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Hemispheres

Spring 1980

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Hemispheres is published annually by the undergraduates of Tufts University to address a variety of contemporary political, economic, historical and legal issues in international affairs. Articles published in the Journal are chosen to represent a balanced selection of topics and opinions but do not necessarily reflect the views of the Editors. The Editors reserve their viewpoint for the Commentary Section.

The Editors would like to thank the undergraduates who submitted articles to The Journal; as a group the authors are to be commended for their scholarly approach to a broad range of international issues. The Editors regret that the limits of space could not allow more articles to be published.

The Editors would also like to express their gratitude for the support of the International Relations Committee and Tufts Council on International Affairs and for the unselfish assistance of John Gibson, Don Klein, Joe Foster, Harry Pollock of Harwich Lithograph and Tom Brown of the *Christian Science Monitor*.

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Hemispheres

Spring 1980

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Tatyana and Efrem Yankelevich left the Soviet Union two and a half years ago. They presently reside in the Boston area.

Andrei Sakharov, Mrs. Yankelevich's step-father, is a prominent Soviet dissident and scientist who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1975. Recently, he and his wife were banished to Gorky by the Soviet authorities.

Sakharov and the Soviet Dissidents:

An Interview with Tatyana and Efrem Yankelevich

Western observers associate the Soviet dissident movement with mock trials and KGB terror tactics. The Western press distorts the real aims of the dissidents by focusing on the repressive measures taken by the Soviet government to silence the movement. Soviet dissidents are fighting for such basic human rights as freedom of speech and freedom of assembly, which are taken for granted in the United States.

Our discussion with Tatyana Yankelevich, Andrei Sakharov's step-daughter, and her husband Efrem is presented here to give our readers a different perspective on the dissident movement in the USSR. In the interview, they discuss the development of the dissident movement in the Soviet Union, its present status and America's role in the issue of human rights.

The Editors

Hemisphere would like to thank Michael Rauchman for his invaluable assistance in putting together this interview.

Hemispheres:

Has President Carter's foreign policy been effective in pressuring the Soviet government towards relaxing control over their citizens?

Yankelevich:

Since my parents were exiled to Gorky, the White House has issued two statements: the first on the day of their arrest, the second after they were beaten ten days later. We believe these statements of protest have some impact on Soviet actions. At least we do not know what else could have an effect.

But it is hard to answer this question. We feel that the Olympic boycott, the Jackson/Vanik amendment and the general emphasis on human rights primarily serves the interests of the United States in the long run if not in the immediate future.

The Soviet Union is preparing a big show for the 1980 Olympics. They are taking a lot of time to produce a good impression on those who will visit; they are trying to rid the city of dissidents.

Hemispheres:

Could you tell us something about the evolution of the dissident movement in the U.S.S.R.?

Yankelevich:

The dissident movement has its roots in the heroic act of independent thinking. We mean a human rights movement. You have to understand that the concepts of inalienable rights of law and equality before the law, have been very carefully destroyed in the past sixty years and have very few roots in pre-revolutionary Russia. No influence of Western ideas has been possible in this case; those were the times of the Iron Curtain. So a man, being cut off from everything, had to invent this idea absolutely independently...The first people believed to be the founders of the human rights movement, such as Volpin, Chalidze, Kovalev and Velikanova and others are no longer in Moscow where the movement began. Volpin left Russia. Chalidze went for a visit abroad and was deprived of his citizenship. Velikanova and Kovalev are now in prison. The founders were just isolated, free-thinking individuals but now things look a little bit different.

Actually, the human rights movement has been formed in the last decade. There are a few associations, the first of which were the Initiative Group for the Defense of Human Rights (1969) and the Committee for Human Rights of which Sakharov was a founding member. In recent years, similar groups have been founded, such as the Helsinki Monitoring Group, the Group Investigating Abuse of Psychiatry (in the Soviet Union dissidents are often put in the

prison-type psychiatric hospitals), the Group for the Defense of the Rights of the Invalids and the Group for the Defense from Religious Persecution.

It is important to note that none of these groups is legally recognized by the government and all members of these groups are to some extent persecuted. You must understand that they are not organizations in the usual sense of the word. There is no strict hierarchy; they are based on the free will of their members. For example, every time the Helsinki Monitoring Group publicizes a document about some violations, only those members who took part in puting it together or who have read it and agree with it, will sign it. It is not obligatory for every member to sign and no one could order him to do so.

Presently, many of these groups have only one or two members who are free. The rest have been put in prison by the KGB.

Hemispheres:

We have heard that the dissident movement consists of isolated intellectuals and hasn't affected the working class. Please comment on this.

Yankelevich:

It was like that in the beginning, to some extent. However, there are groups now that consist of members whom you would call, by their professions, workers...for example, the Group for the Defense of the Rights of Invalids, which I mentioned before and a group which calls itself Free Trade Union. You have to understand that these workers are not representatives of the average blue or white collar workers. These people have come into insoluble conflict with the authorities at some point.

Hemispheres:

How do workers who do not come into conflict with the authorities view the dissidents? Do they know much about them? How do they react to the dissidents?

Yankelevich:

You insist on using the term "dissident." Let us point out that this term appeared in the West first. Their Russian name could be translated into English as "differently minded." The word "dissident" appeared in the Russian lexicon only recently and is used mostly by official press. But as a rule it is very distorted information. The attitude towards dissidents is not always friendly because their intentions are not well understood by the average citizen and the meaning of the word "dissident" is unknown to the majority.

Hemispheres:

Has the increasing Western influence affected the human rights movement in any way?

Yankelevich:

The support of Western public opinion has always been of great importance. Another very significant factor was the reports about dissident activities which were broadcasted in the Soviet Union by the western radio.

Hemispheres:

Has the support from foreign governments and other international organizations such as Amnesty International and the International Red Cross had any effect on the rights of Soviet citizens?

Yankelevich:

First of all, the international Red Cross never replied to any dissident's appeal or to any appeal coming from the Soviet Union. Amnesty International has an affiliate in Moscow. However, the Group is not recognized by the authorities and its members are persecuted.

One form of government support, the Jackson-Vanik amendment, almost entirely influenced Jewish emigration. And it was most effective. Unfortunately, the Americans only emphasized Jewish emigration to Israel when there are many non-Jews who would also like to leave the country.

Hemispheres:

Do you believe that European goverments have not given the United States enough support in the area of human rights? (Editor's Note: When the United States passed the Jackson-Vanik amendment, tying Most Favored Nations status to emigration policy, France, Britain and Japan took the opportunity to increase their trade with the U.S.S.R. instead of supporting the United States with economic sanctions of their own.)

Yankelevich:

Of course it was very unpleasant for us to see that Western Europe never supported the United States in such moves. We feel this is caused by the more general problems of Euro-American relations. Europe is caught between the two superpowers. Western Europe is allied with the United States yet it is geographically closer to the U.S.S.R.

It is sometimes hard for us to understand why Western Europe isn't behaving. But we have a feeling that little by little this is changing. In general, it is hard to hope that all people will be able to sacrifice for the sake of bringing positive changes to the Soviet system.

Hemispheres:

Will the boycott of scientific exchanges with the Soviets by Western scientists be effective in presuring the authorities on the issue of human rights? (Editor's Note: The U.S. Academy of Science recently decided to boycott exchanges with the Soviet Union to protest Sakharov's exile to Gorky.)

Yankelevich:

This decision by American scientists is very significant but the support of other scientists is still needed. French scientists have been very active in my parents' case. We were told that about one thousand French of scientists are boycotting exchanges with the U.S.S.R.

Hemispheres:

Why do you feel that the Soviet authorities have not deported Sakharov as they did Solzhenitsyn and others?

Yankelevich:

It's very strange to hear such questions from free (Western) people. Why don't you ask why he hasn't been given the right to speak out, to think the way he wants, to go where he wants. Instead you ask why he hasn't been deported, which is as illegal as his exile. We are afraid that the influence of Soviet ideology on the mentality of Western people is stronger than one would imagine. Our criticism is not personal. We have been asked this question many times before.

Hemispheres:

We don't think he should be deported, but in keeping with the way dissidents have been dealt with in the past, this seems like something the Soviet authorities would do.

Yankelevich:

They have dealt with dissidents in every possible way. Some are forced to emigrate, others are imprisoned but Sakharov's case is a very special one. Still we do not exclude the possibility that finally he will be expelled from the country.

Hemispheres:

What about yourself, Mrs. Yankelevich, were you personally harassed by the authorities?

Yankelevich:

I was. I was expelled from Moscow University School of Journalism two years before we left the U.S.S.R. The Dean of the department said that I was expelled for having outraged the Arab students. This is nonsense. There were no Arab students in my department. This happened after the demonstration in front of the Lebanese embassy in protest of the murder of the Israeli sportsmen at the Munich Olympic games. There was a small demonstration...Actually, it was not a demonstration because most of the people were immediately taken to a van. I was among those and so I was expelled. But I don't think this was the real reason. The real reason was that I am related to Sakharov. When Sakharov became a member of our family, there were some attempts to expel me from the University but they only succeeded after this demonstration.

Finally we got the feeling that we were being held hostage by the authorities in order to silence Sakharov's human rights plea. We decided in this situation that it would be better for all of us if we would leave the country.

Perhaps we should point out that KGB tactics, such as beating, only developed in the last four or five years. In the late sixties and early seventies the worst measures taken against dissidents would be to have someone fired from the place where he works and perhaps prosecuted on political charges.

Hemispheres:

Do you feel that if these repressive tactics of the KGB continue, the dissident movement might turn into a revolutionary or terroristic movement?

Yankelevich:

If the government's control of every aspect of Soviet life were somehow weakened then it is quite possible that some terrorist elements might arise. You must understand that under the present conditions unifying into a group of more than two persons is almost impossible. Your place of work and your residence are registered. Telephone conversations are bugged. All suspicious-looking mail is opened. Mail coming or going to certain people is censored. In such a situation it is almost impossible to communicate about any underground activities. Although we know of such underground lives, there are very few. These are mostly members of some persecuted religious groups carrying false documents. Somehow they have evaded the attention of the authorities but this happens very seldomly. This is different from a terrorist group. These people's activity is of a completely different nature and they are not involved with any organization.

Hemispheres:

Will the status of Soviet dissidents and Soviet society in general change when Brehznev is out of power?

Yankelevich:

We don't think that a change in Soviet leadership would bring any significant changes to the system. Brehznev is probably not as powerful as he used to be. Under the present circumstances, the state of his health doesn't allow him to deal with as many things. But this fact hasn't influenced the domestic and foreign policy.

No one knows how a socialist state should look, but in every state the government is more or less involved in the life of their citizens. Sakharov acknowledges that some involvement is necessary. However, it is intolerable when the economic life of a citizen depends entirely on the state, when each citizen is an employee of the state.

Since World War II, American foreign policy has been influenced by Soviet aggression. Since then the Americans have never felt themselves secure. Although American attitudes may not change, this situation can be altered by the democratization of Soviet society.

The Missing Truth About Angola

by Todd A. Kessler

There is a dominant political ideology in the United States, as in all nations, which is perpetuated in the media. The coverage of world events in the press is marked by this ideology which clouds the essence of American foreign policy.

The news coverage of the Angolan civil war 1974-76 exemplifies the weaknesses in journalism's standard operating procedures which make the press easy victims to the propaganda of the incumbent administration in Washington. The over-emphasis on the Executive Branch of government and its policy statements cripples the free flow of information capable of providing equal time to alternative views of world events.

The press rarely challenges the fundamentals of American government, preferring instead to challenge the credentials and integrity of Americans in government. (Nixon may have been a miscreant, but the office of the Presidency is still virtuous.) These American-bred values are translated, consciously or unconsciously, into biased press coverage and anlaysis of world events.

Thanks to the post-mortem testimony of those witnesses and contributors to American policy in Angola, clear contrast can now be seen between what was written and what was. Contrary to the implications of Ameican press accounts, the Soviet Union was *not* the provacateur of conflict in Angola; nor was the United States the champion of Third World nationalism. The coverage of the Angolan civil war of 1974-76 by the American print media illustrates the bias which made journalists unwitting partners with the United States government in the conspiracy to keep the truth about American foreign policy from the American people.

The tendency of a correspondent to exclude certain facts while overemphasizing others can be partly attributed to the demand for speed and a competitive edge in the newspaper industry. The confusion of newsroom deadlines, the difficulty in finding reliable sources, and the need for quick concise reports clouds the easy distinction between ideologically linked bias and occupational hazard. Standard operating procedures have weakened the ability of the "watchdog" press to rise above the political ideology to present a more objective view of foreign policy. The overdependence on official and public statements for news copy smothers the smaller percentage of "enterprise" reporting. The administration's view of reality prevails.

On December 12, 1975 *The Los Angeles Times'* front page story, headlined CAN'T ALLOW RUSS TO GAIN FOOTHOLD, KISSINGER WARNS? recorded the Secretary of State's address to the NATO representatives in Belgium in which he defined American resolve to counter Soviet intervention in Angola. The *Times* correspondent quoted Kissinger at length, beginning with the lead.

> *We cannot ignore, for example, the substantial Soviet build-up of weapons in Angola which has introduced a great power rivalry into Africa for the first time in fifteen years.*[1]

The news story continued to quote Kissinger's claim that the U.S.S.R. had contributed over two hundred million dollars in heavy artillery and MIG jet fighters to the Marxist-oriented faction, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Angola (M.P.L.A.), in the three-way civil war which embroiled the small but wealthy Portuguese colony emerging into new nationhood.

On page eighteen of the same issue of the *Times*, beneath the continuation of the Kissinger story, appeared a smaller article with a smaller headline which read, COST OF U.S. ANGOLA WAR SUPPORT PUT AT $50 MILLION. Dwarfed by the seeming importance of the Kissinger warning on page one, Marilyn Berger's story, exposing the leaked findings of the Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs, detailed for the first time the revelation of

covert spending in Angola which amounted to the second largest expenditure in the history of the Central Intelligence Agency, next to the secret Vietnam program. Support for Holden Roberto's Front for the National Liberation of Angola (F.N.L.A.) and Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (Unita) had been approved by the National Security Council's Forty Committee in the summer of 1975, according to the article. The aid, approximately fifty to sixty million dollars, had been funneled through neighboring Zaire, whose President Mobutu Sese Seko was brother-in-law and ardent supporter of Mr. Roberto. The last two paragraphs of the report, attributed to Subcommittee chairman Dick Clark from Iowa, asserted that the United States continued to support "the only sure loser" in Angola.[2]

Suggestion of American support for the FNLA and Unita had appeared in various print media in preceding weeks, but had been overshadowed by allusions to the superpower contest provoked by the Soviet Union. At the advanced stage of the intervention, American readers were to interpret the covert CIA involvement irrelevant to the "massive support" from Soviets and Cubans in Angola. *Time* magazine stated on December 22, 1975:

> *...Whatever the U.S. is now doing, the Russians seem to have started earlier with more, and the Soviet backed force appears to be winning on all fronts.*[3]

" TIME and all other media failed to discover that the United States was involved in Angola first."

What *Time* and all other media failed to discover was that the United States was involved in Angola first. CIA desk officer in Angola Brenda MacElhinney related to her colleague, "The Soviets did not make the first move in Angola. Other people did. The Chinese and the United States. The Soviets have been a half step behind, countering our moves."[4]

As Congress revealed the extent of the United States' covert arms shipments to the FNLA and Unita, and the deception which Kissinger perpetuated around the program, the press slowly began to awaken to their own manipulation by the government. The U.S. involvement in Angola fit unquestionably into Kissinger's policy of halting what he perceived as a slow persistent Soviet expansion in the peripheral Third World arenas. A balance of real or perceived power on the East/West axis was crucial to the Secretary's theory of global stability; therefore, the United States must never be seen as backing down from any confrontation, regardless of how small or remote. However, meeting this Soviet challenge required a swift, massive show of strength in the local areas of contest. In the immediate post-Vietnam era of public caution, Kissinger's designs were thwarted by Congressional objection.

Covert action through the CIA became the most useful means of operation, as Kissinger could easily win approval from the NSC's Forty Committee. As long as the American constituency could be kept uninformed, the Secretary of State felt he could manage global politics, keeping the Soviets in line around the world. The policy was inherently vulnerable to leaks, provided the leaks are promoted by the media and the American public can be stirred. But during the covert involvement in Angola, the press neglected to respond to at least two flagrant invitations which might have prevented the Soviet-American face-off.

In September of 1975, as the first installments of the CIA allotted 31.7 million dollars for the IAFEATURE (Angola project code name) program poured into FNLA coffers, fighting increased between Roberto's poorly trained forces and the MPLA guerillas. The FNLA was driven from the northern town of Caxito, forcing a quick abandonment of U.S. artillery supplies. While the State Department officials brushed off all suggestions of U.S. involvement in Angola, Agostinho Neto, having discovered army crates marked from North Carolina, scheduled a press conference to expose the CIA's mischief.

Former CIA task force leader in Luanda, John Stockwell remembers, "We were all hyper about having our cover blown" by Neto's display of American equipment.[5] According to Stockwell, the only Western press attending the news conference were Reuters, Agence France Presse, and NBC Radio stringer Caryle Murphy. The public disclosure never appeared in American newspapers. The result, said Stockwell, "was a muted flab."[6]

Throughout the summer of 1975, there had been no published inquiry into the U.S. role in Angola. The sporadic skirmishes were of little concern to assignment editors concentrating on negotiations in the Middle East and the coup d'etat in Lisbon. But Kissinger's plans for Angola received criticism from within the Administration.

Although the Forty Committee authorized over thirty million dollars for IAFEATURE, Director William Colby advised the Secretary that the CIA would require at least one hundred million dollars to ensure an FNLA victory. One hundred million dollars was beyond the FY75 Intelligance budget, but Kissinger remained steadfast to continue support. The Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Nathaniel Davis sent Kissinger memos of dissent. He wrote to superiors that the risk of a mutual escalation between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. was too great in Angola. "If we are going to have a test of strength with the Soviets, we should find a more advantageous place."[7] Davis' advice was not taken, if not ignored completely. He was soon transferred to Geneva, but not before the classified information appeared in *The New York Times*. Details about the CIA funding to the Portuguese Socialist Party, in an anti-Communist political battle in Lisbon, and to Holden Roberto's FNLA were ascertained by four unnamed sources.

On the front page of the September 23 *Times*, headlined U.S., SOVIET, CHINA REPORTED AIDING PORTUGAL, ANGOLA, Leslie Gelb reported in the first five paragraphs that Washington was involved in large scale funding to the Portuguese and Angolan factions "as part of the continuing struggle for control of the Meditteranean and for influence and raw materials in Central Africa."[8] Focusing on the Portuguese issue, Gelb interjected that "hundreds of tons of military equipment" were sent to Angola "since March alone."[9] According to Gelb's four "official" sources, the money and arms were funneled through Zaire with the encouragement of sixty million dollars granted to Zairian President Mobutu, with the legal approval of all necessary Congressional committees. (Later it was revealed that these committees were deceived and misinformed by the Colby briefings.)

Clearly, the press did not perceive the importance of this revelation regarding the Third World. The "news peg" of Gelb's story was the threat posed to NATO by Portuguese unrest. The emphasis on Portugal can be accepted in the context of the news occurring at the moment, but the dismissal of the Angolan information cannot be excused as bureaucratic oversight.

FNLA troops during the civil war.

The next mention in *The New York Times* regarding the U.S. in Angola appeared in a November 2 article on the continuing skirmishes between the Soviet-backed MPLA and the FNLA/Unita forces. After three detailed paragraphs of Cuban troop arrivals and Soviet arms estimates, the article made subtle reference that the pro-Western groups were receiving aid from China, U.S.A. and Zaire. No support, denial or mention of the September leak appeared again.

The Washington Post ran a front page story the next day declaring that the Ford Administration refused to confirm or deny the clandestine operation, lending credence to the news leak.[10] The only other published story on this leak appeared in a small news brief in the September 27 *Los Angeles Times* on CIA assistance to the Portuguese Socialists. No mention was made about Angola.[11]

Had this leak been employed to its full potential, the whole record of American intervention in Angola might have been exposed, thwarting Kissinger's one-man instigative policy. But not one newspaper followed up on the revelation that "hundreds of tons of military equipment" from the United States were being shipped via Kinshasa, Zaire to Angola. Instead, the press emphasized the U.S. role in Portugal and the potential danger to NATO if the Communists were to maintain control in Lisbon.

The trouble in Angola began in the early summer of 1974 when the rise of the Left in Portugal and the resulting coup d'etat in the Lisbon government signified imminent independence for the nationalist Angolans fighting colonial rule since 1961.

With independence in sight, but no foreseeable leadership to accept the authority of national government, the CIA began to encourage Roberto to seize control by granting the FNLA small arms and aid. This support was not approved by the Forty Committee. John Stockwell reports in his confession-diary, *In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story*, that the unapproved funding was not large "but enough for word to get around that the CIA was dealing itself into the race."[12] "The bureau in Kinshasa was very sloppy," said Stockwell, "it was hardly a clandestine environment."[13] But because the American press did not consider the region to be important enough to American interests, no correspondent spent enough time in Zaire or Angola to uncover these clandestine moves.

The U.S. had supported the FNLA in the anti-colonial struggle during the Kennedy-Johnson years. However, once in office, Nixon ceased the funding, but kept Roberto on CIA retainer. Similarly, the Soviet Union had suspended its financing of the MPLA by early 1974. The Soviet Union gestured in response to CIA stirrings. In August 1974, Moscow declared that Agostinho Neto's MPLA was the sole spokesman for Angolan nationalism. For Henry Kissinger, this might have been the harbinger of Soviet incursion. Already the governments of Somalia, Congo-Brazzaville, and Guinea-Bissau received major support from the Soviets.

"...American journalists were marked for propagandizing."

As Chinese and American support continued through the autumn, evidence supported the rumor that the Soviet Union had landed an AN-12 transport plane in Dar-es-Salaam in September, carrying small arms and supplies for "African liberation movements." The CIA never ascertained how much of the load was intended for the MPLA, as leftist groups in Rhodesia, Mozambique and South Africa were tagged for aid as well.[14]

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) did succeed in bringing the Portuguese and the thre rival factions to the negotiating table in January 1975. The result of the conference, known as the Alvor Agreement, established a transitional cabinet and plans for national elections. Official independence day was set for November 11, 1975. At this juncture, MPLA minister Lucio Lara requested, along with a joint OAU statement, an international arms embargo on Angola so that the government could ease less violently into new nationhood.

Less than two weeks following the Alvor Agreement, the NSC Forty Committee, under Kissinger's guiding hand, approved approximately three hundred thousand dollars for the FNLA. Colby and Kissinger warned that if the pro-Soviet MPLA gained control in the new government, Angola would become a strategic threat to Western supertankers en route to and from the Middle East. Disregarding Roberto's reputation as a militarist,[15] Colby

proposed that the FNLA leadership would ensure "the most stable and reliable government in the place."[16]

Within a month of the initial aid, the FNLA attacked MPLA training camps in Luanda and in Caxito, killing fifty MPLA students. The Soviet Union responded to Neto's request by flying in arms through the Congo and shipping more equipment by truck and rail to Angola's Cabinda province. The FNLA followed up with more attacks in March on MPLA and Unita union offices in Luanda, resulting in casualties of more than seven hundred dead and nearly one thousand wounded.[17]

Provocation by the "pro-Western" faction was undeniable, and the Soviets needed little invitation to enter the arena. Kissinger's theory called for an immediate, massive build-up of U.S. strength in Angola to intimidate Moscow into withdrawing before both sides were inextricably linked. This would be a Western quadrant, out-of-bounds for Soviet involvement. In July 1975, the Forty Committee authorized a "virtually open-ended budget" for the combined FNLA-Unita forces. The first twenty-five million dollars in arms and supplies would be delivered from North Carolina as soon as possible.[18]

But the intimidation endeavor seemed ineffective as the Soviets called Kissinger's bluff by countering each move with greater quantities of Russian tanks, planes and artillery. Cuban advisors, first tens, then hundreds, began arriving to bolster MPLA ranks. According to Stockwell, "The United States launched a major political effort to embroil as many countries as it could into opposition of the MPLA...And, of course, the CIA launched a major propaganda effort to expose the Soviet shipments."[19]

The official response of CIA and State Department personnel in the field to incoming journalists explained that the United States supported an African settlement to the conflict, as outlined by the Alvor Agreement. Officials denied U.S. supplies were entering Angola on any side, but they would "emphasize the Soviet Union, so it wouldn't look like we were attacking a minor liberation movement.[20]

For the Western press representatives, many of the standard operating problems of Third World coverage were exacerbated by the various language barriers in Zaire and Angola, by the lack of good background on the area, and the scarcity of known, reliable sources. *Time* magazine's correspondent in Nairobi, Lee Griggs, who covered the Angolan civil war, remembers,

> *It wasn't easy to do first hand. We had no stringer per se in-country, and visas were hard to get...it was hard to tell who, if anyone, was in fact, telling the truth.*[21]

Journalists turned to most available source of background information--"Western officials." Stockwell claims that American journalists were marked for propagandizing. "We definitely had an influence. It was indirect, thorugh Angolan sources. We would set them up."[22]

The press was manipulated by their failure to circumvent the dangers of reporting on unknown material. Griggs states, "As for the CIA, I had no direct contact. I did meet with and speak to a number of people--in Luanda, and Kinshasa, Zaire, in Zambia and in South Africa--whom I had reason to believe were involved in intelligence of one kind or another."[23] The constant contact with Western sources and other Western journalists hardened the approach of press coverage. The emphasis on Soviet provocation was overwhelming.

Michael T. Kaufman of *The New York Times* reported on Novbember 23, 1975 from Zaire that according to "Western diplomats," the FNLA was losing the anti-Communist battle because their "paltry" arms supply could not match "the supplies the Soviet Union has been pouring into Luanda for the faction it is backing."[24] Quoting the FNLA Director of External Affairs Demba Oka Ola, Kaufman supported the claims that Soviet missiles dominated the scenario of battle in Angola.

Acknowledging some covert support from the U.S., Kaufman writes that "no one here will categorically deny that there have been covert shipments to the anti-Communist faction." However, following the supplications of Oka Ola, the issue had become secondary to the detailed prominence of Soviet infiltration. Kaufman adds, "But the sources are unanimous in their insistence that no United States arms have been sent to the two groups in Angola."[25] Kaufman's basic facts of battle may have been correct, yet the strengths of the article cloud the role of American foreign policy in the African nation. By referring to the FNLA and Unita as "anti-Communist groups" denies their own power drives and weaknesses.

As late as December 16, when U.S. Senators began to raise the challenging questions to the Ford-Kissinger policy of intervention in Angola, the *Miami Herald*, like so many other papers, continued to place unbalanced emphasis on meeting the Soviet challenge. Above an article on the Clark-Tunney opposition to Angola aid, the *Herald* placed a banner-headlined story, SOVIETS REPORTED SPENDING MILLIONS IN ARMS TO ANGOLA by Fred Hoffman of Associated Press. In what was tagged "Background Report," Hoffman quotes only Defense Department officials on Soviet involvement in Africa, providing gross generalizations about the size and strength of Russian troops.

Time magazine featured a sidebar story to the Angolan conflict titled "Moscow's Own Vietnam?" based solely on Western intelligence sources:

> *For 15 years, Moscow has been supplying military aid and training pro-Soviet guerillas, some of whom formed the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). But some high officials in the Kremlin—and in Cuba as well—are growing increasingly skeptical about the wisdom of that commitment. The muted echoes of the debate that is now underway on the issues were picked up from Western intelligence...*[26]

Citing Soviet assistance to the MPLA out of context (*Time* never mentions the American funding in the past 15 years), the editors strongly implied a wrongness in Soviet policy by associating the actions with the Vietnam errors Americans could easily relate to. Not that Soviet incursion was not reprehensible, but the double standard in surveying Soviet and American foreign policies promoted a deceptive image of the United States' role in Angola. Whether *Time* editors willingly created such propaganda, or they failed to see through the intent of the CIA media campaign, Stockwell remarked about *Time* correspondents, "They were definitely had...We tried to discredit the Cubans, but they were really faultless."[27]

The CIA Lusaka station also fabricated stories of Cuban rape and pillaging in Angola.[28] Catering to anti-Castro readers, the *Miami Herald* led the way in publishing unprofessional coverage of Cuban actions in Africa. Bannered CUBA IN AFRICA, MIDEAST. DOING

"In the case of Angola, the temptation to disseminate propaganda was for CIA personnel a standard operating procedure."

MOSCOW'S DIRTY WORK, on the front page, the *Herald* reported gross generalizations about "thousands of Cubans sent around the world, helping leftist regimes—the latest being a Vietnam-style intervention in the civil war in Angola."[29] In the third paragraph, the reporter quoted "a Cabinet-level U.S. official" referring to the Cubans as "the mercenaries of the Communist World." The article was accompanied by a map of Africa, reminiscent of Cold War lexicography, with nations blackened "Where Cuban Soldiers Operate."[30] The *Herald* indicated such countries as Syria, Yemen, Rhodesia, South Africa and Gabon, as well as Angola, Mozambique and Malawi.

Commenting on the presence of "at least" four hundred Cubans serving in combat with the MPLA, *Time* added parenthetically,

> *(The Cubans tried to pass themselves off as mulattoes from Cape Verde Islands—a flimsy charade since they speak Spanish, not Portuguese.)*[31]

Lee Griggs later reported for *Time* that "having learned that too many white faces alienate African aid recipients, Moscow now uses swarthy Algerians and Cubans as stand-ins whenever possible.[32] Cuba analyst Jorge Dominguez at Harvard University disagrees with the analyses that Cuban soldiers are "stand-ins" or lackeys for the Soviet Union:

> *Throughout these events (in Africa) Cuba has continued to coordinate policy with the U.S.S.R. in ways that make it difficult to determine who leads and who follows...Cuba doesn't answer every call from every quarter.*[33]

The backgrounders and deliberate leaks from the intelligence establishment were carefully designed to present the FNLA and Unita as the underdogs for democracy, beset upon by Communist aggressors. The contact between U.S. officials and the press were both



direct and indirect, but always manipulative. According to former intelligence agents Vincent Marchetti and John Marks, "most reporters are aware that government officials play these games. Nevertheless, the CIA plays them more assiduously, since it virtually never releases any information overtly."[34]

American journalists hurrying about Africa failed to solicit the opinions of those who might disagree with U.S. statistics or provide an alternative view toward the background of Angola issued in policy statements. Relying on unnamed officials crippled the ability of the journalists to see clearly into the roots of conflict in Angola, consequently forging a one-sided view of America's concern for nationalism in the Third World. Author David Wise writes,

> *Public officials will be more relaxed if their words cannot be quoted, attributed or used against them...but it is equally true that officials who hide behind the cloak of anonymity may be more than normally tempted to lie or disseminate propaganda.*[35]

In the case of Angola, the temptation to disseminate propaganda was for CIA presonnel a standard operating procedure.

As well as offering background sessions to journalists and magazine editors, John Stockwell relates that propaganda efforts were often more direct and effective. In November 1975, Unita forces pushed north in Angola, maintaining enough strength to offer the pretense of optimism for "anti-Communist" supporters. The Lusaka CIA bureau issued a Unita statement declaring that the key town of Malanje had been overtaken by the pro-Western troops and that twenty Soviet advisors and thirty-five Cubans had been captured in the victory. It was the first hard evidence of Soviet presence in Angola, the statement said.

Without independent verification, the story was picked up by every major newspaper and wire service in the West. However, the story was not true; there had been no Unita victory in Malanje; there were no captured Soviets or Cubans. The Reuters account, which appeared in the *Chicago Tribune, The New York Times, The Boston Globe,* and in the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* related that Unita had captured "20 Russians, 35 Cubans, 15 Mozambicans, three Congolese, and a Brazilian mercenary, all fighting with the MPLA in Malanje."[36] Although the story did reiterate several times that the information was presented by the National Union, the elaborate attention to detail effectively made credible the unverified report.

A similar account appeared in *The Washington Post* written by David Ottaway, stationed in Lusaka. Mr. Ottaway made a more deliberate effort to make clear that the Unita statement was unverified; however, the effect was just the same. The next day, the *Post* published an unnoticeable three paragraph corner article on page eighteen quoting Tass Agency's denial of the statement. The falsified Malanje story was repeated by Ottaway four days later in a story about South African intervention in Angola, finally adding that "no western journalist has verified that Unita is in fact holding Soviet nationals."[37] According to Ottaway "it was easy to be victimized" because journalists were frequently denied access to the battlefront.[38] Ottaway, who does not speak Portuguese, said his most helpful source of information was the consensus of other journalists.

Stockwell explains how news and propaganda releases were cabled directly from African stations to the permanent CIA offices in the Pan Am building and in nearby skyscrapers. The best propaganda was that which was based on truth and distorted for the purpose. Although the CIA was prohibited from propagandizing the American public, the position of the bureau chief was that the efforts "were safe enough, as long as we could plausibly claim that our intent was to propagandize foreigners in the United Nations."[39]

While Director Colby testified before the House Select Committee on Intelligence that the CIA was taking special precautions to prevent American propaganda efforts from influencing domestic opinion (called "blowback" or "fallout"), Angola task force members were taking special precautions to prevent the truth from reaching the domestic attention.

In one particular incident, a European CIA station cabled headquarters that a foreign journalist was en route to Washington with a story on Angola for the American press. When he arrived, the task force deputy chief Paul Forster, met him secretly in Washington, then brought an article the journalist had written to CIA headquarters for translation. The next day the article was returned to the journalist who sold the story to *The Washington Post.* The story painted a Churchill-like picture of FNLA leader Roberto, defending the interests of democracy—"a man who obviously inspires a quasi-mystical fervor in his men."[40]

The press became a conduit for the anti-Communist sales pitch of the African factions seeking support by quoting both Roberto and Savimbi, or their aides, without providing a proper balance of testimony from opposing sides.

Taking the Kissinger-Ford side of the debate, *Time* wrote that the Congressional opposition was led by "California Democrat John Tunney, not noted for his expertise in foreign affairs." Later the Congressional caucus was referred to as "Tunney & Co." Citing Kissinger's argument that Angola represented a strategic interest to the United States (which NSSM 69 rebutted)[42], *Time* stated that Kissinger's policy "did make sense," but that

> *the Congressional move, however, certainly further weakened the U.S. posture in the world and raised serious questions about whether the present Congress is willing to allow the Administration any kind of latitude in foreign operations.*[43]

Time advocates through its jaded reporting a centralized foreign policymaking body, in Henry Kissinger. There is no question asked of the validity in Kissinger's policies, nor of unilateral powers he exercised.

Commenting on Congressional warnings that the Angolan operation resembled the early involvement in Vietnam, *Time* wrote the comparison was "alarmist and simplistic," but on the same page presented a boxed feature on "Moscow's Own Vietnam?"[44] Incorrectly, *Time* reiterated, "The Soviets were in the field first."

On other occasions, *Time* presented Cold War-style maps where African nations receiving Soviet aid were colored red. They prominently displayed photographs of captured Cubans, towns levelled by Soviet missiles, and stalwart Jonas Savimbi in fatigues and beret. Together, the photography and copy championed the pro-Western forces against the MPLA. Average *Time* readers do not realize they are getting a prejudiced account of world events. But as one *Time* bureau chief remarked, "*Time* has no pretense of being objective."[45]

Other newspapers biased readers with emphasis on the Administration's side by granting front page coverage of Ford and Kissinger's speeches. Leon V. Sigal writes in *Reporters and Officials* that "however adept they have become in using the press, Congressmen have not kept pace with the expansion of newsmaking capabilities in the Executive branch."[46] An address given by Kissinger or Daniel Moynihan, U.N. Ambassador, received greater coverage than those of Senators Dick Clark, John Tunney, Frank Church or others opposing the Administration.

The November 25 *Miami Herald* printed front page story recording a speech made by Henry Kissinger in Detroit warning the Soviet Union to pull out of Angola. The ten paragraph story was entirely comprised of quotations from the speech, without a word of background or balance offered by the reporter. The respected words of Kissinger passed unchecked to an unknown audience.

> *The Soviet involvement is resented by Africans most of all, but the United States cannot be indifferent while an outside power embarks upon an interventionist policy.*[47]

The New York Times quoted the same speech at length, emphasizing "Cuba meddling" in the subtitles and superpower rivalry in the text. Similar stories appeared in the *Boston Globe*, the *Chicago Tribune*, the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* and the *Los Angeles Times*. The *Boston Globe* also quoted Daniel Moynihan's declaration that the Soviets were planning to "colonize" Africa in the foreground of their accounts on Angola.[48]

There is no inherent crime in reporting the text of speeches, but when the speech is not reported in the full context of background and alternative opinions, the material and the newspaper becomes propaganda. There was a very definite impoact from the uneven coverage of the Angolan civil war. The organized efforts of the CIA, along with the misguided efforts of the press, jaded American public opinion on the role of U.S. foreign policy in Africa. An editorial in *The Washington Post* asked:

> *What is behind this rampant Soviet adventurism?...We would not want this country to stand idly by while the Russians play out their "imperialistic games."*[49]

The New York Times editorialized:

> *...Whatever the motivation, it is clear that the massive flow of Soviet armaments, including heavy weapons and aircraft, grossly escalated the level of fighting in Angola earlier in this year and allowed the MPLA to secure total control of the capital city of Luanda. . . the interventionists the provocateurs of the civil war in Angola are not American; it is not Washington that is trying to capitalize. . . on the misery of an ill-prepared African society struggling for national identity and sovereignty.*[50]

The *Times* could not have been more incorrect in its analysis. But its information, like that of the entire American public was fraudulent and was permitted to remain so by their own staff.

The press has neglected information on U.S. involvement in Angola from Congress, academia and opposing forces. The failure of the press to pursue every possible avenue, makes the journalist an unwitting partner in the deliberate attempts by the government to sway the opinion of the constituency. Behind that failure is a rooted acceptance of the dominant pattern in American government. Somewhere behind that pattern is the truth.

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Political Cultures and Policies of the PCI and PCF

by Thomas M. Cynkin

PCI Chairman Enrico Berlinguer.

The recent electoral potential of the communist parties of Italy and France stimulated increased interest in and consequent analysis of the nature of these parties and of their programs. Adaptation of these parties to their national political environments, with its manifestations to varying degrees of revisionism and autonomism, has allowed many analysts to categorize both parties under the broad rubric of "Eurocommunist" movements. Indeed, certain similarities in the more recent evolutions of these parties have been apparent. Attitudes of the PCI and PCF towards civil liberties and parliamentarianism, as opposed to the dictatorship of the proletariat and the necessity of violent revolution, have been increasingly positive albeit to varying degrees. Allegiance to the CPSU in particular and the USSR in general has been more or less repudiated by the PCI after 1968, and by the PCF after 1975. A complete "Eurocommunist" schism has been conscientiously avoided, although it is certainly safe to say that both the PCI and PCF have demonstrated increasing orientations of communist nationalism as opposed to communist internationalism. Nevertheless, it is difficult to determine to what degree these developments are mere tactical adaptations, and to what degree if any they represent changes of a fundamental nature. Moreover, the answers to these questions may differ in regard to the PCI and PCF, in proportion to the differences in the basic composition and nature of these parties. Far from being homogeneous sections of an integral Eurocommunist movement, the PCI and PCF reflect to a great degree the individuality of their respective political cultures and heritage. Important differences between the domestic and international policies of the PCI and PCF may be illuminated in the context of these factors.

Italian socialism originated in the 1870s, infused with a tenor of libertarianism due to the influence of Bakunin's anarchistic doctrine.[1] In the 1890s, Italian socialist thought saw the emergence of Marxism as the dominant strain, during the Italian industrial revolution. The movement gained strenght in the countryside, as well as in the northern industrial centers.[2] The writings of Antonio Labriola helped to initiate an Italian socialist school of thought with more moderation and intellectual appeal than other branches.[3] The PCI (Partito Communista Italiana) which emerged from a split in the socialist party in January 1921, soon became dominated by Antonio Gramsci. Gramsci inculcated his theories of revolution by the "cultural superiority of the proletariat," to be enacted by a broad "histroic bloc" alliance, and to be supported in a major fashion by revolutionary intellectuals.[4]

Mussolini's repression of non-fascist parties in 1925 stayed in momentum of the Communists, many of whom fled to France to collaborate with anti-fascist forces.[5] The pivotal role of the Communist resistance in Italy during the second world war helped legitimitiæ the PCI, and provided it with a major electoral base. Its role as a "constitutional party" strengthened this legitimacy.

The post-war PCI leadership of Palmiro Togliatti had a pronounced autonomist and revisionist tone, particularly after 1959, when he published an outline of his position at the Moscow conference of November 1957. Through this document, Togliatti expressed the views he held quietly throughout the Stalinist period.[6] Togliatti recognized the improbability of a successful violent revolution in Italy while massive American and Church influence predominated. He further realized that a moderate Communist stance and committment to the parliamentary method afforded the only realistic means to power. Togliatti endorsed the idea of a mass based party, and espoused cooperation with non-Communist groups with similar goals. He further rejected the notion of CPSU supremacy, and asserted the right to revisionist domestic and foreign policies by national Communist parties, including a special West European regionalism.[7] The Togliatti and post-Togliatti PCI has shown evolution towards these ends. The policies of the PCI, particularly since 1968, are demonstrative of its political cultural heritage of moderation, revisionism and autonomism.

The heritage of political culture of the PCF (Parti Communiste Francais) is as different from that of the PCI as are the political cultures of the two nations. Unlike the PCI libertarian tradition, that of the PCF is more rooted in the revolutionary nationalism of the Jacobin left.[8] This has given the PCF the quality of a counter-society, more so even than a

counter-party. The PCF absorbed a Leninist outlook duriing the 1920s, and adopted Bolshevik organization and the role of the "vanguard of the working class."[9] Moreover, the PCF adopted a thorough orientation of Stalinization beginning even in 1924. More than simply adopting Leninist-Stalinist doctrine as other West European Communist parties of the period were doing, the PCF adopted Stalinist organizational and operational methods for their own party. One manifestation of this was the PCF policy of "**ouvrierisme**," or idealization of the working class. This concept was reinforced by strong traditions of **ouvrierisme** among the French left, particularly of socialist and anarchist orientation, for over half a century.[10] This proletarian quality was rigorously applied by the PCF to its membership organization.

Another Bolsheivik concept that the PCF applied to itself was the doctrine of encadrement. The PCF opted for a small, tightly knit and closely supervised party in the "vanguard" style, rather than a party with more of a mass base.[11] In concert with the policy of ouvrierisme, this ensured the separation and alienation of the PCF from most classes of French society.

An additional feature that the PCF has manisfested as a result of its Stalinist orientation has been its subservience to the Moscow line. Under the leadership of Maurice Thorez from 1934-64, the PCF policy was to deliberately quash any nationalistic or revisionist deviations in the party.[12] The political lines followed by the PCF during much of this period often tended to reinforce its encapsulization and alienation from the mainstream of French society, such as PCF endorsement in 1939 of the Nazi-Soviet Pact which paved the way for Hitler's Western offensive.[13] Although the PCF has officially moved away from its strict policies of ouvrierisme, encadrement, and Soviet fealty, the nature of this movement, whether tactical or part of an evolutionary trend, must be judged in the context of the PCF heritage or political culture, in order to gain an understanding of PCF policies and why they differ from those of the PCI.

Recent Policies

Recent PCI policies and strategies have reflected its evolutionary trends and political culture in many fashions. The local domestic scene has demonstrated PCI commitments to the participation of the PCI as a legitimate party of government, and has equally shown PCI willingness to follow a pattern of alliance and compromise reminiscent of the "historic bloc" strategy. After 1970, there was an increasing trend of coalitions between the Socialists and the PCI on the local level. In 1970, PCI-PSI coalitions were formed to govern the regions of Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, and Umbria; after 1975, this arrangement was followed as well in the Liguria, Piedmont, and Lazio regions. At the city level, by 1976 the majority of the major Italian cities were under the rule of left-wing coalitions, with some participations by Republicans and Social Democrats.[14]

PCI strategy has proven notable at the local level in that the Socialists were allowed in many cases far greater influence and power than was warranted by pure numerical and electoral strength. Leadership is often allowed the Socialists at the regional level in some instances where they are in a distinct inferior proportion to the Communists. A similar policy is followed by the PCI in its coalition strategies for trade unions and various other nongovernmental institutions.[15] This PCI strategy is also indicative of their downplaying of the "vanguard" role by their willingness to accept junior partnership of the left even in a position of numerical superiority.

The PCI interest in the "historic compromise" at the national level reflects the PCI traditions of moderation and revisionism. An interesting development was the rejection by Berlinguer of a left-wing coalition strategy in preference for a potentially long-term cooperative strategy with the Christian Democrats. (DC) This of course entailed abandonment of the possibility of the PCI playing the role of senior partner in any such left-wing government should a leftist coalition succeed, and instead indicated reconciliation with the idea of long-term junior partner status, which would be inevitable in a coalition with the DC. The specific PCI strategy called for an advance in three gradual stages of governmental participation with the DC: the "programmatic accord," which involved a much greater PCI parliamentary role in committees, in return for tacit support of governmental policies through abstention; the "majority" stage, in which the PCI would actively vote for and support the government for an even greater policy making role; and the "participation"

stage, in which the PCI would actually participate in the government cabinet.[16] Although the PCI never reached the third stage, it is instructive to note the criteria upon which this strategy was based. The PCI leadership pragmatically recognized the international and perhaps even domestic reaction to an immediate PCI-dominated government could bring about the right-wing reaction or even possibly foreign intervention. On a less dramatic level, it might stimulate a rapid outflow of capital from Italy, coupled with a drastic halt of foreign credits and investment upon which Italy has grown so dependent. The political culture of Italy and the PCI was reflected in the moderation and cooperative nature of the PCI national strategy.

The foreign policy of the PCI extends the notion of the necessity to work within the system established to alter the nature of the system, as opposed to overthrowing it through revolutionary means. In the early 1960s, the PCI began to advocate its support for Western European integration. The PCI has since favored political and economic integration advances; has argued for a common Western European foreign policy; has supported extension of the EEC to include present associate members; and has called for increased powers and responsibility for the new European Parliament.[17]

PCI attitudes toward NATO have increasingly reflected the autonomist and even national tenor of the PCI, as a compliment to its "new internationalism" tendencies. The 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia has increased PCI commitments to the formulation of Communism without undue outside interference. It forced a recognition of Soviet attitudes towards revisionist Communist parties such as the PCI. Since 1975, the PCI official policy has been support of Italian membership in NATO to prevent any "unilateral" force imbalance in Europe.[18] The PCI has presumably also recognized the pragmatic politics involved in support of NATO, although it undoubtedly recognizes the value of NATO in balancing other nations' influence in Italy.

PCF strategies have been managed in a very different fashion from those of the PCI. PCF views of the polarization of the French nation and lack of compromise led to PCF to opt for a union of the left as a strategy for power, in contrast to the PCI policy. In 1973, the "Common Program" was signed with the Socialist Party and the Centrist MRG, at which point the PCF was by far the dominant force in the coalition electorally. However, this situation eroded over the course of 1972-76, as the PCF superiority dissolved and the Socialists emerged as the dominant force of the left. Consequently, as the 1978 elections approached, the leaders of the PCF recognized that they would be consigned to secondary status in any leftist coalition government. This was particularly hard for the PCF to bear in light of the fact that a partial reversal of membership strategies of encadrement had failed to bring about the slightest increase in PCF electoral shares nationwide. Furthermore, a junior partnership in a leftist coalition would directly counterpose PCF identification as the "vanguard party of the working class." In this context, it is simple to extrapolate to the PCF's reversion to a perpetually non-governing party position through its Stalinist attacks upon the Socialists in the final six months of the electoral campaign.[19] Thus, on the national front, the tentative or tactical movements of the PCF toward evolution and a "Eurocommunist" revisionism were reversed, and the PCF returned to a position more or less in keeping with its political heritage.

In foreign relations, the evolution of the PCF's policies have moved towards autonomism, but have refrained from the level of direct criticism of the USSR that the PCF and even the PCI have maintained. PCF innovation was initiated by the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, although the formal move towards autonomism was not sealed until 1975, when the PCF publicly switched sides against Moscow and towards the Western European Communist positions. However, the change in the PCF orientation was more of a manifestation of submerged nationalism, repressed during thee De Gaulle period and the era of subordination to the CPSU.[20] This priority of national focus may be seen to be in keeping with the PCF Jacobin nationalist traditions and the PCF hard line base empahsis of nationalism over reformism.[21] This nationalism is also reflected from the political culture of the French nation. In opposition to the PCI, the PCF has consistently opposed any infringements of European integration upon French nationalism. Moreover, the PCF endorsement in May 1977 of the **"force de frappe"** symbolized in many ways the new nationalism of the party, and moreover a rejection of the Atlantic Alliance structure, which it continues to oppose vehemently. Yet what gives the PCF its tone of Gaullocommunism in the extreme is its

opposition to Moscow's policy of detente, which represents to the PCF an acceptance of the West European status quo. PCF continuation of hostility to Western European regionalism disqualifies it from the status of "Eurocommunist" in the general sense, although its decision to strike out against Moscow's detente policy and its subsequent emphasis on French national defense have given it a Gaullocommunist tenor at least. However, with the return to a hard-line policy in May 1979, the PCF has become less critical of Moscow.[22]

The importance of differing political cultures in explaining the differences in PCI and PCF policies is great. This is allowed by enabling greater insight into the nature of these parties and of their consequent motivations. Although the policies of the PCI and PCF have at times been juxtaposed, the fundamental differences between the two cast doubt on the potential realization of a unified Western Eurocommunism movement.

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The Eurostrategic Balance

by Ulrich M. Ambros

The nuclear threat posed by the Soviet Union's mobile SS-20 missiles is forcing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to face the difficult decision of modernizing, improving, and expanding those weapon systems that lie between the strategic and tactical, and that are therefore called "gray area weapons." For over ten years the West Europeans have been threatened by the Soviet SS-4 and SS-5 missiles systems, a threat not entirely different from that posed by the SS-20. Only recently, however, with the gradual replacement by the Soviets of the SS-4 and SS-5 with the much larger, more accurate, and mobile SS-20 system, have Europeans begun to worry.

In particular, the West Germans have expressed the most open concern over the gray area question. As early as October of 1977, West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, in his speech at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, called explicitly for a recognition of the need for parity at all levels—strategic nuclear, theater nuclear, and conventional.[1]

In conjunction with the gray area question is the need perceived by NATO, at its Twenty-Fourth Meeting in November of 1978, to include Soviet medium range systems targeted on Europe in SALT III. The ambiguity of the "gray area" has excluded it from all arms control negotiations to date. The existing relationship between superpower and regional strategic weapons has increased the significance of regional balances, especially that of the Eurostrategic balance. According to Chancellor Schmidt:

> *SALT neutralizes strategic nuclear capabilities of the US and USSR—in Europe this magnifies the significance of the disparities between East and West in tactical nuclear and conventional weapons.*[2].

One current argument maintains that strategic parity and regional imbalance gives the USSR the potential to threaten Europe at the theater level without fear of Alliance retaliation either at this or the strategic level. In this event, Europe would be "decoupled" from the United States strategic deterrent. The advocates of this view argue that the solution to such a problem lies in the development of equivalent European regional nuclear capabilities.

Those who oppose this argument, however, identify themselves with the view formulated by Klaas G. De Vries of the Netherlands, the General Rapporteur of the Military Committee at the Twenty-Fourth Meeting of the North Atlantic Assembly held in Lisbon in November, 1978. Dr Vries believes that decoupling lies more in increasing regional capabilities than in their absence. He argues that Europe has long been targeted by Soviet medium range ballistic missiles and other systems, but that because of the NATO triad, the Alliance has not previously felt it necessary to deploy directly analagous systems. This triad consists of conventional, tactical nuclear and strategic nuclear weapons. The Rapporteur further believes that identification of and unnecessary emphasis on an artificially conceived Eurostrategic imbalance will produce the political basis and technical capability for the process of decoupling that it is supposed to eradicate.[3]

Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, and John F. Kennedy's National Security Advisor of 1962, McGeorge Bundy, who helped manage the Cuban missile crisis, also have voiced strong views concerning the Eurostrategic balance. In September 1979, Henry Kissinger announced in Brussels that the Allied nations in Europe could no longer expect nuclear guarantees from the United States, especially if the extinction of mankind lay at stake. He stated that the United States and Europe must learn to face the possibility of nuclear suppression by a strategically superior USSR, and that they then must decide how

Chancellor Willy Brandt.

best to counter these possibilities, namely through:
1) A European armaments program in the nuclear field;
2) armaments-control discussions;
3) or the piling of nuclear stocks as well as diplomacy.

Kissinger is extremely pessimistic, for he sees the NATO states trailing the Soviets in every important military category. Kissinger is worried that in the years 1982-1989, the Soviets will have "a window of opportunity," when the USSR will have the ability, with its heavy nuclear arsenal, to eliminate preemptively the United States' 1054 land based ICBMs. The former Secretary of State maintains that never in history has a state that has a superiority in all weapon categories not tried to use this to its political advantage. The American President would have access only to heavy bombers and submarines once the ICBMs are eliminated, with which it would be difficult to destroy the remaining Soviet missiles. Therefore, the President would have to choose between a plan of destruction of Soviet cities, which would follow with the extinction of US cities; or the other possibility—surrender.[4]

In light of this vulnerability, it is unrealistic to envision a nuclear guarantee of Europe by the United States, argues Kissinger. This is especially true, now that the balance between NATO's nuclear weapons and those of the USSR in Europe has been altered by the new, mobile, medium-range SS-20.

"the Soviets will have a window of opportunity, when the USSR will have the ability, with its heavy nuclear arsenal, to eliminate pre-emptively the United States' 1054 land-based ICBMs."

McGeorge Bundy acknowledges Soviet arming and the loss of the United States' advantage in the era of parity, yet he argues that this is no reason for panic. The leaders in the Kremlin or White House would not trust their advantage over the other side during a "fictitious "window of opportunity"—the risk would be too high. In reality, it is highly unlikely that the Soviets would give the order for a surprise attack on US land-based missiles. They must calculate that many of their attacking missiles will not hit their American targets, and that many may not detonate. Even if the nearly impossible were to succeed, and all 1054 ICBMs were to be annihilated, this would still leave 656 U.S. SLBMs with over 600 warheads. These missiles are becoming increasingly accurate, and can reach great distances (today, target accuracy is already over 500 meters). In addition, the United States has 432 long-distance bombers with 2600 atomic bombs (TNT equivalent of 100,000 times that of Hiroshima). It is therefore hardly likely that the United States would surrender.[5]

Bundy maintains that similar doubts exist in the justification of the grim outlook for Europe. The new SS-20 and the Backfire bomber could possibly eliminate the important military targets in Western Europe through a surprise attack, but this would destroy vast areas of land and cause millions of casualties. Furthermore, no rational Soviet thinker could be certain that the United States would not step in for Europe and counter-attack the USSR. According to the Eurostrategic power relationship in West German Defense Minister Apel's newest White Paper, analysts citing a grim situation in Europe exaggerate the Soviet threat by neglectiong certain Western Alliance weapon systems in their analysis.[6]

The solution that has been most widely accepted among the NATO partners involves the Western Alliance's willingness to negotiate with the Soviet Union for disarmament, while at the same time showing the Soviets a certain firmness that the West will counterarm the USSR should the latter not dismantle or phase out old weapon systems and curb the production of new ones.

The NATO partners as a whole realize the necessity for the improvement, modernization, and expansion of their nuclear arsenal. They identify three main reasons for this assumption:

1) many NATO weapon systems, especially those in Western Europe, are outmoded and must be replaced by newer models;
2) the Soviets have not yet indicated where they want to set limits on their arsenal build-up;[7]
3) and the Soviets have developed several new military capabilities that on the NATO side require equivalent counter-weapons.

It is important for the NATO countries not to overreact, however, for the North Atlantic Alliance must conduct policies to approach security, but not absolute security. The attempt to achieve total security is more war prone than war preventive. The Soviets too must understand this: there exists a level of arming, that one day will be viewed by all neighbors as a threat, even if its purpose is only for defense.[8]

At the Meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group of NATO in The Hague on November 13, 1979, the commitment to the modernization of nuclear medium-range missiles for Western Europe was made, with the final decision to be made on December 12. The NATO Planning Group decided to station cruise missiles in the following countries with respective allotments: Belgium (48), Italy (112), the Netherlands (48), Britain (160), and the Federal Republic of Germany (96). Germany would also accept 108 of the improved Pershing II missiles.

The Federal Republic of Germany supports the modernization of medium-range missiles and will insure that in December when the Alliance meets again in Brussels, a decision be made for the production as well as stationing of the missiles. Germany further demands that non-nuclear nations of Western Europe also accept the stationing of the new missiles in their territories. At the same time, further suggestions will be made to the Soviet Union to take into consideration new proposals for arms control, including medium-range missiles.

"the North Atlantic Alliance must conduct policies to approach security, but not absolute security . . . the attempt to achieve total security is more war prone than war preventive."

The Netherlands is willing to agree to the production of the missiles on both sides. Much pressure, however, has been put on the Netherlands, particularly by the United States, for that country not to become isolated on this issue.

Some uncertainty still exists concerning the exact number of missiles to be deployed. The present suggestion is 572 systems: specifically, 108 missiles of the Pershing II type with a range of 1600 kilometers, and 464 cruise missiles with a range of 2500 kilometers. As far as concerns the Pershing missiles, which will be stationed only in Germany, unity of the members of the Nuclear Planning Group exists. Several alliance members, however, have asked that the number of cruise missiles be reduced.

Conflict in West Germany

According to West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, it is the role of the Federal Republic of Germany to defend detente in Europe, giving the generally poor European assessment of Mr. Carter's skills and options. Bonn can no longer afford to focus exclusively on the West and ignore its neighbors in the East, and thus attaches a much greater importance to detente than do other members of NATO. Due to this special detente, the danger of conflict has been reduced, as demonstrated by the German Democratic Republic's greater willingness to cooperate with the Federal Republic in recent months. While the West Germans have profitted more than other nations from detente, they have also become more sensitive to pressure.[9]

This pressure has been apparent over past months with the continual threats of "grave consequences" by Leonid Brezhnev, should Germany or the other members of the Atlantic Alliance accept the proposed U.S. medium-range missile system. These threats have sparked much controversy in the internal politics of West Germany, bringing many vocal officials into the foreground.

Herbert Wehner, Chairman of the German Social Democratic party (SPD), maintains that the proposed new weapons may damage what is left of detente for years to come. He suggests that NATO and the USSR should "approach one another instead of passing one another through increased arming."[10] Wehner is worried about a renewed arms race between East and West. Along with Wehner, SPD Secretary Egon Bahr wants to leave open the option of whether or not the nuclear NATO weapons are worthy of deployment until the December meeting of the Social Democrats in Berlin.

West Germany must share its allies' skepticism about what negotiations with the Soviet Union would accomplish, and Helmut Schmidt may well regret having dramatized a set of issues for which no solutions are at hand. Consequently, the view in Germany is split: The Federal Republic is exposed to the threat of the SS-20, but is also anxious to preserve some aspect of East-West detente. The Chancellor has thus had to steer a course between the call of the opposition, the Christian Democrats (CDU), to deploy new weapons before negotiating, and the caution of several of his own SPD party members.

In addition, Chancellor Schmidt and Defense Minister Hans Apel must avoid a confrontation with Foreign Minister Genscher, who is a member of the Free Democratic party (FDP). According to Schmidt and Apel, "Nachruestung," the philosophy of adding arms to the defense arsenal of NATO to compensate for the Soviet lead, should be prepared in such a

manner that Alliance counter-measures can be employed immediately if negotiations with Moscow fail. Foreign Minister Genscher, however, wants to employ the new nuclear weapons in any event; this for him is a prerequisite for successful negotiations with Moscow.

Those opposing Genscher's concept of first arming and then disarming, identify themselves with Christoph Bertram who is held in high esteem with Helmut Schmidt. Bertram, who is the Director of the London Institute for Strategic Studies, feels that the answer to the SS-20 does not necessarily mean the employment of a similar system by the Western Alliance. A Soviet superiority in Europe is "acceptable," for as long as the United States identifies her own security with that of Europe, deterrence will function even with the new Soviet SS-20.

Deputy Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, General Gerd Schmueckle, further dwells on this line of thought:

> *History shows that all previous attempts at disarmament have not centered around actually disarming, but rather only for the purpose of achieving military advantages or broadening them even more. With arms control one can also practice Power Politics.*[11]

According to Schmueckle, Europe will be defended by the United States as long as this promotes its own political gain. Europe in the past thirty years has become stronger and thus more important to the United States. A United Nuclear Force of Europe, however, premeditates political unity in Europe.[12]

Soviet party leader Brezhnev's Berlin proposal of October 1979 also establishes two distinct interpretations by Helmut Schmidt and Hans-Dietrich Genscher. Schmidt's Foreign-Policy aide, Juergen Ruhfus, sees Brezhnev's proposal as a Soviet initiative to reduce tensions. Genscher's aide, van Well, however, feels that NATO could, because of this reducing of tensions euphoria, miss the decision for the production and stationing of the missiles. Genscher, who wants to gain support for his foreign policy by the opposition, sees himself distant from the arms-control politics of the SPD. This of course strengthens the position of the FDP. The Foreign Minister sees the necessity for arming before armaments control, because "the Alliance must be determined to continue her path towards the securing of a balance."[13] Schmidt views this situation in basically the same manner, but he stresses "through the talk of Brezhnev, the will of the USSR to take part in further arms-control talks and further mutual-trust measures is apparent."[14] Genscher, however, does not agree.

According to SPD Secretary Egon Bahr, the Soviets are incorrect if they think they can separate or isolate the European Allies from the United States by using threats such as those expressed by Leonid Brezhnev in Berlin. NATO is committed to the production of medium-range missiles; however the stationing is dependent upon negotiations with the USSR. The time period between the decision to produce the missiles and their actual deployment, will serve for these negotiations. On the one hand, the USSR will withdraw her missiles, and the Western Alliance need not employ hers. On the other hand, if no agreement is reached, then NATO will proceed as planned at their Conference on December 12, 1979. It is important that the West proceed with the production of medium-range missiles before negotiations, for the USSR has already been producing and stationing her SS-20s.

According to Bahr's philosophy, both East and West must achieve that point of development where both sides realize the identity of their security interests. In the event of a catastrophe of conflict, however, the Western Alliance realizes that there is not a German faction, nor a French one, but a United West European Front. For Egon Bahr, the basic conflict involves the question whether armament or disarmament is more dangerous. The SPD Secretary stresses that threats arise through uncontrolled armament, for the moment of incalculability becomes greater. Disarmament, however, does not pose these threats.[15]

Concerning traditional security thought, Egon Bahr feels that NATO's goal cannot be to create parity of deterrence on an ever increasing level, but instead to bring it to the lowest level possible. This achieves more security than armament can ever achieve.[16]

Furthermore, the Soviet Union has no great interest in employing a growing portion of her GNP in defense. The USSR does not want an armaments race with Europe so long as the People's Republic of China remains an incalculable factor for the Soviets. The Western Alliance too, will not deploy more missiles than necessary to preserve the balance. Rather,

the Soviet bloc will determine how many Pershings and Cruise Missiles the Atlantic Alliance will station.

Bahr maintains that Europe could not become a third superpower, and that her security lies in the trustworthiness of the United States. Germany could not have conducted her "Ostpolitik" without the Atlantic Alliance. Finally, the West must demonstrate that her wish to negotiate is still serious. The Soviet Union too, must demonstrate that Brezhnev's Berlin Proposal of withdrawing 20,000 men and 1,000 tanks from East Germany, as well as relocating a portion of the SS-20 arsenal from western parts of the USSR to the Far East, should NATO not station the medium-range weapons, is not only instrumental in hindering NATO's December production decision.[17]

The SALT II debate over ratification in the United States Senate has also caused considerable concern in the Federal Republic of Germany. German Defense Minister Hans Apel is of the opinion that delay or non-ratification of SALT II could damage the NATO decision on medium-range missiles. Chancellor Schmidt, in an interview with *The Economist*, stated that should SALT II not be ratified in its present form, a feeling of insecurity would exist. The SALT negotiations involved three Presidents, their Secretaries of State, and Security Advisors. If after such extensive negotiations SALT were not to be ratified, Schmidt concluded, the effect would be totally incalculable: "How could one, in the future, rely on the politics of a United States President?"[18] The failure to ratify SALT II, would discredit, to a certain degree, the leadership role of the United States. Despite the disappointment over SALT II in West Germany and the other European Allied nations, Chancellor Schmidt has assured that the failure to ratify SALT II will not take its toll on the NATO meeting in December.

The Federal Republic of Germany's position can thus be summed up. Chancellor Schmidt is of the opinion that the Alliance should not wait to increase its armaments; and must only reconsider if the Soviet Union shows initiatives towards disarmament. Germany stresses that due to the pressure of Soviet superiority, it must escalate along with NATO its defense capabilities. Furthermore, for Western Europe there is only one source of security, and that is a unified security without regional disparities or opportunities for independent decisions by its members. The USSR must understand that Europe's security cannot be disassociated from the United States through threats by the Soviet Union directed against Western Europe. The nuclear weapons in Europe are part of a single, united Western defense potential, that no part will allow vulnerabilities for military pressure against a specific area of the Western Alliance.

In conjunction with this, West Germany stresses that the proposed stationing of nuclear weapons in Europe is not aimed at especially setting a parity to Soviet medium range SS-20s. The neutralization of the Soviet weapons is not necessary nor possible. It is more important to allow the possibility for Western Europe to be in a position of adequate power between the conventional and nuclear capabilities, so that the Alliance will be powerful enough to represent herself diplomatically.

Soviet Response

Moscow believes that NATO's missile plans endanger the peace in Europe. The Soviets criticize three points in particular:

1) the stationing of NATO missiles in West German territory;
2) certain statements in the latest White Paper of German Defense Minister Apel;
3) and the thought play of a Franco-German "Force de Frappe."

In conjunction with these accusations, the Soviets are attacking the military experts of the German Social Democrats and Free Democrats, Pawelczyck and Moelleman. In Defense Minister Apel's White Paper there is talk of "Soviet danger" and "arms expansion" of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO). The Soviet critique centers mainly on the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks in Vienna. One particularly offensive comment was voiced by Radio Moscow:

> *These days West German politics and diplomacy rejects all proposals by the Socialist East. The delegates from Bonn in Vienna constantly counterpropose Eastern efforts for military detente which undermines the purpose of the Vienna Conference. At the same time, while Bonn systematically applies the brakes to the Vienna Negotiations, West Germany is engaged in pro-American sentiments.*[19]

It is interesting to note that the Soviet commentaries almost completely neglect discussions of strategic and military/technical problems. Rather, the Soviets focus on political propaganda. The Soviet SS-20, the main focus of West European uneasiness, appears nowhere in the Soviet text.

The news agency TASS stated that the stationing of medium range missiles in West Germany serves Bonn's national interests the least. According to TASS, the socialist states have no intention of attacking the Federal Republic, and would not issue demands for her territory, independence, or sovereignty; rather, because of Germany's geographical and military strategical position, Bonn should instead be interested in the dismantling of the military confrontation situation. TASS does not mention West Germany's concern over the SS-20.[20]

"the stationing of the Pershing II and cruise missiles would create serious consequences especially for West Germany, which would become a nuclear hostage, not of the USSR, but of NATO, and particularly the United States."

The discussion by several French military experts for a European "Force de Frappe," through which West German financial aid could help expand the national French nuclear weapons potential, is attacked severely by Moscow. One commentator of the Soviet press agency Novosti turned against "this dangerous idea" that came from a militaristic mind, and could have been dreamt up by the Pentagon.[21] Furthermore, if the Federal Republic of Germany took part in such a project, this would violate all international agreements that forbade Germany access to nuclear weapons.

Leonid Samjatin, the Chief of the Department of International Information of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), expands on the Western assumption that NATO has nothing comparable to deter Soviet medium range missiles. According to Samjatin, the attempt to separate regional from global parity is an "unrealistic simplification." Until the beginning of the 1970's, the West had "a certain superiority" over the USSR, until the latter achieved strategic parity with the United States. The Forward Based Systems of NATO, however, established a disparity favoring the Atlantic Alliance, not to mention the national potentials of France and Great Britain. Therefore, the USSR had to strengthen her medium-range potential in Europe to once again achieve parity. According to the Soviets, the stationing of the Pershing II and cruise missiles would upset the balance. This would create "serious consequences" especially for West Germany, which would become a "nuclear hostage," not of the USSR, but of NATO, and particularly the United States.[22]

Valentin Falin, the former Soviet Ambassador to Bonn, speaks gravely of the modernization of the Atlantic nuclear potential, which heightens the possibility of a nuclear confrontation on the European continent. A "new, dangerous quality" would result should NATO accept the stationing of the missiles, one that would threaten detente. Falin too warns of the harsh consequences that would follow such NATO action.

This of course is part of the psychostrategic ploy which the Kremlin has conducted in the past months. Falin, however, does not use this psycyostrategy broadly, but rather focuses in on certain points. His purpose must be identified with the general Soviet goal of disrupting the unity of the Atlantic Alliance.

Falin pursues his scheme cleverly. He creates a NATO that in reality does not exist, by inventing propaganda centers for the Atlantic Alliance. "His" NATO gives one the impression that every new initiative by the socialist negotiators irritates NATO rather than condoling her. Falin's NATO attempts to "diverge the people from the road of military detente," or makes "the NATO leaders avoid the arms-reduction initiatives of the socialist countries."[23]

We are therefore dealing with a "phantom" NATO. Falin dwells on NATO's lack of common roots, especially in the sense of the North Atlantic Alliance pretending to be a supranational institution, when in reality NATO is composed of stubborn, sovereign states bound through a feeble Alliance. Falin's thesis of the Atlantic Alliance acting as a unit, being ironic, is thus aimed at irritating the NATO partners.[24]

It is true, that in the thirty years of NATO's existence, the Alliance has seldom spoken strategically with one voice. The military mechanisms function, yet the willingness to develop a supranational political identity is lacking.

Leonid Brezhnev is set on preventing the deployment of NATO's medium range missiles, and to loosen the European-United States relationship by putting pressure on West Germany. In Brezhnev's Berlin speech, the Soviet leader offered to reduce the number of medium range SS-20s in the western USSR, should NATO not employ the Pershing II's or cruise missiles. This of course would not change the balance crtically, for the USSR would continue to have her medium range missiles targeted at Western Europe, and NATO would not possess a response capability.

In analyzing the Soviet Response to West Germany's actions within the North Atlantic Alliance, one must realize that the proposals of the USSR are aimed at codifying NATO's inferiority in conventional and nuclear medium range missiles.

American Reactions

The United States supports stationing the 572 Pershing II and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles in Western Europe to counter the SS-20 and Backfire bomber. The United States also views Brezhnev's proposals as a means of destorying Alliance unity. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski advocates the employment of the medium range missiles, as well as the development of arms-control proposals.

The NATO planned arms control proposals, which will be discussed in the framework of a SALT III, cannnot be implemented so long as the present disparities between the WTO and NATO exist, concerning manpower and tanks, and tactical medium range weapons. President Carter is determined to establish the presently lacking military balance in Europe and with this lay the basis for future arms-control talks towards parity.

In the United States, it has continually been stressed, that the modernization of European NATO weapon systems is closely linked with the ratification of SALT II. It has further been argued, however, that should the modernization of strategic weapons be dropped, due to failure or delay in the ratification of the SALT treaty, then NATO's plans are so weak that they could not be implemented anyway. This in turn would mean that the European Allies do not support their own defense.

Senator Sam Nunn rejects the political connection between SALT II and the modernization of the Eurostrategic weapons. Nunn argues that NATO must deploy medium range nuclear weapons in Europe to be able to interrupt Warsaw pact troop advances into Western Europe. Nunn made it clear to the Europeans, that the US Senate will not be influenced by the modernization of the Eurostrategic weapons in its decision to ratify SALT II. Rather, Nunn was waiting for a clear-cut answer to the question of a 3% annual real increase in the U.S. Defense Budget before deciding on SALT II's fate. This he received, when on December 12, 1979, President Carter announced a 5% annual increase in the Defense Budget, to gain support for SALT II.

Senator Nunn has praised Helmut Schmidt as "one of the militarily smartest statesmen of the West," in light of the West German Chancellor's reconsideration of supporting NATO modernization even if SALT II should not be ratified.[25] Nunn further arranged for the declaration of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (14-0), stating that the outcome of SALT II would in no way hinder the cooperation of Washington with her NATO partners in respect to the modernization of European weapon systems.

In summing up United States Reactions to Soviet threats concerning NATO plans, it is the goal of Washington to disable Soviet attempts at preventing the modernization of the Eurostrategic arsenal.

The Future Eurostrategic Balance

Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko visited West Germany recently to once again lobby against NATO plans. Due to Germany's more immediate stake in detente, the Soviet ap-

paratchik hoped to persuade the German Chancellor to abandon plans for the modernization of the Eurostrategic arsenal of NATO. Gromyko warned that "the basis for negotiations with the Warsaw pact on arms reduction would be destroyed should the Atlantic Alliance go through with her plans at her December Ministerial meeting."

Germany, in the heart of Central Europe, has traditionally been a center of power of the Continent. Today, the crucial role of the Federal Republic of Germany is increased as West Germany seeks to preserve her special relationship of detente between East and West. Determined to accept a greater role in the European theater, the Federal Republic in the future will assume more responsibility and leadership in the North Atlantic Alliance. The first step towads this goal was the qualitative support given by the NATO Foreign Ministers on December 12, 1979, to the modernization of medium-range Eurostrategic weapon systems.

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Transition in the Horn of Africa: Soviet Policy Reaction

by Merle Miller

The area that has come to be known as the Horn of Africa includes the nations of Ethiopia, Somalia, and Djibouti. The Horn has been the setting for territorial conflicts for centuries. Opposing claims to land have recently been thrust into the international arena where the most important actor has been, and continues to be, the Soviet Union. The tension which centers on the Horn has resulted in two major disputes. The first is between the current Ethiopian regime, the Dergue, and Somalia, which is seeking to unite the Somali people by taking the Ogaden region of Ethiopia and portions of the northeast provinces of Kenya and Djibouti. The second is the secessionist movement by Eritrea. The Ethiopian regime itself is in a precarious position as roughly one third of its land is controlled by sessionist movements.[1] To maintain power, the Dergue must settle these disputes. Somalia and Eritrea have good cases for their territorial claims, thus the situation has the potential to remain stalemated, or explode in confrontation. The volatility of this political situation is demonstrated by rapid changes which have occurred on the Horn within the past three years.

In the international context, the Horn of Africa is important primarily on geo-political grounds. Situated on the northeast edge of Africa, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Djibouti are critical in their proximity to the mid-Eastern oil fields and in their potential control of Indian Ocean trade routes. It is these factors which have evoked superpower concern and involvement in the Horn. The current disputes are not simply ideological disputes between various factions and their supporters. The Horn itself is of strategic political and military value and thus provokes foreign interest. No simple solution to these disputes exists, and the fighting on the Horn of Africa continues. These conflicts are not likely to be resolved on the basis of which side is justified in its case. A solution is more likely to be reached on the basis of which side can, due to the coincidence of its interests with those of an outside power, attract superpower support. In the past, foreign powers have helped to train, supply, and direct the military of the conflicting groups on the Horn, and these groups are still relying on foreign assistance to maintain or obtain a position of advantage in the conflicts. International interest in the Horn comes primarily from Saudi Arabia, Kenya, Israel, Sudan, Egypt, U.S., U.S.S.R., and Cuba. The major shift in allies that occurred in November of 1977 as the Soviet Union became Ethiopia's prime supporter and stopped supplying its long-time ally, Somalia, is typical of the impermanence and fluidity of the situation. Today, the Soviets seem to have long-term plans to support a socialist Ethiopian regime which could ultimately dominate the Horn and prove to be a strategic ally. Proposing policy in these areas requires extensive prediction of events and their repercussions, both of which are tasks which can only be partially fulfilled.

English, British, and Italian interests competed on the Horn during the colonial era in the early and mid-1900's. Borders were drawn and redrawn with varying grounds of authority. The first truly nationalist Somali leader, Sheikh Mohammed Abdille Hassan hoped to unite all Somalis despite colonially imposed borders. This sentiment for unity has remained a Somalian objective ever since. In 1960, Somalia, formed from the union of the British Somaliland Protectorate and the Italian Trust Territory, became independent. The five-pointed star motif on the new state's flag was said to represent the five fragments of the Somalis which the new Somali nation was determined to unite.[2] Upon independence, Somalia had to deal with a weak economic base, ethnic divisions, and a post-independence disillusionment. The new nation tried to acquire the Northern Frontier District of Kenya

during Kenya's independence negotiations, but failed, for the issue was viewed as one which would set a dangerous precedent for destroying national boundaries all over the continent. Somalia has never revoked its claims to Kenyan territory and that fact complicates its present efforts to gain allies in its confrontation with Ethiopia. Somalia's desire to unite its people is founded on the cultural homogenity of its people, a tradition of conflict with the Amharas, a privileged ethnic group in Ehtiopia, economic dependence on open borders (nomadic lifestyle), and dispersal across imposed national borders. Moreover, Somalia "contends that the Ogaden was wrongly ceded to Ethiopia by colonial powers in 1897."[3]

Somalia's Emergence: A Pivotal Role

Somalia itself is one of the world's twenty-five poorest nations, yet Siad Barre's regime managed to resettle nomads during the 1973 drought, campaign against illiteracy and mobilize people for economic development, and has remained free of corruption.[4] Barre has also strengthened Somalia's international position by joining the Arab League and by signing a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union which has enabled him to modernize the Somali army. Thus, the Soviet Union, until November 1977 when Somalia broke all Soviet ties, played a major role in Somalia's military development. The Somali army has grown to 23,000 troops and its armour and air forces now compare favorably with those of Ethiopia. The Soviet Union, in return, enjoyed the right to use naval and military facilities at Berbera and Kismayu until November 1977.

In 1973 natural gas was discovered in the disputed region on the Ethiopian side of the border and all semblance of detente between Somalia and Ethiopia disappeared. In July of 1977, the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) invaded and gained control of the Ogaden plain and Somalia was the closest it has been since 1960 to fulfilling its dream of incorporating the Ogaden into Somalia. In August, an eight-nation mediation committee passed a resolution affirming the inviolability of African frontiers and condemning all forms of political subversion. At the time, the failure of Somalia's ability to sustain its occupation seemed inevitable because the Soviet Union and Cuba massively supported the Ethiopian armed forces, while the U.S. and its allies failed to come to Somalia's assistance. In November when Somalia broke its treaty with Russia and expelled the Soviet advisers, Somalia gambled that it would be able to replace Soviet with American backing and that it could afford to ignore African diplomatic opinion's traditional bias against the revision of territories.[5] The Organization of African Unity (OAU) was already divided on other issues, and the partition of the Western Sahara between Morocco and Mauritania had already breached the principle of the inviolability of colonial frontiers. Some African states viewed "Soviet and Cuban expansionism" as a greater threat than OAU divisions or disregard of charter principles. This feeling was probably a result of Soviet and Cuban involvement in Angola. When Somalia first invaded the Ogaden, the situation was very volatile; fears were voiced that Ethiopian retribution would conquer Somalia itself. Remarkably, Somalia has retained its position against Ethiopian troops, thus displaying a strength that extends far beyond the scope of border skirmishes. In light of the successful Somali defense, it is clear that the Soviet Union will be forced into active involvement to install its socialist ally, Ethiopia, as the dominant power on the Horn, and it is questionable whether the Soviets are willing to carry such a burden.

Siad Barre insisted that the Somali invasion of July 1977 was carried out by the WSFL and that the Somali government was not directly involved in the Ogaden. He announced that Somalia supported the right to self-determination for the Ogaden Somalis, but had not as yet intervened. In February 1978, at the time of the Ethiopian counter-offensive, however, he committed the regular army. Such a commitment of men and resources forced Barre to appeal to the Islamic and Arab worlds and to the United States for aid. In March, Ethiopia drove regular Somali troops back across the border, but the two liberation groups, the WSFL and the Somali Abo Liberation Front (SALF), continued guerilla counter-measures against the Ethiopians. Since then, Mengistu Haile Mariam, the Ethiopian head of state, has threatened to carry the war into Somalia itself if the guerillas continue their provocation in Ogaden. While this threat has yet to materialize, Ethiopia has been supporting rebels fighting the Somalian regime of Siad Barre. The most active and largest of these rebel groups is the Somali Salvation Front (SSF).

Ethiopia: Empire or Colony

Ethiopia's stance is inextricably tied to Somalia's position and views. Ethiopia has been forced to wage a two front war, in Somalia and Eritrea, and is itself internally divided by dissatisfaction with the Mengistu regime. Ethiopia has been set apart from other African countries in many ways. It was not only the sole independent African country at the beginning of this century, but it was also the only African "empire." It has a heritage as a Christian empire in intermittent conflict with the Islamic world. The central authority has had a difficult setting in which to try to maintain its control. The use of the East African coast has been important to invaders and is now crucial to Ethiopia's power. Haile Selassie represented a rigidly centralized monarchy founded on tradition and the national church, surrounded by a dependent nobility, supported by a large army, and committed only to that degree of modernization which enhanced its position. The United States has given Ethiopia substantial support in the past. Since a 1953 mutual defense agreement, half of the U.S. military aid to sub-Saharan Africa, and half of the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group's advisors, have gone to Ethiopia.[6] In return, Ethiopia allowed the U.S. to establish Kagnew Station, a major communications and intelligence-gathering facility, which is presently being used by the Soviets.

Selassie fortified the monarchy, but generally neglected economic development, particularly in agriculture where eighty-five percent of Ethiopia's population is employed.[7] As problems of inflation and corruption surfaced, Selassie's power base, the intellectuals, military, and elite became discontented. When Ethiopia suffered a catastrophic drought in 1973, the Selassie government covered up the critical situation to save itself from the international embarrassment of acknowledging that the country was unable to feed its people. The government's failure to deal with the problem or to seek aid catalyzed the widespread dissatisfaction within the country. In June 1974, one hundred and twenty representatives of the military took control of the country. In September, the Dergue was established as the provisional military government. Ultimately, a radical faction of the Dergue, under Mengistu Mariam, emerged from an internal power struggle as the dominant force. The new government established socialism and enforced land reform and social justice. Movement in this direction, however, was slow. Promises in April 1976 for national elections, a ruling party, and trade unions never materialized. The Dergue's inability to restructure the feudal order resulted in a bloody tempest. According to Amnesty International, 10,000 political arrests and executions occurred in 1977 alone.[8] The Dergue's lack of direction and incapacity to deal with the social and economic problems facing Ethiopia is evident in an annual inflation rate hovering around thirty percent. The Dergue has deteriorated from a movement of national purpose and unity to "scientific socialism at gunpoint." The Dergue faces opposition on all sides. The Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU), the more doctrinaire leftist Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP) and the Tigre People's Liberation Front, as well as Eritrean secessionist groups all threaten the Dergue's position. Eritrean secession is Ethiopia's deepest wound, for control of the ports on the Eritrean coast is critical for Ethiopia.

In 1977, the Carter administration terminated aid to Ethiopia because of human rights violations. Thereupon, the regime declared itself Marxist, expelled all American advisors, and welcomed the Soviets. Ethiopia's future will be determined by the interaction of four factors: forces of foreign intervention, separatist movements, regional loyalties, and rival ideologies within the country. Today, Soviet aid is the most critical factor in Ethiopia's survival.

The Emergence of Eritrea

Eritrea was a remnant of Italian imperial dreams after the Adowa disaster in 1896.[9] It now consists of two and a half million ethnically diverse people.[10] In the colonial period between 1890 and 1941, Eritrea developed a separate cultural and political identity from Ethiopia. A modern system of agriculture, industry, and administration was established in Eritrea, and an intelligentsia developed early. At one time, Eritrea represented fifty percent of Ethiopia's learned and skilled class, but only ten percent of its population. In 1943 Selassie claimed authority over Eritrea, and in response the United Nations General

Assembly recommended that Eritrea "constitute an autonomous unit federated with Ethiopia under the sovereighty of the Ethiopian Crown."[11] The United States supported Ethiopia in this dispute in return for the use of the Kagnew Communications Center.

On November 14, 1962, in a rigged parliamentary vote, unconditional union with Ethiopia was chosen and rebellion followed. The Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) began to develop in 1961 as a moderate, predominantly Muslim force, supported by Saudi Arabia and Iraq. In 1970 the Tigrinian speaking Christian intellectuals broke off to form the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) which has been termed "the most impressive" revolutionary movement produced in Africa in the past two decades. Of the two, the ELF has more outside support. The EPLF is remarkably well organized. It is Marxist oriented, but shuns ties with any communist government. The EPLF has built workshops, hospitals and roads and has maintained a working relationship with the people by improving their lifestyle. Although Muslim, it is hostile towards conservative Arab states and aims to build a nonaligned democratic state.

From 1971 until 1974, civil war took place within Eritrea, and in 1974, the Dergue staged an offensive into the Ethiopian highlands, indiscriminately repressing the population. This move by the Dergue united its opposition and stimulated the ELF and EPLF to work together. In 1974 during the civil war, Colin Legum stated, "There can no longer be any hope of defeating the rebels by military force. The only practical question now is what kind of political settlement is possible."[12] The fighting has continued as competing groups capture and recapture strategic towns. The Ethiopian government's 1977 fall offensive collapsed quickly. The EPLF has kept a strong hold on Massawa (a Red Sea port) and the highway from the provincial capital of Asmara. In October of 1977, the ELF and EPLF agreed to initiate a unification process. Over 40,000 ELF and EPLF guerillas were united in a joint command in April 1978.[13] Ethiopia made diplomatic advances in September by hosting the Afro-Arab Anti-Imperialist Solidarity Conference which Fidel Castro and Soviet vice president Kuznetsov attended. The conference passed resolutions denouncing Chinese foreign policies, Somali expansionist policies and "imperialist supported secession groups in northern Ethiopia."[14] Castro urged for a more flexible Ethiopian approach to the Eritrean problem (only months before he was giving Eritrea full backing). During the summer of 1979, Ethiopia initiated another major offensive against Eritrean positions which ended in a stalemate.

Djibouti: The Neutral Observer

Djibouti is a small nation which was known until June 27, 1977, its independence day, as the French Territory of Afars and Issas. Presently under President Hassan Gouled Aptidon, Djibouti's only guarantee of maintaining its independence lies in the presence of French troops, of which 5,000 military and administrative personnel remain. It is a nation of virtually no natural resources and a quarter of a million people, ninety percent of whom are illiterate, and eighty-five percent of whom are unemployed.[15] Djibouti's location on a trade lifeline is its livelihood. The railroad connecting Djibouti and Addis-Ababa has been cut off by Somalia for months, decreasing Djibouti's port activity by one third[16] and by a half a million dollars per month.[17] Half of Ethiopia's trade still passes through Djibouti.[18]

The Djibouti population is comprised of two historically antagonistic peoples, the Afars and the Issas (Somali). Today the government is a balance of Afars and Issas. The Afars occupy the north and west (Ethiopian and Eritrean borders) of the country and are fifty to eighty thousand in number.[19] The Somalis number sixty to one hundred thousand (out of the 160-200 thousand total population), half of which live in the city of Djibouti and around it, and the remainder of which live in the southern portion of the country.[20] Six thousand French and three thousand Arabs also live there.[21] In the conflicts throughout the Horn, Djibouti is attempting to remain neutral. Its position overlooking the Strait of Bag el Mandeb is strategic, and thus attracts foreign aid from France, Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Saudi Arabia.

Soviet policy on the Horn has been opportunistic and reactive. African nations today seek to increase their bargaining power vis-a-vis the superpowers while remaining nonaligned. The U.S.S.R. must project a cautious policy in Africa so that it does not convey an air of expansionism. Its position in this regard was damaged after the Afghanistan invasion. In

the past, the Soviet Union has viewed Africa as a focal point in the historic clash between capitalist and socialist ideologies. The Soviets have been concerned with supporting radical leaders and steering African nations toward domestic socialism and involvement with the communist world. This policy may have suffered a setback in Africa forcing the Soviets to assume a low profile. Recently, the Soviets have become more interested in practical matters, especially those of geopolitical relevance such as ports and airfield landing rights. These concerns have taken precedence over the former task of aiding the development of international communism. In the pursuit of strategic interests, the Soviet Union's primary concern is national security, which has been demonstrated in Soviet naval activity in and around the Horn. The benefits in supporting Somalia for the Soviets had been its strategic location and its naval complex at Berbera which includes a 12,000 foot airstrip, installations for modern ship repairs, facilities for bunkering, ship-to-ship missile storage and naval personnel quarters.[22] Soviet naval presence around the Horn served as a visible reminder of its commitment to its allies in the region, and as an intimidation to hostile countries. Moreover, Russia may have been interested in developing an antisubmarine capability in the region.

The Soviet Naval build-up in the Indian Ocean, coupled with its access to Aden, Holeida, Umm Qasyr, and ports in Mauritius and Mozambique enabled it to pursue naval diplomacy, destroying the western monopoly on naval diplomacy in the Indian Ocean. Increased Soviet control of the sea also figures in its competition with China for influence in the Afro-Asian world.

Shore facilities are especially important for the Soviet Union because of its inferior amphibious support capability. The Soviet dependence on surface-to-air and ship-to-ship missiles for offensive and defensive operations in combination with the absence of any onboard reload capability accentuate the importance of shore facilities such as were available at Berbera. Without Berbera, however, the Soviet Union still has access to ports in South Yemen, Mauritius, and Mozambique. The Soviet Union's naval power is valuable because it is easy to display and it can be used anywhere, thus it is an effective means for intervening in the Third World.

"The Soviets will continue to capitalize militarily and politically in the region to the extent that favorable opportunities arise."

Soviet policy not directly related to its security interests is usually aimed at expanding its political influence. For example, the replacement of Haile Selassie by a group pursuing a progressive socialist direction gave grounds for fostering a new ally by extending Soviet support. That overthrow, along with Somalia's 1977 decision to invade the Ogaden, gave the Soviet Union a basis to intervene. The Soviet Union could not have aided a Somali African attack because it violated the OAU's charter principle upholding African territorial boundaries. By aiding Ethiopia instead, the Soviets preserved the respect of most African nations. Soviet involvement on the Horn has generally diminished Western influence there. After the Angolan civil war, the United States has been reluctant to become involved in African disputes. Soviet activity, on the other hand, has shown a definite commitment and willingness to become involved and to defend its allies, often to the detriment of the Soviets themselves.

Perhaps the most important development on the Horn that threatens the precarious balance existing today is the U.S. interest in naval and air bases in Djibouti, Kenya, and, most importantly, Somalia. Any agreement on the use of bases in Somalia will include a quid pro quo of American economic and military assistance. The practical effect of such aid will be a reversal in the standing U.S. policy of neutrality on the Horn. Military aid to Somalia will necessitate an increase in Soviet aid and weaponry going to Ethiopia. At present, "the Soviets attach the greatest importance to their help to Ethiopia,"[23] and de facto U.S. involvement initiated by military aid to Somalia will up the Soviet ante. Soviet involvement in Ethiopia today stands at 1,000 military and 500 civilian advisors while an estimated 13,000 to 15,000 Cuban troops are also stationed there.[24]

In backing their Ethiopian ally to such an extent, the Soviet Union risks that it is supporting a regime which may not be a long-lasting strategic ally and instrument of influence on the Horn. If this gamble fails, the Soviet Union will suffer a setback similar to that which it experienced in Egypt in 1972 and in Somalia in 1977. Currently, it is debatable whether the Soviet gamble can be successful because Ethiopia is crippled by dissent and internal division. Ethiopia has superior manpower but must fight the Somalian as well as the Eritrean problem. The Soviet Union supports Ethiopia's position against Eritrea, labeling the Eritrean revolution an imperialistic movement. This criticism could be aimed at Saudi Arabia which has been actively supporting the ELF as a pro-Muslim, anti-communist movement. Elimination of the Eritrean nationalists can only be accomplished by massacre in the event that Ethiopia will not compromise or federate with it in some way. Again Eritrea's importance to Ethiopia lies in its ports. Ultimately, the possibility of Eritrean independence could simply be considered part of the process of "decolonization" of the Ethiopian empire. However, the loss of the Ogaden or Eritrea probably would bring down the present Ethiopian regime.

While the Soviet position in Ethiopia is strong, its influence is not ubiquitous. The most important limitation to Soviet control comes from within Ethiopia itself, where a strong sense of nationalism prevails. Indeed, "Mengistu is first and foremost an Ethiopian nationalist and only secondarily an aspiring communist."[25] Mengistu's "failure to institutionalize Ethiopia's social revolution has confirmed the general impression that he has no intention of giving in to Soviet or Cuban pressures on matters directly affecting his authority."[26] Given such limitations to Soviet behavior in Ethiopia, and on the Horn in general, it remains to be seen how Soviet policy will develop. As suggested, the most likely scenario will be that the Soviets will continue to capitalize militarily and politically in the region to the extent that favorable opportunities arise. Soviet policy on the Horn will continue to be dominated by military concerns, and Soviet aid will continue to be in the form of military assistance as Moscow is loath to extend long-term economic aid to an area of instability.

The permanence of Soviet influence on the Horn is unpredictable. As long as the region is politically and militarily advantageous to Soviet foreign policy, the Russians will seek to retain their influence there. When the Soviets initially approached the Horn it was with a proposal for a federation of all the states involved in the conflict. This, and several subsequent attempts at mediation have met with failure. It appears doubtful today that an acceptable compromise can be achieved. Under these circumstances, Soviet policy will be formulated in reaction to events, rather than in predetermination of them, and will thus remain flexible. The Soviet hope of establishing a long-term ally on the Horn will require extensive support of Mengistu's presently unstable regime. To date, Soviet policy has linked military involvement on the Horn with a sense of political gain. The Soviets have taken advantage of all possible opportunities and will continue to do so in the foreseeable future. The Horn of Africa is important to the Soviets within both the African context and the global context. The Horn provides the Soviet Union with a good place to establish an influence in African affairs. Strategically, it provides the Soviets with a geographic area of importance from which they can extend their global influence, particularly in the East-West context. As the Soviets have chosen active involvement in the region, they must guard that their decisions and actions do not jeopardize their relations with other African states. Future Soviet policy on the Horn of Africa will inevitably be flexible and opportunistic.

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Two influential OPEC voices - Libya's Col. Muammar al Qaddafi and Saudi Arabia's Sheik Yamani.

Diplomacy of Oil-: 1960-1973

by John Meynardie

In July 1960, Monroe Rathbone, the new chief executive of Standard Oil of New Jersey (now Exxon) discovered a serious threat in the oil market. The Soviet Union, he believed, was undermining the Western oil industry's stranglehold on the supply of oil. The U.S.S.R. was selling its excess crude at prices well below what the major international oil companies had established. In order to compete in the markets, the Soviet Union was now penetrating, the companies were forced to sell at the discounted Soviet price, but at the same time they were forced to pay taxes based on the old "posted" price.

The major oil companies had only a year before cut the posted price by eighteen cents a barrel. This earlier move was not altogether unexpected since it brought the price down to the level it had been before the Suez crisis — a price justifiable in terms of supply and demand. The reduction meant, however, a loss in revenues to the oil exporting countries of about $132,000,000 a year.[1]

The uproar over another price cut was likely to be strong. Even in the Standard Oil Board room there were doubts as to whether the risks were worth the advantages. One Director felt the company should offer to share in the revenue cuts with the governments, another thought they should increase marketing profits to offset the loss in production profits. They were overridden by Rathbone and the remainder of the Board and on August 8, 1960, Standard Oil of New Jersey cut its posted price for Middle Eastern crude 10 cents a barrel. A few days later the other major oil companies followed suit.

This unilateral decision, made in the company board room, drastically lowered the revenues of the oil exporting nations:

> *The Shah....was furious about the price cuts of which he was given no warning: 'even if the action was basically sound,' he said afterward, 'it could not be acceptable to us as long as it was taken without our consent.' In his indignation*

he was not prepared to join up with the revolutionaries of Iraq, and the Shah's support was very important.[2]

One month after the announcement of the cut in the posted price, the representatives of Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait and Venezuela met in Bagdad to form the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.

In the period between the birth of OPEC and its awakening, each oil producing nation in the Middle East attempted to expand its production in order to increase revenue. By a complex system of supply and demand formulations, the companies were able to keep the overall oil production at a steady level. Their motive was to prevent a glut of oil from reaching the market, lowering prices and necessarily profits.

By using the very complex "Average Program Quantity" (or APQ) system the companies were able to match their predicted need by balancing the oil productions of the individual countries. Standard Oil of New Jersey, Texaco, Socal, and Mobil Oil, the four partners in Aramco used this system at first to restrict the production in Saudi Arabia. But the Saudi concession was too important to risk the extravagant King's wrath. The Aramco partners were determined to lower production in Iran. The Aramco concession was roughly four times the size of the Iranian Consortium and the equity percentage of Socal, Texaco, and Standard Oil of New Jersey in it was 30% as compared with only 7% in Iran. By using the APQ system, the Aramco partners could reduce the total production of Iran, and increase production in Saudi Arabia without destroying the price structure.

The seven major oil companies (better known as the "seven sisters") using similar techniques throughout the oil exporting world, and by playing one country against another, were able to expand the export of oil at precisely the rate they estimated and envisioned would keep the price structure stable. Anthony Sampson wrote.

> *What makes the stable growth of supply so extraordinary is the widely diverse movements of its separate components...Somehow the major oil companies have been able to 'orchestrate' these and other aberrations into a smooth and uninterrupted upward trend in overall supply. Indeed, a steady increase in supply was increased despite such extreme changes as, on the one hand, the virtually complete loss of Iran's output, resulting from its nationalization of Anglo-Iranian's properties, and, on the other hand, the rapid rise of output in Libya, about half of which was in the hands of independents.*[3]

The Oil Embargo That Failed

The growing tensions between Israel and her Arab neighbors threatened to undermine the United States government's policy in the Middle East. Generally these policies involved support for the continued existence of Israel, and securing the United States' economic interests in the area which overwhelmingly dealt with oil. There was a natural conflict in these interests which lead to a United States' policy of separating Israel and oil into two different compartments. For the Arab governments, however, these two major aspects of U.S. policy could never be separated.

Israel invaded Egypt on June 4, 1967. President Nasser immediately blamed the United States and Britain for their support of the invasion. Soon afterwards the foreign ministers of the Arab countries met in Baghdad and following the lead of Iraq, they agreed to slow down their production and to boycott the United States and Great Britain. "King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, who had only three weeks before talked in London about his fears of Nasser's aggression, was now committed to support his Arab brother in time of need."[4]

Iran and Venezuela had, however, no intention of joining the embargo and were reaping the benefits of the extra demand. The United States, which in 1967 had the ability to increase production by 25%,[5] was able to pick up much of the slack in the world market.

As a result the Arab countries were only hurting their own economies by continuing the boycott. After one month, Saudi Arabia resumed exports to all countries and the other Arab producing countries followed suit. During that month Saudi Arabia lost $30,000,000.[6] The oil minister of Saudi Arabia, Sheikh Yamani; "admitted that the use of the oil weapon had been a fiasco;' 'if we do not use it properly,' he said, 'we are behaving like someone who fires a bullet into the air, missing the enemy and allowing it to rebound on himself.' "[7]

The Awakening of OPEC

Throughout the 1960's OPEC was dormant. Perez Alfonso said in 1960, "We have formed a

very exclusive club...Between us we control ninety percent of crude exports to world markets, and we are now united. We are making history."[8] But before 1970, OPEC existed largely only on paper. It's only accomplishment was the halt of unilateral price determination by the oil companies. This impotence began to change in 1970 when the oil companies were faced by their stiffest challenge and lost. The confrontation which began OPEC's role of power in the oil market came in a country on the outskirts of the Middle East, a country that was not even an original member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.

Libya began exporting oil in the 1950's, and with the asset of hindsight was able to a large degree to avoid the restrictive control of the major oil companies. It sould be remembered that before 1970 much of the conflict in the oil market came from countries attempting to expand their production and the major oil companies seeking to restrict it. With the knowledge that the "independent" oil companies were short of crude oil for their refining and marketing interests, King Idris awarded large concessions to them.

Libya was more appealing in many ways to the oil companies than most of the oil producing countries. For one, Libyan oil was conspicuously low in sulfur content, a quality made more attractive as the West became more concerned with air pollution. For another, Libya was located on the European side of the Suez Canal — making Libyan oil cheaper to transport and not subjecting it to the closure of the canal.

By 1969, Libya supplied a quarter of Western European consumption. Production had increased so rapidly, it hurt the position of the major oil companies in their largest concessions in Iran and Saudi Arabia. To the major oil companies, the independent oil companies were responsible, since they were producing and marketing as much oil as the Libyan fields would yield. The major companies had only two options to keep their neatly designed price structure from collapse; curb production in the Persian Gulf and thereby endanger their concessions, or restrict production from Libya.

Some analysts did not believe they could do either. Professor M.A. Adelman predicted in the mid-1960s that the price of Middle East Oil could drop to a $1 a barrel by the early 70's. In February 1969, *Fortune* magazine writer Gilbert Burck stated, "...All the sheiks' horses and all the sheiks' men will never put the comfortable old price structure together again. Consumer everywhere should rejoice."[9] This analysis of the oil market would likely have been correct except for the political changes of the 1970s which neither writer foresaw.

On September 1, 1969, Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi led the coup d'etat that deposed the corrupt regime of King Idris. One of Qaddafi's first actions as head of state was to demand an increase in the price of oil by forty cents a barrel. Qaddafi knew that Libyan oil was worth more than oil from the Persian Gulf, but that the oil companies had refused to give King Idris any better price for it.

The Department of State favored giving the Libyans the extra forty cents. Jim Akins, the State Department oil expert was worried by a possible oil shortage and he felt good working relations with the producers were more important than confronting them and possibly causing a disruption in supply.[10] Standard Oil of New Jersey, soon to be better known as Exxon, believed it necessary to confront Libya because of the danger that giving further concessions would create a "leap-frog situation" in oil prices, where Libya would receive a price increase and the Gulf states would demand one, Libya would demand another one if the Gulf States received theirs, and so on.

Exxon had reason to be bold. Unlike the independents who were almost completely dependent on Libya for their foreign operations, Exxon could make up the loss in other areas. It did not need Libyan oil and so was not afraid of the probable Libyan reprisals. Any reprisal would also have the advantage of destroying the independents' interest in the international oil market and Exxon still had a grudge with the independents for flooding the market with oil.

Qaddafi wasted no time in taking reprisals, but instead of taking on all the oil companies together, he singled out Occidental Petroleum (Oxy), which was totally dependent on Libyan oil. In May 1970, Occidental was ordered to cut back production from 680,000 to 500,000 barrels a day. Desperate for crude oil, Dr. Armand Hammer, Oxy's president, visited Ken Jamison, the chief executive officer of Exxon, in an attempt to buy excess oil elsewhere. Jamison refused to sell any oil to OXY and "Thus Exxon rejected the first op-

portunity for a common front; it was some time before Jamison realized the extent of the common danger."[11] In August, Occidental gave in to the Libyan demands.

Qaddafi's strategy was to pick off one company after another and he was soon demanding the same terms from the other oil companies in Libya. Qaddafi next went after the Oasis Consortium which consisted of three independents and Royal Dutch/Shell, the second largest oil company in the world. When Qaddafi made his demands to Oasis, Shell refused to sign the agreement. On September 25, all of Shell's percentage of Oasis production was stopped.[12]

British Petroleum and Shell believed it was necessary to confront Libya and they informed the British Government that they should boycott Libya at a cost of only 10 to 15% reduction to European markets. Shortly thereafter, the British government informed the companies that there was very little willingness on the part of European governments to accept the reduction. A common stand that might have broken the Libyan demands was undermined by the real possibility that the European governments would buy the oil directly from the Libyan government in the event of a boycott.

The Tehran and Tripoli Agreements

Pandora's Box was now open, and the oil companies' response to the price competition now developing between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf was simultaneous and individual negotiations with the OPEC countries. In January 1971, twenty-three companies sent a letter to the OPEC nations of which the following is an excerpt:

> *"The continuous series of claims which have been, and are being, made by individual member countries of OPEC have been causing us great concern. We believe that it is in the long term interest of both producing countries and consuming countries alike, as well as that of the oil companies, that there should be stability in the financial arrangements with producing governments. For this reason, we have concluded that we can not further negotiate the development of claims by member countries of OPEC on any other basis than one which reaches a settlement simultaneously with all producing governments concerned."*[13]

The reaction against such a plan was swift and indignant. Dr. Amouzegar, the oil minister of Iran, protested on the grounds that the moderates would be forced to follow the radical lead of Libya if single negotiations were held. After meeting with him, Ambassador Douglas MacArthur recommended to Secretary of State Rogers that single negotiations were inadvisable. "The American diplomats were persuaded with remarkable speed, in view of the strong language of the letter to OPEC which they were supposedly supporting..."[14] With the support of the United States government, the Shah of Iran gave companies a two-day ultimatum to give up their global approach.

The next day representatives of the oil companies met in Tehran with the representatives of the Gulf countries. On February 14, 1971, the Tehran agreement was signed which raised the posted price of oil thirty cents a barrel, to be escalated to fifty cents by 1975.[15]

In March the negotiations began in Tripoli. The agreement, signed on April 2, 1971, increased the posted price of Libyan crude seventy-six cents with an additional fifteen cents for fringes.[16] The Shah was furious when he heard of the increases the Libyans had received, and soon obtained a premium for "port costs," already what the oil companies feared was happening.

U.S. Government's Reaction

Between 1971 and 1974, the United States encouraged OPEC to demand a raise in the price of oil. The State Department, as in the case of Libya in 1970, was more worried by a shut-off in production which they believed could be averted by giving the OPEC countries more money. The State Department also still believed oil policies and Israel could be kept separate. But far from easing OPEC demands, this policy reinforced the belief that the days of oil company dominance were gone forever, and that the United States was impotent to stop any OPEC move.

The State Department in addition thought the increase in oil prices would help the United States for three reasons. First, it was felt the increase in oil prices would give the United States a better advantage in world trade with Western Europe and Japan because of its

greater percentage of domestic oil. Second, the State Department though an increase in oil prices would not hurt the U.S. balance of payments because the OPEC nations would have to spend most of their excess money in the U.S. Third, the United States thought the increased money would allow Iran and Saudi Arabia to build up their armed forces to provide regional defense in the Persian Gulf.

Just before the Tehran and Tripoli negotiations in early 1971, a State Department spokesman explained U.S. goals for the coming talks: "The producing countries claim a right to higher revenues, which is a position taken by other people now and again." U.S. aims, he continued, are "Stability, orderliness, and durability."[17] No mention was made of preserving low prices. Again on June 3, 1972, Jim Akins gave a speech at an OPEC conference in which he stated the assumption that oil prices would go up to $5 a barrel by 1975.[18] And again, as Jim Akins was later to testify, Henry Kissinger privately told the Shah "The United States understood Iran's desire for higher prices."[19]

At the same time the oil consuming nations were meeting to try to establish some form of agreement to share oil in the event of a crisis. But the United States stymied the attempt "by simply refusing to share with the Europeans."[20] The United States was afraid to do anything which would appear anti-cartel, in hope of making a special deal with Saudi Arabia.

A way around this difficulty was found by making the price increase a "tax" instead of the customary "royalty." The host countries could still increase their revenues, but the "tax" enabled the oil companies to qualify for the foreign tax credit. The oil companies were able to make a dollar-for-dollar tax cut in their U.S. returns for the price increase, and the U.S. taxpayer, in effect, paid the price of it.

> *"Its purpose was to minimize corporate resistance to host-country policy demands and to bolster the.....regime. Hence, the only policy to protect oil investments that American policymakers were able to implement amounted to using the U.S. Treasury to increase the revenues of host-country goverments.*[25]

Lagging U.S. Investment

Although U.S. consumption between 1967 and 1973 was greatly increasing, capital investment by the oil industry in the United States was declining, forcing increased dependence on imported oil. Between 1963 and 1973 capital investments in the United States as a percentage of the world total declined from 49.8% to 36.25%. During the same period, the investment in the Middle East, as a percentage of the world total, nearly doubled. In addition, while investment in the United States, was doubling between 1963 and 1973, investment in the rest of the world was tripling and in the Middle East, quadrupling. In face, between 1969 and 1971, investment in the U.S., measured in real dollars, declined by 10%.[26]

A major reason that investment was increasing in the Middle East and not in the United States was because the rate of return on investments was so much higher there. For example, the average oil well in the Persian Gulf produced about 4,000 barrels per day - the average U.S. oil well produced only 11 barrels per day.[27] It cost ten cents to extract one barrel of oil in the Middle East , 51 cents in Venezuela, 82 cents in Indonesia and $1.31 in the United States.[28] These factors, coupled with the foreign tax credit gave the oil companies the incentive to become more dependent on foreign sources and less reliant on domestic sources. When CBS reporter Jay McMullen asked W.F. Martin, president of Phillips Petroleum on *CBS Reports: The Corporation* ' "should the corporation be expected to serve the interests of this country by accepting less profits in the U.S. than it can obtain abroad?' Martin replied, 'I don't thing we should be expected to.' "[29]

When the United States government imposed a mandatory import quota on oil in 1957, the purpose was to protect oil producer's profits by excluding cheap foreign imports. As part of the campaign to alleviate criticism of such a policy, the oil companies projected an image of abundant U.S. reserves to undermine the argument that by imposing an import quota, the United States would be depleting its own reserves instead of those abroad. As M. King Hubbert wrote, "contemporaneously, one of the most widely publicized dicta of the public relations arm of the U.S. petroleum industry was the statement 'the United States has all the oil it will need for the forseeable future.' "[30]

In 1969, E. Wayles Browne, former economist of the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly introduced a chart showing the trend of proved reserves in the United States

between 1945 and 1968. The peak in proven reserves was reached in 1961 and followed a downward trend through 1968. The addition on the chart of 1968 through 1974 (prepared by the American Petroleum Institute and Bureau of Mines) shows an even greater reduction in U.S. reserves. Yet precisely at this time when U.S. oil reserves were declining, capital investment in the domestic oil market was also declining.

In June of 1968 the Atlantic Richfield Company (Arco) struck oil in Prudhoe Bay, Alaska. The cost of exploration was so high that Arco was forced to bring Exxon into the deal. The discovery in Alasks was vast, comparable to Texas, but difficult to exploit due to the location. The total reserves in Alaska were estimated by the Bureau of Mines at 9.6 billion barrels, approximately one third of all previous reserves.

Exxon was in no hurry to exploit the oil then, since they had abundant and far cheaper supplies in Arabia and Iran.[31] The other major oil companies were also in no hurry to develop the discovery. A Standard Oil of California internal memorandum of December 6, 1968 made the point.

> *We recently discussed with the strong possibility that Social and other established internationals will find it very difficult to maintain Middle East crude market positions in the future. Our appraisal of oil demand and supply in the Free World indicates it will become exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to maintain relatively rapid growth in the high level producing countries of the Middle East and still accommodate reasonable growth of crude production from* **new** *as well as old fields...*[32]

Exxon experimented by sending an ice-breaker through the Northwest Passage, but his widely seen in the oil industry as a delaying tactic to keep from building a pipeline. Exxon was even threatened by a crude-short competitor with an anti-trust suit to get things going.[33]

As soon as serious proposals for the pipeline began to be discussed, opposition sprung up from conservationists who discovered that the pipeline would create serious ecological damage. Some companies actually accused Exxon of secretly backing the conservationists. Regardless of this charge, "The protests of the ecologists set back the transporting Alaskan oil by four years and the Alaskan alternative was too late to save the West from its dependence on OPEC when the crunch came. It was not until the energy crisis had broken on America that the objections were rapidly overruled."[34]

The discovery of oil in Alaska could not reverse the trend towards the depletion of oil in America. Nevertheless, the lack of Alaskan crude oil seriously hurt the United States when the crunch came in 1973, and might have changed the outcome of the embargo.

Between 1945 and 1962, the United States reserve production ratio remained stable at about 12 years.[35] By 1970, it had plummetted to just over eight years. When the oil from the

CHART I
U.S. CRUDE OIL RESERVES



*excluding North Slope of Alaska
**including North Slope of Alaska
From Blair, John M. *The Control of Oil*, Vintage Books (New York: 1976 pp. 4 and 5)

North Slope of Alaska is added to the figures, the ratio again soars to a stable figure of about 11 years, "long considered a 'comfortable' supply."[36] The failure to develop the domestic oil supply was not the cause of the United States' long term energy problems, but had they been developed the oil embargo of 1973 might have been broken.

Oil reserves are distributed with remarkable unevenness around the world, nearly half being in the politically unstable region of the Middle East, an area becoming increasingly hostile to the United States.

Despite its importance, the United States government delegated the policy decisions on oil to a handful of private multinationals whose first loyalty was to profits. Between 1960 and 1970 the U.S. government had neither the will nor the desire to assume the role for which it had been elected—to create and implement foreign policy.

More and more today, our policies are dictated and our fate is decided by a handful of oil rich nations.

This need not have been.

Throughout the period from the unilateral price increase of 1960, to Exxon's blunder in Libya in 1970, the U.S. multinationals antagonized and took advantage of the producing governments. During this ten year period, the United States government's Middle East oil policy was determined by a small handful of giant corportions.

When the government did decide to take a more active role in the diplomacy of oil, its history was a series of unbelievable short-sightedness and incompetence. The government had so completely acquisced to the oil companies, that when it was needed, the government had no idea how to proceed.

The dramatic reversal of roles of the multinational companies and the OPEC nations between 1970 and 1974 have had devastating effects on the economies of the Western nations. This inversion has hurt the security interests of this nation because of the vulnerability of the most necessary of all the raw materials.

The multinational oil companies played an important role in this subversion. Because of the exorbitant rates of return from investment in the Middle East, the oil companies chose to neglect development in the United States. The fact was and is, that the United States is quickly running out of oil. But the oil from Alaska alone, had it been developed in time, could have broken the embargo and as the Shah or Iran freely admitted in 1971, "If the oil producing countries suffer even the slightest defeat, it would be the death-knell for OPEC, and from then on the countries would no longer have the courage to get together."[37]

The development of OPEC was like the development of a child, each event helping to shape its outlook and thinking, each success making it bolder and more determined.

In the crucial periods of OPEC's awakening, the major oil companies were too busy serving a vendetta against the independents to worry about the effects their decisions would have on the future of the oil market.

By the time the multinationals began to realize that a common stand against OPEC was necessary, the U.S. government entered the picture and quickly undermined every attempt to confront the producers. The hope was that giving in to the OPEC nations would have trouble later. But the concessions only encouraged OPEC, they didn't satisfy them.

The U.S. government also holds the blame for the decreasing U.S. position in regards to reserves. The foreign tax credit was the major economic incentive the oil companies had to neglect development in the United States.

Finally in the government's role, of course, is the state of Israel. Throughout OPEC's history, the United States insisted that oil diplomacy and support for Israel were separate issues. Most of the world's oil reserves are controlled by Arab states. These divided nations have only two major things in common, a Muslim faith and a strong distaste for Israel. As Colonel Qaddafi, ruler of Libya recently said, "...we have given America more than enough time to respect us. But America continues to make fools of us, to make things difficult for us by protecting Israel, and we are fed up. We are acting in self-defense."[38] Even an Arab moderate, King Faisal, has made the same warning.

When Sheikh Yamani, Saudi Arabian oil minister, offered to raise Saudi production to 20 million barrels per day, he was offering the destruction of OPEC. The asking price—**modification** of U.S. policy towards Israel.

The multinations arbitrary decisions, lack of cohesion and self-interested nature have

rendered a disservice to this country. Even more harmful to our interests and security, however, was the incompetence and short-sightedness of the United States government. U.S. oil policy was based on error and a failure of strategic understanding. We are still paying the price.

The price increase placed Saudi Arabia in a difficult position. The princes are not completely in favor of a great price increase since they thought it could provoke a world monetary crisis and they had the largest investment portfolio of any oil exporting country. They also feared a price increase would encourage Iran, whose miliary build-up was already alarming, to arm even faster. The Saudi's had no faith that the Iranian Military intention was to thwart Soviet designs, since that was hopeless, and feared the weapons were aimed towards the Persian Gulf.[21] They also did not wish to undermine the United States position because the U.S. was looked to for protection against violent threats to the Saudi Monarchy. On the other hand, the Saudi Arabian regime was hostile to the State of Israel. Some hostility was also aimed at the United States, who since 1967 had greatly support the Israelis.

Sheik Yamani wrote to Treasury Secretary William Simon about the Saudi dilemma:

> *"I would like you to know that there are those amongst us who think that the U.S. administration does not really object to an increase in oil prices. There are even those who think that you encourage it for obvious political reasons, and that any official position taken to the contrary is merely to cover up this fact..." Unless the United States influences Iran, he continued "it can only lead to Saudi Arabia giving up its present position and joining its OPEC colleagues in their uncompromising stand."*[22]

In a 1972 visit to the United States, Sheik Yamani offered in return for a privileged investment status and modification of the United States policy towards Israel, to increase Saudi production to 20 million barrels of oil a day, a move which in effect would have destroyed OPEC. For political reasons President Nixon refused the offer.

Between the first embargo of 1967 and the second embargo of 1973, a number of changes took place which seriously hurt the United States' position to withstand such an attack. The United States consumption of oil had greatly increased between 1967 and 1973. In 1967 the United States consumed slightly more than 11 million barrels of crude oil a day, by 1973 consumption topped 15.5 million barrels a day.[23] Demand had outstripped domestic supply and the United States was importing more and more oil, an increasing percentage of which came from the politically unstable Middle East. Due to the demand, the United States' "spare capacity," the ability to increase production in an emergency had fallen to only 10%[24]

Before World War II the United States produced 62% of the world's oil; by 1972 the United States was producing only 21%. In 1955 the United States accounted for 18.2% of the world's proved reserves and by 1972 it accounted for only 6.4%. Between 1966 and 1972 the United States accounted for only 1.5% of the additions to proved oil reserves.

Several factors were behind this continued decline. First were the policies of the United States government in providing incentive for multinationals to explore overseas. Second, are the multinations, who decided to forego U.S. investment in the United States. Third, the indisputable fact that the United States was truly running out of oil.

Since the end of the Second World War, the United States' foreign policy in the Middle East has involved three inseparable, if conflicting interests; first, support for the continued existence of Israel, second, securing American economic interests, and third, seeking to contain communism by bolstering politically conservative regimes.

The State Department was sympathetic to the Middle Eastern governments' need to increase revenue. Increased revenue meant more stable regimes in Riyadh and Tehran, which would secure oil supplies for the West, the State Department believed. The oil companies, however, were reluctant to renegotiate their concessions since higher revenues to the producing governments would mean less profit for the oil companies.

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After the Embargo

by Laura Garnick

Since 1973, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries has shaken the world by raising the price of its exported petroleum, with the most dramatic increases occurring in 1973-74 and again in 1978-1980. The effects of the second set of price hikes are still being felt throughout the international community, and it is too early at this point for a full analysis of their long-term consequences. However, we have gained some perspective on the first set of price increases of 1973-74 and on the serious economic and political upheaval they caused worldwide.

The OPEC price increases of 1973-74 signified the end of an era in which oil was relatively inexpensive and supplies secure for the countries of the industrialized West. Although many factors led to the actions taken by OPEC, in the most simple of terms, the event can be considered the juxtaposition of a long term economic trend with a political crisis. The price increases of 1973-74 were triggered by the October War and the United States' government's support of Israel when arms shipments totalling $2.5 billion were made by the United States to Israel. In response, the Arab oil producers placed an embargo on the United States, decreasing overall output by 25%, and reducing shipments to other nations. The OPEC countries ended their previous method of negotiations with the major oil companies and set the price on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Oil buyers on the short term "spot" market, were panicked by the uncertainty of reliable sources of oil, and bid the price up to four times the pre-October War level. At the OPEC meeting held in Teheran on December 22 and 23, 1974, the OPEC share of oil revenues was set at $7.00/barrel, as compared to the $1.77/barrel level prior to the October War.

In the post-1973 economic environment, this drastic increase in petroleum prices had a startling effect on the world economy. In most of the industrialized West, increased oil prices led to a loss in national income and resulted in balance-of-payments deficits. Inflationary pressure increased, leading to the contraction in demand for goods and services. Many industrialized countries deflated their economies, resulting in increased levels of unemployment and reductions in growth. The reverberations of the OPEC price increases

combined to generate a recessionary cycle in the world economy and a period of overall lower growth.

The effects of the price increases were not felt equally by the oil-consuming countries. Although there was a period of adjustment in the world economy following the 1973-74 price increases, the larger, wealthier oil-consuming countries initially found it easier to adapt. The economies of the lesser developed countries were less resilient, making adjustment to the higher price levels more difficult. The OPEC price increases served to widen the gap between the "haves" and the "have-nots," and created a whole new set of "haves." High levels of debt continue to be accumulated by the less developed countries--an issue whose implications for the world economy have yet to be directly confronted.

The price increases of 1973-74 were also politically significant because they marked a crucial change in the relationship between the industrial West and the oil producing countries. Suddenly the West, but more specifically the United States, no longer dominated oil production. The "oil weapon" emerged as a potent force in international relations. Robert W. Tucker described this situation in the September, 1979 issue of *Commentary:*

> *"In taking the actions they did, the cartel members not only asserted a right to determine the price of their oil and to maintain the price by refusing to produce in excess of a certain level. They also asserted a right to deny access to an indispensable source of energy for reasons and in circumstances of their choosing."*

This new-found assertiveness by the OPEC countries had a profound effect on the United States' role in the world. Rather than choosing drastic military or economic actions to restore the status quo, the United States chose to accept the inevitability of higher prices. Although a firm response may not have been feasible at the time due to the United States' dependence on Middle Eastern oil, this measured response reaffirmed a growing perception of the erosion of American power. No longer could the United States be the unquestioned leader of the Western world in foreign affairs. Europe and Japan no longer blindly followed America in respect to foreign policy in the Middle East and elsewhere.

Although the events of 1973-74 set into clear reflief the dangers of United States reliance on Middle Eastern oil, in the post-crisis years a certain complacence developed in the West concerning the reliability of future oil supplies. The United States' complacence was based on the perception of a stable relationship with Iran led by a "friendly" Shah. The United States seriously misread the domestic situation in Iran, as subsequent events have demonstrated. When the Shah was forced into exile in 1979, a complete cutoff of Iranian oil exports occurred (in the same year). This loss of five million barrels per day to the world oil market eventually spurred price increases by OPEC. As Iran resumed production, most OPEC countries reduced their production in order to keep the market tight and their revenues high.

As in 1973-74, a political situation triggered a response in the oil market in 1978-79. The type of crisis situation considered an anomaly in 1973-74 has begun to emerge as part of a pattern in the relationship between the industrialized West and the Middle Eastern oil producers. Daniel Yergin comments in *Energy Future* that "the Iranian crisis, more than just the increase in the price of petroleum, dramatized the dangers for Western nations of depending so heavily on traditional regimes going through a rush of modernization."

The price increases have caused the industrial West to seriously question the wisdom of its dependence on imported petroleum as its major energy source. Conservation and alternative sources of energy have been given increasing attention as oil prices have climbed. But as yet the U.S. government has failed to react to the long term consequences of the rise in oil prices and the threat to oil supplies. *Ad hoc* adjustments to immediate crises have characterized the government's energy policies rather than carefully thought-out, long-term solutions. The United States has consistently failed to come to grips with the clear need for a comprehensive energy policy in which petroleum does not play the central role. The United States in the near future may greatly be hurt by this shortsightedness.

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Yugoslavia and the Soviet Threat

by Suzanne Goguen

Recent Soviet activity in Afghanistan has jolted the American public out of the lull of detent and into the reality of Russian imperialism. What will the next move be after Afghanistan? For those in the world who live under this threat, as does Yugoslavia, this is no idle speculation. Now, more than ever, in a post Tito Yugoslavia the shadow of the Russian bear looms ever darker. In the past, Yugoslavia has avoided military confrontation with the Soviet Union due to its nonaligned status, unique geographic position and rigid national defense. Yugoslavia's choice of nonalignment has afforded it a singular and important role in world politics. The West has supported, at least verbally, Yugoslavia's territorial integrity, security and position of non-alignment, even though the Yugoslavs have always pointedly denied needing help from anyone. While Tito always recognized the political advantages of nonalignment, he realized, however, that it would not be enough in itself to deter the Soviets in case of attack. His beliefs were reinforced after the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia and in order to lend credibility to Yugoslavia's proclamations of nonalignment, Tito devised the concept of "Total National Defense." In addition to the standing army and civil defense system, an emergency fighting force including all able bodied men would fight, using guerilla tactics modeled on those used in the partisan battles fought in WWII.

Yugoslav Security Background

Throughout its history, Yugoslavia has found itself in a precarious position with respect to the Soviet Union. Yugoslav expulsion from the Cominform in 1948 prompted Tito's declaration of nonalignment. At the time, his options were restricted given the extremism of both camps, East and West. Nonalignment proved eventually to be an asset, but initially Tito was unable to exploit the strategic economic opportunities it afforded. Between 1948 and 1950, the value of Yugoslavia's exports was halved and its imports fell to 75% of the 1948 figure:[1] Tito feared a Soviet invasion very much at this time. The U.S., adamant that Yugoslavia not slip back into Soviet hands, started sending huge amounts of aid. Some ¾ of a billion dollars of U.S. aid in the fifties was transferred with the desire that Yugoslavia remain nonaligned.[2] Militarily Yugoslavia built up an army of 500,000 men with 500,000 more ready to mobilize at any time. In 1952, at the peak of the buildup, defense spending comprised a whopping 22% of the national income.[3] Starting in 1955, there was a gradual rapprochement between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia which eventually caused Yugoslavia to reduce defense spending to 6% of its national income and to reduce the army to 200,000 men.[4]

The Cold War heightened the importance of Yugoslavia's nonaligned role. As the world chose sides Yugoslavia remained obstinately noncommitted. As the U.S. took on the political responsibility of defending Yugoslavia's position, Tito was able to cut down further the size of his army, convinced that the U.S. would not allow a Soviet invasion. Other Western countries supported Yugoslavia economically and politically, while the U.S. gave substantial aid and even encouraged American business to invest in Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia facilitated the interaction by making adequate guarantees against the risk of expropriation.[5] Tito was able to feel relatively secure from the Soviet Union as long as the two super-powers were at odds. In this way, Yugoslavia benefitted from the absence of detent and its nonaligned role grew in importance as it played one power off the other.

When the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968, Tito's perception of the world

situation changed dramatically. Tito was outraged, with both the invasion and the "Brezhnev Doctrine," and was worried about the United States' inaction. He said at the 9th Party Congress in 1969, that this action violated the independence of a sovereign state and went against international law and the UN charter. It was an even greater blow knowing that it was undertaken by socialist countries in the name of protecting socialism.[6] In a demonstration of his anger with the Soviets, he reorganized the entire defense system of the country.

The changes in Yugoslavia's defense corresponded to the country's political and strategic characteristics. Marshal Tito was aware of a Soviet buildup of power in the Mediterranean which increased Yugoslavia's geo-strategic importance. Yugoslavia is right in the heart of NATO's southern flank. It borders on Austria, Hungary, Italy, Greece, Albania, Romania, and Bulgaria. Romania and Bulgaria and Hungary are Warsaw Pact countries. With Yugoslavia under its control, the Soviets could conceivably influence the evolution of Eastern Mediterranean politics. Control of Yugoslav ports on the Mediterranean Sea would solve Russia's age old problem of a warm water port and would allow a base for Soviet submarines and ships on the Adriatic Sea. Equally important, possession of Yugoslavia would guarantee passage through the Dardanelles. The Montreux Convention signed in 1936 and still in effect, limited Soviet and all other passage through the Straits. The document signed by Great Britain, France, Bulgaria, Turkey, Greece, Japan, Romania, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union, placed heavy restrictions on the passage of warships through the Straits in wartime and in peacetime and by Black Sea riparian powers and non-riparian powers.[7] Tito saw the Soviets' move into Czechoslovakia as an undisguised attempt to suffocate independent communist states wherever the Soviet Union could penetrate them. Yugoslavia's solution to the queston of how best to deter the Soviet Union from invading was total national defense.

Total National Defense: the Concept and Operation

The concept of "Total National Defense" rests on the premise that the respective republics (Slovenia, Croatia, etc.) of Yugoslavia must be self reliant in defense. To maintain their sovereignty, they must develop a national will and they must have the proper institutions to involve everyone. These territorial armies of citizen soldiers are organized by republican political authorities and form a "Total Defense Force" (TDF) to operate alongside the regular Yugoslav People's Army (YPA). There is very little cooperation between these territorial armies, but they are coordinated from the federal level. This organizational structure evolved from Yugoslavia's partisan fighting experience in WWII. If the current military command is destroyed or captured early in an attack, effective wide scale resistance will continue. In 1969, the National Defense Law was enacted, which stated, in essence, that "it is the right of every citizen to participate in national defense and the right and duty of the local political authorities 'to organize total national defense and to command the battle directly.' "[8] This law basically outlaws the surrender of anybody or of any territory under any circumstance.

This policy is logical given Yugoslavia's size compared to that of the Soviet Union. No matter how many arms it could procure or produce, Yugoslavia will always be outmanned and out-gunned. Its greatest defense resource lies in its people and planning. Yugoslavia's best chance to avoid an attack from the East rests on the Soviet Union's knowledge that any entanglement would be prolonged and bloody. With the entire population prepared to fight, the Soviet Union could not march quickly in as it did in Czechoslovakia. If the invasion took the form of Warsaw Pact countries marching through Bulgaria or Hungary, the YPA (Yugoslav People's Army) would directly engage the enemy in frontal warfare to try to expel the invaders. The TDF (Total Defense Force) in the area would fight alongside the YPA; the TDF nationwide would be on alert. If the invasion took the form of a blitz attack led by the U.S.S.R., the Soviets would have superiority on land, on the sea, and in the air. In this case, the YPA would use frontal tactics but would try to keep losses minimal. If this delay tactic worked for several hours, the country would have time to mobilize. The YPA would abandon front-line fighting once the country was mobilized, and would drop back to wage defensive warfare with the TDF. "The expected consequence would be the emergence of front and rear guards, the transformation of the entire country into a 'hedgehog' "[9] or

Yugoslavia's Marshal Tito.

impenetrable ball. Even in the case of occupation, YPA and TDF forces will revert to partisan and guerilla warfare, making it impossible to subdue the country with fewer than 2 million occupying soldiers, which is 8.5 soldiers per square kilometer.[10]

The TDF and the YPA were declared equal under the law in 1969. Neither was to be subordinate to the other. The TDF is oranized in company-size units at the local or commune level. These units fulfill recommendations drawn up a the federal levels and passed through some 500 urban and rural communal authorities. TDF units are subordinate to newly created defense commands, staffed by reserve YPA officers, at the communal and republican levels. The republics are in turn subordinate to the Federal Supreme Command. Normally the TDF is not a part of the YPA's chain of command. Only when engaged in joint operations does the TDF fall under YPA tactical command. In the event of a complete enemy invasion, the Republican defense will assume military command of the YPA and TDF forces. Even if the entire military command structure is obliterated, it is expected that the general populace will continue guerilla fighting.

TDF units are supplied with light anti-tank and anti-personnel weapons which are Yugoslav made. These weapons are supplemented by heavier mobile anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons for battalion size units. (Some of Yugoslavia's republics have formed large batallion size TDF units to be mobile throughout the nation.) Most of the 1,500 tanks are old Soviet T-34s and T-54s and T-55s plus some old American M-47 Pattons. Yugoslav fighter bombers include the Kraguj and Galeb/Jastreb which are Yugoslav built plus a few American F-84G Thunderjets. The interceptor force has some 110 MIG-21Fs from the Soviet Union and some American F-86s. The YPA is well equipped with mortars because of their value in the mountains. It has a number of howitzers, however they date from WWII. In case of an actual war situation, the West would be hard pressed to get supplies, military and otherwise, to Yugoslavia due to its geographic position. Italy would be the only land route and the Adriatic Sea would be full of Soviet submarines. Therefore, the stress is put on weapons one could use in a guerilla situation. Weapons are stored in mobilization centers Personal equipment is kept at home, as in Switzerland. Some in Yugoslavia would like to

see more sophisticated weapons for the TDF, but until Yugoslavia produces its own infrared and laser targeting devices, it will have to make do." In 1971, Tito staged a simulated war calling it the "Freedom-71" maneuvers. Based on this experience, the Yugoslavs claim they can have one-half of the TDF mobilized in three to six hours.[12] That means the YPA would only have to delay the enemy three to six hours before it would receive substantial help from the TDF forces.

One might expect to see friction between the YPA and the new TDF as some of their duties overlap. But the Yugoslavs hold that this is not the case because the YPA has always been subordinate to Tito and the League of Communists. The YPA is not, and never has been, a truly independent organ. In the new "Total National Defense" plan, the YPA is more mobile and better equipped as well as being a bit smaller. Tito realized that a large national standing army risks deterioration into regional nationalities. By setting up divisions by republic, the problem is neatly solved. The Navy branch of the YPA has been forced to give up ideas of expansion in the Mediterranean in favor of coastal and island defense due to economic and doctrinal limitations. The YPA's role is to resist a limited incursion and delay a massive invasion of the country. In case of a massive attack, the YPA will wage active defense throughout the country. In the event of a failure of the larger units, it can transform itself into smaller units and wage partisan warfare alongside the TDF. 80% of the YPA conscripts are now assigned to the TDF. 20% are assigned to the YPA with active or reserve duties.[13] During the sixties, without the TDF, the YDA practiced maneuvers simulating defense of cities and evacuation of non-combatants. Now both urban and rural areas will be covered, and evacuation will be carried out by the civil defense and wil be limited to the wounded, the aged, and the children.

The role of the civil defense has changed along with the YPA's role in the new defense concept. The emphasis on territorial defense will eliminate the need for large scale evacuation and in addition, the TDF has already taken over responsibility for intelligence and warning, which was formerly the civil defense's domain. While it would seem its role is greatly diminished, civil defense is more important then ever before. Everyone not in the YPA or the TDF 80% of the population is automatically involved in Civil Defense. Civil Defense is divided into units to deal with fire fighting, veterinary problems, evacuation, security, public health and shelter problems. Now under the law, each commune must form its own civil defense organization to be subordinate to the Communal Defense Command. Additional defense units have been organized on a production basis in 2000 large factories, since most factories are required by law to draw up peacetime and wartime plans for local defense. These factory defense units have some civil defense duties if the attack is on the factory itself, the defense units will fight until the factory is lost and then will join regular TDF forces to engage in guerilla warfare in the surrounding area.

The "Total National Defense" plan is not without its problems. Some non-military forms of resistance have been neglected in the rush to organize the TDF. There is a grave scarcity of funds for the territorial defense (republican) units; some funds must be raised locally. The regionally based nature of the defense system can help or hinder Tito's domestic policy whether it leans toward recentralization or decentralization. "The Yugoslav concept of the general people's defense has always contained internal contradictins."[14] There also might be organizational problems between an organized army and irregular units of a people's war if Yugoslavia were to try to coordinate action with an ally. But since it is nonaligned and insists on depending on no one, Yugoslavia does not have this problem for the moment.

Tito has forced the Soviet Union to think twice before invading Yugoslavia, as shown by Freedom-71 maneuvers. Yugoslavia is ready for a protracted conflict which would eventually involved the West and an inevitable super-power confrontation, based on the assumption that the U.S. will intervene if the Soviets move in.

This premise may no longer hold true. The American stand since WWII has been to forestall Soviet attempts to extend hegemony over Yugoslavia, which has allowed Yugoslavia to extract concessions from both super-powers, playing one off the other. In 1975, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the U.S. Department of State, made a statement suggesting that Yugoslavia should become less dependent on the U.S. for security.[15] Sonnenfeldt implied, and Carter later stated, that Yugoslav double-dealing may not be in the American interest in the future. This turn of events outraged the Yugoslavs, already uncertain enough about the future without Tito. "This country wishes to make it quite clear

that it will not tolerate threats to its independent, soverign and nonaligned position from anyone or from any quarter. To be sure, there are no overt threats of this kind being made today; nevertheless, there have been instances of mischief making from time to time and various malicious conjectures are often heard about what will become of Yugoslavia tomorrow. Let it be well understood that the future of Yugoslavia lies in the further development of the socialist system of self-management and the policy of nonalignment a let there be no illusions that it might be elsewhere."[16]

It is this position of nonalignment which keeps Yugoslavia from being an easy target. As long as Yugoslavia remains in the limelight, no one, East or West, would dare do it harm. The European Security Agreements gave greater recognition to the sovereignty and independence of Yugoslavia.[17] "Yugoslavia has never based its independence on anybody's guarantees or patronage, but on its determination to defend its independence, unity and territorial integrity with all the means at its disposal. This is the only guarantee and the only explanation of Yugoslavia's independence."[18]

Any speculation of the future of Yugoslavia must account for "Yugoslavia after Tito." To a great extent, his personality and charisma held the feuding nationalities from each others threats as much as the solidifying fear of the Soviets. Tito not only kept internal rivalries at a minimum and thus benefitted the country as a whole, but he demonstrated remarkable perception of the world theater and carved an impressive role for a relatively small Yugoslavia with the policy of nonalignment. The coming months will demonstate whether or not Total National Defense can continue after Tito's death.

The Helsinki Accords: Defining Detente

by Jane Palmer

"In Kokchetav, a Baptist is arrested for holding a prayer meeting in his home, while in Kirograd, a Jehovah's Witness is sentenced to five years in a 'corrective labor' camp for 'religious activities.'

"In Kustanai, the art director of a technical school is given two years in a labor camp for listening to and taping foreign radio broadcasts.

"In Derbent, the mother of an eight-year-old girl asks to emigrate. Suddenly she is indicted for 'speculating' in household utensils, threatened with loss of her child unless she signs an interrogation record that she cannot read, and sent to a labor camp for eighteen months.

"In Moscow, an artist is locked out of his studio, and his sculptures are smashed, because he asked to tour Western art museums."

These are not isolated examples. They are the enduring reality of Soviet life, relatively unchanged in the three years since the signing of the Helsinki Declaration.

At the end of July 1975, thirty-three European leaders as well as the United States and Canadian heads of government met in Helsinki, Finland, to attend the closing session of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. After two and a half years of preparation, the conference ended in the signing of a declaration, known as the Helsinki Declaration or the Final Act. It is made up of a preamble stating the conference's general goals of "peace, security, justice, and cooperation" and four major sections known as baskets.

Basket One concerns European security and supports ten principles of interstate relations such as respect for sovereignty, nonuse of force, and peaceful settlement of disputes. It covers the inviolability of frontiers, nonintervention in internal affairs, the right of self-determination of peoples, and an international pledge to respect human rights at home. Basket Two deals with economic, scientific, technical, and environmental cooperation. It provides for commercial exchanges, increased cooperation, and the promotion of tourism. Basket Three is concerned with increased human contacts between East and West, the flow of information, the right of travel, improved working conditions for journalists, and increased educational and cultural exchange. The Fourth Basket provides for follow-up action to the conference, specifically the 1977 meeting at Belgrade to review results and decide on further courses of action.

In recognizing the postwar status quo in Europe, the document divided the continent into two social, political, and economic blocs. In this respect, the conference was a success for the Societ Communist Party leader, Leonid Brezhnev. He had obtained a document officially acknowledging the Soviet Union's territorial gains during World War II and her control over Eastern Europe.[2] Because the West recognized the postwar European boundaries, the Soviet Union promised to liberalize its restrictions on the movement of individuals between Eastern European states and to facilitate East-West contacts between persons, institutions, and organizations.

The Soviet Union and the United States emphasized different points of the agreement, a situation which has led to numerous conflicts, each side accusing the other of violating the declaration. The U.S. stressed the Third Basket of the document, which is concerned with broad humanitarian principles. These include stipulations on the reunification of families, the right of citizens to enter and leave countries regularly for personal or professional reasons, marriage across international borders, improvements in working conditions for journalists abroad, and the exchange of information and culture.

East-West Polarization

The United States wanted the Soviets to liberalize the issuance of exit visas for Jews and other people, to permit the circulation of Western publications in the Soviet bloc and, in general, to humanize social contacts between East and West. The three major Western representatives, U.S. President Gerald Ford, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson, and Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, all stressed that the success of East-West detente depended upon such a free flow of people and ideas. Ford spoke of the American commitment to the freer movement of people, ideas, and information. He called on the summit participants to translate the conference's declaration into action.[5]

The very points stressed by the U.S., however, were the ones ignored by the Soviet Union. Brezhnev said that the most important issue was the agreement that European frontiers were inviolable', which was a U.S. concession. The Soviet Union wanted to "formalize the national boundaries created by World War II, in which the Soviet Union advanced both its own borders and those of its allies into Europe."[6]

Another point important to the Russians was noninterference in others' internal affairs. They stressed "the relations of states and their right to run their societies as they please."[6] When Western leaders maintained that the Communists would have to live up to the agreement on human rights, Brezhnev replied: "No one should try to dictate to other peoples, on the basis of foreign policy considerations of one kind of another, the manner in which they ought to manage their internal affairs."[7] The statement implied that the U.S.S.R. will not be influenced by Western views on matters it feels are of domestic concern.

Because the Helsinki document is not a treaty, it is not legally binding. From the very beginning, "it became clear that virtually all delegations desired documents that were morally compelling but not legally binding."[8] International lawyers generally agree that an international agreement is not legally binding unless the parties intend it to be. But governments "tend to be reluctant (as in the case of the Helsinki Final Act) to state explicitly in an agreement that it is nonbinding or lacks legal force. Consequently, inferences as to such intent have to be drawn from the language of the instrument..."[9]

Since the Final Act lacks punitive provisions, there is widespread uncertainty about how communist governments can be held to it. For example, just two weeks after the Helsinki signing, Brezhnev made clear that there would be no change in Kremlin policy. He said that while those parts of the accords dealing with the security of Eastern Europe were "binding," the human rights provisions were not "of a binding nature."[10]

Thus the signatories are expected to observe the agreement out of the moral obligation and courtesy of states. Helsinki provided a "codified set of moral principles against which the West has been able to measure Soviet behavior."[11] As Ford stated before the signing, the document will measure the Soviet Union's intentions in Europe by how they live up to the document, particularly in the field of human rights.[12]

But the document contains many phrases too vague to effectively guide behavior in a predictable manner. For any international document to be effective, it must show precision in its language. The Helsinki Declaration has been described by one Western journalist as "a basketful of old-fashioned, worn out diplomatic jargon behind which governments with things to cover up (including ours) have taken refuge for centuries."[13]

The ambiguous language used in the document leaves the terms open to various interpretations by each state. In truth, Basket Three contains little in the way of concrete Soviet commitments. The language does not specify the extent to which changes are to be made. It states, for example, that the signatories "will encourage" the import of foreign publications and "the number of places where these publications are on sale." In addition, they "will encourage" wider showing and broadcasting of foreign films, and "will examine in a favorable spirit" requests for journalists' visas. They "will favorably consider" applications to leave or enter their territories temporarily, and will "favorably examine" cases of family reunification. Thus, while the West may have succeeded in theory by insisting that cooperation between East and West had to include freer movement of people and ideas, in practice Basket Three proves relatively empty.

Consequently, each state interprets the meaning of the Final Act in such a way as to favor its own political objectives. Principle VI of the document forbids interference in the internal affairs of the signatories—a provision meant to forestall military or other coercion. On the

one hand, it pledges nonintervention in another's domestic affairs; on the other hand, it does not specifically forbid interference in affairs such as human rights. According to international law, "human rights are not matters which are exclusively within 'domestic jurisdiction,' particularly in view of Articles 55 and 56 of the United Nations Charter. Moreover, extensive international practice both within and outside the United Nations indicates that human rights are to be regarded as a matter of international concern."[14] Article 56 states that members will act in cooperation with the U.N. to achieve the purposes of Article 55, which calls for "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all."

The Kremlin, however, points out that the 1975 accord states that each nation should be free from "outside interference and subversion—which is how they view further Western attempts to induce them to liberalize their system."[15] The U.S.S.R. interprets "as selectively and literally as possible provisions of the Helsinki document that threatened to bring any change in the closed nature of Soviet society."[16]

Although the implementation of Basket Three is not subject to the laws and traditions of participating states (as stated in Principle X), the U.S.S.R. argues that all of Basket Three can be implemented only to the extent that it is consistent with Soviet laws and regulations. Principle X indicates that, in determining its laws, a state will conform with international law, including human rights law, and implement the provisions of the Final Act.[17]

Principle VII bases its promise of respect for civil, political, and other rights on the remise that those liberties "derive from the inherent dignity of the human person and are essential for his free and full development." Soviet law, however, "conditions the exercise of those rights on the benefit their exercise brings to the interests of society."[18] According to a report by the U.S. House of Representatives, "both the existing and the proposed Soviet constitutions hedge human rights guarantees with assertions of social obligations."[19] For example, Article 59 of the 1977 draft states: "The exercise of rights and freedoms shall be inseparable from the performance by citizens of their duties. Citizens shall be obliged to observe the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. and Soviet laws..."

Furthermore, the Soviet criminal code punishes two kinds of activity in a manner which violates Principle VII. Article 70 of the Code provides up to seven years of imprisonment and up to five years of internal exile for: "agitation or propaganda carried on for the purpose of subverting or weakening the Soviet regime...or the circulation, for the same purpose, of slanderous fabrications which defame the Soviet state and social system..." Article 190-1 further provides up to three years' imprisonment for: "systematic circulation in an orgal form of fabrications known to be false which defame the Soviet state and social system..."

Convictions under these laws are the chief form of legal punishment of political dissent in the Soviet Union. "These laws have been repeatedly used over the last decade to punish forms of free speech which Principle VII should protect...Instead of reconsidering and relaxing them, however, Soviet prosecutors have applied them on an expanded scale in 1977."[20]

Strain on Detente

The result of different interpretations such as this has been that detente between East and West is strained. Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union have accused each other of not implementing all the provisions of the Final Act. The U.S. placed pressure on Russia to fulfill the humanitarian provisions. As one Western magazine reports:

> *"Nobody expects the Russians to observe many of the provisions for greater human and intellectual freedom. That would require an almost complete restructuring of the Soviet system. But amongst most Westerners there is a feeling that an effort should be made to push the Russians to implement immediately some of the more measurable terms such as reuniting divided families, allowing more Western publications in Moscow, and reducing restrictions on foreign journalists."*[21]

The Helsinki signatories agreed to the free dissemination of information—books, newspapers, and films. The notion, however, that the Soviets would honor these provisions was

"dispelled almost at once. An issue of [the official magazine of the Soviet Union of Journalists] carried the explanation that most Western publications could not be circulated in East bloc nations because they contradicted 'the morality of socialist society.' "[23] At present, non-Communist Western papers are found only in a few selected airports and hotels—points not accessible to the average citizen. In addition, authorities only permit the distribution of Western books and movies that tend to conform to the official Communist view of life in the West.

The Soviet Union took steps to show that it complied with the provisions calling for the relaxation of restrictions on foreign correspondents. Soviet officials now allow newsmen multiple-entry visas. All trips, however, are still organized by the government and Western reporters are frequently attacked by name in the Soviet press. Thus, while restrictions on journalists have been slightly eased, there still has been no apparent increase in foreign information in the East.

Because the U.S.S.R. opposes what it believes is Western intervention in its internal affairs, it jams Western radio broadcasts. Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe undergo considerable interference in the countries to which they transmit—the U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Poland.[24]

One can easily cite several contradictions to the provisions calling for freer movement of persons. First Andrei D. Sakharov, the father of the Soviet hydrogen bomb, won the Nobel Peace Prize in October 1975. His award was viewed as "a test of the U.S.S.R.'s intention to fulfill the spirit of the Helsinki agreement."[25] The Soviet Union, however, refused to permit its citizen to travel to Oslo to receive the award. Thus the U.S.S.R. violated the Final Act in not "facilitating" wider travel by its citizens for personal or professional reasons. Sakharov's recent banishment to the closed city of Gorky for speaking out against Soviet invasion of Afghanistan further underscores Soviet noncompliance with certain terms of the treaty.

Another example involves Boris Spassky, a Soviet citizen who is a former world chess champion. He wanted to marry a Frenchwoman but the Soviet Union tried to prevent the marriage. Spassky, however, cited the declaration's provisions dealing with freer movement, particularly those concerning marriage between citizens of different states. He should, under the agreement, be permitted to marry her.[26]

The most shocking evidence of the Soviet Union's opposition to freedom of movement is found in its emigration policy. The U.S.S.R. is not living fully up to its obligations to ease restrictions on emigration. The nation originally tightened its stand on emigration after the signing of the Final Act, seen by the West as a violation of Basket Three. Moscow, however, became sensitive to Western criticisms. Since then, the Soviet Union has relaxed its strict rules on emigration to show it complies with the declaration's provisions on increased human contacts.

Nevertheless, a potential emigrant must pay an exit fee of 300 rubles (about $450), two months' pay for the typical worker.[27] People who apply for emigration visas are usually penalized immediately by a loss of their jobs and subjected to harassment while they wait for the visas. Moreover, Jewish applicants cite "an atmosphere of fear among Jews, generated by an official policy of anti-Semitism."[28]

As a result, in the interval between the summit and the review conference at Belgrade, many citizens of the Warsaw Pact states united to campaign for civil rights. They appealed to their governments to act in accordance with the Helsinki provisions. One group, the Charter '77 group in Czechoslovakia, demands that its government comply with international human rights documents as well as with the Helsinki accords. Czechoslovakian authorities make efforts to silence Czechs who support the movement.

The most significant initiatives were taken in the Soviet Union. As one report states:

> *"Soviet dissenters of varying backgrounds used the Final Act as a shelter against repression. Jews, Germans, Crimean Tatars, Baptists, Lithuanian Catholics, Russian Orthodox Christians, and nationalists from the Caucasus, the Baltic States, and Ukraine all began to cite the clauses of...Basket Three of the Helsinki accord as the basis for demanding internal change in the Soviet Union. The Final Act became their common bond."*[29]

Violations of the accords

In May 1976, Professor Yuri Orlov and ten other activists formed the Helsinki Watch group in the U.S.S.R. Its members are dissidents who have constantly spoken out against alleged Soviet violations of the accord's human rights provisions. Since 1977, the most outspoken members of the group, Orlov and Anatoly Shcharansky, have been imprisoned. The two men were arrested because they chose to exercise rights guaranteed by the terms of the Helsinki accords. Their sole "crime" was to openly monitor Soviet compliance with the Final Act, which guaranteed that signatory nations would conform their domestic conduct to internationally recognized standards of human rights.

The U.S.S.R., however, defends its performance on human rights, saying that it adheres to the declaration and its humanitarian provisions. Defending itself from Western accusations, the Soviet Union told the United States to resolve its own problems instead of trying to put pressure on her. This "reaffirmed the Kremlin's resistance to the changes sought by the West"[30] on human rights issues. The Soviet Union also accused the U.S. of not enforcing the provisions of the agreement. "Not a single bourgeois daily newspaper in Western countries has published the full text of the Final Act of the European Security and Cooperation Conference,"[31] maintained the Soviet Communist Party newspaper, *Pravda*. The U.S.S.R. complained that the U.S. had "not supported the proposal to include in the Final Act the commitment on its dissemination."[32]

It is in fact not only the U.S.S.R. which violates the right of free movement, but also the United States. Sergio Segre, head of the Italian Communist Party's foreign affairs section, was refused a visa into the U.S. to attend an international conference in October 1975. Another issue seized upon by the Soviet Union in the past has been the refusal of the United States to admit Soviet trade union representatives. Consequently, in September 1977, the U.S. began to grant visitor visas to trade union officials[33] as part of the government's general concern for freer contacts.

The East and West continued to criticizes each other at the 1977 review conference in Belgrade of not honoring the pledges of the Final Act. The West, especially the U.S., raised questions about the lack of implementation by the Eastern European signatory nations of the human rights provisions of the Helsinki accords. The U.S. protested Soviet repressive action against Helsinki Watch members such as Orlov and Shcharansky. This, in turn, questioned the Soviets' faithfulness to their international commitments.

The Soviet bloc response was either to ignore the questions when they were too critical or to say that it viewed Western pressure for compliance as "interference in Moscow's internal affairs."[34] In order to shift the center of criticism, the U.S.S.R. accused the U.S. of interfering in its activities. The Soviet delegate accused Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, supported by the U.S., of "subversive and hostile propaganda"[35] and asked that such activities be stopped. The American response was that Communist jamming of broadcasts by the two stations was a violation of the Final Act.

Rather than forbidding questions about the manner in which another country was implementing the Final Act, the Soviet Union "responded in kind, attacking the U.S. for its sins—racism, crime, unemployment, permissiveness, Watergate, Vietnam, and CIA involvement in Chile."[36] This change in tactics was welcomed by the U.S. and its allies. It meant that the Soviet Union, by bringing up such matters, accepted that they did not constitute interference in another's internal affairs. The communist counterattack actually supported the Western position that inquiry into domestic conduct was a legitimate part of the review conference.[37]

After nearly six months of reviewing compliance with the Helsinki accords, the delegates adopted a brief final declaration. The document, however, made no mention of human rights because of the Soviet Union's opposition; the conference required the unanimity of all 35 states in order to include something in the document. The delegations affirmed merely that their governments would carry out the provisions of the Final Act.

Nevertheless, the Belgrade conference accomplished two things of real consequence. "It established the human rights issue as a legitimate element of East-West diplomacy, and it provided for the continuation of the Helsinki process, which has already brought some progress in the human rights field."[38] The very fact that the review conference was held prompted several countries to ease repressive or restrictive practices that would have been

discussed at Belgrade. In some cases, political prisoners were amnestied, family reunification and emigration cases were approved, some Western papers began to appear in Eastern Europe, and, most importantly, Eastern Europeans began to speak out against their governments.

Then can one expect all the provisions of the Helsinki Declaration to be fulfilled? One must keep in mind that the East-West agreement is not legally binding on the participating states; therefore any "violations" of it must be dealt with cautiously. Accusations can be made only when based upon one state's interpretation of the provisions. As one U.S. State Department official put it: "There's no court to take anybody into, but this document gives us some moral authority for saying, 'You agreed. Why are you not living up to your word?' "[39]

Although the Helsinki document itself is vague, its symbolic importance is heavy. For the first time, the Russians have accepted the human rights issues contained in Basket Three as legitimate topics for international discussion. They can no longer consider them purely domestic issues. It remains, however, for the document's words to be translated into actions. As one American journal said of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE):

> *"For millions of people in the CSCE signatory states, [Helsinki] is the proof that some progress can be made, and that it is reasonable to hope for more. The quest for basic human freedoms—slow and torturous at times, disappointing at others—must continue because the spark of justice refuses to die.*[40]

Raw Materials and Development:

Searching for New Ideas in the World Commodities Market

by Barbara Manville

Unprecedented petroleum price increases since 1973 have sparked worldwide discussions about the availability and price not only of energy resources, but also of all natural resources currently in use. Seeing the rapid economic development of the many oil-producing countries, many leaders of the rest of the developing world now look to the possibility that similar price increases of other raw materials will insure their countries' economic development. Since most developing economies are dependent on raw materials exports, the leaders of these countries have proposed that the foundation of the global redistribution of wealth--the new international economic order--be built on the generalization of price increases to all raw materials markets.[1]

Before examining this proposition, it must be understood what natural resource commodities are and what their role is in the world market. Next, analysis of the global market structure and its effect on the world's developing economies is essential before solutions can be discussed. Perhaps the only enduring solution will be founded on a revolutionary change in current development strategies. However, the task herein is not to judge possible future developments, but is merely to analyze the present mechanisms in the commodities markets and explain why these solutions are not the ultimate answers to the serious problems encountered today in the developing world.

"Commodities," as discussed here, refer to the variety of raw materials available for trade today. Of all commodities, non-petroleum minerals are of particular importance because of their significance in technological change and industrial development. Minerals have played key roles in all major developments in meeting human needs throughout history. According to Rex Bosson and Bension Varon, advances in modern food, housing and transportation are the product of the use of additional minerals, the more efficient use of minerals, or the use of better minerals.[2]

Since the dawn of the Industrial Revolution, man has feared the exhaustion of the world's natural resources. Recently, a number of important studies have increased awareness of the long-term prospects for the availability of these resources. The celebrated Club of Rome Reports emphasize the recent trend toward the dangerous and unwarranted exhaustion of the world's natural resources. Other reports, like those of the British-North American Committee, contradict some of these distressing findings.[3] While it is difficult to predict accurately world mineral reserves because of changing world consumption patterns, potentially revolutionary technological developments and new discoveries, it is more important first to understand the geographic distribution of the world's mineral resources. With this overview, the ability of these resources to meet growing world demands in the future can be better forecast.

While world mineral resources are roughly equally distributed between the developed and developing nations, many developing countries command the unfortunate position of having a limited variety of mineral products available for export.[4] Their lack of diversified resources concentrated their exports on a dangerously small number of mineral products (e.g., copper, iron ore, phosphate and bauxite). In addition, because resources are unequally distributed within the developing world, a small change in the market price for any one of these products can have profoundly different results in different developing economies.

Non-petroleum mineral exports generate only about 16% of total export revenues for the world's developing countries.[5] Seemingly unimportant, this percentage is of great significance to certain developing economies which rely heavily on a non-petroleum minerals sector. For example, Mauritania gets 66.2% of its export receipts from iron ore, yet these exports represent only 3.5% of the total world iron ore market (This revenue accounts for nearly 50% of Mauritania's GNP). Similarly, Togo's phosphate exports are 26% of its total exports, contribute 7% of total GNP, but represent only 3-5% of the total world market for phosphate exports (1972) (Table 1).[6]

An active mining sector can only be one part of a country's total development plan. If well-integrated with a country's economic objectives, a mining sector can earn foreign exchange and produce additional revenues through taxes and royalties. Mining projects may also stimulate development of depressed regions, improve the professional and technical skills of nationals and in general, provide a nucleus for economic development.[7] In addition, however, foreign exchange generated by mineral revenues also supports economic systems which are structurally dependent on imports, and removes the pressure and incentives which would create a more self-sufficient economy.[8]

Mining is a capital intensive industry which requires large investments at high risk.[9] A project is typically a long-term investment because the start of exploration and commercial production. Sometimes it can take twenty years[10] to reach commercial production. Overhead costs are also high for the industry and remain[11] so for any production level. Case

TABLE 1
The importance of the mineral sector in Africa
(1976, percent of total exports)

	Aluminum and Bauxite	Copper	Non-ferrous base metals	Iron ore and concentrates	Pearls, precious and semi-precious stones	Phosphates	Tin	Zinc	Country Total
Angola					7.9				7.9
Cameroun	5.7								5.7
Central African Empire					17.1				17.1
Gabon				9.1					9.1
Liberia			74.5						74.5
Mauritania			63.5						63.5
Niger*				61					61
Rwanda*				18					18
Sierra Leone			10.5		62.7				73.2
Tanzania*					7				7
Togo±						26			26
Uganda*		4							4
Zaire		53.7		12.8					66.5
Zambia		89.6					3.9		93.5

*1975
±1972

Source: U.N. *Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1977.* U.N. *Statistical Yearbook, 1978.* Ordonneau, op. cit., p. 159.

TABLE 2

Direct foreign investment in selected African countries in the mineral sector.
(percent, end of 1967)

Angola	18.9	Nigeria	1.4
Botswana	20	(Rhodesia)	10.7
Cameroon	12.0	Rwanda	26.3
Congo	22.2	Senegal	18.5
Gabon	34.7	Sierra Leone	85.6
Guinea	88.3	Somalia	15.9
Ivory Coast	6.0	Swaziland	37.9
Liberia	62	Togo	68.6
Madagascar	6.9	Uganda	18.8
Mauritania	92.4	Zaire	13.1
Mozambique	11.7	Zambia	82.4

Source: Helge Hreem: The Extent and Type of Direct Foreign Investment in Africa," in Carl Widstiand, ed. *Multinational Firms in Africa*, op. cit., pp. 86-87.

in point: the *Economist* estimated that the cost of a new copper mine to be $2500 per ton of yearly output at a time when world copper prices were hovering around $1400 per ton.[12] Globally, the *Economist* estimated capital requirements for non-ferrous mining would reach fifty billion by 1982.

Large costs also stem from the need to develop infrastructure in many regions before mineral production can be discussed. The elements necessary for successful mining projects--time, money, qualified and highly trained workers, and technology--are generally scarce in developing countries forcing developing countries to turn to the outside world to obtain these necessary elements.

In general, government revenues in most developing countries cannot keep pace with the rising public expenditures required to sustain them.[13] Internally, private and public savings are generally insufficient to meet growing internal[14] investment needs. While these countries receive investment capital from foreign sources, even these credits can be insufficient to finance all aspects of the development program. These credits further burden the country's financial debt with interest payments and are often based on the false assumption that the country can resort to savings when in fact it has already overspent itself.[15] The only choice remaining is to export raw materials to create additional revenue to finance their economic development.

Mining projects are often financed through an arrangement with a multinational corporation. As the statistics demonstrate, the world's mining industries are in fact dominated to a large extent by multinationals. For example, the multinationals which produce refined nickel and aluminum products dominate the nickel and bauxite markets as well as the copper market.[16] In Africa this trend is readily seen in the high concentration of multinationals operating in the mineral sector. For instance, 92.4% of all direct foreign investment in Mauritania alone is in the mineral sector (Table 2).

Although copper, lead, zinc, silver, tungsten, gold and iron filings are traded on the world's commodities exchanges, the actual amount of goods exchanged is small. Presently, only ten percent of all trades made at commodities exchanges result in actual delivery of the commodity (Figure 1). Rather the trend is toward a further reduction of this free market due to long-term contracts negotiated between producers and consumers. In the long run the free market will become but a "residual market."[17] Although the free market is small, it is very important because it serves as the reference prices for all trade in these commodities on the world market.[18]

In the short run, both the supply and demand of non-petroleum minerals are price inelastic. Supply is insensitive to price variations because significant production changes are costly in the mining industry due to high and constant overhead costs.[19] Additionally, demand for minerals is directly related to demonstrated consumer demand for finished products in foreign countries for which the cost of minerals is usually only a fraction of a good's total production cost.[20]

Figure 1 World Raw Materials Production



Adapted from: Aime Teyssier D'Orfeuil, "Penurie sur les Marches Mondiaux de Produits de Base." *Revue Tiers Monde*, Tome XVII No. 66.

Business conditions and substitutability act in the long run because competition among the mineral producers themselves and between the mineral producers and the producers of substitutees force the supply to adapt to changing conditions.[21] As people respond over the long run to changes in taste, to new marketing techniques, to changes in income, demand for minerals becomes more elastic. Eventually, the need for raw materials per unit of GNP diminishes in a growing[22] economy. Empirical analysis of the price elasticities of minerals (Table __) in the short and long runs illustrate the tendency of mineral supply and demand to become more elastic. The changing elasticities indicate serious problems for the future of the world mineral industry.

Price Instability

The most pressing problems relative to raw materials are price-related: the short term price instability which characterizes the minerals market, the resulting instability of export revenues, and the unequal terms of trade between developed and developing countries.[23] While there is no universally accepted theory which explains mineral prices, certain price patterns are apparent.

Classical economic theory dictates that the price of a good is a function of the shifts in the supply and demand of that good. In the short run, mineral prices are subject to wide fluctuations primarily because of the inelastic slopes of mineral supply and demand curves as discussed above. Since both the supply and demand curves are very inelastic in the short run, a small change in either curve will result in a large change in revenue, price, or both revenue and price. The result is usually a fluctuation in profits.[24]

Business cycle fluctuations which lead to changes in industrial growth and consumption patterns also affect mineral prices.[25] Since 1971 this has been of particular importance as recent changes in the world monetary system and fluctuations in the world rates of exchange have led to particularly volatile international markets.[26]

High inflation rates also contribute to mineral price volatility effecting larger price rises in sensitive markets. In addition, the cumulative effect of sustained rates of inflation on producer and consumer expectations eventually become a permanent part of the industry's cost structure. Mineral prices are also influenced by new technology and changing production costs which result from innovation, competition among producers, and changes in protective measures taken by different countries. While strikes, wars and similar events are generally not considered to be part of "business as usual," they, too, influence mineral prices because they can happen unexpectedly in mineral-producing developing countries.[27]

The degree of mineral price instability depends on these factors: the size of the market, storage costs, the magnitude of a supply or demand variation and the ability of speculators to predict price fluctuations.[28] Although speculation has been singled out as the bad boy by some, it plays a crucial role in the minerals market.

Speculation greases the wheels of the commodities market by furnishing the capital necessary to ensure smooth functioning, allowing the high risks of the market to be transferred from the commercial sector to the financial sector.[29] Such benefits must also be weighed against the costs of having speculators in the market; speculators effectively multiply the number of individual price variations. Collectively their actions actually amplify individual price fluctuations[30] and can force small price changes that occur due to minor shifts in supply or demand to be exaggerated out of proportion. This price volatility affects both producers and consumers.[31] To the producer, price instability disallows any guaranteed revenue from sales; to the consumer, price instability subjects him to unstable and unpredictable supply costs.[32]

Regulator Stocks the Solution?

Members of the world economic community have sought an integrated commodities price stabilization program to alleviate many of the problems inherent in the world commodities markets. Introduced to the international community at the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) at its second session in 1968, a proposal based on the use of regulator stocks to stabilize prices was developed.[33] Regulator stocks were adopted as part of an integrated program which was incorporated into the final proclamation of the Second International Development Decade in 1970. The concept gained further recognition in 1974 at the Sixth Special Session of the United Nations and again in 1976 at the Nairobi UNCTAD meeting, which focused on regulator stocks as the key to effective international comodity price stabilization.

Institutionally, regulator stocks intervene in the world commodities markets to maintain stable world prices during periods of instability. When prices are low, regulator stocks intervene to purchase excess supplies on the market to raise world market prices; when prices are high, these warehoused goods are released onto the market to force world prices to remain at a stable level and ensure stable world revenues.

There are many objectives of the UNCTAD integrated program: to promote the more systematic functioning of all commodities markets in terms of both prices and trade volumes (benefitting both consumers and producers); to insure a sufficient rate of growth, in constant prices, of export receipts; to diminish the fluctuations of these receipts; and to improve market access in developed countries for primary and refined products which originate in developing countries.[34] However, with the exception of a few isolated cases, using regulator stocks in the minerals markets can not succeed in attaining these important objectives.

Regulator stocks are useful on a short term basis to eliminate the accidental disruption in the market (and therefore price fluctuations) resulting from strikes at either the production or consumption level. Similarly, regulator stocks are effective against temporary scarcities which originate from cartel actions, unilateral moves taken by a country or group of countries, or embargoes.[35]

Beyond the short run, the usefulness of regulator stocks diminishes quickly. In the long run, regulator stocks can never solve a fundamental disparity between mineral supply and demand structures because they are based on the false assumption that in the long run, prices are stable.[36] The hypothetical example of a unitary demand illustrates the reason regulator stocks will not be useful in the long run (see Figure 2).

In case A assume that for a production of 1,000 tons of mineral X the market price received is $100 a ton which would yield a revenue of $100,000. If, as assumed, the demand has a unitary price elasticity, in case B production of 2,000 tons of mineral X will be priced at $50 a ton and revenues will remain the same, $100,000. Had a regulator stock been introduced, revenues received would have been different in these two cases.

For both case A and B if a regulator stock had been introduced to maintain the price level at $100 a ton, revenues received would have varied in the following fashion. In case A, the regulator stock would not have to function because as stated, the price was at the desired level of $100 a ton. However, in case B, the regulator stock would have intervened in the market to purchase 1,000 tons at the price of $100 a ton. The revenues for the producer would have been $100 x 2,000 tons (1,000 sold on the free market; 1,000 bought by the regulator stock), or $200,000. Obviously, the producer would not be upset in this situation.



Figure 2
Example of
Regulator Stocks
In The Market Place

Adapted from:
Paul A. Samuelson, *Economics*,
10th edition (NY: McGraw-Hill
Book Company, 1976), p. 382.

However, the following year assume that the supply has been reduced to an offer of only 500 tons on the market. Were the regulator stock not in effect, the price would rise to $200 a ton, and the producer's revenues would remain at the constant of $100,000. But, since the regulator stocks are still assumed to be in effect, the price will only be $100 a ton, because in years of market scarcity, the regulator stock releases onto the market all extra stock-piled minerals from previous year of market glut. The producer will only receive total revenues of $50,000 from his sales, and as a result will be poorer because the regulator stock has intervened. If the supply is further restricted, the result will be to reduce revenue further. Thus regulator stocks will destabilize revenues while at the same time they try to maintain a stable market price (table 3).[37]

Over the long run the minerals market is potentially self-destructive because non-petroleum minerals can be recycled and are subject to competition from and replacement by substitute products. The inherent price instability of the minerals market accelerates this process by encouraging research to develop equivalent products which, in the long run, will provide a more stable supply volume and will be more price stable.[38] As mineral prices increase, recycling of minerals and research into replacement products becomes increasingly profitable. The trend is already visible in countries like France where in 1977, industry consumed 326,100 tons of virgin copper (nearly all of it imported); 93,068 tons of recycled copper through the techniques of refining, electrometallurgy chemistry and filings; plus 80,000 tons of copper contained in bronze scrap and recycled brass.[39] In the long run, recycling and product substitution could have the serious effect on developing economies by shrinking the already small world market. This would have the ultimate result of further reducing their development prospects by outmoding their one product economies and slowing growth of the minerals market itself making the world less dependent on non-petroleum minerals.

Once a consumer has modified his production techniques to make use of new substitute or recycled minerals, it is unlikely that he will return to the production technique he first employed; major changes in production are too costly to effect, and such a return to previous techniques would be viewed as a step backward along the road to the further sophistication and development.

Another factor present in the mining industry is the correlation between the highest rates of production growth and the largest growth of mineral reserves. These changes are not accompanied by a similar growth of the demand which, according to classical economic

theory, will result in a fall in prices.[40] This relationship occurs because the highest rates of production growth are accompanied by the largest amount of capital expenditure on exploration and development of available resource reserves. As resources are catalogued and developed, their status is changed from that of a resource to a reserve. This distinction is important because "reserve" generally indicates a raw material ready for (or in the process of) development; "resource" means one which is as yet undefined and often unexplored to any great extent.

This bleak outlook is shared by many developing economies which depend on a thriving minerals sector. Having highly concentrated economies, these countries are dependent on a very small group of products for their export revenues which in turn fund much of their total development scheme. The result is that the long-term prospects for profits derived from mineral exports, on which many developing countries in Africa and elsewhere are dependent, are equally bleak.

While price is very important, it is not the only factor which must be examined. More importantly, the developing economies need to increase their share of the world market in order to insure a distribution of the global wealth. According to Michel Dumas, price stabilization schemes (through regulator stocks or their mechanisms) are simply a relatively inexpensive concession to the pressing demands of certain developing[41] countries.

As discussed, price stabilization schemes could actually have negative effects in certain developing countries. In those countries which have some form of authoritarian or semi-authoritarian government (relatively widespread in Africa, in Southeast Asia, too), mineral revenues support and preserve the political structure.[42] Also, price stabilization in the form of artificial intervention in the market could eventually lead to overproduction by mineral producing countries, which without increased demand, might eventually result in prices far below pre-intervention levels. Through the normal interplay of supply and demand, successive periods of overproduction and scarcity lead to an adjustment of supply to meet the market demand as demonstrated by the "Cobweb Effect."[43] If hindered by intervention in the market, a stable and fair equilibrium price will never be reached; the tendency in the long run will be for prices to fall as a direct reaction to the fundamental fact that supply is almost always greater than demand.

Systems for the stabilization of prices are not sufficient for solving the many problems of the developing world. Rather than simply developing and promoting these stabilization schemes, a new way of thinking about development is a must. The African countries (and all developing countries) must somehow break down the traditional attitude held by many leaders of the developed world which is based on the concept that "small economies are perfectly viable as long as they remain in the position of dependent 'colonial' economies largely supplying primary products to the industrial worls."[44]

For some developing countries one solution seems to be their separation from the existing global system. According to Helge Hveem, it is to the extent that developing countries are able to establish a global counter-system and are able to demonstrate their long-term capability to reinvest their share of the global surplus of raw materials in development programs at the national, regional or inter-regional level that the world will see the realization of the new international economic order.[45]

TABLE 3

Elasticity values for minerals in the short and medium term

	Short term (one year)	Medium term (3-5 years)
Aluminum/Bauxite	- 0.13	- 0.80
Chrome	0 to - 0.2	elastic
Cobalt	- 0.68	-1.71
Copper	- 0.3	elastic
Lead	inelastic	elastic
Tungsten	- 0.15	- 0.30
Zinc	- 0.55	- 0.67

Source: Derived from Tilton op. cit., p. 66.

Bosson and Varon believe that one of the most important reasons that developing countries do not attain the expected results from their mining operations originates from the inability of these governments to utilize profitably their mineral revenues to diversify their economies.[46] Without a diversified economy, true and full economic autonomy is not possible because mineral production is an "integrated process;" it requires markets and marketing, needs transport and services, and relies on technology and management. As long as these elements are monopolized by industrialized nations and multinational corporations, then "the dependence may remain, despite the assumption of self-control over the actual extraction-production."[47]

Transfer of technology is a slow process which is further hampered by the unwillingness of many businessmen and government leaders of developed countries to give up their current market position. One possible solution for developing countries may be for these countries to redefine qualitatively their needs and to produce the corresponding services to meet those needs themselves.[48]

However, this would require an entirely new philosophy of development. For a developing country to forego its reliance on Western technology, for example, would involve a simultaneous divestiture of Western models of production, consumption, etc.[49] For a developing country with a thriving mining industry and a narrow economy based on a small group of exportable raw materials, this proposition would seem both ridiculous and unjust. However, as the prospects for development using traditional mechanisms diminish, this could become the only realizable way for the developing world ultimately to effect the new international economic order it seeks.

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Globalism vs. Regionalism:
Foreign Policy of the Carter Administration

The Editors

In the aftermath of United States involvement in Vietnam, President Carter's pledge to eliminate hypocrisy and arrogance from American foreign policy struck the nation as a breath of fresh air. This shift implies a need for the integration of regionalist and globalist approaches to foreign affairs. Traditionally, in American foreign policy these two points of view have been considered mutually exclusive, with globalism gaining the upper hand since World War II.

A chief proponent of the globalist stand, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, viewed foreign affairs as an inter-connected series of relationships. This concept, which Kissinger termed "linkage," led to a view of international relations which saw all events as moves in a vast superpower chess game. Thus regional needs and aspirations were sublimated to the cold war struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. On the other hand, regional analysis argues for treating each crisis as a unique situation in distinct geographical setting. This does not necessarily dismiss the importance of a wider framework, but emphasizes the local and individual needs of the area.

In an effort to incorporate both points of view, President Carter chose Cyrus Vance as Secretary of State, to represent progressive regionalism, and Zbigniew Brzezinski, a proponent of the globalist perspective, as National Security Advisor. Despite good intentions, U.S. foreign policy often seemed to vascilate between these two extremes. The Carter administration has, however, successfully managed to balance these two contrasting approaches in at least two significant situations. Early in his term of office, the President assigned high priority to sensitive regional issues such as the Panama Canal Treaty. Although the treaty had been a foreign policy objective of preceeding administrations, it had repeatedly become embroiled in cold war rhetoric. President Carter, realizing the overwhelming significance of this issue to Latin American nations, entered into negotiations with renewed commitment. The treaty, ratified despite globalist objections of conservative senators, was a major victory for American prestige in an area too often neglected by American foreign policy.

Southern Africa became another area which benefitted from the Carter administration's new approach. The President fought vigorously in the face of stiff Senate oppositon to maintain the Rhodesian sanction after the "internal settlement" in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia in 1978. Taking into account regional analysis of the situation, Carter astutely penetrated the shroud of hypocrisy that surrounded the new government of Bishop Abel Muzorewa. This renewed economic pressure became a significant factor in forcing the white-dominated Muzorewa government to meet in the London Conference, which laid the groundwork for this February's free elections. In spite of the Marxist philosophy of the new government, Prime Minister Robert Mugabe seems determined on remaining independent of Soviet or American dominance. Carter not only gained the trust and respect of Black African nations, but is well on the way toward friendly and honest relations with the popularly elected Magabe government.

In the wake of the Iran and Afghanistan crises, the Carter Administration seems to have returned to a globalist policy, a Brzezinski twist on Kissinger's balance of power theories. While there is little doubt as to the gravity of the situation in Iran, United States interest in Afghanistan may have been more effective had it surfaced in 1978, when a pro-Soviet Marxist government first came to power. The final indication of this swing back towards globalism came in the saber-rattling tone of President Carter's recent State of the Union address and with the call for renewed draft registration. However not all world situations should be seen from this cold war, east-west perspective. It undermines American credibility around the world, and it will continue to do so until the United States understands the local realities of individual nations as more than pawns in a great superpower chess game.

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