the Far East. The inclusion of the clause achieved the effect on the Soviet Union desired by the PRC and feared by Japan. China's goal was realized, Japan's was not. Japan put economic interests ahead of diplomatic concerns, miscalculated the repercussions of the inclusion of the anti-hegemony clause, was influenced by US policy, and allowed internal politics to influence foreign policy. Thus the treaty demonstrates the weaknesses of Japan's diplomacy.

One of the fundamental motivations for Japan in concluding the PFT was the potential of increasing trade relations with China. In fact, one author states, "Economic considerations, perhaps more than anything, led to the cementing of Sino-Japanese relations. The Chinese were making it clear that the PFT would reinforce the special connection between the two countries,

a connection which was vital to help the Japanese economy to survive and prosper." (Bedeski, p. 85) China's post revolutionary modernization drive offered welcome opportunity for Japanese businesses and industries to penetrate the vast Chinese market." Japan has made available substantial amounts for investment in developing China's resources and markets and remains anxious to take advantage of this favorable position as China's neighbor, in order to consolidate its stake in the Chinese economy. Therefore, the expectations of economic benefits influenced Japan in signing the PFT and commiting itself to a treaty that was not in its best diplomatic interests.

In fact, despite its original objections, in the end, Japan seemed to deny to itself the consequences, and allowed itself to believe that the opportunities outweighed the risks. (Bedeski, p. 23) Similarly, Japan may have underestimated China's well-rooted hostility against the Soviet Union. "Japan and other nations welcome China's stabilization and drive towards modernization which included opportunities for economic and political bridge-building. This enthusiasm for a greater Chinese connection may have led Japanese leaders to minimize the anti-Soviet thrust of China's policy." (Bedeski, p. 57)

Not only was Japan initially motivated to pursue the PFT by changing American policy in the region, but was also influenced by American policy during negotiations. Though both parties and some analysts have since denied that Japan was pressured by the US, what is more important is how the Japanese leaders perceived the situation at the time. In fact, Japan did perceive strong us influence in favor of their treaty conclusion. "Japan, because of its unusually close ties with the US, felt compelled to make the final concessions in negotiations." (Scott, p. 65) The US clearly wanted a resolution of the treaty that would constitute a gain for American interests and a loss for the Soviet Union in Asia. The conclusion of the treaty allowed the us what it wanted, while Japan got what it did not want. By being so closely tied to the US, Japan could not conduct diplomacy in its own best interest.

Japan's actions in negotiations were also influenced by personal competition within domestic politics. A scholar states that one of the major factors contributing to Miki's concession may have been his need to author some positive political activity during his administration. (Scott, p. 58) "Whether by design or not, each prime minister has assumed responsibility for, and identity with, one principal policy achievement during his administration, and inevitably, major foreign policy decisions have fallen into this category." A second factor for Miki's need to author a principal policy achievement was his unusually weak position as prime minister. (ibid) For Miki, resolution of a treaty had become his personal policy goal. Thus, pressure from domestic politics influenced foreign policy.

In its relations with the PRC, Japan was unable to bring its national power to effect a successful treaty in the national interest. By anticipating beneficial economic returns, denying the reality of the treaty's repercussions, by not distinguishig between Japan's best interests and US policy, and by allowing pressure from domestic politics to influence the outcome, Japan committed itself to a treaty which included the one thing it had sought to avoid — the anti-hegemony clause. The treaty established friendly Sino-Japanese relations, but it also severely strained Japanese-Soviet relations and made resolution of conflicts between the two even less feasible than before.

Similarly, Japan has not successfully concluded diplomatic negotiations with the Soviet Union. In fact, the two countries have yet to officially resolve World War II. Historically, they have struggled against each other in East Asia since the turn of the century. Specifically, the controversy over the Kurile Islands has prevented the Soviet Union and Japan, the world's second and third greatest economic powers, from signing a peace treaty for three decades.

The dispute can be traced to conflicting frontier claims dating back to the late 18th century. Japan felt that southern Kurile Islands had always been Japanese and that the central and northern parts of the chain had been peacefully obtained in 1875 in exchange for Japan's rights to Sakhalin. Subsequent demands focused on southern Kurile because 90 percent of the arc's former inhabitants had lived there and because Japan felt more confident about claiming land's that the Soviet Union had never ruled. The Soviet Union feels it annexed the Islands under the terms of the 1945 Yalta agreement, but Japan does not consider that instrument binding under instrumental law.

In 1945, Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration which stipulated that Japan abandon all the "overseas" territories "taken with violence." In 1951, the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which became the legal basis for the solution of all problems related to the Pacific War, stipulated that Japan would renounce all rights an claims to southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands [Article II (c)]. The Soviet Union was not named beneficiary to these rights and did not sign the treaty, although it has since maintained that this treaty finalized Russia's title to the islands. The Japanese government subsequently argued that by Kurile Islands, Prime Minister Yoshida meant only those islands between Uruo and Kamchatka (therefore, those acquired from Russia in 1875) and that the Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashiri and Etorufu Islands are inherent territories of Japan, having never been occupied by any foreign country before 1945. Careful research has exposed this argument to be plausible but not accurate (Stephan, p. 200).

The only other negotiations between Japan and the Soviet Union over the Islands occured in 1955-56 when the two worked out a peace declara-

tion. Because differences still could not be resolved, the Kurile issue was deferred to further negotiations. In August, 1955, a resolution had seemed imminent, but instead of accepting a Soviet concession, Japan announced new demands which called for retrocession of more islands. This sudden reversal may have derived from domestic policy, or, as one Soviet observer concluded, from American determination to obstruct normalization by forcing Japan to raise impossible conditions. "Since 1956, Soviet-Japanese communications over the Northern territories have resembled crab-like minuets accompanied by formulatic incantations."(Stephan, p. 202)

To Tokyo, the Northern Territories issue is one of, if not the only, stumbling blocks in improving relations with the Soviet Union. The Japanese government, as well as irredentist organizations, repeatedly call for the return of the "inalienable" southern Kurile. Soviet officials stubbornly respond that the so-called "territorial problem" is a non-issue, "concocted by reactionaries and militarists. The sovereignty of the Kurile Islands was rooted in history, decided at Yalta, confirmed at Potsdam, and finalized at San Francisco." (Stephan, p. 202)

Though it would seem that a few islands would not be of much significance to a country the size of the Soviet Union, there are several reasons for the USSR's stubborness in not resolving the dispute. Fundamentally, there is the sincere and unquestioned conviction that the entire Kurile archipelago belongs to Russia by right of "prior discovery and prior settlement." The Soviet Union, as a matter of national pride, holds to the diplomatic principle that the frontiers established as a result of World War II will not be altered. Japanese motivations are seen as purely nationalistic, without any political or economic rationale. Whereas, for the Soviets, the islands are strategically located as their gates to the Pacific. The signing of the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty may well have been the catalyst for Soviet fortification of the islands. A scholar cites further reasons for Soviet obstinancy: Moscow has not yet ascertained what benefits it could obtain from Tokyo in exchange for a return of the disputed islands. Soviet disinclination to take a risk for such an intangible and unreliable thing as Japanese national sentiment can in part be justified in light of past Japanese behavior. (Kimura, p. 103)

Japan has reasons similar to the Soviets for not pursuing a resolution of the issue. There exists a popular consensus within Japan, that the Kuriles are historically Japanese and should be returned. The government's position revolves around the belief that Kunshir, Iturup, Shikotan and Habomais are "inalienable" Japanese lands and that this is supported by historical association and international law. As with the Soviets, national pride and prestige are also at stake. Japan, by not compromising, is not losing much in practical terms. And Japan does not see any great benefit to surrender-

ing the islands for once and for all to the Soviet Union.

Japan also harbours a profound distrust of the Soviet Union. This negative perspective on Russia strongly affects Japan's policy toward the Soviet Union. (Uda, p. 61) The deterioration of the Soviet's image in Japan paralleled the West's, but has been exacerbated by incidents minor in world politics, though major in terms of Japan's relations with the Soviet Union. These incidents include spy charges leveled against Japanese, Soviet scout planes in Japanese air space, disputes over fishing rights around the Kurile Islands, and the Soviet policy of requiring visas to visit tombs on the northern territories. "It was because Japanese public opinion was out of touch with defense realities that these events affected Japan so strongly." (Uda, p. 50) Therefore, a general anti-Soviet sentiment seems to dominate Japan.

As with the PRC, American influences have played a role in the relations between Japan and its neighbor. When the territorial issue was close to settlement in the 50s, Washington expressed its apprehension and therefore hardened Japan's position in negotiations. (Kim, p. 89; Mendl, p. 207) However, since 1956, as natural animosity and mutual distrust have kept the two nations from resolving the dispute, the US has gradually withdrawn from active involvement, although it continues to endorse the Japanese government's position.

Japan's stand-off with the Soviet Union again demonstrates its diplomatic weaknesses. Given that there are profound grounds for mutual distrust and non-alignment, Tokyo's positions nevertheless have not addressed the differences between the two, but only exacerbated them. Japan has absolved itself of all responsibility in the present impasse. Furthermore, the government has taken an all-or-nothing stance, even though the Soviets have repeatedly called for negotiation on differences other than the northern territories. Despite this schism, Japan has been able to establish successful trade relations. In the case of the Soviet Union, economics has succeeded where diplomacy had failed.

Tokyo maintains that the present situation between itself and Moscow is nothing other than a product of Soviet policy and action in both international affairs and in its relations with Japan. As reported by Kimura, the Japanese ambassador to the Soviet Union, Masuo Takashima, said to Nakasone in 1982, "In the final analysis, what has made Japan-Soviet relations so cold? This ought to be the basic question, when one thinks about bilateral relations. The cause lies not with Japan at all, but simply with the Soviet Union. In the postwar period, the whole responsibility lies consistently with the USSR. Thus only when the Soviet Union comes to regard Japan as important, respects it and hence amends its current attitudes, can Japan respond. Japan is not in the position to bow to the Soviet Union or to seek good relations with this country." (Kimura, p. 92) Thus, by putting all

obligation on the Soviet Union to change its attitude toward Japan, while Japan maintains a belligerent attitude toward Russia, it has not only given itself reason not to negotiate with the Soviets, but has also given the Soviets reason not to negotiate with the Japanese.

The ultimate objective of Tokyo's policy toward Moscow is to improve bilateral relations in a comprehensive treaty, so that all the issues are linked together and resolved. Thus Japan has decline all Soviet offers to conclude confidence building measures (CBMs). Tokyo exhibits some wisdom in being wary of the possibility that if it establishes a rapport with Moscow through CBMs, the need for a formal peace treaty will lose its urgency for the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, as Russia has pointed out, since Japan and the USSR have been deadlocked in peace treaty negotiations, the time has come for them to seriously discuss another type of arrangement. Thus while the Soviets have searched for alternatives so that the two nations can conclude some kind of agreement, the Japanese have stubbornly refused to put aside the Northern Territories issue. Nakasone stated, "We want to resolve the territorial issue and conclude a peace treaty as an initial step in cultivating a dialogue, in spite of the difficulties involved." (Nakasone, p. 3) Tokyo has ensured that no progress can be made. By failing to realize that an insistence on both a treaty and a resolution of the Kurile Islands dispute has precluded any step in cultivating a dialogue. After 40 years without resolution, it would seem time to put the territorial issue on hold so as to be able to determine what progress could be made. However, "Tokyo seems to have concluded that at present there is no particular reason for Japan to make a diplomatic initiative to Moscow in order to break the current deadlock in relations with the Soviet Union." (Kimura, p. 91) Thus no progress appears likely.

Despite this diplomatic impasse, Japan has been able to succeed with the Soviets through economics. Japan now maintains a balance of trade of 3:2 in its favor with the Soviet Union. (Ozaki, p. 80) In February, 1983, the Japanese head of the Japanese-Soviet Economic Committee and more than 200 businessmen visited Moscow after three and one half years of no exchanges. Although this one mission did not stop the decline of bilateral relations, it was made clear that economic factors will remain to assist the maintenance of normal relations between the two countries. (Uda, p. 53) "In economic terms, there appears to be considerable potential for the expansion of a mutually beneficial collaborative economic relationship between Japan and the Soviet Union." (Ozaki, p. 81) Thus Japan has been able to pursue successful economic relations while foreign relations have failed.

Japan has been trying, in the postwar era, to play a role in international politics. The weaknesses of Japan's diplomacy have been demonstrated in

the case of negotiations with the PRC over the 1978 PFT, and with the Soviet Union over the Kurile Islands dispute. Together, these two situations suggest some of the reasons for Japan's unsuccessful foreign policy.

One factor is historical. Having not been in control of its foreign policy for 30 years, Japan does not have the tradition, motivation or experience that other nations do. From 1931-1945, foreign policy was controlled by the military, leading Japan into World War II. From 1945-1951, Japan was run by the Allied Occupation which rewrote the Japanese constitution and restructured the political system. During the 50s and 60s, a period of rebuilding and recovery from the trauma of defeat and occupation, Japan followed American leads in diplomacy. Japan therefore has not been able to establish an independent diplomatic tradition, nor a corps of trained diplomats. "Slavish adherence first to the policies of General Staff Headquarters and subsequently to the US has not helped Japan cope with its problems in foreign relations, and now, place din the position where foreign policy decisions are Japan's own responsibility, the men of the right sort of experience are lacking. As a result, Japan seems to be aimlessly following the general drift in world events and getting into trouble in the process." (Suichi, p. 60)

Nakasone has, in fact, acknowledged this problem: "Since World War II, Japan has undergone a dramatic transformation to become the second greatest economic power in the world. This transformation has left the Japanese people less than fully aware of the magnitude of their own accomplishments and unprepared for the challenges of the coming age." (Nakasone, p. 1) Nevertheless, Japan is currently emphasizing "internationalism," and with this greater awareness of global affairs, will be able to adapt others' traditions while developng its own motivations and experiences in conducting diplomacy.

Japan's culture, and specifically its emphasis on groups and the Japanese language, has also affected its diplomacy. In international negotiations, for instance, 'It is not the Japanese way' has often been heard as a reason for Japan not being able to come to immediate decisions, since the Japanese are used to the slow process of building group consensus. Cultural traits such as the use of non-spoken thought based on shared experiences, the formality of its language, and the belief that words are not important distinguish communication with Japanese. (Suichi, p. 85) It follows that difficulties which occur in communication between individuals are magnified when it comes to communication between governments and societies. One scholar blames Japan's inferior diplomatic position solely on Japanese culture: "The structure of Japanese society is at fault. Japan transfers its cultural ability to deal in groups to the international level where it is not applicable." (ibid, p. 75) But again, internationalism is changing this as more

people come to understand Japan, more students study abroad, and the international scene does not allow Japan to excuse itself because of cultural differences.

Japan's economic policies have also greatly influenced Japan's diplomacy. Japan is a country with few natural resources and therefore depends on trade for its econimic survival. For example, the 1973 oil shocks hit Japan especially hard and demonstrated Japan's dependence on the world economy. Not only must Japan be concerned about where it will buy its resources, it must also be concerned about where it will sell its products. Therefore, and as one scholar noted, "This vulnerability of resource supply and export markets influences not only Japan's economic health, but foreign policy as well." (Bedeski, p. 85) As has been pointed out, the promise of markets in the PRC was a significant factor in Japan's signing of the PFT. Similarly, the dependence of Japan on US markets clearly affects the foreign relations between the two, as our trade deficit with Japan grows, Congress becomes increasingly protectionist, consequently straining relations.

Furthermore, Japanese politics are closely linked with business interests through MITI (Ministry of International Trade and Industry), a government agency which has been largely credited with the success of Japan's economic growth. Similarly, many politicians had careers in business before politics and influence Japanese domestic policy, as well as foreign policy to the point where economic gain is gauged before diplomatic or strategic gain or loss is considered, "Japanese industry is accustomed to consider development from a long-term perspective and has pressed on with its involvement. This indeed may be seen as part of the general approach taken by the Japanese government and industry toward conduct of international economic relations. That so far as possible, trade, investment, and other economic relationships should be given precedence and ideological or strategic objections to a particular regime or set of policies by another government should not be allowed to get in the way." (Ozaki, p. 75) Because of Japan's lack of natural resources, business has become an intrinsic part of government to the extent that economic considerations cannot be ignored in determining foreign policy.

But, as has been demonstrated, this link can influence Japan to pursue a foreign policy which offers economic benefit, but is damaging to its foreign relations. "A foreign policy which has economic advantage as its aim will serve to isolate Japan from the international community and that tendency is already apparent. It is not good enough to base a long-term foreign policy on economic considerations, but it is not easy to visualize a country such as Japan, which forms its basic policies on the interests of big business, establishing a foreign policy which transcends pure economic advantage." (Suichi, p. 71) Japan's pursuit of a foreign policy in its best interest is con-

strained by its economic vulnerability, a situation which will not change.

However, the most fundamental reason for Japan's weak diplomacy is its dependent and unequal relationship with the US. Japan is dependent on the US for its military protection, and unequal in that Japan's interests have often been overriden by American policy. The Japanese-American Security Treaty provides for a continued American military presence in Japan. And the Constitution allows Japan its only military force, the Self Defense Forces (SDF), which is an agency, not for defense, but for providing disaster relief. Kataoka states, "Japanese democracy is designed in such a way that it can survive only on condition that someone protects Japan." (Kataoka, p. 88) This someone has been, and will be, the US. Mendl states, "Since the end of the Occupation, concern over American reactions has been the single most important factor that has influenced Japan's external policy and, as a price for American guarantee of its security, Japan's freedom of manoeuvre in relations with America's opponenets has been strictly circumscribed." (ibid, p. 206) Unable to build its own military, Japan has concentrated its energies on non-defense matters, thus fueling its economic success. One author states, "The best that can be reasonably pursued is a kind of rolling economic security, conceived of as maximizing flexibility in markets and sources of supply, as being so far as possible nonprovocative of neighbors, and as becoming economically indispensable internationally by virtue of its technological superiority." (Ozaki, p. 81-2)

As its economic priorities have dominated Japan's diplomacy, so has this reliance on another state for its security circumscribed Japan's formation of an independent foreign policy. In fact, some say that Japan's lack of a military force precludes it from acting like a state. Therefore, rearmament, including the possibility of building a nuclear arsenal, is always debated. Nakasone has stated, "I feel that we should have increased our defense efforts some years ago, when we had a great deal of financial leeway," but now Japan must "maintain the three nuclear principles of neither having, manufacturing, nor allowing introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan." And public opinion is strongly against rearmament. Despite the fact that the majority of Japanese do not think that America will come to Japan';s aid in an emergency (56 percent), almost the same majority (57 percent) supports maintaining the SDF at its present level, while only 19 percent supports strengthening it. Most (42 percent) feel that the peace-oriented foreign policy is the most important factor protecting Japan. And 71 percent do not want to amend the Constitution to permit a full-scale military establishment. (Yoshihiko, p. 64-65)

This debate on defense has gone through several distinct phases. In the 1950s it was characterized by an advocation of unarmed neutrality and opposition to the SDF, the Japanese-US Security Treaty, and the US military

bases in Japan. Writers believed that invasion of Japan was impossible as long as Japan remained well-intentioned, strove to maintain friendly relations with all other nations and was dedicated to the preservation of the peace constitution. In the 1960s, unarmed neutrality continued to be popular, but the danger of invasion was recognized. Thus, the suggestion arose of building up a United Nations police force in Japan, or preparing for unarmed civil resistance. In the 1970s, articles published on the subject increasingly stressed the necessity of a national defense, but no consensus could be achieved on the means that would ensure security. (Yoshihiko, p. 63, 68) Today, the controversy is characterized by views ranging from supoprt of unarmed neutrality to support of a nuclear arsenal. Three realist scholars, recently published in *Japan Echo*, demonstrate today's debate on Japan's militarization.

Shimizu Ikutaro, professor, author and current president of the Shimizu Institute, maintains in a 1980 article entitled, "The Nuclear Option: Japan, Be a State!" (*Japan Echo*, 7 (no. 3, 1980) 34-35) that Japan is not a state, only a vulnerable economic giant that should possess nuclear weapons in order to protect its freedom and democracy. He says that article 9 of the Constitution, in which Japan renounced the right of belligerency and the threat or use of force as a means for settling international disputes, has robbed Japan of the most important condition of being a state. For him, a country has military power, or no international leverage at all. "In the final analysis, the essence of a state is its military power, and people as agents of military power must be thoroughly imbued with the quality of loyalty." (ibid, p. 39) Instead of feeling loyal to their state, he continues, the Japanese have allowed corporations to assume the role of the state. Thus, "Japan does not have the leverage in international politics that its economic influence warrants." (ibid, p. 40) He states, "The Japanese-US Security Treaty takes on true meaning and contributes to world peace only if Japan works earnestly and steadily to guarantee its own defense." (ibid, p. 44) So he supports Japan's building of a nuclear arsenal: "If nuclear arms are important, and if Japan has a special status as the first nuclear victim, Japan should indeed have the right to make and maintain nuclear weapons before anybody else. Japan needs nuclear weapons to protect itself," (ibid)

In contrast, Inoki Masamichi, professor, author and current president of the Research Institute for Peace and Security, in an article entitled "From Utopian Pacifism to Utopian Militarism" (*Japan Echo*, 7 (no. 4, 1980) 87-98), and in response to Shimizu, states, "Japan can best maintain security by making as many friends and as few enemies as possible, and make it clear that Japan will never again become a military giant." In reaction to Shimizu's argument, he states that Article 9 did not disarm Japan, but that Japan's defeat and subsequent occupation did. He believes that the most urgent issue

facing Japan is the strengthening of its defense capability. "The major assumption underlying the Security Treaty is that Japan will rely on the US for its deterrence, based on its strategic nuclear weapons, while Japan concentrates on building up its capacity for resistance." (Inoki, p. 97) For him, the issue is "whether Japan has the capacity to resist foreign aggression" (ibid, p. 98) Therefore, he supports Japan incresing its defense spending only so as to have the capacity of resistance to an invasion so that American reinforcement could arrive.

A third position is represented by Kataoka Tetsuya, professor and author, who, in his article "Concept of a Japanese Second Republic" (*Japan Echo* 7 (no. 1, 1980) 85-96) supports an independent foreign policy for Japan that would include a nuclear weapons. First, he says, Japan will have to amend its Constitution, and that in turn would creat a new regime. This regime, a "second republic," would then aim at greater independence while preserving Japan's democratic politics and capitalist economy. Kataoka maintains that nuclear arms cannot be avoided and are, in fact, a "logical capstone of autonomy and self-reliance in defense in today's world." (Kataoka, p. 96)

Simultaneous with these calls for greater independence from the US, there are calls for Japan to be less independent. In an article, "Japan's Search for an Independent Foreign Policy: An American Perspective," (*Journal of Northeast Asian Studies*, 3 (summer 84) 27-43), Ronald Morse states that the view from the current US policy perspective is that "Japan must be more cooperative and forego some of its economic success as a political concession to the US." (Morse, p. 41) He states that while Japan has become more assertive of its interests, it still benefits from operating in the shadow of American world influence. But recently, "Japan has come to doubt America's military might and fitness for leadership while the US has identified Japanese economic competition and lack of reciprocity as signs of unfairness and insularity." (ibid, p. 77-79) Though these observations cannot be faulted, Morse's conclusion, that Japan owes the US some sort of subservience in order to remove the strains in their relationship, is unfounded. Given Japan's strategic and economic dependence on the US, it is unlikely that Japan can sever its relationship with the US in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, the US should not expect Japan to resign its interests to American policy, but should accept Japan as the economic rival.

Another author, Mendl, has a more realistic perspective on Japan's relation to the US ("Japan and its Giant Neighbors," *World Today*, June, 1983). He recognizes the constraints imposed on Japan by being situated between the US, China, and the Soviet Union, but is supportive of Japan pursuing an independent foreign policy. He states, "We are at a transitional stage between Japan's low profile in support of American policies and Japan's assertion of its independence in international politics." (Mendl, p. 209) He

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maintains that despite Japan's strong strategic ties with the US, there exists in Japan a "substantial and influential" body of opinion that feels increasingly uncomfortable with Japan's close security ties with the US. Nevertheless, "For as long as Japan perceives the Soviet Union as posing the greatest potential threat to its security, it will seek to retain an American presence." (Mendl, p. 213) Therefore, Japan will probably continue to move away from strict adherence to American policy, but will not go so far as to break relations with the US because of its economic and military dependence.

Thus, Japan today has emerged as one of, if not the first of, the greatest economic powers, but lacks both a global strategic vision and a strong sense of free-world political alliance. (Morse, p. 41) Japan has been unable to establish an independent foreign policy becuase it lacks an independent world view. Japan's weak diplomacy has influenced its relations with both the PRC and the Soviet Union, such that Japan agreed to a treaty with the PRC which included the one clause Japan had sought to avoid, and which, in turn, worsened the possibility of resolving the last issue remaining from World War II with the Soviet Union. Because of its history, culture, economics, military vulnerability and dependence on the US, Japan's world view, while firmly ensconced in Western democratic principles, is dominated by its "trade or perish" mentality and its reliance on US military protection. Japan, therefore, will continue to pursue its diplomacy the only way it knows how, through trade.

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The Role of WHO in Combatting Smoking in Developing Nations

Charles Collier

Nearly two million people die annually from smoking related diseases. In the United States alone over two hundred thousand succumb to illnesses caused by tobacco which is more than die each year from heroin, cocaine, alcohol, fires, cars, homicide, suicide, and AIDS combined. These are startling figures, yet research shows that smoking is declining or has stabilized in the U.S. and most other developed nations due to education and anti-smoking legislation passed by states and governments. This is not the case in developing countries, however, where smoking hsa reached epidemic proportions. This paper will discuss the work of the World Health Organization and its efforts to stop the smoking epidemic in developing nations and throughout the world as well as the role of transnational tobacco corporations, and individual governments. Information for the paper has been collected from WHO, the American Tobacco Institute, transnation tobacco corporations, and individuals involved with WHO and its anti-smoking campaign in developing countries. In order to establish WHO's effectiveness in combating smoking, it is important to ascertain whether it functions effectively in other areas of world health and whether it can remain fairly independent, especially among powerful member states.

PART I: PROFILE OF WHO

The World Health Organization, created in 1948, is a specialized, multilateral agency of the United Nations responsible for matters of public health and international health matters on a global scale. Upon its creation, the main objective of WHO was the eradication of childhood diseases and the provision of primary health care in countries where it was non-existent. In this context, WHO has been extremely successful in helping to eradicate smallpox and polio, childhood diseases which at one time killed thousands, and is constantly working to control malaria and prevent malnutrition. Today, however, the work of WHO encompasses much more than immunization and nutrition programs. The attainment of world health demands com-

plex international cooperation in many different areas where health is involved. Thus, WHO has been instrumental in developing international standards for pharmaceutical products, environmental health, biological substances, and pesticides, many of which have become written laws in the U.S. and around the world.

WHO also works to educate on the dangers involved in using certain products, especially in developing countries where product information is virtually non-existent. WHO has been successful, for example, in its effort to educate mothers in developing nations on the dangers of mixing breast milk substitutes with contaminated water.

PART II: WHO'S CAMPAIGN TO END SMOKING

WHO made its first serious commitment to end smoking in 1971. At that time the World Health Assembly enacted a series of resolutions urging governments and various international organizations to adopt anti-smoking measures. Through its own offices around the world, and in co-operation with other organizations, the World Health Organization thus began a worldwide health alert, especially in regard to the study of counter measures to prevent a smoking epidemic in developing nations. 1974 saw the start of the first expert committee convened by WHO to advise on tobacco use. WHO also began the publication of a monthly newsletter entitled, "Tobacco Alert," and initiated a series of conferences on Smoking and Health, the last one taking place in Winnipeg, Canada in 1983.

The Testing of Tobacco Products and Educating The Smoking Public

In 1981, WHO started consultation with representatives of nine other international organizations to help find links of cooperation between them and to offer advice on ways of promoting specific anti-smoking campaigns. As a result of this cooperation, WHO started a program which now tests cigarettes in different countries for the amount of tar and nicotine they contain. This type of action is not necessary in the United States and other developed nations which have laws requiring cigarette manufacturers to list the amount of tar and nicotine their cigarettes contain on the individual packages and in advertisements. In many developing countries, where no such laws exist, tobacco companies market cigarettes with excessively high tar and nicotine. Besides the even greater health risks which this type of cigarette presents to the smoking population, chances of addiction are increased with higher amounts of nicotine.[1] There is, in fact, substantial evidence from the U.S. Surgeon General and other health experts that low-tar, low-nicotine cigarettes actually reduce the risks of cancer, heart disease,

and that, in many cases, the chances are lessened of becoming severely addicted to smoking.[2] Thus, by testing cigarettes WHO can work with nongovernmental organizations in developing states (usually the governments are not in favor of restrictions on tobacco) to try to educate the people on the dangers of high-tar, high-nicotine cigarettes.

WHO tries to standardize its cigarette collection procedures as much as possible. Data is then published in a series of reports which are distributed on a world-wide scale. From 1981-1983, for instance, analyses were undertaken of the emission products (tar, nicotine, and carbon monoxide) of the fifty cigarette brands sold in developing countries. This was done with the aim of enhancing national capability to monitor the yield of major noxious substances from both locally made and imported cigarettes; and of ascertaining whether high-tar cigarettes, manufactured, but not for sale in industrial nations, are actually dumped on developing nations. Two WHO collaborating centers (Toronto and London) were responsible for the analysis and quality control of the project and provided training for analysts from developing countries. In South America, testing was undertaken by representatives from the American Cancer Society, yet the same methods were used. The fifty brands were conditioned, machine smoked, and tested for percentages of nicotine, dry tar, and carbon monoxide. Results of the testing are in line with previous WHO statistics. Brands containing the highest amount of nicotine were in countries such as Pakistan and Brazil. Pakistan's Marven Gold Cigarettes, besides having the highest amounts of nicotine (2.4 mg. per cigarette) also had the highest yields of tar and carbon monoxide. The filter used in Marven Gold's is the shortest of any cigarette. The Vila Rica Brand, from Brazil had the second highest amount of nicotine per cigarette, but the highest nicotine yield based on each puff. The second overall strongest cigarette brand is again from Pakistan. Capstan brand also had a short filter, high levels of nicotine, tar, and carbon monoxide. The tar content of cigarettes manufactured in the United States ranges from 1 to 21 mg; in Australia, 5 to 2 mg; 26 to 44 mg in the Philippines; and 4 to 34 mg in the United Kingdom.[3] Dr. Thomas Forbes of the Canadian Medical Association links the high content of tar, which is prohibited in the U.S. and Canada, as the probable cause of the rise in lung cancer rates in developing countries.[4] A comparison of the results from the testing of Marlboro Cigarettes sold in the U.S. to those sold in Venezuela shows that those sold in Venezuela have higher amounts of tar, nicotine, and carbon monoxide. The American Marlboros are longer, yet the Venezuelan ones have higher concentrations of the cancer-causing agents.

The Geography of Smoking

While there has been a slow but steady decline of cigarette smoking in developed nations, smoking has increased in non-industrialized nations. WHO statistics for the last twenty-five years on the progress of smoking controls reveal that in affluent countries adult males and some females are smoking less. In developing countries, smoking is a habit of the wealthy and educated, including doctors and medical students. Production of cigarettes, however, has increased in both developed and developing nations. In 1981, 4,561 billion cigarettes were produced, indicating a growth rate of 3 to 5 percent between 1976 and 1980. It is interesting to note that China substantially increased its cigarette production beginning in the late seventies, adding 1.9 percent to the total world consumption! African and Asian countries are where most of the growth in cigarette output has occured. In most black African nations, the smoking rate is now 40 percent. Rapidly increasing populations, urbanization, and higher incomes, are all factors which lead to a rise in cigarette consumption in these countries. Smoking is in no way a novelty to these nations, but cigarettes are a product of the last twenty-five years or so.[5]

While affluence can be correlated with smoking in developing countries, economically advanced countries such as Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, and Venezuela have shown a decrease in production. Reasons for this are due to the over-all heavy taxes levied on cigarettes and successful anti-smoking advertising campaigns.[6] In most developing nations, however, there is little if any anti-smoking information available for the general public, while advertising campaigns by major tobacco companies are quite prevalent in these same countries. Every effort is made by the tobacco companies to keep abundant supplies of cigarettes flowing into the most remote regions of developing nations. Ruth Roemer, Adjunct Professor of Health at Law School of Public Health, UCLA, an expert on the smoking problem, says, in fact, that cigarettes are in many instances more prevalent than food and medical supplies in regions of Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. "Unfortunately what little money some of these people have is spent on purchasing cigarettes instead of buying necessities such as clothing."[7]

A report completed in 1985 for the World Health Organization entitled, Smoking In Developing Countries (111), by R. Masironi, coordinator for the WHO program on Smoking and Health, and by K. Rothwell, a consultant to WHO, deals extensively with smoking in countries that comprise WHO's five regions of developing nations. Masironi and Rothwell profile each of these countries, citing facts about tobacco consumption among the population in each. In their methodology, Masironi and Rothwell take non-standardized surveys of different age groups in each of the regions, using the figures to estimate smoking trends.[8]

In the African region it was found that 30 percent of the male subjects

surveyed smoked cigarettes and 21 percent of the female subjects smoked. The finding that smoking is more prevalent in urban areas tends to be true for the African region, as well as in the rest of the world. The survey conducted in Nigeria was of students: University, Polytechnic, Nursing, Education, and High School. 14.6 percent of the male high school students smoked compared to 3.1 percent of their female counterparts. 75 percent of the male education students smoked, compared to 51.6 percent of the women. The remaining schools came out with about the same percentages as these two, except 21.2 percent of the male polytechnic students smoked compared to 30 percent of the females. Masironi and Rothwell thus deduced that smoking is more prevalent among those who are better educated and make more money. It seems that smoking represents a tie to western culture which in turn attracts those in white collar oriented jobs. By smoking, one believes that he is elevating himself on the social ladder. These statistics directly contradict the trend of a reduction in cigarette consumption among those who are educated in industrialized nations. The important face is then that awareness concerning the ill effecrs of smoking does not exist for the most part in developing countries.[9]

Cigarette consumption in Nigeria was estimated to be 12.50 billion in 1982-1983. Most smokers were males between 18 and 40 years old, and one percent of the women smoked. Illegally imported cigarettes accounted for almost twenty percent of the total consumption. Ruth Roemer emphasizes that in many instances multinational tobacco companies are behind the exportation of illegal cigarettes to developing nations. "When the figures reach ten, fiften, twenty percent, it becomes evident that the tobacco companies are trying to flood the developing markets with high tar, high nicotine cigarettes that cannot be sold in North America and a good part of Europe.[10] Richard Baker, a publicity agent for Philip Morris Inc., however, refuts Roemer's statement: "In no way would this company ever involve itself with illegal exporting of cigarettes to any country. There is no need for us to take the risk because our sales are high enough to begin with."[11] About seventy-five percent of the cigarettes used by those responding to the survey were filtered. Through extensive studies and surveys WHO has found that only a small portion of Nigeria's population is aware of the dangers connected to smoking, and that education programs have not in any way met the smoking challenge, especially since there is nolegislation against smoking in the country.

In the South East Asian region, which is one of the most indigent and highly populated areas of the world, smoking is rampant. Accordingly, WHO has put a great deal of effort and money into countries in this region in order to bring about a higher standard of health for the people. While the six childhood diseases have all but been eradicated, other maladies and a large

number of cases of malnutrition still remain a severe problem in all of these nations. Smoking, however, has brought about a new series of diseases which in turn inhibits treatment and brings about complications to those suffering from other illnesses.[12] With the exception of Nepal and Thailand, smoking in South East Asian countries exists primarily among male populations. Ruth Roemer attributes the low percentage of female smokers in South East Asian countries to the fact that women lead different lifestyles than men. "Women have been performing the same tasks for centuries, so that it will take some time for smoking to become a part of their lifestyles. Nepal and Thailand have undergone a great deal of westernization over the last twenty years, in which women have tried to emulate western habits and dress."[13] Thus, one sees an increase in women smokers in countries where as recently as fifteen years ago women had no interest in cigarettes.

In India, which is the third largest tobacco producer in the world, tobacco is consumed in many different forms. 250 million kg of tobacco per year is harvested for local use, seventy-eight percent of which is smoked, two percent used for chewing tobacco, and two percent used for snuff. In a revealing survey conducted by WHO in Sundarijal, a rural community of Nepal, it was found that of the 1,421 residents twenty-one and older, seventy-nine percent of the men smoked and fifty-eight percent of the women smoked. Ninety percent of these smokers began between the ages of eleven and twenty, and the materials used for smoking were primarily were primarily inexpensive cigarettes. The young age for beginning smoking demonstrates the need for education directed towards adolescents by WHO and governmental organizations.[14]

In the Western Pacific region, smoking among males is much higher than that of females in non-westernized areas, data which are similar to the findings in the South East Asian region. Masironi and Rothwell found that in countries where cigarettes are the main source of tobacco consumption, 80 percent of the smokers smoke twenty or fewer cigarettes a day and that about two-thirds of the population smokes less than ten cigarettes a day.[15] The United States Surgeon General has stated that smoking more than two cigarettes a day on a continual basis effects one's health to the point of increasing the risk of heart disease and cancer.[16] The World Health Organization has further found that the risk of ischaemic heart disease increases greatly the longer one smokes and that upon cessation the risk declines by substantial proportions. Smoking, however, is not declining in this region nor in other developing countries. Even in Hawaii where anti-smoking information is very prevalent, and cigarette packages and advertisements contain warning labels, 56.6 percent of the Hawaiian male population surveyed smoked compared to 46.9 percent of the female population. Masironi and Rothwell attribute these statistics to the fact that tobacco smoking has occured in most

of the Western Pacific areas since the seventeenth century, and in the last fifty to seventy-five years cigarettes have replaced more traditional methods of smoking. The teenage population and women have demonstrated a preference for cigarettes and have started to buy them in increasing numbers. This cultural consideration is of considerable importance to note, indicating that traditions, both economic and cultural are enormously difficult to overcome.[17]

Masironi and Rothwell came up with seven conclusions from their surveys of smoking in developing countries for WHO. They are as follows: 1. Smoking is increasing throughout the developing countries and the increase can be accounted for entirely by an increase in cigarette smoking. 2. In many developing countries smoking rates among women are increasing. 3. An increse in cigarette smoking and an increse in smoking-related diseases are directly related to each other. 4. Many countries are promoting the tobacco industry belief that short term economic advantage will be achieved. 5. Only a few of the countries have anti-smoking campaigns. 6. Anti-smoking campaigns must be aimed at the 15 to 25 age range with a view to preventing the start of smoking because the subsequent effect of propaganda on confirmed smokers is not likely to be effective. 7. It is necessary to promote an understanding of the long term overall economic effect of smoking in the developing countries.[18]

The Economics of Smoking in Developing Countries

Many health experts have compared the smoking epidemic in developing countries to the bubonic plague and cholera, but experts from WHO feel that unlike the earlier plagues, diseases caused by smoking are known, and that there is for the most part, a world-wide interest in the epidemic. One of the major obstacles facing WHO in its anti-smoking campaign is the problem of having effective legislation passed in individual countries to place high taxes on cigarettes and to require serious education programs regarding the dangers of tobacco. **The tobacco industry, however, has never recognized scientific evidence that smoking is a major cause of death and disease, and uses its influence and money to oppose restrictive legislation.** In the complex economic balance of developing countries, many have a significant dependence on the revenues generated from tobacco crops. Tobacco is a cash crop that not only provides the rural population with jobs, but with employment in the cities (distribution), as well as tax revenues and a means of foreign exchange for the government. *The 1983 World Health Organization Expert Committee on Smoking Control Strategies in Developing Countries* finds that the major obstacles to constraints on smoking are lack of priority for preventative health measures, reluctance on the part of govern-

ments to act, and the influence of tobacco advertising.[19]

M.R. Pandey, a member of the WHO Committee on Smoking in Developing Countries, writes about the problem of controlling smoking in nations that have become so dependent on the industry. "In the Third World a new Smoking Ring is being forged which is even stronger than the one in the West. It is made up of the same political and economic links: employment, revenue, trade, advertising and promotion — but it is stronger because the governments of many developing countries are even more dependent on tobacco. Few believe they have the luxury of choice. They face huge balance of payment deficits; astronomical energy costs; chronic shortages of food; lack of hard currency for imports; enormous debts; soaring food prices; runaway inflation; rising expectations on the part of their people; and the threat of political unrest which all these problems bring. To many Third World governments tobacco offers a lifebelt. It provides jobs, revenues, exports, foreign exchange, education, training and prosperity.[20]

Members of WHO's African Region met in Zambia in 1982 to discuss the increase in smoking and the prevalence of tobacco as a crop in developing countries. The sobering fact is that tobacco is currently grown in ninety developing countries, and that the industry is primarily controlled by seven of the largest tobacco companies in the western world. WHO has recommended that western governments cesae exporting cigarettes to developing countries and that such nations ban advertising, curtail selling cigarettes to minors, and require warnings on cigarette packages.[21]

The Role of International Organizations in Counteracting Smoking

The World Health Organization works with many UN specialized agencies in its fight to combat the world smoking epidemic. In the mid-seventies, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), a United Nations Specialized Organization, initiated a study on the economic aspects of tobacco compared to the costs of poor health caused by smoking. And, in February, 1981, the FAO began studying the importance of tobacco crops to individual countries, and in countries where tobacco was not the main crop, tried to bring (to the attention of that country) WHO findings on smoking and health. The FAO agreed to find alternative cash crops for countries, and when no feasible alternatives were found, to recommend that the country grow a milder form of tobacco. However, despite these claims, WHO reported in 1985 that the FAO had not found one alternative crop for any of the nations to which it had made recommendations. In fact, in a 1982 FAO report the economic advantages of tobacco as a cash crop for farmers and governments were pointed out. FAO concluded that tobacco not only provides substantial revenues to farmers, and governments, but also provides

desperately needed jobs especially in developing nations.[22] This point, (economic benefit to a country), is something the tobacco industry has been contending for years. WHO in a report entitled, *The Health Effects and Economic Implications of Tobacco Consumption in Selected Developing Countries*, from The Fourth Advisory Committee Meeting held in Geneva in June, 1986, counters this argument with proof that health related illnesses due to smoking not only put the individuals affected out of work, but costs the state large sums of money in medical costs.[23]

A hopeful trade-off appears to be between health costs and economic growth. The hopes for economic growth, however, could decline as mechanization spreads to developing nations, thus reducing demands for labor. While tobacco is an extremely profitable crop, it also ties up acreage for food crops. Developing countries can export some of their tobacco crops, but there is a decline in world wide smoking. Also it is hard for most developing tobacco producers to compete with American and Chinese markets. The report concludes that, the farmer undoubtedly earns more by producing tobacco than in other activities because he chooses to grow tobacco, but the value of the activity to the society is not the total net value of production of tobacco but the amount that the society would lose if the farmer chose the next most profitable farming activity, such as rice or maize production, repairing his fences or tending his cattle, or whatever activity would earn him the next best return for his time and other resources.[24] The report goes on to say that in many instances the returns from the next-best alternative will be very close to the net returns from tobacco.

The World Bank, a UN specialized organization, supports tobacco growing in developing countries because the profits from the crops can be used to help repay multi-million dollar loans which the bank has given out. A study conducted by WHO shows, in fact, that between 1974 and 1982 the World Bank and its subsidiary, the International Development Agency, gave out more than $600 million for rural development, including the production of tobacco. In 1978, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), which represents developing nations in the international marketplace, published a report condemning the tobacco industry for exploiting developing nations. In this report, Dr. Frederick Clairmone cited lack of responsibility on behalf of the transnational tobacco conglomerates. It is interesting to note that GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), of which most of the developed nations are member states, has not taken a stance on smoking. It is evident from the GATT report that the four-fifths of the world's trade; probably does not want to become embroiled in a battle with the tobacco industry whose companies are in the countries which belong to the GATT.[25]

The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), however, has taken an

active role in working with WHO in its fight to diminish world smoking. UNICEF is particularly active in the efort to educate women who smoke while pregnant or taking birth control pills. A majority of women in developing countries are not aware of the complications that can develop while smoking under these circumstances. A 1983 WHO study found that a startling number of children were being born prematurely, with low birth weight, and in some cases with birth defects. The number of these types of births have increased along with the numbers of women smokers in those countries where the study was conducted. While female smoking does not usually exceed thirty percent in most developing countries, the lack of education among those who do smoke accounts for the high percentage of complicated pregnancies.[26] The tobacco industry argues that these complications are caused by other illnesses rather than from cigarette smoking. In many cases this is true, but Ruth Roemer points out that the money many of these women spend on cigarettes could in turn be spent on necessities such as food, vitamins, and medications, without which a woman can become ill and harm the fetus.

The astonishing fact is that while UNICEF works to end smoking, the European Economic Community spent $527 million in 1982 on subsidies for tobacco production and trade out of a total 1984 budget of almost $700 million.[26] The United States Government also spends millions on tobacco subsidies. Much of this money goes to tobacco farmers who, without it, would be forced to go out of business causing thousands of people to lose their jobs. Thus, the complicated problem of finding substitute crops is clearly the central issue for decades to come, and is not just connected with the Food and Agriculture Organization. Little has been done in this area despite the large number of international organizations and their financial resources. Dr. Kjell Bjartveit of Norway explains why there has been little action on the part of international organizations to solve the problem of finding substitute crops, alternative sources of employment, new tax revenues, and foreign exchange in light of what he calls a smoking epidemic in developing countries: "Thus far the smoking epidemic has been the concern of health experts, health organizations, and sometimes health ministries. It must become a concern of politicians and thus of ministries of agriculture, industry, finance, education, and national broadcasting. For this goal to be achieved, all the specialized agencies of the United Nations concerned directly or indirectly with tobacco production and transactions involving tobacco must give priority to developing and carrying out a comprehensive, global plan for substituting other crops and industries for tobacco and cigarette manufacturing."[28] At the same time, other initiatives should be pursued. Research on the use of tobacco as a source of protein for livestock feed should be accelerated. The feasibility of international legal measures to control tobac-

co marketing should be explored, including development of an International Code on Marketing of Tobacco that would restrict advertising and regulate reduction of the harmful contents of cigarettes.

Legislative Action Prompted by WHO and Individual Governments

WHO has been working to control smoking for the last seventeen years. The World Health Assembly in 1980 established what is now WHO's Programme on Smoking and Health, and the World Health Assembly in 1986 passed a resolution requiring the Director-General *inter alia*, to oversee the coordination of WHO's programs on smoking with other international organizations, private organizations, and with programs set up by governments of its member states. The role of legislation in individual nations, and promoted by WHO is the strongest possible control which can be exerted to end smoking. *Legislative Action to Combat the World Smoking Epidemic* written by Ruth Roemer and published by WHO in 1982 cites the principal purposes of legislation: 1. To set forth governmental policy on production, promotion, and use of tobacco. Legislation serves the established role of government to protect public health and welfare. 2. To encourage smokers to stop smoking and to dissuade non-smokers from starting, particularly adolescents. Legislation can help high-priority groups to quit — women (among whom lung cancer has surpassed breast cancer as the leading cause of death in 15 states in the U.S.), pregnant women, persons with medical problems that are worsened by smoking, and workers exposed to industrial toxins. Preventing smoking by youths is important because the earlier one begins to smoke the greater the health risks. 3. To protect the rights of nonsmokers to be free from public smoking and the right to breathe clean air. Evidence of health dangers from passive smoking is increasing. 4. To reduce the amounts of harmful substances in cigarettes. While no cigarette is safe, legislation to regulate the maximum tar and nicotine contents of cigarettes is important in developed and developing countries — where tobacco companies are marketing cigarettes with higher levels of tar and nicotine than are allowed in many developed nations. 5. To contribute to the development of a social climate in which smoking is unacceptable. WHO Expert Committees on smoking have found that the main strategy for ending smoking in developing countries is on the grounds of social acceptability. 6. To provide the basis for allocating resources to support effective progrsm to fight smoking. As has been previously cited, legislation is necessary in establishing a national council on smoking and health, in authorizing funding for health education, in supporting smoking cessation programs, in implementing restrictive measures, and in evaluating anti-smoking campaigns and strategies.[29]

In 1986, the Thirty-ninth World Health Assembly drafted the strongest resolution against smoking in the history of WHO's fight in stopping the world wide epidemic. The resolution called for global awareness and immediate action against smoking. The World Health Assembly makes its findings based on world wide research done on the effects of smoking. A 1985 report from the Center for Disease Control in Atlanta is an example of evidence the Assembly used in making this finding. The report concludes that cigarette smoking is responsible for almost ninety percent of all lung cancer cases, seventy-five percent of chronic bronchitis and emphysema, and twenty-five percent of cases of ischaemic heart disease in men under 65. Other types of cancers, birth defects, pregnancy complications, and risks to children from inhaling passive smoke are also included in the Center's report on the risks of smoking.[30] Since the major function of WHO is overseeing its vast network of programs network of programs that provide health care and health education to those in need, the attainment of health for all by the year 2000 cannot be met without effective controls on smoking. Yet, legislation against smoking in every country of the world is necessary for this goal to be met.

It is interesting to note that strong legislation does work. A comparison between Norway, which has some of the most extensive legislation in respect to smoking, to England, which has mostly voluntary agreements with its tobacco industry, shows some important facts. Per capita tobacco consumption in Norway corresponds with the per capita tobacco consumption in England about thirty years ago, yet lung cancer rates among 60-69 years old are three times that of Norway's.[31] WHO's 1983 Expert Committee on Smoking Control Strategies in Developing Countries commented on the need for comprehensive legislative action after seeing figures such as these from England and Norway. According to Ruth Roemer, "It may be tempting to try introducing smoking control programmes without a legislative component, in the hope that relatively inoffensive activity of this nature will placate those concerned with public health, while generating no real opposition from cigarette manufacturers. This approach, however, is not likely to succeed. A genuine broadly broadly defined education program, aimed at reducing smoking must be complemented by legislation and restrictive measures." While Roemer feels legislation is absolutely necessary for an effective anti-smoking campaign, it should not be a prerequisite for programs to fight smoking. "Too often in developing countries, people wanting to initiate programs to combat smoking feel defeated before they begin because there is no legislation, and in many instances an uncooperative government. It is vital that these initiatives get started, because any legislative action must be realistic in its choice of areas and it should only be introduced if it can be implemented.[32]

The WHO Expert Committee in *Smoking Control Strategies in Developing Countries* points out, that governments usually act with great speed in enacting legislation controlling harmful pharmaceutical food additives, or even ones that are merely suspected of being dangerous. The contrast is significant between this kind of action and the reluctance many governments show towards putting constraints on tobacco which is a proven cause of avoidable death and sickness, unsurpassed by any other product that is presently available for human consumption. Ruth Roemer thus proposes two practical forms of legislation to curb smoking. One would control the production, manufacturing, promotion, and sale of tobacco, "the supply side" of the industry. The other area is the demand (consumption) side of tobacco which deals with smoking in public areas.[33] There are many different kinds of legislation within these two areas, and the 1983 WHO Expert Committee on Smoking Control Strategies in Developing Countries feels that priority should be given to a wide variety of legislation because circumstances are different in every country, depending on local circumstances, legislative workings, and politics.[34]

Role of Transnational Tobacco Companies

Transnational tobacco companies are constantly seeking new markets in developing nations due to the decline or stabilization of markets in developed countries. The U.S. market growth for tobacco has been one percent annually over the last five years, and anti-smoking campaigns are growing in the United States and Europe, while developing countries offer new markets with large populations, and governments reluctant to support anti-smoking legislation. Medical experts say it is too early for death rates to start rising in developing nations on account of smoking, as is the cse in many developed ones. There are, however, more cases of lung cancer and heart disease in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Ethiopia than there were ten years ago.

Tobacco companies view the markets in developing nations as having potential for substantial growth. Introducting new forms of tobacco which may have better marketability or deluging developing markets with tobacco that is unpopular or has gone out of style in evolved markets, are ways in which multi-national tobacco companies manipulate the sale of cigarettes. In 1981 WHO, in cooperation with experts including the Addiction Research Foundation of Toronto, did a comparison of the constituent yields of cigarettes in developing countries. The project was initiated after surveys by WHO and other organizations showed that while people in North American and Europe buy cigarettes with less tar and nicotine, the trend does not exist in developing nations.

Over the last ten years Philip Morris' overseas cigarette sales have in 160

countries have increased 18 percent annually. Statistics from the UN Food and Agriculture Organization show that cigarette consumption in developing nations is increasing at a rate of 5 percent annually. At the Fifth Conference on Smoking and Health in Winnipeg, Canada in July 1983 WHO stated that tobacco advertisements which portray smoking as an adult, macho, feminine, healthy, or sexy activity create the wrong image of smoking in the minds of the people who see them, especially adolescents. WHO also protested that tobacco companies should not be permitted to sponsor athletic events and feature athletes in advertisements. WHO finds western governments as reponsible for the smoking epidemic as the tobacco companies. Besides domestic subsidies and price stabilization loans provided by the U.S. government for tobacco growers, tobacco valued at hundreds of millions of dollars is shipped to developing countries with government sanction under the Food For Peace Program. European countries also subsidize tobacco farmers, and China, the world's largest tobacco producer, displays its cigarette brands at global trade fairs.[42]

Advertising and the Tobacco Industry

In 1985 the tobacco industry spent over $2,000 billion on world wide advertising. This amount excludes money spent by the industry to sponsor athletic events, concerts, and other functions. This includes flashy billboards in rural areas that, as previously state, promote smoking as an activity for the "V.I.P." Tobacco companies spend over a billion dollars each year on advertising in the United States. Newspapers, magazines, and billboards are the media used since radio and television ads were banned by Congress in 1971. Dr. Kenneth Warner of the American Public Health Association points out some interesting facts in a 1986 publication entitled *Selling Smoke: Cigarette Advertising and Public Health*. He surveyed some of the most popular magazines in the U.S. over a 10-15 year period and compared the number of articles on the effects of smoking to the amount of revenues received from cigarette advertisements. *Reader's Digest*, which does not accept tobacco ads, published 34.4 percent of its articles on smoking between 1965-1981. *Newsweek*, however, which receives 15.8 percent of its advertising revenues from tobacco companies, published only 2.9 percent of its articles between 1969-1981 on smoking. Warner claims that publications making substantial profits from cigarette ads not only publish fewer articles than ones that don't, but those articles which do get published tend to omit the serious health risks caused by tobacco, including chewing tobacco.[37] *The Boston Globe* ran a front page article on August 26, 1987 discussing the extent U.S. tobacco companies go to in order to make smoking seem attractive to American women. Large donations are given annually to various

women's organizations by tobacco corporations and functions, sponsored by the companies, are frequently given, at which samples of cigarettes especially those geared towards women are handed out.[38]

Restricting advertising is another common type of legislative action used against smoking. By mid-1986, thirty-five countries had enacted some sort of restrictions on tobacco advertising, while in 1982, only fifteen countries had such legislation. Yet, Mozambique was the only developing country to enact such a ban. Some countries such as Chile and Argentina are experimenting with moderate bans on tobacco advertising, to some degree of success. In most developing nations, however, the World Health Organization has found that governments are unwilling to restrict advertising.[39] It is of considerable importance to note that WHO's 1983 *Expert Committee on Controlling Smoking in Developing Countries* finds that while tobacco production is rising between five and six percent annually, food production is decreasing 2 to 3 percent each year in most developing nations.[40] Figures such as these demonstrate the need for immediate action in curbing the sale of tobacco, but the hard fact is that advertising sells products, including cigarettes. While WHO and many other experts strongly believe that a great disservice is being done in the promotion of a product that kills, the tobacco industry argues that adults have the right to make their own decision on whether to smoke. In the United States there is a major fight brewing in Congress on whether to ban all tobacco advertising, including that of smokeless tobacco. However, the anti-smoking campaign recently suffered a major setback in the United States. On August 25, 1987, a Federal Circuit Court Judge in Boston ruled that the family of a person who contracted a fatal illness from cigarettes could not bring suit against a tobacco company for promoting a deadly product because in his opinion warning labels on the cigarette cartons clearly state the harm which can occur.[41]

The 1983 *WHO Expert Committee on Smoking Control Strategies in Developing Countries* has recommended that price increases for cigarettes keep pace with inflation. Thomson and Forbes of the WHO Collaborating Center for Reference on the Assessment of Smoking Habits, in Waterloo, Ontario, have done extensive research into the effects of taxation and high prices as ways of curbing smoking, especially among adolescents. Thomson and Forbes use the Federal excise tax levied on cigarettes in the U.S. as an example of hos higher prices keep people from smoking. In 1983 the Federal excise tax was increased by sixteen cents and smoking decreased by four percent that year despite intensive advertising by the tobacco industry. The authors point out, however, that if the increase had only been eight cents (as had been originally proposed in Congress), almost two million more adults and one million more adolescents would have begun smoking. From 1971 to 1975 New York City imposed tar and nicotine tax in cigarettes that contain-

ed more than 17 mg tar and 1.1 mg nicotine. Sales of these types of cigarettes dropped by 12 to 13 percent during those four years and smokers shifted to brands containing less amounts of tar and nicotine. Cigarettes being brought in from other states was one of the reasons for the law being repealed.[42]

The Fifth World Conference on Smoking and Health differed from the other four because the tobacco industry itself was singled out as being one of the main obstacles in WHO's effort to curb smoking, especially in developing nations. The two previous conferences, Tokyo (1981), and New York (1975) had dealt with smoking as a health problem and with ways of curing the diseases caused by it. The main topics at Winnipeg were smoking in developing nations and in women and children. Besides WHO personnel, over one thousand persons attended the conference, including special interest groups such as heart and cancer charities, and other health organizations. The major theme of the conference was the vital role national governments have to play in order for smoking-related diseases and deaths to decline. Legislation, taxation, and education were cited as the major areas in which governments have to take a more active role. As previously mentioned, WHO cooperates extensively with other international and private organizations, and while it is only at the begining of enacting rules for carrying out its actions, WHO still has an excellent record for being able to get a majority of its programs implemented.

Politics of Financing WHO's Anti-Smoking Campaigns and of WHO Members

WHO's global program to reduce smoking operates at many different levels, and collaboration betwen WHO personnel in the field and at the Geneva headquarters is an important part of WHO's direct link to its programs. Lorena Ciaffei, Assistant to the Director of WHO's Smoking and Health Program in Geneva, stated in a June 1987 interview that reports come in to her office every day from all over the world on the progress of WHO's anti-smoking efforts. Ciaffei says that in her opinion WHO has a very good chance of being able to substantially reduce the number of people who smoke in developing countries, which are her primary area of concentration at this time. "It is vital that every effort be made to rais epublic awareness and help to create new health behaviour patterns in countries that are now being targeted by tobacco companies."[44] Ciaffei stressed that health promotion is the most important aspect of WHO's anti-smoking campaign. Financing for these programs comes from money raised outside of WHO's $250 million annual budget. Public and private organizations concerned about the effects of smoking are the primary donors, as well as member states.

WHO devotes its efforts where the most need lies, and that is in the developing countries.[45]

Member states are vital to WHO's existence. Unfortunately, politicization exists in financial support for WHO, a relatively non-political organization. Financing for WHO Conferences on Smoking and Health, WHO publications such as "Tobacco Alert," the monthly magazine *World Health*, which frequently has articles about smoking, are subsidized by WHO's anti-smoking budget. WHO is dependent on wealthy member states such as the U.S. for money. The United States' share of WHO's 1986 budget is 25 percent although the U.S. is currently withholding five percent of its budgetary assessment because it does not feel it should be paying for prorgrams in communist and hostile nations. Member states give money to WHO through both multi and bilateral means. Ronald Anderson of WHO's Budgetary Department is responsible for getting member states to contribute their allotted share of the budget and to help subsidize other WHO programs such as AIDS research and smoking. Money given to WHO through multilateral means (40 percent of its budget) enables the organization, through its own infrastructure to set up various health programs where it feels the need exists. Money given through bilateral means (sixty percent) allows the donating member state to choose where its money should go. Anderson gives as an example of bilateralism the U.S. desire to launch a multimillion dollar program in Africa to fight childhood communicable diseases. Congress, which appropriates the money, while looking at the countries to be selected, will consider whether they are friendly towards American policy and also what countries have resources that are beneficial to American security and well being. Anderson, whom I interviewed at WHO's Geneva headquarters, says that the advantage of a bilateral donation is that such aid will get sent much faster than through multilateral means where only the Health Ministers of the receiving nations are involved.[46]

The Politics of WHO Members

The annual World Health Organization Assembly is where much of WHO's policy is debated among the delegates from its 166 members states. The U.S. delegation is composed of people directly from the Reagan Administration in Washington and from its Mission to the U.N. in Geneva. While the representatives from the Mission also reflect the views of the Administration, Ronald Anderson feels that they are less inclined to politicize their decisions as much as those from Washington are. While WHO is considered a non-political organization, debate over implementing constraints on the tobacco industry in developed and developing countries, raising money for anti-smoking campaigns, and the need for education programs has

become politicized due to the fact that many of WHO's member states are closely involved with their respective tobacco industries. It is interesting to note that in 1986, subsidies to American tobacco growers from the government were triple the amount the government spent on anti-smoking programs. The tobacco industry has a tremendous lobby in the American Tobacco Institute, located in Washington, D.C. The Tobacco Institute is a non-profit, noncommercial organization which represents the twelve companies which manufacture cigarettes and other tobacco products in the United States. The biggest role, of course, is lobby for the tobacco companies in Congress. Millions of dollars are paid each year by the tobacco companies to the Tobacco Institute for its work in lobbying Congress not to pass high cigarette taxes and not to institute bans on advertising.[47] It is self evident that if the money used to promote smoking were used for education against smoking, the world wide epidemic would probably not exist. However, large tobacco growing states (the Carolinas and Maryland), like developing countries, depend on revenues from tobacco crops, and the tens of thousands of jobs the companies provide for their residents.

The U.S. Delegation to the World Health Assembly reflects the government's policy on smoking. For while the U.S. Surgeon General is outspokenly against smoking, and many states and cities have passed legislation banning smoking in public areas, many members of Congress and people within the Administration do not want to see numerous anti-smoking laws. Anderson says that wealthy nations such as the U.S. and Sweden are reluctant to give large donations to WHO's anti-smoking efforts because there is a great deal of political risk involved. A Congressman such as Jesse Helms, Republican from North Carolina, and very pro-tobacco, wields a great deal of influence with the President whome he is close to, and also others in the Senate.

PART III: CONCLUSION

Article One of the UN Charter states that the ultimate goal of all international organizations is world peace. Is the attainment of health for all by the year 2000 a possibility? And more specifically, can WHO directly influence the world-wide smoking epidemic? The main characteristic of WHO which I have observed is its ability to cooperate with governments and other organizations fo rone purpose: world health. It has been demonstrated that national chauvinism can be overcome when different countries work together for a common goal.[48] And while major opposition to WHO's anti-smoking campaign in developing countries exists, it must be stressed that a great deal of important work has been accomplished. A positive aspect is that smoking is decreasing in developed countries after years of education and

legislative actions which restrict the sale of cigarettes and make them undesirable through higher taxes. Thus, we can hope that similar changes will take place in our time in developing countries. It must be understood that developing nations, especially African ones, are reluctant to allow aid or assistance, as a way of asserting their independence. WHO, however, through its infrastructure, is able to function as an extremely effective international organization, and while nationalism threatens WHO's ability to operate to its full capacity, there is solid proof that the organization has been extremely successful in accomplishing its goals.

When the First World Conference on Smoking and Health met in New York in 1967, nothing had yet been done to prevent smoking in developing countries. Health warnings on cigarette packages in the U.S. did not occur until 1965, after the 1964 report by the U.S. Surgeon General which linked smoking to lung cancer. Today, many people in developing nations are still unaware of the deadly nature of tobacco twenty-three years after most Americans have become aware of this fact. WHO has made tremendous strides in educating the developing world on smoking, and while smoking continues to rise in many of its member states each year, there are numerous positive statistic demonstrating WHO's effectiveness. Smoking among women and adolescents has not reached the epidemic proportions that it has in many developed nations, including the U.S., indicating that WHO and other organizations have made slow but steady progress in reaching these groups in particular. Obviously the most effective means to stop the smoking epidemic is getting people not to start. WHO has been successful in obtaining government cooperation through evidence that the health costs for tobacco related illnesses outweigh profits from taxes. Dr. C. Everett Koop, U.S. Surgeon General, came out with a report in March 1986 containing studies that while tobacco (in the U.S.) raised over $22 billion in taxes, national health costs were $39 billion.[49] WHO's anti-smoking campaign will take several more years of devoted effort to see a substantial decline of smoking in the developing nations. Ruth Roemer feels that as long as other organizations participate and member states keep funding programs, the chances are very good for stopping the epidemic.

If WHO had never been chartered as a specialized UN organization, some of its programs might have been implemented by other organizations, yet it is doubtful that any would have been able to disseminate its programs as effectively through what is today 166 member states. WHO is one of the least politicized agencies of the UN, giving if the flexibility to work impartially with all its member states in working to achieve its goals of health for all by the year 2000.

ENDNOTES

[1]WHO/SMOL 84.4, p.9.
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[3]*Smoking in Developing Countries*, World Health Organization, (Geneva, Switzerland, 1981) p.18.
[4]*Strategies for a Smoke Free World*, The Alberta Alcohol and Drug Abuse Commission, (Calgary, Canada: The Alberta Alcohol and Drug Abuse Commission, 1985), p.3.
[5]World Health Organization, *Smoking in Developing Countries*, p.23-31.
[6]Ibid, p.30.
[7]Interview with Ruth Roemer, 7-8-87.
[8]R. Masironi and K. Rothwell. "Smoking in Developing Countries,"(Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Organization, 1985). p.6.
[9]Ibid, p.6.
[10]Interview with Ruth Roemer, 7-8-87.
[11]Telephone interview with Richard Baker, Publicity department Philip Morris Inc., New York, N.Y., 14 July 1987.
[12]Masironi, Rothwell, pp. 29-35.
[13]Interview with Ruth Roemer, 7-8-87.
[14]Masironi, Rothwell, pp.37-52.
[15]Ibid
[16]*Smoking and Health. A National Status Report*,(Rockville, MD: U.S. Department of Haelth and Human Services, 1986) p.8.
[17]Masironi, Rothwell, pp.37-52.
[18]Ibid, pp.49-51.
[19]Ibid, p. 91
[20]*Smoking Control Strategies in Developing Countries*, World Health Organization (Geneva, Switzerland), p. 91.
[21]Ibid, p. 20.
[22]Ibid, pp. 81-83.
[23]*NCI/WHO Study on the Health Effects and Economic Implications of Tobacco Consumption in Selected Developing Countries*, (Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Organization, 1986), p. 7.
[24]Ibid, p. 10.
[25]Marketing and Distribution of Tobacco. Geneva, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (unpublished document, no. T1B1C1/205 p. 30.
[26]*Smoking Control Strategies*, p. 65
[27]Ibid, p. 65.

[28]*Strategies for a Smoke Free World*, p. 22
[29]Ruth Roemer, *Legislative Action To Combat the World Smoking Epidemic.* (Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Organization, 1982) pp. 14-20.
[30]*Smoking and Health. A National Status Report* (Rockville, MD.: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1986) pp. 7, 8.
[31]Recent Developments in Legislation to Combat the World Smoking Epidemic, by Ruth Roemer, p. 26.
[32]Interview with Ruth Roemer, 7-8-87.
[33]Ruth Roemer, *Legislative Action To Combat the World Smoking Epidemic.* (Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Organization, 1982) pp. 79-81.
[34]*Smoking Control Strategies*, p. 46.
[35]World Health Organization, *Smoking in Developing Countries*, p. 75.
[36]Ibid, p. 76.
[37]Warner, Selling Smoke, p. 48.
[38]The Boston Globe, August 27th, 1987, p. 1.
[39]Legislative Action by Ruth Roemer, pp. 28-35.
[40]*Smoking Control Strategies*, p. 66.
[41]Boston Globe, August 27th, p. 1.
[42]*Strategies for a Smoke Free World* see bibliography, article by Thomson & Forbes, p. 33.
[43]*Smoking Control Strategies*, pp. 48-49.
[44]Interview with Lorena Ciaffei, Assistant to the Director of WHO's Smoking and Health Program, in Geneva, June 24, 1987 — WHO, Geneva.
[45]Ibid.
[46]Interview with Ronald Anderson, WHO Financing Dept., WHO Headquarters, Geneva, Switzerland, 6/24/87.
[47]"The Tobacco Observer" (Newspaper) July, 1987 as an example of advertising by the tobacco industry.
[48]Lecture by Professor John Gibson "International Organizations in Geneva" delivered at Tufts European Center, France — 6/25/87.
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1. Telephone interview with Ruth Roemer, Adjunct Professor of Health, Law School of Public Health, UCLA, LA, California, July 8, 1987.

2. Telephone interview with Richard Baker, Publishing Dept., Philip Morris Inc., New York, NY. 14 July, 1987.

3. Personal interview with Lorena Ciaffei, WHO Headquarters Assistant Director, Smoking and Health Dept. of WHO. WHO Headquarters of Geneva, Switzerland 6/24/87.

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US Policy Making: The Invasion of Cambodia, 1970

Christopher K. Hummel

Six years after the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and under the leadership of a new president, the US commitment to the war in Southeast Asia began to falter under intense scrutiny. Nevertheless, just as the US declared its program of 'Vietnamization' and its intent to remove American troops from the area, US forces in South Vietnam executed an attack on two points across the Cambodian border. To the outside observer, an attack on a declared neutral country does not seem to constitute a withdrawal of forces, instead, it appears as a blatant widening of the war. Why did we attack Cambodia As with all history, the questions one asks determine the type of answer one gets.

Graham Allison wrote a book 16 years ago entitled *ESSENCE OF DECISION: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. In that book, Professor Allison came up with three models (and some variants thereof) to explain foreign policy decision-making. Let me emphasize that the purpose of this lecture is not to determine whether or not the US attack on Cambodia was justified or even if it worked; we are only trying to figure out *why* the US attacked Cambodia by using case-theory analysis with Professor Allison's three models. In the process, we will attempt to discuss what merits those models have toward the general interpretation and analysis of foreign policy decision-making.

Professor Allison has titled his first model a Rational Actor or Classical Model. To avoid confusion or technical argument of terms he refers to it simply as Model I. Model I attempts to understand governmental decision-making by thinking of the state as one entity with one set of objectives, goals and options, almost giving it human qualities. The underlying assumption is that governmental actions are the products of choice. The state has objectives that it wants to realize; when events in the international environment confront the state, it acts in accordance with its objectives. The specific

response is determined by first creating a set of alternatives within the given state's power (whether restricted by internal and external forces, precedents, or lack of resources), and then, as a rational actor, value-maximizing. By rational value-maximizing I mean that the state determines the consequences of each alternative or action, and then chooses the alternative that it judges will best meet its objectives while still inflicting the least amount of consequences: the optimal choice. In Allison's own words, "[a]n increase in the costs of an alternative reduces the likelihood of that action's being chosen," while "[a] decrease in the costs of an alternative increases the likelhiood of that action's being chosen."[1] Though this may all seem quite obvious, Professor Allison gives the model structure and defines important terms. This particular model is also arguably the most frequently used by international relations theorists or planners. Furthermore, Allison has listed a few variants for Model I to increase its applicability. One focuses on "an individual leader or leadership clique as the actor whose preference function is maximized and whose personal (or group) characteristics are allowed to modify the basic concepts of the"[2] model. A second "more complex variant of the basic model recognizes the existence of several actors within a government...but still attempts to explain (or predict) an occurrence by reconstructing the calculations of the victorious actor."[3] Hopefully, Model I and its variants will shed some light on the case at hand.[4]

The actor in this case according to Model I would be the United States government. The US perceived the problem that their vital Vietnamization program was in danger from North Vietnamese attacks which were being conducted from across the Cambodian border. The US had to do something; the international system impetus had caught the Americans and now forced them to act. For the outside obserrver to rationalize the action taken by the US, we must first reconstruct what goals and objectives the US had and what options it perceived as open to itself. The primary goal was the protection of the Vietnamization program, yet that led to other goals as well. While withdrawing US troops and replacing them with South Vietnamese were top priorities, inherent in that was the removal of US troops without appearing to have lost and the reduction of casualties. American honor could not remain intact if it backed out of a long struggle with a Third World country while receiving heavy losses. The United States' provided objective was to leave the conflict in Southeast Asia honorably (note the human quality of pride attributed to the state). So how could the US leave Vietnam under the pretense that its presence was only to contain communism while Vietnam's next door neighbor — an anti-communist government now that Lon Dol had replaced Sihanouk after the coup of March 1970 — fell to communist insurgents? To defend its objectives in Southeast Asia, the US had to answer the anti-communist Cambodian government's plea for help.

Now, given the objectives of the US, what options did it see itself as hav-

ing, and what consequences would follow from each of these options? The first option was to do nothing, but this option would compromise the US's main objective. The Vietnamization program would be helpless agains NV and VC raids from its left flank, and the South Vietnamese would soon crumble. The second option was to encourage larger raids across the Cambodian border with ARVN troops and US air support. This plan hoped to protect the US retreat by destroying key NV and VC military stashes. Unfortunately, an ARVN raid with US air support might not be enough to knock out militarily the NV bases in Cambodia and would officially break Cambodian neutrality, too. Finally, the US government considered the option of a full-scale attack across the Cambodian border using US troops to supplement those ARVN troops planned for use in the second option. This would almost assure the US of military victory because the US troops were much more dependable than the ARVN. Nevertheless, perhaps the strongest argument against this option — according to Model I — would stem from its lack of consistency with regard to US objectives of Vietnamization. Professor Allison makes the point that "[w]hat rationality adds to the concept of purpose is: consistency among goals and objectives relative to a particular action; consistency in the application of principles in order to select the optimal alternative."[5] Thus, a full-scale attack would not be a rational option, and therefore should hardly be considered as a possibility.

Using Model I, we can now understand why the US chose a solution in between the second and third options. They decided to attack the Fishook and Parrot's Beak points across the Cambodian border. At Fishook, both US and ARVN troops were used while at Parrot's Beak only ARVN troops with US air support were used. Nixon (if we refer to the first variant of Model I) needed to use enough force so that he was relatively sure of a US military success limiting the actual manpower used. The ARVN needed time to improve if they were to defend themselves agains NV and VC forces, temporarily stepping up US military forces was a necessary evil. If only to illustrate the de facto utilization of this model, one need simply look at how this decision was made by both Kissinger and Nixon: they created separate lists of the positive and negative aspects of each alternative. When they compared lists both were the same. As dominant factors it was their decision that went into effect, thereby representing the US government.

Model II is the Organizational Process Model. Though still a model of governmental decision-making, it primarily deals with the implementation of those decisions. Unlike Model I, Model II does not perceive of the government as a black box that produces all decisions as one entity. Instead, it assumes that the key actors in the decision-making process are the organizations within the government; the 'gears inside the box.' To reconstruct the decision behind a governmental action one must first start by defining what

organizations were involved and what influence they had relative to the decision in question. For the next three steps involved in analysis, a few terms must be clarified: Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), programs and repertoires. SOPs are "routines for dealing with standard situations;" programs are complex clusters of SOPs that form coordinated operations; and repertoires are the programs tailord towards standard specific scenarios that are available to an organization.[6] The entire Model relies on these structures in its questioning. First, how do these repertoires, programs and SOPs affect the implementation of these alternatives by the organization? An obvious critic of Model II at this point would ask what role does the established leadership in a government play? Anticipating this criticism, Allison parallels governments to huge conglomerations directed and controlied within established guidelines and controls by our leaders. Leaders can affect the specific SOPs, programs and repertoires over time, but they need to overcome the institutional output by one of three ways: first, they can opt to implement one program over another; second, they can put into action an established program in a new context; and thirdly, they can choose to enact several organization programs at once.[7] Nevertheless, once a leader decides what programs he wants to implement, he has little in the actual implemenation. The final action of a government depends on how the programs in each organization involved interact by supplementing or negating one another. Now, we shall use Model II to take our second crack at explaining why the US chose to invade Cambodia in 1970.[8]

The main organizations involved in this decision were the Air Force, the Navy, the State Department, the Department of Defense, the CIA, and obviously the President's office. Most of these organizations had relatively equal power with the exception of the CIA which possessed the least amount of influence, and the President's office, which had the most. As for access to information, the USAF and the USN have their own separate intelligence programs that would also feed into the DOD; meanwhile, the CIA would give some of its intelligence information to the State Department. The President's office would receive briefings from all three intelligence sources. The USAF had an established program of bombing NV and VC targets in Cambodia, so the US invasion of Parrot's Beak and Fishook already had institutional momentum behind them. The USMC (as part of the USN) had also already established its own set of programs and SOPs that would added to the institutional momentum behind the US attack. Take, for example, the SOP of Search and Destroy missions; they had already penetrated areas that would normally be considered off-limits for military maneuvers, such as civilian hamlets in the allegedly friendly South Vietnamese lands. Also, as it was the military's job to do, the both forces had planned repertoires for attacks on various terrains, and these programs were easily applicable to

an invasion of Cambodia. The DOD's purpose was the correlation of the various military branches, and nearly all of its SOPs, programs and repertoires were geared towards this end. Yet even its attempt at correlation resulted in an oversimplification of data, so that the intelligence presented to the President could have been different from the intelligence collected in the field. Some Model II analysts could claim that the CIA had an established program of helpin Lon Dol's new regime in Cambodia because they aided in putting him in power. Regardless, the CIA would have a repertoire for handling coups and aiding military overthrows (such as the Bay of Pigs). On the other hand, the State Department had a program in operation in Paris where they were trying to gain ground for the cessation of hostilities through diplomatic ends. With the new anti-communist government in Cambodia, the State Department would have already initiated programs attempting to strengthen and aid them. The President, therefore, seems to have had his decision made for him in advance. The institutional momentum created by the various organizations and their programs may have forced governmental leaders to 'ride the wave.' Besides, the attack on Cambodia was really an extension of Nixon's own program: Vietnamization.

Model III is the Governmental (Bureaucratic) Model, and perhaps the one Professor Allison favors the most. It starts with the assumption that governmental actions are equivalent to political resultants. Much like Model II numerous actors are involved, except this time each of their individual motives affect the final outcome through the "compromise, conflict, and confusion of government officials with diverse interests and unequal influence."[9] Allison makes the analogy in this case to a game with numerous players. The first step — as in Model II — is to determine who the players in the game were and what positions they held. Next, it should be to determine where he stands on the given case by questioning what priorities does his position have, what goals and interests does the organization he represents have, what stakes are involved and what deadlines does he have to meet. Following that, each player's impact on the results must be defined. Finally, one must reconstruct how the various players' positions, goals and powers combined to yield a specific action or decision. This last question should be answered keeping in mind the environment in which the game was played: the rules, structures, laws, and pace of the game. One other important factor to consider in the evaluation of a case using Model III is the access of players to specific action-channels: what players are hooked into political channels that allow them to affect political resultants. The President of the United States may influence indirectly decisions in the Soviet Union, but he does not necessarily have direct access to specific action channels. Also, like Model I, Model III has a variant. This variant is similar to the second variant of Model I for it assumes that there are numerous actors; yet that

one actor or a group of actors is victorious. However, the difference comes from Model I's emphasis on the reconstruction of the victorious actor's personal decision process, and Model III's concentration on the intranational infighting that occured to make one actor victorious.[10]

For purposes of this application of Model III we will assume that the same organizations involved in Model II will be discussed here. Any ad hoc players (to use Allison's terminology) will not be mentioned because the secrecy shrouding this decision by Nixon precluded actors such as the media, domestic interest groups and even the majority of Congress. Obviously, this immediately gives a clue as to the President's position and his impact on results. Nixon was the top official and had the power to dictate much of how the game was played; by excluding several key ad hoc players and potentially removing strong opposition to his personal stand, Nixon increased the impatct of his own objectives. Meanwhile, the military's stand (including the DOD) in this case would obviously favor military action because by doing so the military increases their own utility now and in the future. This stand comes from their perception that they were in a retreat (not a very boastful occurrence for any military), and that their credibility as a powerful force was diminishing rapidly; they needed to prove something to themselves and to everyone else. Their influence was generally only one of recommendation, but the commitment they had to this military endeavor incresed their ability to convince other important players. The CIA had a vested interest in maintaining Lon Dol's government because the CIA probably had something to do with his ascension to power. They, like the military, need to prove to important leaders their usefulness, particularly those that control the funding of their projects. Yet, one of their projects was in jeopardy, and they were going to fight to protect it. The State Department unlike many of the players previously mentioned did not advocate military action. It wanted to appear to have ended the Vietnam War through diplomatic means, yet a military action in Cambodia might break the crucial Paris Pace talks. Then there was one new actor in this game: Kissinger of the National Security Council. He had clearly been involved in the Model I process, yet could be considered an actor almost synonymous with Nixon. Here he deserves specific attention because of his position. First, he had a very direct action-channel to the President, so his impact on the final outcome was high. Second, his stand on the issue reflected an attempt at moving up in the administration; his goals were very personal, yet had profound effect. Neverthelese, Nixon was obviously the key player in this game. His position gave him the power to define his terms of who played the game and, to some degree, what game was played. He managed to exclude nearly all other players from the game with the exception of very high level chiefs. These chiefs represented their organizations and groups, but did not have

the entire force of an organization behind them, because of Nixon's insistence on secrecy. Thus, Nixon made the decision by himself to have Kissinger as his prime confidante. This would fit most closely with the Model III variant, but emphasizes that Nixon's other advisers had affected the final decision.

Three different approaches have led us to three different answers; the US action was always the same but the reasons were not. As mentioned at the start of this essay, that was the ultimate goal. So what went wrong; why did each model come up with a different answer? While all of them can be useful, not one of them is complete. Each Model emphasizes information that will make the theory fit but neglects information that might be disruptive. Model I emphasizes the key role of the individual or the monolithic state, yet its sterility neglects the psychology of the individual, and very few states can be considered monolithic. It does however provide for a quick analysis of a decision-making process and provides a framework for judging the actions of states about which very little is known. Model II provides a deeper analysis, yet retains the sterility of Model I. It assumes that every state has compartmentalization and decentralization of power, and also that insitutional momentum or inertia is the key force in decision making; we are essentially victims trapped by our past. Still, Model II does introduce the concept of insitutional momentum and forces us to think beyond the role of individuals. Model III is the most complex because it involves the individual's (whether a single person or group) objectives, matched against another individual's objectives; the inevitable conflict of interest within the decision-making process is highlighted. This model fits the United States very well, but how does it compare with other systems? It is difficult for a Western analyst to find models that conform to alternate, non-Western systems. Model I comes into effect at times of crisis. At these moments, decisions are centralized to meet the need of expediency. Model II is used routinely for decisions that — due to precedents — would not normally require the attention of high-ranking officials. Normal day to day operations are decided according to a Model II process. Model III is in effect at all times in the states in which this type of decision-making process is relevant (Model III would not apply to an absolute monarchy). From the decisions made in the Town Hall of Brookline, Mass. to the decisions made in the White House in Washington, D.C., Model II is relevant. Graham Allison's models in *Essence of a Decision* need reworking given all the new information recently released about the Cuban Missile Crisis, but it is at least a structure to work with.

1. Graham Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, Boston, Little, Brown and Co, 1971. P.34
2. Ibid p.37
3. Ibid
4. Ibid pp.32-37
5. Ibid pp.28-29
6. Ibid p.83
7. Ibid p.87
8. Ibid pp.78-96
9. Ibid p.162
10. Ibid pp.162-181

The Illusion of Trade Liberalization and Economic Reform in Argentina (1976-1981)

Eric Garrison

The objective of this paper is to discuss the economic policies implemented in Argentina between March 1976 — when the second Peronist government was overthrown by a military coup — and March 1981 — when the de facto president Jorge R. Videla gave way to another military, General Roberto Viola. The team that Videla put at the head of the Ministry of Economic Affairs was determined to bring about radical reforms, in an attempt to open up an Argentina used to decades of protectionism and statism. By 1981, it was apparent that the announced trade liberalization had become a mere illusion. It is important to note that the type of measures that Minister Jose Martinez de Hoz tried to implement were done in a climate of political censorship and repression. In other words, there was less room for dissent and a better chance for the economic program to succeed than under a civilian government.

The policymakers first had to cope with inflation and balance of payment deficits. But the goal was not to implement the typical stabilization program (read IMF). The economic team wanted to introduce fundamental structural changes in the Argentine society and economy. In the economic program announced on the 2nd of April of 1976, Martinez de Hoz insisted on the need to increase the overall degree of economic efficiency as a precondition to achieve economic growth. This was to be pursued by restoring the properties of a market economy, which had been distorted by a long history of state intervention. Being an advocate of mixed economies himself, he stressed the fact that the state should lay the basis for economic activity, on how it was to proceed, but that it would not intervene in areas where private enterprise was more efficient.

The first steps, measures of price liberalization, were decreed immediately. In the last months of her mandate, Isabel Peron had resorted to rigid price controls in order to stop an annual inflation of over 100 percent. The elimination of these price controls might explain why inflation sprang up to a monthly rate of 35 percent in April of that same year[1] (World Bank Staff Work-

ing Papers, No. 706). Unions were restricted and the right to strike was abolished. The reduction of the size of the state was a heavily publicized issue, and a key one for the success of the economic plan. In this respect, it was a total failure, for reasons that I will discuss below. Emphasis lay in the reduction of public expenditure and in the modification of the tax structure, with a shift towards indirect taxation. A new legal regime for foreign investment was introduced in early 1977. Again, the concrete results were poor. Even though foreign investors were allowed to remit all their profits back home, direct foreign investment rose insignificantly.

One of the most significant aspects of the long-term plan was the law on banks and financial intermediaries. The operation of market mechanisms in the banking system was restored. Credit assets were decontrolled and financial institutions were allowed to operate as banks, although with minimum capital requirements. The reform meant an opening up of the domestic money market to foreign competition and the cancellation of rural and industrial promotion by the state-owned banks. The foreign exchange market was freed of any controls on the purchase of other currencies and the multiple exchange rate was abolished. Tariff reduction was obviously one of the government's main aims, although no definite level was adopted as a target. The average rate of protection in manufacturing decreased from 95 percent in 1976 to 44 percent in 1978. After 1977, however, tariff reduction became an anti-inflationary instrument. In December 1978 the tariff reduction target was set to an average of 20 percent[2] (Cambridge Journal of Economics, p. 153), although in most cases this goal was not reached.

At the outset, though, Martinez de Hoz was confronted with an inflation rate of 170 percent and the virtual absence of foreign reserves to service the external debt. He was forced to concentrate on solving short-term problems, which, he underlined, were only an external manifestation of the profound structural problems at which his long-term policies were directed. It is useful to divide the 1978-1981 period into two phases because two different approaches were used in the battle against inflation, with a direct effect on other policies.

The first phase, from 1976 to December 1978, was similar to a typical stabilization plan, since the two main aims were to reduce inflation and to solve the balance of payments deficit. This was done by reducing real wages, curbing the fiscal deficit, increasing real interest rates and improving the real income of the rural sector (by shifting from direct to indirect taxation). The peso was devalued and price controls abolished, as noted above. Martinez de Hoz was constrained by the military in one crucial aspect, which had much to do with the plan's eventual failure. Priority was given to defeating the terrorist insurgency, a task the military had taken to themselves to accomplish. They saw the 'shock treatment' proposed by the policymakers

as a catalyst for popular support of the insurgents, and therefore only let him operate with gradualist policies. Also, unemployment was to be avoided at all costs given its political risks.

Wages were frozen to prevent high unemployment. Using 1969 as the base year, real wages fell from a level of 107 in 1975 to 59 in 1977[3] (see Appendix 1). Falling internal consumption, as a result of the depressed wages, permitted increased exports, and the current account of the balance of payments rose from a meager U.S. $39 million in the first quarter of 1976 to a healthier U.S. $616 million in the fourth quarter of the same year[4] (see Appendix 2). This was complemented with IMF and commercial bank loans, a proof of the approval of the program by the IMF.

Support for the rural sector was clear throughout the first phase. The objective of a unifed foreign exchange market was achieved towards the end of 1976. Export taxes were reduced, although not entirely eliminated, given the importance of these as a form of state revenue and the existing fiscal deficit. Between 1975 and 1977, the effective exchange rate (EER) for traditional exports rose by 60 percent (price deflated) against a real exchange rate appreciation of 29 percent. For the same period, the EER for nontraditional exports rose only 9 percent[5] (World Bank Staff Working Papers No. 765, p. 22). The bias in favor of the latter was therefore reduced. After 1977, though, the EER for primary products fell consistently until 1981[6] (see Appendix 3). This exemplifies the often contradictory and economically irrational policy behavior of the policymakers which contributed to keep the climate of uncertainty.

In April 1978, a new program was put into effect. The most important feature was the complete floating of the exchange rate. After the liberalization of international capital movements, practically simultaneous to that of the foreign exchange and financial markets, a policy of controlling both the money supply and the exchange rate was seen as incorrect. "The monetary approach to the balance of payments indicates that you can either fix the path of the money supply and leave the exchange rate to float freely, or fix the exchange rate and the money supply becomes an endogenous variable,"[7] (World Bank Staff Working Paper, No. 706). The change in policy responded to the military's unwillingness to have unacceptable levels of unemployment. The active monetary policy of 1977, seen as part of the anti-inflationary strategy was considered dangerous in this respect. Since there was an excess supply of foreign currency, the freeing of the exchange rate would have resulted in its appreciation. In turn, this would have a beneficial effect on inflation, when viewed with rational expectations. The expected behavior of the exchange rate would have also tended to reduce the level of protection for many industries and, therefore, force them to reduce the rate of their price increases[8] (Cambridge Journal of Economics, p. 156). Again,

a policy inteneded to integrate the economy into the world economy was being used for the wrong purpose, i.e. to fight inflation. In this sense, the results were disappointing[9] (see Appendix 4).

The second phase in the fight against inflation began in January, 1979. As a consequence of the poor results, a new anti-inflationary strategy was announced. It implied a switch to a fixed exchange rate economy. It consisted of pre-announced devaluations of the peso — 'la tablita' — with a decreasing rate over time and an initial rate below the recent rate of inflation. Monetary supply now became the uncontrolled variable and inflation was to be affected by the effect the direct management of the exchange rate was to have over prices. Money supply disappeared as a form of policy. Given the difficulties in controlling money supply, especially given the rate and momentum of inflation, the policymakers might have considered that the control over the exchange rate would have a more effective effect in reducing inflation. The underlying assumption was that by controlling the exchange rate and devaluating at a rate lower than the rate of inflation expectations of inflation would be defeated. With this type of exchange rate, the balance of payments fluctuates when the domestic creation of money is not properly controlled. Theoretically, then, the control of inflation is possible but also means a continuous balance of payments deficit. At the end of 1978 the level of foreign exchange reserves was high — the equivalent of 20 months of imports at 1978 levels — and this probably allowed the experiment[10] (see Appendix 2). The policy was complemented with tariff reduction to penalize those sectors whose prices rose faster than costs[11] (Cambridge Journal of Economics, p. 157). The tariff targets that had been set were not reached, and these reductions were determined in case by case negotiations between the authorities and a given industry.

Consequently, a situation of uneven growth of domestic prices occured. Those activities more exposed to external competition faced falling profits. Together with the high cost of capital[12] (see Appendix 1), these two factors combined to cause a large number of bankruptcies in middle- and large-sized industries. Between 1974 and 1981, 18 percent of the firms in the industrial sector shut down, with a consequent decrease in employment figures for the sector of 30 percent[13] (La Perversa Deuda Argentina, p. 26). The position of some tradeable and even of some exportable rural activities were affected. It can be concluded that the anti-inflationary program of January, 1979, led to changes in the relative prices against the rural sector and some manufacturing activities without achieving the desired control over inflation. The high interest rates explain the failure of some firms not exposed to foreign competition. The use of a controlled exchange rate and of tariffs as stabilizing instruments finally contradicted the long-run objectives of the plan. The high interest rate jeopardized the the position of pro-

ducers who well could have been internationally effective[14] (Cambridge Journal of Economics, p. 163). These high rates were caused by the state's policy of short-term borrowing in financial markets to cover its continuous deficit. This, together with the elimination of minor capital inflows controls still existent in 1980, contributed to an increase in short-term capital inflows[15] (World Bank Staff Working Papers No. 765, p. 18). Instead of achieving a much needed stabilizing effect, the policies led to a climate of uncertainty and instability, diverting capital for investment into a highly profitable speculative market — given the difference between the internal and external interest rates.

The contradiction between long-run objectives and the struggle against inflation is clearly seen in the rural sector. The policy carried out by the government was adverse to the principal political basis of the plan. Why did this happen? It must be kept in mind that the Armed Forces viewed inflation as a reflection of social and economic chaos. Also, they would not accept high levels of unemployment. Visibly, the margin left for policymakers to balance the trade-off between inflation and unemployment was not very big. Figures show that 70 percent of the public sector budget consists of wages — which not only did not fall, but in most cases kept rising[16]. Moreover, for the majority of the manufacturing sector which retained its share of the domestic market — against the flood of cheap imported goods — the overvalued exchange rate made it impossible to export. In terms of balance of trade, the situation in 1981 was critical. For the five-year period 1978-1982, imports of consumer goods amounted to $4.79 billion against $480 million for the previous five years. Argentinians, especially the middle classes taking advantage of the high value of the peso, spent $5.68 billion abroad for the same 1978-1982 period as compared to $587 million for the previous period[17] (La Perversa Deuda Argentina, p. 58).

Towards the end of 1980, the overvaluation of the peso led to expectations of non-announced devaluations and to huge capital flight. In 1981, according to Central Bank figures, capital flight reached $5.2 billion, and for the 1978-1981 period it equalled the private foreign debt, since it reached $15 billion. Added to these expectations were the uncertainties arising from the imminent change of authorities in March, 1981. When the name of the next president, General Viola, was announced, there was speculation that the next economic team would modify the economic strategy. This is, in fact, what finally happened.

Critics of the 1976-1981 attempts at structural reforms stress the lack of cohesiveness in the many forms that the plan took. The reality is that it is inaccurate to refer to the policies implemented under Martinez de Hoz as a plan. What he had were intentions of carrying out a liberalization plan. He was constrained by factors that go beyond the economic sphere. The

military never seemed to back up the plan completely. Where their own interest was at stake, such as the steel industry controlled by them, they made sure that protectionist tariffs remained[18] (see Appendix 6). Also, Martinez de Hoz was forced to accpet the huge military expenditures undertaken by the government, which account for about $10 billion of the foreign debt. His failure to reduce the size of state expenditures, mainly by laying off public workers and privatizing public companies — which would have meant more unemployment — can be better understood if we realize that the Armed Forces were not willing to undergo such radical reforms — the government's history of paternalism and employment as a reward for political favors and support is an institution deeply ingrained in Argentina. A proof of this non-commitment to liberalization is the shift towards inward-oriented economic policies once Martinez de Hoz's predecessor came to office. Other political interests played against his intentions, such as those of IS producers who did not wish to lose their favorable positions.

Martinez de Hoz's major constraint, though, was the pressure to focus on short-term problems, namely the uncontrollable inflation. To combat inflation he used policies that often conflicted with his long-term goals. But worse than that, he used policies for these long-term goals to combat inflation and stabilize the economy. The meddling with exchange rates to reduce expectations of inflation; the selective reduction of tariffs to penalize industries raising prices; the reversal of policies when short-term results did not appear. All this shows that he was under extreme pressure to produce quick results, and that priority was not given to long-term goals. The result was an Argentina with lower levels of gross fixed investment — 15 billion 1970 pesos in 1982 as compared to 19 billion 1970 pesos in 1974 — and the highest rate of inflation in the world for the 1976-1984 period (end of military rule) — in December 1984 the CPI with a $1974^{5}100$ base was calculated at 22,669,905[19] (La Perversa Deuda Argentina, p. 26). Worst of all, the size of the foreign debt was $43 billion in 1982 against $7.8 billion in 1975. Much of this debt took the form of capital flight, military expenditures and the financing of a state that grew in size instead of shrinking. At the end of his period, Martinez de Hoz could account for every little of what he had announced. But if liberalization became an illusion it is because he lacked credibility in the eyes of most Argentinians, and this because he never had the political backing to carry out his plan.

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Kennedy's Nuclear Policy

Jay Greene

Humpty Dumpty sat on a wall,
Humpty Dumpty had a great fall,
All the King's horses and all the King's men,
Couldn't put Humpty back together again.

For years, much of strategic thought could be characterized by Karl von Clausewitz's dictum, "War is the continuation of policy by other means."[1] Bernard Brodie noted that central to the Clausewitzian view was the idea "that war is violence...but it is planned violence and therefore controlled. And since the objective should also be rational, which is to say that the procedure and the objective must be in some measure appropriated to each other."[2] With the advent of nuclear weapons, however, a number of strategists began to question whether the classical Clausewitzian model could be applied in the nuclear age. It was argued that the destructiveness of nuclear weapons was so out of proportion to any rational political objective that general war could no longer be seen as an appropriate means to a political end.

This, however, was not the view of the first two post-war American administrations. Both contemplated the use of nuclear weapons, publically threatened their use. It appears as if President Harry Truman envisioned nuclear weapons as a powerful tool for demonstrating resolve. While paying very little attention to comprehensive war plans, Truman favored "the option of dropping a controlled number of bombs — possibly only a single bomb on a single target — as a coercive measure of last resort: in effect a 'Hiroshima option'."[3]

President Dwight Eisenhower's strategy greatly expanded the uses of nuclear weapons. The "New Look" confronted the Soviet Union and Communist Chinese with the prospect of "massive nuclear retaliation" in response to even limited aggression against such obscure points at Quemoy and Matsu in the Taiwan Straits.[4] This threat was not merely a rhetorical bluff. During the Berlin crisis in 1959, Eisenhower stressed during

secret briefings that the United States must "be willing 'to push its whole stack of chips into the pot'."[5] If the Soviets failed to back down, the Administration officials agreed, there would be "no other way" than to "push the button."[6] If they did push the button, the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), which was the nuclear war-fighting plan approved in late 1960, called for the simultaneous delivery of 1,459 nuclear bombs, totalling 2,164 megatons, against 654 urban and military targets in the USSR, China and Eastern Europe.[7] Expected fatalities were estimated to be 360 to 425 million people.[8] Clearly, the idea that the destructiveness of nuclear war was out of proportion to any rational political objective did not control the strategic thinking of the Eisenhower Administration.

As the Kennedy Administration was entering office in 1961, however, a technological change was occurring which forced serious reconsideration of nuclear strategy. Nuclear-armed manned bombers, which were vulnerable to detection, preemption, and air defenses, were being replaced by high-speed long distance missiles, against which no adequate defenses existed. With Soviet acquisition of these inter-continental and sea based ballistic missiles, US leaders began to realize that they could no longer contemplate a one-sided nuclear exchange. The nuclear policies of the Kennedy Administration were a response to this new American vulnerability. Administration officials understood that nuclear war did not conform to the classical Clausewitzian strategic model, that the destructiveness of the means was inappropriate to the ends. Yet, they rebelled against this fact, procuring the capabilities and devising the doctrines to attempt to shove nuclear strategy back into the classical model. They grappled with American vulnerability to nuclear annihilation by trying to make war, once more, "the continuation of policy by other means."

Confronting American vulnerability was a central theme of John Kennedy's campaign for the presidency. In a 1959 speech Kennedy observed that Soviet nuclear missiles created a situation where "for the first time since the War of 1812, the American people live on what would be the front lines of a world war."[9] The implication, he argued, was that "war, in the age of the hydrogen bomb, is no longer a rational alternative."[10] Kennedy was aware of the revolutionary changes occurring in war technology, yet he was also self-confident and eager enough to try to develop ways to get around those changes. He believ-

ed that "once the Soviets have the power to destroy us, we have no way of absolutely preventing them from doing so. But every nation, whatever its status, needs a strategy. Some courses of action are always preferable to others..."[11]

The course of action that Kennedy preferred was to develop a strategy that did not allow a nuclear stalemate to make impotent the threat of military action. His primary effort toward this objective was to greatly improve conventional capabilities. In the years following 1961 the total number of combat-assigned divisions was increased by 66 percent, conventional force expenditures were increased by 60 percent, and nearly every type of weapons system was upgraded and modernized.[12]

Kennedy believed that the United States needed more flexible options in the face of Soviet challenges than simply "world devastation or submission."[13] In a world of mutual nuclear vulnerability, he feared that threats of nuclear retaliation against limited aggression would no longer serve as a credible deterrent. Therefore, if nuclear weapons had diminished credibility, he shought conventional military capabilities whose use suffered from no lack of credibility. In essence, part of Kennedy's nuclear policy was simply to rely less on nuclear weapons.[14]

Even though Kennedy paid greater attention to conventional forces, he did not, like President Truman, ignore planning for general nuclear war. Instead, Kennedy and the chief architect of his nuclear policy, Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara, concentrated on developing a rational strategy for the use of the irrational nuclear arsenal. As National Security Advisor, McGeorge Bundy, wrote: it was the goal of the Kennedy Administration "that in the terrible event of a general atomic war, we retain the capability to act rationally to advance the national interest by exerting pressure and offering choices to the enemy."[15] Bundy further noted that "This [goal] need not be public at this stage."[16]

In fact, the early public pronouncements of Kennedy Administration officials contain no references to this goal. But, from the very beginning of Kennedy's tenure in office, secret planning had begun to develop a "rational" nuclear war-fighting strategy. This strategy, known variously as the "damage limitation," "counterforce," or "no-cities" doctrine, contained two central elements. The first was to develop the capability to target and destroy Soviet nuclear forces in order to reduce the damage that those forces could inflict on the United States. The second was to refrain from initially destroying Soviet cities and to withhold a portion of the American nuclear forces with which to threaten those cities. The idea was to hold Soviet cities hostage by threatening to destroy the spared urban centers if the conflcit

was not terminated on acceptable grounds. The advocates of damage limitation realized the United Stated did not have the capability to prevent Soviet missiles from reaching the U.S., but they hoped that the combination of disabling a portion of the Soviet nuclear force and the psychological coercion of holding Soviet cities hostage might reduce American casualties significantly in a nuclear war.

Targeting Soviet nuclear forces was not a new idea in nuclear planning. The primary objective of every nuclear war plan since Soviet acquisition of the bomb was to blunt the Soviet nuclear threat.[17] The innovative aspect of damage limitation was that it distinguished between military and urban-industrial targets; targetting the former while withholding destruction of the latter. It was the introduction of a counter-intuitive notion into military strategy: using less force might actually yield greater power.

Damage limitation and counterforce targetting had its origins among civilian analysts at the Air Force-affiliated RAND Corporation in the late 1950s. Dismayed by the indiscriminate destruction of massive retaliation, they began a study to find a strategy that would be more flexible and controlled. After numerous simulated nuclear exchanges, the RAND study group concluded that a nuclear war which was conducted with a "no-cities" strategy could save as many as 100-150 million American lives.[18] Armed with these figures, the head of the RAND study, William W. Kaufmann, toured the Washington briefing rooms in 1960 to gain converts; however, only a few military officials were persuaded. They found the idea of withholding part of the U.S. nuclear arsenal alien, and believed that whatever was withheld would simply be destroyed on the ground by Soviet forces. Furthermore, they feared that minimizing the casualties of a nuclear war would diminish the deterrent power of nuclear weapons. The goal, as they saw it, was to make nuclear war as gruesome and horrible a prospect as possible; that way no one would dare take action that would risk precipitating it.

Kaufmann's counterforce strategy found greater acceptance, however, among other RAND analysts and defense intellectuals. In particular, RAND economist, Charles Hitch, and perennial foreign policy advisor, Paul Nitze, were drawn to the idea of damage limitation. When they came into power in January, 1961 in McNamara's Pentagon, along with the remainder of the "Whiz kids" from RAND, "no-cities" finally began to be considered in the upper levels of government.

Robert S. McNamara was a Defense Secretary of startling intellect and energy. His analytical abilities, his attention to detail, and his enthusiasm for hard work had made him the savior of Ford Motor Company and he was determined to be the same for the Pentagon. David Halberstam has described McNamara as "the can-do man in the can-do society, in the can-do era."[19] Naturally, McNamara was looking for the 'can-do' strategy for

nuclear war. Massive retaliation, with American vulnerability to nuclear missile attack, was not what McNamara had in mind.

Upon entering office, McNamara was briefed about the existing "massive retaliation" nuclear war plan, SIOPO 62. The SIOP presented McNamara with virtually no other option than to launch the entire U.S. nuclear arsenal in a single spasm of nuclear destruction. He understood that with the nuclear imbalance in early 1961, which greatly favored the United States, it might be possible for the U.S. to execute SIOP 62 without suffering unacceptable damage from Soviet nuclear forces.[20] But McNamara also understood that as the Soviets acquired hardened and dispersed ICBM's, he would need a strategy which not only diminished the Soviet *ability* to strike at the American homeland, but also the Soviet *will* to do so. In a briefing in January 1961, Kaufmann met with McNamara and explained his rationale for a "no-cities" doctrine. "McNamara was immediately impressed."[21] He had found the "can-do" strategy that, in the event of general nuclear war, would "retain the capability to act rationally to advance the national interest...," to make nuclear war "the continuation of policy by other means."

Work began to adopt a no-cities doctrine. Charles Hitch was assigned to head a review of general war plans and forwarded recommendations favorable to a damage limitation strategy.[22] Paul Nitze circulated those recommendations and began to influence skeptical military officers. Eventually, no-cities had found a strong base of support within the Pentagon.

Switching to damage limitation entailed enormous costs. To successfully destroy Soviet nuclear forces and still have a reserve with which to threaten spared cities required a greatly expanded and modernized nuclear arsenal. Emphasis on bombers would have to be replaced by missiles. The missiles woul dhave to be hardened and dispersed to maximize their ability to survive a Soviet first strike. Missile accuracy would have to be improved and warhead kilotonage reduced so that they could destroy hardened Soviet nuclear forces with the minimum of collateral damage. Furthermore, the size of the U.S. missile force would have to be significantly larger than it was, and significantly larger than the Soviets'. If the United States were to have enough missiles to survive a Soviet first strike and still be capable of targetting remaining Soviet forces while having enough left over with which to threaten cities, it was necessary to have a nuclear arsenal of enormous size. Finally, the U.S. would need vastly improved command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) capabilities to selectively strike at remaining Soviet forces while reserving a force which could destroy Soviet cities in a "controlled and deliberate way."[23]

This was the can-do era, however, and these obstacles left the Kennedy Administration undeterred. Thus, they embarked on an ambitious program of expanding and modernizing the U.S. nuclear arsenal which resulted in

the largest and most rapid build-up in the history of the nuclear age. The revised fiscal year 1962 budget which Kennedy submitted to Congress on March 28, 1961 contained an increase of over $1 billion in spending on strategic forces from what Eisenhower had requested to make a total of $93. billion.[24] In a closed meeting with the Senate Committee on Armed Services, McNamara defended the requested increases by arguing that "the problem of deterring an all-out nuclear war has been greatly complicated by the introduction of intercontinental ballistic missiles into the arsenal of our major adversary in the world struggle."[25] He noted that the threat posed by Soviet bombs was serious, "but it pales by comparison with the problem of defending against an ICBM attack."[26]

To meet the new threat posed by ICBMs, McNamara requested the type of capabilities which a damage limitation strategy would require. In particular, he asked for a near-doubling of the rate at which Polaris submarines were produced and requested an increase in their total number from 19 to 29.[27] Because the missiles based on Polaris submarines were extremely difficult for the Soviets to locate, McNamara observed that they had "the highest degree of survivability under a ballistic missile attack."[28] Similarly, the land-based Minuteman missile force, which McNamara argued "should also have a high degree of survivability," was expanded by 60 missiles. C3I capabilities were also increased, while more vulnerable bomber programs were slowed. The entire size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal was increased nearly two-fold, from 1,390 weapons to 2,350 by the end of fiscal year 1962.[30]

Although the revised 1962 budget was consistent with a damage limitation strategy, it was probably not formulated on that basis.[31] The review of strategic nuclear policy which had begun in January could not have been completed by the time Kennedy had decided upon the revised budget.[32] Nevertheless, the strategic direction in which they were going was clear to administration officials from the beginning and they made budget requests accordingly.

Fully articulating and endorsing the strategy of damage limitation did not occur until the fall of 1961. Events over the summer in Berlin served to solidify the movements that were already occurring. As the East and West feuded over access rights, tensions had spiraled and Kennedy morbidly remarked that "there was one chance out of five of a nuclear exchange."[33] McGeorge Bundy pointed out to the President that if there were a nuclear exchange:

> The current strategic war plan is dangerously rigid and, if continued without amendment, may leave you very little choice as to how to face the moment of thermonuclear truth...In essence, the current plan calls for shooting off everything we have in one shot, and it is so constructed as to make any more flexible course very difficult.[34]

Unlike Eisenhower, who had argued that we might have to "push our whole stack of chips into the pot" over Berlin, Kennedy quickly tried to backpeddle from the nuclear brink. Publicly, the Kennedy Administration was taking a rather hawkish position on the situation. The State Department declared that: "The world must know that we will fight for Berlin. We will never permit that City to fall under Communist influence. We are defending the freedom of Paris and New York when we stand up for freedom in Berlin."[35] Yet, Kennedy's private thinking on Berlin seems to have been far less belligerent. He rejected the advice of a report prepared by former Secretary of State Dean Acheson that advocated sending military units along the autobahn to Berlin to test Soviet intentions. Instead of taking this type of provocative action, Kennedy fully intended to avoid war over Berlin. As he wrote in a letter to West Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt: "grave as this matter is...neither you nor we, nor any of our allies, have ever supposed that we should go to war on this point."[36]

Despite Kennedy's intention, tempers flared over Berlin and the superpowers seemed, at times, on the brink of war. The lack of available options for war other than large scale nuclear destruction horrified the president. He reacted by significantly bolstering conventional capabilities, calling for 3.25 billion additional dollars for the defense budget, mobilizing 250,000 Reservists and National Guardsmen and increasing the number of U.S. troops in Europe from 230 to 270 thousand.[37] Again, a central aspect of the Kennedy nuclear policy was to rely less on nuclear weapons. Yet, the Kennedy Administration also had to consider the possibility that nuclear war would break out, and if it did, they wanted "to have a choice other than doing nothing to instituting a general nuclear war; or as President Kennedy said, a choice between 'inglorious retreat or unlimited retaliation'."[38] Besides developing greater conventional options, the Kennedy Administration committed itself to finding rational options for the use of strategic nuclear forces.

By the end of 1961, the Kennedy Administration had settled upon damage limitation as the means for accomplishing this. On September 13, 1961 President Kennedy was given a full briefing on the SIOP 62 general nuclear war plan by General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Lemnitzer attempted to dissuade Kennedy from a damage limitation strategy. He argued that witholding a portion of the U.S. nuclear arsenal would be unwise since vulnerability to Soviet attack meant that their "subsequent use could not be assured." In addition, he argued that Soviet leaders might be unable to distinguish between a counterforce (no-cities) and a countervalue attack due to the fact that "atomic weapons are relatively nondiscriminating" and "the proximity of many of those [counterforce] targets to urban-industrial centers." Furthermore, Lemnitzer noted that "because

of fallout from attack of military targets and co-location of many military targets with urban-industrial targets, the casualties would be many millions in number" regardless of whether the strategy was massive retaliation or damage limitation. Finally, Lemnitzer appealed to Kennedy that the chaotic and disruptive nature of nuclear war "imposes an overiding requirement for simplicity of military response."[39] Massive retaliation, with its single launch of the entire nuclear arsenal, certainly had simplicity.

Kennedy was not persuaded. The arguments of his Secretary of Defense, reinforced by his experience with Berlin, convinced him that the United States needed a more flexible and controlled nuclear war plan. Even if nuclear war could never fully be a rational means to a political end, "some courses of action are always preferable to others." To Kennedy, a strategy which attempted to minimize the casualties through counterforce targetting and psychological coercion was preferable to indiscriminate slaughter. He ordered a new SIOP (SIOP 63) to be written based on the damage limitation strategy developed by McNamara's Pentagon analysts. The revised SIOP was completed on August 1, 1962 and Kennedy was briefed on it September 14, 1962, one month before the start of the Cuban missile crisis.[40]

Damage limitation was not only enshrined in operational policy, it was also the basis for budgetary and force level requests. Each year McNamara wrote a Draft Presidential Memorandum (DPM) on strategic nuclear forces which served as the summary of the administration's strategic thinking and explained the rationale behind the Secretary of Defense's budget recommendations. The first DPM, completed on September 23, 1961, clearly made the FY 1963 budget recommendations based on a strategy of damage limitation. It states:

> The forces I am recommending have been chosen to provide the United States with the capability, in the event of Soviet nuclear attack, first, to strike back against Soviet bomber bases, missile sites, and other installations associated with long-range nuclear forces, in order to reduce Soviet power and limit the damage that can be done to us by vulnerable Soviet follow-on forces, while, second, holding in protected reserve forces capable of destroying Soviet urban society, if necessary, in a controlled and deliberate way.[41]

To have an effective damage limitation strategy McNamara recommended a nuclear force which could give the U.S. "a substantial military superiority over the Soviets even after they have attacked us."[42] By the end of FY 1963 the U.S. would have 1,295 nuclear-armed manned bombers, 522 air-launched missiles, and 507 long range nuclear missiles which could deliver 2,450 nuclear warheads.[43] Soviet nuclear forces, as of September 1961, were estimated to be considerably smaller. The National Intelligence Estimate released on September 21 "placed the number of Soviet ICBMs on launchers as only 10 to 25 with no marked increase considered likely in the suc-

ceeding months.[44] The Soviet bomber force consisted of "165 long range bombers and tankers, and about 950 medium-range bombers and tankers." Yet, out of these 1100 aircrafts, McNamara estimated that (presumably because of logistical difficulties) the Soviets could only put 200 bombers over North America, and this was before air defenses were considered.[45] Meanwhile, Soviet submarine forces, according to McNamara's testimony before a Senate Committee, consisted of thirty submarines capable of delivering approximately ninety nuclear missiles.[46] These Soviet forces, however, were not on high states of alert and were extremely vulnerable to preemption.[47] Thus U.S. operational nuclear delivery vehicles numbered over 2,000 while Soviet forces were closer to 300.

Even with this vast superiority, however, McNamara recommended against trying to achieve a "full first strike capability" like that of the previous administration's massive retaliation strategy. McNamara defined a "full first strike capability as a situation where 'our forces were so large and effective, in relation to those of the Soviet Union, that we would be able to attack and reduce Soviet retaliatory power to the point at which it could not cause severe damage to U.S. population and industry'."[48] McNamara rejected a full first strike capability arguing that chieving such a capability would "almost certainly be infeasible." Despite U.S. nuclear superiority, it was simply impossible to have any confidence in the notion that the U.S. could deny the Soviets the ability to deliver a portion of their nuclear arsenal and wreak unacceptable destruction on the American homeland.

Furthermore, McNamara argued that even if it were feasible for the United States to achieve a full first strike capability, "it would put the Soviets in a position which they would be likely to consider intolerable." McNamara feared the increase in tensions that would inevitably follow. Lastly, McNamara rejected a first strike strategy because he believed that it would prove "very costly in resources," resources that he wished to preserve for other purposes. It was for these reazsons that McNamara advised against a "full first strike capability."

In the same memorandum McNamara considered and rejected another type of nuclear strategy, minimum deterence. He defined this strategy as one in which "after a Soviet attack, we would have a capability to retaliate, and with a high degree of assurance be able to destroy most of Soviet urban society, but in which we would not have a capability to counter-attack against Soviet military forces." He rejected such an approach arguing that:

> Deterrence may fail, or war may break out for accidental or unintended reasons, and if it does, a capability to counter-attack against high-priority Soviet military targets can make a major contribution to the objectives of limiting damage and terminating the war on acceptable terms.[49]

The strategy McNamara did endorse, damage limitation, was an odd compromise between full first strike and minimum deterrence. Damage limitation was neither an attempt to achieve total superiority, like full first strike, nor was it the acceptance of a nuclear stalemate, like minimum deterrence. Instead, damage limitation involved the realization that nuclear technology drastically altered the nature of defense by making nations vulnerable to massive destruction. Yet, damage limitation was also an attempt to keep this mutual vulnerability from rendering our nuclear arsenal impotent, to preserve nuclear weapons as "the continuation of policy by other means."

To achieve a damage limitation strategy, McNamara recommended that by 1969 the United States should have 696 bombers, 1,982 long-distance missiles, and 493 air-launched cruise missiles capable of delivering 2,930 warheads or 5.077 megatons.[50] This was far less than the first-strike oriented Air Force requests which were as high as 10,000 in missiles alone.[51] Yet it was also more than the roughly 1,000 warheads that a minimum deterrence strategy would require. Thus, McNamara's strategy of damage limitation was an odd compromise, rejecting attempts at total superiority as infeasible and rejecting minimum deterrence as irrational if deterrence were to fail. Instead, he wrote, "I believe that the coercive [no-cities] strategy is a sensible and desirable option in second-strike circumstances in which we are trying to make the best of a bad situation."[52]

With damage limitation or no-cities implemented in both operational and budgetary policy, the Kennedy Administration decided that it was time to make the case for this strategy to the European Allies and American public. In a speech before a restricted session of the May 5, 1962 NATO Ministerial Meeting and in a near-identical speech a month later at the University of Michigan commencement in Ann Arbor, Defense Secretary McNamara revealed the Kennedy Administration's strategy for nuclear war. He recognized the new nature of the nuclear age:

> Nuclear technology has revolutionized warfare over the past seventeen years. The unprecedented destructiveness of these arms has radically changed ways of thinking about conflict among nations. It has properly focused great attention and efforts by the Alliance on the prevention of conflict.

Despite the changes, McNamara stressed that the Clauseqitzian view of warfare should not be abandoned.

> Nevertheless, the U.S. has come to the conclusion that to the extent feasible basic military strategy in general nuclear war should be approached in much the same way that more conventional military operations have been regarded in the past. That is to say, our principal military objectives, in the event of a nuclear war stemming from a major attack on the Alliance, should be the destruction of the enemy's military forces while attempting to preserve

the fabric as well as integrity of allied society.[53]

The strategy that could best accomplish this goal, he argued, was on that destroyed enemy military forces while refraining from targetting cities. If the Soviets confined their attacks to military targets, "the United States...might suffer 25 million deaths and Europe somewhat fewer." While if cities were attacked, "the United States might incur 75 million deaths and Europe would have to face the prospect of losing 115 million people. While both sets of figures make grim reading, the first set is preferable to the second."[54]

Furthermore, McNamara believed that the Soviets "had very strong incentives" to avoid a nuclear exchange involving cities because if the U.S. destroyed Soviet urban centers they "would suffer at least 100 million deaths," but if the U.S. spared the hostage cities, they might suffer around 25 million deaths."

To achieve a successful damage limitation strategy McNamara made two appeals to the European allies. First, he repeated the Kennedy Administration's call for improved conventional capabilities. As McNamara told the NATO ministers:

> But I would be less than candid if I pretended to you that the United States regards [using nuclear weapons] as a desirable prospect or believes that the Alliance should depend solely on nuclear power to deter the Soviet Union from actions not involving a massive commitment of Soviet force.

Instead, McNamara believed that "the threat of general [nuclear] war should constitute only one of several weapons in our arsenal and one to be used with prudence."[56] If it was to be only one option, NATO needed to make serious efforts to bolster non-nuclear capabilities.

Second, McNamara pleaded with the European allies not to develop national nuclear forces which were targetted independently of an Alliance-wide plan. He argued,

> There must not be competing and conflicting strategies in the conduct of nuclear war ... We would all find it equally intolerable to have one segment of the Alliance force attacking urban-industrial areas while, with the bulk of our forces, we were succeeding in destroying the most of the enemies' nuclear capabilities. Such a failure in coordination might lead to the destruction of our hostages — the Soviet cities — just at a time at which our strategy of coercing the Soviets into stopping their aggression was on the verge of success.[57]

It was to avoid European development of independent national nuclear forces that the State Department had pursued the idea of a multilateral force (MLF) that would give Allied powers partial control over nuclear weapons without

having independent (and possibly conflicting) strategies.[58] Various conceptions of the MLF existed. Most envisioned nuclear submarines manned by a multi-national crew with some procedure for each country to have control over the launching of nuclear weapons on board. McNamara and Kennedy were skeptical of the MLF proposal and were particular doubtful feasibility of having more than one sovereign state try to control a single piece of military hardware. Rather than prefering the "hardware" solution of MLF, they favored the more direct method of trying to dissuade development of national nuclear forces through candid and powerful discussions with the Allies on this topic.

After the Ann Arbor speech it appears as if Kennedy Administration confidence in damage limitation began to wane. Referrences to "no-cities," "damage limitation," and "counterforce" faded and were replaced with a new term: assured destruction. Assured destruction was defined as the ability to withstand a Soviet nuclear first-strike and still have the capability to destroy "the Soviet government and military controls, plus a large percentage of their population and economy (e.g. 30 percent of their population, 50 percent of their industrial capacity, and 150 of their cities)."[59]

Scholars disagree on how to interpret this shift. Some, like David N. Schwartz and William Kaufmann, argue that "assured destruction" was only a change in rhetoric and not a change in policy.[60] They note that while assured destruction became the public stance, the operational policy, SIOP 63, "was never revised to reflect this change in declaratory policy."[61] The official nuclear war plan continued to be a counterforce, damage limiting strategy. The change in public rhetoric, they argue, was necessary to fend off ever-increasing Air Force procurement requests. The Air Force, which had initially been reluctant to abandon massive retaliation, soon took to counterforce like fish to water. Air Force planners realized that a counterforce strategy left the definition of sufficient strategic forces open-ended; the larger the U.S. nuclear forces, the more that damage could be limited. As David Schwartz observed: "Any target of military importance could be pressed for inclusion in the SIOP on the basis that its destruction would reduce Soviet capability to wage war against the United States."[62] As the list of targets expanded, the Air Force's budgetary requests expanded, too. Thus, assured destruction allowed McNamara to limit forces according to the criteria assured destruction provided, while still targeting those forces according to damage limitation.

It also is possible that McNamara made these rhetorical changes to avoid the negative public reaction that followed the Ann Arbor speech. Ordinary citizens did not take well to the idea that nuclear war could be fought in a "conventional manner." Furthermore, "the language of the discussion itself, with casual references to 'city-busting;' 'exchanges,' 'surgical strikes,' and the like" gave the public the impression that military planners had "lost

all common human feeling."[63] Following the negative reaction, McNamara apparently reversed his belief that nuclear strategy could be explained simply and openly to the American people.

The shift to assured destruction, however, was not merely cosmetic, as Schwartz and Kaufmann suggest. While damage limitation remained the operational policy, the experiences of the Kennedy Administration caused them to lose enthusiasm for it. The attempts to gain European cooperation had failed. McNamara's speech followed by a six-capital tour by Secretary of State Dean Rusk proved unpersuasive. The French proceeded to develop their own nuclear forces and to target those forces against cities regardless of U.S. strategy.[64]

The Cuban missile crisis in October 1962 further undermined confidence in damage limitation. As George Quester has pointed out.

> American actions in the Cuban crisis weakened any notion of general war without annihilations of populations. During the crisis, which had erupted so soon after the Ann Arbor speech, U.S. B-47 aircraft were deployed to civilian airfields (thus perhaps denying the Soviets a counterforce "no-cities" option), and President Kennedy had threatened a "full retaliatory strike" against the Soviet Union, seemingly if any missiles from Cuba were fired at any target. The declaratory policies which had seemed desirable when general nuclear war was a mere abstract question appeared to have lost their appeal when a conflict of wills had begun.[65]

Finally, damage limitation began to appear less attractive to Kennedy Administration officials as the Soviets made advances with their nuclear forces by 1967 projected that the Soviet Union would have 650 ICBMs, 450 of which would be in hardened silos. Submarine launched ballistic missiles were estimated to number 84 and submarine launched cruise missiles were placed at 144.[66] These figures led McNamara to conclude in his 1963 DPM on strategic nuclear forces: "the prospects for 'Damage Limiting' by counterforce attacks may not hold great promise in the latter part of the 1960s if the Soviets harden and disperse their ICBM force and build up their missile submarine force as we now expect them to do."[67] He therefore set "assured destruction as the 'essential test of the adequacy of our posture'." Yet, he also stated that "beyond the forces required to meet the test of 'Assured Destruction,' additional forces may be justified if they could further reduce the damage to the U.S. in the event of a Soviet attack by an amount sufficient to justify their added costs."[68] However, according to aides, McNamara had "included several passages on the planning of counterforce or 'no-cities' contingencies simply to make it consistent with the FY 1963 statement and speeches by administration spokesmen during 1962, especially the Ann Arbor speech."[69]

McNamara had begun to realize that as Soviet forces grew and became

invulnerable to pre-emption, damage limitation would become increasingly difficult to the point where it would no longer be worth the costs required. By the time of Kennedy's assassination, the new policy of assured destruction had become entrenched as the criteria for force levels, although McNamara was careful to remind the President that "this calculation of the effectiveness of U.S. forces is not a reflection of our ac[tu]al targetting doctrine in the event deterrence fails."[70] Thus, damage limitation ceased to be the basis for budget requests, yet it remained in place as operational policy. Confidence in damage limitation had faded enough so that it was no longer worth spending additional resources to maintain it. Yet, the Kennedy Administration continued to target what equipment it already had, believing that if nuclear war did break out, the United States might as well attempt to limit the damage of that war by avoiding destruction of cities.

In September 1967 McNamara looked back on the build-up he had spearheaded and stated that the United States' current "numerical superiority over the Soviet Union in reliable, accurate and effective warheads is both greater than we had originally planned and in fact more than we require."[74] As this chapter shows, this statement is not entirely accurate. The superiority was not only planned, but was in fact, necessary for the strategy that the Kennedy Administration initially pursued. If war was to be the continuation of policy by other means, the United States needed the capability to "prevail" in a nuclear conflict. The only way to prevail, Kennedy Administration officials believed, was to have a superiority in nuclear forces and a counterforce targetting strategy. As the prospects for maintaining a clear superiority faded, so did enthusiasm for damage limitation.

The nuclear stalemate had become a reality. Every administration since Kennedy has had to confront this uncomfortable reality, knowing that U.S. cities were vulnerable to nuclear devastation regardless of their efforts. Yet, every administration has also rebelled against this realization, trying futilely to fit nuclear weapons back into the Clausewitzian model. Each technological escalation in the arms race, such as the development of multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs) during the Nixon Administration, and more recently, President Reagan's proposal for a Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), can be seen in this light. The hope is that technological innovation will undo the fundamental changes that nuclear weapons have introduced; that perhaps the next development will somehow erase American vulnerability to mass destruction and allow war to be once again the continuation of policy by other means. Yet, if there is any lesson to be learned from the Kennedy Administration's experience with damage limitation, it is that any attempt to return nuclear strategy to a classical Clausewitzian framework is extremely difficult. Even with all the King's horses and all the King's men, they couldn't put Humpty back together

again.

The author would like to thank the Nuclear Age History and Humanities Center for providing the necessary documents for this essay.

Notes

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[5]Memo of Conference with President, March 6, 1959, 5:00 p.m., Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, p.5.
[6]Ibid., 10:30 a.m., p.7.
[7]Kaplan, p.269.
[8]Desmond Ball, *Politics and Force Levels: The Strategic Missile Program of the Kennedy Administration.* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), p.190.
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[10]Kennedy, p.28.
[11]Kennedy, p.38.
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[13]Kennedy, p.184.
[14]For more on conventional capabilities, see Jane Elizabeth Stromseth, *The Origins of Flexible Response*, (MacMillan, forthcoming). Can also be found as a Ph. D. dissertation from Oxford, 1985.
[15]Memo from McGeorge Bundy to Theodore Sorenson, March 13, 1961. Box 273, National Security Files, JFKL.
[16]Ibid.
[17]Rosenberg, pp.39-40.
[18]Ball, p.33 citing Richard Fryklund, *100 Million Lives* (NY: MacMillan, 1962), pp. 2,4,14,15,16.
[19]David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest, (NY: Random House, 1969), p.215.
[20]Scott Sagan, SIOP 62: The Nuclear War Plan Briefing to Pres. Kennedy, Intl. Security Summer, 1987, pp.32-5. Also contains a copy of the briefing itself.
[21]Ball, p.34.
[22]Ball, p.34. See also Kaplan, pp. 258-62.

[23]McNamara, Draft Presidential Memorandum,on Strategic Nuclear Forces, September 23, 1961. Available under the Freedom of Information Act from the Dept. of Defense.
[24] Ball, p.115. See also Statement of Secretary of Defense Robert S. MacNamara before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, April 4, 1961.
[25]Statement before committee, p.4.
[26]Statement, p.4.
[27]Statement, p.9.
[28]Statement, p.3.
[29]Statement, p.12.
[30]Draft Presidential Memo, 1961 (DPM 61), p.2.
[31]Ball, p.115.
[32]Kennedy announced the essentials of his revised budget in a special message to Congress on Jan. 30, 1961.
[33]Schlesinger, p.331.
[34]McGeorge Bundy, Covering Note on Henry Kissinger's Memo on Berlin, July 7, 1961, National Security File, Box k75-81, Germany-Berlin-General, Vice President's Trip, JFKL.
[35]State Department, *Berliner Illustrite*, Summer 1961.
[36]JFK letter to Willy Brandt, Aug. 18, 1961, National Security Files, Box 82-3, JFKL.
[37]Stromseth, p.71.
[38]McNamara, Statement before Committee on Armed Services, Jan. 29, 1962.
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[40]Sagan, IS, p.38.
[41] DPM 61, p.4.
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[47]Sagan, p.29.
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[57]Athens, p.10-1.
[58]David N.Schwartz, NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas (Wash: Brookings, 1983) pp.82-136 for History of MLF.
[59]DPM 63, p.9.
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[61]Schwartz, p.175.
[62]Schwartz, p.175.
[63]Powers, p.93. See also Ball, pp. 197-9.
[64]Schwartz
[65]George Quester, Nuclear Diplomacy (Boston: Dunnelin, 1971), p.246. Quote in Ball p. 198-9.
[66]DPM 63 p.7.
[67]DPM 63 p.6.
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[71]Robert S. McNamara, "The Dynamics of Nuclear Strategy," Dept. of State Bulletin 57 (9 Oct. 1967), p.445.

Operation Ajax: U.S. Intervention in Iran; 1953

Roshanak Malek

This paper was presented by the author at the symposium on Covert Action and Secret Diplomacy held at Tufts in March, 1988.

If we took a poll today around the United States, and asked what comes to mind if we said "Iran," I imagine we would get responses like "the Shah;" "Khomeini;" "Shiite Terrorists;" "the Hostage Crisis;" and in light of the Iran-Contra Affair, we'd probably get some "Ollie Norths;" and maybe even a few "Albert Hakims."

But chances are good that no one would remember a long-dead nationalist prime-minister who tried to rid Iran of foreign domination and exploitation.

In his time, Dr. Mohammed Mossadeq was enormously popular with his countrymen for this attempt — popular with his people, but unfortunately not with the CIA.

In 1951, he engineered the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company which was founded and controlled by the British. His hope was to expel the foreign elements within the country while taking back the oil that rightfully belonged to the Iranian people.

In doing so he earned the respect and love of his people as a democratic leader. His followers demonstrated in the streets on his behalf and he was made prime minister by an overwhelming majority vote in the Iranian parliament. Unfortunately, Mossadeq's promising rule was ended abruptly by American and British intervention.

It took only five CIA operatives, led by Kermit Roosevelt, and several hundred thousand dollars to oust the foremost nationalist leader in the history of modern Iran. The fate of an entire country was decided by a few hundred thugs and rebel rousers bribed by CIA agents to take to the streets in support of the Shah. The Iranian army, infiltrated by British spies, should also be held responsible for the 1953 coup.

The American and the British had made other attempts at getting rid of Mossadeq. They boycotted Iranian oil and put severe pressures on him in an effort to either make him compromise the Iranian position in the oil crisis or have him resign. But these efforts proved futile because Mossadeq

refused to sacrifice Iranian dignity any longer by allowing the British to continue to exploit Iran's natural resources. Perhaps it was for this reason that *Time*magazine voted him the "Man of the Year" in 1952.
The Iranian people were caught by surprise the next year, and once again their future depended on a foreign power — this time the United States, which had emerged after World War II as the global Super Power. Operation AJAX was the code name for the CIA's program in Iran. It was the United States' first major covert intervention in the political affairs of a foeign country, and was considered to be a huge success.

Operation AJAX's success is significant because it led to a series of American covert actions all over the world. AJAX led to Operation Success in Guatemala, which led to Operation Pemesta in Indonesia, which eventually led to Operation Track II in Chile, and the list of injustice continues to this day as evidenced by the disclosures of the Iran-Contra scandal. How are these cases rationalized by the American government? Let's begin by analyzing the American mentality a bit. Americans have a fear of Communism and the American government recognizes his paranoia. It uses the Communist threat as an excuse to get involved in other nation's affairs, knowing that the majority of the American people would accept this argument blindly. In a way, Covert Action serves as a protective shield for America's conscience. It allows Americans to preserve their self-image as the champion of Democracy and an enemy of communism. While, in reality, the goal of these covert actions is to exploit other countries' resources for America's economic growth and benefit.

Take Iran as an example. Mossadeq was a nationalist leader without any communist tendencies. In fact, the Soviets first viewed him as a Western puppet. Not only that but Mossadeq strongly followed a policy of "negative equilibrium" — meaning that Iran would not accept any favors from any foreign camps, whether Western Capitalist or Eastern Communist. Iran would remain nonaligned, neutral and independent. The Soviets did not intervene once in the oil crisis and remained aloof and disinterested throughout the whole period.

Iran was not their concern, they were already committed in Eastern Europe and were experiencing problems in that area. Furthermore, Stalin had died in March of 1953, leaving the Soviets with the task of reorganizing their bureaucratic structure. They just weren't interested in getting involved in another war. It seems obvious that during this particular period the chance of a communist take-over in Iran was very slim.

Still, the Americans labeled Mossadeq as a communist and exaggerated the presence of a communist threat in Iran. It was not communism that worried the American government — but the whole idea of a nationalist leader who wanted home rule for his country.

If, in fact, Mossadeq had stayed in power, Iranian oil would have completely been under the control of Iranians and the American oil companies would never have had the opportunity to get involved in the lucrative Iranian oil business, of which, until the coup, they had never had a share. Yet, after the Shah took power the Americans gained a forty percent share in the international oil consortium designed to control Iranian oil. Iran received only a fifty percent profit of the oil sold.

This seems ludicrous considered it was Iran's oil.

If the United States had allowed Iran to keep its oil nationalized, then other countries in the region, with whom America had business dealings would have demanded that they too receive more than a 50-50 deal. And the region would then have needed to be "saved" from the communists and the nationalists. It was the nationalists who posed the real "threat" in Iran and the Middle-East. With Mossadeq in Iran, taken in conjunction with the emergence of Nasser in Egypt and his plans to nationalize the Suez — the other countries like Iraq and Kuwait might have followed suit, which would have left the United States out in the cold.

Nationalists pose a real threat to imperialist powers like the U.S., because they eventually gain the support of the masses and refuse to work for the benefit of their former patrons.

At least the communists present a real enemy to fight against. How could America justify undermining a nationalist government to its people? It can't. therefore, it engages in **covert**action in order to avoid having to justify its goals.

That America gained a forty percent share in the Iranian oil business after the Shah was brought into power is beyond dispute. Some, including Noam Chomsky have argued that the American oil companies were forced by the American government to take an interest in Iranian oil, because the government wanted to take over Britain's position as THE power in the Middle East. But whatever the initial impetus, once established, America had no choice but to protect its newly won economic and political interests.

Towards that end, the U.S. continued its support of the Shah for the next 25 years. He became a major ally for the United States as well as the newly founded state of Israel. Israel was able to buy oil which was non-arab in origin. Bear in mind that Iranians are not Arabs and Israel was closely tied to the U.S. The Shah was more than happy to sell oil to the Israelis. As a result, the Shah received arms and the Mossad helped him establish his network of terror — the Savak. In fact, evidence found in the American embassy by Iranian militiamen after the revolution, documents a strong Mossad presence in Iran.

Due in large measure to AJAX, America was able to forestall the nationalist wave in the Middle-East for more than a decade. An example was set with

Mossadeq that any nationalist movement, democratic or not, would be undermined if it posed a threat to Western capitalist interests. By ousting Mossadeq, the United States bought itself more time to exploit the natural resources of the gulf nations.

So, we know what the U.S. got, now let us examine the Iranian gain. Well, with the Shah and his close ties with the U.S., Iran westernized at a rapid pace. There is a common misconception that westernization is unconditionally beneficial to a country. This is not true, and certainly not in the case of Iran. The majority of the people were not able to adjust to secular western ways. The people were still religious and could not identify with western morals and values. Discontent and opposition to the Shah began to grow, as is not too surprising when considering that less than ten percent of the people had real wealth and the remaining ninety percent suffered from massive poverty. The Shah and the Americans who had put him into power were held responsible for the actions of the Savak, the gross discrepancy of wealth and the westernized, secular ways which violate traditional religious values and were seen as corrupting the people.

Mossadeq was remembered as a martyr and a similar leader was sought. Unfortunately, this search was unsuccessful and Iran wound up with Khomeini instead.

The Iranian revolution of 1979 is a direct consequence of the CIA engineered coup in 1953. The discontent with the Shah and the hostility towards America grew to a point where the country exploded and the people chose to return to traditional, conventional religious beliefs rather than remain under the Shah in a country dependent on, and subservient to, America.

Operastion AJAX was an interim success, but a long term disaster for both its sponsor and its victim. After the revolution, America lost a very important economic and strategic ally. America's name was publicly disgraced in the region, and fifty-three Americans were held hostage for 444 days as a symbol of Iranian anger towards America. Iran's progress fell back a hundred years as a black veil of religious fanaticism swept the country and any signs of Americanization quickly disappeared.

The irony is that the U.S. did not hesitate to label its ally of twenty-five years as a terrorist country, while America itself had engaged in what can easily be called political terrorism in its support of the Shah who used psychological warfare and murder to establish and then support his reign.

The United States likes to hold its head proudly as the Patron of World democracy, but it is fooling itself when it comes to its operations abroad. It is ironic to see Americans enjoying democracy — free elections, freedom of speech, freedom of religion and so forth — when around the world, people are suffering at the hands of dictators supported by the U.S.

The United States had the choice to cooperate with a democratic government of Iran, and initiate a foreign policy in the Middle East based on democratic values. Instead, it chose a covert intervention, and we have all suffered the consequences.