The purpose of Hemispheres is to inform and educate students on the many facets of international affairs. Thus Hemispheres attempts to solicit both analytical and historical papers.

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Hemispheres

Spring 1978

An Interview with Stanley Hoffmann

The rise of communism in Western Europe has been the focus of extensive debate in European and American academic and policy-making circles, culminating in the concern over the French elections this spring. The implications of domestic political changes, possibly resulting in the ascendance to power of the West European Communist Parties, are ambiguous. It is unclear what Eurocommunism is; what the causes of the rise of French, Italian, and Spanish Communist Parties have been; and what the long term effects of this phenomenon on the Atlantic alliance will be. In an interview with Hemispheres, *Professor Stanley Hoffmann has addressed questions such as these and clarified many of the issues surrounding the rise of the West European Communist Parties.*

The Editors

Hemispheres:
The inability of the Left Alliance to unite effectively has been a perennial cause for their defeat. What do you think the causes of the breakdown were?

Hoffmann:
I think the cause of the breakdown was the determination of the Communists to accept the alliance only on its own terms. I will not go into the details for the Communists tactics over recent years, instead to simplify, one can say that since 1962 they had tried to get out of the political ghetto in which they have been in since 1947. The strategy for getting out has always been the same. It has been a popular front strategy of alliance primarily with the Socialists. But it was always based on the assumption that the Communists would be the leading partner in the alliance. In the conditions in which the common program was signed in 1972, the Communists were still very much the larger of the two parties. The Socialist party had just been taken over by Mitterrand and had been pretty much in ashes since 1969. For this reason in a first phase between 1971 and 1974, the Communists did not really have to push very hard; the alliance was serving their purposes, Mitterrand was their candidate, all was going well.

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The first sign of trouble came in the fall of 1974. For about nine months, the Communists began to attack the Socialists. Already they were annoyed by two things. One was the determination of the new Socialist party not only to get bigger, one of the stated objectives of Mitterrand, but also to drag the Communists along with them, but behind them. Thus the determination was not only to get bigger, but to become the ideologically dominant partner. The second thing which I think antagonized them was the kind of personal buildup of Mitterrand. After a series of small, local elections in the fall of 1974, which went badly for the Communists, they began nine months of offensive that got nowhere and that ended as abruptly as it had started.

For about two years after this there was a different sort of tactic which appeared to lull the Socialists into believing that their gamble had won. The tactic was, on the one hand, to support to the hilt the alliance of the left. This made it possible for Communists to make considerable gains in the local elections of 1976 and 1977, particularly in the cities. The Communists did appear as kind of loyal partners of the union of the left. The other thing the Communists did during this period, which the Socialists interpreted as a kind of modernization and opening up of the Communist Party (and I think this was a misinterpretation), was to effect a number of changes in ideology. These changes included the ditching of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the celebration of pluralism and liberties, and the beginning of overt attacks on the Soviet Union in issues like dissidence. There also appeared to be a transformation of the party's foreign policy. The Socialists interpreted this as steps in their direction. However retrospectively, one can see it much more as a strategy aimed at attracting young voters to the Party, especially young workers who were tempted by some elements of the Communist line, but obviously not by the Stalinist aspect which were unpopular with the younger elements of the population. So, rather than being an opening of the party in the direction of the Socialists, I think that it was a move to attract people who would otherwise have been repelled by the old strictures of Stalinist orthodoxy.

Hoffmann:
It is very hard to answer in abstract terms. In fact, you have to look at two things. First of all, one must look at each country separately; secondly, not only at intentions, whether overt or covert, but also at the possibilities. You may have a party that covertly intends not to respect its own profession of faith in pluralism and yet, when it is constantly sharing power it may be incapable of establishing a monarchy of power. For instance, even if the Communists in Italy where insincere, which I do not think they are, I do not see how they could easily get rid of the Christian Democrats which are still a dominant party. In the

case of France, where I believe that the Communists' profession of faith in pluralism is indeed profoundly insincere, for the life of me, I cannot see them establishing a monopoly of power on a country which is 80% non or anticommunist. In a way, what the Communists say does not matter. I do not see any sign in the French case of a real in-depth de-Stalinization of the party when it abandons the dogma of the dictatorship of the proletariat without discussion or by unanimous rule. The Italian case, on the other hand, is a very different one for reasons which are largely historical — Italy when through 20 years of Fascism and still has a very weak democracy. In contrast France has a democracy which is old and fairly stable. The French Communist Party's highest loyalties are to itself. They take the republic for granted and want to go beyond it in the direction of Communism. They are their own best and highest concern. The Italian Party, precisely because of the experience of Fascism and its awareness of the weakness of constitutional order, have established as a first order of priority, the preservation of their constituional order. First, to preserve it, then maybe to move beyond. But the first business is literally to save Italian democracy, once you have saved it maybe then you can push further. Their highest loyalty at present seems to be to Italy. Needless to say, the Italian Communists expect rewards — all parties do —but what is interesting is that by contrast with the French, the Italians are obviously willing to wait for their rewards until later. The French want their rewards in advance, and they will not have an alliance unless their rewards come here and now. That makes for a complete difference.

This incidentally, is one of the reasons why it seems to me that the whole subject of Eurocommunism is a splendid misnomer. The Spanish Party is very close to the Italian, although not so much in style — the Spaniards, as usual, are harsher than the Italians. But certainly, for them also, after 30 years of Franco the first thing to do is to establish a democracy and then we will see. Thus, in terms of national strategy there is the Spanish and Italian examples on the one hand, and the French on the other.

With respect to relationships with the Soviet Union the three are very different. The Italians have had such a long tradition of national autonomy including their own theories and their own traditions of analyzing things, that they do not have to be on bad terms with the Soviets. They can afford to be very Florentine or Byzantine without attacking the Soviets directly. The Spaniards, by contrast, have in a way trained their guns at the Russians quite deliberately. The French, interestingly enough, have been very blunt with the Soviets, probably in order to prove to their own public that they are no longer controlled by Moscow. Therefore one sees three very different relationships with the Soviet Union. What is interesting is that the French, having proven their

autonomy by attacking the Soviets, and after all the zig-zags, have fallen back on a kind of defensiveness which is the only thing they know how to do well to protect their own base. In addition, the relations between the three parties have been pretty poor. Therefore, I do not think there is such a phenomenon as Eurocommunism.

Hemispheres:
It has been argued that even if the Communists are committed to democracy, and they follow through on this commitment, the kinds of economic changes that they are committed to are irreversible; therefore, their commitment to democracy is really meaningless, because they have to somehow back up these economic policies.

In the last phase, which started last spring, the Communists seemed to have decided that since the Socialists kept at their own tactics, the Communists would try to put the following hand of cards on the table: either the Socialists accepted Communist terms for both a more radical version of the program and on the distribution of power after the election, or else the Communists would break up the alliance. They may have expected the Socialists to yield. I do not know. Nobody knows what goes on within the Communist Party, that's one of its charms. So they may have expected the Socialists to yield since, after all, the Socialists did need the Communists to get to power. However, it was clear that the Socialists would not yield, so the Communists broke up the alliance and developed an enormous offensive against the Socialists which did not cease until the day after the first ballot. But it seems to me that it was a rather cold blooded choice — either you do it on our terms or we will not.

They changed terms the day after the first ballot because of two things. First they knew that the battle was lost; it would have taken a miracle for them to win on the second. Almost any nincompoop looking at the results knew that the game was up. Second, even though the Socialists did not yield much on the program, they did yield on the post-election distribution of power. So, in a sense, the Communists, while hoping to lose, were equipped for both winning and losing.

Hemispheres:
Given the fact that, because of their respective strategies and histories, the Communists and Socialists are engaged in a struggle for power, do you think that this will continued to hinder their ability to gain power?

Hoffmann:
Yes I would. It is an interesting situation. As much as each side needs the other to get to power, the Communists can live without being in power. They have now been in existence for 57 years, only 4 years of

which they have been in or close to power. So they can do reasonably well without it. The Socialists, on the other hand, are not very happy with not being in power. It's not as frustrating as it might have been. They did try to become a combination of catch-all and ideological party. Yet there is a danger of their falling apart if they do not get a chance to come to power. There is, therefore, an uneven need for immediate power. Simply put, the Socialists need the Communists more to get to power than the Communists need the Socialists. Nevertheless, both parties need each other if either is to attain power, so, in this sense, they are bound to remain tied together.

On the other hand if you look at the scene over the next few years, there is no objective need for a very tight alliance because the next election is a presidential one, and a tight, programatic bind is not needed. If the Socialist candidate is ahead of the Communist one on the first ballot, which is likely, all that the Socialists need is Communist support for the Socialist candidate on the second ballot. So, in a sense, each party can, for the next three years, concentrate on its own house. And I think they both have a great deal to do to get their house in order. The Communist Party, both among the militants and in the electorate, must be very thick with the residue of the last period, which was a period of zig-zags to which they have not been accustomed. And, needless to say, within the Socialist Party, you had fairly thorough confusion.

Hemispheres:
In your book *Decline or Renewal* you indicate that because of the logic of bipolarization within the French political culture the possibility for great political reform in the future was minimal because the Communists and the Socialists were both forced to look to the center for votes, making it impossible for them to advocate any reformism.

Hoffmann:
Yes, however the reason why they will not advocate reformism is not because of their need for votes from the center. In fact, if there had been more concern for the votes of the center, there would have been much more reformism. This is particularly true for the Socialists. There is a premium on the left for appearing to be much more radical or revolutionary than reformist. The great bug-a-boo of the Socialists was that they did not want to appear to be neo-Social Democrats, even though if they had appeared as neo-Social Democrats they might have gained more than 22% of the vote. There will always be many Socialists who feel that, as long as the Communists insist on being a party of drastic change, the only way in which the Socialists can compete with the Communists is by being as radical as the Communists, but in a different way. The feeling is that if they became neo-Social Democrats, the Communists

would expand by gaining part of the real working class electorate, while still holding many Socialists. In this way the Socialists would be pushed further to their right, which they don't want. So, essentially the Communist Party has this kind of hold on the Socialist Party leaving the choice among the Socialists a rather difficult one. On the other hand, if they chose to appear more pragmatic and reformist they risk becoming a kind of left wing of a very immobile majority. This has happened to them in the past and it was disastrous for them. On the other hand, they remain locked in their attempt to appear as a party for radical change, along the line of the Communists. This way they always risk remaining 48 or 49%, but not 50, which is their problem.

Hemispheres:
So I gather then that you do not think that there is much that could unfreeze the situation to the advantage of the left?

Hoffmann:
Not really. I see the situation remaining frozen because the left, is essentially faced with a choice between ideological rigor, which incidentally would not be enough to help it overcome its divisions — particularly between the radicals of each party, and a completely divided left, which is impotent.

On the other side of the picture, you have two rather conservative parties led by a President who is aware of the need for his own majority to open up. But this is difficult to do. At least half of his majority (the Gaullists) will oppose any kind of large scale reform. Giscard's own party is at least as conservative as the Gaullists when it comes to domestic politics and Giscard himself has never shown any political imagination. For example, he has talked a great deal about reform, and I am sure he is, as the Americans would say, a sincere man, but he does not have a terrific imagination. France's economic and social situation does not make reforms easy. The first order of business in France is overcoming the recession. The measures which the French will have to face would probably hit some categories very hard, creating unemployment, forcing branches of industry to close, and probably creating a combination of some inflation and more recession for a while. This is not the best climate for reform so Giscard is in a bind. Both sides are in a bind.

Hemispheres:
There is a question as to whether the Left's claims of commitment to democratic processes are sincere, or merely tactics to further their ambitions.

Hoffmann:
There are two questions here which are questions of fact. First of all, are the Communists capable of imposing their conception of the economic order? The answer in France and Italy, and even more so in Spain, is no, because they would have to be a part of a coalition, and it is difficult to imagine either the Christian Democrats or the French Socialists accepting the Communist version of economy. The second question is whether that is what the Communists want. Here the answer would be yes. In the case of France the measure that the Communists were advocating would have led to central control of the French economy by the state and particularly, if possible, by the Communists. This might have been irreversible, because the payments crisis and inflation might have forced the French out of the Common Market and into the open international economy.

This is not at all what the Italian Communists at present are up to. The Italian Communists instead seem to be saying to their own followers and to their unions: if you don't accept some sacrifices, the state will disintegrate. So again, one has to look first at what they are actually saying. Then one has to question whether or not they can do it alone. Personally I refuse to get easily scared.

Hemispheres:
Given the decline in the role of private capital, and the fact that the state has taken over a lot of the responsibilities of fanning the economy, do you think the debate between Communism and Capitalism becomes irrelevant?

Hoffmann:
I do not think it is irrelevant because the Communists, particularly the French, insist that profit is illegitimate, that it is necessary to move away from the profit-motivated economy, and that the state has to take control of all means of production. The reality is much more mixed than is described in the sense that for expansion and getting out of the recession, private investment is still very present, and if ways are not found for increasing it, the economies will be in trouble. Public investment is not easily a substitute.

So, in practice you have mixed economies, and in theory the debate is not irrelevant because there are two opposing sides of the fence: the Communists and those who are for free enterprise. The Communists consider the mixed economy to be only a step towards a totally planned and centralized one. In France, certainly in Germany, where they are the most potent, and to some extent the conservatives in England, there are a number of people on the other side of the fence saying that the mixed

economy has fettered private initiatives with taxation and state regulations and that part of the public sector must be reduced. The debate is still a very hot one.

Hemispheres:
Depending upon what effects you think the rise of communism in Europe will have, what foreign policy should the U.S. pursue?

Hoffmann:
I do not see communism rising over Western Europe. That is a myth. For example, the last election has shown that the erosion of the French Communist Party continues despite the votes of the 18 year olds. Its popularity is down to 20.6% from 21.3% of the vote in the last election. This is a loss of 0.7% despite the change in the base of the electorate, an aging electorate. Remember they were as high as 26% immediately after the war. In the Italian case the question is not whether or not one likes Communists, but whether there is an alternative. If one's first concern is to preserve Italian democracy from the chaos of collapse one has no alternative but to support the kind of broad coalition or "historic compromise" that the Communists seem to be moving towards very slowly, very prudently, and kind of step by step, salami slice by salami slice. It would be nice to say that in an ideal world one would not have to do that (compromise with the Communists), but this is not the alternative.

Hemispheres:
However, it seems that the Carter administration is not as relaxed as we might like them to be, and in fact there is a very different view at the executive levels as to what we should be doing about Eurocommunism.
Hoffmann:
Even the Carter Administration seems to have discovered that the phenomenon of Eurocommunism does not exist, and that they are dealing with Italian Communism, specifically. It is not a current problem in Spain, obviously the Spanish populace is not that strong. It's strength is increasing in the unions, but Spanish Communism is an academic question at present. The question in Spain right now is not so much the degree of communist influence but essentially whether the governing coalition of Soares is going to move further to the right or not. That is what is relevant. In France, we now have a few years of grace, without having to worry about the Communist demise. The problem is real only in the case of Italy, and there, I think the administration did make a mistake by its statement of last January. I think it would have been much better to leave one's mouth shut and leave one's lines open to the Italian Communists. Denouncing them has no effect, and they get closer to or into power anyhow. We merely create further problems.

Hemispheres:
Would you say that the concern of the Carter administration grows out of its concern over the Soviet Union?

Hoffmann:
Yes, but it appears to grow out of a concern over the strength of what would be called a combination of old and new Right in Congress. The Jackson wing of the party, which is now very well established intellectualy, does not make much of a distinction whether it's the Soviets or whether it's the European Communists. It wants to make the administration look strong. One result is the statement on Italy. Another is the President's speech of three weeks ago on the Soviet Union, as if from time-to-time to reassure the Right that the Administration is not lowering its guard. However, I do not see any reason to believe that the Soviets would really influence the Italian Communists, if they were elected to power. It is true that the foreign policy of the Communist Party in Italy is very close to that of the Soviet Union in various parts of the world, but what is also important is that it's a purely declaratory policy. The fact that the Italian Communist Party supports the Soviets in East Africa is not going to do the U.S. much harm. What is important is that they tell us they will not do anything about NATO and that they are highly supportive of European integration. We should look at where it is relevant and not where it's not. So I would not worry.

Hemispheres:
Would you say the Italian Communists present any specific cost to the Soviet Union?

Hoffmann:
Yes, I think so. I think the Soviets were probably rather happy with the French Communists. Largely on their own they decided to stay out of what might have been a very erratic experience. Whereas, if the Italian Communists shore up the Italian state and economy while still keeping it in NATO, this would serve as a bad example for the East Europeans. The reason the Soviets are less worried about Italy than they are about Spain is simply that unlike the Spanish, the Italian Communists have been very careful never to attack the Soviet Union directly for what the Soviets do at home.

Hemispheres:
Since you do not see communism rising in Europe, what do you feel the major problems confronting Europe are?

Hoffmann:
In the case of Italy it is not so much the rise of communism as the decline of the Christian Democrats. I think that the real problem is, if you like, not so much the Communist problem, as it is the difficulties all of the Western European governments have in doing something about their own economic and social problems. The French sociologist, Michel Crozier, in a collective book for the Trilateral Commission called *The Crisis of Democracy,* looks at the issue of governability in the U.S., Japan, and Western Europe. The point he makes, which has also been made by others, is that we have a kind of overload of circuits for all of these governments. None of them really has either the full support of their public or, even if they do, find it very difficult to control the economy because many of the instruments are no longer in their hands. Economies have become too interdependent, nobody can find a way of climbing out of the recession by himself. The main danger is the erosion of authority of governments all over Western Europe. Whether it is terrorism or just plain political impotence, this strikes me as a more serious problem to life than the communist one.

The West German Ostpolitik

Jack Spilsbury

Ostpolitik, a German word translated as "Eastern Politics" involves the stabilizing of West Germany's relationships with the communist states of Central and Eastern Europe. Specifically, it refers to the conciliatory foreign policy pursued toward East Germany and her Soviet bloc allies by Chancellor Willy Brandt in the late 1960's and early 1970's. Conciliation came as a reaction to twenty years of Cold War which had undermined West German security as well as her desire for a more flexible and vigorous foreign policy. Through the Ostpolitik West Germany finally came to grips with the reality of the German division and the full implication of her defeat in World War II. Furthermore, the Ostpolitik served as a vital tool in West Germany's progression from a state of political impotence to become an active, powerful force in Europe once again. This paper will trace the historical evolution from outright hostility toward the East through to the eventual normalization of relations under Brandt. In attempting to explain this radical reevaluation of policy it will be necessary to assess both domestic and international factors. Finally I will consider the goals behind Brandt's Ostpolitik and will attempt to measure their success.

The policy of Ostpolitik is inseparable from the century old question of the proper location for the German peoples in the established world order. The unification of the German nation in 1871 had upset the power balance in Central Europe and resulted in three wars of aggression in only seventy years. Inevitably European security in the post World War II years was considered in terms of the "German Question" in two contexts: first the question of legitimacy for the communist German Democratic Republic along with the prospects and implications of reunification, and second the question of West German security particularly in terms of the Soviet threat to West Berlin. Though proclaimed as only a temporary state in its "Basic Law" constitution, the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany was central to the "Cold War" hostility between East and West. Despite Germany's defeated position and devastation, a sense of power remained due to the potential return to European dominance through reunification. "The future of relations

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between the super powers of the world depended to a very high degree on the policies and attitudes of Germany, that was not a world power but whose interests were of world wide interest."[1] Throughout the international movement from Cold War to detente the Ostpolitik became a vital tool in West Germany's progression from a state of political impotence to an active, powerful force in Europe once again.

Adenauer Years

Konrad Adenauer, the Christian Democratic chancellor of the new West German state initiated a foreign policy governed by the harsh realities of the Cold War period. He understood that the Soviet occupied zone was lost to West Germany for an indeterminate future. "Accordingly, he set himself the high priority task of recovering the sovereignty of West Germany, which could not only be achieved through cooperation with the occupying Western powers."[2] Accepting the burden of the Nazi past, the new regime turned to alliance with the Western style liberal powers for aid in reconstruction. The consolidation of her new liberal democratic system took priority over even the desire for German reunification as an immediate goal.

The new regime's fervent anti-communism represented their desire to appeal to the Western allies, as well as their personal repudiation of the Soviet treatment of East Germany. The "Basic Law" rejected the legitimacy of the communist rule, insisting on sole representation of the German nation within the boundaries of 1937. Renouncing the G.D.R. as an affront to the principle of self-determination, Adenauer demanded free elections for a united Germany. But, the potential reunification with East Germany would be dictated by strict West German terms. The "Hallstein Doctrine" called for the severing of relations with any nation other than the U.S.S.R. that recognized the G.D.R., regarding this acknowledgment of the G.D.R. as a hostile act. This posture of strength was designed to isolate East Germany, demonstrating that its relationship with Russia was a liability that could be beneficially admonished.

Adenauer believed that only this firmly held position of superiority to East Germany could induce the Soviet Union to negotiate for German reunification. Therefore he turned his back on any contact with her fellow communist regimes in Eastern Europe. With respect to Poland, he refused to recognize the Oder-Neisse line as her western boundary with East Germany. Regarding Czechoslovakia, Adenauer was unwilling to renounce the 1938 Munich Agreement for German acquisition of the Sudetanland as a first step toward stabilization of their relations. "To

[1]Windsor, Philip, "West Germany in Divided Europe" *Foreign Policies of the Powers* (London: Faber, 1972), p. 238.
[2]Payne, J.P. *Germany Today* (London: Methuen Co. 1971), p. 3.

compromise these issues would have undermined his position of strength and weakened his policy of German reunficiation through diplomatic pressures before accommodation with the East could be considered."[3]

The West German "all or nothing policy" inevitably caused it to devote "all its energy and influence to having practically no foreign policy at all."[4] Its adamant stand precluded any reduction of tension that might legitimize the independent East German state. Though Russia had given the Federal Republic *de facto* recognition by exchanging ambassadors in 1955, she continued to berate West Germany as the main source of Eastern provocation. In a sense these verbal assaults camouflaged the Russians' acceptance of the German partition as the best antidote to German dominance: better Germany divided, than to risk a united Germany that could potentially swing the power balance toward either camp. Rather than assisting reunification as Adenauer had hoped, his intransigence only made the German partition completely impenetrable as evidenced by the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961.

Erhard Administration

The election of a new coalition government in the autumn of 1963 under Christian Democrat Ludwig Erhard brought on the first rumblings of change. Though Erhard preserved the basic principles of Adenauer's bargaining through strength including "Exclusive Representation" and the "Hallstein Doctrine," he did shift emphasis from outright hostility toward the cautious opening of contacts. Internally the smaller Free Democratic Party urged adjustment with the East as a price for coalition support. However, the motivation behind these openings stemmed from changes in the international political scene rather than from any real reevaluation of Adenauer's policy. Erhard was pushed by Washington's bridge building program and by DeGaulle's rapprochement with the communist camp raising the spectre of political settlement at West Germany's expense if she continued her inflexibility.

Liberalization began through a flurry of "trade diplomacy" sponsored by the West German Defense Minister, Gerhard Shroeder. Throughout 1963 and 1964 West Germany exchanged trade missions with all the Eastern European countries with the exception of Czechoslovakia. In the political realm Erhard moved toward cooperation short of diplomatic recognition, illustrated by the West German "Peace Notes" sent to 115 governments including those of Eastern Europe in March 1966. In these he devised the formula of "mutual non-

[3]Korbel, Josef, *Detente in Europe,* p. 144.
[4]Windsor, p. 240.

violence" that later served as the basis for the treaty to normalize relations with Russia. Simultaneously, these contacts were reinforced by cultural and semi-official exchanges precipitating a shift in the West German press toward detente.

Viewed from Moscow, the Erhard policy only intensified the German danger. Bonn appeared determined to secure concessions without making the slightest move towards accommodating the security interests of Eastern Europe. Since 1961 the existence of the Berlin Wall had stabilized the volatile internal condition of the G.D.R. Though still only officially recognized by communist states, East Germany was now economically sound, and well on her way to international respectability. By the end of 1966 it was clear that Erhard's cautious policy was no longer adequate. The Western powers were actively engaged in detente and losing interest in German reunification. In the words of Josef Korbel, "Instead of isolating the German Democratic Republic from the rest of the world, the Federal Republic faced the prospect of isolating itself."[5]

> "The Federal Republic alone advocated changes in the status quo which in the meantime all the super-powers were interested in keeping as it was."[6]

As the prospect for reunification on Christian Democratic terms proved untenable, public confidence in their foreign policy fell from 39% in 1959 to only 9% in 1966, leading to Erhard's fall from power in November.

"Deutschlandpolitik"

After heavy bargaining a new coalition was formed, this time between the Christian Democrats, led now by Kurt Georg Kiesenger, and the formerly excluded Social Democratic Party. Under the charismatic leadership of Willy Brandt, the Social Democrats demanded an Ostpolitik in line with Western detente as their terms of entrance. Hence Chancellor Kiesinger's first official declaration in December 1966 called for a reconciliation through pragmatic adjustment. He proclaimed that "each move towards normalization must be matched reciprocally and that the normalization of relations could be a valid intermediate goal to the final solution of the German Question."[7]

[5]Korbel, Josef, p. 147.
[6]Sontheimer, Kurt, *The Government and Politics of West Germany* (London: Hutchinson and Co., 1972), p. 183.
[7]Whetton, L.L. *Germany's Ostpolitik: Relations Between Federal Germany and the Warsaw Pact Countries* (London: Richardson, 1971), pg. 51.

At this time the resurgence of nationalism within the Warsaw Pact allowed for an extension of West German influence at East German expense. Consequently, Kiesenger modified the Hallstein Doctrine by opening diplomatic relations, first with Romania in January 1967, and then with Yugoslavia in January 1968. Meanwhile, in 1967, he had lifted the West German embargo on several thousand articles excluded from trade with the Soviet bloc. In addition, West German companies joined the communist governments in "co-production" schemes, trading technology and factory construction for credit ward purchasing the final products. The result was that "between 1958 and 1969 West Germany led all other Western Countries in trade with Eastern Europe both in import and export."[8] Thus, through the establishment of diplomatic and economic ties, relations with these communist states had been successfully separated from West Germany's continued refusal to recognize the German Democratic Republic.

In the realm of intra-German relations, Kiesenger submitted a statement in April 1967 of fifteen proposals for economic and commercial arrangements and cultural exchange. "The policy in question was based on a painful choice: not only was detente the only way of making progress on the German question, but West Germany was prepared to make unilateral concessions to bring it about, in the hope that one day it would be of benefit to all Germans."[9] East Germany was no longer to be isolated, but rather to be induced toward closer contact with the West through the lure of trade and cultural contact. Moreover, the inhuman separation of the German people would be countered by an increased mobility between the two states.

In relations with Poland, Kiesenger prepared to discuss the recognition of the Oder-Neisse line. The number of West Germans willing to accept the present frontier had risen from 8% in 1951 to 46% in 1967, until in 1969, 50% of the population supported the status quo.[10] The Czech Government continued to demand West German renunciation of the Munich Agreement *ab initia.* Kiesenger moved slowly towards an acceptance of the Czech position, but held off complete abjuration pending the status of the Sudetan Germans. Nevertheless, on August 3, 1967 an agreement was reached for the exchange of trade missions. On all fronts Kiesenger's government, spurred by Foreign Minister Willy Brandt, seemed to be moving towards a normalization of relations with the East.

However, it was in his "Deutschlandpolitik" that Kiesenger's policies eventually failed. Confronted by West German inroads into the Soviet bloc, the East German Head of State, Walter Ulbricht, denounced

[8]Korbel, p. 164.
[9]Grosser, Alfred, *Germany in our Time* (London: Penguin Books, 1970), p. 495.
[10]Korbel, p. 181.

Ostpolitik as an attempt to subvert and undermine his regime. Overtures toward political negotiations were met by ever more intense refusal. Ulbricht rejected any diplomacy, let alone reunification with what he termed "capitalist, militarist, revanchist West Germany." Only on the economic level did Kiesenger manager any progress as trade figures doubled from 1960 to 1969. This trend was guaranteed by a 1969 trade agreement that envisaged another doubling by 1975. Nevertheless, even these agreements were open to Ulbricht's caprice. By the end of the "Grand Coalition," political relations between the two states had reached an impasse.

> "It is hard to foresee any meaningful arrangement (one that inevitably presupposes such elements as a common foreign policy and a parallel economic and social development) between two countries that are by now so clearly identified with two different power systems, profess two mutually exclusive world outlooks, and whose economies are based on mutually incompatible principles."[11]

This was especially true regarding the continued insistence of the Kiesenger regime for reunification under their own liberal democratic system.

Then, compounding these problems, the Czech invasion by Russia on August 20, 1968 seemed to negate any progress in the Ostpolitik. Without any basis, the Soviets denounced the "Prague Spring" of liberalization as German motivated. The "Brezhnev Doctrine" rationalized the invasion as the "common cause of all communists [in] defending Czechoslovakia's independence and sovereignty as a socialist state."[12] Brezhnev was attempting to subject the Warsaw Pact countries to Russia's broader strategic interests through this policy of limited sovereignty. Ulbricht, in turn, used this West German-Czech scenario to justify his own hard line policies.

The Grand Coalition had certainly laid the groundwork for relations with Eastern Europe. Its remarkable achievements in trade and cultural areas served as an avenue for later political cooperation. This shift did not occur in a vacuum. By 1967, 90% of the population favored direct negotiation with the G.D.R. and 36% favored recognition. "By 1969 it appears that the majority of West Germans, if not reconciled, could see no viable alternative to an indefinate existence of two German states, and for the benefit of detente they were not willing to press for reunification."[13] Yet, even in May 1969, 52% were not ready to go as far as a formal recognition of East Germany. This debate

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 181.
[12] Whetton, p. 93.
[13] Korbel, p. 197.

led to polarization in the election campaign of 1969. The Christian Democrats remained cautious on Ostpolitik, appealing to conservative voters by stressing the Eastern threat to German security. The Social Democrats under Brandt countered with proposals for regulated co-existence.

Brandt's Ostpolitik

Willy Brandt captured a narrow victory in coalition with the Free Democratic Party. He quickly took advantage of the changing atmosphere at home and in the East to probe for accommodation. Brandt's first foreign policy declaration in October 1969 recognized the existence of two German states and called for a "modus vivendi." In Eastern Europe the price was security; in the Soviet Union it was stability within its post-war sphere of influence.

In the aftermath of the Czech crisis, Brandt realized that headway could only begin through rapprochement with the Soviet Union. By adopting a conciliatory approach, Brandt destroyed the utility of the German threat as a means of uniting the Warsaw Pact countries in fear behind Russia. Above all, he made it clear that West Germany was not seeking to stir up dissension within the Soviet bloc. Spurred by economic needs for western technology and commodities, the March 1969 Warsaw Pact summit meeting finally dropped its vindictive denunciations of "militarism and neo-Nazism" in West Germany. At the Moscow meeting in December, the communist leaders endorsed bilateral East-West negotiations, establishing a "division of labor among pact members." "Accordingly, East Germany would concentrate on legal recognition, Poland on border issues, Hungary on a European Security Conference, Czechoslovakia on abrogation of the Munich Agreement, and the Soviet Union on the renunciation of force agreement with Germany and on the strategic questions with the U.S."[14] By placing all these bilateral treaties under one heading, the Soviet Union asserted herself as the leader of the unified solution to the German problem. Brandt had persuaded the Russian leaders that negotiation was the best means for maintaining Pact predominance.

An exchange of official notes culminated in the signing of the "Moscow Treaty" on August 12, 1970, less than twelve months after Brandt had become Chancellor. It consisted of only five articles: a commitment to normalize relations on both sides, a pledge to respect the principles of the United Nations in their mutual relations, a promise not to violate European boundaries, and lastly an agreement that the treaty would not come into effect until after ratification. The German's had finally con-

[14]Whetton, P. 103.

ceded to Soviet demands for a legal confirmation of the status quo. This included not only the Oder-Neisse line with Poland, but also the boundary with East Germany, implicitly recognizing her existence. In return the Soviet regime agreed to treat the formal recognition of the G.D.R. as a separate issue, no longer prerequisite to normalization.

The Federal Republic secured its own objectives through a series of letters and official statements. First, they reasserted their aim to "work towards a condition of peace in Europe in which the German nation attains its unity again in free self-determination."[15] Second, a letter sent to the United States, Britain, and France confirmed their responsibility for the defense of Germany and especially Berlin. Finally, the "Bayh papers," formulated with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, declared West Germany's willingness to sign non-aggression pacts with the other communist countries including even East Germany.

At the same time, Brandt forcefully advised the Soviets that the treaty could not be ratified without a satisfactory settlement on Berlin. West German Foreign Minister Walter Scheel described this event as the hinge on which the whole range of treaties rested.

> "The entirety is after all an attempt to achieve an effective detente in Europe — and one cannot speak of detente as long as tensions in Berlin are not solved."[16]

Bowing to pressure, the ambassadors of the four World War II powers opened negotiations on political and technical matters concerning the city in March of 1970.

A Quadrapartite agreement on Berlin was finally signed on September 3, 1971. Significantly, it reaffirmed the Four Power rights and responsibilities, thus renewing Soviet accountability for East German actions toward Berlin. Though it denied the Federal Republic sovereignty over West Berlin, it did accept their *de facto* relationship including application of West German laws, presence of their authorities, and acceptance of a wide range of existing political, economic, and social ties. Furthermore, it guaranteed that West German transit through the G.D.R. territory "will be unimpeded, conveyance sealed before departure." This put an end to the harassment of Western communication as a tool for East German political pressure. Finally the agreement pronounced that "communcation between West Berlin, and East Berlin and East Germany, will be improved and that residents of West Berlin will be able to travel to and visit such areas for compassionate, family, religious, cultural, or commercial reasons or as tourists."[17] The Russian pledge to respect the

[15]Korbel, p. 197.
[16]Whetton, p. 103.
[17]Korbel, p. 223.

territorial anomaly of West Berlin as a part of the status quo created a test case for humanitarian relations with the communists.

In the meantime, negotiations with Poland had led to the signing of the "Warsaw Treaty" for normalization of Polish-German relations on December 7, 1970. It incorporated Bonn's policy of "force renunciation" with an affirmation of mutual territorial integrity. By renouncing Germany's claim on its former Eastern Territories, Brandt gave a *de facto* recognition to the Oder-Neisse boundary in lieu of a Four Power Treaty. In concession, the Polish government communicated "information on measures for a solution of humanitarian problems." Article Four of the treaty pledged "further steps toward a full normalization and a cooperative development of their mutual relations." Then, a non-legal statement by the Poles advised "that people of indisputable ethnic German origin who wish to leave for either of the two German states may do so and that considerations will be given also to mixed and separated families."[18] By January 1971 they had already released 3,300 emigrees and by 1975 emmigration had surpassed 100,000.[19] The signing of another package of agreements in October 1975 allowed for increased emmigration, but only in return for a low interest economic loan. Even in view of these humanitarian gains, the Warsaw Treaty was not really a triumph for West Germany. Rather, it represented the end of a lost struggle. With yet another opening into Eastern Europe, West Germany was well on the way to a more flexible foreign policy.

Regarding Czechoslovakia, Brandt delayed until after the settlements with the other Soviet bloc states. The main questions to be resolved dealt with the legal relationship of the Sudetan Germans to the Czech state between 1938 and 1945 in order to determine the legal responsibilities of the governments for property compensation due to their expulsion. Brandt's policy stressed the invalidity of the Munich Agreement from a moral standpoint, avoiding the question of its historical application. The Husak government in Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, was consistently ambiuous, calling for talks, while continuing a hostile campaign against "West German revanchist policy." However, a step towards political contact was taken in November 1970 with a five year economic agreement. Czechoslovakia eventually tired of her odd man out position within the Soviet bloc. Under pressure from Soviet detente and her own economic need, Czechoslovakia signed the "normalization treaty" in 1973, allowing for formal recognition and an exchange of ambassadors. The agreement left both sides with their respective interpretations of what happened at "Munich," while calling for German reparations and assumption of responsibility for the Sudetan expellees. This served "for Czechoslovakia, a demonstration of the legitimacy of her rule, and for

[18]*Ibid.*, p. 232.
[19]Haftendorn, Helga, "Ostpolitik Revisited 1976" *The World Today,* June 1976, p. 1222.

West Germany as evidence that she was prepared to cope with the most intractable legacy of World War II."[20]

Relations with the G.D.R. were left as the last stumbling block for a real solution of the "German Problem." The post-war period had proved that "The Federal Republic could neither turn Eastern Europe against the G.D.R., nor cultivate relations with the other socialist countries as if the German problem did not exist."[21] Now, with East European security assured, the question of German relations could be dealth with without raising the bogy of German revisionism. Assisted by the Soviets, Brandt pushed for a treaty of equal coexistence that would emphasize humane relations between "the two states of one German nation."

Under pressure, East Germany accepted a historic first meeting between Brandt and the East German Foreign Minister Willy Stoph at Erfurt in East Germany during March of 1970. Besides allowing for an airing of their respective stances, this meeting was significant for taking up the challenge of a peaceful relationship. But, a second meeting at Kassel in West Germany displayed the persistent tension and conflict between their two positions. Moreover, Brandt's enthusiastic reception by the East German crowds at Erfurt only pointed further to the danger of contact with a popular alternative German leader. But, despite these fears, "once the Soviet-West German relations were put on a treaty basis, the East German leader's course was determined."[22] Ulbricht ultimately realized this and retreated from his extremism. After his death in 1971, his chosen successor Erich Honecker bowed to Soviet pressure. In the autumn of 1970 negotiations were opened with West Germany.

The "Basic Treaty" for normalization of relations between the two Germanies was signed on November 8, 1972. West Germany thereby conceded that the German Democratic Republic was a legal, legitimate state, with whom she would have formal diplomatic relations. Both states declared the inviolability of existing borders and committed themselves to unqualified respect for each other's territorial integrity. Lastly, they agreed to apply for membership in the United Nations and other existing international organizations on a basis of equality. This was a major concession to the G.D.R. whose international stature had always suffered in comparison with West Germany. The only concession that Brandt received for his radical shift was a pledge to recognize the integrity of the German nation as a whole. When they exchanged representatives, they were referred to instead as "High Commissioners," rather than as ambassadors in order to represent the special status of

[20]Dean, Robert W. "Bonn-Prague Relations: The Politics of Renunciation," *The World Today:* April 1973, p. 149.
[21]Whetton, p. 148.
[22]Korbel, p. 242.

their single national relationship. Through these subtleties, Brandt hoped to retain the right to criticize internal affairs within the other state of the German nation.

An acceptance of the status quo was central to the settlement of the "German Question." However, the two states still differed fundamentally on whether this existing reality should be taken as a final stage of development or whether as Brandt hoped, it would be the starting point for the idea of community within the greater nation. By 1972 events had gone so far that East Germany could not have been excluded from international politics for much longer. Brandt's Ostpolitik was a concession to this incontestable reality. He hoped that by strengthening the G.D.R. position its leaders would feel safer in adopting a more open policy to the West and possibly even liberalizing internal affairs. After its signing Brandt declared that, "With this treaty is lost nothing that wasn't lost long ago. We have the courage to open a new page in History."[23] The "Basic Treaty" was only ratified after a heated political debate. But, Brandt's landslide victory in the November 1972 elections seemed to confirm the desire to sweep aside the confrontation of the Cold War.

East Germany, on the other hand, only submitted to detente in as far as Soviet policy demanded. They feared the internal concessions given up in exchange for a more positive foreign policy stature. Though certain progress in the flow of goods, persons, and information was guaranteed by the April 1972 "Traffic Treaty," the East German reaction as a whole has been a great disappointment to the West. Instead of liberalizing her regime, East Germany instead used her consolidation as an excuse to return to earlier intransigence. She apparently viewed the "Basic Treaty" as a less significant part of a treaty structure formulated by Moscow, and demanding little of herself. Fearing ideological competition from the West, Honecker devised a doctrine of presupposed delimitation, or frontiering off of West Germany, Called "Abgrenzung," this policy was justified in terms of the class struggle between the two opposing state systems. Though accepting economic and diplomatic ties, Honecker has rejected the tenet that these should in any way lead to political or cultural bonds. Exchanges are tolerated on an official governmental level only. It is her lack of internal liberalization that precludes a more open relationship. "The G.D.R. cannot humanize the partition until she liberalizes her rule and bridges the economic gap — processes that are unlikely to be completed in this decade.[24]

[23]Freund, Michael, *From Cold War to Ostpolitik* (London: Oscar Wolf, 1971), p. 122.
[24]Whetton, p. 120.

Conclusion

Ostpolitik has clearly not lived up to all that Brandt had hoped for. Even the remarkable trade has been critized for being one-sided and for failing to wedge open cultural contacts. In the end though, the Ostpolitik will stand or fall on its ability to attain a true state of peaceful coexistence. Brandt's policy represented a decision that unity was not worth the price of war, and that the continued illusion that it might someday materialize was not worth continued instability on the Eastern frontier. The assurances of non-aggression and territorial integrity seem to have provided this volatile area with a new found security that might be considered almost priceless, especially when one recalls the hysterical mood of the Berlin Blockade in 1949 and the later Berlin Crisis of 1961. Further, Russia's public avowal that the Federal Republic, of itself, could no longer be regarded as an aggressive, revanchist state should not be underestimated.

West Germany has successfully capitalized on this more positive role as a peace-making state. Free of Communist denunciation and one-sided dependence on her Western allies for support over reunification, Bonn has been able to develop a more flexible and assertive foreign policy. Furthermore, on the psychological level, "the recognition of the G.D.R. has meant for the first time that it is possible to recognize the Federal Republic. It has begun to make possible the development of a specifically West German nationalism and thus greatly enhanced her chances of political stability."[25] Her acceptance of the status quo was in reality an acceptance of her own permanence and legitimacy.

The Ostpolitik must be commended for coming to terms with the incongruities left by the Second World War. Adenauer's insistence on democratic reunification through the singular support of his staunch, new allies from the West, had gone as far as it could go. West Germany's complete isolation from her Eastern neighbors had become increasingly uncomfortable and unrealistic. As a politician of this "New Germany," Willy Brandt revised Adenauer's rapprochement with the West to include for the first time friendly relations with the Soviet bloc. Since the signing of the "Basic Treaty" the Ostpolitik has come to a virtual standstill. Perhaps it was unrealistic to have expected anything more. The main areas of contention had been settled, and both sides turned to their own alliance partners in an attempt at a multi-lateral shoring up of their internal security and defense. Since 1972, the Federal Republic's Ostpolitik has been overshadowed by this "Westpolitik" directed toward West Germany's status within N.A.T.O. and the European Community, but finally reinforced by this new sense of flexibility and self-assertion.

[25]Patterson, W.E. "Foreign Policy and Stability in West Germany," *International Affairs,* July 1973, p. 425.

China's Response to ASEAN

Dave Timberman

The response of the People's Republic of China to the development of the Southeast Asian regionalism, represented by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) offers a unique and intriguing opportunity to evaluate some of the priorities and motivations of Chinese foreign policy due to the diverse, if not ambiguous nature of the Association. Although ASEAN is now in its eleventh year, the true identity of ASEAN is still subject to debate — not only externally, among the nations and organizations that are beginning to accept the reality of the Association, but internally as well, among the five ASEAN nations themselves. The spectrum of perceptions of ASEAN is a broad and colorful one. To some, ASEAN is not much more than another insignificant regional grouping based on little more than rhetoric and wishful thinking. To others, it is a quasi-military pact between oppressive regimes; and in yet another view, it is nothing less than the Asian equivalent of the European Economic Community. Amid this forest of truths and half-truths, it is necessary to single out three obvious and relatively indisputable characteristics that are likely to shape the perception and response from the P.R.C.

First, ASEAN is a developing regional association of five Southeast Asian nations (Indonesia, Malaysia, The Philippines, Singapore and Thailand). Its stated primary purpose is to "... accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region through joint endeavours in the spirit of equality and partnership in order to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of South-East Asian nations..."[1]

Second, ASEAN is an association of noncommunist, but increasingly nonaligned nations who have stated that:

> ...all foreign bases are temporary and remain only with the expressed concurrence of the countries concerned and are not intended to be used directly or indirectly to subvert the national independence and freedom of the States in the area..."[2]

Dave Timberman wrote this paper while studying in Hong Kong in the spring of 1977. A senior political science major, Mr. Timberman is interested in Southeast Asian affairs.

[1] The ASEAN Declaration, August 18, 1967.
[2] *Ibid.*

Third, due largely to the course of international events, ASEAN is beginning to represent a new type of indigenous and potentially viable Asian organization that seeks to ". . . secure the recognition of, and respect for, Southeast Asia as a zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, free from any form or manner of interference by outside powers. . ."[3]

In light of the above characteristics the manner in which the Chinese perceive ASEAN and react to it illuminates a number of recurrent themes and problems of Chinese foreign policy. For example, is China's reaction to an organization of developing nations located within China's own region, consistent with the PRC's declared support of other Third World nations and organizations? Furthermore, how do the Chinese react to this same organization when its members are virulently and actively anti-communist in their domestic affairs, but seek accommodation with Peking in international affairs? And finally, consider China's response to this fledgling regional grouping and how it has been altered by the sudden involvement or exclusion of the two superpowers in the region?

Thus, this is not a study of ASEAN per se. However, implicit in the following discussion is the assumption that, despite the discouraging inactivity of ASEAN during most of its first eight years, the past two years have witnessed significant development of the Association, and that the future is even more promising. As Derek Davies and Deuzil Peiris observed in 1977:

> Today, government officials, diplomats, and even bankers and businessmen are no longer discussing problems — whether on trade, politics, investment, or security — from a narrow nationalistic viewpoint. Instead, such matters are debated primarily as problems faced by ASEAN, to be dealt with and hopefully solved within the Association's framework. The most important ingredient of international cooperation — a general belief on the part of policy — and decision-makers in the inevitability and advantages of ASEAN has been created.[4]

Given the still highly tentative nature of most ASEAN projects, this interpretation of Davis and Peiris may be overblown journalism; but in international politics, the mood and perceptions are often as important as the reality.

Historical Perspective

ASEAN came into existence with the signing of the ASEAN or Bangkok Declaration on August 8, 1967. It was signed by the Foreign Ministers of

[3]The Kuala Lumpur Declaration, November 27, 1971.
[4]*Far Eastern Economic Review,* February 18, 1977. p. 25.

Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Despite the establishment of ministerial meetings, trade and cultural committees, and a Secretariat, the Declaration cannot be viewed as much more than a vague, but laudable statement of general intent. Furthermore, the degree to which the U.S. was involved in ASEAN's formation was minimal, because the U.S. was generally disinterested.

To the Chinese however, there was little or no doubt about the instrumental role that the U.S. played in initiating the Association. More importantly, the Chinese perceived the fundamentally anti-Communist, anti-Chinese nature of ASEAN due to U.S. influence. The implications of the Bangkok Declaration as published in a *New China News Agency* article of August 9, 1967 evaluated this stance:

> The declaration revealed its cloven-hoof by indicating that "cooperation in the economic, cultural and other fields is merely a cover. It said that the alliance would "maintain close and beneficial cooperation" with the existing international and regional organizations which oppose China and oppose communism and would "explore all avenues for even closer cooperation among themselves." Defending flagrantly the building of aggressive military bases in Southeast Asia by U.S. imperialism, the declaration asserted that "all foreign bases in the area were temporary" and "were not intended to be used directly or indirectly to subvert the national independence and freedom of States in the area." This amounts to an admission that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations "is only the twin brother of the SEATO and part of U.S. imperialism's ring of encirclement around China."[5]

China's condemnation of ASEAN as just "another instrument fashioned by U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism for pursuing neocolonialist ends in Asia" was echoed further in a *Peking Review* article of August 18, 1967. Neglecting to quote the ASEAN Declaration, the *Review* stated that ". . . the alliance of U.S. stooges openly supported the existence of U.S. military bases in Southeast Asia, not even bothering to make excuses for them," and concluded that ". . . all this proves that this reactionary association formed in the name of "economic cooperation is a military alliance directed against China."[6]

What prompted so vehement an attack on such an ostensibly innocuous organization as ASEAN? The sources of Peking's motivations may be illustrated by examining the particular time period. In 1967, the U.S. presence in Asia remained extensive, with little sign of a reduction in the near future. This perception began to change with the 1968 Tet Offensive in Vietnam and the withdrawal of British forces from Singapore in 1971.

[5] *Survey of China Mainland Press,* August 14, 1967. p. 41.
[6] *Peking Review,* August 18, 1967. pp. 39-40.

During the Vietnam War, the U.S. had stationed forces in the Philippines and Thailand, both members of SEATO. In many respects Southeast Asia could be regarded as an American basin. Furthermore, of the five ASEAN nations only one, Indonesia, had established diplomatic relations with the PRC; Indonesia, however, had suspended relations in 1967, after an attempted coup in 1965 when it was purported that the endeavor was supported by Peking. At the same time the ASEAN governments were busy suppressing active or residual communist led insurgencies supported (at least verbally) by the Chinese. Finally, the PRC was in the throes of the Cultural Revolution which was radicalizing all aspects of Chinese politics, society, and her foreign policy as well.

Peking's Attitude Reformed

The withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Asian mainland following the Vietnam War concluded ASEAN's period of dormancy. Amongst the Chinese, a new attitude gradually emerged toward the Association. Precisely when the Chinese position began to change is difficult to discern — largely because (with the significant exception of the Kuala Lumpur Declaration in November 1971), ASEAN had done little that was important enough to elicit any comment. The first hint of China's reconsideration of ASEAN was made public on June 19, 1973. On that day, Pan Wannanethi, a Thai deputy undersecretary of state, said that during discussions with Chen Ji-sheng, China's Director of Southeast Asian Affairs, Chen had indicated that Peking welcomed ASEAN's Kuala Lumpur Declaration of "peace, freedom and neutrality," and that the idea of a neutralized Southeast Asia corresponded with Peking's own view that no power should dominate the region.[7] In December 1974 this initial statement of China's recognition of the Kuala Lumpur Declaration was further substantiated, this time, by the Thai Foreign Minister.[8] It is interesting and revealing that it took eighteen months for China to acknowledge a proposal which appeared consistent with the PRC's own prior declarations, and even then with little more than a whisper.

In August 1975, Peking made the first public pronouncement of its new attitude towards ASEAN. In a substantial article of August 15, the *Peking Review* (almost 8 years after the *Review* condemned ASEAN as a tool of America's anti-communism) commended ASEAN for leading

[7]Vanderkroef, Justus M., "ASEAN's Security Needs and Policies," *Pacific Affairs* 47 (Summer 1974), p. 162.

[8]*Far Eastern Economic Review Asia Yearbook 1976* (Hong Kong, Far Eastern Economic Review, Ltd., 1976), p. 34.

the battle against attempted (i.e. Soviet) hegemonism in the region. ASEAN was described in glowing terms:

> Over the years the five ASEAN countries, intent on speeding up the neutralization of Southeast Asia, have forged closer relations among themselves, strengthened their economic cooperation, actively developed relations of friendship and cooperation with other Third World countries. Together with them, they pressed forward their struggle to oppose superpower hegemonism and power politics and safeguard their national independence, sovereignty and economic rights and interests. This shows that the proposal for a zone of neutrality in Southeast Asia reflects the desire of countries and people in the region to rid themselves of superpower interference and control, and thus has won the sympathy and support of many Third World countries.

The important point here is that the new found Chinese support of ASEAN is not based primarily on the inherent merits of ASEAN's regional or developmental goals, because they had not changed significantly since 1971. Instead, the most important factor which prompted China's change was the profound shift in the regional balance of power that was ushered in by the collapse of South Vietnam in April, 1975. This event effectively ended the "American Era" in Southeast Asia. The fall of Saigon was followed closely by the establishment of diplomatic relations between the PRC and Malaysia, as well as the Philippines and Thailand. Thus by mid 1975 ASEAN had gained Peking's support as an acceptable alternative to the designs of Moscow in the region, that were exemplified by the continued Soviet attempts to create an Asian "collective security system" with Soviet participation. The article reflected Peking's apprehension as well:

> Countries in Southeast Asia have long discerned Soviet social-imperialism's machinations to supplant U.s. imperialism and establish hegemony in Southeast Asia. They are keeping their vigilance sharp. They are determined to prevent a situation in which the tiger is let in through the back door while the wolf is repulsed at the front gate.[10]

Peking: Another Subtle Change

A subtle, but nevertheless noteworthy shift in China's attitude towards ASEAN has occurred over the past two years. Peking's apprehension

[9] *Peking Review,* August 15, 1975. p. 20.
[10] *Ibid.*, p. 21.

of the Soviet proposal for an Asian collective security system, and the fear that it might be embraced by the Asian nations, prompted her initial support of ASEAN. By 1976, it was clear to both Peking and Moscow that the Asian nations in general, and ASEAN in particular, were not yet in support of the Soviet's vague and relatively suspicious plans for the region. As a result of this realization, the Chinese seemed less preoccupied with generating criticism of the Soviet plan. Instead, they have turned their attention to espousing and castigating the growing economic threat posed by the Soviet Union. Once again, ASEAN was lauded for its efforts to oppose the sinister Soviet designs. On January 18, 1976 Peking broadcasted (in Thai) a review of ASEAN's activities of the preceding year. In the broadcast Peking said:

> In the past year, the five ASEAN nations have strengthened regional cooperation in economic fields and won successive victories in their common struggle against hegemonism and against the superpowers' efforts to cause others to suffer the consequences of economic crises and in their effort to protect national economic rights and interests . . . (They) have increasingly realized that, in order to safeguard national independence and sovereignty, they must first develop an independent and self-reliant economy . . . The close cooperation among the five ASEAN nations is developing the regional economy and has dealt a heavy blow to economic hegemonism by the superpowers.[11]

Conclusion

The difference between China's initial response to ASEAN eight years prior, and her present position is vast. However, given the profound changes in the region during the past decade, China's shift is not unexpected. China has normalized relations with all five ASEAN nations, which had been described previously as reactionary stooges of U.S. imperialism. It may be assumed that in the course of normalization the Chinese have agreed to mute their support of communist insurgencies in the ASEAN nations, although support on the intra-party level has not ceased entirely. Today, little or no mention is made of the continued U.S. presence in the Philippines, whereas in 1967, America's "temporary" bases were denounced as evidence of the aggressively anti-Chinese nature of ASEAN. Finally, ASEAN's proposals for making the region a zone of free trade and of peace, freedom, and neutrality, though previously ignored by Peking, are providing a viable and acceptable alternative to, and check upon, the expansion of Soviet influence in the region.

[11] *Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report: The People's Republic of China,* January 23, 1976; p. 49.

The portrait that emerges of Chinese Foreign Policy in the Asian region is captured well in the findings of Peter Van Ness. In his study entitled *Revolution and Change in Chinese Foreign Policy,* he concluded:

> Like it or not, Peking must in its foreign relations deal with other countries primarily as states and governments . . . By and large, most of the benefits to be derived from international intercourse almost inevitably involve foreign governments (beneficial trade relations, advantageous diplomatic alliances, security arrangements with neighboring countries to protect vulnerable borders, and the like). . . . The special context of international politics demands a commitment to state self-interest if the societies are to survive.[12]

China's self-interests are as real, as diverse, and just as strong as those of any other nation; her commitment to World Revolution; notwithstanding, she has adopted methods of protecting and furthering her self-interests, which are flexible and pragmatic. Securing an Asia free from the domination of the world's major powers is one of the PRC's primary interests. As long as Peking feels that ASEAN is helping to further this goal, the Chinese response to ASEAN will continue to be favorable.

[12]Peter Van Ness, *Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy* (Berkeley, California, University of California Press, 1970), p. 250.

External Debt Situation in LDCs

Thomas Peters

In recent years, the governments of Less Developed Countries have been borrowing increasing amounts of money. The debt that they have accumulated is external public debt. External public debt does not include the borrowings of the private sectors in a country, rather it is that debt which is owed and guaranteed by the federal government. This debt has grown enormously in recent years to the point where repayment is becoming a serious problem.

Less Developed Countries must go into the world market to borrow money because their people are so poor that it is impossible to generate savings for investment; and with a host of serious problems ranging from health to lack of technology intelligent investment is the keystone of all development.

Today, there are two main sources of funds for the LDCs — official and private funds. The official funds include bilateral aid agreements and loans from multinational development banks such as the World Bank, the InterAmerican Development Bank, and the Asian Bank. Since these banks were set up to aid the development process their loans to LDCs are made at a rate lower than the commercial rate, and are therefore concessional.

The other sources of funds for the LDCs are private commercial banks, or the eurocurrency market. Commercial banks are becoming an increasingly important source of capital for the LDCs. In 1972, for instance, total debt of Non-Oil Developing Countries* to banks was $10.95 billion. By 1975 this total had shot up to $32 billion. This is a full 30 percent of the NODC's debt.

Debt in itself is not a bad thing. Countries can finance needed projects with it and the returns generated can be used to finance interest payments. As a temporary expedient to bridge short-run dislocations in an economy debt can be essential. Nevertheless, external debt can pose a variety of problems. In particular, the cost of a loan exceeds the benefit if:

1) marginal yield is lower than marginal cost

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[1] *World Bank annual report, 1977,* p. 111.

2) a long pay-off period puts returns too far in the future
3) consumption rather than investment accounts for much of the use
4) the transfer of the loan's benefits into foreign exchange does not occur fast enough to service the debt
5) the fiscal regime does not raise enough revenue to service public sector debt[2]

If debt repayments reach an unmanageable level many of the poor countries face the prospect of becoming net capital exporters rather than borrowers; that is the return flow of capital to the rich countries will be greater than the gross lending from the rich countries. The economic, let alone political repercussions of such a situation would be staggering. Countries also have the option of defaulting, but this carries the possibility of losing all future credit, and of throwing the eurocurrency markets into panic.

The problem of debt relief is serious. Even in 1967, before the OPEC price rise and world-wide recession, the Development Assistance Committee estimated that $14.4 billion was lent to the NODCs, but that $4.7 billion was sent back to official and private lenders in the form of debt service payments. Thus, nearly 33 percent of foreign lending was offset by debt payments. The reverse flow of capital to the private lenders was particularly large. Estimates by the World Bank for 1967 indicated that debt service payments on private loans to LDCs exceeded the gross flow of new lending by 18 percent or $200 million. This indicates that the net flows to the LDCs were negative!

Ever since WWII, loans from the rich nations to the LDCs have been growing. As early as 1967, some were looking with increasing alarm at the debt service situation of many LDCs. One of the first was Charles Frank who pointed out that between 1957 and 1967 11 countries had asked for relief from their creditors through rescheduling of debt service payments. As both the debt service payments and the total debt burden for LDCs were continuing to rise, Frank expressed great concern over this situation.[3]

Oil and LDC Debt

What Frank did not foresee was the sixfold increase in the price of oil, and the world-wide recession that were to characterize the years of 1973 and 1974. The increase in the price of oil led LDCs to borrow even more foreign exchange in order to import oil. Since this increased borrowing was geared mainly toward consumption and not investment,

[2]Whellons, p. 42.
[3]Frank, p. 27.

there will be little return on it and the possibility of paying the money back is dubious.

The world-wide recession in 1973 hit the LDCs hard, particularly those whose exports were not diversified. These countries saw the demand for their exports plummet, and the terms of trade they faced adversely affected. Some, like Zaire and Peru (copper exporters), have already been forced to reschedule their debt payments.

The Increasing Role of Private Banks

Private banks comprised only 10 percent of the NODC external debt total in 1967. Now private banks represent over 30 percent of the external debt total and the percentage appears to be on the rise. This phenomenon is of great concern because of the hardness of the private bank loans as compared to loans from multilateral or bilateral agencies. The hardness of a loan is determined by the interest rate, the maturity, and the grace period (the grace period is the initial period in which no amortization payments are required, only interest payments). The terms of private bank loans are much harder because official lenders make loans for development — whereas private lenders do so for profit. Loans from official agencies can have a payback period as high as 40 years with ten year grace periods and low interest rates. Loans from commercial banks typically will not exceed five years, have no grace period and will have a high interest rate. There is also virtually no regulation on banks that lend money across national borders. This enables them to charge very high interest and have very low reserve requirements.

In spite of the hardness of their terms private banks become responsible for 30 percent of the credit to NODC, with this percentage on the rise. The reason for this lies predominantly in the OPEC price rise. In 1972, borrowing by NODCs was only $50 billion. In 1975 it was $90 billion.[3] Most of this additional borrowing by the LDCs was necessitated by the rise in the price of oil. The price rise also was responsible for the accumulation of large foreign reserve surpluses in the OPEC countries which they tended to deposit in commercial banks. Thus, the commercial banks, liquid in petrodollars, were anxious to lend them to the NODCs at high rates of interest and management fees.

The NODCs were forced to go to the private banks because official agencies simply did not have enough capital to finance the tremendous demand in loans. For example, the World Bank has less than ⅓ the assets of Citicorp, a private commercial bank. The NODCs were willing to accept the harsh loan terms of the banks because the alternative was to cut down on oil consumption or other imports.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 32.
[3] *World Bank annual report, 1977*, p. 108.

Measuring External Debt

As mentioned above, the external debt of the NODCs was $90 billion in 1975, up from $50 billion in 1972 and $14 billion in 1967. This figure in itself means little until it is compared with the amount of export earnings a country has to service its debt. The ratio of debt service payments to export earnings is useful for determining the capacity of a country to service its debt. This ratio is called the debt service ratio.

A high debt service ratio implies that a country is very vulnerable to fluctuations in export earnings. A country's capacity to import is related to the excess of foreign exchange earnings above debt service obligations. Thus, if the debt service ratio is high, a given percentage drop in foreign exchange earnings lowers the country's capacity to import by an even greater amount, because the country must pay the debt back anyway. If an NODC is dependent on imports to acquire many of its capital goods (as many who practice import substitution are), a reduction can reduce the rate of investment. With an accelerator effect, the growth of the economy can be slowed substantially.

A look at some of the debt service ratios of the NODCs is helpful in ascertaining the seriousness of the problem. The undisputed worst debt service ratio belonged to Uruguay, which had to pay back 45.9 percent of her export earnings to lending agencies in 1975. Seven other countries had debt service ratios of above 20 percent. This is compared to 1971 when only four countries had debt service ratios above 20 percent.[6]

Whereas the debt service ratio is a good indicator of the likelihood of a particular country having difficulty in financing its debt, or even defaulting, it is not necessarily the best indicator. The ratio only tells us how much foreign exchange is free to purchase imports. If a country can limit their import demand, a high debt service ratio can be maintained. A country with a good credit rating can also borrow in the short-run and maintain their debt service ratio. Indicative of this are Mexico and Israel, who did not default despite debt service ratios of 39 and 26 percent respectively. Conversely, Bolivia, Brazil, Columbia, Cuba, Peru and Uruguay defaulted in 1931-33 with relatively low debt service ratios of 16-20 percent.

A New Indicator of the Need for Debt Relief

A better indicator of a country's ability to pay back their debt is a function proposed by William Cline and Charles Frank, which com-

[6]*Ibid.*, pp. 112-113.
[7]Frank, p. 33.

bines the debt service ratio with the average maturity of all the country's debts. The higher the debt service ratio, the shorter the maturity of the debt must be if a country is going to have a good chance of paying the loan back. If the debt service ratio is lower, the maturity of the debt need not be as short. In other words, a country can afford to pay out a high percentage of its export earnings only for a short period of time.

Cline and Frank predict that if the average maturity of debt is about 30 years (like India), a debt service ratio of no greater than 18.3 can be maintained. If, however, the average maturity is 8 years (as in Mexico) a debt service ratio of up to 25.1 can be maintained. If a country exceeds the critical value, Frank and Cline maintain, the likelihood that debt relief will be sought is great.[8]

Using the function for 1970, it was predicted that six countries would have to reschedule their debt in a sample taken of 24 countries. In fact, three of those countries rescheduled. In 1976, in a sample of 25 countries, it was predicted that nine countries would reschedule. Six of those countries did reschedule.

The debt service problems have not reached the crisis proportion envisioned by the Frank-Cline function because LDCs are both relying increasingly on private sources for funds and are less willing to risk their creditworthiness than they were 10-15 years ago. Moreover, governments today have better debt information and can command more effective policy than they could ten years ago. Improved access to private funds enables countries to roll over (refinance) bank credits so that temporary problems (e.g. bunching of maturities) can be dealt with. Also, direct aid from OPEC to countries such as Egypt and Pakistan have forestalled multilateral rescheduling.[9] All of these factors do not change the debt service ratio or average debt maturity, but they do make countries more willing and able to service their debts without defaults or rescheduling. This does not suggest a long-term lessening of possibility of default but it does indicate a relative short-run calm that might enable the adoption of longer term policies which will pose a more permanent solution.

The Effect of Inflation

Other factors, primarily inflation and the increase in export revenues, have also mitigated the problem of debt. The export prices of the higher and middle income countries rose 73 percent in four years (1972-1976). This inflation was not anticipated and a substantial easing of the burden of servicing past debt occurred. If inflation is taken into account, the real

[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 31-36.
[9] Smith, pp. 24-26.

debt service payments for the LDCs were reduced by 36 percent.[10] However, import costs and interest rates have also risen, partially offsetting this trend.

Inflation has reduced the present value of debt service payments for 1973-82, far more than *total forgiveness of interest payments* would have over the same period.[11] If it were not for the rise in oil prices and the recession, LDC indebtedness might have ceased to be a problem.

Oil and LDC Debt

The oil price rise was largely responsible for the NODCs borrowing about $74 billion between 1974-76. This meant that debt disbursed and outstanding *doubled* in three years. Although when inflation is taken into account, debt only increased 54 percent since 1973, this is still appreciable.[12] As mentioned, lending terms have been hardening because of the increased reliance on private banks, but also because official lending agencies such as the World Bank have increased interest rates. This hardening of terms combined with the unwillingness of the NODCs to deflate their economies and slow their growth (for understandable reasons), could pose some serious debt service problems for particular LDCs in the future.

In the immediate future, debt service ratios are not expected to be particularly burdensome, at least no more so than in the period before 1974. In fact, only eight countries are in the danger zone of the Frank-Cline function, and as mentioned above these estimates have tended to be on the high side. The period from 1979 to 1982 is another story, however. Debt service ratios are projected to peak in 1979 at 25 percent for 25 middle income countries, and 17.5 percent for 16 lower income countries.[13] Repayments to the IMF Oil Facility (a fund set up by the IMF to help LDCs finance their oil needs) begin in 1978 and continue until 1982. Private banks who have become such a major credit source might find it prudent to reduce their loans to LDCs in order to avoid the risk of such high debt service ratios. Finally, even though the recession of 1975 is over, the possibility of another recession cannot be ruled out.

Solutions to the Debt Crisis

To ease the debt service problem of the LDCs two policy questions in

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 5.
[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7.
[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 41-44.
[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 45-47.

the public sector must be addressed. Should aid flows to the NODCs be increased during the next few years, and if so, is generalized cost relief in the public sector a good way to do it? Secondly, should the burden of peaking debt service be eased for various LDCs and if so, what steps could be taken to do this that would preserve the present value to the bilateral and multilateral lenders? The first question is of particular importance to the poorer LDCs, while the second concerns the utility of avoiding overly rapid adjustment to changes in balance of payments.

Debt relief is a reduction in the present value of debt outstanding. This is comprised of two factors: (1) refinancing, which stretches out the time profile of debt service payments, while preserving present values, and (2) untied aid grants. Outright debt forgiveness or reduction in interest rates consist entirely of the second element while rescheduling of debt, bearing less than market rates, yield a combination of the two, although no outright forgiveness of principal or interest is involved.

In individual cases, there is no compelling reason why external assistance should not take the form of debt relief. India prefers that a portion of her aid be in debt relief, even though since 1970, there has been little danger of India defaulting. Debt relief has the advantage of being untied, that is, there is no specification placed on the use of the money.

Generalized debt relief has been proposed by some LDCs. Third World groupings have used the imminent liquidity problem of the early 1980's to argue for increased resource transfer by debt relief. An UNCTAD Secretariat set forth a three-point program: (1) moratorium on all debt service payments on official MSA bilateral loans through 1980, (2) a similar moratorium extended to all LDCs, and (3) a suggestion that all official loans to MSAs be converted to grants.[15]

Generalized debt relief is essentially a resource transfer. However, it bears no relationship to the need or the past performance of a particular country. It also has the disadvantage of being an uneven proposal as there are wide disparities in how much countries receive in official bilateral debt. In fact, the richer LDCs tend to have a greater amount of debt, which implies that generalized debt relief would be a poor instrument (in terms of aid distribution) for rescheduling debt. Finally, it should be pointed out that the grant element of new commitments already exceeds 60 percent, and this does not even include inflation. One must question whether or not it is desirable at this juncture to increase these grant elements. If it is desirable, there are probably better ways to go about it than generalized debt relief.

[14]Wellons, p. 100.
[15]Allan, p. 27.

Debt Rescheduling as an Alternative

Rather than generalized debt relief, traditional rescheduling for individual nations would retain the present value of the debt but not make it payable until a future date, and could be a useful method of relieving debt service pressure. Rescheduling public debt has the advantage of increasing the confidence of private accreditors because it relieves their anxiety that foreign exchange pressures might interfere with the service on their debt. It also helps the economy, without undue sacrifice on medium-term growth prospects. In individual cases, there is no reason why rescheduling should have any harmful effect on capital market access. In fact, the opposite is true. It is the economic and political situation that effects lender confidence adversely. Rescheduling is a move in the opposite direction.

It should be pointed out, however, that a rush of reschedulings could conceivably shake the confidence of private lenders in the LDCs (even though in each individual case the rescheduling would improve the outlook for the national economies). A severe setback to LDC capital market access could ensue.

This problem could be averted by anticipatory rescheduling. Previous analysis has suggested that for the present, debt pressures will not be too severe. This calm ought to be taken advantage of to stretch out the public debt of those countries that appear vulnerable to problems in 1979-82. If the reschedulings are not to become an aid exercise (a reward for past profligacy), the present value of the loan balances must be preserved at the time of rescheduling. The debt could be rescheduled for the mid to late 1980's, after the shocks of 1979-80 have passed. Relatively hard terms should be imposed in order that a plethora of reschedulings does not take place, but if a country has a debt service ratio of over 18 percent it should be eligible for rescheduling. With an 18 percent debt service ratio as a cut-off, and the Frank-Cline test as a guide, 8-10 countries would probably reschedule their debt.[16]

The previous discussion has focussed on the ability of LDCs to service their public debt. With the increasing reliance on commercial loans (30 percent in 1975, and rising quickly), the problem of debt service to the private banks is paramount. Private banks are not charity organizations, and tend to be unwilling to reschedule debt although they will roll over loans (setting new terms). Irving Friedman, in his study for Citicorp, states, "(for LDCs) the fundamental assumption must be that debts to private banks must be serviced. If a country is going to continue to have access to private capital, a good past debt service performance is essential."[17]

[16]Frank, p. 51.
[17]Friedman, p. 69.

It is difficult to determine exactly how willing various private banks will be to deny capital to countries with poor debt servicing records. The banks are terrified that a default will lead to a whole rash of defaults and that their $30 billion (as of 1975) of debt to the NODCs will be jeopardized. This is clearly demonstrated by the case of Zaire which fell into arrears in 1975. Zaire, in essence, said they would not pay up until Citibank lent them another $250 million.[18] A final solution has yet to be worked out, but Zaire's story raises an interesting question: who has the leverage in this situation, the banks or the LDCs? The banks want their money and many LDCs need continued access to capital.

Who has the Upper Hand, LDCs or Banks?

Looking at the situation recently, it appears that the LDCs have had the upper hand. The banks have been afraid to say no to the OPEC deposits, and are thereby forced to continue to loan large amounts to LDCs. However, defaults such as Zaire's, Peru's and others have spread a feeling of consternation into the international banking community. Although it has not been reflected in a decrease of loans yet, prudent bankers may be reluctant to increase their risk with LDCs where the prospects of repayment are uncertain. Many countries are so dependent on private finance that a default would mean a major economic shift away from imports. Brazil, with $7 billion, and Mexico, with $8 billion worth of private debt come to mind.[19] It is important to these countries, as well as the whole international banking system, that a default not occur.

Along these lines, it has been proposed that some kind of facility be established which would allow countries to retire private bank loans in favor of longer maturities — say 15-20 years. This refinancing would enable NODCs to avoid the debt service peaks of 1979-82. If this is carried out there ought to be some kind of anticipatory criterion in order that private debt service pressures be taken care of before they occur. To encourage fiscal and monetary readjustment rather than borrowing from the facility, interest rates ought to be high.

While some of these funds for such a refinancing facility could be supplied by the industrialized nations, it would seem appropriate that the OPEC nations supply the bulk of the capital. Because of their tremendous surpluses, the OPEC nations could absorb a strain on their balance of payments. OPEC's incentive to do this would be the high interest rates they would receive, and the fact that this credit will be necessary in order to keep their oil prices high.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 71.
[19] *World Bank annual report, 1977,* p. 108.

Short versus Long-Term Solutions

Refinancing or rescheduling of debt are short-term solutions to an impending crisis. The obvious assumption behind such programs is that the debt service problem will be dealt with at a later date when countries are more able to deal with it. If some adjustments in the economy are not eventually made, however, a vicious circle ensues and the problem is never solved. If countries are going to continue to have access to private capital, these adjustments must be made because banks are not going to continue to invest money into a problem area where no effort is being made to correct it.

Essentially, the LDCs must improve their creditworthiness in the eyes of foreign lenders. Paramount in achieving this should be a policy of intelligent external debt management. In this regard, systems ought to be set up that have the following characteristics: (1) centralization in one agency of authority to review, register and approve all external capital flows. Without centralization, the knowledge of who has borrowed how much and for how long is too hard to keep track of; (2) in this vein, a core team ought to be responsible for negotiating all government loans; (3) finally, a set of laws governing terms and perhaps uses of loans in the private sector ought to be enacted.[20] These laws should be flexible, but the government ought to be wary that private debt does not become outlandish.

Not only must debt management be intelligent, but the investment of a country's debt must be intelligent as well. Borrowing must be for productive purposes. Particularly if the debt service burden is high, the highest priority should be given to quick yielding export-oriented activities. Diversification of exports should also be strived for, if feasible, as it makes the country less prone to be wiped out by a drop in a particular world market price. Although it is recognized that investment in infrastructure, education, and health is essential, these returns accrue over such a long term, that they are better financed by bilateral official agencies. Intelligent monetary policy should also be adhered to with rational exchange rates and interest rates.

It is crucial that the debt service payments be handled intelligently, if the development plans for the LDCs are to proceed. If some of the countries with debt service problems pay out everything that they owe, they will be in economic ruin. If they default and lose their credit, they will also be ruined. In the latter case, the whole world financial market would also be in dire straits. LDCs must pay back what they can afford to and make provisions to reschedule or refinance what they cannot afford to.

[20]Wellons, p. 49.

For some, especially where net capital flows are negative, it may be most effective to default, with capital flowing out rather than in they have little to lose.

Not only must rescheduling and refinancing take place, but borrowing, and thus growth of *some* LDCs will have to slow down until their debt situation is at a manageable level. This may not be very palatable to the LDCs, but the alternative of losing capital funds ought to be even less so.

It has been shown that inflation has tempered the problem to a great degree. There are, however, no simple or quick remedies. Rather, it is only through the cooperation of the banks, OPEC, the official lenders and the LDCs themselves that an acceptable solution will be reached. All must give in a little, none must demand too much, and in this way, slowly but surely, the problem can be solved.

Legal Status of the West Bank

Jill Haberman

The West Bank is an area in contention; Jordan, Israel, and the Palestinians live there, Israel controls it, and Jordan would like to refederate it. Implicit in the controversy over sovereign status is the effect of Jordanian action in 1949 and Israeli action in 1967 on the rights and obligations held under the concept of trustee occupancy.

On June 7, 1967, Israel invaded the West Bank (among other territories)[1] in response to the threat of a Jordanian attack. The West Bank has been Israeli occupied territory since that time. Prior to 1967, the West Bank was under Jordanian jurisdiction. When the state of Israel was created in 1948, and the British Mandate over Palestine ended, Trans-Jordan, along with other Arab states attacked Israel. Jordan subsequently gained control over parts of central Palestine, including the West Bank and annexed this territory on April 24, 1950.[2]

The issue lends itself to legal analysis. This paper will take the form of an *amicus curiae* (an advisory opinion by a "friend of the court"), and will be organized in the following manner:

FACTS. A straightforward account of the present situation including an explanation of the claims of the parties involved.

ISSUES. Statements questioning the legality and the validity of the contending claims.

REASONING. An evaluation and analysis of the legality of the claims, including a philosophical and historical perspective.

Facts

The West Bank, known as Judea and Samaria in Biblical times, is an area approximately 85 miles long. It is bordered on the east by the Dead Sea and Jordan, and on the north, west, and south by Israel. Seven hundred thousand Palestinians live in the West Bank, 300,000 of whom are refugees from the 1948 War.[3] The Palestinians seek to establish an

Jill Haberman, a senior political science major, wrote this paper for Professor Teichman's course on the Middle East.

[1]This paper will not discuss Jerusalem which was formally annexed by Israel and therefore constitutes a separate issue.

[2]Congressional Quarterly, *The Middle East,* September 1977, p. 44.

[3]New York Times, 2/19/78

independent Palestinian state or, if necessary, a Palestinian state in confederation with Jordan. Jordan seeks to undermine the credibility of Israel's claim and thereby strengthen its own proposal for refederation based on reversionary rights. Israel's position is based on the proposition that historically the West Bank belongs to the Jewish people and therefore to the Jewish state. It also rests on the practical concept of *res nullius* ("the property of nobody — a thing which has no owner, either because a former owner has finally abandoned it, or because it has never been appropriated. In international law — absence of sovereignty."[4]) and the theoretical concept of *uti posseditis* ("the parties to a treaty are to retain possession of what they have acquired by force during war"[5]). However, Menachem Begin has also proposed a plan for "self-rule" for the Palestinians living in the West Bank. The plan would be "subject to renewal after a five-year period."

Issues

– Does either Israel or Jordan have a legitimate right to establish sovereign status on the West Bank?

– Do the Palestinians have the right to "self-determination" in the form of an independent state to be located on the West Bank?

– Can Israeli action during the 1967 war be labeled belligerent ("engaged in lawful war"[6]) and if so, how does that status affect its present status as a negotiator for a peace treaty vis a vis the West Bank?

– Does Israel's present military and civil control over the West Bank constitute trustee occupancy?

– Is the determination of who has sovereign status on the West Bank a prerequisite for the resolution of peace in the Middle East?

Reasoning

Jean Bodin is responsible for the modern definition of sovereignty: ". . . Sovereignty is the most high, absolute, and perpetual power over the citizens and subjects. . ."[7] The power implied is the power to legislate laws with absolute authority, which is unified and indivisible. Hobbes considers sovereignty as coincident with law and a legal system. The power of sovereignty, according to Hobbes, is based on "authorization" and not merely "habitual obedience." The modern concept of sov-

[4]Black's Law Dictionary
[5]*Ibid.*
[6]*Ibid.*
[7]Alexander Passerin D'Entreves, *The Notion of State*, Oxford, 1967, p. 100.

ereignty has expanded to include the interaction of sovereign states within an international arena. Hugo Grotius formulated the concept stating that ". . . the Law of Nations is more extensive than that which is Civil. . ." and "derives its authority from the joint consent of all or, at least, of many Nations."[8]

The key principle is common consent, because sovereign states adhere to principles of international law on a voluntary basis. Sanctions applied are a mixture of customary and positive law, of moral and religious principles, and of political, economic, and military reprisals. The dispute over who has legitimate rights to the West Bank reflects this mixture.

Israel claims that it has a legitimate right to establish sovereign status on the West Bank, but the government seems to realize that a compromise solution is inevitable.

Israeli Claims to the West Bank

Israel's claim to the area is based on the grounds that "Judea" and "Samaria," as Prime Minister Begin refers to the West Bank, are historically part of the Jewish homeland. How is it possible, he argues, to "occupy" an area that already belongs to you? In Begin's mind Israel "liberated" the territory. The argument is not particularly strong, but Israel has bolstered it with the concept of *res nullius.* Israel conquered the area in the 1968 War when it was considered Jordanian territory. It is important to note that Jordan's claim was and is disputed by the Palestinians. Israel's contention is that Jordan did in fact annex the West Bank, but received no international support save from England and Palestine. Therefore Jordan's claims for sovereignty are based not on the legal rights of reversion, but on illegal annexation, according to Israel.

Furthermore, according to Begin, a state of war exists mentally if not in actuality. The current borders are armistice lines laid down according to positions at the cessation of fighting in 1967. Israel contends that until a peace treaty is reached in accordance with and to the satisfaction of the parties involved, Israel may legally retain its present boundaries. "A treaty which terminates a war may adopt this principle (of *uti posseditis)* or that of the *status quo ante bellum* or a combination of the two. In default of any treaty stipulation, the former doctrine prevails."[9]

Israel's argument is weakened by its contradiction of U.N. Resolution 242. The resolution, unanimously accepted by the United Nations Security Council on November 22, 1967, requires the "establishment of

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 126.

[9] *Guillermo Alvarez y Sanchez* versus *United States.* 42 Volume of United States Court of Claims, p. 458. Also see Black's Law Dictionary under *uti posseditis.*

a just lasting peace in the Middle East" in accordance with the following principles:

1. Withdrawal of Israel's Armed Forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;
2. Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.[19]

Israel contends that the Resolution does not apply to all territories. This maximalist interpretation is a product of the Begin government, and seems to be a refutation by the current government of an international resolution that for eleven years has been understood to be the accepted basis for peace negotiations. Israel has not withdrawn from the territory, and instead has established settlements within the West Bank. The rationale behind establishing these settlements is the Israeli perception of the need to establish "secure and defensible" borders. Israel is threatened by the three "no's" of the Khartoum Conference: no acknowledgement of the legality of Israel, no recognition of the state of Israel, and no negotiated peace with Israel. Israel perceives the threat of a consolidated Arab force against its existence, and therefore perceives the need to maintain secure borders.

The government's motivation to develop and settle the West Bank might stem from the desire for increased national security, but the more overreaching rationale seems to be to resolve the sovereignty issue in a manner that would give Israel special privileges in the area. The Begin Plan, submitted by Mr. Begin to Mr. Sadat on December 25-26, 1977 is a plan for administrative, limited self-rule for the West Bank under a democratically elected council in conjunction with an Israeli military presence which would maintain security and public order. The residents would choose between Israeli and Jordanian citizenship. The Plan would be implemented after a five year interim period.

The Begin Plan is an example of the general principle of international law which states that acquisition of the territory and subsequent acceptance may be considered legitimate if the terms of acquisition and occupation are acceptable by all parties involved. Since World War II, increasing support has been given to the principle that any occupation and annexation of territory conquered in the course of war is inadmissible and illegal. Furthermore, the post-war world saw an increase in positive law regarding the treatment and protection of prisoners of war, and the protection of the rights of occupied peoples.[11]

[19]U.N. Resolution 242, November 22, 1967.
[11]New York Times, 2/17/78.

The 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (known as the Fourth Geneva Convention) protects the civil and legal rights of the citizens of occupied territory, and restricts the behavior of the occupying nation. Article 47 of the Fourth Geneva Convention states that:

> Protected persons who are in occupied territory shall not be deprived, in any case or in any manner whatsoever, of the benefits of the present Convention by any change introduced, as the result of the occupation of a territory, into the institutions or governments of said territory, nor by any annexation by the latter of the whole or part of the occupied territory.[12]

The Convention also states that "... the occupying power shall not ... transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies."[13] Establishing settlements and replacing the laws and government of the prior power with her own laws and form of government constitutes, according to certain members of the international community, a violation of Resolution 242 and the Fourth Geneva Convention.

Israel has avoided discussion of its position vis-a-vis the convention, but Former Attorney General of Israel Meir Shamgar did say that the Israeli position is perfectly legal under the concept of *res nullius.* He interprets the convention to be applicable only if the territory under occupation belonged formerly to one of the contracting parties (Jordan or Palestine) who could then legally claim rights of reversion.[14]

Whether or not Jordan may claim the legitimate right to establish sovereign status on the West Bank depends not only on the legality of the claim, but the acceptance of the claim and the form it might take.

Jordanian Claims to the West Bank

Jordan's claim to sovereign status on the West Bank has two premises. The first revolves around the legality of Israel's claim. By condemning Israeli action as illegal and by drumming up international support for a renouncement of the status quo, Jordan bolsters her own position in regard to the West Bank, and also in the larger picture of negotiations for peace in the area. The second premise is Jordan's own claim under positive international law to Reversionary Rights, i.e. the right of succession and future possession.

There are presently some 1,150,000 Palestinians in Jordan's East Bank.[15] The P.L.O. has been banned from Jordan but the Arab com-

[12]Allan Gerson, Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 14, p. 7.
[13]Fourth Geneva Convention, 1949.
[14]New York Times, 2/17/78.
[15]*Ibid.*, 2/19/78.

munity in general has accepted, after the Rabat Meeting of 1974, the P.L.O. as "the sole legitimate representative" of the Palestinians in the West Bank. Palestinians in Jordan enjoy status as Jordanian citizens, they hold passports and most other legal privileges associated with national identity.

Rather than pushing for complete sovereign control over the West Bank backed by the principles of Reversionary Rights and international ostracization of Israeli actions, Jordan has proposed a moderate plan for Palestinian confederation with Jordan. The federation would make Jordan responsible for the defense of the area and would give the Palestinians control over their internal affairs. This plan combines Jordanian self-interest (control of contiguous territory) and Jordanian interest in perpetuating Arab solidarity. In terms of Palestinian self-determination the Jordanian plan could develop simply as an alternative to the Begin Plan, in other words, a confederation with no genuine Palestinian participation.

Palestinian Self Determination

The Palestinians' claim to "self-determination" in the form of an independent sovereign state located on the West Bank is complicated because they lack the status of a sovereign nation.

No universally accepted definition of "self-determination" exists in international law. Generally, it means "the determination by the people of a territorial unit of their own future, political status without coercion or outside influence."[16] Defense of Palestinian rights to a sovereign state in the West Bank is replete with paradoxes. "Self-determination" predicates that the people determining their future political status are contained within a single territorial unit. Four million Palestinians are presently scattered throughout thirteen different territories and countries.[17] Four million Palestinians with conflicting interests, opinions, and geographical locations are expected to somehow coordinate under the rubric of "self-determination."

While the Palestinians have a good international and customary law defense to establish sovereign status on the West Bank they nevertheless have a weak base from which to argue. Presently no sovereign status exists and this considerably weakens their position.

According to customary law the Palestinians have inalienable rights which cannot be transferred from one person to another, rights such as liberty. Customary law recognizes the rights of people to seek "self-determination."

[16]Webster's Dictionary. Gerson defines "self-determination" as "sovereignty resting with an area's inhabitants." (*Ibid.*, p. 23).

[17]U.N. Resolution 338.

Based on a General Assembly resolution, the Palestinians have observer status in the U.N. For the past eight years the U.N. has condemned Israel for the perpetuation of "war crimes" in Arab occupied territories while consistently passing resolutions affirming "the right of the Palestinians to establish an independent and sovereign state." It has also called on all nations "to support the Palestinians through the Palestinian Liberation Organization."

Israel has been accused of ignoring Resolutions 242 and 338 which call for the end of Israeli occupation and imply the establishment of a Palestinian state. The U.N. also passed a resolution condemning Israel's violations of the Fourth Geneva Convention, and its failure to recognize the convention as applicable to the West Bank.

The Palestinians see the Begin Plan as worse than continued occupation or direct annexation. It is perceived as annexation of the land without responsibility for the people. The Palestinians are also wary of the repercussions of a union with Jordan, since it could lead to a transfer of Palestinian dominance by Israel to Palestinian dominance by Jordan. In the last eight years the Palestinians of the West Bank have had to move under international, military, economic, and political pressure from a militant position demanding the political and geographical incorporation of Israel into a secular Palestine to a less militant and more political position demanding the creation of an independent state in the West Bank. They have since moved to the moderate position of considering the viability of a West Bank/Gaza Palestinian state in union with Jordan.

The Negotiating Status of Israel

Israel's status as a belligerent during the 1967 War affects its present status as a negotiator for a peace treaty vis a vis the West Bank because of the international law governing the behavior of belligerents.

According to international law, Israel was considered a belligerent during the 1967 War. However, belligerency during a state of war is considered legal behavior. Since Israel perceives itself to have been engaged in an act of self-defense (its goal being to gain enough territory to provide "secure and defensible boundaries") it has the right, according to international law, to take action to occupy its attacker's territory. Furthermore, it may make territorial arrangements prior to and during peace negotiations to insure its own safety from further attacks.

The establishment of settlements and their legality is a separate issue since belligerent states and states negotiating for peace obey different laws and sanctions. Israel's goal is to protect itself against further attack and the means to that end is the negotiation of an acceptable peace treaty while maintaining a military protective presence.

If Israel's present military and civil control over the West Bank can be construed as a trusteeship rather than a belligerent occupation, then her claim to sovereign status, in addition to her status in the international community, may be enhanced.

Whether or not Israel's occupation in the West Bank is one of a belligerent or a trustee depends upon varied interpretations of certain legal principles. "Belligerent occupation . . . presupposes a state of affairs in which the sovereign, the legitimate government of the occupied territories, is at war with the government of the occupying forces."[18] Trustee occupancy implies the right to possession until formal cessation of belligerency. . ."[19] Until the formal cessation of belligerency, occupancy would be legal the laws and government could be changed if the changes are for the betterment of the inhabitants.[20]

Trustree occupancy is possible if the trustee negotiates a peace treaty that will determine who gains ultimate control of the territory in question. However the occupying country, under international law, is required to maintain the status quo in order to protect the option of sovereignty. If Israel establishes settlements — civilian populations, Israeli laws, i.e. *de facto* Israeli sovereignty — the question of sovereignty could be rendered moot.

Israel has not maintained the status quo of the West Bank thus violating international law. It has, however, raised the standard of living of the Arabs there; the inhabitants virtually rule themselves; the Palestinians win all of the popular elections; the inhabitants are better educated, healthier, and wealthier than they ever were under Arab rule. Does a breech in international law which results in a more positive and social climate for the people involved warrant international vituperation against Israel? By the same token, international reaction against Palestinian actions seems to ignore the fact that the Palestinians' means are limited because of their non-sovereign status.

The determination of who has sovereign status on the West Bank is the pre-requisite for the resolution of peace in the Middle East.

International law does not have legally binding sanctions. World opinion, the force of domestic politics, economic sanctions, circumstance, and military reprisals — these are the components which constitute sanctions in the international arena. Leaders negotiate with other leaders to win the best postures for their own national goals. Negotiations imply compromise. Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinians have each abided by and violated international law in order to obtain their goals. Internal and international pressure continue to force these participants to negotiate for peace and resolution of the West Bank controversy. Step

[18]von Glahn in Gerson, *ibid.*, p. 39.
[19]Gerson, p. 43.
[20]*Ibid.*, p. 43.

by step, each participant will be obliged to recognize not only the legitimacy of the people they are negotiating with, but also the legitimacy of the separate goals.

Some of the alternatives for resolution of the West Bank controversy are as follows:

— international control of the area by U.N. peacekeeping forces;
— the federation of the West Bank with Jordan;
— the creation of an independent, sovereign Palestinian State in the West Bank;
— the continuation of the status quo with adjustments and concessions by Israel to guarantee Palestinian representation.

All of these alternatives are feasible under international law. Some are more feasible in terms of political reality. The alternatives, however, must be negotiated and the resultant decision made equally acceptable on all counts to Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinians.

The Use of Soviet Psychiatry as a Political Weapon

Elizabeth Cohen

Psychiatry is the branch of medicine which deals with mental illness. Mental illness, however, is a vaguely defined concept. It consists of a group of arbitrarily categorized diseases, whose diagnoses and treatments are subject to constant debate. The problems of definition inherent in present-day psychiatry make this field especially vulnerable to abuse and exploitation.

The misuse of psychiatry has particularly dangerous and repugnant consequences because it threatens man's most precious possession — thought — with attack, alteration, and annihilation. It is likely, then, that the discovery of such misuse would elicit violent and powerful protest from any humane observer.

Abuse and protest both have occurred in the Soviet Union. What led to the widespread perversion of psychiatry in this country? Elements of psychiatric theory may have allowed for profanation of practice. Perhaps the organization or administration of the mental health care system planted the seeds for abuse. Political events and ideologies also may have played a role. Tracing the development of psychiatric theory and abuse in an historical perspective may help to determine the significance of these possibilities.

Historical Background

Prince Vladimir's ruling in 996, requiring churches to house mental patients, orphans, and widows is the first record of special provisions for the mentally disturbed in the Soviet Union. This practice of placing the insane in monasteries was officially continued by Ivan the Terrible in 1551, reaffirming the long-held belief in supernatural causes of mental illness.[1]

Under Peter the Great, an attempt was made to improve the treatment of the mentally ill through the creation of mental hospitals. Nonetheless, the shift in responsibility for psychiatry from religion to medicine

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[1]Sidney Bloch and Peter Reddaway, *Psychiatric Terror* (New York: Basic Books, 1977), p. 34.

remained largely theortetical. Mental hospitals actually came into existence in the 1770's, during the reign of Catherine the Great.[2]

In 1806, G.F. Miller categorized the mentally disturbed in "On the Founding of the Homes for Lunatics."[3] According to Miller, "lunatics" could be divided by symptoms into melancholics, epileptics, lunatics, and the furious. He stressed the necessity of isolating members of these categories from society.

One of the first abuses of Russian psychiatry followed shortly. Philosopher Pyotr Chaadayev, impressed by the life of Western Europeans he observed while serving in the army, returned to Russia and published an essay in 1836 criticizing his government. He suggested that Russia's only hope for progress was to adopt the ways of Western Europe, including the Roman Catholic religion. Nicholas I exiled the publisher of the essay and declared Chaadayev insane.[4]

Cases such as Chaadayev's remained rare for many years, as improvements in psychiatry continued. The zemstvo period (1864-1917) began under Alexander I. Zemstvos were local government committees whose responsibilities included health services. By 1892, 34 mental hospitals with 9,000 beds and 90 psychiatrists were in operation under zemstvo administration.[5] The somatophysiological school of psychiatry, which has exerted considerable influence on modern Russian psychiatry, was also introduced during this period.

The first psychiatric clinic of this type was opened in 1867 in St. Petersburg. S.A. Korsakov, a key proponent of the somatophysiological approach, became director of the Moscow clinic when it opened in 1887. He introduced the "non-restraint" method of dealing with the mentally ill by removing bars and abolishing isolation rooms.[6] A number of similar reforms were effected throughout the country during this period, such as the introduction of occupational therapy, beds for the severely ill, female employees, and therapeutic psychopharmacology. The October Revolution marked the beginning of a new era in psychiatry. The zemstvo system was organized, and the centralized People's Commissariat (Ministry) for Public Health was established in 1917.[7]

Despite the innovations and changes occurring in Russian psychiatry at the time of the Revolution, a striking abuse occurred in 1918. After the collapse of the alliance between the Bolsheviks and the Socialist Revolutionaries, the leader of the latter party, Maria Spiridonova, was

[2]*Ibid.*, p. 35.
[3]Naomi Raskin, "Development of Russian Psychiatry Before the First World War," *American Journal of Psychiatry*, Vol. 120, 1964, p. 853.
[4]Peter Reddaway, *Uncensored Russia* (New York: American Heritage Press, 1972), p. 228.
[5]Bloch and Reddaway, p. 36.
[6]Raskin, p. 855.
[7]Bloch and Reddaway, p. 36.

arrested and placed in prison for a year. After securing an early release, she began re-organizing her party, and was again arrested. The Bolsheviks were in a quandary. Spiridonova had not actually committed a crime, but she was too powerful to release. Spiridonova, herself, accurately predicted her fate: "I have a feeling the Bolsheviks are preparing some especially dirty trick for me. It would be difficult for them to kill me, and to send me to prison for a long term would not do either . . . they will declare me insane and put me in a psychiatric clinic or something like that . . . . they want to strike a moral blow at me. To save their position they resort to every possible means."[8]

Theoretical Background

At the time of Spiridonova's internment, Pavlovian theory enjoyed much respect and attention in Soviet Psychiatry, as it still does to a certain extent. Ivan Pavlov had introduced his classical conditioning model around the turn of the century.[9] His beliefs were reconciled with Marx's so as to suggest that "man's behavior is a consequence of social and economic conditions prevailing in his society, to form a basis for psychiatric treatment."[10]

A.V. Snezhnevsky, present director of the Soviet Institute of Psychiatry of the Academy of Medical Sciences, feels that adherence to Pavlovian dogma has stunted the development of Soviet Psychiatry, and urges a critical study of Freudian theory. He states that "Both Trotsky and Lunacharsky thought that Freud's dialectical approach could be reconciled with Marxism and that the conflicts he studied would continue in a classless society — though in a different form."[11]

Until Snezhnevsky, Freudian theory had been shunned in the Soviet Union, because of its emphasis on individualism and autonomy, and its recognition of the central role of instinct in behavior.[12] These attitudes are antithetical to the communist emphasis on the group, used in psychiatric therapy today. Stalin particularly opposed the Freudian approach. Perhaps because "he trived on irrationality, he was against the exploration of the unconscious. Others argue that the 'engineer of souls' could not tolerate the competition of another psychopathologist."[13]

[8]*Ibid.*, pp. 49-50.
[9]Paul Mussen and Mark R. Rosenzweig, *Psychology* (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath, 1973), p. 456.
[10]Bloch and Reddaway, p. 40.
[11]"Smuggling in Freud," *Economist,* Vol. 224, 1967, pp. 1079-1080.
[12]Bloch and Reddaway, p. 40.
[13]"Smuggling in Freud," p. 1080.

Stalinist Abuses

Unfortunately, little information is available on Stalinist period abuses. In 1939, it is known that a 400-bed psychiatric hospital was established in Kazan, specifically for the incarceration of "politicals."[14] Today this hospital houses truly mentally ill patients, but also operates a special section for "politicals." Natalia Gorbanevskaya, a well-known dissenter, and Victor Kuznetsov, another well-known, incarcerated dissenter, were both detained in this section.

Poet Naum Korzhavin was punished by internment in a psychiatric hospital in 1948. Although Korzhavin considered himself a Stalinist, he was arrested and placed in the Serbsky Institute for Forensic Psychiatry for writing "anti-Soviet" poems. He found his confinement not unpleasant, and concluded that "the practice of placing healthy people in mental hospitals was not malicious in intent, but benevolent."[15]

The incarceration of Ilya Yarkov provides a grimmer picture. He was mistakenly rearrested for "counter-revolutionary activity" in 1951, twenty years after he had served time for the same "crime." This crime actually turned out to be the writing of a benign, unpolitical biography. Yet to hide their error, the secret police capitalized on their knowledge of Yarkov's previous mild mental illness, and had him detained in psychiatric hospitals for three years. During this time, Yarkov described most of his fellow patients as mentally ill, although he also met "a great mass of people who were definitely intelligent and developed personalities, often well-educated, sometimes profoundly cultured, people whom not one self-respecting doctor in a 'civilian' hospital would dream of detaining for years on the pretext that they were 'nutcases. . . .'"[16]

Sergei Pisarev was instrumental in convincing the Central Committee to organize a commission to investigate special hospitals. Pisarev spent several years in such hospitals for criticizing the secret police for their role in the "Doctors' Plot." The commission, chaired by A.I. Kuznetsov, confirmed the abuses cited by Pisarev in his letter to the Academy of Medical Sciences. According to Pisarev, the commission found ". . . among the mentally ill people sentenced to indefinite isolation . . . hundreds of absolutely healthy persons. It listed systematically the perversions of the truth in the diagnoses given by the (Serbsky) Institute, in particular by D.R. Lunts . . ."[17]

The commission's report was hidden from the Central Committee by Kuznetsov's immediate superior for two years. Even so, after the investi-

[14]Bloch and Reddaway, p. 51.
[15]*Ibid.*, p. 53.
[16]*Ibid.*, pp. 55-56.
[17]Reddaway, p. 232.

gation, treatment of legitimately ill patients improved. Pisarev resumed his campaign in 1970 in another letter to the Academy, stressing the injustices rampant at Serbsky.

Modern Soviet Psychiatry

Modern Soviet psychiatry is unique in theory, organization, and execution. A developed system of outpatient care is utilized to avoid problems plaguing the United States and Great Britain, concerning the return of discharged patients to the hospital. The number of outpatient dispensaries in the USSR increased from 194 in 1963 to 257 in 1969.[18]

The Soviet Union claims that its psychiatric hospitals care for only acutely ill patients. In light of the extensive use of effective psychoactive drugs similar to those used in the West, it seems surprising that the number of Russian psychiatric hospitals has been increasing. In 1962, there were 222,600 beds available, while in 1974 there were 390,000 beds available for the mentally disturbed. This trend continues.[19] In the United States, researchers suggest that pharmacological improvements largely contributed to the 33% decline in the number of hospitalized schizophrenic patients between 1957 and 1967.[20]

Snezhnevsky's model of schizophrenia prevails in the USSR today. It outlines three loosely defined categories: continuous, shift-like, and periodic schizophrenia. Continuous schizophrenia, particularly of the "sluggish" sub-type, has been used extensively in political perversions of psychiatry. Snezhnevsky states that the sluggish, continuous schizophrenic "overvalues his importance and may exhibit grandiose ideas of reforming the world" while ostensibly functioning normally in society.[21]

Zhores Medvedev, the Russian biochemist whose imprisonment in a mental hospital was widely publicized, found a definition of his diagnosis of "incipient" (probably becoming continuous) schizophrenia in a medical text coauthored by Snezhnevsky:

> "Despite his systematized pattern of delusions, the patient is able over a long period to fulfill his professional obligations. But at the same time his behavior is often determined by the nature of his delusions which may lead him to dangerous aggression against imaginary persecutors and corresponding attempts to protect himself against them

[18]A.F. Serenko, "Achievement sof Soviet Neurology and Psychiatry and Basic Trends in Their Further Development," *Soviet Review,* Vol. 12, 1971, p. 73.
[19]Bloch and Reddaway, p. 47.
[20]Oakley S. Ray, *Drugs, Society, and Human Behavior* (Saint Louis: C.V. Mosby, 1972), p.4.
[21]Bloch nd Reddaway, p. 247.

by appealing to different organizations, to public opinion, or by pestering others with demands to give effect to his delusional ideas and projects. The patient is proud, has a feeling of his own dignity, expresses himself dogmatically and is convinced of the supreme value and infallibility of his views."[22]

In Medvedev's case, the incipient schizophrenia was coupled with "paranoid delusions of reforming society." His affliction was further described: "split personality, expressed in the need to combine scientific work in his field with publicist activities; an overestimation of his own personality, a deterioration in recent years of the quality of his scientific work, an exaggerated attention to detail in his publicist writing, lack of a sense of reality, poor adaptation to the social environment."[23]

Other diagnoses commonly made by Snezhnevsky and his subordinates are "paranoid psychopathy, doubtful mental pathology, creeping schizophrenia (probably synonomous with incipient), and persecution mania."[24] Thus, Soviet textbook definitions of schizophrenia, and variations of these definitions proposed by powerful and influential psychiatrists, seem open-ended enough to allow for their application (or misapplication) to normal people.

The Modern Abuses

There are two paths to confinement in a mental hospital in the USSR. Commitment based on civil law leads to detention in an ordinary psychiatric hospital, operated under the Ministry of Health. A single psychiatrist may make the initial commitment; a group of three psychiatrists must decide within 24 hours on the eventual fate of the patient.

The grounds for civil commitment are nebulous. As outlined in 1961 in "Emergency Hospitalization of Mentally Ill Persons Who are a Public Danger," they include "The morbid conditions . . . which can undoubtedly constitute a danger to the public (which may be accompanied by externally correct behavior and dissimulation). The grounds for compulsory hospitalization enumerated above are not exhaustive but only a list of the most frequently encountered morbid states which present a public danger."[25] The ramifications of such vague regulations are obvious.

[22]Zhores Medvedev and Roy Medvedev, *A Question of Madness* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971), p. 180.
[23]Medvedev, p. 175.
[24]V. Nekrasov, "Letter to Academician Andrei Snezhnevsky of the Serbsky Institute of Forensic Psychiatry, Moscow," *Survey*, Vol. 21, 1975, p. 177.
[25]Medvedev, p. 148.

Criminal commitment, as initiated by the KGB or Procuracy, is justified by the violation of Articles 70 and 72 (opposition) or 190 and 191 (dissent) of the Criminal Code. These articles prohibit "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda," "anti-Soviet organization," and "deliberate fabrications which discredit the Soviet political and social system," respectively.[26] In these cases, the accused is usually sent to the Serbsky Institute of Forensic Psychiatry for a diagnosis. When committal is being used as a political weapon, Daniil Lunts, head of Serbsky's special (political) section, and his colleagues "consult with the KGB as to what diagnosis would be politically most convenient and duly produce it."[27]

Lunts' notoriety for participating in the incarceration of healthy people in mental hospitals caused Medvedev to demand his removl from the commission of psychiatrists chosen to examine him. Some have asserted that Lunts is a KGB, or at least an MVD colonel, based on a belief that he wore a uniform beneath his white jacket.[28] Lunts was quoted as telling patients that "when I say a man is schizophrenic, he is schizophrenic, just as if I say an ashtray is schizophrenic, it is schizophrenic."[29] Witnesses have claimed that one of Lunts' "diagnostic tools," used to determine hypersensitivity in women, was to strip them and stick pins in their breasts.

On the whole, treatment of dissidents in the special psychiatric hospitals where they are housed following criminal commitment is more severe than treatment in ordinary psychiatric hospitals. Despite the numerous injustices Medvedev discusses in *A Question of Madness,* he does not mention physical abuse. His doctor once suggested a drug treatment, but quickly dropped the idea after Medvedev's vigorous protest, probably to avoid any further negative publicity about the case.[30]

Special psychiatric hospitals are under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In this type of hospital, strict prison regulations are maintained, political prisoners live in the same areas as acutely disturbed mental patients, and pharmacological "treatments" are implemented if the "patients" refuse to renounce their convictions.

The most commonly used antipsychotic drugs in the Soviet Union are aminazine (American equivalent is thorazine) and haloperidol.[31] While these drugs have beneficial effects in controlling the major symptoms of schizophrenia, they also have severe side effects, and can be used as convenient punishments for uncooperative patients. When used in excess, they cause motor disturbances, skin reactions, memory loss, and extreme

[26]*Ibid.*, p. 213.
[27]Reddaway, p. 234.
[28]"In the Dark Ages of Psychiatry," *Economist,* 244 (1972), p. 34.
[29]*Ibid.*, p. 34.
[30]Medvedev.
[31]Bloch and Reddaway, p. 203.

fatigue. Sulfazin — purified sulfur — has no therapeutic value whatsoever; however, it induces high fever and body pain, and is often used in special hospitals.[32] Insulin, an obsolete psychiatric treatment previously used to induce coma or subcoma in schizophrenics, is another pharmacological punishment.

"Dry packs" are also used to "treat" dissidents in special hospitals.[33] Patients are wrapped in wet canvases, which contract upon drying, supposedly causing excruciating pain. Filthy, cramped living conditions compound the horrors to which inmates of such hospitals are subjected. In addition, many of the orderlies are convicted and bitter common criminals who are forced to work in the special hospitals as punishment.[34]

Abuse and Condemnation

Vladimir Bukovsky is a well-known dissident who has spent his time between internments in prisons and special psychiatric hospitals and campaigning for human rights. He and Semyon Gluzman, a dissenting Kiev psychiatrist, combined their diverse knowledge to compose *A Manual on Psychiatry for Dissidents.* This document presents strategies which might enable an incarcerated dissident to escape many of the cruelties outlined above as possible, but it requires concessions that some may not be willing to make. For example, the authors suggest that "the best motivation you can offer for the actions being imputed to you is: 'I wanted to become famous, to be well-known; I did not understand the seriousness of the consequences, I did not stand aside and take a look at myself; I did not realize that I had gone too far . . .'"[35]

Cases of internment of political dissidents in Soviet psychiatric hospitals in the 1960's and early 1970's are numerous, and extensive description of them is beyond the scope of this paper. It has been during this time period, however, that the West has become acutely aware of the Soviet abuse of psychiatry.[36] Valery Tarsis' fictionalized autobiography of his detainment in mental hospitals, *Ward 7,* was published in Britain in 1964. The confinement of student interpreter Evgeny Belov in 1965 incited British students to initiate a campaign in England to protest the abuse. The widely publicized Medvedev affair began in 1970. The diary of Major-General Pyotr Grigorenko (recently stripped of Soviet citizenship), who was recommitted to a mental hospital after his criticism of

[32] *Ibid.*, p. 202.
[33] "In the Dark Ages of Psychiatry," p. 41.
[34] Reddaway, p. 237.
[35] Vladimir Bukovsky and Semyon Gluzman, "A Manual on Psychiatry for Dissidents," *Survey,* Vol. 21, 1975, p. 193.
[36] Bloch and Reddaway, p. 65.

such practice, was published in the same year along with a televised interview with Bukovsky, which further revealed the political abuses of psychiatry.

Western criticsm became more vocal by 1972. An article by I.F. Stone in the *New York Review of Books* denounced the American and World Psychiatric Associations for not intervening to condemn Soviet psychiatric abuses.[37] Bukovsky's sentence in 1972 inspired international protest, led by groups from Holland, Switzerland, France, Britain, Germany and Austria.[38]

Amidst much controversy and debate, the World Psychiatric Association narrowly passed a resolution (90 to 88) condemning Russia's abuse of psychiatry for political purposes. At that same August, 1977 meeting, a Committee to Investigate Abuse of Psychiatry was established, at the suggestion of the American Psychiatric Association delegation.[40]

Nixon's 1972 visit to the Soviet Union, marking the initiation of detente, led to an accord to embark on joint research on schizophrenia. Psychiatry was no longer as effective in quietly supressing dissenters as it had been, and it posed a threat to the policy of detente. It is not surprising, then, that the practice of placing famous dissenters in special psychiatric hospitals was generally curtailed in that year. The cessation of internment of famous dissenters in ordinary psychiatric hospitals was not effected until 1973. In both cases, exceptions have been noted, and lesser-known dissenters continue to be placed in both types of hospitals. It was not unitl mid-1976 that all previously incarcerated well known dissenters were released.[39]

Conclusion

Numerous factors have contributed to the development of the use of psychiatry as a political weapon in the USSR, and it is likely that several have been overlooked in this brief overview. The root of the abuse may well have been in the nature of psychiatry itself; it was (and still is) a discipline of ill-defined boundaries and concepts. Snezhnevsky took advantage of this problem by outlining ill-defined symptoms of ill-defined mental illnesses.

The acceptance and application by many Russian psychiatrists of Snezhnevsky's definitions permitted the potential of misuse. That potential was realized when necessity arose. The Soviet government frequently has found it necessary to control dissidence by any means. Until recently,

[37] *Ibid.*, p. 280.
[38] *Ibid.*, p. 282.
[39] Walter Reich, "Soviet Psychiatry on Trial," *Commentary*, 65, 1978, PP. 47-48.
[40] *Ibid.*, p. 288.

when publicity led to protest abroad, the internment of dissenters in psychiatric hospitals was a convenient and frequently used means of achieving this end. The practice, though decreasing, is still used today. Pharmacological "treatments" available in hospitals provide an easily accessible means of torture and punishment. The fact that the MVD oversees the special hospitals makes that practice even more convenient. This type of convenience has shattered the dreams, lives, and minds of many productive Soviet citizens.

The French Communist Party and Classical Marxism and Leninism

Andy Goldwater

"There are different levels of compromise. One must be able to analyze the situation and the concrete conditions of each compromise, or of each variety of compromise. One must learn to distinguish between a man who has given up his money and firearms to bandits so as to lessen the evil they can do and to facilitate their capture and execution, and a man who gives his money and firearms to bandits so as to share in the loot." — V.I. Lenin

The strategy of the French Communist Party (PCF) in recent years has been based on a "peaceful transition to socialism." The achievement of national power through the ballot has been the central goal of this strategy. This shift to a peaceful strategy has been marked by a more emphatic commitment to pluralistic democracy and civil liberties. The PCF is, in effect, rejecting the orthodox Leninist variance of Marxism — the idea that the state will invariably defend monopoly capital, and therefore the state must be destroyed since meaningful reform can only be introduced through the dictatorship of the proletariat. The French Communists have accepted the Kautskyite interpretation that allows the tie between the state and monopoly capital to be severed through political means. If a progressive front is brought to power, reform can be introduced in this way. In the PCF's view, the logical course is to pursue a democratic parliamentary line and come to power in a coalition. Hopefully, the predominance of the PCF in the coalition will increase. Through this mechanism profound social change can be introduced. This paper will examine the French Communists' "revolutionary" tactics, the program to be carried out after taking power, and the compatibility of the PCF's doctrine with "classical" Marxist and Leninist theory.

The French Communist leadership lays the groundwork for the peaceful road strategy in their analysis of the present "general crisis of capitalism." The status of all socio-economic groups in French society is determined primarily by this "profound and lasting" crisis. Through technological advance, capital has become concentrated in a clique of monopolies, while the rate of profit has declined steadily. The machinery of

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the state has become an economic agent which serves the monopolies.[1] PCF Politburo member Jean Kanapa wrote:

> (The monopolies) exercise a decisive and exclusive influence on economic policy, and they use all the machinery of the State to carry out programs which they alone have decided upon, while the results . . . affect the great majority of the people and the economic stability of the country. This situation . . . is resented more and more as an absence of *economic democracy.*[2]

The Communists' rationale for the use of parliament is the claim that the economic contradiction between monopoly and non-monopoly capital now exists in the political structure. It appears as a contradiction between the executive and the elected assemblies. The monopolists and their Gaullist servants have consolidated their control over the state administration. They have expanded its power at the expense of the National Assembly which still has representatives of the lower and middle-class parties.[3] This widens the gap between the state and the people, and is responsible for the lag in political democracy. The contradiction within the state between the executive and the legislature is the weak point in the French system. The executive must be assaulted through a parliamentary alliance between the PCF and the noncommunist democratic parties.[4]

The PCF's "revolutionary" tactics are, therefore, parliamentary tactics. Since national power is the Party's vehicle in achieving socialism, universal suffrage is the mechanism through which democratic changes are brought about:

> In order to pull out of her crisis, France must start on the right path toward democratic changes in her structures and in her objectives in every area. It is this uninterrupted extension of democracy which will lead the country to socialism . . . Such an experiment can only be the result of a free choice by the majority of the people . . . The PCF has categorically declared that it will respect the verdict of universal suffrage under all circumstances, even if the majority of the voters decide not to pursue the experiment.[5]

The PCF's emphasis on universal suffrage demonstrates their apparent commitment to a peaceful road to socialism. Ronald Tiersky argues the general conclusion that seemed to flow from the PCF's action in the student disorders of May 1968 is that even in a general strike situ-

[1] Richard Johnson, *The French Communist Party versus the Students,* p. 140.
[2] Jean Kanapa, "A New Policy of the French Communists?" *Foreign Affairs,* January, 1977, p. 281.
[3] Richard Johnson, p. 141.
[4] *Ibid.,* p. 142.
[5] Jean Kanapa, p. 282.

ation like '68, the PCF will not give up the strategy of a peaceful road because they believe they are certain to lose with any other strategy, such as an armed insurrection. This conclusion is supported by the writing of Kanapa:

> As the PCF says itself, there is ultimately another guarantee that the policy it follows will be a truly democratic one, relying in every case on the free choice of the people: this guarantee is that there is no other possible way to effect the social changes necessary. France of 1977 is not Russia of 1917; only the small ultra-Leftist groups dream of the D-day of armed rebellion.

Instead of a violent Marxist revolution by the masses, the PCF desired to come to power through existing state institutions by a majority vote. "To start the country on the road to democratic reform with the best chance of success requires a popular movement embracing a *large* majority of the people. Since we reject recourse to armed violence and repression, this is a requisite victory."[8]

Indeed, the lessons of Chile and the apparent ability of the French left-wing parties to collaborate in electoral affairs have combined to induce the conclusion that a Leftist government can and must be in a large majority when it comes to power. The Communist strategy now prescribes that a political majority in parliament should also be supported on the outside by an unchallengeable, constantly mobilized "social majority."[9]

As a result, though the PCF leaders had preferred a smaller to a larger party, there has recently been a significant degree of change in the party's policy with respect to the size and composition of its membership. Previously, the party's organizational strategy had been one of "encadrement," which produced a smaller, more homogenous party organization. To accommodate the large majority strategy, the party is to achieve a much larger size; it will become a "mass Party."[10] The increase in size is being accompanied by a relaxtion of the political requirements for membership. PCF Politburo member Roland Leroy stated that, "The desire to work for democratic changes is sufficient condition for membership."[11] Secretary-General George Marchais said of the new members, "Obviously they do not all have a clear vision of our strategy and of the final objectives of the party. But this cannot be an insurmountable obstacle to membership."[12]

[6]Ronald Tiersky, "French Communism in 1976." *Problems of Communism,* January-February 1976, p. 34.
[7]Kanapa, p. 284.
[8]*Ibid.*, p. 287.
[9]Tiersky, p. 32.
[10]*Ibid.*, p. 32.
[11]*Ibid.*, p. 32.
[12]*Ibid.*, p. 32.

The PCF needed justification for this change in membership requirements since the party maintained its pretensions to a Leninist vanguard role. Politburo member Etienne Fajon claimed that, "Far from being contradictory to massive recruitment, the vanguard role of the Communist Party is inconceivable without it. The Party would be in no condition to face its various obligations . . . if it were reduced to the dimensions of a sect."[13]

Above all, the party's performance in national elections has preoccupied the leadership. The major goal has been to bring about the combination of legislative and presidential election victories required to put the alliance of Left parties in power with a strong PCF presence in order to begin implementation of the Communist/Socialist/Left Radical "Common program."[14]

Continued electoral and programmatic alliances remain an accepted fact despite all the various Communist-Socialist conflicts, because the Communists have no alternative to the Left alliance insofar as their goal is national power through the ballot. Kanapa stated that, "The quest for such an alliance and the will to maintain it are not, as far as the French Communist Party is concerned, a matter of circumstances. On the contrary, this is one of the most permanent features of its policy."[15] In reply to party members who argue the danger of such a broad alliance policy, the leadership claims that the double goal of a large Left political majority and increased Communist power within the alliance is the overriding imperative.[16] To obtain wider electoral support, the PCF's present appeal is not directly for socialism, but for an anti-monopolist coalition that will institute democratic reforms.

The Coalition and the Common Program

After the coalition comes to power it will begin implementation of the Common Program. The PCF defines this stage as one of "advanced democracy," not socialism itself. According to Kanapa, "This program is not a 'communist' program in the sense that carrying it out would be tantamount to a 'communist revolution' in France. It foresees profound and, at the same time, carefully measured democratic reforms."[17]

The reforms called for by the Common Program would begin the transformation of society by breaking the state-corporate power link in "state monopoly capitalism" through nationalization of several key industrial sectors and the entire banking and credit sector. Further

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 32.
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 20.
[15] Kanapa, p. 286.
[16] Tiersky, p. 34.
[17] Kanapa, p. 285.

economic and social changes would again place primary importance on a broad policy of nationalizations.[18] "The French Communists still assert that the transition to socialism requires as its core the kind and extent of nationalizations associated with existing Communist regimes."[19] This is qualified by excluding as objectives the nationalization of all industrial and commercial enterprises, the nationalization and collectivization of family farms, and nationalizations beyond an immediate "minimum threshold" designed to make the transition irreversible.

This stage of advanced democracy would include the maintenance and extension of "all the rights and liberties gained by the French people over the centuries." The state will be further democratized by the reestablishment of the prerogatives of the elected assemblies. A joint PCF-Italian Communist Party statement issued in November 1975 stated that the eventual building of a socialist order would be characterized by "a continued democratization of economic, social, and political life," while existing bourgeois liberties would be "guaranteed and developed." The statement went on: "This goes for freedom of thought and expression, of the press, of assembly and association, of demonstration, for free circulation of persons at home and abroad, for inviolability of private life, for religious freedom."[20]

The PCF places special emphasis on reconciling the Communists and the Christians. Kanapa hopes the party and the Christians will be "debating ideas while respecting one another's point of view." In addition:

> A significant number of believing Christians have joined the French Communist Party; naturally they are not asked to abandon their beliefs, and they have the same rights, obligations, and responsibilities as all other Communists . . . (French Communists) have clearly committed themselves to respect freedom of conscience and religion in every aspect.[21]

In short, the repression that is envisioned in the classical model of the dictatorship of the proletariat will not be incorporated into the stance of the PCF. Marchais stated, "Our position in this is fundamental, one of principle . . . we think there will be no socialism in France without political democracy."[22]

Another aspect of this political democracy is the right to existence and operation of opposition parties and democratic alternation between the majority and the minority. In the Common Program the Communist leadership subscribed to a document stating that when the advanced

[18]Tiersky, p. 34.
[19]*Ibid.*, p. 34.
[20]Kevin Devlin, "Eurocommunism," *Problems of Communism,* January-February 1976, p. 9.
[21]Kanapa, p. 289.
[22]Tiersky, p. 42.

democratic stage of the transition to socialism occurs, "if the majority parties were refused the confidence of the country, they would renounce power to take up the struggle once again in the opposition."[23] Thus, the PCF has apparently conceded that the principle of alternance will extend to a future socialist stage in France.

Even while in power, "the Party believes that it is not good for the state to retain all power and play the role either of guardian angel or of policeman."[24] All actions will be in accord with the "bourgeois" legality. Marchais said: "The only ones who have every reason to fear us are the 'barons' of big industry and high finance . . . We want the country in a legal and democratic way to take back from them the main levers of control."[25] The PCF has also "come out against the establishment of a particular philosophy as an official doctrine, and against all recourse to totalitarianism and personal power. And very logically, it has decided to abandon the idea of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat.'"[26]

The dictatorship of the proletariat has been classically considered by the communist movement as a condition of socialism. The PCF, however, has made every effort to dissociate itself from the negative connotations of the phrase as it could hurt the party's electoral credibility. Politburo member Jacques Chambez said that "Lenin's conclusions were not valid everywhere and always, and hence also in France."[27] Kanapa rejected the dictatorship of the proletariat as irrelevant to French conditions:

> If one considers that in order to install socialism in France it is necessary to have recourse to the dictatorship of the proletriat . . . then it is necessary to state that one must ban opposition parties, establish censorship, deprive part of the population of the freedom of expression, association, demonstration, etc., and one must tell the French worker, "This is one of the consequences of what the Communists propose to you," because the dictatorship of the proletariat, no matter what its form, is exactly (not entirely, but exactly) this.[28]

However, the "nationalization" of French communism cannot be interpreted as a step toward "deleninization" in the sense of an abandonment of the doctrine of a "historically necessary" hegemony or "vanguard role" for the PCF in socialist politics.[29] "The concept of the Communist vanguard role is a claim to unique legitimacy, a pretension by the

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 42.
[24] Kanapa, p. 283.
[25] *Ibid.*, p. 289.
[25] *Ibid.*, p. 282.
[26] Devlin, p. 5.
[27] Kanapa quoted in Devlin, p. 15.
[28] Tiersky, p. 44.
[29] *Ibid.*, p. 44.

Communists to define by themselves the nature of the regime."[30] The PCF leadership unquestionably maintains the pretension of a unique and "directing" role in the Left alliance. Machais stated that "the possibility for building socialism in France is linked to the capacity of the Communist Party to fulfill its directing and vanguard role,"[31] and "We do not aspire to exercise a monopoly in the democratic movement today — nor in the socialist society tomorrow, but . . . to play a vanguard role in social and human progress."[32] The PCF's vanguard doctrine leads to some confusion regarding the party's commitment to pluralism under socialism.

PCF Tactics

The PCF's electoral tactics diverge significantly from the paths laid by "classical" Marxism and Leninism. Perhaps most importantly, the PCF, in staking its success on parliamentry politics, has jettisoned the basic Marxist concept of a revolutionary class struggle. Marx saw the class struggle as the only means of freeing the working-classes. "The escape from political alienation, unlike that from religious alienation, requires a real revolution — a collective act whereby the citizens repossess the social power externalized in state institutions."[33] Marx never wavered in his radical opposition to the existing order and his commitment to class struggle as the means of overthrowing it as evidenced by his reaction to the German Social Democrats. The Social-Democrats urged piecemeal reform and collaboration with liberal elements who favored only gradual and partial change of the society.[34] Marx's response was, "there is only one path open to us. For almost forty years we have stressed the class struggle as the immediate driving power of history and in particular the class struggle between bourgeois and proletariat as the great lever of the modern social revolution. It is impossible for us to cooperate with people who wish to expunge the class struggle from the revolution."[35] Even Engels, in his praise of the benefits of parliamentry participation, said, "Our comrades do not thereby in the least renounce their right to revolution. The right to revolution is, after all, the only *really* historical right."[36]

Lenin goes beyond Marx in his view of the necessity of revolution.

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 44.
[31] George Marchais quoted in Kanapa, p. 286.
[32] Robert Tucker, *The Marx-Engels Reader*, p. xix.
[33] *Ibid.*, p. 399.
[34] Karl Marx, "Circular Letter to Bebel, Liebknecht, Bracke, and Others," *Marx-Engels Reader*, p. 405.
[35] Friedrich Engels, "The Tactics of Social-Democracy," *Marx-Engels Reader*, p. 420.
[36] V.I. Lenin, "Two Tactics of Social Democracy," *The Lenin Anthology*, p. 141.

"Let us leave to the opportunists . . . the task of inventing round-about, circuitous paths of compromise, out of fear of the revolution and of the direct path."[37] The nature of the bourgeois state does not mitigate in any way the need for revolutionary action. "A Social-Democrat must never for a moment forget that the proletariat will inevitably have to wage a class struggle for socialism even against the most democratic and republican bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeoisie. This is beyond doubt."[38] Marxism depends on its belief in its own infallibility. It asserts that there is only *one* way for a true communist party to come to power. The PCF's tactics are un-Marxist in this sense.

"Parliamentarianism" does have its advantages as well as its disadvantages as a "revolutionary" tactic. Engels cites many uses of parliamentarianism and universal suffrage in the bourgeois state — for example, it allows the party to count its numbers, it becomes a means of propaganda, it informs the party concerning the strength of all hostile parties, election agitation provides a means of getting in touch with the people, etc.[39] The primary use of participation in parliaments is to win over the great mass of the people. However, Engels never claimed that parliamentarianism was the way the party was ultimately to come to power. Marx warned that if the party sticks to the "immediate aims" of parliamentary power, "one devotes one's whole strength and energy to all sorts of petty rubbish and the patching up of the capitalist order of society in order at least to produce the appearance of something happening without at the same time scaring away the bourgeoisie."[42] The party should make no attempt to win over the bourgeoisie in parliaments.

Lenin set forth the idea of "alternation of parliamentary and non-parliamentary forms of struggle . . . legal and illegal forms of struggle."[41] Parliamentarianism, in Lenin's view, was not politically obsolete as long as masses of proletarians were still in favor of it. The party must work where the masses are to be found.

> You are in duty bound to call their bourgeois-democratic and parliamentary prejudices what they are — prejudices. But at the same time you must soberly follow the actual state of the class-consciousness and preparedness of the entire class and of all the working people (not only of their most advanced elements.)[42]

Thus, participation in parliaments is acceptable in pre-revolutionary situations for the purpose of educating the backward strata of the proletarian class.

[37] *Ibid.*, p. 134.
[38] Engels, p. 416.
[39] Marx, p. 402.
[40] Lenin, "Left-Wing Communism," p. 555.
[41] *Ibid.*, p. 581.
[42] *Ibid.*, p. 564.

Lenin does not reject the permissibility of compromise in general, but a true communist party "must be able to distinguish concrete cases of compromise that are inexcusable and are an expression of opportunism and treachery."[43] Totally ignoring the illegal forms of struggle, such as the PCF has done, might constitute an inexcusable compromise in Leninist terms because "action by the masses, a big strike for instance, is more important than parliamentary activity at *all* times, and not only during a revolution or in a revolutionary situation."[44] The effect of conforming to strictly legal means is evident in the PCF's case. They are bound to an electoral alliance with the Socialist Party which limits the PCF's flexibility. Marchais himself has said, "At bottom, the ideology animating the Socialists is and remains absolutely reformist."[45] If the PCF adhered to Leninist principles they would not be so limited in their options. They could always exercise their strength in the illegal aspects of class struggle.

Membership policy is another area where the views of the PCF and Marx diverge. Marx's intentions in this regard are apparent in the following statement:

> It is an inevitable phenomenon, rooted in the course of development, that people from what have hitherto been the ruling classes should also join the militant proletariat . . . If people of this kind from other classes join the proletarian movement, the first condition must be that they should not bring any remnants of bourgeois, petty-bourgeois, etc., prejudices with them but should whole-heartedly adopt the proletrian outlook . . . in a workers' party they are an adulterating element.[46]

The PCF's new relaxed membership policies that allow entry to those willing to work for "democratic changes" are incompatible with a truly Marxist outlook. Leninist doctrine also contrasts with the PCF policy as "ten wise men are better than a hundred fools." The PCF's old encadrement strategy was certainly more Leninist than the proposed mass party.

The large majority strategy is one area where PCF policy is consistent with classical Marxism. Engels said, "Socialists are realizing more and more that the no lasting victory is possible for them unless they first win the great mass of the people."[47] On the other hand Leninism holds that the vanguard should not wait for the majority of the masses to achieve consciousness before initiating revolutionary action. Insofar as the PCF's

[43] *Ibid.*, p. 582.
[44] Tiersky, p. 36.
[45] Marx, "Critique of the Gotha Program," p. 404.
[46] Engels, p. 420.
[47] Lenin, "Two Tactics of Social-Democracy," p. 136.

"large majority" will not be made up of conscious proletarians in the Marxist sense, this strategy presents the same danger as when Lenin's vanguard takes power. The PCF is part of a Left coalition of "democratic" parties. This coalition may be able to install itself in power, but this political victory will not represent the backing of a majority of conscious proletarians. Thus, the PCF's "large majority," made up to some degree of "petit-bourgeois vacillators," might not support the party if and when it attempts to institute truly Marxist reforms.

PCF Leninist or Marxist

The PCF's program is Leninist in that it intends to use the state to transform society instead of the long-range Marxist concept of the masses shaping their own stateless society. The all-important difference between PCF and Leninist strategy, however, is that the PCF plans to lay hold of the existing "bourgeois" state machinery, with perhaps minor structural changes, while Lenin calls for the smashing of the old state machinery and institution of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Since the state is nothing but an organ for the suppression of one class by another, Marx and Lenin both assert the historical necessity of the dictatorship of the proletariat for the period of political transition from capitalism to communism. In this period the proletariat must temporarily make use of the instruments of state power in order to suppress the resistance of the former exploiters. "Without a dictatorship it is impossible to break down that resistance and repel counter-revolutionary attempts."[48] There must be a continuation of the class struggle from above.

The PCF proposes a period of "advanced democracy" as a new transition stage. In this advanced democracy, not only is the bourgeoisie not to be abolished immediately, but the "bourgeois rights" of all are to be protected. Marx and Lenin argue by refraining from crushing the bourgeoisie after gaining power, the party is not consolidating the "revolution," society cannot move on to higher stages of socialism, and the party can be deposed.

The PCF accepts the possibility of being voted out of office by assenting to the principles of pluralism and alternance. Pluralism is unacceptable to Marxism in that only one class should exist, therefore only one party to represent that class. It might conceivably be argued that pluralism is Leninist because it recognizes different levels of consciousness, but, in Leninism, these differences are certainly not to be reconciled through pluralism. It is the reshaping of society by the vanguard party that will bring socialist consciousness to the backward elements.

[48]Marx, "The Civil War in France," p. 529.

Without pluralism, of course, there could be no alternance so the above arguments apply here as well. In addition, alternance is contrary to the Leninist belief in preserving the revolution at all costs. The party should not take the Kautskyite approach and save democracy at the expense of the revolution. Alternance is not consistent with the party's vanguard role. The party takes power in order to shape the masses accoring to Leninist theory. The vanguard has the true view of history. It should not let its programs be dictated to any extent by a desire to facilitate electoral popularity with the masses. The vanguard should be able to *act* upon its true vision. It should not be one group out of many lobbying for their own interests. The PCF's concept of the vanguard role differs from the Leninist concept.

Marx would argue another danger of alternance and not crushing the bourgeoisie. This is the risk of the possible retrenchment of the bourgeoisie after they have faced a loss of power. Marx stated that after the Paris Commune "the bourgeoisie showed to what insane cruelties of revenge it will be goaded the moment the proletariat dares to take its stand against the bourgeoisie as a separate class, with its own interests and demands."[49] The PCF program of nationalizations is not sufficiently severe to serve as the "expropriation of the expropriators." There is not the complete abolition of the bourgeoisie. This is so because, to Marx, bourgeois is more than an economic description, it is a state of mind and a way of thinking. The PCF's program does not offer the immediate radical restructuring of society that supposedly will lead to severing of the attachment to private property.

The PCF's concern for protection of existing bourgeois liberties and legality is an undue one judging by traditional Marxist and Leninist standards. In the dictatorship of the proletariat the state should be democratic in a new way: for the proletariat, and dictatorial in a new way: against the bourgeoisie. This workers' democracy is what counts. The PCF guarantee of freedom of religion is an especially un-Marxist element. According to Marx, religion is the opiate of the masses and the cause of spiritual alienation. After the party comes to power they are to break the power of the priests, the spiritual opressors of society. Under the bourgeois state, these liberties are not "true" liberties. Engels called universal suffrage in the bourgeois state an instrument of class rule.Universal suffrage is "the guage of the maturity of the working-class. It cannot and never will be anything more in the present-day state."[50]

Lenin sees the whole range of liberties in the bourgeois state as meaningless for the workers: "In general, all political liberty founded on present-day, i.e., capitalist, relations of production is bourgeois liberty.

[49]Engels quoted in Lenin, "The State and Revolution," p. 319.
[50]Lenin, "Two Tactics of Social Democracy," p. 139.

The demand for liberty expresses primarily the interests of the bourgeoisie."[51] Even in the proletarian state, Lenin proposes that the press should "serve as an instrument of socialist construction."[52] For Lenin, the interests of the Revolution stood higher than the legal rights of any entity or person: "Every direct or indirect attempt to consider the question of the Constituent Assembly from a formal, legal point of view, within the framework of ordinary, bourgeois democracy and disregarding the class struggle and civil war, would be a betrayal of the proletariat's cause, and the adoption of the bourgeois standpoint."[53]

An Appraisal of the PCF

Apparently, the PCF has adapted its strategy to the existence of the present state. The working-class is not being prepared for a revolutionary insurrection. The PCF has acquired a stake in the system and is very reluctant to risk the gains it has made. It may be considered a reformist party by the standards of classical Marxism. The 1966 affair involving two party theorists, Garaudy and Althusser, is an example of the PCF's de-radicalization.

Garaudy fulfilled the typical popular front duties of the party intellectual. He argued the necessity of assimilating the positive aspects of existentialism into modern Marxist theory and criticized intolerant atheism. Garaudy strove to make communism appealing to the sympathetic bourgeoisie.[54]

Althusser, more of a "Maoist," tried to show that the economically-oriented mature Marx repudiated most of the notions of the ethically oriented young Marx. He argued that Marxism had virtually nothing in common with the humanistic conceptions of the existentialists and the progressive Catholics.[55]

At a special meeting the Central Committee vindicated the revisionist line of Garaudy and reprimanded Althusser. Garaudy's approach was accepted not because it was theoretically superior (in fact it was not), but because it was tactically more useful in the opening up of a Christian-Marxist dialogue.[56] This demonstrates that, "Creative theoretical activity no longer guides strategic and tactical decision making. Instead, theory is used to justify and facilitate the extension of a predetermined political line."[57]

[51]Lenin, "Theses on the Constituent Assembly," p. 421.
[52]Lenin, "Immediate Tasks," p. 450.
[53]Johnson, p. 57.
[54]*Ibid.*, p. 57.
[55]*Ibid.*, p. 58.
[56]*Ibid.*, p. 58.
[57]Annie Kriegel quoted in Johnson, p. 117.

The growing party bureaucracy is another conservatizing force. Annie Kriegel argues that the growing party apparatus has gradually transformed itself from a tool into an end in itself: "Thus weighted down, the Party machine risks functioning increasingly for its own sake."[58] This is the argument also of Danie Cohn-Bendit, leader of the 68' student revolts. Since the PCF has succeeded in inserting itself into the French parliamentry system, the party elites try to preserve the power and influence the party has thereby gained. As a result, the PCF is reluctant to abandon parliamentary tactics. It wants to preserve the system to increase party power within it.[59] Thomas Greene wrote:

> In the context of the unrest in France in May-June '68, the PCF's quick and positive response to De Gaulle's call for national elections reflected the Party's anxious concern for redirecting revolutionary activity into the constitutional channels of electoral competition. The tactic reduced the PCF's long-range risks of being outflanked on the left, and it clearly demonstrated the bias of Communist elites for preservation of the organization over which they preside.[60]

The *Monthly Review* argued that the fundamental cause of the PCF's deradicalization was its initial decision to utilize the tactics of legal parliamentary politics:

> No mass party which is organized to work within the system of bourgeois institutions can also be revolutionary. If it accepts the institutions and adapts itself to them — even if it thinks it is doing so only temporarily — it is bound to acquire vested interests in the existing social order which would not merely be jeopardized, but wiped out by a genuine revolution.[61]

The Party is thus compelled by self-interest to help sustain and perpetuate the system. Rosa Luxemburg said, "Having adjusted to parliamentary tactics there is a tendency to regard parliamentary tactics as the immutable and specific tactics of socialist activity."[62] However, by adopting the membership, electoral, and alliance policies required by the peaceful transition strategy, the PCF leaders take the risk of diluting the results. Most unacceptable of all, they risk weakening the party in its pretensions to a vanguard role.[63]

In the PCF's defense are the arguments that a violent revolution would not be successful, and that classical Marxism-Leninism is no longer

[58] Johnson, p. 156.
[59] Thomas Greene, "Non-Ruling Communist Parties and Political Adaptation," *Studies in Comparative Communism,* Winter 73, p. 357.
[60] Johnson, p. 157.
[61] Rosa Luxemburg quoted in Johnson, p. 157.
[62] Tiersky, p. 34.
[63] *Ibid.*, p. 46.

applicable. Tiersky states that it is extremely doubtful that the PCF leaders could rally enough support or maneuver with enough skill to engineer a successful revolution.[64] Changing technology has placed immensely powerful weaponry at the disposal of the state. There is also the "end of ideology" debate which has emphasized to a substantial degree the effect of rising levels of economic development on the validity of the premises of classic Marxist doctrine.[65]

> In advanced countries, the proletariat and the peasantry — defined in terms of socio-economic status, not in terms of the possession of a revolutionary class consciousness — are a steadily declining portion of the total population. The inevitable impoverishment of the lower bourgeoisie has been belied by experience. So Marxist parties have to change their assumptions and strategies, or else risk being dumped on the ash heap of history.[66]

Thomas Greene also spoke of the declining relevance of socio-economic class to political competition. The modification in class structure is making the old class approach untenable and necessitating a populist approach. This is if free elections continue to remain crucial to political success. "A citizen's political orientation becomes a function more of his subjective values and perceptions than of his economic role in what Marx called 'the means of production.'"[67] The fact remains, however, that it is the Party that has *made* elections crucial to political success by abandoning other tactics and accepting elections. It has transformed a tactical objective into an ultimate strategic goal.

> Inadvertently, then, the major non-ruling communist parties have helped to integrate their supporters into the existing social structures as they have adapted their ideology and politics to the prevailing norms of collective bargaining and pluralist competition . . . Initially committed to radical change . . . the non-ruling communist parties have ended by inducing their supporters to adapt to the requirements of reformist politics.[68]

"The Party can fulfill its mission as the vanguard of the working-class only if it assiduously follows the teachings of Marx and Lenin. But these teachings must be applied in light of the concrete conditions which prevail in particular environments at particular times."[69]

[64]Norman, Kogan, "The French Communists and their Italian Comrades," *Studies in Comparative Communism*, Spring-Summer 73, p. 190.
[65]*Ibid.*, p. 190.
[66]Greene, p. 360.
[67]*Ibid.*, p. 361.
[68]Johnson, p. 3.
[69]*Ibid.*, p. 188.

"Lenin said, 'The theory of Marx is all-powerful because it is true.' But its truth assumes a different form in different settings and situations."[70]

It is clear that the PCF has deviated widely from classical Marxism-Leninism to the point of becoming ultimately reformist in these terms. But even though the PCF has compromised in tactics to a great degree, it is still not an "either/or" proposition as to whether they are Marxist or not. They must adapt to their own political environment and time. There is some doubt as to whether classical Marxist and Leninist tactics are applicable in light of changing technology, mass media, nuclear power, etc. As Lenin said, "it is a glaring theoretical error to apply the yardstick of world history to practical policies."[71] The real test will come after the PCF has installed itself in power. If it is able to perpetuate itself in power, this too is not proof of their Marxism. To be Marxist, the PCF must take steps towards the eventual withering away of the state in a classless society.

[70]Lenin, "Left-Wing Communism," p. 579.
[71]*Ibid.*, p. 579.

Commentary

Commentary is a new editorial section of *Hemispheres* devoted to important topics in world affairs. The opinion's expressed on these subjects are not necessarily endorsed by the entire editorial staff, rather they are views which the editors feel have relevance to these contemporary international issues.

The Editors

For The Rhodesian Internal Settlement

The internal settlement recently arrived at and presently being implemented in Rhodesia offers the only reasonable possibility of peaceful transition to black majority rule in Rhodesia. The agreement between Messrs. Smith, Muzorewa, Sithole, and Chirau provides for black majority rule, with written assurances of white minority rights. The United States should support the plan because it is moderate, conforms to our basic demand for an end to white minority rule, and is the only scheme on the table with a chance of success.

Clearly, the Anglo-American Plan stands as good a chance for attaining a peaceful settlement as a reconvened Geneva Conference would for settling the present problems in the Middle East. The communist-oriented Patriotic Front, committed to violent overthrow, does not deserve the support the Anglo-American Plan offers it. The approval conferred on the Patriotic Front by the OAU binds us not. Although it might be argued that the Patriotic Front's military pressure on Smith caused him to opt for an internal settlement and recognition of the one-man, one-vote principle, that certainly bestows no inherent right to rule upon its leaders. The unwillingness of Nkomo and Mugabe to return and stand election betrays the obvious: they could never win a freely held election given their low levels of popularity.

There is reason to be optimistic that the internal settlement will work and that the struggle will not become, in Ambassador Young's words, a "black on black war." For as the internal settlement reaches fruition, we can expect massive defections from the Patriotic Front armies, in light of the fact that the internal settlement guarantees what most black Rhodesians want. In addition, the proposed offers of amnesty to returning guerillas will make it painless.

Nkomo and Mugabe, especially, are not interested in a moderately progressive and bi-racial Rhodesia. That they receive support from the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China is ample reason to deny them our blessing. The time is ripe to admit that a Cold War rages in Africa. The USSR and their Cuban gurkhas (as Moynihan calls them)

are acceding to great influence across the continent. Our recent setbacks on the Horn and in Angola go far to prove that American restraint will only benefit the imperialistc tendencies of the Soviet Union. At present, the bloody dictatorships of Neto in Angola and Mengistu in Ethiopia are held in place only by the presence of their communist patrons.

Last fall, American liberals were boundlessly optimistic that the Soviets were in a "no win" situation on the Horn of Africa, probably drawing themselves into a "Russian Vietnam." Similarly, in the winter of 1975-76, Congressional liberals said no to Kissinger's plea to support anti-Soviet factions in Angola, claiming that we might be led into "another Vietnam." Well, it is by now clear that Africa is not Vietnam, and that the Soviets are playing a winning game there. They must be challenged.

By supporting the internal Rhodesian settlement, the United States would be backing a fine anti-Soviet bulwark in southern Africa. If we make it clear that we see the internal plan as the only basis for discussions, Nkomo will probably return to participate in elections. The important point, though, is for us to take a strong stand. Our constant policy vacillations are due to our unwillingness to "disappoint" the leaderships of Nigeria, Zambia, Tanzania, etc. The United States would be spineless to allow Nigeria to lead us around on their "oil leash" or to let such "moral leaders" as Kaunda or Nyerere conjure misbegotten guilt in us. The good opinion of black Africa is a worthy goal, but never at the expense of muting our own convictions or abdicating our natural role as world leader.

Zimbabwe And U.S. Foreign Policy In Africa

American foreign policy towards Zimbabwe (the black African name for Rhodesia) in particular, and black Africa in general, must be based on the realities of African politics. The realities in Zimbabwe are: a political system on the brink of transition; a guerilla war of liberation between the black nationalist forces of the Patriotic Front and the Rhodesian army; and a large question mark surrounding the future political stability of Zimbabwe, with or without an internal settlement. For the U.S. to support Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith's largely aesthetic proposal for "peaceful transition," would be to ignore the plan's inherent weaknesses and the nature of the political environment that will be its litmus test, as well as the widespread African denunciation of the internal settlement as guaranteeing neither an end to minority domination nor a resolution of the black factionalism.

The proposal is far from comprehensive and, indeed, raises suspicion of Smith's commitment to real change. There are points of great concern: 1) Prime Minister Smith has yet to relinquish the statutory powers of his office; 2) it is doubtful whether the four Executive Council Members,

including Smith, will demonstrate restraint from the temptation to abuse their veto power; 3) the real extent of power of the black cabinet members remains in question; 4) provisions have not been made for black penetration of the upper levels, most importantly, of the civil service and bureaucracy; and 5) there is, as yet, no final provision to pass operative control of the military and police, long bastions of white domination, to a larger body representing majority interests.

Smith's answer to the guerilla war — an offer of amnesty to the Zimbabwean nationalists based in Zambia and Mozambique — underestimates the power base and cohesion of Joshua Nkomo's and Robert Mugabe's movements. Chances are negligible that the internal settlement will draw the disaffected elements into the fold, defuse the military opposition of the Patriotic Front, or avert the threat of political disintegration. If U.S. foreign policy towards Zimbabwe seeks [its] internal stability — which can be derived only from political integration of all [interested] parties — the U.S. must continue to search for a compromise solution that effectively incorporates the opposing (and well-armed) nationalist forces of the Patriotic Front. In the event that no such solution is reached, the U.S. will be faced with a decision as to whom it will support: leaders of the internal settlement who have been denounced by the OAU or African and Communist forces fighting a war of liberation.

It has been argued that both Zimbabwean internal stability and American popularity with the African nations is secondary to the objective of countering Communist influence in the region — i.e. the Chinese and Soviet backing of Mugabe and Nkomo's aims. This view, which advocate U.S. endorsement of the internal settlement, fails to appreciate the realities of African politics and the futility in the long run of attempting to translate African-Superpower relationships into U.S. or Soviet "strategic footholds" on the continent. African alignments with the superpowers have tended to be based on expediency, and are generally ephemeral, due to both the nature of African nationalism and the political instability of so many African regimes. The dramatic diplomatic realignments in Egypt, the Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia since 1972 illustrate the unpredictability of African leadership and the potential suddenness of change.

The U.S. has far less to gain from attending to anachronistic Cold War rhetoric than from adhering to an intelligent foreign policy based on a sensitivity to the subtle but significant changes in the international order. The political power that the Third World has begun to exercise in international institutions and the increasing prominance of the North-South dialogue on a new international economic order are two examples of the diffusion of international power which has occurred in the 70's.

In this age, in which the political and economic balance is gradually

shifting to the advantage of developing nations of Africa, a positive American reputation is essential to the long range economic and political interests of the U.S. American foreign policy in Africa must take into account the political weight of international leaders such as Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and the economic power of a nation such as oil-rich Nigeria. The opinions of these forces, as well as those voiced by the OAU (which, in this case, denounce the Internal Settlement) are not to be taken lightly if the U.S. is to develop the kind of respectability necessary for relations with African nations to be productive in the future.

The Real World Food Crisis

The World Food Crisis as it has been presented to the American public is a myth. Admittedly, in 1973 there was a serious food shortage whose effects were felt worldwide in rising grain prices and the depletion of food reserves. However, in the eyes of the people most directly effected, those for whom shortages and rising prices mean hunger and starvation, the real cause of their plight is not the variation in world harvests but political and economic factors which limit their access to food, irregardless of world supplies. For the poor of the developing world, hunger is a problem which must be dealt with year after year.

If the problem of hunger is ever going to be overcome two factors which are primarily responsible for blocking the poors' access to food must be resolved. These conditions are: elites in developing countries who manipulate their governments solely for the purpose of solidifying their own political position; and foreign corporations and governments which act both in collusion and independently to create exploitative dependencies for their own benefit. For example, the United States sells grain under the euphemism "Food for Peace" at prices which undercut local suppliers, drive them out of the market, and create a need for continued external supplies. Multinational corporations such as Nestle, to choose but one, stage attractive advertising campaigns and pay nurses to convince new mothers of the necessity of infant formulas which in terms of both expense and nutritional value are widely recognized to be inferior to breast feeding.

As for the governments of developing countries, one common policy is to set food prices for their own growers at levels below the actual market value. This creates a substantial disincentive for poorer farmers to produce anything beyond their own immediate needs and, most important, keeps urban consumers, who hold the bulk of political power in developing countries, relatively well fed and happy with the present regime. Unfortunately for the rural farmer, the government is then apt to turn around and demand taxes in cash — cash which is difficult to acquire because of the low prices set by the government in the first place. Thus, the rural poor are caught in an exploitative cycle which drains them of their income, their ability to move beyond the margin of subsistence, and of their access to food. This is the real World Food Crisis.

For some (notably China and Cuba) the solution has been revolution, but with the increasing military sophistication of most nations this option is rapidly vanishing. This does not mean that the poor are locked into a future of hunger, for there are several countries which have voluntarily instituted policies which go a long way towards ending past exploitation. The governments of Sri Lanka, Taiwan, and the Kerala state of India have set policies which insure a just distribution of income through fair market prices and an equitable balance of funding for development.

In the area of foreign assistance increased support has been given to agencies like the Inter-American Foundation which fund proposals made by the poor themselves — assuring that development projects are in the interest of the people they are meant to serve and not the governments who supply the money. The overriding question is: how can these examples be duplicated?

In the face of dominant elites in LDCs and substantial corporate and bureaucratic support in developed countries, overcoming the status quo is not an easy task. It is impossible for the U.S. to directly interfere in the governments of developing countries but pressure can and should be put on our own government and aid other donors to use an evaluation of a country's performance in this area as an important criterion in both bilateral and multilateral aid. Government support (for instance the granting of insurance to corporate investments in LDCs) of multinational corporations should also be structured so as to penalize those which have a negative impact on their host countries.

Action should be taken to create incentives such as aid supplements for countries where the government has shown a real concern for dealing effectively with the problems of the rural poor. Disincentives should be instituted for those with negative records, but only after a reasonable warning has been given, and even then incrementally. It is important to avoid alienating governments which if dealt with carefully would have gone along (hopefully President Carter's human rights policy has taught us this much).

This sort of an aid policy will require firm but understanding leadership to avoid antagonizing both domestic and foreign political groups. In the past such leadership has not been forthcoming. Perhaps the current hesitation over the new U.S. aid policy is an indication that these difficult questions are finally being dealt with. Let us hope so.

U.S. Arms Sales Policy: A New Approach

Despite his good intentions, President Carter's declaration that the export of weapons was "to be an exceptional tool of American foreign policy," has not been upheld. One need look only as far as the proposed $4.8 billion dollar sale of war planes to Israel, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. If U.S. arm sales are to approach the "exception" status that President Carter called for last May, certain steps are necessary [to insure this.]

In December, the U.S. and Soviet Union, the world's two largest arms merchants, began talks to limit arms sales. While these talks have not included, as yet, either the French or the British, they are certainly a step in the right direction and must be continued. However ideal the multilateral approach may be in solving the arms sales question, it is unrealistic to expect any meaningful agreement in the short term. Thus, the U.S. must begin to formulate and implement a policy of unilateral restraint in specific areas of arms sales. Until this policy is undertaken, U.S. arms sales will continue to be used for political and economic purposes, rather than as a selective and thus more powerful tool of American foreign policy.

The first step that U.S. arms sales policy must take is to consciously identify the three different categories of arms buyers. The first group, our traditional allies (Western Europe, Japan, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia), must continue to receive preferential treatment. A positive step towards decreased arms sales in the two other categories would be to give Great Britain and France a greater share of this market, especially its NATO component. Certainly such a move would infuriate American weapons producers, but unless America is willing to take this step, it is unlikely that the British and/or French arms transfers will be eventually reduced.

The second category of U.S. arms purchasers is composed of the Middle East countries. The Carter Administration recently backed itself into an inflexible position, by leaving itself susceptible to Saudi Arabian linkage of arms for oil. Thus, a move that sought to increase U.S. influence in the area could become a potential misfortune for U.S. interests if Congress rejects this proposal. President Carter has missed an excellent opportunity to prove his commitment to the restraint of arms sales and peace in the Middle East. The United States should have negotiated a regional arms sales agreement with the Soviets as part of their October joint declaration on the Middle East. Such an agreement would have carefully defined the Middle East. i.e. Is Iran to be included? And implemented, on arms transfers, a total freeze or at least placed limits on the numbers of weapons and the sophistication of technology to enter

the region. The recently proposed sale has denied the U.S. the opportunity to negotiate such an agreement until the Middle East situation approaches an environment conducive to negotiations. At the very least, the U.S. must more carefully approach the question of arms sales in the Middle East. Until this is done, U.S. claims as facilitator of peace in the Middle East will lack credibility.

The third category of U.S. arms sales concerns the Third World. In approaching arms sales to the Third World, the United States must answer two major questions: What is the impact of the proposed sale on regional security? and, will the effect of the arms transfer deter nuclear proliferation? These questions, not those that deal with countering Soviet arms sales at every corner, should be the key to placing effective restraints on the U.S. arms sales to the Third World.

Undertaking this strategy unilaterally poses a major feat for U.S. foreign policy. Willingness to adopt unilateral measures will entail some short-run domestic and international costs. Yet, the benefits of responsible American behavior in arms sales will be immeasurable.

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