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Established in 1976, *Hemispheres* is the Tufts Undergraduate Journal of International Affairs. *Hemispheres*, which is published annually, addresses a variety of contemporary and historical social, economic, political, and legal issues within the framework of international relations. The contributors of this scholarly forum are from the undergraduate population and their articles represent the diverse political views found on the Tufts campus. While the Editorial Board is solely responsible for the selection of articles appearing in *Hemispheres*; the opinions of the individual articles do not necessarily reflect those of the Board.

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FROM THE EDITOR:

This issue of *Hemispheres* carries with it the impetus of a new direction for our publication. In past issues, though there never was a shortage of material to publish, most articles were written for classes, senior theses, and independent projects. Our continued publication of this material reflects the committment that we share with the group of students who first founded this Journal; to act as a showcase of the best work being done by students of international relations at Tufts University. This year's issue does, however, present a change in the nature of our relationship with past and perspective authors for the Journal. More and more articles are being written specifically for *Hemispheres*. Like everything else that we publish, these articles provide an in-depth analysis of contemporary as well as historical events and problems. The articles published in *Hemispheres* continue to represent the basic philosophy of our Journal in that the study of international relations must encompass all directions: from history to political science, economics to psychology. The support that we have received in pursuing this philosophy is evidenced not only by the additional contributions of this new faction of writers, but also by the size of our current volume. It contains nearly two times the number of pages of past editions.

More evidence of this new direction comes from a look at our subscriptions base. Greater numbers of requests are arriving from Canada, England, West Germany, and other nations. Not only is this an example of the intense interest of scholars the world over for new and different perspectives in international affairs, but it is a recognition that the forefront of the development of new ideas is within the minds of students like those at Tufts. They are the focus of a growing interest in the study of international affairs.

As always, our hope is that this issue will prove thought provoking and spark discussion; essential to propagation of an intellectual atmosphere. We openly solicit correspondence for publication that challenges or expounds on the material that we have published. Our next issue will also carry our Book Review and Bibliography sections again, which do not appear in this issue because of space limitations.

In closing, we would like to extend a special "thank-you" to all of the people who made this issue possible. Of course, any omissions or errors in the text remaim solely the reponsibility of the Board.



As with any task which requires close scrutiny by more than one set of eyes, the editing of proof often leads to a few misspellings and style variances. Aside from the usual assortment, the following footnotes were exempted from *Forging the Spear: The African National Congress of South Africa and Armed Struggle*, pages 155-159.

44*Lodge, p. 295.*
45*Lodge, p. 298.*
46*David Martin and Phyllis Johnson*, The Struggle For Zimbabwe, *New York: Monthly Review Press (1981), p. 10.*
47*Lodge, p. 299.*
48*Descriptions of the Morogoro Conference can be found in Tom Lodge, pp. 300-302, and Stephen Davis, p. 121.*
49*Area Handbook, p. 244.*
50*Gerhart, p. 253.*
51Time Running Out, *p. 69.*
52Time Running Out, *p. 70.*
53*Gerhart, p. 261.*
54Time Running Out, *p. 177.*
55*Gerhart, p. 293.*
56Time Running Out, *p. 178.*
57*Gerhart, p. 270.*
58Time Running Out, *p. 179.*
59*John and Stephen Gelb*, Monthly Review *(Vol. 33, no. 3) "The Crisis in South Africa" (special issue), July-Aug. 1981, pp. 137-38.*
60*Lodge, p. 296.*
61*Taken from an editorial in* Sechaba, *the official organ of the ANC; June 1982, p. 1.*
62*For an extensive study of the 1976 riots see Baruch Hirson,* Year of Fire, Year of Ash; The Soweto Revolt: Roots of a Revolution?, *London: Zed Press (1979).*
63*Area Handbook, p. 60.*
64*Gerhart, p. 310.*
65*Author's interview with Mrs. Florence E. Maleka in New York 15 August 1983. Mrs. Maleka was visiting New York from Lusaka to address the United Nations on August 9th which has been designated as South African Women's Day.*

Hemispheres Editorial Board

Morality and Politics: The Competing Claims of Kant and Meinike is the recipient of the John S. Gibson Award. This award, named after the first Director of the International Relations Program at Tufts University, is given annually to the most outstanding, in-depth, and analytical piece written by an undergraduate.

Morality and Politics: The Competing Claims of Immanuel Kant and Frederick Meinecke.

Eve Dubrow

Politics says: 'Be ye therefore wise as serpents'; but morals adds as a limiting condition: 'and innocent as doves.'[1] —Immanuel Kant

It is the supreme and also the most difficult task of modern culture to harmonize the inalienable rights of the individual and the moral-spiritual ideals of humanity with the stern and unyielding demands of the state which by nature is egoistic and domineering.[2]
—Friedrich Meinecke

Recognizing that individual morality and the morality of States occupy distinct positions within the realm of ethics, and concerned that national self–interest is often at odds with higher ethical principles, Immanuel Kant and Friedrich Meinecke attempted to reconcile politics and morality in their theories of world order. For Kant, the goal of civilization is the full development of the autonomous personality, and this goal can be realized only through the establishment of a universal rule of law, a scheme of organization which will guarantee universal and eternal peace.[3] In his treatise *Eternal Peace*, Kant envisioned a world progressing towards inevitable and eternal peace. His schema is grounded in a belief in man's inner moral content which, when combined with self–interest, propels man forward towards eternal peace. Meinecke, in contrast to Kant, did not envision freedom and full development of the individual as ends attained through international relations grounded in moral content, but viewed such ends as grounded in power politics. Rather than espouse the Kantian notion of man as the repository of moral content and values, Meinecke postulated that the state is the center of man's values. Thus, instead of accepting the idea that a moral law within man drives States

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[1] *Immanuel Kant*, Eternal Peace, *in* The Philosophy of Kant: Immanuel Kant's Moral and Political Writings, *ed. Carl J. Friedrich, (New York: Random House, Inc., 1949), p. 457.*
[2] *Richard W. Sterling*, Ethics in world of Power: The Political Ideas of Friedrich Meinecke, *(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958), p.115.*
[3] *Carl J. Friedrich*, Inevitable Peace, *(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948), p.29.*

towards eternal peace and civilization, Meinecke believed that only the total subordination of the individual to the needs of the state[4] could lead to the goal of civilization. From an examination of Kant's schema of individual freedom and development grounded in the universal rule of law and Meinecke's belief in freedom and civilization grounded in the State, the distinction between idealism and realism becomes apparent, and the contrast between individual morality and State morality can be seen quite clearly. In the final analysis, the difference between the sphere of individual human relations and international relations may be reduced to a difference in the individual's position vis-á-vis the State.

The Grounding of Eternal Peace: Distinction Between Noumenal and Phenomeal Realms

> *We find only one kind of being in this world whose causality is teleological, i.e. directed toward ends, and yet at the same time is structured in such wise that the law in accordance with which they have to determine their goals or ends is perceived by them as unconditioned and independent or natural conditions, yet as intrinsically necessary. This being is man . . . , the only natural being in which we can recognize a supersensual capacity: freedom . . .*[5] —*Kant*

The Kantian schema for eternal peace, based on a belief in ends towards which humans are progressing as well as a theory of man's moral content, is the epitome of idealism. Instead of accepting political realism and positing experience as the foundation for eternal peace, Kant distinguishes between the noumenal and phenomenal realms, the realm of norms and the realm of being,[6] and posits the moral law within the noumenal realm as the base upon which eternal peace will be built. For Kant, the ends towards which man is directed are freedom and moral autonomy,[7] and freedom under law is the final goal of nature. The realization of freedom and autonomy is grounded in the noumenal realm, specifically in a universal moral law, an "unconditioned" law "independent of natural conditions" which imposes upon each human being the obligation of working for the establishment of lasting peace.[8] This moral law is Kant's categorical imperative, which stipulates that all human beings must be treated as ends in themselves, never merely as means. According to Kant only a moral and legal order which is in accordance with

[4] *Sterling, p.117*
[5] *Friedrich, p.65.*
[6] *Friedrich, p.29.*
[7] *Friedrich, p.59.*
[8] *Friedrich, p.48.*

this categorical imperative is an order of freedom under law.[9] In his schema for eternal peace, then, it can be understood that Kant posited a link from categorical imperative to freedom under law to eternal peace, and he located them in the noumenal realm.

It is evident that Kant grounded the universal moral law and eternal peace in the noumenal realm of his dualistic framework, for he held that universal peace is and end beyond all past experiences, an end not drawn from phenomena, from the course of history, but an end projected from the realm of freedom which contains the norms for all human conduct.[10] And in asserting that the moral law and the end towards which man progresses transcend all empirical data and cannot be derived from them,[11] thus eliminating the categorical imperative and eternal peace from the realm of phenomena, kant made it clear that he established the foundation for his idealisitic framework by relegating the origins of eternal peace to the noumenal realm.

Although he grounded eternal peace in the noumenal realm and established that man is subject to or compelled by a universal moral law, Kant nevertheless was not a determinist, for he believed in the reality of freedom and the operative causal impact of freely willing person.[12] Rather than define a noumenal realm which constrains man and determines his course of action, Kant created a realm in which man can will his future.[13] And in accounting for human actions which result from the will, Kant recognized an antinomy central to human thought: "one can only think of two kinds of causality for whatever happens, either that of nature or that of freedom."[14] These two types of causality distinguish the phenomenal and noumenal realms, and were recognized by Kant as the world of natural necessity and the world of freedom under law.[15] The noumenal realm, according to Kant, is governed by the moral law, while the phenomenal realm is governed by the laws of nature. Both worlds are equally given in the mind of man, as Professor Carl J. Friedrich noted, "neither one of them can be proved to be 'the thing in itself' which is behind the curtain of the *phenomena* and below the sky of the noumena."[16] Thus man's actions in the phenomenal realm in pursuit of freedom under law can be seen as grounded in the noumenal realm, for at the base of his actions is the transcendental *idea* of freedom which defines the conditions of potential experience.[17] Within the noumenal realm Kant posited transcen-

[9] *Friedrich, p.186.*
[10] *Friedrich, p.74.*
[11] *Friedrich, p.74-75.*
[12] *Friedrich, p.77.*
[13] *Friedrich, p.78.*
[14] *Friedrich, p.79.*
[15] *Friedrich, p.48.*
[16] *Friedrich, p.79.*
[17] *Friedrich, p.80.*

dental ideas which provide the necessary channel or mold for experience. Without these ideas one cannot experience nor even think of having an experience. The transcendeatal idea of freedom enables the reason to think of that which is not conditioned by anything in the world of the senses as beginning the causal chain of conditions as they occur in the external world. But such a consideration of the idea of freedom involves reason in an antinomy with itself as it speculates on the course of nature, since such speculation necessitates considering the idea of causality. Thus the Kantian notion of dualism enters, providing for two causalities: the causality of nature and the causality of freedom, whose necessities rest on the laws particular to each realm.[18] The moral law is the prine datum of "experience" in the realm of freedom, and such experience is not sense experience but the experience of willing. The essence of freedom's antinomy lies in the fact that man, as he experiences the compulsion of the categorical imperative, discovers freedom. At the same time freedom is a necessary premise underlying the moral law, because without freedom man cannot even think of a moral law.[19] The interaction of fredom and the categorical imperative is motivated by man's will, which always accords with the moral law, and progress towards eternal peace is dependent on that will. Kant's schema, in light of the antinomy of freedom, provides a foundation for eternal peace in which man's will is grounded in the noumenal realm, specifically in the moral law which governs that ream. And to circumvent what would otherwise be a curtailment of man's freedom due to the imposition of the compulsory categorical imperative, Kant equated man's will with the higher moral law, and thus man can be said to pursue his ends freely with his motivation firmly grounded in a self–imposed inner will, the categorical imperative. Man, then, is indeed a teleological being, whose goals are determined by a universal moral law, and he is at the same time "the only being in which we can recognize a supersensual capacity: freedom . . ." Kant's belief in man's inner moral content provides the foundation for his idealistic framework for eternal peace, but his total reality depends on an incorporation of the phenomenal as well as the noumenal realm. And understanding of the world of nature is crucial if one is to understand Kant's complete reality.

[18] *Friedrich, p.80-81.*
[19] *Friedrich, p.81.*

Dualism and the Social Contract

> *Through the wars, through the excessive and never realized preparation for them, through the want which hence every state, even in the midst of power must feel, nature drives man to make attempts, at first quite inadequate, to leave the lawless state of savages, and to enter a league of nations; where each state, even the smallest, may expect his security and his rights — not from its own power or or its own legal views, but alone from this great league of nations* (foedus amphictyonum), *from a united power, and from the decision according to laws adopted by the united will.*[20]
>
> *Kant*

In addition to the moral law which compels man to work for eternal peace, Kant acknowledged that man's self-interest also compels him to progress towards universal freedom under law. Thus the complete schema for eternal peace includes components from two realms: the categorical imperative of the noumenal realm combines with self-interest of the phenomenal realm to propel man towards his ultimate end. Kant, in the vein of Hobbesian realism, argued that man lives in a state, if not of actual, then of potential, war.[21] "The state of peace among men who live together is not a natural state; for the natural state is one or war, i.e. if not of open hostilities, still a continued threat of such."[22] And as the social contract theorists had argued, so too Kant maintained that the state of potential war is a state of actual fear which engenders a powerful desire for security and leads to a social contract. Crucial to Kant's theory of eternal peace and the international "contract" which leads to it is his premise that there is an order of nature. Based on this premise he maintained that war is part of a hidden plan of nature which is driving man onward to the establishment of a universal reign of freedom under law.[23] In Kant's theory, war, rooted in the phenomenal realm, is the road toward a universal constitution for mankind.[24] Thus while social contract theorists posited an end to the state of nature within civil society, Kant extended social contract theory to the international level by linking man's self–interest to an overall plan of nature which would usher in a universal reign of peace.

Arguing for a social contract theory between States which seek to escape the international state of nature, "the lawless state of savages," Kant held that States will be propelled towards a general treaty which will establish lasting

[20] *Friedrich, p.30.*
[21] *Friedrich, p.59.*
[22] *Friedrich, p.39.*
[23] *Friedrich, p.55.*
[24] *Friedrich, p.60.*

peace.[25] To support his notion of an international social contract towards which nations aspire, Kant held that the end of human existence, to achieve moral autonomy and freedom, can only be realized under self–imposed laws, and that therefore only a universal reign of law under a world–wide popular constitution can satisfy the moral destiny of man. For that reason Kant made it man's moral destiny to work for the establishment of eternal peace,[26] and he expanded the universal moral law on the international level so that it entailed the commandment for man to work for eternal peace. And while he combined noumenal with phenomenal realms in his theory of the establishment of peace through law, Kant nevertheless saw the causal chain of human conflicts, the phenomena, as catastrophic and self-destructive forces which are being transcended by the moral forces in man.[27] It is man's moral content, then, which combined with his desire for security in the empirical realm and provides the impetus for eradicating conflicts in the phenomenal realm.

The Ends and Foundation of Eternal Peace: Individual Man and the International Order

> *Man, Kant thinks, we may consider hypothetically the ultimate or final goal of nature; not just as he is, however, but in his potential and gradual perfection as a civilized being. The creation of the fitness of a reasonable being as a free being is the essence of culture.*[28]
>
> Professor Carl J. Friedrich

Underlying Kant's schema for eternal peace and freedom under law is the significance he attributed to the individual. As revealed by the categorical imperative, which rules that man should always be treated as an end in himself and never merely as a means, Kant revered the individual as the final goal of nature, and the universal republican constitutional order which he envisioned is based on a reverence for man as the repository of all value. Kant abandoned the idea of an intellectual elite and held that the common man is endowed with as much dignity as the most exalted. The denial of an elite is central to Kant's idea of the autonomous personality and its freedom; and in stressing that history is the unfolding of man's moral destiny[29] and that the faculty of freedom is man's inner moral content,[30] Kant noted the need for a universal order which would guarantee each individual, regardless of his position in life, the opportunity to experience freedom and equality and to attain his moral destiny.

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[25] *Friedrich, p.59.*
[26] *Friedrich, p.59.*
[27] *Friedrich, p.197.*
[28] *Friedrich, p.65.*
[29] *Friedrich, p.58.*
[30] *Friedrich, p.31-32.*

It was Kant's belief that if man's freedom and autonomy were to be realized, then all men who could influence each other must be under a common civil constitution,[31] thus eliminating the threats and insecurities which abound in the sate of nature. Kant defined three levels of constitutional order for men: 1) the constitution of each nation *(ius civitatis)*; 2) the constitution regulating international relations *(ius gentium)*; and 3) the constitution according to which men and states are considered citizens of a universal state of all mankind *(ius cosmopoliticum)*.[32] In his theory of world order, Kant postulated that each state shall have a republican civil constitution, and constitution under which power is exercised according to well–defined laws which are adopted with the consent of the citizens represented in a legislature.[33] Kant extended his notion of the State's civil constitution to the international level, and his second definitive article in *Eternal Peace* reads thus: "The law of nations *(Volkerrecht)* should be based upon a *federalism* of free states."[34] Kant's concept of freedom under law provides that each State in the international order should be governed under a republican constitution,[35] a constitution which is established according to the principles of freedom of the members of society as human beings, according to the principles of dependence of all as subjects upon a single, common legislation, and according to the law of equality of all men as citizens.[36] True freedom, for Kant, is that which is compatible with the freedom of every other free man, and right is governed by the reconcilability of the will of each man with the will of every other man according to a common rule of freedom.[37] The common rule of freedom is defined by the categorical imperative, for the general will, which directs the rule of freedom, is the composite will of a civilized people, each member exercising his will in accordance with categorical imperative.[38] Such a general will provides a firm foundation for a universal order of freedom under law, and consists in the greatest correspondence between the constitution and the principles of law which the moral law obliges us to strive for.[39]

It was Kant's conviction that a government of nations, a comprehensive world state[40] in which individuals are world citizens[41] governed by the laws of *ius cosmopoliticum*, would be the material foundation for eternal peace.

[31] *Friedrich, p.39.*
[32] *Immanuel Kant,* Philosophy of Kant, *p.436.*
[33] *Friedrich, p.41*
[34] *Kant,* Philosophy of Kant, *p.441.*
[35] *Friedrich, p.45.*
[36] *Friedrich, p.41.*
[37] *Friedrich, p.42.*
[38] *Friedrich, p.186.*
[39] *Friedrich, p.186.*
[40] *Friedrich, p.45.*
[41] *Friedrich, p.47.*

Urging the equality of all men and unconditionally denying the right of one people to rule over another,[42] Kant established a framework for the realization of man in his perfection as a civilized being. A united world government would witness the end of war,[43] and would entail realization of the autonomous moral personality. Kant's framework for eternal peace, then, can be seen as directed towards man's freedom and moral autonomy, towards civilized man, and based on a universal republican constitutional order which provides for freedom under law. And in Kant's dualistic schema, man is both the starting point and the end point in the progression towards eternal peace, for it is man's inner moral content originating in the noumenal realm which propels him to the realization of freedom under law in the phenomenal realm. In the end, under a universal republican constitution the noumenal and phenomenal realms coverge, and the ultimate goal of nature is realized.

Friedrich Meinecke: Rejection of Absolute Universals and Assertion of State Egotism

> *the orgin . . . and purpose [of states] are embedded in the universal, but their actual life is only a living out of themselves. It is true that the study of history which contemplates and reflects [this phenomenon] is necessarily universal in so far as anything human cannot be alien to it. But the objects of historical observation, the individual states, can be understood only if they are granted the unconditional right to act solely in accordance with their own nature and profit. Here we find a marvelously constructed antithesis: the actions of states are generated not by uiniversal but by egotistic motivations. But their connotations are universal and the perspective from which they are observed must also be universal.*[44]
>
> Meinecke

While it was Kant's belief that it is the moral imperative of individuals and thus nations to move towards the universal rule of freedom under law, Friedrich Meinecke rejected any such notion of an absolute universal standard to which nations must aspire. For Meinecke, a universal political community, such as the one envisioned in Kant's scenario of eternal peace, is equivalent to universal conquest, for it was his belief that the diversity of human societies hampers their incorporation into a single political system except by force.[45] And while Kant saw an inevitable peace resulting from the moral compulsion of individu-

[42] *Friedrich, p.48.*
[43] *Friedrich, p.45.*
[44] *Friedrich, p.92.*
[45] *Sterling, p.26.*

als and from the forces of the plan of nature, Meinecke saw eternal peace as only a dream, for he held that "the fate of the true nation-state is not peace and repose but struggle, friction, and anxiety."[46] In maintaining that the actions of States are generated by egotistic rather than universal motivations, while at the same time realizing that the origin and purpose to States is grounded in the universal, Meinecke acknowledged a dualism between realism and idealism while he attempted to reconcile the spheres of politics and ethics. Meinecke affirmed the antitheses between realism and idealism in his study of the history of ideas which appeared in 1908 as *Weltbuergertum und Nationalstaat*. Meinecke acknowledged the antithesis in order to give the state the greatest freedom of action.[47] However, because he was aware of how easily the State could ignore its universal obligations, Meinecke invoked the idea of a cultural nation which provides more concrete restraints on the arbitrariness of political sovereignty.[48] In Meinecke's schema the nation is mediator between the idea of the State and the idea of universal humanity,[49] or as Kant would have it, between the idea of phenomenal and noumenal realms. Within this framework, Meinecke held his dualistic approach by manintaining that the State has transcendent obligations but that, at the same time, the political and cultural community is individual and unique and not universal and uniform.[50] Thus, in rejecting an absolute universal such as Kant's universal rule of freedom under law, Meinecke could embrace both realism and idealism, and his nationalism is both political and ethical.[51]

Unlike the universalist doctrine which dominated the leading personalities of the time of Frederick William IV,[52] Meinecke's mixture of nationalism and cosmopolitanism, although it posits a nation which is a community of both power and spiritual values,[53] nevertheless in the end rejects cosmopolitanism and asserts national political interest as the foundation of international relations. Such a position is enunciated in*Weltbuergertum und Nationalstaat*. Meinecke defined cosmopolitanism and universalism as a body of "ideas with ethical or political content."[54] He did not deny such transcendent norms, but rather he rejected arguments which absolutized these norms and attempted to subject the State to them with no regard for its political interest. Those who argued such, he reasoned, were enemies of the State. In Meinecke's view universalist doctrine exerts severe pressure on practical politics and the power position of the State. Ultimately if the State is to function naturally it

[46] *Sterling, p.100-101.*
[47] *Sterling, p.93.*
[48] *Sterling. p.93*
[49] *Sterling. p.93*
[50] *Sterling. p.93*
[51] *Sterling. p.93*
[52] *Sterling. p.70*
[53] *Sterling. p.93.*
[54] *Sterling. p.60.*

must abandon such doctrine.[55] Although he regarded cosmopolitanism and universalism as doctrines which hampered and distorted Germany's (his own nation's) political development, he did not consider their deadly effects to be simply the result of their injection into specifically German affairs. Rather he saw cosmopolitanism as an agent basically alien to all material aspects of international relations.[56] And rather than side with Frederick William, who stated that transcending all political considerations of the nation was the ruler's divine commandment as a Christian king "that I may not put my hands to that which is not mine . . ,"[57]Meinecke gravitated more towards Bismarck's conception of the State. Bismarck had asserted that "The only healthy basis for a great state . . . is state egotism . . . It is unworthy of a great State to contend for something which does not correspond to its own interests."[58] Thus his assertion of national self–interest as the basis of the State can be seen as a rejection of absolute standards, for whereas Frederick William maintained the existence of such absolute standards when he said that the State must be guided by the moral law and that the statesman must think in ethical–legal terms, Bismarck demanded that the statesman must think solely in political categories.[59] For both Bismarck and Meinecke, States are the protagonists on the field of international relations, and in order to follow correct strategy in the world of political necessity, the States must look only to themselves.[60] Thus while Meinecke's dualistic approach to international relations posits States grounded in and subject to universals and also propelled by egoism, his theory nevertheless provides for egoism to take first position in front of ethics as each State heeds its own call.

Although the national idea is a relatively concrete goal toward which States must strive in order to fulfill their functions as communities of power and of spiritual values, its concreteness fails to provide a system of order between nations, leaving a gap between political necessity and cosmopolitanism. The concentration of real power and moral values in the nation–state outweighs the abstract ideal of the universal commandment as it applies to international relations, and tips the scale so that the concrete needs of the autonomous State always take precedence over transcendent moral doctrines.[61] The will of the nation, in Meinecke's theory, is absolute, and if there is a general commandment that each nation has rights equal to those of every other nation, it is left to the individual nation to interpret this commandment.[62] Thus in

[55]*Sterling. p.70.*
[56]*Sterling. p.70-71.*
[57]*Sterling. p.76.*
[58]*Sterling. p.75.*
[59]*Sterling. p.76.*
[60]*Sterling. p.78-79.*
[61]*Sterling. p.97.*
[62]*Sterling. p.97.*

leaving the State's external relations to its own discretion, Meinecke provided for a world in which international politics are always conducted primarily in terms of individual communities and seldom if ever in terms of the cosmopolitan ideal of the world community.[63] Nation and State always separate the individual from humanity, and statesmen are always obligated to give first consideration to the survival of their own political and cultural communities.[64] The pattern of world politics remains a dualistic one, a conflict between concrete, tangible interests and an abstract and glimmering ideal of the human community.[65]

Meinecke's rejection of absolute universal doctrines and his insistence that the political interest of individual States governs international relations stands opposite to Kant's conception of a universal moral law which motivates individuals and thus States to establish a worldwide constitution and usher in eternal peace. Whereas Kant believed that universal freedom under law would inevitably be established, Meinecke believed that such "freedom" could only be the result of force and conquest, as the plight of Napoleon had demonstrated.[66] Perhaps the most revealing aspect of the contrast between Kant's idealism and Meinecke's realism is the position which both men assigned to individual man in society. An analysis of Meinecke's theory of the individual and the State uncovers his justification for the primacy of national self–interest over any absolute universal such as the Kantian categorical imperative.

The Super-personality and Subordination of the Individual

> *But the condition of [the state's] existence is that it create anew avenue of expression for the human spirit, that it articulate this spirit in unique form and reveal it ever anew. This is its missions from God.*[67]
>
> Leopold von Ranke

In *Weltbuergertum und Nationalstaat,* Meinecke accepted German historian Leopold von Ranke's answer, that the nation–state is the avenue of expression for the human spirit, as his own.[68] Ranke's theory provided for an organic union between citizen and State in great "collective personalities." This projection of personality characteristics into the nation–state was the hallmark of the dominant tradition in German political thought, giving the nation–state a philosophical basis for its freedom and at the same time imposing upon it

[63] *Sterling. p.101.*
[64] *Sterling. p.102.*
[65] *Sterling. p.101.*
[66] *Sterling. p.26.*
[67] *Sterling. p.80.*
[68] *Sterling. p.80.*

a moral obligation.[69] Meinecke followed the tradition when he conceptualized the nation–state as the great and natural super–individual within which individuals work out their destinies.[70] According to Meinecke, if the State is to embody the human spirit, its statesmen cannot treat the bulk of its citizens as mere means to the State's ends. On the contrary, Meinecke's transfer of personality characteristics from individual to nation–state required that the nation–state incorporate within itself the ends and values of its citizens. The nation–state, as a super–individual personality and bulwark of spiritual values, cannot merely pursue the ends of some of its citizens, nor can it only express the power aspect of the human personality, but must represent all of its components and the entire range of human values.[71]

Meinecke's commitment to the nation–state as the repository of all values is revealed in a telling statement in *Weltbuergertum und Nationalstaat:* "Sustaining and justifying all our thinking about and concern for the state is the profound recognition that the state is an ideal, super–individual corporate personality. This recognition could be fully attained only when the community sentiments and energies of the individual citizens permeated the state and transformed it into the nation–state,"[72] The nation–state is the true macrocosm, it is the super–individual and the political community least likely to oppress the individual.[73] And although Meinecke followed Ranke's formula which merges self–interest and ethical imperatives by giving the state a moral purpose,[74] nevertheless his formula subordinates ethics and the individual to political necessity. For by positing the nation–state as the concrete bulwark of all man's values, Meinecke created a scenario in which the nation–state can and must demand the total subordination of the individual to its own needs.[75] As the individual's definition of spiritual and cultural values provides the foundation for the State, the State in turn transcends the individual as personal values become transferred to and embodied in the collective political entity. Thus the nation–state as super-personality becomes imbued with such high functions as to place the question of the desirability of its survival practically beyond argument.[76] And though the individual creates the values embodied in the nation–state and therefore his freedom and liberty seem to be the foundation of Mienecke's concern, the State in effect becomes a barrier confronting and separating the individual and humanity, and tends to control

[69] *Sterling. p.134.*
[70] *Sterling. p.134.*
[71] *Sterling. p.135.*
[72] *Sterling. p.133.*
[73] *Sterling. p.135.*
[74] *Sterling. p.80.*
[75] *Sterling. p.117.*
[76] *Sterling. p.116.*

the individual while denying humanity.[77] For Meinecke, the mighty concentration of values attributed to the nation–state outweighs all the value and power needs of the individual, family, church, and economic interests and social groupings, and of the ideal of humanity as well.[78] In the end, his transfer of values from the cosmopolitan idea of mankind to the national idea results in a denial of the primacy of the individual. And unlike Kant's belief in man's inner moral content, Meinecke's concentration shifts that moral content to the state and justifies State egotism in the name of defending morality and higher spiritual values.

"Fusion" of Values: Primacy of Power and State Egotism

> *Power will always be part of the state's essence. But it does not comprise the whole of this essence. Law, morality and religion are also integral parts. At least they demand their place as soon as the state has fulfilled the first basic injunction to be powerful . . .*[79]
>
> Meinecke

Inherent in Meinecke's conception of the nation-state is the fusion of power and non–power values.[80] It was Meinecke's belief that not only does power create moral values, but that moral values also create power. Accordingly, the society which grants its members moral freedom and dignity enhances its powers of survival,[81] a survival which in turn safeguards high spiritual values. The interplay of mutually creative power and moral values was at the center of the problem of politics for Meinecke,[82] and he grounded the legitimacy of state egotism in the role the state fulfilled. Meinecke's nation–state is the cultural and moral community justifying the egotistic forces which determine the conduct of States,[83] and the justification is based on the fact that the State serves to preserve the higher values of individuals and their cultural ends. Because history had shown the State to be the outer limit of significant social cohesion and legal relationships, the protection of the State which embodies social, spiritual, and human values is an end in itself. In this way Meinecke injected moral content into the causal relationship that forces the State to be primarily concerned with its own security in an anarchic world.[84]

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[77] *Sterling. p.117.*
[78] *Sterling. p.116.*
[79] *Sterling. p.277-78.*
[80] *Sterling. p.278.*
[81] *Sterling. p.225.*
[82] *Sterling. p.225.*
[83] *Sterling. p.100.*
[84] *Sterling. p.122.*

In his reading of history and politics Mienecke saw international conflict as the chief threat to the power and existence of the super-personality, and he therefore accepted Ranke's doctrine that "foreign policy has primacy over domestic policy, that the internal constitution and development of the state are subordinated to the compulsions imposed by the struggle for power and independence in the outside world. The state must build its internal organization in such a way that it will be in the best possible position to pursue its external interests."[85] Meinecke held that Ranke's doctrine of the primacy of foreign policy was born out by history to be a natural law in the life of States, a law which had always prevailed.[86]His basic proposition, that man's civic life is a creature of relations between rather than within States, naturally led to the conclusion that internal State issues are secondary to the great issues of power politics in foreign relations.[87] Thus, in his assessment of the interntional political arena, Meinecke conceded absolute and universal validity to the egotistic human components and to the proposition that the State's primary concern must be to protect itself from external threat.[88]

Meineck's assessment of the primacy of foreign policy and of State egotism was one which maintained that the State must be more than power, that it must embody the spiritual avenue of its component individuals. However, in Meineck's schema power remains the first prerequisite to the State's existence:[89] and, although he asserted that the State must "recogonize and honor the spiritual and moral forces in the nation," Meinecke added that it must at the same time "press them into its service as a new instrument of power,"[90] Such a prescription reveals the all-embracing nature of the power drive as well as implies that the State must accept moral and spiritual forces only if they do not endanger its power objectives.[91] Substantiating this implication is the essence of Meinecke's theory, which states that in any age human freedom must wait until the accumulation and consolidation of power has provided social stability. The postulate that power considerations must be satisfied before all other matters are dealt with requires that if power is threatened, then men must ignore and sacrifice their other pursuits in order to protect power which is the foundation of their total existence.[92] This postulate reveals the central difference between Meinecke's concept of the individual and Kant's concept, for while Kant grounded the individual's existence in

[85] *Sterling. p.103.*
[86] *Sterling. p.103.*
[87] *Sterling. p.112.*
[88] *Sterling. p.104.*
[89] *Sterling. p.140.*
[90] *Sterling. p.138.*
[91] *Sterling. p.138.*
[92] *Sterling. p.116.*

freedom and the universal moral law, Meinecke grounded man's existence in the concrete phenomenal realm of power politics and state egotism. Thus for Meinecke, anything beyond human existence, such as individual development and moral autonomy, rests on the foundation of power politics as well. Furthermore, while Kant envisioned States shedding their belligerence and egotism as they inevitably moved towards a universal republican constitution and eternal peace, Meinecke held that "state egotism, the ruthless impulse to power and self-assertion, even though it expresses itself in historically differentiated forms, is nonetheless in its essence timeless, unconditional and part of the nature of the state."[93] The State will not transcend its egotism or the necessity of power politics, then, and eternal peace remains an eternal dream in Meinecke's schema.

Relativization of Power and Primacy of the Individual: and Alternation of Terms

> *The natural tendency of* raison d'etat *. . . is to restrict itself to reckoning only in terms of tangible advantages to the state's ego . . . It is perpetually in danger of becoming a mere utilitarian function without ethical function . . .*[94]
>
> Meinecke

While Meinecke grappled with the fusion of power and moral values and seemingly postulated the primacy of power politics and the State over moral imperatives and the individual, his theory nevertheless in the final analysis reduces power to a relative value and elevates the individual to a position of primacy over the State. In his major effort at a systematic statement of his political ideas, *Die Idee der Staatsraeson,*[95] Meinecke went begond the position that State egotism is primary and above moral values. Like Ranke he refused "to make the state a God and unconditionally to exalt *raison d'etat* to a position superior to morality." On the contrary, the *salus populi,* the state ego, can be satanic as well as God-like,[96] and *raison d'etat,* which in its highest form expresses the state's ethic, is one of the "too many things in which God and the devil are joined together."[97] Thus "the statesman must carry both the state and God in his heart if he is to prevent the demon which he cannot wholly exorcise from overwhelming him . . . [98] These words concluded Meinecke's study of *raison d'etat,* and they provide evidence that he finally relegated the State ego to the status of a relative value.[99]

[93] *Sterling. p.104.*
[94] *Sterling. p.235.*
[95] *Sterling. p.14.*
[96] *Sterling. p.232.*
[97] *Sterling. p.266.*

The consideration which prevented Meinecke from absolutizing the State and State egotism was his deeply rooted commitment to the individual.[100] And although he had initially postulated that the individual must be subordinated to the State, which was the repository of all values and the foundation of the individual's existence, the experience of two world wars and especially the atrocities committed by Nazi Germany compelled Meinecke finally to elevate the individual above the State. In *Das Zeitalter der deutschen Erhenburn,* written in 1905, Meinecke defined the supreme task of civilization as the reconciliation of "the inalienable rights of the individual . . . with the stern and unyielding demands of the . . . egotistic and domineering state." He also identified "the inner freedom of the human being [as] the highest of all values."[101] And when the pressures of World War I began to tear apart the German state, Meinecke stood with those who put internal freedom before external power and wrote: "But before the word Fatherland . . . we have put the word freedom, because only a free Fatherland can give the full measure of happiness to the national community."[102] However, before World War II the ideas of his *Weltbuergertum* and *Staatsraeson* dominated and allowed the nation-state to control the individual, since the freedom of the individual remained contingent upon the freedom of the State. It was not until Meinecke witnessed the Second World War and the atrocities committed by Nazi Germany that he was able to confirm the primacy of the individual over the nation-state absolutely.

In the midst of World War II, Meinecke wrote in *Die Entstehung des Historismus* that he stood on the principle that "the creative human being . . . was the main thing, the creator more precious . . . than the creation." Meinecke's commitment to a cosmopolitan spirit ambivalent in its attitude toward nation and State and historicism led him to the ultimate position that put the individual above the State.[103] With the perversion of the nation-state in Nazi Germany, the idea of absolute loyalty to the State became intolerable for Meinecke, and thus he altered his earlier theisis regarding the absolute super-personality. Meinecke did not deny the intimate union between the individual and his political community, but he did conclude that it is the *individual* who makes the crucial decisions determining the nature of this union.[104] As he maintained in "Ein Wort ueber geschichtliche Entwicklung," an essay written in 1941 or 1942, if collective individuals evolve according to their own tendencies, they "obviously do not evolve by themselves . . .

[98] *Sterling. p.232.*
[99] *Sterling. p.232.*
[100] *Sterling. p.282.*
[101] *Sterling. p.282.*
[102] *Sterling. p.282.*
[103] *Sterling. p.284.*
[104] *Sterling. p.284.*

They are created by men." Their origin and evolution are products of "the actions of the human being, of the totality of the personalities by which they are supported."[105] In Meinecke's final assessment, if there is a state personality or national character, it is a human heritage absorbed by individual personalities, conditioning them but also being conditioned by them. The very existence of the nation-state, then, is dependent upon the individual's decision to accept, alter, or reject it.[106] In this sense Meinecke recognized the creative human being as superior to the super-personal forces comprising his heritage and environment.[107]

While Meinecke's earlier position had placed him in opposition to the Kantian notion of eternal peace and the accompanying notion of freedom grounded in the universal categorical imperative, his final analysis, although still not merging with Kant's idealism, nevertheless moved him closer to Kant's positon. For in asserting the primacy of the individual over the State and thus transforming him from a means into an end, Meinecke freed the individual from unqualified subordination to the super-personality and accepted that the nature of international relations is in fact grounded in the freedom of individuals. Man, in creating the nation-state, controls the actions of that State and thus he can, if he is willing, enter an international social contract. But while Meinecke freed the individual from subordination to the State, he did not free him from inherent egotism. Thus there are no grounds for assuming that individuals (and thus States) will abandon self-interest in favor of an international social contract based on universalistic notions. Furthermore, although both Kant and Meinecke recognized the primacy of the individual, the individual as the end in international affairs, their different conceptions of freedom kept their theories at opposite poles. In Kant's view, man strives for freedom and moral autonomy which can be realized only through a universal republican constitution and eternal peace. But for Meinecke there is no such condition for man's freedom, and there is no grounding of individual development in the relations between nations. Rather it seems that Meinecke's theory provides that if a nation-state has ample power to safeguard the cultural and spiritual values of is citizens, then its citizens will be free. For a fatherland with enough power to protect its values is a free fatherland, and a free fatherland assures happiness and freedom to its community. In the end, then, the theories of Kant and Meinecke can be distinguished by their idealism and realism, respectively, as Kant grounded individual freedom in the noumenal realm with its universal moral law and as Meinecke grounded that freedom in the phenomenal realm with its ever-present State egotism.

[105] *Sterling. p.285.*
[106] *Sterling. p.285.*
[107] *Sterling. p.284.*

The Final Analysis

> *In applying the principles of morality to the affairs of nations, the difficulty which meets us arises from hence, 'that the particular consequence sometimes appears to exceed the value of the general rule.' In this curcumstance is founded the only distinction that exists between the case of independent states, and of independent individuals. In the transactions of private persons, no advantage that results from the breach of a general law of justice, can compensate to the public for the violation of the law: in the concerns of empire, this may sometimes be doubted.*[108]
>
> William Paley

There can be no question that in practice, individual morality and the morality and the morality of States occupy distinct positions within the realm of ethics. The distinction between them hinges on the respective relationships of the individual and the State to the laws and norms within the appropriate societies, either civil or international. The individual who violates a law of justice may personally benefit from such a violation, but, as Paley noted, it is impossible for such personal benefit to compensate the general public for the breach of law. On the other hand, Paley intimated that the State can violate a general law of justice, the violation of which may, in certain instances, actually benefit the public. The distinction between the individual and the law on the one hand, and the State and the law on the other, can be drawn from the fact that whereas the individual is bound by certain laws as a result of his consent to be a member of civil society, the State in contrast is not bound by any social contract between nations. And while the individual joins the social contract in order to insure his personal security and escape the Hobbesian scenario, the State itself has come to be viewed as the repository of that security.

The nation-state has come to be the most monopolistic and exacting of all associations, and one which attempts to make devotion to national interest the most severely sanctioned of all virtues.[109] National interest, or the security of the nation's individual components, becomes the highest virtue which the individual pursues, and thus any sense of an inclusive international society dissolves when national interests conflict. The justification for pursuing national interest is not merely one based in the realm of power-politics, however, but is fused with universalism. And although cosmopolitanism remains illusory

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[108] *William Pailey*, The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, Volume II, *(London: Brettell, Printer, Marshall-Street, Golden Square. 1804), p.453.*

[109] *Percy E. Corbett*, Morals, Law, and Power in International Relations, *(Los Angeles: Castle press, 1956), p.7.*

in today's world, national interest has come to be linked to the State's morality, and the morality of a particular nation is equated with the commands of supranational ethics.[110] As Hans Morgenthau noted, any universal ethical system to which all nations would otherwise adhere is replaced by the particularity of national ethics, and each nation claims universal recognition for its own particular system.[111] "The moral code of one nation flings the challenge of its universal claim with messianic fervor into the face of another, which reciprocates in kind."[112] The persistence of "nationalistic universalism," of nations claiming universal validity for their own morality which cloaks particular national interest, militates against any realization of a universal reign of peace and freedom under law.

When Kant pursued his idealistic endeavor to sketch out the foundations for eternal peace, he envisioned an international legal order which, in its jurisdiction over individuals, bypasses the State. Kant's formula does not provide for a reconciliation between the individual's world citizenship and his national citizenship.[113] Thus, in his failure to provide a link between civil and international society, Kant left a vacuum in his theory. In failing to address whether the obligations of the world citizen supersede those of the national citizen, Kant posited an international government of nations which would ignore those very nations as it appealed directly to the individual. In his thesis that freedom is realized only under a universal legal order, Kant in effect nullifies the value of the nation-state as the individual's repository of security. For in denying that the individual can realize true freedom within the State in the absence of world government, he implies that the autonomous and egotistic nation-state does not embody ultimate human values, and he severs national security from the notion of a State's morality. In practice, Kant's idealistic schema fails to provide a substantial solution to the problems between nations and peoples, because the fact remains that the State exists and that the individual's security and freedom are indeed realized through the State and not through his status as a world citizen in an illusory peaceful order.

While Kant's theory seems bankrupt in an era in which nationalistic universalism thrives, Meinecke's theory of the nation-state comes closer to portraying the reality of today's international relations. As Meinecke noted, the State as a self-contained center for the individual's development is not only the means but also the end through which the individual can attain freedom. The necessity of the State's national security transcends any constraints on the fulfillment of its obligation to provide for the freedom and well-being of the individuals within its borders. Thus international law fails as a compulsory foundation

[110] *Hans Morgenthau*, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, Fifth Edition, *(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1973), p.252.*
[111] *Morgenthau, p.252.*
[112] *Morgenthau, p.253.*
[113] *Friedrich, p.45.*

for international order, for in a conflict between international law and national security, international law is often a constraint on the State's obligation to its citizens. Meinecke's recognition of the central importance of State power is closer to reality than Kant's belief that moral imperatives bringing on the reign of universal law and peace will transcend the need for State power, for no effective authority higher than the State currently exists.

Attempts to implement authoritative and effective supranational juridical powers have been stymied by the State's primary concern with its own self-interest, as the United States' limited acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) attests. The fact that the United States accepted compulsory jurisdiction subject to the qualification that such jurisdiction does not apply to matters within the domestic jurisdiction of the US, *as determined by the U.S.*,[114] illustrates the primacy of state egoism over notions of international morality and universalism. For in qualifying the conditions for compulsory jurisdiction, the US established the legal apparatus whereby it can be judge and juror in all cases of its own national security. Furthermore, as the US has recently suggested in its legal dispute with Nicaragua regarding the mining of Nicaraguan harbors by the United States Central Intelligence Agency, any party to the ICJ need not obey the sentences pronounced by that organization. The decisions of the Court can simply be ignored. International relations currently follow Meinecke's interpretation closer than Kant's theory, as the actions of the US demonstrate. and individuals continue to invest their confidence in today's "super-personalities."

The difference between State morality and individual morality, in the final analysis, reduces to the fact that the individual adheres to laws because it is in his own self-interest to do so, while the State shuns the notion of absolute higher law because it is not always in its best interest to abide by the laws of an international community. In the sphere of individual human relations, then, laws and norms can be seen as necessary components. But in the sphere of international relations, laws and norms can perhaps best be viewed as contingencies, as portions of a fragile legal apparatus, the implementation of whose laws is contingent upon their correspondence to national self-interest. Until the nation–states which currently separate individuals and define the boundaries of a multitude of moralities and national ideals disappear, individual and State morality will remain separate entitites, the former an absolute and the latter a mere expedient. Only with the dissolution or transcendence of the State will it become possible for the individual to overcome the primacy of power objectives and enter Kant's idealistic realm, in which the universal moral law is absolute. As Percy Corbett stated thirty years ago:

[114]*Corbett, p.12.*

> Have not science and technology made it finally clear that national power cannot ensure the attainment and preservation of those values that make life worth living? If so, have not those objectives which were too far ahead for practical politics taken on immediate urgency? Is it not imperative that the power of the state should be subordinated to a more inclusive social order able to master the forces that threaten our entire civilization? My final contention is that the indispensable foundation of such an order is an operative recognization of moral values transcending all state interests.[115]

[115] *Corbett, pp.15-16.*

The Alliance for Progress—The Failure of Cold War Liberalism

Carlos Ball

The Kennedy Administration came to Washington proclaiming a new kind of liberalism which was designed to replace the stagnant conservatism of the Eisenhower Administration. The Third World, and especially Latin America, was one of the areas targeted for broad and drastic policy changes. Arthur Schlesinger was one of the intellectual forces behind these changes in policy. In his view, there was a need to produce in Latin America a "democratic revolution" that would create the necessary political, economic and social conditions to prevent the growth of radical leftist movements. Under a program called the Alliance for Progress, the United States would promote democratic reforms in Latin America. The goal of the program was to reduce the power of the landed and business elites while incorporating into the political system the middle and lower classes. Schlesinger believed that if pluralistic societies were formed in Latin America, the radical leftists would lose their popularity, and the United States would retain its political and economic influence in the area.

I have chosen to study the Alliance through Schlesinger's theory because he was the premier liberal intellectual in the Administration, and because the contradictions and flaws in his own theories proved to greatly contribute to the failure of the Administration's policies. Once the Alliance was put to work, Schlesinger turned his attention to other issues (after January 1962 there is very little in Schlesinger's papers that deal with Latin America). Teodoro Moscoso, US Coordinator of the Alliance, and Richard Goodwin, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, were the ones that dealt with the day to day running of the Alliance.

Schlesinger did not see reforms as important in themselves. The important objective was to avoid the expansion of communism. In other words, the emphasis on reform was simply a means to achieve the end goal; the elimination of the communist threat. Schlesinger, however, when formulating his theories, did not foresee the fact that reforms were going to change the patterns of distribution of power in Latin America. Once started, reforms would be very hard to control. It was going to be difficult to prevent the democratic reforms

from transforming themselves into radical overhauls of the system.

The fear that leftists would benefit from the possible turmoil created by the implementation of the reforms paralyzed the Alliance. Instead of fully committing themselves to democratic changes, the members of the Administration remained indecisive and confused. Since they were unwilling to enforce reforms, they still had to do something to undermine the growing discontent in Latin America. They proceeded to strengthen those sectors of society that were already in control (landed and business elite, the military), and to reduce, by force if necessary, the strength of radical movements. What ensued was a paradoxical policy in which the Administration called for reforms and talked about the "democratic revolution", while at the same time, they were unwilling to cease their protection of the status quo.

When it came down to deciding between strategies that stimulated democracies and those strategies whose ultimate goal was to prevent communism the Administration, rhetoric notwithstanding, chose the latter, Examples of these choices (explained in greater detail below) were the US support for dictators such as Duvalier and Somoza; the exclusion of lower classes from the decision making process of the Alliance; and the unparalleled funding, arming and training of Latin American military forces.

Schlesinger's Liberalism: Background and Theory

Schlesinger's interest in Latin America began in 1943 when he started his position as editor of the weekly intelligence bulletin of the Office of Strategic Services. Schlesinger was in charge of summarizing and reprinting reports submitted by the regional Latin American desk of the Research and Analyses Branch.[1]

In 1946 he became a history professor at Harvard. He continued to write about Latin America in such magazines as *Fortune*, *The New Republic* and *Harper's*. In the winter of 1946 he became a charter member of the newly founded Americans for Democratic Action. During the 1950's he worked for both of Stevenson's campaigns, while he concentrated on his work for the ADA, and on his teachings and writing.

John Kennedy was his Congressman from 1947-1952, and his Senator from 1953-1960. "Over these fourteen years, Schlesinger came to know and admire the young legislator."[2] During the 1960 election, Schlesinger broke ranks with his fellow liberal intellectuals and decided to support Kennedy over Stevenson. During the election, he wrote a pamplet titled *Kennedy or Nixon:*

[1] *Arthur Schlesinger*, A Thousand Days, *(Boston: Houghton Miflin, 1965), p. 171.*
[2] *Mitchell S. Ross*, The Literary Politicians, *(Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Co., 1978), p. 91.*

Does it Make a Difference?, "which blasted Nixon more eloquently than it defended Kennedy."[3]

Ten days after the inauguration, Schlesinger was installed as Special Assistant to the President. His exact duties were not specified and "appropriately enough for this rangy-minded man, his function was never really clarified."[4] Theodore Sorensen has noted that Schlesinger "served as a constant contact with the liberals and intellectuals both in this country and abroad, as an advisor on Latin America, [the] United Nations, and cultural affairs, as a source of innovation, ideas, and occasional speeches on all topics, and incidentally, as a lightning rod to attract attacks from the rest of us."[5]

Arthur Schlesinger fervently believed that liberalism provided a new source of pragmatic theories. He saw the liberal as a person willing to accept change and to produce new answers to the old problems which conservatives remained unable to solve. In 1957 Schlesinger wrote that:

> The conservative supposes that human contrivance is so treacherous a guide that efforts at purposeful change will always produce more grief than good. The liberal, while he does not (if he is sensible) believe in the perfectibility of man or the infallibility of reason, does contend that the application of the human intelligence to social problems can improve individual opportunity and security. The conservative is the traditionalist; the liberal, the pragmatist.[6]

Schlesinger believed that liberalism was the only political and economic strategy that would save society from totalitarianism. In his book *The Vital Center* (1949) he argued that in "times of despair" conservatism turns to fascism and progressivism turns to communism. Liberalism contains the conservatives' emphasis on individualism and law and order while also including the progressives' concern for mass welfare.

Schlesinger saw the birth of the new liberalism as originating in the hopes produced by the New Deal. Franklin D. Roosevelt had been able to reduce the control of government by the business interests while allowing other interests to participate in the policy decision making process. The New Deal expanded democracy to cover previously ignored sectors of the society (the poor, farmers and labor unions).

Liberal foreign policy offered the only pragmatic and effective way of preventing the expansion of Soviet-sponsored communism. "The experience

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[3] *Ibid.*
[4] *Ibid.*
[5] *Theodor Sorensen,* Kennedy, *(NY: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 296.*
[6] *Arthur Schlesinger, "Liberalism",* Saturday Review, *June 6, 1957, p. 12.*

with Communism has had one singular healthy effect; it made us reclaim democratic ideas which a decade ago we tended to regret and even to abandon."[7] The threat of communism pressured the forreign policy establishment to look for policy alternatives. The US was now forced, Schlesinger argued, to actively promote democracy in the world as an alternative to communism. It was necessary for the US to lead a world-wide strategy to stimulate faith in democracy and to reassure the "easily frightened middle class."

Schlesinger argued that the Soviet Union "kicks every door" and enters those that are unlocked. Those that are closed, the Soviet Union stays away from because it does not want to fight with the "householder or his friends." Yet, the simple policy of containment (i.e., locking the doors) was not enough:

> If conditions inside the house are intolerable, if a few people live in luxury while the rest scramble for table leavings and sleep in the cellar, then eventually someone will admit the communists by stealth. So the locking of the house must be accompanied by the cleaning of the house; our policy must secure the inhabitants against the desperation which breeds totalitarianism by seeking to restore them to state of economic and political health. Economic health means high levels of production and employment; policital health means free institutions under the law.[8]

New Frontiersmen liberals truly believed that the Kennedy Administration would bring the necessary changed in policy to prevent the Soviet Union from "kicking in doors."

These liberals saw the pre-Kennedy policies towards Latin America as being interested only in creating stable investment markets for American companies. All of the previous US aid had had one goal in mind; to help American corporations make more money. This materialistic attitude was distasteful to academic liberals such as Schlesinger. It was important to them to create a new image for the US in Latin America.

To demonstrate that the new Administration was going to bring changes in policies towards the southern hemisphere, President Kennedy sent Schlesinger and George McGovern (Director of the Food for Peace program), in a good-will trip throughout the Americas. While planning his trip to Latin America, Schlesinger wrote a memo to the President about the importance of creating a new image:

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[7] *Arthur Schlesinger,* The Vital Center, *(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1949), Introduction p. x.*
[8] *Schlesinger, p. 226.*

> One good thing about my going to [Latin America] is that my presence as your representative will help persuade the Latinos that the new US government is not run by money grubbing materialists. Intellectuals, of course have become a dynamic political force through much of the world, especially in the new nations. In many cases the newly liberated intellectuals see the US as materialistic, vulgar, obsessed with comic books and TV, hostile to higher cultural and spiritual values. Your predecessor in the White House unintentionally reinforced this impression by conveying a picture of America as kindly, well-meaning, ignorant, unintellectual, indifferent to the things of the spirit.[9]

Schlesinger made his trip to Latin America during the first week of March 1961. His journey took him to Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Peru and Venezuela. The trip reaffirmed his belief in the need to use the "resources of progressive democracy to combat poverty, illiteracy and injustice."[10] A decade before, Schlesinger had argued that "[m]ost of the world is already in the throes of social revolution — a revolution deriving its source from discontent on the land and having as its goal the assertion of national independence and the beginnings of industrialization. It is a revolt against the landlords, against the money-lenders, against foreign political domination, against foreign economic exploitation."[11] His visit to poverty stricken areas, such as Northeastern Brazil, convinced Schlesinger that there was a need for fast and bold action. In his report to the President, Schlesinger argued that if current conditions were allowed to continue, the US, in the very near future, would have to deal with new communist revolutions in many nations throughout the hemisphere. He argued that poverty and injustice in Latin America had created a crisis of such magnitude that unless the US acted in a "strong and comprehensive way," the crisis would "end by transforming the southern half of the hemisphere into a boiling and angry China."[12]

As early as 1946, Schlesinger argued that "the US must pursue a positive policy if it wishes to maintain the strategic security of the hemisphere . . . Many facets of the complex South American problem are not accessible to US policy. One facet is accessible — the economic; and one way in which the US can take action to check Peronismo and communism is to develop and execute coordinated measures of its own to deal with the economic unrest in Latin America."[13]

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[9] *Arthur Schlesinger, Personal Papers, Box 14, Folder: State Department and Memoranda,* Memo to the President, *Feb. 6, 1961, JFKL.*
[10] *Schlesinger,* A Thousand Days, *p. 185.*
[11] *Schlesinger,* The Vital Center, *p. 229.*
[12] *Schlesinger,* A Thousand Days, *p. 186.*
[13] *Arthur Schlesinger, "Good Fences Make Good Neighbors"*, Fortune Magazine, *August 1946.*

Schlesinger wanted a policy that went beyond the simple non-interventionist commitment of Franklin D. Roosevelt's Good Neighbor program: ". . . the Good Neighbor Policy did not, as such, call for an extension of the New Deal to the hemisphere; it was primarily diplomatic and legal in its emphasis. Except for the Export-Import Bank, it lacked an economic dimension."[14] Schlesinger wanted the US to commit itself to the promotion of democracy and the raising of the standards of living of the Latin people. The US was to use the Alliance as a way of participating directly in the formulation of the economic strategies of every country in the hemisphere.

Schlesinger saw changes in the Latin American societies as inevitable. The best strategy for the US was therefore to participate in those changes and make sure that the unavoidable reforms would not threaten US interests. On his return to the US, Schlesinger wrote a report to the President on the findings of his trip:

> The argument is that Latin America is irrevocably committed to the quest of modernization. This process of modernization cannot take place without a drastic revision of the semi-feudal agrarian structure of society which still prevails through much of the sub-continent. That revision can come about in two ways — through a middle-class revolution or through a "workers and peasants" (i.e. communists or Peronist) revolution. It is obviously to the US interest to promote the middle-class revolution. Unfortunately the Latin American landed oligarchy does not understand the gravity of its own situation. It constitutes the chief barrier to the middle class revolution.[15]

If the participation in Latin America's policy decision making processes could be expanded to include previously non-participating groups (as occurred in the US during the 1930's), the basic tenets of capitalism and individualism could be maintained, without the need to look for radical alternatives.

Schlesinger called for US support of: 1) the industrialization of the Latin America economies; 2) an extensive loan program that would not only assist the private sectors, but would also strengthen the national governments; 3) land and tax reforms; 4) and social reforms that would protect basic human rights for all individuals.[16] These economic and social reforms would reduce the poverty and political repression and, therefore, would contain the propagation of communism. The Alliance was to eliminate the conditions that

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[14] *Schlesinger,* A Thousand Days, *p. 171-72.*

[15] *President's Office Files, Arthur Schlesinger, Box 65, Folder: 11/60-6/61, Report to President Kennedy, March 10, 1961, JFKL.*

[16] *President's Office Files, Box 121A, Folder:* Latin America, Report to President, March 10, 1961, JFKL.

produced political unrest. "The problems of political ferment . . . is the problem of the peaceful incorporation into their national economic and political societies of a vast submerged population, largely Indian, which has existed for centuries outside the money economics and party politics, but which is now uneasily stirring with (and being ruthlessly stirred by) new aspirations and new expectations."[17]

The Administration's idealism consisted of their honest belief that the US could help those that had been left out by the system. Schlesinger's liberalism, in theory, was to withdraw US support for the classes that maintained Latin America in "semi-feudal" conditions. The conservative upper classes represented a threat to the Administration's anti-communist goals. Their unwillingness to accept change was radicalizing and polarizing the middle and lower classes. The Alliance would attempt to force the elites, for their own good, to accept the needed reforms that would prevent revolution.

There was an attempt to hire people in the Administration who were more concerned with the welfare of the Latin people, than committed to laissez-faire economics and strident anti-communism. Scholars such as Richard Goodwin and Jack Behran (Assistant Secretary of Commerce for International Affairs) appeared to be truly concerned with creating substantial changes in Latin American societies, changes that would not only raise the standard of living but would also help these nations form democratic institutions, laws, and values. The young liberals opposed the use of US power and resources "to prop up inequitable social and economic structures and oppressive political regimes . . . Goodwin and Schlesinger were particularly insistent on this point, urging that the US use its resources as levers to bring about fundamental social change. Their position reflected both their pragmatic judgement that any other policy was doomed to failure, and their moral indignation, as American liberals, at the perpetuation of intolerable injustice with US support."[18]

The young liberal intellectuals saw in the election of Kennedy an opportunity to bring real changes in US policy. A month after the election of Kennedy, Jack Behrman wrote that it is "important that we remove any impressions that we are friendly to repressive and undemocratic governments, and that our actions, as issues arise, make clear our hearty sympathetic support for democratic governments and their right to lead their countries in directions of their choice, whether or not we happen to like the directions in which they move."[19] The fact that US policy makers were admitting that Latin Americans had the right to decide by themselves their own futures was indeed a drastic

[17]Ibid.

[18]Jerome Levinson and Juan de Onis, The Alliance That Lost Its Way, *(Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970), p. 56.*

[19]*Jack Behrman, Personal Papers, Box 2, Folder:* Origins of the Alliance for Progress, *Paper written by Behrman for a conference on Latin American affairs at Harvard, December, 1960, JFKL.*

shift of policy.

Kennedy first offered the idea of the Alliance to the public in his October, 1960, campaign speech in Tampa, Florida. He argued that the failure of the US to identify itself with the "rising tides of freedom" was persuading Latin Americans that the US was more interested in "stable regimes than in free governments; more interested in fighting against communism than in fighting for freedom; more interested in the possible loss of our investments than in the actual loss of the lives of thousands of young Latins who have died fighting dictators."[20]

After the election, the President gave Richard Goodwin the job of creating a task force that would study Latin America's problems and submit specific proposals to solve them. The task force was to be headed by Adolf Berle, who had worked in the Good Neighbor program under Roosevelt. The other members were Arturo Morales Carrion (who became Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs), Teodoro Moscoso, Professor Lincoln Gordon, (a Harvard professor who had experience working in the Marshall Plan and who later became Ambassador to Brazil), and professors Robert Alexander and Arthur Whitaker.

The task force report is still classified. Yet, the evidence presented by Schlesinger in *A Thousand Days* (1965), suggests that the report looked at Latin America from a cold war perspective. The report argued that the problem was "to divorce the inevitable and necessary Latin American social transformation from connection with and prevent its capture by overseas Communist power politics."[21] the communist objective was "to convert the Latin American social revolution into a Marxist attack on the United States" and concluded that the communist threat "resembles, but is more dangerous than, the Nazi-Fascist threat of the Franklin Roosevelt period and demands an even bolder and more imaginative response."[22]

The report agreed with Schlesinger's liberal theories. It argued that the US had to take an active role in promoting democracy. There was a need for the US to work in conjunction with the democracies of Latin America "coordinating and supporting the wide-spread democratic-progressive movements . . . pledged to representative government, social and economic reform (including agrarian reform) and resistance to entrance of undemocratic forces from outside the hemisphere."[23]

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[20] *Ronald Hellman and John Rosenbaum ed.*, Latin America: The Search for a New International Role, *(John Wiley and Sons, 1975), p. 59.*
[21] *Schlesinger,* A Thousand Days, *p. 195.*
[22] *Ibid.*
[23] *Schlesinger, p. 196.*

President Kennedy, having received both Schlesinger's report (after his trip to Latin America), and the report by the Berle task force, decided to officially announce a new US policy towards Latin America. On March 13, 1961, before a group of Latin American diplomats at the White House, he announced the creation of a new program called the Alliance for Progress. Its goals was to "demonstrate to the entire world that man's unsatisfied aspiration for economic progress and social justice can best be achieved by free men working within a framework of democratic institutions . . ."[24] Kennedy proposed a meeting in Punta del Este, Uruguay, where the countries of the hemisphere would get together and create a development plan that would include the basic tenets of the Administration's liberal ideas.

The Charter of Punta del Este, signed by the US and all Latin American countries (with the exception of Cuba), on August 17, 1961, called for: 1) An increase of at least 2.5% in the Gross Domestic Product of every country; 2) fair wages, stable prices and an increase in import substitution; 3) the elimination of adult illiteracy and a minimum of six years of primary education for all children by 1971; 4) an increase in the life expectancy at birth by a minimum of five years within a decade, improved medical and health services, water and sewage service for at least 70% of urban population and 50% for the rural areas; and 5) agricultural and tax reforms. The Charter stated that these reforms should be carried out "under democratic structures" and "within the framework of personal dignity and political liberty . . . in democratic societies adopted to their own needs and desires."[25]

The US offered $1 billion worth of aid for each of the following ten years to achieve the goals of the Charter and called for assistance from Western Europe and Japan that would add another $10 billion to the Alliance. In addition, the Charter emphasized liberal ideals in that it was an aid program that was not only interested in economic growth, but it also emphasized social justice and political freedoms. The Alliance was only supposed to help those sectors of the society that were democratic and avoid giving assistance to the anti-democratic forces. The Charter also emphasized national planning (in fact, before any American money was given to a country, the government first had to present a long-term economic plan) and it also emphasized the need for the public sectors of the Latin American nations to take a bigger role in economics. It was considered a taboo in past American aid policies to stimulate the growth of national governments.

The Charter was more specific about how to achieve economic development than about how to achieve social and political reforms. There seemed to be, however, an honest commitment by the Administration to substantially reduce

[24] *Harvey Perloff*, Alliance for Progress, *(Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1969), p. 20.*
[25] *John Drier (ed.)*, The Alliance for Progress, pp. 118-19.

US support for military regimes and for the reactionary elements of the Latin American societies. The President said in his Tampa speech that "we must give constant and unequivocal support to democracy in Latin America. We must end our open and warm backing of dictators. Our support must be reserved for democratic leaders, not despots."[26] In his report to the President, Schlesinger wrote that the US "must make it absolutely clear that we regard dictatorship and the suppression of popular rights as incompatible with the principles of the hemisphere."[27]

Jack Behrman noted that "there exists in the minds of many Latin Americans — among both intellectuals and the middle and lower classes — an image of the US as interested in monetary and military advantage to an extent that subordinates concern with human welfare, and sympathetic to undemocratic and repressive governments in Latin America."[28] Berhman argues that it is normal that the Latin Americans are upset at the US, which has in the past "shown friendliness to undemocratic leaders." This type of insightful thinking had rarely been shared by previous US policy makers. In the past, anti-American feelings had been explained as "socialistic" or inspired by Soviet propaganda.

The response to the Alliance in Latin America was positive. The Administration, and especially Kennedy, symbolized in many Latin American's minds a new beginning. Congressman Henry Reuss from Wisconsin argued that part of the enthusiasm was the substance of the Alliance (land reform, tax reform, democratic governments). Yet "[a]nother part, of course, was the incalculable advantages John Kennedy had. He was Catholic; he was young; he was handsome; he was romantic; he was articulate; he epitomized the aspirations of the new generations of Latin Americans.M"[29] Charles Burrows, Ambassador to Honduras, argued that the Alliance "was a subject of tremendous excitement, really created a lot of enthusiasm in Honduras . . . Kennedy himself was an exciting figure to Latin Americans. Pictures of President Kennedy appeared all over Honduras . . ."[30] By the end of August 1961 it seemed as if real changes were going to occur in the political and economic systems of Latin America.

Liberalism Meets Reality

Unfortunately, the idealism and the hope never left the halls of the State Department. Once it came time to put their liberalism into practice, the

[26]Hellman and Rosenbaum (ed.), p. 59.
[27]President's Office Files, Box 121A, Folder: Latin America, Schlesinger report to President Kennedy, *March 10, 1961, JFKL.*
[28]*Jack Behran, Personal Papers, Box 2, Folder:* The Origins of the Alliance for Progress, *Dec., 1960, JFKL.*
[29]*Henry Reuss, Oral History, p.75, JFKL.*
[30]*Charles Burrows, Oral History, pp. 5-6, JFKL.*

intellectuals realized that to create a revolution, even a "middle-class democratic revolution," they would have to support drastic changes. The implementation of reforms would contradict the interests of those in Latin America who were regarded as America's "friends." The Administration realized that reforms would produce transformations in the societies, transformations whose outcomes could not be specifically determined before hand. As so many conservative adminstrations before them, the Kennedy liberals were frightened by the possiblity that reform might get out of hand and that leftists would gain power. Che Guevara told Richard Goodwin in Punta del Este that there was "an intrinsic contradiction in the Alliance. By encouraging the forces of change and the desires of the masses, you might let loose forces beyond your control, ending in a revolution which would be your enemy."[31]

Guevara's prediction turned out to be correct. Schlesinger himself has admitted that "US officials hastily pulled back when pressure for structural change threatened to produce civil conflict . . . Their retreat was due to the fact that violence made Americans personally uncomfortable and unhappy. Perhaps most of all, they feared that turbulence would play into the hands of the Marxist revolutionaries."[32] Bruce Miroff has noted that "the Alliance could not really afford to mobilize Latin America's workers and peasants, could not afford to draw its strength from their mass action. For that action might get out of hand, might rapidly push beyond the Administration's moderate goals, might turn suddenly and unpredictably into radical revolution."[33]

Even though the Administration believed that they had created a new atmosphere in US-Latin American relations, there were many liberal democrats in Latin America who remained skeptical. For example Secretary of State Rusk, writing about the Alliance, argued that "[t]he basic goal of American foreign policy is a world where individual men are free to pursue their own ends, subject only to the liberating restraints of a free society."[34] It was very hard for people in Nicaragua and Guatemala who were fighting against US supported dictatorships to believe this. As the Alliance progressed, Administration officials complained that Latin intellectuals and students did not support it enthusiastically. Yet, it was naive of the Administration to believe that by offering $1 billion worth of aid, questionable as that aid was (as explained below), there was going to be an immediate change in anti-American feelings in Latin America.

The Administration's concern about reforms "getting out of hand" forced it to rely on the people it could trust (right of center parties, landed elites,

[31] *Richard Goodwin, "Our Share in a Big Awakening"*, life Magazine, *April 11, 1967, p. 83.*
[32] *Hellman and Rosenbaum (ed.), p. 73.*
[33] *Bruce Miroff*, Pragmatic Illusions: The Presidential Politics of J.F.K., *(New York: David McKay Co., 1976), p. 123.*
[34] *Drier (ed.), p. 103.*

businessmen and the military) to lead the "revolution." Yet, these people were not interested in change. This basic paradox sentenced the Alliance to death before it could even begin. The fear of communism, which was at the core of their liberal ideas, did not allow the members of the Administration to trust the peasant and working class movements; and therefore, ironically, they were excluded from the "democratic revolution."

Tad Szulc, an author and a reporter for the *New York Times* wrote in 1964 that "in [the] intellectual, labor, and student circles in Latin America, the Alliance has caused no visible stir, and yet these are the groups that are vital in any effort to animate the revolutionary concept President Kennedy had in mind when he launched the program. The primary reasons for this apathy is that the Alliance leadership in Washington has made very little attempt to communicate a sense of excitement and participation to these restless groups."[35]

Instead, the Administration tried to pressure the upper classes into carrying out reforms. In his first trip to Latin America as President, Kennedy gave a speech in Bogota, in which he argued that:

> The leaders of Latin America, the industrialists and the landowners are, I am sure, ready to admit past mistakes and accept new responsibilities. For unless all of us are willing to contribute our resources to national development, unless all of us are prepared not merely to accept, but initiate basic land and tax reform, unless all of us take the lead in improving the welfare of our people; then the leadership will be taken away from us and the heritage of centuries of Western civilization will be consumed in a few months of violence.[36]

In a speech to commemorate the first Anniversary of the Alliance, Kennedy argued that "those that possess wealth and power in poor nations must accept their own responsibilities. They must lead the fight for those basic reforms which alone can preserve the fabric of their societies. Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution inevitable."[37]

There is a sense of naiveté in the Administration's belief that the elites would be willing to participate in the creation and implementation of the reforms. Teodoro Moscoso (the AID Assistant Administrator for Latin America and the US Coordinator of the Alliance), in a speech at the National Press Club in Washington argued that "[t]he Alliance clearly deserves the

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[35]*Tad Szulc*, The Winds of Revolution; *(New York: Preager Publishers, 1963), p. 251.*
[36]*Miroff, p. 121.*
[37]*Willard Barber, "Can the Alliance for Progress Succeed?"*, Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science, *January 1964, p. 82.*

support of the poor because its great objective is the end of poverty, illiteracy, disease, and social injustice. But it also deserves the support of the privileged by its appeal to their conscience (sic), their sense of patriotism, and also their sense of self-preservation."[38]

However, democrats who had been struggling to gain power had a very different opinion about the ability of elites to change a system that was basically good to them. Juan Bosh, who succeeded Trujillo (who had been in power for over thirty years) as President of the Dominican Republic but was himself overthrown by the military a few months later, argued "[t]hat it is difficult for a citizen of the US to understand the mentality of the oligarchical sectors of Latin America. Their solidarity and lust for power, in order to hold on to privileges that are unknown today to most civilized countries of the world, is beyond the comprehension of the average person in the US."[39]

In 1961, Latin American investment in the US increased by more than $316 million to a total of $4 billion; this is four times the amount of the contribution that the US pledged for Latin America during the first year of the Alliance (and the $4 billion amount does not include Latin American investment in Western Europe and in Swiss banks). "That is to say, if the Latin American oligarchs were as nationalistic as they claim . . . in one year, they could have invested sufficient capital to achieve four times what was realized through United States assistance."[40]

What began to occur was that Latin American governments payed a lot of attention to the Alliance's rhetoric (and so got money from the United States), yet they did not put reforms into effect. The Administration kept warning the elites of the threats of communism and Castro, but it was not enough to scare them into reforming their societies. The elites were simply looking out for their own interests. "Using their strategic political position, especially in national legislatures, the oligarchs managed in most Latin American states to block even moderate land or tax reforms. Despite their intransigence, they remained secure in the knowledge that the US would not unseat them, indeed needed them as a bulkwark of social stability in the face of the revolutionary threat."[41] Schlesinger himself has admitted that the Administration "underestimated the rigidity of the existing agrarian and business structures" which "defined the effective political and economic community in most countries and controlled the access to education, power and wealth."[42]

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[38] *Teodoro Moscoso, Personal Papers, Box 9, Folder: Speeches,* Speech at the National Press Club, *Washington, D.C., February 15, 1962, JFKL.*
[39] *Barber, p. 82.*
[40] *Victor Alba,* Alliance Without Allies, *(New York: Frederick Preager Publishers, 1965), p. 147.*
[41] *Miroff, p. 121.*
[42] *Hellman and Rosenbaum (ed.), p. 70.*

The Argentine military government that came to power in 1962 is a good example of elites only paying attention to the rhetoric of the Alliance. In April 1962, Schlesinger met with Rogelio Frigerio who was a former Argentine government official. Schlesinger then reported to the President on the meeting:

> As for the present government in Buenos Aires, it gives lip-service to the Alliance and to friendship with the US; but its whole effort to restore the pre-war economy is absolutely opposed to the Alliance program of development and reform. Eighty percent of the Peronists are workers. They will be for anything which will give them jobs. Hence they are potentially for the Alliance — if only they could be made to see that the Alliance will be a source of employment. Because they have been misled by demagogues, they do not understand this and in consequence are at present against the Alliance."[43]

David Huelin, Head of Research for the Bank of London argued in February 1963 that it is "wrong to assume that governments in general are willing to undertake the agrarian and fiscal reforms that the Alliance demands . . . so long as Washington acts on this fallacy, the Alliance will have no impact at all on the depressed sectors and its political aims will therefore be frustrated."[44]

A vital part of Schlesinger's ideology consisted of a strong US support for the interests of the middle-class; it was the middle class who was supposed to lead the democratic revolution. In his report to the President after his trip to Latin America, Schlesinger argued that:

> The most favorable measn from the U.S. point of view would be the middle-class revolution where the processes of economic modernization carry the new urban middle-class into power and produce, along with it, such necessities of modern technical society as constitutional government, honest public administration, a responsible party system, a rational land system, an efficient system of taxation, mass education, social mobility, etc. . . .[45]

However, this liberal strategy could not be put to work because many members of the middle-class were skeptical about US intentions. The progressive mem-

[43] *President's Office Files, Arthur Schlesinger, Box 65, Folder: 1962,* Report to the President, *April, 1962, JFKL.*

[44] *President's Office Files, Box 121A, Folder: Latin America,* Speech by David Huelin, *Head of Research — Bank of London, to the Royal Society for the Encouragement of Arts, Manufacturers, and Commerce, Feb. 18, 1963, JFKL.*

[45] *President's Office Files, Box 121A, Folder: Latin America,* Report by Schlesinger, *March 10, 1961, JFKL.*

bers of the middle-class were aware of the long history of alliances between their oligarchic elites and the US government; it was going to take more than rhetoric and $1 billion a year to convince them of the benign intentions of the US "The Alliance is wrong in assuming that . . . the political allegiance of the progressives can be bought. There is little evidence that Washington has understood the suspicion with which the progressives regard alliances between their oligarchies and the US, or that the more earnestly Washington tries to help Latin America through its conservatice governments, the more this will be resented by those whom it is designated to assist."[46]

In addition, most of the middle-class was not as progressive and as interested in the plight of the poor as most American policy makers wanted to believe. The middle-class was afraid that the economic and political gains of the poor would be at their expense. "The [middle class] proved less interested in modernizing their society or improving the lot of the poor than in holding on to privileges that were, for an underdeveloped country, already substantial."[47] As the elites had seen it to be in their best interest to agree in theory with the changes proposed by the Administration (but in practice did very little to implement these changes), the middle-class also looked after their own best interests. They believed that the best strategy in achieving economic and political power was to ally themselves with the elite. "Middle-class politicians have shown themselves to be committed most of all to their own advancement; often they ally with the traditional elites — whose values, attitudes and consumption patterns they emulate — rather than with those promoting change."[48]

The liberalism that Schlesinger had formulated became worthless in the field unless the US was willing to promote the drastic change that were needed. As the Administration realized that it could not carry out the reforms of the Charter, the goals of the Administration began to change; if weakening radical movements was not possible by reforms then the Administration had to fall back on the strategy of strengthening the status quo: "In education and agriculture they [the Alliance officers] turned their efforts away from adult literacy and agrarian reform, to technical education and agricultural production. These changes reflect[ed] not only an increasing technocratic orientation but a shift of political concern from bettering the lives of the marginal masses to protecting the key elements of the core society."[49]

Unless there were changes in the patterns of distribution of income, almost all of the American aid would fall in the hands of the select few that were

[46] *President's Office Files, Box 121A, Folder: Latin America,* Speech by David Huelin, *Head of Research — Bank of London, Feb. 18, 1963, JFKL.*
[47] *Miroff, pp. 123-24.*
[48] *Abraham Lowenthal, "American Rhetoric vs. Latin American Reality",* Foreign Affairs Journal, *April 1970.*
[49] *Levinson and de Onis, p. 308.*

already rich. The economic aid:

> will tend to follow the recipient country's existing pattern of income distribution; unless they are accompanied by social or political restructuring, they will go primarily to those who already hold wealth and power. The Alliance principle of distributing the benefits of economic growth throughout a society by means of social and political reforms was new to both development economists and loan officials in the U.S. But experience soon showed them that social and political reforms were indeed destabilizing.[50]

After a while, most Latin Americans began to perceive the Alliance as an aid program that was to benefit a select few. A poll done by A.I.D. in Lima on May of 1962 confirmed this.

Schlesinger, after his trip to Latin America in early 1961, had argued that it was self-defeating for the Administration to concentrate only on the production of wealth and not on its distribution. A basic tenet of his liberalism was to make sure that levels of poverty were reduced. Yet, the Administration fell into the trap of waiting for the notoriously inefficient "trickle-down" effect. Like many previous administrations, the Kennedy liberals realized that this was the safest (in the short-run) and less controversial strategy. Yet reliance on "trickle-down" effects and economic growth did not help the poverty stricken masses of Latin America. James Johnston, the Second Secretary of the American Embassy in Costa Rica, wrote a memo to the State Department explaining the problem:

> While working to bring about a substantial increase in the size of the national economic pie which . . . has to be a long term objective; the US should in the short term direct more attention to (1) achieving a more equitable distribution of the existing pie and (2) restraining the increase in the number of people (through family planning) who are sharing the pie . . . The Costa Rican who lives in abject poverty is just as miserable as his counterpart in Asia and elsewhere and is not likely to derive comfort from the fact that Costa Rica's per-capita income is three times higher, or that it is increasing 2.5 percent a year, even if it were, in fact increasing at such a rate.[51]

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[50] *Ibid.*

[51] *National Security Files, Box 35, Folder: Costa Rica 6/63-11/63,* Memo to State Department by James Johnston Second Secretary of US Embassy *in Costa Rica, August 21, 1963, JFKL.*

The lack of emphasis on political and social reforms exasperated some Alliance officials. Edwin Martin, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs wrote in an internal State Department report that "there is a wide agreement that our major goal must be political development, yet less is known about how to achieve this than economic development, little is known about that. Yet, State and AID Programs have literally almost no funds for research while the Pentagon spends billions to maybe kill people someday."[52]

As mentioned above, one of the reasons for the lack of importance given to political reforms was a consequence of the exclusion, from the decision making process, of those groups that were interested in reform. Among those excluded were trade unions, student federations, peasant leagues and cooperatives. Yet, these organizations represented the majority of the population. These were the groups that the Alliance was supposed to support to be able to create democratic institutions and values. These were the people whose interests had been ignored by previous Administrations; unfortunately the Alliance did the same.

A good example of the difference between the Administration's liberal rhetoric and what it actually accomplished was the Alliance's treatment of workers. President Kennedy speaking to the Inter-American Conference of Ministers of Labor in Bogota on May 6, 1963, said that:

> It is . . . clear that technology cannot be forced upon a people, save by a tyranny, that destroys as much as it creates. The full cooperation of workers, through their trade unions, must be achieved. This is a rule of economic development, and equally a fundamental tenet of a free society. It is no coincidence that wherever politcal democracy flourishes in the modern world there is also a strong, active, responsible trade union movement.[53]

The Administration's "commitment" to a free trade movement was purely in the form of speeches and hollow declarations of policy like the one above. No specific steps were ever given to assure the creation of free trade unions. Originally there had been the intention of getting labor involved. President Kennedy in early 1961 went to George Meany, President of the AFL-CIO, asking him for help. Meany has noted that "President Kennedy openly took the position that we [the AFL-CIO] had a part to play because we were not

[52] *Arthur Schlesinger, Personal Papers, Box 2, Folder: The Alliance for Progress,* Internal State Department Memo, *Written by Edwin Martin, Dec. 30, 1963, JFKL.*

[53] *Ralph Dungan, Personal Papers, Box 1, Folder: Alliance for Progress,* Speech by the President at the Inter-American Conference of Ministers of Labor, *Bogota, Colombia, May 6, 1963, JFKL.*

only Americans but we were trade unionists and that trade unionists could develop contacts in the countries with worker organizations that no one with the official badge of government could make."[54] The AFL-CIO did sponsor a few limited programs (such as housing units for workers in Mexico City) , but there was no real attempt to unionize and organize workers. There was no real labor revolution to speak of; most programs were limited and symbolic.

On November 18, 1963 at an Inter-American Economic and Social Committee meeting in Sao Paulo it was decided to creat a Labor Affairs Commission to study how to upgrade the role of labor within the Alliance. Yet by then it was too little, too late. The Commission was supposed to give the Alliance new energy, but it never got off the ground. The urban workers should have been a vital part of any "democratic revolution" from the very beginning; however, the Administration did not trust worker's movements in the fear that if they were given power, they might radicalize. The strategy was to give the middle and upper classes the power and motivation to make changes in the living conditions of the poor; yet, this had been tried before with no measurable success. The Administration's conservatism was the Alliance's biggest enemy.

The Administration continuously used the word "revolution" in its rhetoric, but nobody could agree exactly what the word meant. Thomas Mann, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American affairs has noted that "to a Latin American, revolution means blood and shooting in the streets. And I think we here in this country define everything as a revolution, from the Industrial Revolution on down."[55] Ambassador Loeb in Peru wrote a memo to Ralph Dungan in which he asked if "we [the U.S. officials] fully understand the implications of what we like to call the 'democratic revolution?' . . . I have sometimes had the impression that we are seeking a nice, neat, tidy, packaged revolution which will harm no one and benefit everyone. This would be fine if we can get it, but, however sound the economic premises may be, this conception flies in the face of all we know about the political dynamics of social change."[56]

Land Reform

One of the vital prerequisites for a successful Alliance, which would promote real changes in the Latin American societies, was the need for a planned and systematic land reform program. Schlesinger, on his return from Latin America had described the "semi-feudal" conditions of many rural areas where a very few owned most of the land and where the rural population was competely dependent on the latifundias. The Alliance called for an agrarian reform; it

[54]*George Meany, Oral History, p. 53, JFKL.*
[55]*Thomas Mann, Oral History, p. 14, JFKL.*
[56]*Arthur Schlesinger, Personal Papers, Box 14, Folder: Latin America,* Letter from Ambassador Loeb to Ralph Dungan, *March 7, 1963, JFKL.*

was proof, Administration officials argued, of the Administration's willingness to change from the past American attitude of never threatening private property.

One has to question, however, the Administration's support for agrarian reform since the Charter of Punta del Este did not specify in any way how that land reform was to be achieved.

> Whereas the targets of the Alliance for Progress in housing and education were quantified in the Charter of Punta del Este, agrarian reform goals, in the term of number of peasants to be given land or the desirable ration of family farm owners to farm laborers, were not specifically stated. The US offered no new ideas on agrarian reform, but simply urged the Latin Americans to adopt the modern US agricultural system of farmer-businessman, supported by "agri-business" services, with some special emphasis on cooperatives for the small farmer.[57]

The roots of the land problem go back to the Spanish conquest. During the colonial era, the land in Latin America was distributed by the Spanish Crown to the conquistadors. Even though many areas were not occupied until the Nineteenth Century, the land was divided up by the Sixteenth Century and given to a small group of people who then gave the property to their descendants. The property title included the land and the "ownership" of the people that were living on that land. These Indian peasants subsequently became dependent on the latifundio system. This was a very different system from that adopted in North America, where after independence the land was gradually distributed in relatively small parcels by the government after most of the indigenous population had been eliminated.[58] The latifundio system produced a new class that not only had economic power, but also had complete control of the local government in the rural areas. These were people that for generations enjoyed complete political power and huge amounts of financial wealth; it was going to take more than rhetoric to convince these people that, for the good of the nation, they had to sell their source of power. Even if, somehow, they could have been convinced to sell their land, there were still many obstacles left.

A land reform program needed funds to pay the owners for their land, and to supply the new owners (the peasants), with support (credit, tools, seeds). The governments needed revenue to pay for all of this, yet the tax collection system in most Latin American countries was very primitive. so there was a need for a tax reform. Yet, when people see a new tax reform coming they take their money out of the country. This can be stopped by forcing exprop-

[57] *Levinson and Onis, p. 229.*

[58] *Gary Wynia,* The Politics of Latin American Development, *(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 9.*

riated latifundia owners to invest in the country and by putting a halt to the export of private capital. In other words, what begins as a straight forward land reform ends up transforming inself into major changes in the economy that will leave many people, not only latifundia owners, unhappy. It was going to take a lot of American aid, in addition to economic and agriculture advisers, to achieve a productively efficient land reform. It would have also taken a certain amount of boldness and confidence for the Administration to produce the drastic changes in the economy that were needed to achieve a comprehensive land reform proposal. The Administration was not willing to reduce the "semi-feudal" rural conditions when it realized that doing so would mean radical changes in the status quo.

Schlesinger explained the US dilemma in the following way: "The problem of stagnation, rural and urban, unemployment and poverty, could not be tackled . . . without revising the land holding system that reserved good lands for a few and sent an endless flow of campesinos to the stinking slums of the cities." However, (Schlesinger quotes J.K. Galbraith) it is an illusion to suppose that land reform is "something that a government proclaims on any fine morning — that it gives land to the tenants as it might give pensions to old soldiers . . . In fact, land reform is a revolutionary step; it passes power, property and status from one group in the community to another."[59]

Hondura's land reform proposal exemplifies the Administration's fear of reforms. Theoretically the land reform program provided for payment in cash for whatever lands were taken over. However, Ambassador Burrows has noted that "they [the government of Honduras] had no cash to pay, and it would have resulted in just seizing the land . . . All land had to be under cultivation or in use, or it was subject to expropriation."[60] The land reform proposal was met with stiff opposition from the fruit companies. The companies had the habit of leaving thousands of acres unused in case there was an "emergency" on the land that was being used; this was a good business practice for the companies, but it had horrible effects on the economy of Honduras. This was, after all, wasted land.

Burrows sent a copy of the land reform law to Washington and asked for advice. However, "there was nobody in Washington who was prepared to do what we asked . . . Although everybody theoretically was in favor of agrarian reform at that time, they couldn't give us from Washington any reasonable critique . . . "[61] In other words, nobody in the State Department had the knowledge to be able to decide whether the reform proposal was a good one. Even though land reform was supposed to be a vital part of the Alliance, the

[59]*Hellman and Rosenbaum (ed.), p. 70.*
[60]*Charles Burrows, Oral History, p. 14, JFKL.*
[61]*Burrows, pp. 14-15.*

fact that nobody at the State Department had the job of analyzing land reform programs is an indication of how much importance the Administration placed on land reform.

The fruit companies were unwilling to compromise. The President of Honduras, Villeda Morales, panicked and went to Washington where he was told to cancel the land reform law. On his way back to Honduras, Villeda stopped in Miami where he met with fruit company officials. They had, what Ambassador Burrows calls "a very satisfactory conversation" and as a result Villeda Morales promised to make major revisions in the law.[62]

The Administration called for a revolution, yet it was anything but revolutionary. Perhaps what made it worse was that there seemed to be an honest concern about the poverty in Latin America; there seemed to be a willingness to try something new. Yet, when it came down to it, the Administration retreated to orthodoxy. Roberto Campos, the Brazilian Ambassador to the US, has noted the conservatism of the Administration as applied to his own country: "The Administration and the Alliance became . . . extremely timid and overly conservative in their appraisal of economic and political phenomena in Latin America. Certainly, despite his [Kennedy's] obvious interest in Brazil, and his realization of the Brazilian potential, and perhaps his affection for Brazil, Brazil got actually very little from the Alliance . . . There was a gap between the generous intention and the rather reticent performance of the administrative machinery."[63]

At first, Administration officials did not fully understand the consequences of their rhetoric. After a few months, when they finally understood that there was a need for radical change, and their policies, and even their rhetoric, turned upwards the defense of the status quo of poverty and totalitarianism.

> Kennedy and his advisors displayed a willful ignorance about the nature of revolution. Authentic revolution strikes both widely and deeply, touching every aspect of social life, uprooting and remaking economic, political and cultural patterns. Kennedy's proposed revolution had no such intent; it was designed to preserve as much as to change. It spoke of saving "the heritage of centuries of Western civilization," a euphemism for a social order that was basically stagnant, repressive and unjust.[64]

In the end nothing proved more conclusively the conservatism of the Administration, than its unmitigated support for the military. Whether it was military aid, support for old military regimes or support for military coups, the Admin-

[62] *Ibid.*
[63] *Roberto Campos, Oral History, pp. 54-55, JFKL.*
[64] *Miroff, p. 131.*

istration proved that its allegiance to the democratic process in Latin America was merely rhetorical. The Administration unabashedly strengthened the most anti-democratic group of the Latin America societies; the military.

The Role of the Military

A very important part of US-Latin American relations during this century has been US support for the Latin American military forces. It is believed that a strong military is the best way to prevent serious attempts to undermine the status quo. It has been US policy to support almost any military leader as long as he remains loyal to the US and as long as there are open markets for American companies.

Dozens of times, the US has backed military dictatorships (Samoza in Nicaragua, Stroessner in Paraguay, Perez Jimenez in Venezuela, Duvalier in Hiati, Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, etc.) in the fear that if they fail to do so, radical elements will take over. It is one of the greatest ironies that the "leader of the free world" has helped maintain most of Latin America under tyrannies for most of the twentieth century.

When the Alliance was being planned in Washington there were statements by the Administration that the time had come for the US to cease its unconditional support for dictators. In addition, the US was going to reduce the levels of funding for the Latin American militaries. Three years later, however, nothing else could be further from the truth.

The Administration was very concerned about insurrectional movements. President Kennedy set, as a priority, the need to prepare counter-insurgency (CI) plans in almost every country in Latin America. On June 28, 1961 Kenndey wrote a memo to the National Security Council explaining the importance of CI operations:

> It is important that we anticipate now our possible future requirements in the field of unconventional warfare and paramilitary operations. A first step would be to inventory the paramilitary assets we have in the US Armed Forces, consider various areas in the world where the implementation of our policy may require indigenous para-military forces, and thus arrive at a determination of the goals which we should get in this field. Having determined the assets and the possible requirements, it would then become a matter of developing a plan to meet the deficit.[65]

There was a belief in the Administration that many countries in Latin America

[65] *National Security Files, Box 330, Folder: NSAMs 51-70,* National Security Action Memorandum *#56, written by President Kennedy, June 28, 1961, JFKL.*

were vulnerable to radical movements. The Administration's public solution was to try to raise the levels of poverty and create democratic institutions through the Alliance. The Administration, however, without the propaganda and public relations of the Alliance, quietly began strengthening the Latin American militaries through more military aid and training for Latin American officers.

During the first six months of the Administration, there were courses created at Fort Gulick (Panama Canal Zone); Fort Bragg, North Carolina; and Fort Holabird, Maryland, that specialized on CI and mob and riot controls. In addition, in May of 1961, a joint State Department-Defense message directed at US personnel in Latin America ordered them to "seize every oppotunity to acquaint their host country counterpart with the danger of Castro-Communism."[66] The memo adds that the "[p]rovision has been made for the assignment to the Latin American missions of officers trained in internal security subjects. In addition to serving as advisors on internal security matters, these officers will give the mission chiefs a greater capability to explain and encourage the use of available internal security training."[67]

There was also an increase in the use of mobile teams that went throughout the Americas to provide training to officers in their own countries.

Arthur Schlesinger wrote in his report to the President in March of 1961 about the dangers of US support for the military to "protect the hemisphere from external attacks:"

> No one believes this thesis any more; obviously Communism is aiming to conquer Latin America by penetration and not by invasion. But in the meantime our own services have established direct relations with their counterparts in Latin America and have fanned the desires of Latin America's service chiefs for new appropriations and new weapons. This means persistent military pressure on national budgets (Brazil, Peru, Chile and Argentina all devote a quarter or more of their national budget to military expenditures) and on civilian governments and this pressure increases both economic and political instability.[68]

The Administration, however, increased the sales of warfare weapons. During he 1961-65 period Latin American countries spent an average of $1.5 billion on military weapons while the average US aid during the same period was $1.1 billion.[69] At the same time, the Kennedy Administration increased

[66] *National Security Files, Box 331, Folder: NSAMs 71-98, NSAM 88, October 16, 1961, JFKL.*
[67] *Ibid.*
[68] *President's Office File, Box 121A, Folder: Latin America, JFKL.*
[69] *Eduardo Frei, "The Alliance That Lost Its Way"*, Foreign Affairs, *April 1967.*

the civil police and the military's ability to deal with "insurgency" movements. In most of these countries there was very little guerilla activity, yet the Administration continued to strengthen the military at a record pace.

The Administration did not see any contradiction between the "goals" of the Alliance (political stability, economic growth, social justice and support for democratic institutions) and the relentless (and reckless) strengthening of the military. It became obvious that the Administration's real goal was the suppression of "communist movements" while the formation of democratic societies retained a secondary importance. Schlesinger has admitted that "it is not possible to doubt that, on balance, the US contribution to police training in Latin America gave the status quo a new and nasty weapon employed promiscuously against all forms of dissent."[70]

In fact, the Administration saw the economic aid and the military aid as complimentary. In a State Department Policy Paper it was argued that "[b]oth economic and military aid can indirectly enhance the effectiveness of the other. By improving law and order, military and paramilitary programs can increase the productivity of economic progress."[71] The Administration chose to ignore the long list of examples in which the Latin American military, using the excuse of maintaining "law and order", had overthrown democratic governments and then prohibited the organization of political parties, disbanded national assemblies and censured the press. The Administration, however, did not seem to be interested in such trivial matters. Walter La Feber has argued that "the military forcefully maintained the status quo for the oligarchs. The transformation of police forces was notable. Under AID which operated the Alliance program from Washington, these forces learned to use gas guns, helicopters, and other anti-riot equipment. For this newly powerful elite, it proved to be only a short step to controlling dissent through sophisticated methods of torture."[72]

In April of 1962, there was a joint State Department-AID-Defense memo sent to Third World Ambassadors (the list is still classified) that argued that the Administration was not only interested in countering guerilla warfare, but was also interested in preventing "urban coups and demonstrations. Also important are capabilities for counter-subversion and maintenance of public order which [could be] lumped under the heading of preventive medicine."[73]

Liberals, such as Schlesinger, argued that the "reforms" of the Alliance were not enough. ". . . while the Alliance was the best way of attacking the

[70] *Hellman and Rosenbaum (ed.), p. 75.*
[71] *National Security Files, Box 373, Folder: Foreign Aid, Internal State Department Report titled:* Some Relations Between Economic and Military Assistance, *March 9, 1962, JFKL.*
[72] *Walterh La Feber,* Inevitable Revolutions, *(New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1983), p. 151.*
[73] *National Security Files, Boix 373, Folder: Foreign Aid, State — AID — Defense Memo, April, 1962. JFKL.*

long run sources of communist appeal, it would not by itself ward off short-run attempts at disruption and subversion . . . vitamin tablets will not save a man set upon by hoodlums in an alley."[74] AID Administrator David Bell, in seeking larger than ever funds for military assistance for the fiscal year 1964, argued the "[t]he use of military assistance for internal security purposes is predicated upon the fact that military forces have an essential role as a stabilizing force in these countries."[75] Murat Williams, Ambassador to El Salvador argued that emphasis on CI and its subsequent strengthening of the military "didn't always improve [El Salvador's] position as a Republic, but it [made] it stronger from a security standpoint."[76]

Both strengthening the military and the implementation of the Alliance had the same goal: to prevent the mobilization of leftist forces that might sooner or later produce another Cuba. Yet, they both had another unforeseen consequence: they destroyed the democratic left and center, the only group that would have been able to create democratic reforms. Schlesinger has said that the "CI business was a great blind spot on the New Frontier. In our concern with protecting the external processes of democracy, we were too far removed from what the thugs were doing behind the screen."[77] For all the cynicism that can be applied to the Administration's real intentions (i.e., rhetoric versus actual implementation), one cannot prove that they actually preferred military governments over democratic governments. They did, however, increase the power and the resources of the militaries. Between 1961 and 1966 military forces overthrew nine Latin American governments.[78] The military destroyed not only the radical movements, but also the leftists and centrists movements. To the Latin American military the moderate progressives were as dangerous as the communists. The Administration created a monster and then was unable to control it. The Kennedy liberals continued to strengthen the military while, through the Alliance, they weakened the democratic groups.

To make things worse, the Administration not only supported the military in those countries that had civilian governments, but they also gave support to oppressive military governments, in some cases over other nations that had civilian governments. A case in point was the sugar quota for the year 1962. Nicaragua, under the Somoza dictatorship, received a quota of 50,000 tons; while neighboring democratic Costa Rica received a quota of 5,000 tons. The President of Costa Rica, Mario Echandi wrote to Kennedy where he expressing bewilderment over the fact that Nicaragua recieved a quota ten times larger

[74] *Schlesinger*, A Thousand Days, *p. 774.*
[75] *Barber, "Can the Alliance for Progress Succeed?"*, Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science, *January 1964, p. 82.*
[76] *Murat Williams, Oral History, p. 33, JFKL.*
[77] *Hellman and Rosenbaum (ed.), p. 75.*
[78] *Walter La Feber, "Inevitable Revolutions"*, Atlantic Magazine, *June 1962, p. 76.*

than Costa Rica's even though the Nicaraguan production was not much higher than Costa Rica's and in Nicaragua "the sugar is concentrated in two or three large companies, the one belonging to the Somoza family and the San Antonio Sugar Mill . . ."[79] Costa Rica had an institutionalized democracy and a much more equitable and fair distribution of land (two of the biggest "goals" of the Alliance). The Administration decided to punish the democracy while helping the tyranny. President Echandi finishes his letter by saying that "[t]his discrimination, I repeat, is inexplicable to the people of Costa Rica and to me; it is already being used by the Communist Party of Costa Rica to strengthen its campaign against the US"[80] Even though President Kennedy promised Echandi to study the problem, the quotas remained the same.[81]

Another flagrant example of US support of a dictatorship arose in January of 1962, when the US attempted to have Cuba expelled from the OAS. Some of the major countries (Brazil, Mexico and Argentina) were opposed to the idea. The vote came down to a tie with the deciding vote up to "papa Doc" Duvalier, President of Haiti. Duvalier was perhaps the worst tyrant in Latin America; his ruthless regime had killed thousands upon thousands of people while many other thousands were in jail for "political crimes." During the first idealistic days of the Alliance, the US had cut off aid to Haiti because of Duvalier's crimes. Yet, under the need to get his vote, the US resumed giving financial support to Haiti. Schlesinger, describing the embarrasing situation has written that "[w]e finally yielded to blackmail and agreed to resume our aid to the airport at Port Au Prince."[82]

The priorities of the Administration were painfully clear; a symbolic gesture of throwing Cuba out of the OAS became more important than obeying the rules of the Charter and the ideals of the Alliance which offered aid and assistance only to those governments that worked "within democratic structures." After this incident, the Somoza's of Latin America realized that the Administration's liberalism was nothing more than words; the "leader of the free world" was not going to threaten their dictatorship as long as they were pro-Western and on Washington's side of the cold war.

The Administration, for all its democratic rhetoric, moved very cautiously in the face of military coups. On March 29, 1962, the President of Argentina, Arturo Frondizi (a loyal supporter of the Alliance) was overthrown by the military. Other democratic Presidents around the hemisphere began to get nervous as their own militaries began to study the possibilities of a coup. (A. Loeb, American Ambassador to Peru, wrote a telegram to Secretary of State

[79] *National Security Files, Box 35, Folder: Costa Rica 4/62-12/62,* Letter from President Echandi to President Kennedy, *June 24, 1962, JFKL.*
[80] *Ibid.*
[81] *National Security Files, Box 35, Folder: Costa Rica 4/62-12/62, JFKL.*
[82] *Schlesinger,* A Thousand Days, *p. 717.*

Rusk stating that the "[i]mpact of Argentine crisis on Peru immediate and powerful. Military sees complete analogy with Armed Forces moving against totalitarianism influences (sic) in Argentina and Peru military do here against APRA"[83] (which was the democratic ruling party in Peru.) Two months later there was a military coup in Peru. For the sake of the Alliance, and democracy in Latin America, the democratic leaders begged Washington to come out with a strong statement against the coup. The Administration, however, refused.

Other governments, however, were firm in their reaction to the coup. President Betancourt of Venezuela issued a statement condemning the coup and reduced relations between both countries to a minimum. Betancourt wrote a telegram to Kennedy in which, ironically enough, the President of a small Latin American country, which by 1962 had only enjoyed five years of democracy during the twentieth century, reminded the President of the US about his duty to support democracy:

> . . . it appears desirable to adopt a firm position in order to make the perpetrators of the Argentine coup d' etat understand that they have lost all international support . . . We shall refuse to grant diplomatic recognition to the government formed in Buenos Aires. My government was one of the first governments in Latin America to adopt a position of active repudiation of the Communist regime that has usurped the power in Cuba. It now adopts that same position of active repudiation of the regime installed in Argentina.[84]

Betancourt was following the rules of the Alliance; he was willing to criticize and remove his support of all totalitarian governments, whether of the left or right, that did not allow political freedoms. The liberal American Administration, however, was not as committed to democracy as Betancourt. President Kennedy answered Betancourt a few days later:

> I fully sympathize with the considerations which lay behind your initial reaction. A contagion of military coups d' etat would be a shattering blow to the hemisphere. Our hopes for the Alliance for Progress must rest on the ever-growing strength and vitality of our dmocratic processes (sic).
> The question remains how we may best contribute to strengthening democratic institutions in Argentina. I have concluded, after long

[83] *President's Office Files, Arthur Schlesinger, Box 65A, Folder: 1/62-5/62,* Memo to Secretary of State Rusk written by Ambassador Loeb, *March 29, 1962, JFKL.*

[84] *National Security Files, Box 192, Folder: Venezuela,* Letter to President Kennedy written by Romulo Betancourt, *March 29, 1962, JFKL.*

> personal reflection and after consultation with our colleagues in the OAS, that these interests would best be served by resumption of normal relationships with the government of Argentina. My fear is that the failure to do this will only play into the hands of the extremists.[85]

One wonders what can be more "extremist" than an overthrow of a democratically elected government. The Administration once again proved that it was only concerned with left-wing extremism; while right-wing extremism was simply an ugly, but somehow tolerable fact.

Conclusions

Schlesinger's liberalism understood the roots of the problems in Latin America. However, that same liberalism was more afraid of the consequences of the treatment than of the disease itself. For the Alliance to have succeeded it would have had to implement bold changes in US policy. There had to be moral and financial support for those groups that really represented the democratic majority. There should have been support for the labor and peasants; to exclude them was asking for failure, because they were, after all, the only ones that could create the democratic revolution. In fact, the Administration was left without allies in Latin America. With its strident rhetoric it alienated the elites that had always been supportive of the US; and with the lack of a real commitment to change to support that rhetoric, they alienated the middle and lower-class progressives.

A couple of years after the Alliance debacle, Arthur Schlesinger argued that "it was unrealistic to expect Latin American governments to enact overnight land and tax reforms revising the basic structures of power in their societies . . ."[86] While it is true that reforms were going to take a lot of time, his argument misses the point. The fact is that the US did not commit itself to the drastic changes that were needed for real reform; we cannot blame the Latin American political and economic leaders for looking out for their own interests. However, we can blame an Administration that seemed to understand the roots of the problem, but was unwilling to do anything about it. Twelve years after the death of President Kennedy, Schlesinger finally understood why the Alliance failed. He asked:

> Could the Kennedy Administration resolutely hold to the Alliance goals in the face of the backlash that would inevitably be the

[85]*National Security Files, Box 192, Folder: Venezuela,* Letter to Romulo Betancourt by President Kennedy, April 17, 1962, JFKL.
[86]Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, *p. 784.*

> determined pursuit of these goals? Could the Administration stay the course when the price could be manifold? — violent opposition from those in Latin America whose privileges were threatened, social turbulence that drove away foreign capital and could be plausibly claimed to "play into the hands" of the communists in a tense period in the cold war . . . The answer is that not even the Kennedy Administration could stick to the course.[87]

Democratic values, groups and institutions were sacrificed for the "greater good" of preventing the expansion of communism. On many occasions the Administration had to choose between constitutional democracy and social justice on the one hand and the protection of "national interests" on the other: almost every time they chose the latter. At first it seemed that the Alliance was born from hope, idealism, and pragmatic willingness to change which were the foundations of what Schlesinger called the new liberalism. However, as the Alliance developed, it became another American aid program based on cold war paranoia, using all tools available to undermine leftist movements.

The Administration naively simplified the conflicts in Latin America. They divided millions of people into "communists" and "anti-communists" (as defined by the State Department) without realizing that in Latin America there are a myriad of ideological groups. This over-simplification led them to assist the fervent anti-communist groups (which were usually not democratic and which achieved their goals through repression and violence), without thinking about the harmful consequences to the already weak civilian democratic governments. At the same time, the Administration fueled the hopes of many mainstream Latin Americans, who waited in vain for the "miracles" of the Alliance.

Senator Frank Church explained the contradictions inherent in the Alliance; "We failed because we had neither the ability to impose reform from outside nor the will to pursue it from within. The one was simply impossible; the other went against the priority of our own interests as we conceived them. However much we may have wanted reform and development, we wanted "stability", anti-communism and a favorable investment climate more."[88]

Schlesinger once prided himself in the fact that his liberal "center" was the only solution to the world's problems.

> Conservatism in its crisis of despair turns to fascism: so progressivism in its crisis of despair turns to Communism. Each in a sober mood has a great contribution to make free society: the

[87] *Hellman and Rosenbaum (ed.), pp. 72-73.*
[88] *Hellman and Rosenbaum (ed.), p. 83.*

> conservative in his emphasis on law and liberty, the progressive in his emphasis on mass welfare. But neither is capable of saving free society. Both faced by problems they cannot understand and fear to meet, tend to compound their own failure by delivering free society to its totalitarian foe.[89]

Yet, it was the liberal "center" that supported the feudalistic landed classes, and supplied the military with arms and training at a pace never before seen in history; it was the liberal "center" that supported the few wealthy elites over the workers and peasants and it was the sacred "center" who supported tyrants, such as Somoza, over democratic presidents.

Many of the problems that the US is having today in the hemisphere, and especially in Central America, are a direct result of the failures of past American Administration. Of course, Eisenhower and Johnson are as much to blame; yet one feels that the Kennedy Administration had the potential to really make changes. They seemed to be more compassionate and understanding in their analyses of Latin America's problem. The fact that they at least attempted to come up with a program such as the Alliance proved that they originally felt that there was a need for reforms. It seems to me that the original intentions of the Administration were noble; yet they were unwilling to take the bold and risky actions to put that idealism into effect. When it came down to it, the Administration panicked and returned to the orthodox policies of the past.

Arthur Schlesinger once measured the freedom of a society by asking three questions: 1) Do the people have relative security against the ravages of hunger, sickness, and want? 2) Do they freely unite in continuous and intimate association with like-minded people for common purposes? and 3) Do they as individuals have a feeling of initiative, function and fulfillment in the social order?[90] These questions were answered poignantly in an article written by Ted Kennedy in 1970 (around the time when, according to the Charter, the goals of the "democratic revolution" were supposed to have been achieved):

> The Alliance has been a political failure. It was intended to write a new page of political history in Latin America to end the depressing chapter of family dictatorship and military coups. Instead, thirteen constitutional governments have been overthrown in nine years. Today in eleven Latin American republics military governments rule, supported by hundreds of millions of dollars in Amer-

[89] *Schlesinger*, The Vital Center, *p. 50.*
[90] *Schlesinger, p. 249.*

> ican military assistance. In some of these nations, basic human rights are violated and the democratic ideals of the Alliance have vanished . . .
>
> It is a personal failure that I can repeat nearly the same somber statistics about Latin America that President Kennedy cited in 1960 . . . For the vast majority of Latin America, the Alliance has failed. Nearly 30 percent of the population still die before their fortieth birthday. Poverty, malnutrition and disease continue to deny strength and incentive to the majority of the people in Latin America . . . There is still a 55 percent dropout rate in primary schools, and for 100 students who enter the first grade more than 75 will have dropped out by the time they finish high school.[91]

The Kennedy Administration's Latin American policy is paradoxical because in theory, they seemed to understand that the discontent in Latin America, and the subsequent search for radical alternatives, was a response to the poverty and the oppression. However, they were unwilling to implement thei "liberal" ideals. They were frightened that a change of policy would undermine the anti-communist sectors of the societies.

The Administration sacrificed the interests of the democratic groups to prevent the rise of leftist movements and possible alternatives to the establishment. If the goal of the Alliance was to prevent another Cuba, then it was very successful (at least in the short-run). Yet, if we measure the Alliance, using its own goal of creating democratic societies, then it was an utter failure. As long as US policy towards Latin America continues to be distorted by cold war paranoia (explaining every conflict as having been masterminded in the halls of the Kremlin), failures such as the Alliance will continue to occur. By supporting dictators who keep their people in poverty and misery, we will, in the long-run achieve exactly what we do not want: the growth of radical movements. Today we see the growth of communist movements in those nations (Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala) where the poverty levels are the highest and where tyrants have governed (with US support and assistance) for most of the century.

[91] *Edward Kennedy, "Beginning Anew in Latin America"*, Saturday Review, *October 17, 1970.*

Arms Control, Cruise Missiles, and the Euro-Strategic Imbalance

Michael Brown

The aftermath of World War Two left the fate of the world largely in the hands of two Superpowers — the United States (US) and the Soviet Union (USSR) — each the only threat to the other's primary national goal, survival. Strategic nuclear policy, as a component of foreign policy, must serve to protect our survival and freedom, and those of our allies. In the past, these needs have been met by a policy of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) whereby war is avoided because the cost, assured destruction of the aggressor, is too high to justify any conceivable benefit. This balance of terror rests on the assumption that an invulnerable, and thereby credible, second strike ability on both sides will allay fear and entrench stability. The Soviets' massive conventional, strategic, and tactical nuclear build–up of the last ten years, in addition to their emphasis on war–fighting ability, air and civil defense doctrine, and political aggressiveness, has altered this precarious balance. Because the Soviets "assign to their military capabilities a political utility,"[1] the politico–military ramifications of this strategic imbalance are vital. A failed or insufficient attempt to rectify this, by seriously eroding confidence in the West's ability and will to defend itself against Soviet ideological, political, and military expansionism, would widen the path down which the communist monolith is intent on traveling. Any arrangement to deal with this problem must be reconciled politically, ideologically, and militarily with this increasingly accepted world view.[2]

The political ramifications of any solution are at least as weighty as the military ones, especially as the USSR assumes and takes into account the fungibility of its military power. An understanding of the political balance is

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[1] *Robert Pfaltzgraff and Jacquelyn Davis,* The Cruise Missile: Defense Bargain or Bargaining Chip? *(Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc., 1977) p. 52.*

[2] *The theme of a crusade, a continual ideological and military battle of East versus West, is prevalent in the Reagan Administration and especially in Reagan's speeches. (his foreign policy address of January 16, 1984 is a prime example). Russian leaders from Lenin to Andropov have expressed similar beliefs. Much of it is rhetoric, but if the principals believe it or even repeat it enough times, it becomes fact.*

as important in assessing the merits of a solution as a knowledge of the military balance.

NATO policy has long countered Soviet/Warsaw Pact conventional superiority and continental nuclear superiority with the American nuclear umbrella. As the credibility of the umbrella decreases, so does the probability that the US can, and will defend Europe. In fact, as European anti-nuclear protestor's howls to keep American nukes out of Europe have risen, so have voices in the US bureaucracy. They advocate the removal of American troops unless the Allies accept a greater burden of the costs of this defense. This division, which rests, to a certain extent, on differing American and European perceptions of defense, deterrence, and Soviet intentions, is exploited by the Soviets via their dual policy for the neutralization (Finlandization) of Western Europe: namely, seduction and fear, the proverbial carrot and the stick. Soviet reaction to the 1979 NATO decision to deploy US Pershing IIs and cruise missiles, if arms control talks did not progress, vividly illustrates this point. West European foot-dragging in raising their defense commitments, and growing Soviet involvement and leverage in West Europe's political economy, is worrisome to the US. This problem is reinforced on the other side of the Atlantic by European fear of America "de–coupling" her strategic arsenal from the defense of Europe, as well as, confusingly enough, the feeling that US nuclear weapons in Europe could serve to provoke — not deter — war! Even the encouraging political developments of the Thatcher and Kohl elections are mollified by the growing popularity of the anti–nuke/anti–NATO Social Democrats in Germany and the British Labor Party, which runs on a "no–nuke defense" platform.

US policy, whether it be unilateral deployments, bilateral agreements or some combination thereof, must make it unnecessary for Western Europe to cut a political deal with Moscow due to a fear of Kremlin military power. It must also deny the USSR any leverage to impose a deal. To do this, any solution must achieve both crisis and long–term stability. In addition, considering the extreme political importance of any solution, the new policy must be founded on a real, as well as perceived, equivalence in capabilities. It is unlikely, faced with the fact of the Soviet military build-up, that arms control agreements alone can accomplish this. Still, of increasing importance in aligning capabilities and intentions, is the development of a survivable force structured to fight and "win" a war. This same force must be able to "facilitate the negotiation of equitable and verifiable arms control agreements"[3] in the future. The deployment of cruise missiles in Europe, owing to their war-fighting ability, survivability, and flexibility, may serve this pupose — possibly

[3]*William Taylor and Amos Jordan,* American National Security: Policy and Process *(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), p.* 222.

in concert with some informal, bilateral measures.

It is imperative in defining policies not to confuse ends with means. Arms control is not an end. It is one mean, and not the only one, toward achieving security and broader strategic objectives. There are also unilateral methods, such as the deployment of the cruise missile, as well as gray areas in between, such as tacit "restraint and reciprocity" and other informal avenues. Only after recognizing the purpose of strategic forces can policies be coordinated and programs (such as the deployment of cruise missiles on arms control agreements) be pursued.

The general purpose of the United States' strategic forces is to deter and, if deterrence fails, to defend against an attack on the US or its allies. Deterrence necessitates establishing and maintaining crisis and long–term stability. Crisis stability exists when neither side has an incentive to launch a first strike, and so implies reliance on a survivable, credible second strike capability. Long–term stability exists if a technological advance (for example, a highly effective ballistic missile defense system) or a doctrinal change (as from MAD to war–fighting/winning) will not threaten the opponent's ability to respond, and thus the credibility of the deterrent.[4] As such, flexibility of options, political and military, is vital. Essential equivalence is another psychological/political aspect of deterrence. This facet of deterrence is rather difficult to measure due to doctrinal and force structure asymmetries. Nonetheless, it is a pivotal component of stability because West European and Soviet perceptions of non-essential equivalence, that is, Soviet superiority, would undermine confidence in the credibility of NATO's deterrent and thereby its effectiveness in promoting stability. Since the Soviets would logically seek political advantage from their position of military superiority, the absence of essential equivalence could lead to the eventual success of Soviet political goals. That is, the neutralization of Western Europe, with the benefit of not having to fire a single shot.

In the Euro-theatre, a policy of massive retaliation is no longer credible nor pursued. Present US policy is based on a strategy of Flexible Response, as embodied in part by the Air Land Battle 2000 (ALB2000) doctrine, which emphasizes forward defense and war–fighting deterrence. According to the US view, nuclear conflict would be most likely to occur if NATO was forced to choose between capitulation and escalation if it was engaged in conventional warfare with the Warsaw Pact. By raising defensive capabilities, NATO may be able to avoid this scenario, or at least make credible its threat of escalation. West Europeans, however, dislike the prospective financial and political burdens of a conventional, or in any way "Europeanized," defense. Instead, they prefer a lower nuclear threshold to deter war. This would minimize their

[4]*Charles Sorrels,* United States Cruise Missile Programs: Development, Deployment and Implications for Arms Control *(NY: McGraw Hill, 1983) p. 148.*

political and financial responsibilities via continued reliance on the US, especially the "visibility" of US strategic nuclear weapons. An effective and politically viable deterrent, then, requires credible and complementary conventional and nuclear components; a blurring of the fine line between nuclear and conventional conflict. Any solution to the European military imbalance must address these military and political ambiguities, especially considering the cruise missile's effectiveness in both conventional and nuclear warfare (and the difficulty in verifying which role it is playing at a given time), and, of course, its political vulnerability.

Limited Nuclear Options (LNO) (and their successors as embodied in PD 59) are an attempt to make Flexible Response credible and re-couple the American nuclear deterrent to the defense of Europe. They are meant to assure NATO of America's will to defend Europe. LNO's success depends on a survivable, flexible, nuclear deterrent. This credibility derives from their ability to provide symmetrical responses to Soviet aggression, which, unlike massive retaliation, do not inherently invite retaliation on the US. A posture that depends on sacrificing American cities in defense of European ones is not accepted as credible by NATO or by the USSR. Possibly, the enormous flexibility of cruise missiles, in their missions, arming, and launch platforms, by providing both a potent conventional defensive weapon consistent with ALB2000, and a survivable, credible second–strike capacity consistent with extended deterrence and Flexible Response, can transcend these political–military ambiguities if arms control cannot alleviate the threat it seeks to counter. Any progress, then, whether uni- or bi-lateral, must be judged by how it supports the strategy, and tenets, of (extended) deterrence, and the policy of Flexible Response. With this understanding of the role of nuclear force and the policies that support it, it is now possible to consider the implications of the available programs that affect those policies.

Arms control is the arena for military and political competition. The *military logic* of arms control is, in fact, dependent upon the *political assumptions* behind its formulation. As Michael Howard points out, the military is subservient to political objectives. It is important to iterate that arms control should not be seen as an end in itself — that end being to change political behavior — but rather, as the pursuit of military advantage by "other means." The fundamental political assumption of the Reagan Administration, and others, is that the USSR seeks military superiority over the US as a means of political advantage in their "historic" struggle with capitalism. Thus Reagan must combat the Soviets on two fronts, ideological and military,[5] which roughly parallel the two goals of arms control: 1) to reduce intensity of ideological confrontation through a clarification of intent, 2) to limit any potential threat

[5] *see footnote #2.*

by raising one's own capabilities or by limiting those of his adversary. To many conservatives, attempts at amelioration via arms control ignore the important lessons of the Munich Agreement and also ignore the Soviet view that self–defense against the "inevitable" rise of socialism is by definition aggressive, as is anything short of capitulation. Therefore, the main incentive for the US to enter into arms control agreements would be an opportunity to reduce Soviet capabilities. Even here, the starting point is contentious. The USSR believes parity exists under SALT II, and that negotiations must be based on that premise. Americans insist that Soviet superiority necessitates, in the interest of stability and peace, that the communists give up more, since they started with more and since essential equivalence must be one result of arms control agreements. The talks must lead to reductions, not just codifications of Soviet superiority.

The cognitive dissonance of the US — that the USSR seeks political advantages from its military power, that the US is militarily inferior, and that past arms control agreements are a part of the issue makes real compromise and thus positive results unlikely. In fact, if political considerations push the US into talks, these might even prompt a continued US build–up — the rationale being that this strengthens the US bargaining position, making an agreement more likely.[6] In other words, to be acceptable, arms control accords must accomplish what the US intended to attain anyway through unilateral actions. Although arms control has the added benefits of alleviating intra–alliance bickering, squelching demonstrations of the far left (especially in West Germany) and of thereby promoting alliance cohesion, an agreement that did not meet NATO security requirements would have the opposite effect on alliance cohesion. Arms control could also raise the manpower and financial burdens that the building of a conventional defense entails, and thus the political, social and economic burden of NATO membership, and at the same time lessen our determination by promoting the mistaken notion that arms control means a lessening of the Soviet politico–military threat. But, as many Europeans feel, arms control in itself must be good. Americans, remembering Soviet military progress during detente and under SALT I, regard any agreement as potentially dangerous, especially if it distorts security needs of deflects adequate funding for defense, compromising our ability and will to deter Soviet imperialism.[7] So arms control, to be viable, would have to have at least the same net military if not political effect as unilateral actions. That is, a US build–up or a Soviet build–down — probably an unacceptable notion for the USSR, whose premise is that parity already exists — and reductions, if any, should be equal. The contradiction between the US view of Soviet superiority and the Soviet view of parity may be the single largest obstacle to arms control agreements, especially considering the potential political con-

[6] *Strobe Talbott,* The Russians and Reagan, *(Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., 1984) p. 51.*
[7] *Jack Kemp,* An American Renaissance: A Strategy for the 1980s *(NY: Harper and Row, 1979) p. 173-176.*

sequences of West European (or Soviet) perceptions of non-essential equivalence. It could lead to the Soviets reaching their goal of neutralizing Western Europe, precisely what US/NATO hopes to prevent. Yet there are political and military incentives to negotiate on both sides, as well as proposals already on the table if talks resume. The power of the incentives and the expected effect of arms control agreements on security and foreign policy objectives will determine its ultimate fate.

Arms Control can have a positive effect on long–term stability if it is an on-going process, and not an occassional codification of the status quo. Limits on testing, research and development, and deployment of new technologies can serve to quell fears that a technological breakthrough, in ballistic missile defenses or cruise missiles for example, can threaten to make either side's defense investments obsolete and/or make deterrent posture vulnerable. Long-term stability in the strategic balance depends on each side's confidence in its own capabilities.

In the case of the cruise missile though, research and development testing, and deployment have already taken place. Furthermore, verification of the above is made virtually impossible by its flexibility. The various missions it can undertake, the numerous platforms it can leave from, and its ability to transport nuclear or conventional warheads make its war–fighting ability formidable. Its relatively cheap cost, enabling deployment of large numbers, offers NATO the ability to saturate the massive Soviet air defense system, while its maneuverability, range, low radar cross section and advanced TERCOM guidance system enable it to avoid radar systems and SAMs. The net result being that, with a high degree of confidence, NATO planners expect it to stay ahead of any Soviet technological breakthroughs in defense. By definition, this promotes long-term stability. Soviet fears of the cruise missile's first strike potential can be allayed to some extent by unilateral pledges, observable differences in security for nuclear and conventional launchers, and maybe even through building Functionally Related Observable Differences (FRODS) into cruise missiles and such confidence building measures as non–interference of National Technical Means. Similar methods were adopted by the USSR to assure the US on Backfire bomber capabilities. To limit the cruise missile option could be potentially very destabilizing to long-term stability.

Number and research and development limitations threaten the cruise missile's ability to saturate and evade the Soviet air defense in case of technological or numerical improvements in SAM, radar, or look–down/shoot-down systems. Research and development limits are also unverifiable as cruise misssiles are easily hidden and can be tested in wind tunnels. Also, by limiting the possible scopes of our conventional and nuclear responses, our ability to react to changes in Soviet war–fighting doctrine are hampered. By minimizing our leverage and maximizing theirs, long-term stability is threatened. In limiting our ability and credibility to react to technological change, our deterrent is

undermined. Limiting our conventional ability and flexibility could result in vulnerability in case Soviet strategic doctrine changed from quick thrust to, say, first use of nuclear weapons. Indeed it was the flexibility of our triad which made stability possible when the Soviets substituted war–fighting doctrine in place of MAD. Clearly, limiting our greatest technological resource at a time when it is our best, if not only, hedge against Soviet/Warsaw Pact quantitative superiority seems extremely unwise, and its potential destabilizing effects on long-term stability could be disastrous.

While flexibility is the key to long-term stability, an invulnerable, credible second strike force is the key to crisis stability because it supplies the opponent with a disincentive to launch a first strike. The cruise missile, by virtue of its ability, survivability and flexibility, offers great potential in this area of deterrence. With expected warning time, sea, ground, and air launched variants could be expected to survive a first strike, especially an expected conventional one with expected warning time. Its ability and numbers, as stated before, assures the credibility of its threat against even hardened targets, including those in the USSR, thus denying the Soviets a "safe haven" from which to wage war. A credible second strike is a vital component of deterrence. Attempts to limit range or numbers would be destabilizing, especially without corresponding reductions in Soviet air defenses and/or SS 20s. The range limits SALT II put on air-to-land cruise missiles, by requiring the bombers to fly closer to their targets and thus make them more vulnerable, degrades them as a threat and undermines crisis stability. The range limits imposed on sea launched missiles have the same effect. The less credible our deterrent, the greater the incentive to strike first against it. Soviet fears that cruise missiles could be a first strike weapon (like the SS20) is unreasonable considering NATO doctrine and cruise missile speed limitations. The unique flexibility, survivability, and penetrability of the cruise missile makes its value as a deterrent and stabilizer great. The costs of limiting it are directly proportional. And with the difficulties of verification, technology, it seems, may have made it impossible for arms control to promote crisis stability. For this reason, more emphasis may have to be given to restraint and reciprocal arrangements than to formal treaties, which, if they limited cruise missile deployment, might threaten both strategic stability and essential equivalence.

If the cruise missile can indeed give NATO confidence in its defense and deterrent power, the perception of essential equivalence that will result ensures that political benefits will accrue to the Atlantic Alliance. If the US perceives Soviet acceptance of this position of essential equivalence, then meaningful negotiations may take place, with the aim of reducing the threats to each competitor instead of codifying them. Acceptance of Reagan's proposed Zero Option, or Interim Solution, both of which, by setting intermediate range nuclear forces at equal levels, would require a Soviet reduction which might be possible if the USSR believed that US unilateral deployments would have

the same effect. In this sense, unilateral deployment (of the cruise missile) is consistent with arms control if it precedes it. That is, such a force structure could indeed facilitate arms control, while simultaneously offering a war–fighting ability and posing a strong deterrent. It clearly supports our imperative of building up to Soviet levels or forcing them to reduce to ours. This is due to the unique nature of the cruise missile and its near perfect match to US security strategies and policies.

One of the biggest incentives for the USSR to agree on limiting systems that the West fears is the possibility that, via our technological advantage, we will produce a "breakout" technology that will leave their vaunted defenses obsolete and offense vulnerable. We could offer trade-offs in our areas of strength (CM, bombers, SLBM), for reductions in the areas of Soviet power which concern us most. Ballistic missile defenses and SS 20s for example. This would be a policy of "tech-for-tat" instead of "tit-for-tat". The famous "walk in the woods" proposal, in fact, followed this logic. A reduction in SS 20s was to be exchanged for cancellation of the Pershing IIs (which the USSR believed were soon to be deployed MIRVed, and in larger numbers with increased range in the future). Cruise missile deployment was allowed presumably because the Soviets would not degrade their air defenses.

The West's reliance on flexibility and technology to offset the Warsaw Pact's quantitative superiority demands the use of the cruise missile as a stable deterrent, or at least as an effective king on the asymmetrical chess board of arms control. To gain the flexibility necessary for asymmetrical deals, though, INF and START talks would likely have to be merged. If there is no arms control, the political costs of this failure, and of the need to continue NATO deployments, will be high and reflect negatively on military capabilities by lowering alliance cohesion.

The political problems for the United States regarding arms control are intertwined. If the US reaches agreement, it must not be seen as a capitulation to Soviet military superiority, implying recognition of Soviet hegemony throughout Europe. If an accord appears impossible, the US must at least be seen as bargaining in earnest, lest Western Europe blame it for failing to bargain, producing a potentially hostile political atmosphere for the deployment of American missiles. Western Europe, it seems, always feels that the US is either too provocative, or, alternately, as not providing enough deterrent. Arms control, Joseph Nye believes, "establishes a sense of prudent management."[8] But the complications of simultaneously pursuing armament and arms control, as the 1979 NATO decision illustrates, are constantly at work. To the USSR arms control is a political tool — like detente — to use in its quest for a neutralized Western Europe. As Brezhnev has said:

[8] *Joseph Nye, "Restarting Arms Control,"* Foreign Affairs Journal, *1982, p. 101.*

> We do not conceal the fact that we see [arms control] as a way toward creation of a more favorable condition for peaceful Socialist and Communist construction . . . [We] subordinate [our] activities to this historic task.[9]

While from a military standpoint cruise missile restrictions may be important to the USSR by limiting US technological muscle, politically its main purpose is the undermining of NATO and promotion of the Finalandization of Western Europe.

To "help" West Germany "decide" to reject cruise missile deployment, Andropov promised both political and military concessions (carrots) to the head of the Social Democratic Party. When Germany held firm, the Soviets threatened dire consequences (the stick). The Soviet propoganda machine also funded most West European "no–nukes" rallies to put pressure on NATO governments. Ironically, initial deployment proceeded. This was due largely to perceptions of Soviet heavy-handedness which increased the determination of Kohl, Thatcher, and Reagan to persevere. This must be seen as a political loss for the Soviets considering their all (reject deployment . . .) or nothing (. . . or we will leave the talks) position. Because the Soviets left the talks, Reagan and NATO gained political leverage to push through military programs. It was not a total loss for the USSR though, as two NATO countries recently decided to delay their deployments pending progress in arms control. Essentially, despite setbacks, the policy of causing alliance friction is a no–lose proposition for the Kremlin and will probably continue. And the presence of leftist parties in Western Europe means that the West must be able to blame arms control failures as much as possible on Moscow. NATO must be seen as both willing and flexible in negotiations. Military programs will not be supported without the initial pursuit of political options.

Yet, even more difficult to overcome than the lessening of the alliance cohesion that may result from a lack of arms control, and the subsequent need to deploy American nuclear arms, is the political leverage Moscow would muster if an accord granted the perception of Soviet military superiority, with the implication of American acquiescence to Kremlin political goals.

> The greatest political — and in the end military — danger of American-Russian arms control deals is the wedge they tend to drive between America and its allies at a time when American technologial superiority is the West's best defense against [Russia] . . . The threatened closure of the cruise option for Europe makes this danger real. If a treaty [does not sugnificantly reduce Russian strength] . . . at the price of starting to unravel the Atlantic alliance, it would be . . . disastrous.[10]

[9] *Pfaltzgraff and Davis, p. 52.*
[10] *Sorrel, p. 167.*

If arms control did not stop the trend, now peaking, of Soviet military superiority, it would, by raising doubt about NATO's will and ability to resist Soviet expansionism, undermine stability. In light of this, the problems of overcoming domestic opposition to deployment are almost moot, especially since the first missiles have already been deployed. The political dangers of an unfavorable arms control agreement, then, are much greater than the political danger of deploying the cruise missiles, especially if it is perceived that cruise missiles can, indeed, establish a credible deterrent. So the big question mark becomes: Can cruise missiles pose a credible deterrent?

Cruse missile contribution to deterrence is through the revitalization of our conventional defense and strategic triad. For long-term stability this is important, because it allows NATO to overcome possible Soviet technological breakthroughs. Such a break-through in ASW, for example, could jeapordize our sea–based deterrent. Air-to-land cruise missiles (ALCM) and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM) may protect deterrence in this event, but deploying sea-to-land cruise missiles (SLCMs) on naval surface vessels can assure the survivability of the sea leg because there would simply be too many widely dispersed targets to destroy. And, armed with cruise missiles, each is a high priority target. GLCMS, through their mobility and flexibility, possess extraordinary interdiction capacity, capable of reacting to almost any change in Pact attack doctrine. ALCMs can, through their advanced guidance system, low detectability, and high penetrability, overcome advances in air defenses. And, if the USSR began deployment of an effective anti-ballistic missile after SALT II expires, the cruise missile option would become even more valuable. In ensuring a credible deterrent, even faced with the uncertainties in Soviet defensive ability and offensive plans, the cruise missile is a valuable aid to long-term stability.

The cruise missile can also blunt Soviet offensive postures and guarantee a survivable, credible, capable second strike force. Placing SLCM on a large number of naval surface vessels deployed in a vast ocean makes effective targeting, tracking, and destroying of these launch platforms almost impossible. A potent, secure second strike force will survive. With their accuracy and long range, they can protect NATO against political blackmail by credibly threatening targets inside the USSR, especially missile silos, so the USSR cannot securely withold a "blackmail force." To deny them this incentive safeguards crisis stability. Although bombers (and thus ALCMs) and GLCMs are vulnerable to surprise nuclear attack, it is expected that in case of impending danger there will be ample time to scatter bombers and hide GLCMs, especially against conventional moves. The incentive for launching a disarming "out of the blue" attack is negated by SLCM/SLBM survivability. The problems of defeating mobile GLCMs, scattering bombers and numerous surface ships are menacing to say the least. Enhancing the survivability of our strategic deterrent promotes crisis stability, and indeed, our political position.

With the knowledge that NATO maintains a deterrent to guard against blackmail and is capable of remaining credible despite changes in Soviet offensive or defensive strategies or abilities, Western Europe is in a stronger position to resist East bloc ambitions. The defensive power of cruise missiles adds to perceptions of essential equivalence, and it is in this political role that they are most important. If Europe believed itself capable of defending itself and confident of American support, then there would be little reason to think Western Europe would be vulnerable to Soviet threats, or susceptible to seduction.

The most important perception that cruise missile deployment affords is that NATO has the will and ability to take action against the threat posed by Soviet SS 20s and Backfire bombers. Another is the perception, even in the USSR, that the West can overcome Pact quantitative advantages by Western qualitative ones. Cruise missiles also contribute significantly to forward defense (ALB 2000). They have the ability not only to detect and relay information on Warsaw Pact troop and armor preparations, but can hamper them, especially when the troops are in a "quick–thrust" formation. By mine laying and electronic jamming, cruise missiles can disrupt Warsaw Pact supply lines vital to quick movement. The cruise missile's long range interdiction capacity can destroy C^3I and other support facilities. GLCMs, able to destroy "hard" targets with accuracy, would free bombers to pursue other support missions.

Conventional armaments on cruise missiles are extremely effective against concentrated troop movements. In this military role, and the political role of assuring our allies of the American commitment, cruise missiles doubly replace the abandoned neutron bomb. In fact, Robert Pfaltzgraf estimates that four MIRVed Tomahawk cruise missiles, with multiple anti–armor warheads, could seek–out and destroy up to two hundred enemy tanks![11] This military and cost effectiveness outpaces that of any other system on either side. Giving NATO this confidence in its strategic sufficiency, despite asymmetries in force structures and numbers, also gives the Warsaw Pact uncertainty about its chances for successful aggression. They would face what Richard Rosecrance deems "the slippery slope." Conventional defense is vital to deterrence. Cruise missiles deter by both defense and denial, and offer credence to essential equivalence and all of the political benefits of that perception.

It is imperative that the United States redress the military imbalance now looming over Europe. If it can do so by negotiated settlement with the Soviet Union, it should. However, the prospects for such an accord are slight because they require that the Soviets reduce their strategic forces while accepting some deployments by NATO, a politically untenable situation for the Soviets. A settlement that does not create a balanced strategic environment, credible deterrence, and essential equivalence is politically untenable for the US.

[11] *Pfaltzgraff and Davis, p. 36.*

Codifying the present Soviet superiority, or at least the perception of such, is akin to renouncing involvement in, and de–coupling the American strategic deterrent from the defense of Europe.

Unilateral deployments are necessary to redress the dangerous military imbalance we now face, and to entrench American support for Western Europe's independence. Once this is done, negotiations can take place with our improved defense/deterrence as a formidable bargaining chip. Strength and dialogue must walk together. If mutually agreeable, stabilizing reductions are either unnegotiable or found to be unverifiable, informal avenues must be explored. Tacit agreements may in fact eliminate some problems of formal treaties, like loopholes and verification, and pave the way for more comprehensive treaties later. The tacit approach may also relieve problems of the "prisoners' dilemma," where, since neither side knows the intent of the other, they must act to protect themselves, to the possible detriment of both. If informal agreements were to clarify intent, both sides could conceivably act together to reduce mutual threat, and both would gain.

Now is a momentous time in history. The West must decide whether it has the will to resist Soviet imperialism. Unfortunately, the USSR will probably not negotiate away its advantage. The West must begin to close the gap unilaterally. Agreements that pursue areas of mutual interest in a situation of parity, even if limited, can also promote deterrence and promote a stable status quo. Such agreements should be sought. Arms control as a diplomatic, political, and military tool cannot be scrapped. The destructive force of each Superpower's arsenal is such that national, if not global, survival is at stake. But, if the lessons of Munich and Detente are to be learned, we must not seek arms control for its own sake or in an attempt to change the nature of US–Soviet political relations. All concerned should realize, and must accept, that the essence of peaceful coexistence is competition, in both ideas and in arms. If one side ceases to compete, a stable peace cannot be ensured. We must find the formula that promotes both credible deterrence and peaceful competition, and we must do so before it is too late.

An Analysis of Government Sponsored Exchange Programs as Diplomatic Strategy

Tom Peirce

Because of the many budget cuts which the Reagan Administration is now initiating, many government agencies and programs are grinding to a halt. In theory, the cuts are in the best interest of the entire country, for they will decrease waste and reduce the national deficit. However, because economic theory can never take into account all the variables of a problem, it is more than likely that some short-sighted policies, with potentially devastating results, will be erroneously implemented. One such policy, which the current administration is leans towards, concerns the virtual elimination of all student exchange programs, the most notable being the Fulbright Scholarship Program.

There has been no time when student exchange programs, which attempt to create an understanding of values and interests between US citizens and foreign nationals, have been needed more. At the conclusion of the recent North–South summit in Cancun, President Reagan stated that "great progress has been made" in achieving an understanding between the US and fourteen developing nations.[1] In all likelihood, such a statement was political double talk, for, unfortunately, none of the leaders of the modernizing countries received that impression. In economic, political, and social terms, the heads of industrializing nations perceive the US as insensitive, and ignorant of their needs and concerns.[2]

The Cancun Summit and other upcoming events (such as strategic missile talks) demonstrate the fact that diplomacy is still a major foreign policy tool. Yet, unless the US can understand the other side, diplomacy is useless. A main source of knowledge of foreign cultures comes from the experiences of foreign-exchange students.[3] To abolish such programs could only be detrimental to the US in the long run.

To understand the full significance of the student exchange programs, one must study the impact they have had both domestically and abroad. Also, one

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[1] *John Meyers, "Here We All Are"*, Time Magazine, *Nov. 2, 1981, p. 19.*
[2] *Meyers, p. 20.*
[3] *John Richardson,* The Human Dimension of Foreign Policy: An American Perspective, *(Philadelphia: The American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1979), p. 120.*

must differentiate between long-term and short-term interests. The major error which the Reagan Administration has been making is that the exchange programs have only been studied for short-term, immediate results. Similarly, the impact these programs have had abroad has been overlooked and even shoved aside in a quest for dramatic domestic results.

As neither short-term results nor domestic effects have been overwhelming, the administration has proposed cuts in the exchange programs which would lessen their annual budget by an astronomical forty-five percent.[4] The exchange programs to be reduced, which are organized under the banner of the International Communication Agency, are: Fulbright Fellowships, Humphrey Fellowships, East/West Foundation Fellowships, Japanese-US Friendship Commission Exchanges, Alliance for Progress Scholarships, and positions as Peace Corps Volunteers. While each of these programs differ in method (i.e. — Fulbrights generally participate in academic research while the Peace Corps attempts to apply technical skills towards helping underdeveloped nations) the purpose of all of them is to promote global cooperation and understanding.

The overall allotment for exchange programs from the federal budget is currently seventy-nine million dollars a year. Should the budget cuts go into effect, this amount will be reduced to twenty-two million a year. Initially, these cuts would effect at least 30,000 Americans (about 5000 US citizens are involved in each of the exchange programs each year). Obviously, the longer the cuts are in action, the more people they will affect. However, many foreign students and professors who wish to study in the States will also be affected since exchange programs work on the principle of exchange; foreign countries can send over a certain number of their citizens in return for ours. Frequently, though not always, such exchanges are arranged on a one-to-one basis.[5] It is estimated that 300,000 foreign students are in the US as an "exchange" for US students. Were US students no longer sent overseas — or even forced to return home — the 2.5 billion dollars which foreign students infuse into the US economy would surely be lost.[6] This fact by itself is one argument (however ignoble or coarse) against halting the exchange programs.

Further effects of the budget cuts would be the extinction of almost every single exchange program concerned with Africa. Such a move seems to ignore the fact that Africa is one of the world's most strategic and volatile areas. Reasons indicate that all types of friendly exchanges with Africa would certainly be in the US's favor. At any rate, the fact that the Soviet Union presently

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[4] *Fred Hechinger, "Fulbright Grants in Danger"*, New York Times, *Nov. 17, 1981, sec. C. p. 5.*
[5] *Henry Kellerman, Cultural Relations as an Instrument of US Foreign Policy, (Washington, DC: US Department of State, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, 1978), p. 176.*
[6] *Hechinger, p. 5.*

hosts 24,000 African students, at Soviet expense, should give the US reason to reconsider its actions.

Of all the programs to be cut and mutilated, certainly the most prestigious, and probably the one to suffer most, is the Fulbright Program. The Fulbright Program was born in 1946 with the revolutionary Fulbright Act. The first funds for the program were obtained through the use of foreign countries' war reparations. The purpose of the program was to allow student to experience another culture so that they "might develop a capacity for empathy, a distaste for killing other men, and an inclination for peace."[7]

The program was launched in one-hundred countries, covering Europe, Asia, Latin America, and Africa. Usually the student involved would spend some time teaching a class or acting as a teacher's assistant, and the remainder of the time conducting research in the areas of social science, political science, human relations, psychiatry, public health, or architecture.[8]

By 1965 the program was at its apex, with an all time high of 9000 scholars participating. Similarly, the program's budget was continually ballooning; at that time it had reached a healthy seventy-six million dollars a year. At the present time, the Fulbright Program is limping by with a budget of forty-five million and has 5,500 participants. While the Fulbright Program currently sends students to 120 countries, proposed budget cuts would bring the number of participating countries to fifty-nine. The companion program to the Fulbright is the International Visitors Program, which is one of the programs which specifically operates its exchanges in a one-to-one basis with the Fulbrights. Should the budget cuts go into effect, the number of students participating in it will be divided in half. It is amazing to think that such a program should be so callously treated, when it is responsible for having provided the education of thirty-three pro-Western heads of state, among others. Similarly, of the fifteen cabinet members of pro-Western Zimbabwe, (with which *all* future exchange programs shall be abolished) five were educated under this exchange program.

One major characteristic of the Fulbright Program which pervades all student exchange programs, is a certain amount of idealism, mixed in with a desire for "down-to-earth progress."[9] The Peace Corps, which began under John F. Kennedy in 1961 and has since sent out 72,000 volunteers, probably reflects such idealism better than any other program. While such idealism has obviously motivated quite a few people to help other nations, many people in the White

[7]*Felicity Barringer, "Budget Cuts Threaten Exchanges"*, Washington Post, *Nov. 16, 1981, Sec. A, p. 13.*
[8]*Kellerman, p. 178.*
[9]*Morrell Heald,* Culture and Diplomacy, *Greenwood Press, 1977. p. 328.*

House feel that idealism and the "crusading spirit" have no place in US foreign policy.[10] Certainly, idealism can not guarantee results. For the Reagan administration, this is one of many prime reasons for suffocating the exchange programs; they are not perceived as being pragmatic (in the true American spirit) — they do not seem to have concrete results.

Similarly, another argument of the Reagan administration against student exchange programs is that, while they *may* satisfy an individual's sense of achievement, their overall contribution to the US population is minimal. After all, if there are 250 million people in the States, what effect could a few thousand people possibly have? This argument against the exchange programs is supported by the fact that over half of the US students involved in the programs participate in either arts or sports; there are few skills which are learned overseas which can make a direct contribution to the US.[11]

One example of a Fulbright program in which a US student spent a year may initially seem to confirm the futility of exchange scholarships. The project, conducted in Spain, simply allowed the exchange student to spend a year studying the art of El Greco. At the end of the year the artist-student stated that he had gained a "new perspective" on El Greco — one that could only be gained through experience.[12] People have also argued that the student became a type of "citizen-diplomat", and promoted universal understanding.[13] However, the White House has argued that to send a student at taxpayer's expense to gain a new perspective on art, and in turn to have a foreign-exchange student arrive in the US, usually to study engineering or some other technical skill, and again at tax-payers expense, is unjustifiable.

The inevitable international politics which seem to be wound up in student exchange progams have also provided the Reagan group with reasons to cut back.[14] For instance, the Reagan Administration cites the fact that most exchange students sent to the Soviet Union are not allowed to "make contact" with Soviet citizens.[15] Rather, the exchange students are given a one-sided presentation of the USSR, and as a result, the Administration fears, may come back with an extremely rosy picture of life there, thus becoming unwitting Soviet propaganda tools.

Another example concerns exchange programs in China. All the projects which exchange students participate in are shaped by Chinese generosity. While many scholars would like to study the intricacies of the Chinese social

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[10] *Louis Hartz*, The Liberal Tradition in America, *(New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1955), pp. 36-39.*

[11] *Douglas Murray, "Exchanges With the PRC"* The Annals, *vol. 424., March, 1976, pp. 24-29.*

[12] *Joan Joslen, "International Exchange in the Arts"* The Annals, *vol. 424., Mareh, 1976, pp. 78-84.*

[13] *Joslen, pp. 78-84.*

[14] *Hechinger, p. 5.*

[15] *Felice Gaer, "Scholarly Exchange Programs"*, Vital Issues, *June 26, 1980, p. 2.*

and political system, the CCP deems these areas as being too "politically sensitive" to allow in depth analysis.[16] Because Chinese students are "shown and told all"[17] in the US, to the White House it only seems fair that American exchange students should be similarly treated.

Defendants of the exchange programs have counter-argued that the US government is perhaps the prime culprit for mixing politics with the exchange programs, and therefore exacerbates the problem of having other countries do the same. One instance of an obvious blending of US politics with the exchange programs involved American fury over India's support for Bangladesh's move towards independence from Pakistan. On this occasion, all exchange programs to India were suspended.[18] Another example of US political action overshadowing the exchange programs includes a temporary boycott of Chinese-American exchanges in 1976 because a Chinese choir touring the US refused to cancel a song in their program which implyed that Taiwan belonged to the PRC.[19] More recently, the Carter administration curtailed Soviet-American exchanges because of the Soviet invasion of Afganistan.[20]

Finally, President Reagan has indicated that an atmosphere conducive to US interests could be much more successfully brought about through a policy based on radio propaganda rather than through a foreign policy stressing exchange programs.[21] While exchange programs are seen by the White House to have little domestic value and negligible effect abroad, radio propaganda is viewed by the Administration as a cure-all.[22] Through radio propaganda it is thought that people abroad shall be stirred up to revolt against Communist tyranny, and that this in turn shall raise morale at home. If this were to happen, Reagan would achieve the short term results which he is seeking. However, opponents argue that the long term results of such a program could be increased Soviet hostility or a second Cuban mass exodus — both results being ultimately detrimental to the United States.

The first radio propaganda program to be put into effect (assuming the Fulbright cuts are passed) shall involve "a special US radio service to Cuba".[23] While Florida's Spanish radio stations and the Voice of America can already be received in Cuba, the new station will attempt to specifically orient its

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[16] *Murray, pp. 24-26.*
[17] *Murry, pp. 24-26.*
[18] *Robert Johansen,* The National Interest and the Human Interest, *(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 136.*
[19] *Murry, pp. 24-29.*
[20] *Gaer, p. 5.*
[21] *Barbra Crossette, "US Starts 'Project Truth' ",* New York Times, *Nov. 3, 1980, Sec. A, p. 27.*
[22] *Flora Lewis, "Wasting Money on Propaganda",* Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, *Nov. 7, 1981, sec. A, p. 4.*
[23] *Lewis, p. 4.*

attacks towards Castro and towards Cuba's lack of economic progress.[24] The cost of implementing the radio service will be accounted for through the dismantling of almost all of the four-hundred Latin American Fulbright Scholarships and International Visitors Programs[25] (as compared to the 4,700 fellowships which the USSR offers to Latin Americans annually).

As it is my contention that the exchange programs should not be sacrificed, it is important to re-examine their purposes and to evaluate their effectiveness in terms of what the White House hopes to achieve. Henry Kissinger has said: "exchange programs should be seen not as 'do good' programs, but as the vital tools through which we help build an international climate conducive to American interests."[26] In general, this seems to reflect the Administration's viewpoint.[27] Reagan feels that exchange programs should not have strong idealistic or philanthropic bases. Such foundations for exchange programs are only seen as weak attempts to rationalize US imperialism and uniqueness in a guiltless format.[28] Because exchange programs do embody a certain amount of idealism and philanthropic concern, it follows that the Reagan administration sees them as not necessarily creating an atmosphere immediately conducive to US interests. In other words, many of the programs help other countries but are not thought to specifically create a pro–American atmosphere within them — which is the goal of the White House.

However, this is a mistaken view. Despite the fact that exchange programs are generally imbued with feelings of goodwill, they are also, and probably unwittingly so, the best American propaganda tools available. To see that this is so, one must examine trends which have occurred over long periods of time. The exchange programs cannot produce (as probably no programs can produce, for that matter) quick, short–term results. Some of their long–term propaganda results, though, have been rather impressive. But, again, when judging the results of the exchange programs, one must not be too hasty. After all, they have only been in operation since 1946, and concrete results, which can be proven beyond a doubt, are rare in the realm of international affairs.

One example of the exchange programs use as propaganda messengers involves the American Studies Seminar, taught by Fulbright Scholars in twenty-four of the one-hundred and twenty countries within which the Fulbright Program operates.[29] In its early stages it received more attention than

[24] *Lewis, p. 4.*
[25] *Lewis, p. 4.*
[26] *Johansen, p. 136.*
[27] *Hechinger, p. 5.*
[28] *Charles Lerche,* Foreign Policy of the American People, *(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967) p. 108., p. 173.*
[29] *Kellerman, p. 180.*

any other Fulbright project. The seminar, taught by a student in addition to the research he or she may be doing, covers subjects as diverse as American government, legislation, academic life, architecture, and business. Long-term trends in available data indicate that in most of the twenty-four countries (from post-war Germany to modernizing Zimbabwe) American influence can be found in all of the areas covered in the seminars.[30]

There are also many more subtle reasons why exchange programs are effective as propaganda. For instance, even in countries where the American Studies Seminar is not being taught, it is very likely that the exchange students will come into contact with many other foreign students of their own age. Psychologists have pointed out that students, out of all social groups, are the most impressionable.[31] Therefore, even if the American exchange student does not overtly try to propagandize it is likely that the actions of exchange student will make a strong impression — which would probably be attributed to Americans in general, thereby creating a pro-American atmosphere.

When comparing the effectiveness of special radio services to exchange programs in terms of their propaganda value, one must remember that radios are less personal, and therefore make less of an impact. Also, when considering the planned special radio service to Cuba in particular, one should be aware of the fact that Castro's government can easily jam the stations with two giant transmitters of its own — rendering the US stations ineffecitve.[32]

Yet another factor against using radio as propaganda is that the propaganda might conflict with the subject's culture. If the US can't understand another people's "aesthetic or mystical concerns" (such as understanding can only come from direct experience) then the propaganda message may do more harm then good.[33] Perhaps, though, the strongest case against overt propaganda is that the American public in general seems to have a negative reaction to it.[34] Simply put, blatant propaganda initiatives are not the "American" or "democratic" way.

While radio propaganda may be seen negatively by the US public, studies have indicated that exchange programs have the opposite effect; they lift morale at home.[35] Perhaps one of the more unexpected ways in which these programs do this is by providing the public with a sense of competition; competition with the Soviets to capture the visions and hopes and knowledge of the rest of the world.[36] In further defense of exchange programs, in terms

[30] *Kellerman, p. 216.*
[31] *Kellerman, p. 213.*
[32] *Lewis, p. 4.*
[33] *Robert Holt,* Strategic Psychological Operations and American Foreign Policy, *(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 44.*
[34] *Holt, p. 42.*
[35] *Lerche, p. 3230., p. 322.*
[36] *Lerche, p. 168.*

of their being used as reverse propaganda (i.e. — US exchange students in the USSR or the PRC becoming tools of foreign propagandists because of the limited exposure US students are allowed to get of the countries which they are visiting — thus returning to the States with an overly positive view of them), studies have shown that the majority of US exchange students who have been in Communist countries return to the US being more critical of the countries than when they left.[37]

One can look beyond propaganda, however, to find positive results of the exchange programs. For example, of all the Fulbrights, seventy-two percent of them have remained in touch with their Fulbright countries through various professional careers.[38] Thus, US businesses, missions, embassies, and humanitarian organizations have the opportunity to employ people with direct experience — people who *know* their host country. This is important because "values and styles of learning and communication reflected in the classroom are often the opposite of what is needed in societies to which an exchange student or a Peace Corps volunteer is sent."[39] Since this is the case, diplomats (including "citizen" diplomats) with only classroom learning would be at a great disadvantage in trying to create an atmosphere conducive to American interests.

The usefulness of the projects which Fulbrights and others pursue is determined by the Board of Foreign Scholarships; a board made up of representatives of private business, cultural affairs groups, graduate and undergraduate educators, government, and student organizations. While the Reagan administration may not personally find much use for studies of El Greco or other similarly individualistic projects, available data indicates that they are of vital importance. It has been said that music and art are international languages.[40] Assuming that this is the case, there certainly could be no better way for establishing a friendly foreign policy than through exchanges involving the arts.

Domestically, such projects have also, ultimately, been of benefit. A study by the Fulbright Alumni Association concluded that 76.4 percent of all Fulbrights have used their experiences towards teaching others about international affairs in a classroom context.[41] On a more abstract level, the Fulbright program is also a necessity. If the world is to remain at peace, internationally educated people are necessary. This is because a universal education does not simplify ideas — rather it gives one a realistic view of their awesome complexity and may prevent premature and irrational actions from being taken.

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[37] *Robert Byrnes, "Soviet — American Exchange"*, Journal of East and West Studies, *Summer, 1976, p. 31.*
[38] *Hechinger, p. 5.*
[39] *John Condon*, Intercultural Encounters with Japan, *(Tokyo: The Simul Press, 1978), p. 144.*
[40] *Kenneth Holland, "Underfinanced Programs"*, The Annals, *vol. 424., March, 1976, pp. vii-xi.*
[41] *Hechinger, p. 5.*

Therefore, exchange programs, in all field — cultural, academic, and developmental — must be preserved. They allow both the Third World and the developed world a chance to identify their interests with ours (and an opportunity for us to identify with them). In terms of propaganda, exchange programs are much less ambiguous than any other approach. It is true that they might reach fewer people than radio propaganda would, but, for most of those they do reach, their effect will be greater. At the same time, it is prudent to remember that radio propaganda already exists; budget cuts will simply add more stations to the air. As for the future of exchange programs as propaganda tools, the government should not interfere with the programs nor try to increase their potential. The strength of exchange programs in this area is that they work through a gradual evolution of ideas. If such programs were to be obviously controlled by political strings, it is a certainty that foreigners would develop a feeling of repugnance towards them.

A policy of support for the exchange programs does not mean that the programs cannot be improved. For instance, not all people who participate in exchange programs find opportunities to put their knowledge to work once they return to the States. Unless such opportunities are offered in the US, a globally educated person is of no use. Therefore, the International Communication Agency or the Board of Foreign Scholarships should attempt to help the student locate a useful job before he or she returns. In all of the programs, continuity is not consciously stressed; when individuals come back, they are on their own — there is no debriefing or re-integration into society. This problem could also be partially solved if the Board would attempt to forecast what areas of expertise shall be in demand by the time students return; so far, such forecasting has not been used.

Also, more teacher and group seminars, such as the American Studies Program, could be extended to the many Fulbright countries. Certainly this would allow even more meaningful contact than may now exist to occur between the US student and his or her peers. Lastly, exchange programs should be given more national publicity. With their current budget of seventy-nine million dollars, the exchange programs have no opportunity for expansion; however, more publicity of exchanges would encourage individuals and businesses to make private donations in support of the programs. For example ITT, in the belief that exchange programs have helped international businesses merge more smoothly with foreign societies, has, been a strong financial backer of the Fulbright Scholarships.

Billions of dollars are already being spent on the US military and on radio propaganda. On a strategic level, the exchange programs represent a bargain

in terms of their cost and in terms of their effectivenss. The White House must realize that by understanding and serving the interests of others, the US is ultimately serving its own interests. To cut these programs would send a "devastating message" to US allies: that the US is not interested in them.[42] This, at a time when effective diplomacy and global cooperation are vital to world survival, would certainly represent insanity. Therefore, the White House must make it its policy to allow the exchange programs to continue and to exist as an effective diplomatic tool.

[42] *Hechinger, p. 5.*

Bureaucratic Politics and Decision Making Explanations to the Punjab Crisis

Vivek Pathela

The theories of bureaucratic politics and decision-making in a one party dominance system best explain the internal crisis which India now faces. There is much more to the Indian story, but the events in the northwestern state of Punjab can stand as a case study of Indian politics as the late Prime Minister Indira Gandhi mounted her return to power, and then, after her amazing comeback at the polls in 1980, maneuvered to maintain it. The issue to be discussed can be defined as the threat to Indian unity produced by erosions of democracy in the Punjab and of secularism at the national leadership level. Subsequently, this paper will attempt to show that the Punjab crisis is not so much a problem of self-determination as it is the result of a failure of bureaucratic politics and the decision-making process.

In a developing and socially diverse nation that seeks to function within a democratic framework, only a political party or coalition which is secular in nature and broadly based can hope to hold the divisive components together. There are two principal prerequisites for political and social integration. The first is a great diversity at the center, thus assuring that the central authority is not identified with any single group, and the second is that the traditional society ensures that all dominant elements enjoy formal equality, in order to guarantee the continuity and durability of evolving politico-social institutions. In this context, a paternalistic central authority may enforce unity, and, representing society as a whole, create an integrated society from which polyethnic nationalism can be defined.*

In the process of successful nation building, charismatic leaders sometimes emerge. Successful nation building in a traditional, one-party dominated system has usually meant active, progressive, strong, politico-social leadership.[1]

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[1] *Albert F. Reiterer, "Leader and Movement: Charismatic Personality, The Armed Forces, and Party as Instruments of Nation-Building,"* Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism, *Spring 1984, p. 55.*

**The context of India the nation-state cannot be defined in the same manner as its Eastern and central European usage, where "ethnic" and "national" have identical meanings (a practice derived from ethnocentric concepts of the nation).*

Successful charismatic leaders fuse potentially disruptive elements into a functional whole by persuading antagonistic forces to endorse the leaders' schemes.[2] A leader's emphasis solely on the rapid modernization of society is only one means toward political integration.

During times of uncertainty or the sudden expansion of traditional political participation, the society can seldom function on the basis of personalized authority, but must secure at least a partial consensus in the executive decision-making process. Under such conditions, ideally, charismatic leaders eliminate political antagonists — militarily if necessary — and then introduce new patterns of behavior among influential parties, attempting to promote a gradual assimilation of the population into these modified institutions.[3] To be effective, the system should be symbolically linked with the charismatic leader's personality and to his people. That is, the leader must be represented as the authentic law-giver and arbiter of his society.* The dilemma such leaders face derives from a fear of domestic or foreign challenge to his authority. In general, these pressures keep charismatic leaders on the defense. The effectiveness of the leader's decision-making is determined by the perceptions and interests of the leader and the approach he takes. On the one hand, a leader can be trapped by indecision if he chooses an analytical approach to national problems. On the other hand, cognitive and cybernetic approaches can result in the making of many decisions, over time, whose results the leader may not necessarily have sought.

The riskier the perceived outcome of the action, the smaller the surrounding group of decision-makers must be. The leader may seek to control all power, even in areas outside the range of his own leadership. If the leader alters the bureaucratic political structure in times of a crisis, and the opposition — politicking in its own interest — is not subverted, or if the leader goes too far and appears to be primarily pursuing his own political ends, then social integration may be disrupted, and democracy may be threatened. As a consequence, the charismatic leader is no longer a viable arbiter, that is, the society would lack a leader at the center who could hold the diverse political and social groups together.

The case of India, a culturally diverse nation, vividly illustrates the problem of maintaining a viable political system in the face of the divisive internal threats to its existence. The fundamental conflict in India, since its independence, has been between the nationalist leaders, seeking to create a society

[2] *Reiterer, pp. 52-53.*
[3] *Reiterer, pp. 51-55.*
* *"Where the opposition has constantly hurled challenges to the very existence of government and has not hesitated to bring the state to the brink of disorder, the use of patronage and the stationing of loyal men in strategic places, plus a certain sternness in administration, are legitimate instuments for the government." Baldev Raj Nayer, in article IX: "Punjab," in* State Politics in India, *ed. by Myron Weiner, (Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, NJ, 1968), p. 491.*

founded on secular nationalism, and the many parochial leaders, seeking narrower goals relating to religious, ethnic, linguistic, or tribal groups.

The assassination of Mrs. Gandhi on 31 October, 1984 is directly related to the unresolved crisis in the Punjab over the past 28 months. During this period there developed a situation of serious disaffection among members of the Punjab's Sikh community, popular disorder, and a growing sense of despairing insecurity among all Punjabis.[4] Since the commitment in 1980 of the Shiromani Akali Dal party — claiming to represent the entire Sikh community — to winning greater autonomy for the Punjab under Sikh rule, sectarian violence between militant Skihs and Hindus has been escalating.[5] Even more frightening, in the wake of modernization and the growth of communist influence that has reduced the influence of religious factions on political life — a threat to the Akali power base in the long run — the Akali Dal, in August 1982, launched a campaign of fear and intimidation. This religious fundamentalism and Sikh militancy has been responsible for the loss of over 400 lives, half of them moderate Sikhs, by the summer of 1984.[6]

The national government's policies during the early eighties were partly responsible for this growth in sectarian violence. In the desire to return to power and regain her party's political position, which were both lost in 1977, subsequent to the public's rejection of her undemocratic "emergency" period, Mrs. Gandhi had created conditions that produced disastrous confrontations while seeking short-term political advantages.

In case in point is Congress' attempt at creating splits in the Akali Dal. In creating these splits, it had backed Sikh extremists, hoping to divide the several factions and leaders of the Akali Dal. After Congress (I) came back to power in 1980, Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, the Sikh extremist who had been arrested and interrogated for the murders of several Nirankaris (Sikh deviationists) and Hindus in the Sikh-Nirankari clash of 1978, had been released and openly supported by Congress (I).[7] Congress (I) succeeded in weakening the parlimentary position of the Akali Dal. However, as Bhendranwale became more bold, more miltant, and began to direct a mass protest movement from the Golden Temple, the extremist faction took control of the Akali Dal. The prolonged fundamentalist terror against Hindu and moderate. Sikh provoked Congress (I) into attempting to settle the present crisis militarily, a crisis which it had helped to instigate in the first place.

Mrs. Gandhi hesitated a long time before ordering national troops to storm

[4]*W. H. Morris-Jones, "India: More Questions Than Answers,"* Asian Survey, *vol XXIV, no. 8, August 1984, pp. 809-816.*

[5]Weekly World News Digest, *published by Facts on File, Inc., New York, NY, 4 November 1983, p. 845.*

[6]Weekly World News Digest, *8 June 1984, p. 401.*

[7]*S. S. Gill and K. C. Shinghal, "The Punjab Problem: Its Historical Roots,"* Economic and Political Weekly, *7 April 1984, p. 607.*

the Golden Temple at Amritsar on 6 June, 1984.* The raid killed over 500 people, including Bhindranwale, and destroyed portions of the Temple. This sent shock waves through all of India, drew denouncements by all Sikh groups (including moderate Sikhs, and destroyed their belief in the Indian union.[8] The crisis obviously was not a simple law and order problem.

Applying the theories of bureaucratic politics and decision making, it can be concluded that the historical problems of the Punjab which became the crisis of the Punjab today — and finally the tragedy of the assassination of Indira Gandhi — was the result of a fatal mismanagement of central authority. We will first apply the bureaucratic politics theory in an examination of Gandhi's political strategy during the early eighties, and then we will apply the decision-making theory to the critical days before the army's assault on the Golden Temple. These will demonstrate that Mrs. Gandhi made choices and propagated policies that were undemocratic and originated in the pursuit of self-interest.

In this socially diverse nation, it is essential that the central government represent a myriad of specific interests. Only then can the authority gain the acceptance of all groups, and function as a unifying force. This attribute was the key to the success of the Congress which the late Jawarhalal Nehru had helped to establish.** Since it was committed to a democratic framework, it sought legitimacy for its leadership by deference to the popular will through normal elections. In short, the Congress Party had previously emphasized the political and psychological relations between the center and regional authorities.

Mrs. Gandhi, however, in recent years, had dramatically altered the bureaucratic framework of the Congress and eroded its democratic institutions. Since the mid-sixties, when she came to power, she had split the party into various factions, destroying the national movement her father had built. Under the influence of her notorious son, the late Sanjay Gandhi, she had declared a state of emergency rather than submit to the rule of the courts. In 1980 she had helped the Sikh extremists acquire the leadership that would further divide the Akali Dal, bribed supporters of opposition parties with office or cash to

[8] *Darryl D'Monte, "Alienating the Sikhs: After the Golden Temple Assault,"* The New Leader, *11 June 1984, pp. 11-13.*

**The Golden Temple is a 72-acre complex and the Sikh's holiest shrine. It became the well-armed headquarters of the Akali Dal party. Places of worship are privileged sanctuaries against the police in India. Though the party was divided, the two rival factional leaders, Bhindranwale and the more moderate Harchand Singh Longowal, resided in the temple complex. This illustrates the ties between Sikh politics and religion.*

***Congress of the 1940s to mid-1960s emphasized the need for national unity, the evils of communalism, caste-ism, regionalism, and linguism. In its attempt to cope with the Akali Dal, the Congress Party in the Punjab produced a strong leader — a Sikh — and provided Sikh leaders in the party with a share of political power disproportionate to the size of the Sikh community and the ability of these leaders to mobilize political support from the community to the party. From Nayer's* Minority Politics in the Punjab, *(Princeton Univ. Press, NJ, 1966), pp. 158–168.*

encourage then to defect, accepted the support of smugglers and criminals who earned immunity from the law by their loyalty to her, and recruited local gangsters in northern India as her campaign workers, and even had them elected to office.[9] Moreover, wherever she saw her leadership challenged from within her own party, she dismissed the competing members from office.

A consequence of this was that Mrs. Gandhi no longer had politcal supporters who were influential in the states, only those incapable politicians whose sole qualification was loyalty to her. Center-state relations deteriorated as she went in circles, trying to find bureaucratic solutions to problems that were essentially political and psychological. For instance, the choice of governors for the Punjab during spring of 1984 had been chaotic.* The absence of coherence at the top was reflected by the confusion in the Punjab.

Decision making became highly personalized. Gandhi believed that, other than herself, almost no one in India was able to offer the kind of national leadership that was essential to hold the country together.[10] As a consequence, her first goal was to secure her position, not for personal gratification but in the best interests of the nation.

As she removed influential politicians from her party, many options for the settling of the present crisis in the Punjab fell through. One such option that could no longer be considered was that of unilateral declaration.** There was no guarantee by the spring of 1984 that 1) the Akalis would stop demanding more concessions, that 2) the agreements could be enforced, since the Congress lacked effective political leaders in the Punjab, nor that 3) the conflicting demands and interests in the Punjab would not trigger more violence.

A second option that was no longer possible was a return to negotiations. The government had allowed the political problem in the Punjab to become too extreme. The only negotiations possible were with Harbind Singh Longowal's Akali faction (the more moderate faction), which lost much of its support with the rise of the Akali's fundamentalist faction. There was no way that Bhindranwale, the fundamentalist leader, would agree to any compromisal agreement with the ruling Congress (I) regarding the Punjab.

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[9] *Joseph Lelyveld, "Fajiv, The Son,"* The New York Times Magazine, *2 December 1984, pp. 38-40, 90-98.*

[10] *Lelyveld, p. 90.*

**When President's Rule was declared in March 1982, the most capable administrator of all, B.D. Pande, lost much of his support when three of his four advisors quit their jobs. As a result, some functions were arrested by local authorities in the Punjabi town of Moga. For instance, there was no clear instruction from the top, hence, demonstrations increased and paramilitary forces had to take up positions. S. Gupta and P. Chawla, "Punjab Crisis: Is There a Way Out,"* India Today, *15 May 1984, pp. 50–60.*

***A United Front meeting accused the Prime Minister of keeping the issue alive for her own purposes and stated in a resolution: "The policy of drift and delay is too expensive for the nation. Her pivotal position demands that she does not stand on prestige or continue to take shelter behind weather-beaten pleas." S. Gupta and P. Chawla, "Punjab Crisis: Is There a Way Out?"* India Today, *15 May 1984, p. 55.*

The degree of violence in the Punjab during the spring of 1984 testifies tothe failure of attempts to check the deterioration of law and order, and also underscores Mrs. Gandhi's adoption of a policy of drift.[11] Mrs. Gandhi probably had deliberately been following this strategy of neglect, allowing the violence to continue in order to attract the support of terrified Sikh and Hindus in the elections that were coming up in December 1984. However, by June 1984 she could no longer pursue this policy since the violence was obviously undermining confidence in the national government.*

A fourth option, that of battling terrorism in the Punjab, required the continuation of effective intelligence and good military tactics, both of which the police force lacked by this period. The terrorists had displayed a remarkable degree of cunning. Their strategy was not to attack the police or paramilitary forces, but to attack civilian Hindus, priests, bus passengers, and moderate Sikhs.[12] The key to the containment of terrorism in the Punjab was the use of a revived and rebuilt state police force which, however, was unlikely to be established for some time.

Mrs. Gandhi's dilemma in pursuing this last option was the need to attack the Golden Temple; retaliation by Sikhs could well outweigh the advantages. If she had delayed the order to attack, she would have risked a steady decay not only of law and order, morale, and public patience, but of the credibility of the ruling party, and of Mrs. Gandhi and her Congress (I). On June 6, 1984, challenging this threat to Indian unity, she ordered the army to take the Golden Temple.

Theoretically, in times of uncertainty and change, the leader, as an arbiter, should introduce new patterns of behavior among the influential parties that would reduce tension among the various conflicting groups. One way Mrs. Gandhi's administration could have subdued the wilder Akali politicians was to offer a coalition government in the Punjab between the Akali Dal and the ruling Congress (I) parties.[13] Apparently, nothing of this sort was even considered. As a result, factional political interests were permitted to forestall a resolution over a period of months, then years. Mrs. Gandhi chose short-term answers to issues in Punjab, primarily for her own political advancement. The problem with her bureaucratic and decision-making strategies was that

[11] *Gill and Singhal, pp. 603-608.*

[12] *S. Gupta and P. Chawla, "Punjab Crisis: Is There a Way Out?,"* India Today, *15 May 1984, pp. 54-55.*

[13] *Morris-Jones, p. 811.*

**Definition: "ethnic group is a functioning community grounded in past experiences, characterized by a life endured in perceived unity; a homeland common to all (mainly through inheritance); the inter-connectedness of the generational process; and the perception of being part of a Volk which fears for its ethnic survival in a state dominated by an alien ethnic community." Theodor Vieter, "VOLK, Ethnic Group, and Region," translated form German by Thomas Spira, in* Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism, *Fall 1982, pp. 166–167.*

they did not preserve the secular and democratic institutions which are the most significant elements of Indian unity.

Mrs. Gandhi's Congress had made every effort to maintain its political legitimacy. In some cases, as was learned after her death, the party instigated violence to achieve this. The central authority had altered Indian politics dramatically and, ironically, came to be seen as a threat to Indian democracy. Simple military solutions do not apply in such complicated socio-economic and political issues as the Punjab crisis.

In order to understand the origins of the conflict in the Punjab, one must examine the historical period before the politicization of the problem. The perennial problem of the Punjab has been produced by a combination of economic, social, and political factors. When most of the India states were being reorganized on the basis of language, Akali Dal raised the demand in 1953 for the formation of Punjabi Suba, a separate political entity for the Sikhs, apart from the Hindus. This demand reflected the national aspirations of an ethno-religious group, but also was the result of social problems created by the religious unorthodoxy caused by modernization, which the Sikh community felt unable to handle without their own sovereign polity.[14] As a consequence, the problem must also be examined as a problem of self-determination, with the purpose of determining whether or not the crisis may legitimately be seen as conflict over the freedom of association.

The theory of self-determination requires the problem to be qualified regarding certain issues. Firstly, one must examine the community, that is, 1) whether the community seeking political autonomy represents a separate ethnic group* in the state and 2) whether the political group making the demand represents the whole community. Secondly, one must examine the central authority, that is, whether its policies and practices are unjust "according to appropriate principles of justice."[15] Thirdly, we must determine the costs, that is, 1) whether the injustices imposed on the ethnic group are greater than the injustices that might be imposed on a subgroup within the community's demanded territory after autonomy was granted, and 2) whether the injustices imposed on the ethnic group might be greater than the threat imposed, after the granting of autonomy, on the state and nation's unity.

Demands for self-determination from within the Sikh community are probably not legitimate. One reason is that the Shiromani Akali Dal party, though it has secured the support of a significant segment of the Sikh community,

[14] *Baldev Raj Nayer,* Minority Politics in the Punjab, *Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, NJ. 1966, pp. 11-119.*

* *"No one could say the 14 million Sikhs were discriminated against as a group. They had more than their share of places in the Indian Army (of only two percent of the population, Sikhs make up ten percent of the Army) and the bureaucracy; they were among the country's most successful farmers and businessmen." Joseph Lelyveld, "Rajiv, The Son,"* The New York Times Magazine, *2 December 1984, p. 92.*

[15] *Charles Beitz, "State Autonomy and Individual Liberty,"* The Theory of International Relations, *pp. 69-123.*

does not represent the whole community. The major cleavage is among the Sikhs in the rural areas — the poor and depressed Sikh Harijans and the high-caste-landowning-agriculturist classes (the most predominant and prominent among them being the Sikh Jats who control the Akali Dal).[16] The depressed Sikh group has always sought the political support of the secular-based Congress Party. Secondly, unlike other linguistic demands of the 1940s and 1950s, the demand for a Punjabi Suba was opposed by large sections of the population, mostly Hindus, who spoke the Punjabi language.[17] As a consequence, it became increasingly apparent that the separatist strategy in the Punjab was to divide the people along communal lines and to negate the achievements of democratic movements by giving communal color to mass thinking.[18]

The arguments against self-determination for the Sikhs are as follows. First, a Punjabi Suba would probably impose the will of a substantial minority upon the majority. Secondly, as many Hindus opposed the formation of a Punjabi Suba when it was conditionally granted in 1967, and disowned the Punjabi language (their mother tongue), the very issue of language in the Punjab had been communalized and was later used by Sikh separatists to equate Punjabi culture to Sikh culture.[19] Thirdly, the Akali's demand was made despite the privileged position of the Sikh community in India.* Fourthly, the strategic location of the northwestern state of Punjab, bordering Pakistan, and the fact that it is the bread-basket and industrial center of India, makes it extremely difficult to territorially divide the prosperous region after one-half had been given to Pakistan in 1947. Finally, the effects of separatism on Indian unity — as divisive groups all over India today may intensify their separatist movements — will be catastrophic to the whole of India.

From this analysis it must be concluded that, prior to the attack on the Golden Temple, the crisis in the Punjab was not an issue of self-determination. In fact, the escalation of terror and violence in the Punjab, according to the evidence provided by its political and temporal development, clearly points to failures in the bureaucratic and decision-making processes as the causal factors. The Punjab crisis was politicized by changes in the policies of the previously sound and secular Congress Party, as emphasized in this discussion. In an attempt to preserve her own influence, Indira Ghandi destroyed the

[16] Baldev Raj Nayer, "Punjab," State Politics in India, *ed. by Myron Weiner, Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, NJ, 1968, pp. 445.*
[17] Nayer, *Minority Politics in the Punjab, p. 52.*
[18] Gill and Singhal, *pp. 603-608.*
[19] Gill and Sirghal, *pp. 603-608.*
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights' report on Argentina can be applied to the Punjab issue: "It recognizes that, given the government's obligation to maintain public order and repress acts against violence, the existence of widespread anti-government terrorism justifies tempoorary restrictions on human rights, in the case of extremely serious circumstances." Stanley Hoffman, Duties Beyond Borders, (Syracuse Univ. Press, Syracuse, NY, 1981), pp. 108–109.

democratic institutions that were established under her father's administration. She allowed violence, terror, and political intrigue to play a role that was indefensible in India, or in any democracy. In the end Mrs. Ghandi herself became a victim of her own flawed policies.

India's regional assertiveness need not be destructive to the union. Excessive social strains that seem to threaten Indian unity ultimately can only be blamed on central mismanagement.

Chile and Allende

Richard Tretsfelder

In response to what was a deluge of foreign policy crises during the sixties and early seventies, a new body of theory evolved which promulgated the idea that the reins of power in the American political system were largely controlled by the government bureaucracy. The Bay of Pigs, the Cuban missiles crisis, and the Vietnam War had created a sense of urgency in political and academic communities, as each looked for an answer to the complexities of the decision-making process. The heart of this new theory is embodied in Graham Allison's *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. In it Allison sees the foreign policy of the United States as a product of organizational constraints and bureaucratic politicking and not a reflection of the values of the President.

Given the confusion present in scholarly circles, the warm welcome that Allison's theory received is understandable. In light of the existence of the Nixon administration, however, acceptance of Allison's theory seems anachronistic as well as naive. An undervaluing of the power of the executive during the Nixon administration would do little to predict the actions of this particular president. The argument against the power of the bureaucracy is most clearly elucidated to Steven Krasner's "Are Brueaucracies Important (or Allison Wonderland)?" In it, Krasner criticizes bureaucratic theory for "underestimating the power of the president, for failing to hold policy makers accountable for their actions, and for excusing policy inadequacies."

In the context of the Chilean intervention that proceeded from 1963 to 1973, Krasner's theory is useful in explaining how Nixon was able to put his personal imprint on policy towards Chile despite the presence of a well-entrenched, extensive bureaucracy. Krasner is also helpful in predicting that neither Nixon nor Kissinger would be held responsible for what was a policy failure.[1] However, wheras Krasner is useful in clarifying *how* leadership of the decision-making process is held by the president, he fails to theorize on *why* the executive might make certain decisions.

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[1] *Stephen Krasner in his article, "Are Bureaucracies Important: (Or Allison Wonderland,"* Foreign Policy *(Washington: Brookings Inst, 1972) describes policy failures as those decisions made "by leaders who fail to see accurately the consequences of their decisions or attempt to maximize values not held by the electorate."*

Robert Jervis, in his *Hypotheses on Misperceptions,"* explains how presidential values might be translated into policy. The most significant aspect of Jervis's theory stems from his contention that a policy maker's preconceived ideas are instrumental in determining the direction of foreign policy. Bureaucratic intelligence networks are constructed in such a manner that leaders can manipulate information to serve the theories of a given leader. What Jervis does in supplementing Krasner is to give reductionist insight into explicating and predicting the decisions of key policymakers. Although Krasner is reductionist in his use of rational values to explain key policies, he fails to explain how, in a theoretical sense, we are to go about deciphering different leaders' views. For the most part, Krasner's theory is more successful as a systems assessment of the superior power of the executive vis-á-vis the bureaucracy in determining an American foreign policy for which the president must be held directly accountable.

American involvement in Chilean politics effectively began in 1962 when the Special Group, a congressional committee charged with overseeing covert operations, approved $50,000 to strengthen the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) and subsequently authorized an additional $180,000 to support the PDC and its leader, Eduardo Frei.[2] Concern within the Kennedy administration stemmed from the 1958 election, in which the Conservative candidate, Jorge Alessandri, had won only 28 percent of the popular vote. Frei was second, and Salvador Allende, leader of the Popular Unity Party, a coalition of communist and socialist parties, finished third. Had Allende received the 33 percent of the leftist vote that went to a radical priest, he would have won the election.[3]

Worries in the U.S., however, should have been assuaged by the fact that Chile had a well-entrenched democratic constitution. Since 1932, Chile had an unbroken tradition of free elections. Moreover, as an upper middle income country with a per capita income of $760 (US) a year,[4] Chile had a capitalist oriented economy and an urbane citizenry which made it the showcase of the Alliance for Progress.[5] Despite these factors, concern was extensive enough, that for the elections in 1964 some estimates state that as much as $20 million (US), about eight dollars per voter[6], was spent in support of the PDC, radio and newspaper propaganda campaigns, and right wing political groups. Support for the latter was initiated in order to make Frei appear as the moderate. Much to the pleasure of the State Department, CIA and ITT, which had

[2]US Senate Select Intelligence Committee Report on Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973, p. 57.
[3]Interview with Peter Winn, Professor of History, Tufts University, Medford, Ma.
[4]US Senate Select Intelligence Committee Report, *p. 3.*
[5]US Senate Select Intelligence Committee Report *p. 2.*
[6]*Seymour Hersh,* The Price of Power *(New York: Summit Books, 1983), p. 260.*

offered money to the CIA in support of Frei, Frei won a decisive victory with 57 percent of the popular vote.

To a large degree, Frei had been helped by the funding he received from the American government. With financial aid Frei had the capital to go out and reach the grassroots of the population, thereby adding to his already sound electoral base. Frei's constituency included a majority of moderates as well as right wingers, who were without a candidate in this election, and anti-Allende liberals. What was perhaps most attractive about Frei was his plan to move to a more autonomous economic condition. As a rapidly modernizing nation, Chile understandably wanted greater control of her economic resources. Through a program of agrarian tax and housing reform, Frei looked to reverse the trend towards increasing disparities in income differenctiations.

From an American perspective, the biggest problem with this policy was the "Chileanization" program that Frei put forth after his election. Aimed most directly at the copper industries, Chile looked to gain financial control of the productive assets that earned Anaconda Corporation $500 million during the 1960s. The program, as it was outlined by Frei, looked to legitimately buy back 51 percent of the ninety-one major American-controlled industries in Chile.[7] The fact that there would still exist a total of 35,000 private enterprises should have been enough to persuade key figures back in the US that Cuban-style communism was not in the immediate offing in Chile. Pressure, however, from both government and corporate bureaucrats helped to exacerbate the American perspective of the Chilean situation.

Between 1964 and 1968 covert action in Chile continued, but attempts were made to keep a lower profile, whereas there are reports of 22 covert operations between 1962 and 1964, only 20 covert operations were reported between 1965 and 1969.[8] During the 1964 election, there were simply too many leaflets distributed (3000 per day), and too many broadcasts (24 per day), for the typical Chilean party to afford.[9]During the years leading up to Allende's overthrow, there was an obvious link between the US and the PDC that we both hoped to obscure. Although propaganda measures continued, and monetary support amounting to approximately $2 million (US) was given during this time, overt involvement was not as intense as it had once been. American policy between 1965 and 1969 took the form of attempts at infiltration into every level of society. Efforts were made to develop contacts within Chilean student organizations, women's groups, unions, the military and the Chilean cabinet. All actions during this time were conducted under the auspices of the Special Group, which by 1965 had been renamed the 303 Committee.

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[7]*Interview with Peter Winn.*
[8]*Hersh, p. 261.*
[9]US Senate Select Intelligence Committee Report *p. 15.*

With Nixon's ascendance to power in 1969, the governmental bureaucracy began to lose its grip on American foreign policy in Chile. A National Intelligence Estimate greeted Nixon with relatively unfavorable reports on social and economic policies in Chile. As the PDC lost 14 seats from 1965 to 1969 in the congressional elections, there was increasing pressure from the leftist sectors on the party to continue the Chileanization programs. By 1967, 51 percent of Kenecott had been bought for a price of $80 million (US) by the Chilean government, $13 million (US) over the book value.[10] As Frei moved towards the fulfillment of his program, increasing tensions grew between the CIA and the Frei government. Henry D. Hecksher, the CIA station chief in Chile and an ardent anti-communist, saw Frei as moving too far to the left. Much of the friction that arose between the CIA and the PDC government stemmed from Hecksher's growing distaste for Frei, and Hecksher's support of the 1958 National Party (PN) election winner, a conservative named Josef Allesandri.[11] As the 1970 campaign approached and Frei opened diplomatic relations with Cuba, Hecksher expressed a well founded fear that the PDC would choose an even more liberal candidate than Frei and, in fact, it did.

The final nail in Frei's coffin, particularly from Nixon's perspective, was his connection with the Kennedy Administration. Frei was a "social liberal who had gained prominence with the aid of the Kennedys and the Georgetown sect in the CIA."[12] Nixon, on the other hand, was a corporate man. Far removed from the liberal development policies of the Great Society, Nixon's main goal was to protect the business interests of his friends from the Business Group for Latin America, (later named Council of the Americas) which included Jay Parkinson of Anaconda, Harold Geneen of ITT, and Donald Kendall,[13] chairman of the board of Pepsico. With the coming of the elections in 1970 the volatility of the Hecksher-Nixon-corporate triangle would play an increasingly important role in Chilean political life.

On April 15, 1969, the 303 Committee held its first meeting on the question of what to do about the 1970 presidential election in Chile.[14] In that same year an NIE report stated that whoever succeeded Frei would push for further Chilean independence and be less cooperative with the US. Were Allende to win, it was reported that his administration would establish close relations with communist countries, and would step up nationalization of US copper holdings. Between April and September, forty meetings of the Forty Committee (the new name for the 303 Committee) were held with little being ac-

[10] *Hersh, p. 262.*
[11] *Hersh, p. 261.*
[12] *Hersh, p. 261.*
[13] *Hersh, p. 260.*
[14] *Henry Kissinger,* The White House Years *(Boston: Little Brown, 1979), p. 663.*

complished other than Kissinger's consolidation of power over the Committee.[15]

The decision to actively participate in the Chilean election was made at a Forty Committee meeting in March 1970 when it approved of the transfer of $135,000 (US) in funds for anti-Allende propaganda.[16] March 25th marked the beginning of what was termed the "Spoiling Campaign." It was official US policy in the 1970 election not to support any candidate, but instead to follow a course of action which would undermine efforts to bring about a coalition of leftist forces, and strengthen non-Marxist political leaders in Chile in order to develop an effective alternative to the Popular Unity Party. In spite of the formulation of a more directed policy, the government failed to create a contingency plan in case of an Allende victory. This failure, which Kissinger later lamented, was a manifestation of the fact that "Chile was not yet completely vital to Nixon."[17]

This implementation of the "Spoiling Campaign" accelerated the process towards a bureaucratic breakdown. Most significantly, the gap that began to develop between the White House's knowledge of corporate involvement in Chilean affairs, and the ignorance of the Forty Committee regarding connections with ITT and the Council for the Americas increased. Communications with ITT were kept secret from both Chilean Ambassador Edward Korry and the Forty Committee, as it was official US policy not to accept support from multinationals. What ITT was looking for was an "in" for the channelling of funds into the Alessandri campaign. Richard Helms had informed ITT board member, and former CIA chief under Kennedy and Johnson, John McCone that that the CIA would not support a candidate.[18] Contrary to the Senate hearings report, Seymour Hersh reports that Hecksher, working behind Ambassador Korry's back, and not McCone, set up a meeting between Harold Geneen and William V. Broe, then chief of CIA's clandestine operations in Latin America. Through Hecksher and Broe, ITT was able to find conduits for its funds. Ultimately, $350,000 (US) were funnelled into the Alessandri campaign — in direct contravention of the March 25th Forty Committee meeting.[19]

On September 4, 1970 Salvador Allende won a plurality in the election, assuring him victory. According to the Chilean constitution, in a case where there is no majority, the top two vote–getters have a runoff in parliament to

[15] *Kissinger, p. 660. Forty Committee members included John Mitchell, Richard Helms, Admiral Moore, Alexis Johnson (Under Secretary of State), David Packard, Deputy to McLun Laird of the Defense Department. It is also important to note that the Senior Review group and the Special Action Group, both of which were set up to oversee the Forty Committee, were composed of the same members as the Forty Committee.*

[16] US Senate Select Intelligence Committee *p. 20.*

[17] *Hersh, p. 269.*

[18] *US Hearings before the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, p. 457.*

[19] US Hearings, *p. 560.*

decide upon a winner. Traditionally, the top vote–getter, in this case Allende, always wins the runoff. US response to this victory was less than favorable. Korry described it as a "grevious defect." Nixon immediately informed Helms that an Allende victory would not be amenable to the United States' perception of the world, and consequently ordered the organization of a coup d'etat. The prospect of a coup was pursued under what would be termed by the CIA as the Track II Policy.[20]

Both Track II and its alternative Track I were examined by the Forty Committee as responses which might promote a change in the Allende outcome. Track I included propaganda, and political and economic measures which might induce anti-Allende forces to block his ascendancy. The political program was centered around what was called the "Rube Goldberg" gambit. It entailed a propaganda campaign as well as secret CIA payoffs to members of the Chilean congress in order to bring about an Alessandri victory in the parliamentary runoff. Alessandri would then resign and Frei would take over.[21] Frei, however, rejected the offer as it was against Chilean political tradition to elect anyone other than the candidate who owned the plurality.

Economic and propaganda pressures were essentially ineffectual in preventing the rise of the Popular Unity Party. A cutback in US aid — from the highest in Latin America to a total of only $800,000 (US) by 1973[22] — wass symptomatic of the Nixon Administration's attempts at destabilizing Allende support. The drop in aid, as well as strict restrictions on credit limit, served to create a crisis-like situation in the Chilean economy, but failed to promote sufficient unrest for an attempt at a coup d'etat.[23] Propaganda efforts, although extensive, also produced limited results. Despite a relatively intensive campaign, including a concentration of articles in the most popular tabloid, *El Mercurio*[24] measurable effects were hard to detect, although the CIA did conclude that its contribution was both "substantial and significant."[25]

Track II marked a completely different route towards blocking Allende's ascendancy. Track II was also indicative of the most fundamental breakdown in the leadership process. The Forty Committee never authorized Track II, which called for direct support of an overthrow of Allende through a military

[20] *Kissinger, p. 662.*

[21] *In the Chilean constitution the limit is one 6-year term in succession. The feeling was that since Frei was not elected, officially somone had served as President, then Frei could take over.*

[22] *Hersh, p. 262.*

[23] *Perhaps the key to preventing this coup was military. General Schneider, in control of the Chilean army, did not look favorably upon attempted coups.*

[24] El Mercurion *were a series of newspapers owned by Chilean entrepreneur, Augustus Edwards. Edwards was a good friend of Kendall's at Pepsico. Edwards' paper turned out to be the most extensive form of propaganda used by the CIA due to its pervasiveness. It is important to note again the role that corporate bureaucrats played in the Chilean crisis.*

[25] US Select Intelligence Committee Report *p. 25.*

[26] US Senate Select Intelligence Committee Report *p. 37.*

coup. Ambassador Korry was also unaware of the attempt at a violent overthrow. An avowed anti-Allendeist, Korry was also a realist. As the ambassador to Chile, he had the best and most extensive information gathering resources. He repeatedly informed Nixon and Kissinger that neither the Rube Goldberg gambit, propaganda campaigns nor an attempted coup would effect any change in Allende's status.[26]

Korry, however, was not the only source that seemed to raise questions regarding the sagacity of the Track II government policy. Between 1969 and 1973, five National Intelligence estimates (NIEs) were produced on Chile, none of which stressed an extreme urgency with regard to the direction of the Allende regime. The second NIE, put out in August 1972, stated that Allende was far from consolidating power, and in fact, Marxist rule was not inevitable in Chile. The PDC and PN controlled congress was forming an effective opposition and the media, labor unions, and student groups had been permitted to voice their objections to government policies. Another NIE, produced in 1972, stressed the fact that Allende was seeking to prevent a complete breakdown in relations with the US and was perhaps seeking to open negotiations concerning the nationalization of industry. Finally, with regard to the threat posed by Chile to the United States, an interdepartmental group comprised of the CIA, the Departments of State and Defense, and the White House, reported to the President that "we had no vital interests within Chile" and that "the balance of power would not be significantly affected by an Allende regime."[27]

Despite these reports stressing the relative moderation of the Allende government, Nixon and Kissinger continued to push for a Track II policy.[28] CIA efforts to carry out the executive order were of the most covert nature. Three top CIA men allegedly involved in the attempted assasination of Fidel Castro were smuggled into the country with the express purpose of giving monetary and ideological support to reactionary elements in the military.[29] Moreover, a military attache with excellent contacts in the Chilean military, Colonel Wimert, was enlisted by the CIA to secretly promote the coup. His support was directed towards a more moderate group led by General Valenzuela, rather than the groups that the CIA men had contact with, who were referred to as "false flaggers."[30] The general plan was to kidnap Chilean Chief of Staff General Rene Schneider, who was the main force preventing a military coup. Once out of the way, it was thought that the coup would occur spontaneously. The Valenzuela group gained support in 1970, as the White House received

[27]US Senate Select Intelligence Committee Report *p. 48.*

[28]*Hersh speaks of how the pressure on the CIA to stop Allende was as great as the pressure to get rid of Castro just a few years earlier.*

[29]*These three men were later identified under their CIA names as Henry Stamon, Bruce MacMaster, Robert F. As carriers of fake passports, they were widely referred to as falseflaggers.*

[30]*Hersh, p. 262.*

alarming reports concerning the stability of the radical right wing leader General Viaux. Hersh reports that Nixon and Kissinger even went into a bit of a panic when a suspicious Korry informed them of Viauz's insane character. Fears that perhaps a failed coup could be traced to the White House if Viaux was to become captured were rampant. The controversy over Viaux, which eminated from the White House, created much confusion amongst CIA bureaucrats. Despite a withdrawal of concerted support for Viaux, his knowledge of US intentions were enough to set him off on his own. His attempt at a coup failed despite the assasination of Schneider.[31]

Considerable propaganda and economic pressures were again placed on Chile from 1970 to 1973. Due to our insufficient knowledge of intelligence gathering during this time, particularly after 1972, information is extremely limited. While investigating covert actions in Chile, the Senate Committee on Select Intelligence allowed the administration to edit reports of what went on during the months immediately preceeding the Allende assasination. But we are aware that the CIA was receiving information concerning the coup. Because of its highly secretive nature, two pressing questions have arisen concerning American involvement in Chile. Why did the US pursue such an extensive policy of covert actions in Chile in direct contravention of the facts provided by every known intelligence source? And how were Nixon and Kissinger able to circumvent bureaucratic controls, and thereby establish a policy which was free of any traditional democratic constraints?

In answer to the latter question, the power wielded by the Nixon administration illustrates Krasner's basic tenet that the power of the president should not be undervalued. The autocratic control that Nixon and Kissinger were able to assume over foreign policy is a particularly strong indication of how misleading the Allisonian Wonderland can be. Hersh describes Nixon and Kissinger's view of bureaucracy as a sector which was to be "utilized or ignored." In the sense that the bureaucracy was "utilized," standard operating procedures were followed in order to establish an air of legitimacy about our foreign policy in Chile. The Forty Committee met intermittently, Korry was consulted on all Track I policy options, and NIEs were annually collected. In another sense, however, the executive branch "utilized" the bureaucracy through manipulation. Colonel Wimert, for example, was duped into working for the CIA by a cable instructing him to begin following the orders of Station Chief Henry Hecksher.[31] This cable fit the standard operating procedures of the Defense Intelligence Agency. The intelligence reports, which Wimert believed were heading to the DIA, were instead rerouted through the CIA

[31] *The CIA's association with the fanatical Viaux was a cause of great concern for Kissinger and Nixon. Kissinger's testimony therefore in the Senate hearings and in his book categorically seeks to deny any link with Schneider's assasination. In fact, the* White House Papers *on the whole can be seen as an attempt to vindicate certain foreign policy measures.*

and into the White House for direct review by Kissinger.

Another, more conventional, manipulation of bureaucratic constraints involved the fine line that existed between defining covert actions and clandestine operations. Covert acts imply that measures have been taken which affect the domestic conditions of another country. Clandestine operations, on the other hand, are pursued for the purpose of gathering intelligence.[32] Covert actions, because of their more controversial nature, are subject to extensive bureaucratic controls. In attempting to get around the restrictions which legally govern in covert actions, operations are often classified as clandestine. Moreover, even when projects such as infiltrating the military leadership are truly clandestine, agents cannot help but have some influence on informants.

When the bureaucracy became too cumbersome, Nixon and Kissinger were simply able to ignore normal procedural channels. With little difficulty, the bureaucratic machine can be bypassed through direct contact with the CIA. The enactment of the entire Track II program after October 25, 1970 was again only possible if free of interference from typical bureaucratic controls. The State Department in particular was decidedly against severe pressure of any kind on Chilean society. Not only did Track II ignore the Forty Committee, but Foreign Assistance Act 662,[33] which insisted that the CIA report covert activities to six congressional oversight committees, was also violated. The failure of the oversight committees to monitor covert actions adequately was attributable to both indolence on the part of Congress and conscious complacency on the part of the CIA.

Nixon and Kissinger also largely disregarded the input that they received from all levels of the bureaucracy. Indicative of this sort of mind set were the gradual increases in amounts of money for covert operations that occurred from 1970-1973. As NIE reports were mellowing, the destabilization policy picked up. Despite the protestations of Hecksher and Korry, who saw the White House's measures to prevent the rise of Allende as wholly unrealistic, Nixon and Kissinger continued to support the Track II policy. A 1973 NIE report even went so far as to say that, although the Soviets wanted expanded influence in South America, "they did not want another Cuba on their hands."

Further problems with NIE surfaced in the Senate Hearings regarding their very formation. The Senate Select Intelligence Committee discovered that intelligence gatherers had not been informed about covert action in support of anti-Allende elements in the population. Consequently, a 1972 report on the strength of opposition groups in Chile was written without the knowledge of US covert support. As a result there were no estimates in the intelligence network of what the strength of those groups would have been without US

[32] *Interview with Peter Winn.*
[33] US Senate Select Intelligence Committee *p. 49.*

funding. By the end of 1970, the CIA had carte blanche to do what it saw fit in Chile. That is not to imply that the CIA did not keep a close watch on its field members or that the CIA leaders, namely Hecksher and Helms, did not have close contacts with the White House. What it does say is that the typical limitations on policy formulation and plicy implementation that are inherent in representative governments no longer existed. With particular regard to policy formulation, the direction of foreign affairs in the United States from 1969 to 1973 was based almost exclusively on the values of the president and his resulting worldview.

In essence, then, not only does the president have extensive control over the government bureacracy, but the popular perception that his actions are dictated by the political machine relieves him of responsibility for failed policies. Krasner speaks of how it is "dangerous" to break the linkage between a leader and his programs. When accountability is no longer a factor, the potential for irrational behavior increases dramatically. In the case of Chile, Nixon and Kissinger could have been bouyed by the persuasiveness of Allisonian theory at the beginning of the seventies.

There are several factors that point to the fact that Kissinger took great care to cover his tracks and protect the image of the executive offices. Ultimately the Senate investigation into covert action in Chile implies that it was the CIA which seemed to be most at fault during the crisis. Manipulating the bureaucracy in order to muddle accountability channels, the White House consented to give Senator Humphrey's Subcommittee on Chile all its papers if editing was permitted on documents after 1972 and, if the committee promised not to bring up the Defense Intelligence Agency. During 1977-79, the CIA handed control of Chile to the DIA, in what was perhaps the major instance of bureaucratic politicking encountered in Chile.[34]

Having examined, through Krasner, exactly how Kissinger and Nixon were able to control the formation of foreign policy it is important to ask exactly why they chose the course they did. Most significantly, both Nixon and Kissinger were heavily influenced by their perceptions of world history. Kissinger reveals the very essence of his view in *The White House Years:*

> We live in an age of ideological confrontation, through every phase of coexistence the Soviet leaders have insisted that it does not imply any lessening of the ideological struggle. Soviet line communist parties occasionally differ with their senior partner in Moscow on questions of internal communist policy . . . They almost never differ on international issues.

[34]US Senate Select Intelligence Committee *p. 6.*

For the president and his national security advisor, political life centered around the East-West conflict. As Kissinger would say to Chilean Foreign Minister Gabriel, "History has never been produced in the South. The axis of history starts in Moscow, goes to Bonn, crosses over to Washington and then goes to Tokyo." The Nixon administration's treatment of Chile is certainly a reflection of this view.

The foundation of this world view was largely predicated on two factors: the political economy of the American system, and the immediate personal experience of Nixon and Kissinger in terms of the recent plethora of foreign policy crises. From Nixon's perspective, the single most important factor was his desire to defend the capitalist system. Particularly in light of the fact that Nixon had close relations with the Council of the Americas, Nixon looked to protect both Chile and America from encroachments upon free enterprise. Communist incursions in North Vietnam, Argentina, and Italy, all served to heighten our chief policy-makers' belief in the Domino theory. For the Nixon administration, preventing communism from hitting the continent was tantamount to maintaining the balance of power in the East-West conflict.

Jervis speaks of how having confidence in one's theory allows a policy-maker to interpret events to fit that theory. Kissinger's complete commitment to the notion of the East-West conflict went beyond confidence to the point of arrogance. No matter what information was brought to him in terms of NIEs and interagency reports, Kissinger refused to accept that an Allende victory would not create a base for Cuban and Soviet insurgents. To say that Kissinger was irrational in his perception of the Chilean crisis would be mistaken. Jervis describes irrationality as "acting under pressures that the actor would not admit as legitimate if he were conscious of them." It does not appear that the White House truly succumbed to the pressures, thereby losing control of the leadership process. For Kissinger and Nixon, it was more a problem of "cognitive distortion." Their arrogance with regard to foreign policy theory allowed for perceptions of an Allende regime which were not necessarily consistent with the facts. Most significantly, "contrary to Kissinger's portrayal of Allende, the Chilean leader was not a card-carrying communist."[35]

In examining the policy alternatives in Chile, Nixon and Kissinger suffered from two common failings: they did not establish a logical linkage between their policy goals and the reality of the Chilean situation and they overestimated the threat posed by the Popular Unity.

Preventing Allende's ascension to power, given the extent of his support and the unique structure of the Chilean constitutional system, was highly unlikely. When Track I was unable to stop the victory of the Popular Unity,

[35] *Interview with Peter Winn.*

the White House pressed for a more violent solution. Track II was followed, despite what was described by the CIA as the "Mission Impossible" nature of the policy.[36] Theoretical arrogance helped to contribute to the breakdown in logical linkage that occurred. Containing Allende was simply not a necessary step in the program to stem the flow of communism. As an aspect in the East-West conflict, Kissinger's arrogance also came to the fore as expressed by his faith in the fungibility of power. Because the axis of history cuts through Washington it was assumed that we could convert our military and economic superiority into political power. American failure to do so could easily have been avoided had the U embarked on a course in which logical linkage was more firmly established.

Typically, an overestimation of power also resulted from American perceptions of the ideological supremacy of the East-West conflict. Despite reports of firm congressional opposition to many Allende policies, splits between socialists and communists in the Popular Unity Party and Soviet reluctance to become involved with another Cuba, the White House saw the Allende regime as a firm, solidified government committed to the politices of its "comrades" in Moscow and Havana. This overestimation of power produced a policy response which was more severe than necessary. The severity of our response was significant in terms of reading internal and external forces of change. In his Hypothesis 11, Jervis states that actors tend to over-estimate the degree "to which others are acting in response to what they themselves do when others behave in accordance with the actor's desires, but when the behavior of the other is undesired, it is usually seen as derived from internal forces." The US had good reason to believe that support given during the 1964 election played an important role in contributing to the election of Frei. The extent of CIA support however, was so pervasive that the 1964 election served to link the PDC to American support. Increasing aversion to American intervention in the Chilean political system characterized Chilean popular opinion. As covert actions intensified in the 70's Nixon and Kissinger failed to establish the connection between the polarization and unification of anti-American Allende forces on the left, and growing violations of Chilean sovereignty by American agents.

Essentially the message the US conveyed to Chile through its policy of intervention was, from the Chilean perspective, intolerable. Chile's support of Allende's nationalization policy is indicative of their desire for a society free of American exploitation. Imperialist in nature, the US, despite its aid in Chile's development, had come to be seen as the enemy. As the self-proclaimed defender of democracy, America failed to fulfill its role in Chile. The US was seen as the disrupter of the constitutional process. Prior to covert

[36] *Hersh, p. 277.*

action in Chile from 1963-1977, Chile had enjoyed a democratic tradition of 40 years.

Kissinger and Nixon's perception of the American image differed greatly from what Latin American nations saw. Both Nixon and his chief aide felt that the US was viewed as a benevolent neighbor interested in promoting economic and political development within the confines of a democratic, capitalist system. For Nixon and Kissinger, American involvement in Latin America was considered a favor to those nations lucky enough to be the beneficiary of American technology, capital and values. These vastly different perceptions concerning the conveyance of a foreign policy "message" play an important role in explaining why Nixon and Kissinger were able to opt for convert action.

On the whole, then, Jervis's "Hypothesis on Misperceptions" serves as a significant supplement to Krasner in explaining why Nixon and Kissinger chose to use executive authority to promote the overthrow of the popularly elected Salvador Allende. The Chilean case is an extreme example of how dangerous undervaluing the president can be. Contrary to Allisonian theory, the Nixon administration proved that the president, not the bureaucracy, holds the reins of power in determining foreign policy. Krasner's theory is also visionary in predicting the absence of accountability for foreign policy failures when the bureaucracy is perceived to be in control. The brunt of the blame for the Chilean embarrassment did not fall on Nixon and Kissinger, but instead, it was a bureaucratic agency, namely the CIA, that was found guilty. Without Jervis's theory, however, it would be difficult to illustrate the mind-set that leaders should be careful to avoid in formulating foreign policy.

Despite lacking the predictive capabilities of Krasner, due to a Waltzian excess of reductionist variables, Jervis plays an integral role in revealing, in this case, the all important part that the East-West conflict had in affecting the exercise of authority within and beyond typical bureaucratic constraints.

The most glaring fault with both Krasner's and Allison's theories is that they fail to take into account the role of corporate executives as part of the bureaucracy constraining the policy alternatives of the president. ITT, although an extreme example as the "elephant rogue" (Peter Winn) of the business world, and the Council of Americas on the whole played a significant role in determining the policy of the government. Again, Nixon's primary concern was protecting the interest of his friends at the top of major industries. ITT heads, particularly chairmen Geneen and former CIA Chief McCone, were in constant touch with Helms and Kissinger, as several reports of sightings of ITT executives in Kissinger's office confirms. The interchange that often occurs between executive positions in the corporate sector and offices connected with the presidential branch in government reaffirms the notion that corporate leaders should be included in analyses of the bureaucratic machine.

In terms of the bureaucratic politicking that Allison speaks of in forming government policy, it seems that corporate bureaucrats have at least as great an input into the decision making process as their political counterparts.

Crisis in the Caribbean: An Analysis of the Decision to Invade Grenada

Alison Jo Guss

On the morning of October 25th, 1983, the White House announced that the United States had just begun an invasion of Grenada, a small island in the eastern Caribbean. The decision to invade was announced as a *Fait accompli*, and less than a month later, American troops returned home boasting of having "saved" Grenada from a communist takeover. Grenada, until the known only as the nutmeg capital of the world, was suddenly being described as a possible outpost for Soviet expension in Latin America. How did this transformation in perception come about, and why did the US choose to invade such previously insignificant tropical island? An understanding of the motives (and justifications) behind the invasion of Grenada sheds light not only on the perceptions and values of the Reagan administration, but also on the way that foreign policy is publicly and privately created in American politics.

"An interesting framework" for this type of analysis is the decision-making, atheoretical guide to understanding how external stimuli influence both the decision-making process and the decision itself. The oldest, and most common, type of decision-making model is pure description, where events are chronologically catalogued to hopefully establish cause and effect relationships. Richard Snyder revolutionized this process in the early 1960's by describing decision-making as a "type" of behavior or process; i.e., all decision-making has similar structural attributes. In his work with James Robinson[1] Snyder divided his decision-making model into three general categories: the individual decision-maker, the organizational context, and the occasion of decision at the level of "crisis".

The "individual decision-maker" category has three variables: personality, background, and motivation. these variables affect the way a decision-maker chooses to interpret data and react to stimuli. Although all three were important factors in the Grenada decision, motivations (the complex combination of values and objectives) seem to have played the most important role. What

[1] *James Robinson and Richard Snyder*, International Behavior: A Social-Pshychological Analysis, *(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965).*

the Reagan administration hoped to prove by invading Grenada was equally as important as how it perceived the treat.

The organizational context of a decision is based on two basic components: communication and composition. The composition of the group is basically the ideological background of its members, and is much like the motivational aspect of the individual decision-maker category. Communication is the subtle ways which information is transfered within a decision-making body. This factor is often important in understanding how decisions are made, and has proved pivotal in the decisions relating to Vietnam and the Cuban Missle Crisis. in terms of Grenada, however, this type of information is still unavailable to the public, so its relevance is unknown.

The occasion for decision, also known a the level of "crisis", is the most researched and applicable variable of the decision-making model. There are three components governing the level of crisis: whether the situation has been anticipated or not, whether the time to make a decision has been long or short, and whether important or unimportant values are invloved. The reason that the level of crisis is considered a factor in decision-making is because crisis decisions, as opposed to rational decisions, take on characteristics of their own. In a rational process, decision-makers establish their goals first and comprehensively consider all the options open to them. However, during a crisis, decision-makers generally use what Lindblom terms the "successive limited comparison" model, where goals and means are intertwined, and goals are often affected by the desirability of specific means. Human beings, either not being able to, or not wanting to analyze large amounts of data, satisfice their options by choosing the first one that seems workable. Crisis decision-making is therefore often not rational, but influenced by preconceived goals and insufficient data analysis.

There are specific drawbacks to decision-making theory, both in general and in the specific case of Grenada. In general, there is the problem of "noise"; many details are unimportant, yet it is difficult to tell, until years after the fact, which ones these are. Access to material is also a problem, especially if decisions were made in the recent past. The issue of evidence in the case of Grenada has proved to be doubly difficult; not only is the administration that made the decision still in power (so that most documents remain classified), but, also, reporters were not allowed to witness the invasion first-hand, thereby creating a paucity of non-official points of view. Therefore , a decision-making model of Grenada cannot yet be complete, and conclusions about inputs can only be extrapolations of the data at hand. Nevertheless, the model provides important insight into the motivations and values of the present decision-making body.

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[2]*President's Statement, October 25th,* State Department Bulletin, *Volume 83 (December, 1984), p.67.*

On October 25th, 1983, the President made the following remarks:

> On Sunday, October 23rd, the United States received an urgent, formal request from the five members of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) to assists in a joint effort to restore order and democracy on the island of Grenada . . . Early this morning, forces from six Caribbean democracies and the United States began a landing or landing on the island of Grenada in the eastern Caribbean.
>
> We have taken this decisive action for three reasons. First, and of overriding importance, to protect innocent lives, including up to one thousand Americans, whose personal safety is, of course, my paramount concern. Second, to forestall further chaos. And third, to assist in the restoration of conditions of law and order and of governmental institutions to the island of Grenada, where a brutal group of leftist thugs violently seized power, killing the Prime Minister, three Cabinet members, two labor leaders and civilians, including children.
>
> Let there be no misunderstanding. This collective action has been forced on us by events that have no precedent in the eastern Caribbean and no place in any civilized society . . .

For most Americans, this was probably the first they had ever heard of Grenada, much less the internal turmoil of this small, tropical island. Grenada, a former British colony, achieved total independence in 1974, under the leadership of Sir Eric Gairy, a former nightclub owner and expert on UFO's. In 1979, Gairy was ousted by Maurice Bishop, leader of the New Jewel (Joint Endeavor for Welfare, Education and Liberation) Movement. Bishop suspended the constitution and put into effect the "People's Laws", a long-range plan for gradual socialization. The New Jewel Movement began to fight within itself, and a more militant faction, headed by Bernard Coard, accused Bishop of not facilitating socialist change fast enough. On October 14th, 1983, Bishop was placed under house arrest and the Grenadian political situation fell apart. Many of Bishop's ministers resigned and Coard was reported to be running the government single-handedly. On October 19th, Bishop and three members of his cabined were killed outside his home, causing the internal situation to become more even chaotic. On October 23rd, the OECS sent a request for military assistance to the United States, claiming that the events in Grenada had destabilized the entire area. The United States accepted the invitation, and on October 25th, US troops, plus divisions from Antigua, Barbados, Jamaica, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent, stormed the island.

To understand why the Reagan administration chose to invade Grenada, is is important to analyze its motivations, both public and private. "Public"

motivations are those that were espoused by the administration in press statements, documents, and interviews, and include the safety of the American students, the OECS invitation, and the role of the Cuban "construction workers" at the time of the invasion. "Private" motivations are those factors that, although never officially articulated by the administration, can be subtly extrapolated by actions, choices, and, sometimes, a reinterpretation of public statements. The highly questionable nature of the public justifications proves how very important the private factors were in the decision-making process.

The most widely touted reason for the invasion, and the one that Reagan dwelt most heavily on in his October 25th address, is the alleged danger that the American nationals, faced during the chaotic period following Maurice Bishop's death on October 19th. At the time, there were roughly fifteen hundred Americans in Grenada, most of whom were enrolled at the St. George Medical School. Reagan, haunted by memories of the hostage situation in Iran, wanted to "rescue" the medical students before they became victims of the Grenadian political chaos. As George Shultz points out, "He (Reagan) felt that it was better, under the circumstances, to act before they might be hurt or be hostage than to take any chance, given the great uncertainty clearly present in the situation."[3]

The political situation in Grenada at that time was indeed uncertain, but charges that the students were in imminent danger are debatable. In his aricle "Oh What a Lovely War!",[4] Jonathon Kwitny asserts that not only was the Coard government extremely solicitous of the medical students, but it unsuccessfully tried to arrange for their departure from Grenada days before the invasion occurred. Dwitny interviewed Geoffrey Borne, the Vice Chancellor of St. George's Medical School and one of the four main diplomats on the island at the time of the invasion. Bourne asserted that, throughout the crisis period (October 19th-25th), Major 'Hudson Austin, commander of the Grenadian People's Army, consistently called and visited the medical school to make sure the Americans were comfortable and safe. The day Bishop was killed, Bourne said that two Grenadian guards came to his house and asked if the school had enough water to last throughout the twenty-four hour curfew. Bourne and Coard were in constant contact throughout the crisis period, and on the 25th, a few hours before the invasion began, Coard stopped by Bourne's house and said "Thank you for your cooperation, and I won't forget it."[5]

If the Reagan administration had considered the safety of the students its paramount concern, one would think that it would have consistently tried to arrange for their safe passage, but evidence proves this to be untrue. One of

[3] *Secretary Shultz's News Conference, October 25th,* State Department Bulletin, *p. 69.*
[4] *Jonathon Kwitny, "Oh What a Lovely War!"*. Mother Jones, *June, 1984.*
[5] *Kwitny, p.33.*

the reasons cited for the amphibious rescue mission was that Pearl's Air Force Base, the only completed runway in Grenada, had been closed on Monday, October 24th, and was therefore unable to receive military rescue planes. Not only did both British and Canadian planes fly out of Pearl's on the 24th, but the airstrip was too small to accomodate American jetliners, anyway. Throughout the week of the 22nd, the Grenadian government had consistently tried to convince the United States to evacuate the students by private, chartred planes. US officials asserted that an evacuation of that kind would take too long and proposed removing the students in US warships. General Austin refused, not wanting in US military presence so close to Grenada during the chaos, but suggested an alternative plan of evacuating the students onto a Swedish cruise liner that had volunteered its services. This proposal, which reached the White House by October 23rd, was mysteriously ignored. This information appears puzzling, considering that the Reagan administration used the issue of student safety so often in justifying the invasion. But a number of more subtle factors were at work.

On October 26th, the White House acknowledged that the Grenadian military council had offered the the US an opportunity to evacuate its citizens before the invasion (this was probably in reference to the Swedish cruise liner proposal). When this was brought up at a press conference that evening, Larry Speakes, spokesperson for the Reagan administration, acknowledged the proposal, but said that Washington would not be dealing with any Grenadian leaders because there was "bloody anarchy on th island" and the political structure was a "floating crap game".[6] Throughout the entire week before the invasion, Grenadian attempts to negotiate with the White House had been met with deaf ears. Victims of Jervis' "cognitive dissonance"[7], the Reagan administration saw Coard's Marxist government as illegitimate and unreliable, and refused to cooperate with them, even at the possible expense of American nationals on the island. From Reagan's point of view, cooperation with the "thugs" was impossible, making an invasion the only viable solution.

The second publicly motivating factor for the invasion of Grenada was the request for assistance from the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) to restore stability to the area. The OECS is a security alliance of English-speaking Caribbean states and includes Antigua, Dominica, St. Chris-

[6] *Hedrick Smith*, New York Times, *27 October 1983*.

[7] *The theory of cognitive dissonance, psychological in orientation, has great bearing on decision-making in international relations. Jervis asserts that decision-makers fit incoming information into their existing theories and images; i.e., they perceive what they expect. Instances where information seems to be ignored can often be explained by this phenomenon, especially when the opposing state is seen as a threat, either militarily of ideologically. In trying to assure its own safety, State A will see State B as only bellicose, so as not to be caught off guard. See Robert Jervis, "Problems of Misperception"*, World Policy Reader, *(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983)*.

topher-Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines (Montserrat, and Grenada). During the President's address to the nation on October 25th, Eugina Charles, prime minister of Dominica and spokesperson for the OECS, explained why the organization felt the need to invade one of its own members. She explained that the "suppression of the population" and the "military buildup" in Grenada had posed "a serious threat . . . to the security of the OECS countries and other neighboring states".[8] Charles also explained that the US, Barbados, and Jamaica had been invited to accompany the mission because many of the OECS nations had no standing army.

The request for assistance by the O.E.C.S. states is incontrovertible, but the legality of both the invitation and the US acceptance is highly questionable. George Shultz defended the US-OECS alliance by referring to Article 8 of the OECS treaty, which provides for "arrangements of collective security against external aggression."[9] Yet many international legal experts, including Christopher Joyner, question Shultz's justification, its legal parameters and overall implications.[10] Joyner asserts that the obligatory norm of non-intervention is a permanent tenet of international relations, and State A is only allowed to intervene in the affairs of State B for reasons of self-defense, the rectification of the treatment of nationals, or humanitarian purposes. Joyner believes that the action in Grenada cannot be seen as self-defense, for even with Soviet aid, Grenadian military forces could never be a tangible threat to US security. Joyner also questions the real "danger" of the student situation, citing many of Kwitny's arguments. He asserts that, for intervention on the behalf of nationals to be legal, the threat must be "genuine, imminent and substantial."[11]

The humanitarian justification of restoring stability to the Caribbean is questionable on a number of counts, most importantly because it contradicted a number of existing treaties. First, although the OECS treaty calls for collective defense, nowhere is the option of inviting outside states mentioned. Second, the charter calls for collective defense against external aggression only. While Grenada was embroiled in internal chaos, it had yet to draw other OECS countries into its struggle. Third, paragraph five of the OECS charter says that decisions pertaining to securtity and defense must be agreed upon unanimously. St. Kitts-Nevis, Monserrat and Grenada all were not consulted on the decision to invade. Lastly, and most importantly, the US decision to accompany the OECS went specifically against the United Nations and Organization of American States' charters. Both Grenada and the U.S. belong to these organizations. Both charters assert that sovereign States enjoy the fun-

[8] *O.E.C.S. Statement,* State Department Bulletin, *p. 68.*
[9] *Stuart Taylor,* New York Times, *26 October 1983.*
[10] *Christopher Joyner, "Reflections on the Lawfulness of Invasion",* American Journal of International Law, *Volume 78 (January 1984).*
[11] *Joyner, p. 135.*

damental, legal right of independence and freedom from external political interference unless the state in question specifically requests assistance. The US ignored both of these charters to accept the OECS invitation for reasons it clearly considered more important than adherence to international law. Again cognitive dissonance came into play; the Reagan administration felt that the Grenadian situation was so dangerous that it chose to ignore existing obligations and participate in the invasion.

The third and most well-founded public motivation for the invasion of Grenada was the Cuban influence on the island, most notable in the form of "construction workers" at the Port Salines Air Force Base. The role of these men is still unclear; the US asserts that they were soldiers in disguise, readying Grenada for a Cuban takeover. Havana, on the other hand, asserts that they were really construction workers who had volunteered to aid the Grenadian revolution. It is difficult to tell which of these assertions is correct, but it is known that these Cubans were the primary resistance to the invading troops. President Reagan saw this as a clear example of widespread Cuban military influence, but it could also be seen merely as fighting against Yankee imperialism. The real Cuban "threat" on the island was not the alleged construction workers *per se*, but the fact that Cuba, along with the rest of the Eastern Block, had both military and friendship treaties with Grenada. This will be discussed as a "private" motivation.

In decision-making, the occasion of decision, or level of crisis, is an important variable in determining how decisions are made. In the case of Grenada, the Reagan administration perceived the dilemmas presented to them during the week of October 19th-25th as unanticipated and requiring quick action; i.e., a "crisis" situation. As George Shultz describes the chain of events leading up to the decision to invade, it is clear that he saw the problem in "crisis" terms. At a press conference on October 25th, Shultz began the explanation with Maurice Bishop's death on October 19th. The next day, the President received news of this and instructed his cabinet to review the implication of these events for the American citizens on the island. At the recommendation of that meeting, the President diverted naval ships originally bound for Lebanon to Grenada as a precautionary measure. On October 22nd, the President received the OECS invitation and key national security advisors convened in Washington to discuss the matter. On Sunday, October 23rd, news was received of the massacre in Beruit. Concurrently, a tentative decision was made by the President to accept the OECS invitation and join the invasion. At 8:00am on October 25th, American, Jamaican, Barbadian and OECS troops began the invasion.

According to this official chronology of events, Grenada became an issue only six days before the invasion, making it a true "crisis" situation. In reality, however, the decision concerning the Grenadian situation had been a concern of the Reagan administration for months. In February of 1983 Maurice Bishop

had come to the U.S. "almost desperately",[12] trying to establish diplomatic ties with the U.S., but was kept at arms length because of his Marxist leanings. In the spring of 1983 the U.S. also tried to block and $4.1 million International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan to Grenada on the grounds that it would use the money to finish building Port Salines airstrip, which Reagan considered military in nature. Although the airstrip could conceivably accomodate Soviet military craft, its basic purpose was to facilitate tourism, which compromises fifty percent of Grenada's economy. The evidence of the tourist nature of the airport was so overwhelming that the IMF approved the loan, despite US reservations.

Bothy the attempted stoppage of the IMF loan and the refusal to establish diplomatic ties with Grenada can again be seen in terms of Jervis' cognitive dissonance; Reagan perceived Bishop as a threat and consequently blocked all evidence to the contrary. As Anthony Lewis notes. "President Reagan had publically written off Grenada as a bearer of the communist virus."[13] Reagan perceived Marxist Grenada as such a menace that any overture by Bishop was an exercise in futility.

Considering the Reagan outlook on Grenada, it is not suprising that there is also evidence of military planning months before Bishop's death. The most conclusive evidence of this is the fact that, from August 1st to October 15th of 1983, the US conducted the largest scale naval maneuvers since World War II. According to Eldon Kenworthy, during these maneuvers "American hostages were rescued from Guantanamo while U.S. troops remained on the targeted islands to 'install a regime favorable to the way of life we espouse'."[14] Many of the rangers present on this maneuver eventually participated in the Grenadian invasion. Although this is not absolute proof in itself, when it is combined with Reagan's consistent unwillingness to compromise with the Grenadians, it is quite possible that the "crisis" of Grenada had been anticipated for months. In this sense, the OECS invitation can be seen much more as a "green light" than an unexpected call for help.

To understand fully why the United States chose to invade Grenada, it is necessary to see beyond the official rhetoric and look at more subtle, internal impetuses — what can be called the "private" motivations. The first of these, and possibly the most important, was the fact that Grenada was not only domestically Marxist, but it had ties with the entire Eastern Block. Grenada had friendship and military assistance treaties with the USSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslavakia, East Germany, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Libya. In agreements discovered during the invasion (although many believe the U.S. government had known about them for some time), both military and logistical support

[12] *Anthony Lewis, "Was Grenada Necessary?"*, New York Times, *3 November 1983.*
[13] *Lewis.*
[14] *Eldon Kenworthy, "Grenada As Theatre"*, World Policy Journal, *Spring 1984.*

were to be delivered to Grenada over a period of years from most of these countries. At the time of the invasion most of the weapons discovered on Grenada were quite antiquated, causing Daniel Patrick Moynihan to exclaim, "We heard that Grenada was a Soviet and Cuban arsenal. Today I picked up the newspaper and read that many of the weapons were made one hundred years ago and are valuable historical pieces . . ."[15] Judging from the discovered treaties, however, the potential for Grenada to strengthen itself with Soviet aid was substantial. Whether this aid would have been used to export communism or merely to defend Grenada is a matter for speculation.

The second private motivation behind the invasion was the fact that it was eminently "do-able." First, Grenada was a small country right near Florida and at the time was in complete domestic disarray; i.e., it was an easy target. Much more important, however, was the fact that American military power in Lebanon was a complete disaster. For months, the US peacekeeping force had suffered setback after setback, finally culminating in the massacre of the Marines on October 23rd. Power in Lebanon was proving to be completely infungible, and the military needed to prove to itself and the world that it could still live up to its billion-dollar potential. As one military officer noted, "the officers suggested that invading Grenada was seen as better than standing guard in Lebanon. At least we're on the offensive and not sitting on our duffs."[16]

The third private motivating factor, and the one that is most influenced by the individual decision-making themselves, is the Cold War mentality of the present administration. Reagan and his aids see the world only in East-West terms; the" Soviet influence in Grenada meant that the island had already been lost to the other side and could only be "regained" through force. When all the world is seen as "us" versus "them", many of the subtleties of specific situations become lost. In his address to the nation, Reagan explained his understanding of both the Lebanese and Grenadian situations:

> "The events in Lebanon and Grenada, although oceans apart, are closely related. Not only has Moscow assisted and encouraged the violence in both countries, but it has provided direct support through a network of surrogates and terrorists. It is no coincidence that when the thugs tried to wrest control over Grenada, there were thirty Soviet advisors and hundreds of Cuban military and paramilitary forces on the island."[17]

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[15] *Paul Seabury and Walter McDougall, editors,* The Grenada Papers, *(San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1984), p. 17.*
[16] *Richard Holdran,* New York Times, *27 October 1983*
[17] *President Reagan's Address to the Nation* New York Times, *27 October 1983.*

Although Soviet influence in Grenada was strong, the events leading to the chaos were a result of complicated domestic factors, and cannot be reduced to a purely East versus West conflict. To a stauch cold warrior, however, this type of analysis is the only one that seems viable.

The last, and most subtle, private motivation to carry out the invasion has almost nothing to do with Grenada itself but more with sociological factors within the US. Ever since the Vietnam War, America has been unusually skittish about using force in the international arena. According to the present administration, this fear of bellicosity, also known as the "Vietnam Syndrome", has caused the US to lose credibility around the world. This becomes a real problem of perception, for as Eldon Kenworthy points out, "If the U.S. cannot secure threats near its own borders, why should Europeans and Asians believe we are seriously concerned about threats to them? If the Soviets can assume that nothing short of an attack on the U.S. will provoke an American response, which friend will trust us then?"[18] In this respect, the invasion of Grenada can be seen as US muscle-flexing, assuring our friends of our conviction and our enemies of our strength.

At this point, it is helpful to go back to the decision-making model to acquire some perspective on the entire Grenadian situation. The motivations, both public and private, have been discussed at length and provide probably the clearest cause – and – effect relationships behind the invasion. The individual decision-makers are also important factors, for their inability to perceive the subtleties of the situation left them without any choice but to invade. In the words of one senior official, "Grenada, Beruit and KAL Airliner all serve to confirm in the President's mind his own views of the world that there was a common thread to all these events and that it led back to Moscow."[19] If Grenada is seen as merely an outpost of the "Evil Empire," invasion would seem a logical choice of action.

In terms of crisis decision-making, the decision to invade Grenada, contrary to official assertions, was not a crisis at all, but had in fact been anticipated for months. It was a "rational" decision, but instead of taking into account all possibilities 'such as diplomacy or the use of sanctions), the decision-makers satisficed their options and chose to invade. This was done for basically two reasons. First, in the "successive limited comparison" model, the U.S. goal (to rid Grenada of Communism) became entwined with the means available (a huge military which had been frustrated in Lebanon). Second, in their predispositions, the decision-makers saw Marxism in Grenada as so evil that they never really considered negotiations. To them, an invasion was the only way to deal with a chaotic, Marxist government — which just happened to be small enough to defeat in a week.

[18] *Eldon Kenworthy, "Grenada As Theatre"*, World Policy Journal, *Spring 1984, p. 649.*
[19] *Leslie Gelb.* New York Times, *7 November 1983.*

One year later, the consequences of Grenada are still widely unknown. The invasion did achieve a few identifiable, short-term goals, such as the erradication of Soviet influence in one Caribbean nation and a surge of support for an already popular president. The long-term consequences of Grenada, however, are much harder to judge. It is possible that the invasion signalled a new dawn for "gunboat diplomacy," aliteral enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine. Although the Reagan administration has yet to invade any country this term, Grenada has set a precedent that could easily be repeated. Grenada proved to our friends in Central America that the U.S. backs up its rhetoric with force, and showed our enemies that an invasion is still within the range of possibilities.

On a more theoretical level, the fact that the U.S. chose to ignore its association with the U.N. and O.A.S. and accept the O.E.C.S invitation could mean a lessening of the effectiveness of international law. This shortsighted approach to national security could be seen as a step away from the Kantian world order, toward a Hobbsian "realpolitik".

The overall question raised by the invasion of Grenada, however, seems to be how far one set of morals can go in determining foreign policy, especially policy that takes lives. Although Grenada was a "successful" war, eighty-seven Americans, Grenadians, and Cubans died in the fighting. Were the justifications sound enough to cause even one death? From Reagan's point of view, they were. But looked at retrospectively, it is unclear that Grenada was much more than an insignificant pawn in the Cold War. Superpower rhetoric can rise to deafening proportions, but when words turn to gunfire, motives must be clearly evaluated before innocent lives are sacrificed to East-West muscle-flexing.

Command and Control — An Organizational Perspective

Robert Donnelly

Nuclear weapons command systems are enormously complex. The task of simply managing the weapons themselves, performing routine maintainance and assertaining which weapons could undertake what missions at any given time is not simple. Developing a system by which these forces can be controlled during a nuclear war is a genuine (if grisly) organizational challenge. Defined in the most simple terms, the C^3 (command, control, and communications) system is an oganization (or more exactly a complex set of organizations and suborganizations interacting with each other) by which nuclear forces are controlled during peacetime and in war. The C^3 system can be further defined in terms of its most basic components, which William Arkin and Richard Fieldhouse define as follows:

1. Command authorities, nuclear control systems, facilities for data analysis and decisionmaking.
2. Early warning sensors, attack characterization sensors, and their data processing facilities.
3. Communication links to distribute warning information and orders.[1]

The functions of the vast C^3 organization can be classified in terms of these three categories: command authority, sensing capability, and communication systems.

We can also look at C^3 in terms of its goals. This becomes somewhat problemmatic because the goals of C^3 depend on a number of different factors, including the technology at hand and the prevailing strategic doctrine. Strategic doctrine is a highly political issue, and the actual operational goals of the military in nuclear war are (for obvious reasons) classified. In a highly abstract sense, however, C^3 has several goals:

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[1] *William Arkin and Richard Fieldhouse, "Nuclear Weapons Command, Control, and Communications." SIPRI* Yearbook, 1984.

1. To prevent the release of nuclear weapons unless authorized, and to keep the weapons that are on line ready for release should orders arrive to fire them.
2. To insure the execution of orders and direct the operational use of nuclear weapons if necessary.
3. To provide timely warning and prevent successful surprise attack.
4. To deter attack by insuring that retaliation will occur no matter how successful the attack might have been.
5. To support the prevailing strategic policy, which in recent years has come to involve the flexible use of nuclear weapons over a period of days, weeks, or even months.

C^3 systems for nuclear forces are shaped by two fundamental pressures, both inherent in the technology of modern strategic arsenals. In 1945 the advent of the atomic bomb introduced the possibility of wreaking complete destruction in a matter of hours or days through strategic bombing (which was beyond the reach of even the devastating bombing campaigns of WW II). The hydrogen bomb, developed later, multipled the available destructive power hundreds of times. Within the military organizations entrusted with the strategic bombing mission, the unprecedented scale of the possible destruction led to the development of strategies of war centered on the notion of a "Sunday punch" or "killing a nation." Some have argued that such operational policies ought not be called "strategy" in the traditional sense, because they are essentially without military objectives (other than inflicting obliteration) and lacking in political purpose. In any case, it is the possibility of an overwhelming, obliterating attack which is the source of the first pressure shaping C^3. Their power is so great that a nation can be destroyed in hours, and the war lost. Defense at any significant level is impossible; the stakes are enormously high.

Because nuclear weapons are so powerful, they pose a great threat to the C^3 network itself. A dedicated attack on command and control would impair retaliation and might prevent any coordinated response at all. This is known as the "decapitation" scenario, about which more will be said later. Clearly, the first major pressure on C^3 is the destructiveness of the bomb itself, and its implications as an apocalyptic, ultimate weapon.

The second major pressure shaping C^3 has been time compression. Prior to the nuclear age, a nation could expect (assuming its intelligence systems are effective and alert) at least a day or two's warning that war was near. With the advent of nuclear weapons, it became possible to damage a country far beyond the levels of World War II in a few hours. Throughout the 1950s, the principle strategic delivery vehicle was the intercontinental bomber. The warning time expected between first detection of incoming bomber attack and their arrival over their targets was 5 to 8 hours. But modern arsenals rely on

intercontinental-range ballistic missiles as the primary weapon.

The time scale of ballistic missile attack is measured in minutes. Thirty minutes at most will elapse betwen the satellite detection of an ICBM attack and the explosion of the first warheads. SLBMs can be fired from submarines much closer to their targets, giving perhaps 12 to 15 minutes warning time. If what is known as a "depressed trajectory" is employed, SLBM warning time can be reduced to under ten minutes, possibly as low as 5-7 minutes (Neither side has tested an SLBM in a depressed trajectory yet, but the concept is technologically valid and could be implemented without much difficulty). Presursor warheads, detonated in space, can bathe the victim nation in electromagnetic pulses, damaging electronics. Clearly, C^3 systems must be able to respond almost instantly. This time compression factor has had a great impact on the organizational structure of command and control.

The process of responding the these pressures has generated a third souce of difficulty. This is a phenomenon we may call "information overload." Because of the time compression brought about by ballistic missiles, it was necessary to rely on a large number of real-time electronic sensors to provide tactical warning (warning that an attack has just been initiated, as distinguished from strategic warning, which might give a few hours or even days notice of impending attack). These sensors, including a variety of satellite based infared detectors and ground based radar systems, produce a constant flood of information which must be processed, evaluated, and integrated into an interpretation of whatever situation is in question. The flood of information should be kept in mind whenever we think about nuclear command and control. It has led to automation and standardization of responses (to the extent that responses can be standardized), possibly effecting the real flexibility of nuclear options.

The development of the information overload problem is directly related to a fourth determinant of C^3 structure, strategic doctrine. Up until the Kennedy administration, nuclear strategy was relatively simple.[2] Declared policy and operational policy both involved "massive rataliation" to nuclear attack, and through the Eisenhower years (1952-1959) the Strategic Air Command (SAC) under the direction of General Curtis LeMay gave little thought to less than

[2]*There are at least four aspects to nuclear policy: The declaratory policy, intended for public consumption; the force development and acquisition policy, heavily influenced by bureaucratic interests and the political power of the so called military-industrial complex; the arms control negotiation policy, which is to say the positions taken for the purposes of negotiations; and the force employment or operational policy, which is what determines the course of events should nuclear war actually be fought. It is important to bear these conceptual facets in mind when interpreting the term "strategy." Desmond Ball, "US Strategic Forces: How Would They be Used?" International Security,* Winter 1982-83.

massive nuclear operations.[3] Massive retaliation required two things of the C^3 system: an early warning system capable of detecting Soviet attack in time to blunt it as much as possible by prompt counterattack, and clear lines of communication between the NCA and the military for the issuance of "go" orders. There was no need for survivable, hardened C^3 facilities, as the war plan anticipated a single spasmodic blow.[4] Under the Kennedy administration, a strategy of "flexible response" was instituted in order to provide the President with options below the holocaust level should nuclear war break out.[5]

Once operational nuclear policy departed from the simple spasm response, issues of command and control became much more vital. If limited nuclear options were to be used, communications between the National Command Authority (NCA — the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff) and SAC, and between SAC and the nuclear forces themselves, had to be improved. Additionally, this strategy required much greater ability to assess an attack, and to predict before the attack was over the amount of damage it would cause, so as to allow the NCA to develop the appropriate retaliatory strike. Early warning sensors had to provide not only warning but also attack characterization, and this had to be integrated into the decision making process. (Roughly concomitant to this, of course, was the complicating development of intercontinental range ballistic missiles). provisions for the survival of the NCA and important communication and command facilities had to be made. More will be said about flexible response and its implications for the structure of C^3 later on, as it is a critical issue.

In response to these pressures, and to a complex set of "political" issues including bureaucratic and interservice rivalries, nuclear C^3 system have "matured." Paul Bracken defines two phenomena basic to this maturation process. The first is the "vertical integration of warning and intelligence systems with [the] actual nuclear weapons and their offensive machinery," and the other is a horizontal integration of the diverse and dispersed nuclear weapons commands (offensive and defensive) into a centralized system.[6] The necessity of this can be seen by looking at a particular case.

In the 1950s, an air defense system known as SAGE (Semi-Automated Ground Environment) was developed to coordinate the employment of fighters

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[3]*Eisenhower's doctrine of massive retaliation had been characterized as a completely inflexible, 'fire everything at once' strategy. Eisenhower intended it to be more flexible than it was perceived to be, and did not anticipate firing nuclear weapons to deal with any small contingency somewhere on the globe. See Samuel F. Wells, Jr., "The Origins of Massive Retaliation,"* Political Science Quarterly, *Spring 1981.*

[4]*Paul Bracken,* The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces, *(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), pp. 185-188.*

[5]*Fred Kaplan,* Wizards of Armageddon, *New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), ch. 18-22; and Bracken, p. 25.*

[6]*Bracken, pp. 6-7.*

against bomber attack (at this time, bombers were the only means of attack open to the Soviets). The task of SAGE was exceptionally complex: it had to plan and direct the launch of and flight of hundreds of intercepter aircraft against incoming bombers which have been detected but only partially plotted and evaluated by radar sensors in the Artic. Gathering the necessary data, performing the required calculation (e.g. effect of windspeed, air density, etc.), and communicating the information to the fighters was quite difficult. The SAGE system was a partial success.

As the first full scale warning and control system of the nuclear age, SAGE illustrates two general points about nuclear C^3 which are, of course, true of many complex organizations. First, as one might guess, it proved impossible to specify all the different contingencies and conditions of nuclear attack. It was impossible to specify, in advance, rules covering every contingency, and yet the rules could not be made broad and vague enough to allow a large amount of discretionary authority to lower level personnel operating the system.[7] That would have violated the requirement for Presidential control over armed forces. As a result, the operators of SAGE developed informal rules and operating procedures to augment or circumvent the formal rules. As Bracken explains, this is a problem with all nuclear C^3 systems, and the most stressful and potentially dangerous situations (where mistake or miscalculation is most likely) are those not covered by a formal operating procedure. The modern C^3 system experiences the same problem as SAGE, albeit in a much more complex world where greater time compression exists.

We can actually only guess at what a real Soviet attack would look like, basing our guess on what we assume to be the most efficient means of employing the Soviet arsenal against our forces. But there is an information asymmetry here, and the Soviets may know something about their own forces which dictates an attack quite unlike any anticipated. Our better knowledge of our own vulnerabilities may further warp our predictions concerning Soviet attack scenarios. The effects of nuclear explosions are not completely understood. It is possible that once the detonations begin, the system will have to cope with some unanticipated synergistic effect of hundreds of nuclear explosions. SAGE was a system of the late 1950s, when arsenals were much simpler. Today, these problems are multiplied many times by ballistic missiles and by "exotic" technology such as antisatellite devices."[8]

The introduction of real time warning systems in the late 1950s such as BMEWS (Ballistic Missile Early Warning System) and particularly the satellite based MIDAS (Missile Defense Alarm System) program had a strong impact on the control organizations. In order to best use the real-time continual flow

[7] *Bracken, p. 12.*
[8] *SAGE is still operational, though in an updated form. Arkin and Fieldhouse, p. 475.*

warning technology, it was necessary to integrate the command of the weapons with the organizations overseeing the early warning network. As Bracken notes, "It was at this juncture that the overall nuclear command system first began to shift from a relatively slow-reacting and loosely coupled system into a quick-reacting and more tightly coupled one."[9] Only a system which vertically integrated warning facilities with command authority would be capable of making full use of the flood of real time information, and in any case, the time scale of ballistic missile attack mandated such coupling. Command organizations had to be brought in line with the developing warning technology, and this required integration and automation.

In 1957, NORAD (North American Aerospace Defense Command) was established as a separate organization to deal with the continuous flood of warning information. Consistent with the need for vertical integration, NORAD is closely tied with SAC (which has operational control over strategic nuclear weapons). For two reasons, however, NORAD and SAC are separate organizational commands.[11] First, by setting the early warning function aside in its own organization, the possibility of institutional bias interfering with the alerting process has been minimized. Second, by creating two separate organizations (NORAD and SAC) which must (in most circumstances anyway) concur on the decision that (1) the warning information is correct and an attack really is under way, and (2) that forces must be launched or retaliation must be made, NORAD serves as one check in a series of institutional checks and balances which help control the alerting process (as the level of alert is raised, the different checks are bypassed to make execution of launch orders easier and faster.) These organizational changes were the result of attempts to deal with specific problems which arose largely from changes in the technological environment. Perhaps a specific example will be useful.

In 1969, the Soviet Union deployed the Yankee class ballistic missile submarine.[11] From patrol positions off of any sea coast, these subs could attack bomber bases and command facilities very quickly, destroying bombers before they could be scrambled and ideally decapitating the NCA and the C^3 system (so as to prevent an immediate or coordinated response). According to Bracken, this had two implications. First, it endangered the political control over nuclear weapons, since provisions had to be made for retaliation (and in some scenarios, for continued coordinated nuclear warfighting) even in the event of the destruction or isolation of the NCA. Chains of command are always tricky, and we must remember the example of SAGE, which developed various informal and underwritten operating procedures to circumvent cumbersome formal rules. Second, it called for the improvement of satellite based

[9] *Bracken, p. 17.*
[10] *See Bracken, pp. 19-24.*
[11] *See Bracken's discussion, pp. 34-41.*

SLBM early warning technology. Because of the extreme time compression, this data is fed simultaneously to NORAD, SAC, and the NMCC (National Military Command Post) in the Pentagon. It is not clear what the SLBM threat has done to NORAD's role as a check in the alerting process, but greater integration between the warning systems, its data and processing equipment, and the organizations having operational control over nuclear weapons has been the trend in responding to increased time pressure. In the future, the problem will be more severe as SLBMs become sufficiently accurate to attack hardened missile silos.

What is the magnitude of the data processing task today? The current generation of satellite based early warning sensors consist of three DSP (Defense Support Program) satellites which monitor the USSR, China, and the oceans. These satellites can detect any missile launch within seconds of rocket motor ignition, regardless of weather conditions. (Many improvement in their detection and characterization capabilities are being planned).

After detection, the next step in the warning process is confirmation and characterization by radar. Radar detection is vital for two reasons. First, present generation DSP satellites only have a limited ability to characterize the attack, to tell what warheads are coming in and where they will land. Radar is highly capable of calculating this, and in strategies envisoning a flexible or limited response, this is absolutely vital. The second reason for radar detection is to confirm the attack using "dual phenomenology." DSP uses infrared sensors to detect the heat of rocket motors, while radar detects the presence of physical objects. Using two different types of sensors (infared signature and radar imaging) provides a hedge against some sort of error which might give false readings on one type. It reduces the chance of error.[12] There are five main radar systems in the early warning/attack characterization system. They are:

BMEWS — 3 sites: ICBMs

PAVE-PAWS (Precision Acquisition of Vehicle Entry Phased-Array Warning System) — Otis Air Force Base Massachussetts, Beale Air Force Base California: SLBMs

PARCS (Perimeter Acquistion Radar Characterization System) — North Dakota: Attack assessment

FPS-85 and FSS 7 radar systems in Florida: SLBMs Cobra Dane phased array, Alaska: treaty verification, early warning, and attack assessment.

Consistent with strategies of flexible response and limited nuclear war, all these systems are under improvement.

[12] *Arkin and Fieldhouse, p. 474; see also Peter Pringle and William Arkin,* SIOP, *(New York: Norton, 1983), p. 98.*

All early warning and attack assessment sensors are real-time sensors, spewing out an incredible amount of information in a constant flow. Some of this is partially processed at the sensor station (or at ground stations if the sensor is satellite bourne) and sent on to C^3 organizations.[13] In the initial phase of a nuclear war, the following information would (ideally) be available:

1. Number of incoming warheads.
2. Warhead impact points.
3. Latitude and longitude of impact points.
4. Identification of each target as coded in a target characterization database, allowing commanders to anticipate how much damage an attack will cause and to select response on that basis.
5. Impact time of each warhead, and or next impact times (after initial impacts.)
6. Type of reentry vehicles (useful in determining explosive yield of incoming warheads).
7. Class of the attack: Urban/industrial; missile fields; bomber bases; C^3; Washington, DC.
8. Time of first explosion.
9. Number of warheads impacted.
10. Number not yet impacted.
11. Launch point of each missile in USSR / useful in knowing what types of warheads are coming in.
12. Number of subs launching missiles, possibly an idea of their location.

Theories of limited nuclear war employ this information to develop an "appropriate" response. Given the time constraints and the complexities of a modern nuclear arsenal, the magnitude of the data processing and decision-making task is obvious.

In the early 1960s, the Kennedy administration re-thought nuclear strategy with the intent of bringing nuclear war under rational and political control. It became particularly clear during the Berlin crisis that the President needed limited and restrained nuclear options, indeed a whole spectrum of options at a sub-holocaust level, making up a ladder of escalation. The administration quickly realized that the C^3 facilities that they inherited were not tailored to fit a flexible policy. They had been developed under the Eisenhower Administration and were geared mainly toward executing massive blows all at once — the opposite of escalation dominance and limited nuclear options. The problem that the Kennedy administration faced was that while the hardware of the existing system was not optimal for their purpose, building a new

[13] *Pringle and Arkin, p. 97.*

system would have been prohibitively expensive. They chose to cope with this by using "the physical and technical apparatus inherited from the late 1950s but to reorganize control policies for flexible response."[14] What was necessary was to: (1) centralize the political control of nuclear forces, and (2) at the same time find some way of preventing centralization from allowing the entire system to be disabled by one bomb which kills the President.

Centralization of authority is a very problematic area for C^3, particularly in the time-compressed era of ballistic misiles. A completely centralized system can be disabled (in theory) by a single bomb. Bracken notes an additional problem with centralized C^3, explaining that it places too much detailed control in the hands of civilian leaders who do not possess the skills, experience, or special technical knowledge to exercise control properly.[15] The task of managing employment (or deliberately holding of reserves) of thousand of nuclear weapons, both strategic and tactical, cannot be handled by a fully centralized system. It is simply too complex. Information overload and the need for timely response require decentralization.

The system finally developed did in fact incorporate a high degree of decentralization, but it was a curious form of decentralization adapted to the specific needs of nuclear C^3. Certain military commands were delegated the responsibility of actual operational use of nuclear weapons, reporting to the President though the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Bracken explains that in this system, each command authority (be it the locus of the President or one of the military commands) functions as a trigger. Operational command over nuclear forces devolved downward to the military commands only (but automatically) if the President is killed or if he authorizes it.[16] If the high level military commands (e.g. CINCLANT, CINCPAC, etc.) are destroyed, authority presumably devolves still lower to individual elements within the C^3 system still surviving. Naturally, the precise chain of command and the manner in which devolution of authority takes place is highly secret. Allowing authority to devolve to lower levels (should higher levels be destroyed) is a way of coping with the decapitation problem.

How serious is the decapitation problem? John Steinbruner estimates that as few as "50 nuclear weapons are probably enough to eliminate the ability to direct US nuclear forces to coherent purposes," assuming those bombs are carefully targeted at critical communication stations and command authorities. This is undesirable in that it: (1) may tempt the Soviets to attack during a severe crisis, hoping to prevent or reduce retaliation; and (2) it may lead to "use it or lose it" fears in the US military, generating pressure for a preemptive strike. The thrust of Steinbruner's analysis is that C^3 vulnerability, not ICBM

[14] *Bracken, p. 191.*
[15] *Bracken, p. 197.*
[16] *Bracken, p. 197.*

vulnerability (the "window of vulnerability" President Reagan spoke about in the 1980 campaign) is the chief source of strategic instability. Steinbruner also holds that none of the C^3 improvements made in the 1960s or 1970s served their purpose — to support limited war — and that further attempts to gain this capability are a waste of money.[17]

The problem of centralized command was not generated solely by the move to flexible response. A prudent deterrent posture ought to be able to deter attacks on both the forces themselves and the C^3 network. But with the move to flexible response, and later, the adoption of counterforce strategy and a policy of protracted nuclear war-fighting, survivable C^3 became al the more important. Additionally, the task of processing and evaluating the warning data and choosing the "proper" response (based on complex equations of anticipated damage, and such) became far more complicated. Thus under flexible response or counterforce, the operational command of nuclear forces came to require even more specialized technical knowledge of a sort political leaders simply do not have, as well as special training and experience with military operations. A system oriented to counterforce must therefore be decentralized.

[17] *John Steinbruner, "National Security and the Concept of Strategic Stability,"* Journal of Conflict Resolution, *Sept. 1978.*

The Effect of Western Influence on the Changing Role of Women in Arabia and Iran

Robert Lakos

The nations of Saudi Arabia and Iran stand out as leaders in both their region and religion. These two countries have also experienced a much celebrated recent history of dealings with the Western world and in particular with the United States of America. The natures of these countries with respect to their historic backgrounds are not dissimilar, but the evolution and development of their contact with the West do differ considerably. The effect of this contact with the West on the changing role of women in these two countries is therefore also radically different. I would like to analyze the influence of these two different relationships with the West, on the role of women in the Islamic nations of Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Saudi Arabia considers itself to be a focal point of Islam. This, to a large degree, determines its national character. Saudi Arabia has one other claim to fame in the modern world: some 37% of the world's petroleum reserves lie in Saudi Arabia, making it exceptionally wealthy and powerful.

The modern story of the rise of Saudi Arabia is that of a nation which is determined not to squander its newly gained wealth. *"Il-Hamdullah"* (praise Allah), the Kingdom struck oil, and it intends to continue reaping the benefits of that oil well into the future. The history of Saudi Arabia lies in sharp contrast to its present status in the world. The peninsula on which the kingdom lies is composed of harsh desert bounded by two seas. The lands bordering it to both the north and south enjoyed the blessings of either agricultural prosperity — in the lands fertilized by the Tigris and Euphrates — or the geographic importance of controlling the mouths of the either the Arabian gulf (Oman and Iran) or the Red Sea (Djibuti and Yemen–Adan). The inner desert of Arabia spawned no great civilization and no cohesive population. The people were nomadic, moving constantly in search of water and grazing land for their sparse flocks of sheep and goats.

Saudi Arabia was the birthplace of Islam. It was in the desert, during the middle of the seventh century, that Mohammed received the Holy *Koràn* from God *(Allah)*. Mecca was the Holy center of Islam and Medina was its "sister" city. Islam seems tailor–made to the region and lifestyles of Saudi Arabia;

not only is it one of the five duties of every Muslim for him to travel once during his life to Mecca to perform the pilgrimage called Hajj, but five times a day he turns his head to Saudi Arabia when he prays his ritual prayers. The laws of the Koràn, which we shall touch on later, find particular relevance to the conditions of life among the Arabian nomads. The high value placed on the family and on the role of the women as childbearers was dictated by the harsh requirements of tribal survival. A tribe needed to grow in order to survive; female children grew up to spend much of their time pregnant and nursing the newborn. With women thus incapacitated during much of their lives, they became a liability in a society where tribal skirmishes and wars were a constant threat. Whereas males could fight for their tribe, women were relegated to the support role of "male supplier" for the tribe. Male babies were valued more highly than female babies because of their greater "productive" potential. This is, however, an incomplete picture since nomadic women did not spend all their time pregnant — in fact, they did participate in herding the animals and they were, in many cases, responsible for such heavy labor as erecting and tearing down the tents of the tribe.

The value of women was as producers of male children; this entailed much in terms of sexual responsibility. The nomads of the Arabian Peninsula, like many other cultures, were patriarchial — i.e. wealth was passed on from generation to generation along the male side of the family; thus, sons inherited from fathers. It therefore became very important to ensure that a woman could, beyond the shadow of a doubt, identify the father of her sons. This is essential in a patriarchial society to ensure the preservation of social order, since wherever a son's legitimacy is questionable, internal tribal disunity grows and blood feuds can erupt as relatives choose opposing sides in the legitimacy dispute. It was therefore in the interest of group stability to prevent any extramarital or premarital relations, as these might in some way cast doubt as to the lineage of a son.

The Koràn refers to the separation of the sexes *(purdah),* and it seems logical that this was initiated for the greater stability of the tribe. Purdah asserts that men and women should not mingle in public and that if such interaction were necessary, then everything possible should be done to ensure that it does not develop into a sexual encounter. The means to this end are found in the Koranic admonition for males and females to dress modestly and, when meeting in the streets, to look down, averting the gaze. This is something which we in the West equate with the imposition of inferior status on women. But among the nomads, this implied nothing of the sort. It was simply insurance against sexual mischief. The issue of the equality of the sexes is dealt with quite plainly in the Koràn, where it is written that both men and women have different roles to play in the world but that neither is superior to the other in the eyes of Allah.

A side effect of *purdah* which developed over many centuries, and which

now reinforces the segregation, was the resulting fragility of the male ego, and the result this has had on male treatment of women. The lack of premarital contact with females fostered the suspicion that women were endowed with a seductive and luring nature, from which a man was powerless to escape. Naturally, as a girl aged, her understanding of men and their potential vulnerability to her power sharpened (really this "power" refers to her ability to tempt men into sinful list — *fitna*). If a woman had already "known man," her experience would be all the more dangerous to men. Therefore men traditionally choose young, quiet virgins as their ideal brides. In response, women who wish to marry (and nearly all do) must act innocent and ignorant; they should never be open or demonstrative about their mental capabilities. This reinforces the concept (which I shall deal with later) of women as mentally incapable and deficient.

Because a woman's worth in life was determined by her ability to produce offspring, especially male offspring, her father, having the economic responsibility for her until she was married, was clearly interested in lessening his burden through an early marriage. If this could in any way be impeded by some improvident sexual promiscuity on her part, it became in the interest of the father to watch over the actions of his girls. A father would be judged severely by his male friends if he were so unshrewd as to let his daughter roam freely in the streets and talk with strange men. A relationship thus developed between a daughter's chastity and the honor of the males of the family, who were supposed to watch over that. A girl's promiscuity reflected the impotence of the males in her family in controlling her.

Until oil reserves were discovered in Saudi Arabia in the early 20th century, there had been no force enabling (and certainly none pushing for) social change. The country was very poor, populated by beduoin and some more settled city dwellers. The major income was from religion, which provided an assured annual influx of Moslem pilgrims coming to fulfill their Hajj obligations. This was also the primary means of contact with the outside world for most of the native population. The Hajj focuses the attention of Muslims around the world on Mecca. Because of this attention, it was, and continues to be, crucial to Saudi Arabia's position that it do everything possible to protect its image as such a center of Islam. In a sense, the stability of Islam is now related to the stability of Saudi Arabia. It must maintain its national image of religious integrity.

The discovery of oil in 1936 pushed Saudi, Arabia rapidly into the fast lane of change. After the OPEC oil embargo in 1973, which resulted in greatly increased oil prices, Saudi, Arabia's wealth soared. Development, rather than waste and squandering was emphasized by the government (though these values are notoriously neglected by many Saudi nationals in their overindulged private lives). A decade ago, during the second five-year plan, much of the

national income was put to use in building hospitals and schools; now in their third five-year plan the emphasis has been placed on staffing these hospitals and schools with local employees rather than imported labor. This has become important in view of both the destabilizing impact of the large immigrant workforce, and the "brain drain" caused by the emigration of the few educated Saudis to the West.

Education for females in Saudi, Arabia recently became popular as proof to the rest of the world that Saudis are not uncultured boors. Also, as men were educated through the university level in greatly increasing number, they sought wives who were somewhat better educated. During the past forty years, it became acceptable for women to obtain primary and secondary education, and the trend has by now evolved to include university education. Since 1960, when women were first admitted to King Saud University, the number of female students studying at universities in Saudi, Arabia has risen to above 9,000. These women are entering the fields of medicine and education in ever-increasing numbers. Hospitals and schools which were built exclusively for women have thus far been staffed by imported labor; there is now a great demand for Saudi women to enter such fields.

For females, banking is another newly developed sector of the economy which is currently being staffed by native Saudi women who have an interest in finance. In early 1980, the first entirely female bank was opened in Riyadh by the Al-Rajhi Company for Currency, Exchange and Commerce. By mid-1982 there were at least 13 all-female banks in Saudi, Arabia employing 120 Saudi women, and each one with a female director. At this time, the field of female banking may seem relatively insignificant, but the existence of independent finances for women allows a much greater potential for independence.

In addition to medicine, teaching, and banking, women are also participating increasingly in private enterprise. For example, as the head of clothing stores selling high fashion for women, or hairdressers operating their own beauty salons, Saudi women are becoming increasingly important members of the nation's economy.

Journalism is another field now open to female participation. In her article on Saudi women, Louay Bahry points ot extensive female contribution in two major Saudi newspapers. The apparent freedom of these journalists to express themselves on topics such as the west bank, and in fact, on the role of women in Saudi Arabia, indicates the potential impact on such important issues.

The debate over working women rages between conservatives and liberals in Saudi Arabia. Conservatives argue for the traditional "family" role of the wife, and assert that the working woman upsets the stability of the family unit; and further, that, in order to fill the mother's place in the house, even more foreign help will have to be imported. Liberals contend, however, that it is more important to fill the upper level jobs with native Saudis, rather than

hiring foreign workers. As Louay Bahry writes, "they argue that the failure to utilize female is tantamount to paralyzing half of society."[1]

What was the combination of factors which led to these gradual but significant changes? On the most basic level it must be recognized that the sudden and awesome wealth of Saudi Arabia provided the foundation for the more particular factors. These more specific factors are fourfold. Firstly, increasing wealth has enabled many wives to hire imported helpers to assist in housework, thereby freeing the woman during part of the day to take a job, since she needs something to do with this free time. Secondly, a growing number of college educated women wish to put their required knowledge to use — i.e., work. Also, economic pressures in an increasingly expensive country, and especially for families with increasingly expensive tastes, necessitate a second, supplementary income. The last factor, on which I will subsequently elaborate, is that of the increasing contact with the West and the example of possible but non-traditional female roles which the West has displayed to the Saudis.

Contact between Saudi Arabia and the outside world, the West in particular, has taken several forms. As I have already mentioned, prior to the discovery of oil in the early part of the 20th century, contact between the Saudi portion of the Arabian peninsula and the outside world was limited to reception of Moslem pilgrims on their way to Mecca. Since the oil boom, interaction with Moslems from many different countries, and with Westerners, has sky-rocketed. For example, many Saudis who are living in apartment complexes now share their space with neighbors who are Egyptian, Pakistani, Yemeni, Palastinian, or who come from a variety of East Asian nations. These people all live in Saudi Arabia because it has jobs. For Saudi women, this means that the woman next door, although she is probably Asian and not Western, either has a career or some sort of temporary job.

Their contact with Westerners and Western role models is threefold. First, there is tangential contact with the Western expatriate population working in the Kingdom. These foreigners are, however, entirely secluded from the mass female population, and as afar as we understand, their contact with Saudi women is limited to the indirect influence of the Westerners on the husbands, with whom they work. On the other hand, since most of the expatriate Westerners living in Saudi Arabia are unmarried males, it is unlikely that they are viewed by the natives as an example to be copied. Though the sexual histories of the Westerners are doubtlessly the object of much query and awe by the Saudis working with them, the Saudi male views the interaction and sexual liberty of the West with much the mind-set of Orwell's "double think." He may be quite interested in experimenting with what he considers the frivolities of the West, yet his requirements in a wife will remain largely

[1] *Louay Bahri, "The New Saudi Woman: Modernizing in an Islamic Framework,"* The Middle East Journal, *Vol 36, No. 4 (Autumn 1982), p. 507.*

unchanged even by a recognition of the charms he finds in a Western woman and her style of behavior. Like the man who visits a prostitute, he would never want to take one for his wife. The Saudi man remembers that his desires in a wife are those of mother and home-manager; until recently she saw him rarely and her level of education and experience didn't afford for much intellectual debate with him, much less normal conversation. He didn't meddle in her responsibilities and she stayed out of his.

The Westerners therefore have only a minimal impact on the role of women in their direct dealings with Saudis. However, much more also arrived with them. Take, for example, the television station of ARAMCO which broadcasts many American movies and T.V. shows in English. This station and numerous radio stations can be received in many Saudi homes. Certainly, with the growing number of women who learn English in school, or who go to school abroad in the West or Egypt, the Western media is opening many eyes to the vast possibilities for women to work in non–traditional occupations.

Saudis are also travelling abroad, and often living for parts of each year in a Western country. So far, it is still difficult to think of these women immediately shedding all ideas of *purdah* as they cross the Mediterranean and land in France or Britain. usually we see them on the streets with their husband — thoroughly covered. Of course, without such heavy covering they would melt into any cosmopolitan population (looking perhaps just a little richer than the rest). I believe that, as their exposure to the West increases, and with the simple passage of time, they will adapt their dress and comportment while abroad. Among the young, these changes are taking place already.

Once out of Saudi Arabia, (even, as I pointed out, in the Islamic nation of Morrocco) Saudi females are no longer restrained by the strict interpretation of *purdah* which, it seems, is nearly unique to Saudi Arabia. Unquestionably for those growing numbers of Saudi girls who are educated abroad, the increasing contact with the West will alienate some of them from the constrained, highly regimented role of women on the peninsula.

As females enter the fields of teaching, medicine, and journalism, there will soon be women who desire careers in engineering and more importantly, in law. In the future, as the secluded women's sector grows, there will be a need for female lawyers to handle the dealings between the women of these interacting fields. Other changes will also have to take place, such as increasing the number of day-care centers available to working mothers (a measly forty at present), and the expansion of public transportation in accordance with rules of *purdah*, since women wearing a veil are not allowed to drive cars (in fact, public buses in the large cities now have a separated compartment for women.)

When Westerners look at Saudi Arabia, two topics are always mentioned: the veiling of women, and the strict interpretation of Islamic Law *(Sharià)*. When one speaks of the status of women in present day Iran under the rule

of the Ayatollah Khomeini, the same two topics are discussed with the same degree of severity. Women are veiled, and the justice system is a severe Islamic one. An examination of the history of Iran and the role of women in that society will clarify this simplistic comparison of the two countries.

Iran's history is one of civilization and of dynastic rule. Iran, once referred to as Persia, was a center of art and religion. The city of Qom stands out as one of the Eastern centers of Islam. Iran is far more diverse than is Saudi Arabia and nearly four times as large in population. Although the current rulers of Iran are the Shià Muslim clergy of the country, Iran has, until very recently, contained numerous exotic religions. Zoroastrians, Jews, and the Bahaie all make up considerable minorities within the borders, and Iran is the home country of two of these religions, Zoroastrianism and Bahaie. As well as religious diversity, Iran is home to several different ethnic groups which together claim close to half of the population. Among these ethnic groups (Kurds, Azerbiajanis, and Bakhtiaris) the Kurds probably are the most vociferous in demanding their sovereign rights within the country. This heterogeneity has led to the existence of a very dynamic country; but as a dynamic country it is also somewhat unstable.

Unlike the gradually developing role of women in Saudi Arabia, Iran's dealings with women are characterized by extreme and sudden changes. A survey of the past eighty years will leave us with a better comprehension of the nature of Khomeini's rise to power and of his dealings with women.

The traditional role of women in Iran was that of mother and house–manager. The women of Iran, however, showed a spark not demanded yet of Saudi women — that of participation in revolution. The Constitutional Revolution of 1905-11 provided women with their first taste of action. Guity Nashat writes that, "it created an awareness of women's potential in society and of the need to provide them with a modern education."[2] The first schools for women were opened in 1907 and since then education for women has grown tremendously.

In 1936 Reza Shah officially banned women from wearing the veil and officially encouraged women to enter education. Shortly thereafter, Teheran University admitted women both as students and also to the faculty as professors. In spite of our Western concept that removing the veil liberates the woman, many women in rural areas reacted negatively to the ban on veils. Some were even known to be hesitant in leaving their homes for fear that, if they continued to wear their veils as they wished, the police would rip them off, thus leaving them "naked" in public. In the cities however, time changed people more quickly. By the 1950's women had entered a great variety of professions, among them, engineering, law, and medicine.

[2]*Guita Nashat, "Women in the Islamic Republic of Iran,"* Iranian Studies, *Vol. 13 (Nos. 1-4), 1980, p. 166.*

In 1963 women were enfranchised through a constitutional amendment. Various stumbling blocks had to be surmounted in order to gain these rights. For example, a major objection to women's suffrage concerned the belief that women are mentally unstable and unable to judge the merits or the demerits of a politician or an issue. This proceeds from the belief that the menstrual cycle of a woman renders her physically "dirty" and mentally unfit four to seven days each month. This is an argument which is also used to keep women out of law and politics. However, the strength of the women's movement, pushed by the Shah's burning desire to make Iran into a modern copy of the West, provided the impetus necessary to overcome these obstacles.

Guity Nashat writes that, by 1978, women were in the cabinet and the senate. Nineteen were Majlis deputies, and there were even deputy ministers and one ambassador. Close to 2,000 were upper level teachers, and female students numbered about one third of the nation–wide university level student population.

Another of the Shah's proposals did not meet with such ready acceptance. This was the Family Protection Law of 1967 (revised in 1975) which restricted polygamy, outlawed temporary marriage *(mutà)*, and gave the courts the final say in divorce proceedings. Also, the minimum marriage age for girls and boys was raised to 18 and 20 respectively. Unlike female suffrage, the above legislation provided a stronger position for the conservative clergy in their criticism. This time, the Shah had pushed for a law that clearly contradicted Islamic teachings.

Whereas Islam doesn't give its temporal rulers an infrastructure to copy in forming a government or political system, it does deal quite thoroughly with legal issues and with issues of personal conduct. So, while ideological opposition surfaced in response to the issues of women's education and voting rights, they were easily countered. The clergy's opposition to the Family Protection Law, however, centered on the much more important *Sharà* (Islamic Law). The Shah was, however, in a position of power over the clergy during his reign, and to the degree that he could afford to ignore their objections, he was not at their disposition.

By now however, the clergy *(Ulema)* were not alone in their criticism of the Shah's Westernizing approach to modernization. Marxists also criticised the Westernization, but offered only an equally vacant alternative — that of atheistic communism. An alternative and more syncreatic movement was led by Dr. Ali Shariàti, who appealed to students of both sexes in his modernist approach to Islam.

The important feature of this development of Iran during the 1960's and 1970's under the Shah was the particular slant imposed by his regime. He molded his development into Westernization. He bought technology and legal systems wholesale from the West. What he adopted, he didn't adapt, and much was therefore not utilized by the Iranian. The Shah concentrated on the

development of the city in which he resided — Teheran — and within that capital city he focused his attention only on those from whom he derived political support; i.e., the Western educated elite. The elite were the supporters and beneficiaries of the Shah's wealth and efforts. Outside of Teheran's elite circles, the improvement and developments were felt by very few, and appreciated by fewer still. Farmers still worked with outdated machinery or no machinery at all. The laws which the Shah proposed, and had passed in the *Mujlis* (parliament), were inappropriate to the rural communities' needs and were rarely implemented. While his famous 1967 Family Protection Law boosted his ego because he could point to his modernization laws, in the villages the laws were left unnoticed and unimplemented. Girls were still married before adolescence and women still wore the veil.

The wasteful use of the petroleum wealth of Iran was to serve only one goal in the mind of the Shah. It was to make Iran important again in the eyes of the West. The Shah's improvements were not done out of a genuine love for his people, or an expressed wish to improve their lot in life. As Cheryl Benard states, "the improvement in the status of women was one of the measures intended to establish his reputation as a progressive leader."[3] In his autobiography, he described the purpose of the existence of women as "delineated by the obligations, in this order, to husband, children, and the nation."[4] Such an opinion indicates an underlying chauvinism that contradicts his public policies, and suggest the insincerity that may have lain at the root of some of his impetuous and unconscientious reforming. As the nature and motives of the Shah become apparent, they can now be added to a brief overview of the international political situation of the 1970's in order to form a more complete picture of the domestic and international pressures that eventually resulted in his exile and the beginning of a new era.

Oil wealth was chanelled to move Iran into a position of prominence in the West. The Shah did this by captializing on Iran's strategic position as a boundry between the oil-rich (and therefore important) Arab world, and the USSR. This, combined with the budget deficits of the Nixon administration and Kissinger's diplomatic strategies, resulted in enormous weapons sales from the United States to Iran. This stimulated the American economy and at the same time strengthened a friendly nation which bordered the Soviets. American contact with Iran was one of mutual benefit, except that Iran's benefit from the relationship profited the whims of the Shah and the few elite surrouding him, and was not shared by the masses. As our military advisors in the area continued to suggest increased arms imports, the peasant farmers began to resent the strong arm tactics of the ruling government. Iran's secret

[3]*Cheryl Benard, "Islam and Women: Some Reflections on the Experience of Iran,"* Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, *Vol. 4, No. 2 (Winter 1980), p. 16.*
[4]*Bernard, p. 16.*

police, SAVAK, terrorized the people and rooted out all those opposing the regime. The people saw the oil wealth and its wasted use on the military machinery that lay rusting, simply because there weren't any Iranians trained in the sophisticatd mechanics necessary to fix them; instead of training Iranians to do this, the Shah's government had simply let the broken ones rust and bought new ones. People increasingly recognized that their government's purchase of Western weapons came at the expense of less exciting domestic development programs in, for example, agriculture and rural education.

In Iran itself, there was a growing Western presence — especially of Americans. But the example set by the Westerners was, as in Saudi Arabia, not an example which the Iranian masses wished to copy. Additionally, the majority of the Americans were with the military. This factor displays a crucial difference between America's contact with Saudi Arabia, and with Iran.

In Saudi Arabia all the Americans are connected with petroleum, and thus are a source of profit for the people of Saudi Arabia. Without Western oilmen Saudi Arabia wouldn't be a rich nation. Furthermore, whereas Saudi Arabia secludes its Western oil technicians and imports mostly non-westerners for those occupations which deal actively with the people (Egyptian school teachers, Pakistani doctors, etc.), Iran's major import of foreigners was concentrated on the highly visible U.S. military. While the people of Saudi Arabia could see the need and worth of a foreign doctor, the Iranians viewed defense expenditures as very far removed from their own lives. Whereas in Saudi Arabia foreigners contributed to the nation's wealth, in Iran the major foreign presence was the American military, which was draining the oil profits away from the country.

The Islamic revolution of Khomeini appealed to the sentiments of tradition among the citizens. Those women who, under the Shah, had been exposed to the West, perhaps through education or travel, now criticized him for modernizing outside of an Islamic framework. His Westernization programs had obviously ignored the religious gap they had left in the life of the commoner. Women returned to wearing the veil *(chador)* as a symbol of their resentment of the Westernization of the Shah's regime. The women who took to the streets during the revolution, wearing the *chador,* were young and many were well educated, having received university schooling under the education programs of the Shah. Westerners were dumbfounded at this behavior. They saw women rejecting progress and demanding degredation; but the women saw themselves searching for progress within the framework of their religion and culture — something hitherto missing from their lives.

Khomeini may not have been the answer to the needs of all Iranians, and since the revolution he has unquestionably disappointed educated women, among others. However, many still believe that his was a step in the right direction.

That Khomeini abolished the laws of the previous regime, including the

advanced Family Protection Law of 1967, is not in itself an indicator or a worsening or regression in the role of women. Rather it is his interpretation of *Sharià* which dealt the blow to women's rights. His repeat to these laws was no real surprise, since as early as 1963 he spoke out against women's progress. At an anti-women's suffrage rally in Qom, he sharply criticized the Shah's Westernism as a policy which was murdering Iran's youth. Such opinions were, however, forgotten in the interest of replacing the Shah. In hindsight, the recent developments appear predictable. Khomeini has recently effectively excluded women who previously had held jobs in the workplace. Where a woman had been developing habits of interaction with men and a stronger role in her dealings with them, she is now asked to back down — those laws which she, as an educated woman, could rely on, are now out of existence. On the other hand, for the peasant woman life has not changed significantly, except that now there appears to be less contradiction between the religious culture of Iran and the present methods of the government.

Khomeini's struggle was no longer that of Islamic modernization, but rather of political preservation. Rather than cater to an educated few in Teheran, whom he just might be able to coax into continued support, he focused his attentions (as previously) on the traditional uneducated masses. Just as the Shah's desire for progress included Westernization, Khomeini's hatred of the West required an end to progress. Many of the just and good reforms which did not in fact run counter to Islam were unquestioningly abolished.

Under the Shah, open and free contact with the West was allowed. Movies were shown uncensored and Western magazines were available. Sexual promiscuity was increasingly prevalant. Western decadence was dominant in the contact between the West and Iran. Teheran was full of prostitution, and pornography was available. Such a high level of freedom met with stern disapproval from the organized religious clergy, the Ulema. However, the Shah could control their power by tight regulation of the government administered *Waqf* tax, which goes to support religious institutions.

Under Khomeini the role of the Ulema is by definition more powerful; however, it is now constrained by political necessities., As is apparent, the Ulema is not unanimous in its interpretation of the *Sharià*, much less of the rest of Shiite Islam and the proper role of its clergy. Many of the clergymen favor a more moderate and liberal approach, especially in reference to women's issues. For example, during the struggle in the 1960's to obtain women's suffrage, and also the Family Protection Law, the Ayatollah Baheshti, among other leaders, favored such progress, and pushed for further support from the Ulema. Khomeini's decisions are no longer determined theologically, but rather politically. While he has been losing popularity, he has called on several obvious scapegoats to take the brunt of criticism for Iran's problems. The war with Iraq; Western imperialism; anything American; Jews . . . He came to power through his appeal to the masses and with the support of those

disallusioned with the Shah; now in order to hold their support he must continue to do in exaggerated form whatever he believes got the public's support in the first place. In reference to women, this has resulted in increasingly regressive policies.

One initial point influencing the role of women and especially the prospects for changing their role, is the ability of Sunnism and Shiìsm to adapt to a changing world. In the Sunnism, of Saudi Arabia, the basic interpretation of the Koràn emphasizes the individual and his own ability to understand and interpret the word of Allah. The Arabic word *Ijtihad* reflects this individual liberty. Ijtihad is a concept born of the expressed necessity of *Tajdid,* i.e., the ongoing reinterpretation and reapplication of Islamic teachings to an ever–changing world. The potential which these concepts embody is remarkable. The educated individual can, and in fact it should be his duty to, assess the relevance of certain laws to the modern day. The Sunnis also incorporate the teachings of several different schools of thought regarding the interpretation of the laws, and in this way can change Sharià interpretation by applying a different precedent set by another school to determine the ruling on a particular case.

Unfortunately, the employment of these provisions for Islamic change has currently fallen into disuse. For example, polygamy is one of the allowed practices which, in the original context, actually caused a reduction in the number of wives a man took. The stipulation that he not marry more than one unless he can treat them both (or all) equally, can now be evaluated as an outdated law. The original legalization of polygamy was part of a social welfare system which catered to a society in which a disproportionate number of the males were killed in battle, and too many females remained unmarried and thus a burden to their fathers, whose household supported them. An unmarried woman was not able to be a productive member of society, as she could bear no children. In the nomadic, traibal society of Saudi Arabia, population growth was crucial to survival, and hence polygamy was tailored by Allah to fit society at that time. Now however, the country has enough wealth to finance a more complex social security system, and, since Saudi men are not being slaughtered in battles, polygamy has lost its social benefit. In fact, women now argue, as they are becoming literate and thus able to read the Koràn themselves, the practice of polygamy now acts only to satisfy the needs, especially the sexual needs, of the male. With exceptions, the first wife does not generally feel that she is treated with equal care by her husband as those he married more recently. Thus, contrary to the equal status of men and women in the eyes of Allah, men are now abusing the practice of polygamy to their own benefit. In all fairness, the occurrence of polygamy in the Arabian peninsula is now a far rarer sight than previously, but the fact remains that it persists, though a modern interpretation of the Islamic Sharià would prohibit it.

Another of the Sharià laws which will soon be out of date in Saudi Arabia is that of the equation of the testimony of one woman to half the worth of that of one man. As women gain education and increasing importance and responsibility in the economy, this will soon become a more obvious travesty. Imagine, for example, that the testimony of a female bank president does not carry equal weight to that of a male Bedouin! The economic power she could mobilize to make her influence felt would surely point out the idiocy of such a law.

The Shià branch of Islam, which counts the vast majority of Iranians as members, does not accept the concepts of Ijtihad and Tejdid as such, but instead practices *Aql* in which reasoning provides the basis of Koràn interpretation. The path to progress within Shihism for women must, however, follow other lines, since in Shiìsm the responsibility for interpreting and reapplying the laws of the Koràn to the modern day (Aql) falls to the clergy. Lay persons, called *Mushtaheds*, teach these interpretations to the commoner. However, in the countryside and remote towns, the freedom of the Mushtahed to depart from the official teaching of the clergy (which in the case of Iran is also the government) is considerable. The Mushtahed are both male and female, and each is responsible for the education of his gender and for organizing festivities and speaking during various religious holidays.

The potential power of the female Mushtahed (Mushtahedah) is considerable. Far removed from the capital, such a leader could easily use the forum of a religious holiday to educate women about their rights as they exist in the Koràn, or to go even further in an attack on the ruling Ulema. At this time, however, it does not seem likely that those women who studied Islam so thoroughly, in order to become Mushtahedahs, will be calling for women's rights. In addition, the Ulema continue to limit the further ascendancy of women into the clergy by citing the tried and proven arguments which assert mental instability in women due to their menstrual cycle.

The question of women in the clergy has become a sore point for the three modern, male-dominated, monotheistic religions. Christianity, Judaism and, I believe, Islam will all have to admit women into their clerical ranks. Thus far only the Protestant Christians and the Reformed (Liberal) American Jews have opened their seminary doors to women. Most interesting in its relation to Islam is the pending (but virtually certain) acceptance of a woman as a Rabbi to a Conservative Jewish order. Very similar in style to Islam, especially in its agreement on the mental instability of women due to their menstrual cycle, it may be seen as an precurser for Islamic change. The Rabbi-to-be, Amy Eilberg, answered those who challenged her ordination by saying that the codifications of the Jewish law *(Halacha)* make it "inappropriate," with the retort that the law isn't etched in stone! "Like any other vibrant legal system, the halachic process has internal mechanisms for adapting to new realities in contemporary society." She continued, saying, "We know that

Jewish women choose to be lawyers and doctors and everything else. The problem was that we had this painfully absurd situation where Jewish women could contribute their talents to every profession but the rabbinate."[5] Of course, Judaism, like Islam represents the whole spectrum of opinion, since it is equally true that within Israel the Orthodox branch, which asserts the unchangeable nature of Jewish law, is currently very angry at the action of the American Conservative movement because of this.

The potential for the progress of women in Saudi Arabia and Iran is obvious. Means exist for this progress to be couched in religious terms; thus, progress can be achieved without necessarily running counter to the religious culture of the people. An obvious obstacle exists in Iran in the Ulema, who, though religious leaders, are restricted by the necessity of maintaining political power.

In Saudi Arabia, the progress of women is moving very slowly, but appears to be accelerating. The development of a women's sector in the economy, completely apart from the men, may acutally result in a successful merger of Islam and new women's roles.

[5]*Mark McCain, "Women is set to make history as Rabbi,"* The Boston Sunday Globe, *24 February 1985, p. 3.*

Famine in the Sahel

Margaret Luck

The Sahel is a diverse and complex region with a rich history of powerful empires and magnificent cities, yet for many Americans the word "Sahel" evokes images of sandy wastelands and starving children. Clearly the Western media's "discovery" of the Sahel in 1973, at the height of a tragic famine, and its portrayal of the Sahel as a desolate region doomed by the advancing Sahara, fostered this gloomy vision. Recent studies of the Sahel, however, belie this oversimplified and fatalistic perception, asserting that the problems of the region are both more complex and less catastrophic than first believed. This essay is intended to serve as an introduction to the relatively sophisticated perspective of these recent studies. A brief examination of the causes and devastating effects of the 1968-74 drought will reveal the enormous difficulties faced in the Sahel, and a subsequent review of post-famine development projects will bring to light the region's great potential.

Drought In the Sahel: 1968-74

The term "Sahel" refers to the strip of land along the southern edge of the Sahara which separates the desert from more fertile regions to the south. Extending from Senegal's Atlantic coast 2600 miles eastward to Chad, the Sahel encompasses an area equivalent to two-thirds of the continental United States. Minimal rainfall, averaging only 200 to 300 milliliters per year, limits vegetation in the Sahel to hardy grasses and small trees. The six Sahelian countries have approximately thirty-three million inhabitants concentrated primarily in three small ecological zones which total only 200 miles in width. Agriculture, primarily the farming of millet, sorghum, cotton, and peanuts, occupies over 80% of the Sahel's population.[1] The average GNP per capita of the six nations is under $300, and their population growth rates are among the highest in the world.[2] Thus the Sahelian countries endure harsh climatic

[1] *Food and Agriculture Agency,* FAO Production Yearbook. *(Rome: FAO, 1979)*
[2] *World Bank.* World Development Report *(Washington: World Bank, 1984)*

conditions, depend almost exclusively on agriculture for their survival, and are unable to maintain a GNP growth rate capable of supporting their rapidly expanding populations. It is in this context that the Sahelian drought of 1968-74 must be understood.

The crisis that brought the Sahel to the world's attention began in 1968 when annual rains failed to arrive throughout the region. By 1971 areas of the Sahel were devastated; Lake Chad, reduced to one-third its normal size, became four separate ponds, and the Senegal and Niger Rivers narrowed to shallow streams.[3] Cereal production dropped by one-third,[4] and from 1972 to 1973 the real agricultural output of the six Sahelian nations was reduced by almost 20 percent.[5] Four million head of livestock, 30 percent of all cattle, were lost during the disaster.[6] In areas of Mali, Senegal, and Niger where livestock is the livelihood of 90 percent of the population, the rate of herd losses ranged from one-third in Niger to "virtual annihilation" in Mali.[7] This dramatic reduction of agriculture and livestock production greatly weakened the already fragile economies of the Sahelian nations. In 1973 a Food and Agriculture Agency (FAO) official announced that the GNP of the six states had been devastated by the drought, with an estimated 50 percent average drop.[8] The Sahel thus became by far the world's poorest region.

Human costs of the drought were tragically high: failure of both food and export crops left the Sahelian peoples with neither locally-grown grains nor money to import foreign surpluses. Farmers were forced to eat seeds usually saved for the next year's planting, and pastoralists slaughtered their herds — and only source of income — for meat. In 1968 when hunger struck the Sahel's most vulnerable areas, some pastoral peoples fled their villages in search of forage for their herds. By 1973 mass migrations had brought two million weak and malnourished people to refugee camps and urban slums.[9] Disease, often accompanying malnutrition and forced migration, became both more prevalent and more deadly during the drought. One report noted, "Measles . . . appears to have significantly increased . . . In Niger, deaths attributed by villagers to measles and/or famine accounted for 73 percent of the total among sampled nomads."[10]

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[3] *Hal Sheets*, Disaster in the Desert *(Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1974), p. 11.*

[4] *Jacques Giri, "An Analysis and Synthesis of Long-term Development Strategies for the Sahel" (Paris: OECD, 1976), p. 13.*

[5] *Elliott Berg*, The Recent Economic Evolution of the Sahel *Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Center for Research on Economic Development, 1975), p. 38.*

[6] *Theodore Cohn, "The Sahelian Drought: Problems of Land Use,"* International Journal *30, (No. 3, 1975): p. 429.*

[7] *Sheets, p. 11.*

[8] *Sheets, p. 11.*

[9] *Sheets, p. 29.*

[10] *United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare, "Nutritional Surveillance in West Africa", 1973, quoted in Sheets, p. 133.*

Massive international relief efforts in the Sahel were able to prevent the millions of deaths feared by some experts, but an estimated 100,000 Sahelians, mostly women and children, died in 1973 alone.[11] According to one study, "on a proportional basis, it was as if more than a million Americans had been struck down by a natural disaster."[12] Public reaction to the horrors of starvation described by the Western media during the summer of 1973 encouraged the international community to confront a crucial question: was the famine merely the result of a rare climatic accident, or could it happen again? The causes of the famine thus became the focus of numerous studies which produced a great body of vital information about the long-ignored Sahel in the years following the disaster.

Causes Of The Famine

The traditional explanation of famine in the Sahel centers around two issues: climatic change and overpopulation. According to this theory, a steady southward expansion of the Sahara is continually reducing the agricultural potential of the Sahel while population growth simultaneously increases demand for food. Thus, enormous regional food deficits are inevitable unless the population of the Sahel drops rapidly. In marked contrast with the traditional perspective is the more radical "political economy" approach, developed during the 1970's. This new theory emphasizes the Sahel's great agricultural potential and cites political and economic factors as the principal causes of famine. A brief look at the primary components of the traditional argument — desertification and overpopulation — will show why this view has been largely superseded by the more sophisticated political economy theory.

According to some climatologists, the 1968-74 drought was merely a stage in the gradual desertification of the Sahel. These scientists cite historical records to prove that the Sahara has advanced steadily southward for centuries, engulfing areas which once supported crops and livestock. One French expert calculates that the Sahara has expanded over 250,000 square miles of arable land in the past fifty years alone.[13] But is desertification the result of long–term climatic changes? Many scientists believe it is not, asserting that human factors such as overgrazing and deforestation are to blame. These experts point to the severe drought of 1913-1915 and the less destructive one of 1941-1942 as evidence that droughts are not a new phenomenon in the Sahel, but admit that environmental degradation could be causing the temporary

[11] *Sheets, p. 1.*
[12] *Sheets, p. 1.*
[13] *Guillaume Boudat,* Desertification de l'Afrique Tropicale Seche *(Paris: Anasonia, 1973) in Noel V. Lateef,* Crisis in the Sahel *(Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1980), p. 5.*

change in weather patterns. One report notes that, "As vegetation is reduced by deforestation or overgrazing, the share of rainfall running off directly to the ocean increases. Less rainfall evaporates into the atmosphere to recharge rain clouds that move inland."[14] Dr. Erik Eckholm of the Worldwatch Institute sums up the general consensus regarding desertification in this quote from a *New York Times* interview: "This desert creep is in no way due to a long-term downward trend in rainfall or an increase in aridity. It is the result of erosion following the destruction of natural vegetation."[15] Thus desertification, while widespread and disastrous, is not symptomatic of inevitable climatic degradation. This realization may not suggest an immediate solution for the current situation in the Sahel, but it does offer hope that desertification may one day be halted.

Overpopulation plays a major role in the traditional view of famine in the Sahel. Proponents of this perspective emphasize the Sahel's growing food deficit and assert that the region, incapable of supporting its 33 million current inhabitants, will be even less able to feed the population of 53 million forecasted for the year 2000. According to these experts, the Sahel's arable lands are already overgrazed and overcropped, and realization of higher yields would require an impossible investment. While the traditional argument is based on truth — many areas of the Sahel are indeed overworked — recent studies have emphasized the Sahel's great agricultural potential. After an extensive soil survey, one French group concluded that during a year of average rainfall, and assuming present technology, the Sahel could produce 18 million tons of cereal annually: twelve million more than the region's current output.[16] According to an MIT study, the Sahel has the capacity, with only minimal modernization, to support 30 percent more people than currently inhabit the area.[17] Yet if the Sahel is capable of supporting a larger population, why does its food deficit increase each year, and why are the Sahelian peoples plagued by hunger and famine? A brief review of the "radical" theory of famine in the Sahel, with its emphasis on political and economic factors, may explain this dilemma.[18]

Two economic conflicts, each with broad political ramifications, act as the

[14] *Worldwatch Institute*, State of the World *(New York: W. W. Northon, 1985) quoted in* The New York Times, *18 February 1985.*

[15] The New York Times, *25 February 1976.*

[16] *Societe d'Etudes pour le Developpement Economique (SEDES) and Societe Centrale pour l'Equipement du Territoire,* Etude sur les Potentialites Economiques des Pays du Sahel *quoted in Giri, p. 9.*

[17] *William Seifert and Nake Kamrany, "A Framework for Evaluating Long-term Development Strategies for the Sahel-Sudan Area" (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1974) quoted in Richard W. Franke and Barbara H. Chasin,* Seeds of Famine *(Montclair, New Jersey: Allanheld Osmin, 1980), p. 38.*

[18] *The following paragraphs which examine the effect of peanut cultivation on the Sahel are a summary of Franke, chapters 2-4.*

principal obstacles to Sahelian food self-sufficiency: both the competition between export crops and staple grains, and the struggle between urban and rural economic interests have limited food production in the Sahel.

Before the establishment of French administration and introduction of export crops, Sahelian farmers grew staple grains — primarily millet and sorghum. Herders, who spent the rainy season in the North of the Sahel, travelled south during the dry season for grazing and trade. Farmers allowed the pastoralists to keep their herds on fallow fields, thus gaining valuable natural fertilizer. Trade of milk, butter, and bulls in exchange for grain and roots supplemented the diets of both groups. Even the environment benefitted from this relationship; northern grazing areas, vulnerable to erosion during dry periods, were freed of the strain of supporting cattle while mineral–depleted fields in the South were being fertilized. The introduction and rapid expansion of peanut farming during the 1800's put an end to this symbiotic relationship between farmers and herders and had devastating effects on both the environment and the Sahelians' ability to feed themselves.

France introduced peanut production in her Sahelian colonies during the mid-1800's when the vegetable oil industry became highly profitable. French administrators forced peasants to grow the export crop by imposing heavy taxes which the farmers were unable to pay.[19] Peanuts, easily converted to cash, thus became a highly desirable crop. As farmers moved north in search of new land for growing the lucrative crop, they began to displace pastoralists, pushing the herders into more arid, marginal land along the edge of the desert. When conflict over land ensued, the traditional cooperation between farmers and herders was greatly reduced. Thus, expansion of peanut cultivation shifted emphasis from subsistence to export crops; it expanded the area of land being farmed by bringing new areas into cultivation; and finally it ended the beneficial relationship between farmers and herders. These changes have had disastrous implications for both the Sahelian environment and for the region's agricultural self-sufficiency.

The delicate environmental balance of both arable and grazing lands in the Sahel was upset by peanut production. Degradation of arable land occurred because the peanut, unlike millet and sorghum, draws great quantities of nutrients from the soil. Soil depletion from peanuts is rapid; the yield of an unfertilized peanut field drops 20 to 40 percent after only one year.[20] Mineral–depleted fields, highly vulnerable to erosion, lose their precious topsoil in strong winds.[21] Sahelian farmers were unable to prevent this disaster because peanut production had degraded farmer/herder relations and thereby reduced farmers' access to the herders' cattle — their only source of fertilizer. Unable

[19] *Franke, p. 73.*
[20] *Franke, p. 70.*
[21] *Franke, p. 70.*

to afford chemical fertilizers or the luxury of leaving fields fallow, the farmers were forced to "cut their own throats" by overworking their fields.

Herders, too, began to disturb the environmental balance when peanut production became prevalent. Forced northward by the expansion of peanut farming, many pastoralists were unable to take their herds south for dry–season grazing. The vulnerable arid regions of the North were thereby deprived of crucial periods of replenishment. Compounding this problem was the increase in the size of Sahelian herds, a response to higher beef prices in Nigeria and the Ivory Coast.[22] Thus, overgrazing of the ecologically vulnerable northern Sahel led to destruction of natural vegetation and ultimately to desertification. Like erosion of fertile lands in the South, desertification can be seen as the indirect effect of the Sahel's shift away from staple crops and of the predominance of peanut cultivation.

While environmental degradation was a major cause of reduced food self-sufficiency in the Sahel, the conflict between urban and rural economic interests is equally to blame. As Robert H. Bates writes in *Markets and States in Tropical Africa,* the political pressure exerted by urban workers and employers has forced African governments to keep food prices low. Governments utilize pricing policies to set staple grain prices below the true market value. Below-market pricing is, in effect, a tax on farmers which benefits the minority of consumers outside the agricultural sector. This tax is reflected in the great difference between urban and rural incomes in Sahelian countries, for in each of the six nations agricultural income is significantly lower than the national average.[23] In Niger, Mali, and Mauritania, farmers earn eight to 14 times less than urban workers.[24] The relative poverty of the rural sector acts as a disincentive to agricultural production and thus limits Sahelian food supplies. While in the short–term farmers bear the burden of these pricing policies, the long–term costs of ever–increasing food deficits will be felt by all Sahelians.

The debate over the causes of famine in the Sahel seems to be coming to an end. Desertification and overpopulation are now viewed as serious problems which aggravate rather than cause malnutrition in the region. In contrast to traditional perspectives, new studies have shown that the Sahel may be capable of supporting a much larger population than its current 33 million inhabitants, and that desertification is a man–made problem, and therefore not inevitable. It is evident, however, that the hope offered by the new studies rests on access to substantial foreign resources, for without outside funding Sahelian nations will be unable to obtain the technology and training required to stop desertifi-

[22] *Franke, p. 100.*
[23] *Michel Labonne of the Institut National de Recherche Agronomique of Montpellier, France quoted in Giri, p. 35.*
[24] *Giri, p. 35.*

cation and to augment agricultural production. Clearly, then, the role played by the industrialized world is a principal factor in Sahelian development.

International Response to the Famine

The 1968-74 famine in the Sahel highlighted the region's enormous problems and taught the international community that the six Sahelian nations would be unable to make even limited progress without foreign assistance. Western response to the crisis evolved throughout the 1970's, beginning with a late and poorly organized relief effort, but culminating at the end of the decade with an unprecedented long-term international effort — the Sahel Development Program. A look at American policy in the Sahel (a policy which largely parallels the involvement of other developed nations) will illustrate the slow, but finally heartening, response of the international community.

American relief efforts in the Sahel, while ultimately extensive, were initially poorly organized and tragically slow. Substantial aid began only in 1973 — five years into the drought — and these tardy efforts were hampered by lack of information and planning. Why was the US, an international leader in emergency relief projects, unable to respond more quickly and efficiently? An examination of the American response to the crisis will illustrate that both longstanding neglect of the Sahel by the US and poor performance by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) were obstacles to prompt and effective allocation of aid.

The Sahelian countries received relatively little American aid during the 1960's because the US viewed the region as a French sphere of influence. This neglect of the Sahel was made official in 1966 by the Korry Report, a review of US development policies in Africa submitted by the ambassador to Ethiopia, Edward M. Korry. The report recommended that bilateral aid to Africa be restricted to ten "emphasis" countries[25] where the US had major economic, political, and strategic interests. The Sahel, falling under the category of "an accident of colonial history", would continue to rely on France.[26] Although the "emphasis" nations received 75 percent of US aid even before 1966, the Korry Report ensured that the Sahel's poverty would remain a secondary factor in determining the level of American aid to the region.[27] Thus from 1962 through 1973, American aid to the Sahel was approximately $175 million, while the "emphasis" countries received over three billion.[28]

[25]*These countries were Morocco, Tunisia, the Congo, Liberia, Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria, Morocco, and East Africa (Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya).*
[26]*Edward M. Korry, "Review of Development Policies and Programs in Africa as Directed by the President" (Washington: USAID, 1966) quoted in Sheets, p. 75.*
[27]*Sheets, p. 9.*
[28]*Sheets, p. 9.*

America's long-term neglect of the Sahel became apparent when the delivery of emergency food and medical supplies was delayed due to transportation problems, and a lack of specific data on famine conditions and storage facilities. In October 1972, just as Sahelians began to die in great numbers, USAID issued a 160-page "in-house" report describing in detail the ecological, social, and political problems of the Sahel. The report highlighted reasons for failure of past aid to the region, mentioning lack of information and poor coordination among various governments and organizations. The general analysis of potential problems in distribution of emergency aid included in the document would have been appropriate in 1969, when the drought began, but by 1972 it was too late to make up for years of neglect.

While the inefficiency of American relief efforts may have stemmed from a traditional neglect of the Sahel, the delay in the US response is less comprehensible. American presence in the Sahel after 1966 was not extensive,[29] but USAID employees stationed there knew of the worsening conditions. USAID's annual public reports described drought conditions and crop failures as early as 1969, and the US began shipping some emergency food aid (under four million) in 1968.[30] According to one study, officials "just kept thinking that each year [of drought] would be the last."[31] Climatic data available after 1968, which predicted the coming disaster, was ignored, and scientists' warnings were not heeded.[32] USAID finally overcame its bureaucratic inertia in November 1972 with the formation of a special task force to study the crisis, but by then the famine was acute. Congress allocated substantial relief funds only in June 1973, five years after the drought began, four years after USAID reports first described massive crop failures, and eight months after people and livestock began to die in great numbers. America's slow and inefficient response to the 1968-74 drought can thus be attributed to two factors: lack of accurate data due to long-term neglect of the Sahel, and inadequate response to the information that was available.

In 1974 normal rains returned to the Sahel, but it was clear that the income and lifestyle of the Sahelian people could not return automatically to pre-drought levels. Without massive international aid, poverty, malnutrition, and disease would remain widespread. The United States and other industrialized nations were thus presented with a question: would the developed world be willing to devote greater resources to the Sahel, or would the desperate region remain largely ignored? Ultimately, the internationl community chose to support the Sahel through the creation and funding of the Sahel Development Program.

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[29] *After 1967 AID had 35-75 full-time employees in the Sahel. Sheets, p. 12.*
[30] *Sheets, p. 11.*
[31] *Sheets, p. 18.*
[32] *Sheets, p. 19.*

The Sahel Development Program

The Sahel Development Program is the product of a collaboration between the Interstate Committee to Combat Drought in the Sahel (CILSS), which is responsible for cooperation among the six Sahelian nations, Gambia, Cape Verde and the Club du Sahel, a consultative organization jointly sponsored by the Sahelian countries and donor nations. The CILSS was created in 1973, and in 1974, as rains returned, it established three principal goals for the post-famine era: to reduce the consequences of emergency situations in the future, to ensure self-sufficiency in staple foods, and to accelerate economic and social development. The Club du Sahel brings together Western and Sahelian representatives for discussion, bargaining, and research. As part of a unique program of donor/recipient cooperation, the Club has worked with the CILSS to develop long-term strategies for the Sahel and to reconcile Sahelian goals with Western priorities and finances. The culmination of CILSS/Club efforts is the Sahel Development Program (SDP), an ambitious blueprint for creating a healthy agriculture-based economy in the region.

Agricultural self–sufficiency — the second CILSS goal — is considered by both Sahelian and Western leaders to be the key to the Sahel's economic well-being. This aim is clearly optimistic, for self–sufficiency means producing 15 million tons of cereals annually by the year 2000, a huge increase from the six million tons currently produced.[33] The SDP recommends three strategies for achieving this goal: development of traditional non-irrigated agriculture, development of irrigated agriculture, and development of livestock production. Linked to these strategies are programs designed to improve the Sahelian nations' infrastructure, food marketing and pricing mechanisms, grain storage facilities, and ecology, as well as the education and health of their citizens. Yet clearly the SDP's three agricultural strategies are the project's keystone; without increased agricultural production, substantial progress in other areas is impossible.

Development of non-irrigated cultivation is the most crucial of the SDP's strategies, since dryland farming currently occupies 99 percent of cultivated land in the Sahel.[34] One FAO report asserts that development of traditional farming methods might eventually produce 24 million tons of cereal yearly, a nearly 200 percent improvement over current yields.[35] A more conservative study estimates that non-irrigated production can increase 50 percent in the Sudan/Sahel, just south of the Sahel, and 20 percent in the Sahel proper before the year 2000.[36] The attractively "low-tech" methods recommended to achieve

[33] *Cereals Policy in Sahel Countries: Nouakchott Colloque/CILSS: Club du Sahel, 1979. p. 27.*
[34] *Giri, p. 38.*
[35] *Lateef, p. 19.*
[36] *SEDES quoted in Giri, p. 31.*

dryland production goals include better soil preparation, use of improved seed varieties, application of fertilizer and pesticides, protection from locust and other pests, and better crop storage. Cultivation of new lands may also contribute to higher yields by reducing pressure on currently farmed areas and thus permitting farmers to leave overworked fields fallow. Manpower restraints now limiting agricultural production could be overcome with education and extension programs. Despite their apparent simplicity, these SDP recommendations for development of dryland agriculture offer great challenge, for the patience and perseverence required to achieve widespread distribution of small improvements have traditionally been absent from development programs.

In contrast to the limited objectives and wide scope of the dryland proposals, the SDP plan for irrigated agriculture features huge projects which can be realized only after years of research and fund-raising. The SDP calls for irrigation of 500,000 hectares[37] — an ambitious goal considering that only 120,000 hectares are currently irrigated.[38] The potential of irrigated land in the Sahel is staggering; one study notes that 1.5 million hectares of land within main river systems are capable of supporting double cropping, thus doubling yields.[39] The study estimates that irrigation of these areas will be economically feasible before the end of the century, and that their annual production could reach ten million tons of cereals.[40] Ruled out by the same report is irrigation of 1.4 milion hectares of land lying outside main river systems. Irrigating these areas, it asserts, would require construction of several thousand storage dams and an unreasonable investment.

Livestock production, the third SDP strategy, has been touted as a means for the Sahel to gain foreign currency without displacing staple crops. Desertification is clearly a major obstacle to development of a Sahelian livestock export industry; the cattle population must be reorganized to utilize water and pasture resources without destroying the environment. Use of fencing and herd limitations are two inexpensive but politically sensitive recommendations. Another option — the establishment of livestock ranches — is liable to incur less resistance from herders, but its cost–effectiveness has yet to be proven. The SDP also suggests study of a possible reestablishment of traditional farmer/herder relations which would permit herds to fatten in pastures before sale. Creation of herder cooperatives, a prerequisite of any large-scale livestock development program, has already begun,[41] Because relatively little is known about the economic and social implications of various livestock strategies, study of many small projects must precede funding of large-scale programs.

[37] *Franke, p. 150.*
[38] *Giri, p. 38.*
[39] *SEDES in Giri, p. 38.*
[40] *SEDES in Giri, p. 39.*
[41] *Dan R. Aronson, "Toward Development for Pastoralists in Central Niger" (Niamey, Niger: USAID, 1982).*

The achievement of SDP goals in livestock production and dryland and irrigated agriculture is by no means assured. Yet some experts have faulted the plan not because of its optimism, but because they believe it fails to address the political and economic roots of famine in the Sahel.[42] These critics assert that basic issues such as predominance of export crops and misguided pricing policy have been largely ignored by the CILSS/Club organization. While not unfounded, these allegations seem unduly negative. Price and export crop policies may not be the SDP's most salient feature, but neither are they completely overlooked. Inherent in the SDP goal of self-sufficiency in staple crops is the rejection of the "comparative advantage" theory, previously espoused by both Sahelian and Western leaders, which advocates production of export crops to be exchanged for staples goods in the international market. Thus by aspiring to food self-sufficiency the SDP dismisses the dependence on foreign-grown staples stemming from emphasis of export crops. Although this ideological stance taken in favor of self-sufficiency does not mitigate the Sahelian nations' desperate need for the foreign exchange now earned by peanuts and cotton, it does represent a vital first step toward greater independence. Pricing policy — another barrier to increased food self-sufficiency — is addressed by the SDP in two ways. First, the SDP suggests that data on Sahelian cereal pricing policies be collected and studied. More importantly, however, SDP projects effectively subsidize cereal production inputs by supplying farmers with seeds, fertilizer, water, and technology. Thus rural incomes are augmented even without an increase in prices paid for cereals.

The indirect manner in which the SDP addresses the political and economic roots of famine is consistent with its general approach to development, for, while based on many principles elaborated in "radical" studies, the SDP avoids the drastic proposals often found in development documents sponsored by Third World nations. Cooperation between aid donors and recipients within the CILSS/Club framework has thus resulted in the choice of a moderate path which is attractive to both Sahelian governments and Western donors. The SDP's pragmatism, while perhaps less inspiring than radical polemics, is certainly its greatest strength.

Conclusion: America's Role

The American government's role in the Sahel has expanded greatly since the Korry Report dismissed the region as unimportant in 1966. The 1984 USAID Congressional Presentation had the following to say about Sahelian development:

[42] *Franke, p. 155.*

> Sound Sahelian economies would provide greater markets for US private investment and facilitate open access to Sahelian resources by the free world, e.g. uranium (Niger), phosphate (Upper Volta), iron (Mauritania), bauxite (Mali). Expanding Sahelian economies will strengthen regional stability to help avoid the costly and destabilizing effect of expansionism (as now practiced by Libya) and economic dislocation.[43]

Clearly the "accident of colonial history" is now perceived as having great economic and strategic importance for the United States. USAID's new emphasis on the Sahel is manifested in government appropriations to the region. During the last decade American aid to the six nations has increased more than tenfold, reaching nearly 220 million in 1985. USAID envisions contributions totalling $1–1.5 billion over the next ten to 15 years.[44] America's role goes beyond financing, however, for US clout is used to influence SDP policies in several important areas. According the a USAID strategy paper, American influence helps focus SDP projects on improving pricing policies and building institutions to oversee agricultural production and distribution.[45] Yet the greatest service performed by USAID is the agency's effort to promote development projects that benefit not Sahelian leaders' powerful political constituents, but rural producers. Although African governments have traditionally been reluctant to distribute development money to rural populations isolated from the central government, USAID's emphasis on equity should help ensure that all Sahelians benefit from the SDP.

Lester R. Brown, the President of the Worldwatch Institute and long-time expert on Africa's food problems, recently wrote that "reversing the ecological deterioration and economic decline now underway in so much of Africa may require international collaboration greater than any since the Allied powers mobilized in World War II."[46] Mr. Brown's allusion to the Allied powers is singularly appropriate, for the images of courageous American international leadership evoked by this reference are a reminder of what the US is capable of accomplishing. Perhaps American policy-makers should keep these memories in mind as they consider the plight of the Sahel.

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[43] *USAID*, AID Congressional Presentation, *Regional Bureau for Africa, FY1985, p. 25.*
[44] *Lateef, p. 88.*
[45] *USAID*, Food Sector Assistance Strategy for the 1980's for Africa *(Washington: USAID).*
[46] The New York Times, *18 February 1985.*

Forging the Spear: The African National Congress of South Africa and Armed Struggle

Chris Tone

The African National Congress (ANC) has been fighting for the political liberty of South Africa's black majority for over seventy years. For nearly fifty years, the ANC sought to effect peaceful change by working legally within South Africa's political system. Composed predominantly of the black educated classes, the Congress had faith in the rationality of the country's white minority, and thus believed that the whites in power need only be convinced of the reason behind black demands for political equality. Once enlightened, the ANC was confident that the whites would give them liberty and equality. The blacks however, were not confronted by the paternal vestiges of British imperialism, as they believed, rather, the opposition was that of the dogmatic Afrikaner reinforced by capitalist demands for cheap labor.[1] Following the massacre at Sharpeville in March of 1960 and the subsequent banning of the ANC a month later, the Congress turned to violence. Umkonto we Sizwe (MK), the Spear of the Nation, was created as the military wing of the ANC in 1961. Although their record over the past twenty-two years has not been encouraging, both the Congress and MK have survived the continuous onslaught of the South African security and defense forces. Today, the ANC is the pre-eminent black liberation movement opposing the Nationalist government of the Republic of South Africa (RSA). This article traces the development of the ANC after its prohibition, and then looks into the ANC today and the issue confronting it.

The Road to Sharpeville (1912-1960)

In 1912, prominent blacks from throughout the country met in Bloemfontein and created the South African Native National Convention (NNC). Its first

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[1] *For an analysis of the development of South African capitalism with its demands for cheap labor, and how these damands coincided with Afrikaner secruity interests, see Shula Marks and Richard Rathbone (eds.),* Industrialization and Social Change in South Africa *(London: Longman Group Ltd., 1982)*

President was the Rev. J.L. Dube. The NNC was later renamed the African National Congress in 1925. The organization's primary objectives included: black unity across tribal divisions, the extension of political rights, and the economic and social advancement of blacks.[2] The ANC protested the Natives Land Act of 1913 by sending delegations to London to appeal the Act. By then, however, the British Government was no longer in a position to respond.[3] In 1919, following Gandhi's example, the ANC sponsored an unsuccessful passive resistance campaign against the Pass Laws.[4] The leaders were arrested and the crowds dispersed by police.

Following these defeats, the ANC faded from the forefront of African politics. Returning to prominence in the later 1930's, the ANC campaigned against Hertzog's Representation of Natives Bill of 1936 which sought to eliminate the qualified electoral franchise that blacks enjoyed in the Cape Province. Working in cooperation with the Indians and Coloureds, the Congress still failed to defeat the Bill, and black voters were removed from the common roll in the Cape.[5] During most of this period, ANC activities were in the form of petitions and representations to the Government in hopes that the influence of white liberals would secure a greater political role for blacks.[6]

In the 1940's a new generation came into the ANC. Disillusioned with their leaders, they formed the ANC Youth League (ANCYL) advocating a more militant line.[7] Walter Sisulu, Nelson Mandela, Robert Sobukew and Oliver Tambo were all founding members of the ANCYL. Meanwhile, the white polity elected the hard-line Nationalist Party to power, which then moved to institute the polity's policy of Apartheid.

In 1949, the ANC adopted the Programme of Action. This program "called for civil disobedience, strikes, boycotts and stay-at-homes, and thus unequivocally committed the ANC to a new strategy based on extra-legal tactics, mass action, and the principle of non-collaboration."[8] The institution of the Programme was a victory for the nationalism and Afrianism of the ANCYL. In 1952, the Congress launched the 'Defiance Campaign.' Over 8,000 demonstrators were imprisoned by the authorities in this nationwide civil disobedience movement.[9] ANC membership skyrocketed during the campaign to over 100,000 members, but following sporadic violence, repression and

[2]Official Yearbook of the Republic of South Africa: *1983 (Johannesburg: Chris van Rensburg Publications Ltd., 1982), p. 187.*
[3]South Africa: A Country Study *[Area Handbook Series], (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1981), p. 35.*
[4]*Ibid., p. 38.*
[5]*Ibid., p. 40.*
[6]Official Yearbook, *p. 187.*
[7]South Africa: Time Running Out *[Report of the Study Commission on US Policy Towards Southern Africa], (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), p. 171.*
[8]*Gail M. Gerhart,* Black Power in South Africa: The Evolution of an Ideology *(Berkeley: Univ. of California Press,, 1978), p. 82.*
[9]Time Running Out, *p. 171.*

arrests, the campaign slowly expired.[10] "Although the campaign was unsuccessful in its efforts to force the government to repeal some of the undesirable legislation, it consolidated black sentiment, gave training to future leaders, and achieved great international publicity."[11]

During the Defiance Campaign, the Congress received sympathy and help from other racial groups. In June 1955, the ANC convened the "Congress of the People" in Kliptown. At this historic meeting the Congress Alliance was established. Under the Freedom Charter the ANC aligned itself with the South African Indian Congress, the South African Coloured People's Organization and the Congress of Democrats (a white organization). The Freedom Charter remains the basic document of ANC ideology. In the Charter's Preamble it states that:

> South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white, and no government can justly claim authority unless it is based on the will of all the people; . . . only a democratic state, based on the will of all people, can secure to all their birthright without distinction of colour, race, sex or belief; . . . And we pledge ourselves to strive together, sparing nether strength nor courage until the democratic changes set out here have been won.[12]

One year after Kliptown, 156 leaders of the Congress Alliance were arrested and charged with treason. The Government claimed that their efforts to achieve political change necessarily involved overthrowing the state by violent means.[13] The trials lasted four years, and all the defendants were eventually acquitted.

Disillusioned with the tenuous ideology of multiracial socialism set forth in the Freedom Charter and fearful of the influence of Communists within the Congress Alliance, a group of Africanists in the ANC advocated racially exclusive nationalism. The ANC had argued that the goal of the movement and the means to achieve that goal must be consistent. Multiracial cooperation was necessary, therefore, to achieve a multiracial society. The Africanists on the other hand, argued that nothing would be achieved without first mobilizing the black people. They turned to the most powerful sentiments available to rally Africans to action: "consciousness of their identity and unity as the oppressed, and hatred of their white oppressors."[14]With most of the Congress'

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[10]*Gerhart, p. 89.*
[11]A Country Study, *p. 47.*
[12]*Excerpts from the preamble of the Freedom Charter. See Thomas Karis, Gwendolen Carter and Gail Gerhart,* From Protest to Challenge: Documents of African Politics in South Africa *(vol. 3), (Standord: Hoover Institution Press, 1977), p., 205.*
[13]Time Running Out, *p. 172.*
[14]*Gerhart, p. 164.*

leadership detained for trial, the Africanists challenged ANC involvement in the Congress Alliance. In 1958, this group of Africanists led by Robert Sobukew formed the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC).

Hoping to gain adherents and to establish themselves as the 'true' black leadership, the PAC initiated the 'Positive Action' Campaign. On March 21, 1960, the Campaign was launched. The PAC called on Africans to turn themselves over to the authorities for not carrying their passes.[15] The massacre that took place on that day in Sharpeville is internationally infamous. All evidence supports the PAC claim that the crowd was not violent, yet nervous security police opened fire on the crowd.[16] Sixty-nine Africans were killed and 186 were wounded. Blacks were shocked. Immediately the ANC called a general stay-at-home strike, and for three weeks chaos gripped the Republic.

The State's response was as brutal as it was thorough. The Nationalist Government declared a state of emergency on March 30. Scenes of angry crowds, police baton charges and shootings, tear gas, wholesale arrests, and assaults on African homes were witnessed in Capetown, Durban, Port Elizabeth, Bloemfontein and on the Wittersrand.[17] Civil rights were suspended. Ninety-eight whites, 36 coloureds, 90 Asians and 11, 279 blacks were detained.[18] The Government banned both the ANC and the PAC under the rapidly enacted Unlawful Organizations Act. "Clearly, the whites were prepared to match any demonstration of black defiance with a show of *force majeure*."[19]

Amateurs in Arms (1961-1964)

Unable to continue openly as a mass political organization, the ANC sought to rebuild its organization underground with the support and guidance of the South African Communist Party (SACP), which had been underground since 1950. The President of the ANC, Chief Albert Lutuli, while he did not actively oppose the violent direction taken by younger leaders in the ANC, remained personally committed to non-violence. Lutili received the Nobel Peace Prize on December 11, 1961. "The award was a tribute to Lutuli and the historical record of the ANC."[20] Mandela, Sisulu, Mbeki and others chose a different course. On December 16th, the anniversary of the Afrikaner victory over the Zulu at Blood River, a series of explosions occurred at symbolic targets in Johannesburg, Durban, and Port Elizabeth.[21] Leaflets were distributed an-

[15]Official Yearbook, *p. 188.*
[16]Time Running Out, *p. 173.*
[17]*Ibid.*
[18]Official Yearbook, *p. 188.*
[19]*Gerhart, p. 246.*
[20]*Karis et al., p.. 657.*
[21]Time Running Out, *p. 175.*

nouncing the creation of a new organizaiton, Umkonto we Sizwe (MK) — the Spear of the Nation.

> The time comes in the life of any nation when there remain only two choices: submit or fight. That time has now come to South Africa. We shall not submit and we have no cnoice but to hit back by all means within our power in defense of our people, our future and our freedom.[22]

The decision to employ violence was made very carefully and deliberately. In trials after his arrest, Nelson Mandela revealed the concerns and considerations that went into the decision. Fifty years of peaceful protest had not only failed to prevent the situation from becoming worse. The black South African's world was significantly worse than it had been in 1912. Mandela gave two reasons for creating MK.[23] First, its founders feared that embittered Africans would turn to racial terrorism as a result of Government policy. MK sought to provide responsible leadership to prevent such bloodshed which would only intensify racial bitterness. Second, the founders agreed that violence was the only effective means for achieving equality.

> They [the Government] set the scene for violence by relying exclusively on violence with which to answer our people and our demands . . . Africans are turning to deliberate acts of violence and force against the Government in order to persuade the Government, in the only language that this Government shows, by its own behavior, that it understands.[24]

Sabotage, with careful and rational control, was adopted by MK as its tactic for armed struggle. Compared to guerrilla warfare, terrorism and open revolution, sabotage was viewed as the lowest level of violence.[25] ANC leaders still hoped for a negotiated settlement with the Nationalist Government. "Sabotage did not irrevocably commit the movement to bloodshed."[26] By limiting their attacks to targets of economic importance and symbolic political significance, MK believed that the Government's supporters would be forced to acknowledge that the Nationalists' policies had to be changed to avoid a civil war.[27] The National High Command (NHC) of Umkonto issued strict

[22] *Excerpts from the Umkonto we Sizwe leaflet of December 16, 1961 in Karis et al., p. 716.*
[23] *From Mandela's defense at the Rivonia trial. See Karis et al., p. 772.*
[24] *Mandela at the dock on November 22, 1962. Karis et al., pp. 740-41.*
[25] *Karis et al., p. 647.*
[26] *Tom Lodge,* Black Politics in South Africa Since 1945 *(Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1983), p. 235.*
[27] *Karis et al., p. 717.*

instructions that sabotage should not injure or kill people. During the eighteen month campaign over 200 attacks were made; none resulted in the loss of life.[28]

No longer able to operate openly, the ANC and MK were reorganized in accordance with the M-Plan. Named for Mandela who created the plan in the mid-1950's, the M-Plan restructured the ANC into a cellular hierarchy, hoping to decentralize its leadership while strengthening national control.[29] The plan became the basis for the new ANC underground. While this reorganizaiton hindered the Government's security police, it did not stop them. Mandela was arrested in August of 1962 in Natal after dodging the authorities for seventeen months.[30] On July 11, 1963, RSA security poice raided the NHC at the Lilliesleaf Farm in Rivonia, a white suburb of Johannesburg. There they captured Sisulu, Mbeki and the rest of the MK leadership. They also uncovered enough information to destroy the organization as it then existed within the Republic.

One of the documents uncovered by the police in the raid was an outline of MK's plans for guerrilla war. By 1963, Umkonto was questioning the effectiveness of sabotage and had begun to consider using guerrilla tactics. Operation 'Mayibuye' (from "mayibuye Afrika" meaning "come back Africa"), described by the document, consisted of four parts.[31] First, the sabotage campaign would increase while a 7,000-man paramilitary army was raised underground. Second, 120 trained MK soldiers would be infiltrated from abroad to arm and lead the paramilitary volunteers in a pre-planned attack program. Third, a worldwide propaganda campaign would be initiated to trigger an economic boycott and United Nations intervention in Namibia, and fourth, the conflict would be settled by granting majority rule. While this plan was very naïve, it does show that MK was considering the option. Mandela testified at the subsequent trial that no decision had yet been made on guerrilla war.[32]

With the Rivonia trials, the leadership of MK and the ANC within the Republic of South Africa was destroyed. Mandela, Sisulu, Mbeki and five others on the NHC were convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. By December 1965, about 1,300 people were sentenced to prison in nearly 200 political and sabotage trials.[33] The eight MK leaders are now in Pollsmoor Prison after twenty years on Robben Island. Nelson Mandela is sixty-five years old.

The Rivonia trials have been labelled as the "death knell of amateurism."[34]

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[28] *Ibid., p. 677.*
[29] *Ibid., p. 37.*
[30] *Karis et al. (vol. 4), p. 73.*
[31] *The Operation Mayibuye document in* From Protest to Challenge *(vol. 3), p. 760.*
[32] Time Running Out, *p. 175.*
[33] *A Country Study, p. 48.*
[34] *Karis et al. (vol. 3), p. 659.*

When one considers the small number of MK cadres involved and the limited resources at their disposal, the number of MK sponsored attacks was impressive. However, given its goal of forcing the Government to the negotiating table, the campaign was a failure.

> Its impact on the White population was limited by the scanty press coverage and the usually superficial damage that resulted from the bombings, as well as being overshadowed by the considerably more frightening activities of Poqo [the PAC's underground organnization].[35]

Poqo had a much larger membership than MK. Its strategy called for a violent revolution which explicitly involved killing whites.[36] Unlike MK tactics, fear of Poqo terror solidified the white community against the black aspirations.

The unsuccessful sabotage campaign taught the ANC many valuable lessons. Bringing change to South Africa would not be a simple task, but would involve painstaking organization and patience. The problems with the sabotage effort were numerous.[37] Discipline and organization within MK was inadequate. Local branches exercised considerable independence in selecting targets for their attacks. This was particularly true of the Durban and Port Elizabeth units.[38] Financial and logistical deficiencies were constantly a problem. International support for the sabotage campaign was minimal and not strongly solicited. More importantly, support for MK within South Africa was not developed or utilized effectively. The vague and unstable alliance of MK's parent organizations, the ANC and the SACP, was confusing to members and supporters alike. Instead of using local ANC organizations to aid the MK effort, a lot of tension was generated because local ANC branches were not consulted or informed of MK's establishment.[39] It was not until October of 1962 that the existence of a special military wing was acknowledge by the ANC at its national conference in Bechuanaland. Perhaps the most important failure was the absence of any comprehensive program for popular political mobilization. No effort was made to expand the considerable support for the ANC before its banning in 1960.[40]

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[35] *Lodge, p. 236.*
[36] *Ibid., p. 241.*
[37] *A comprehensive discussion of the problems with the Sabotage Campaign is in a dissertation by Stephen Davis at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy entitled* Seasons of War: Insurgency in South Africa 1977-1980 *(1982), p. 105.*
[38] *Lodge, p. 236.*
[39] *Ibid., p. 237.*
[40] *Ibid., p. 239.*

Rebuilding Abroad (1965-1976)

After its banishment in 1960, the ANC had to establish itself in exile. Just prior to the passage of the Unlawful Organizations Act. Oliver Tambo was dispatched by the National Executive of the ANC to set up a foreign mission and to act as the ANC representative abroad.[41] During the Sabotage Campaign, this foreign office was primarily concerned with fundraising and diplomatic efforts. It also coordinated the military training programs for the recruits being smuggled out of South Africa.[42] With the Fivonia Raid, political and military leadership of the ANC passed to the exile group. Mandela and the NHC were in prison. While Albert Lutuli remained the nominal President of the ANC, contact with him was banned and he was confined to a small village. By the end of 1965, the entire ANC organization inside the Republic was destroyed. When Lutuli died in 1967, Tambo became the new ANC president. As a leader, Tambo lacked the charisma of Lutuli or Mandela. Nonetheless, he was a moderate with integrity and convicvtion, and won the respect of those around him.[43] Tambo is still the president of the ANC today. He has proven to be a durable and resolute leader with substantial diplomatic skill and political astuteness.

All exiled political movements have to face a new set of problems in the foreign environment. One author groups these problems into three categories:

> those arising from the need to maintain sanctuaries in foreign states and sources of external assistance; those related to efforts directed at the re-establishment of internal activity and support; and finally, the problem of holding the exile movement together.[44]

Operating in exile placed new demands on the leadership of the ANC. With the formation of the Organization of African Unity in 1963, the African Liberation Committee sought to coordinate Pan-African support for the exile groups. The Tanzanian foreign minister presided over the committee, and within the next few years the ANC established four training camps with Dar es Salaam's approval at Kongwa, Mbeya, Bagamoyo and Morogoro.[45]

The first armed activity of these newly trained MK guerrillas was conducted in 1967. In August a joint force of MK and ZAPU (Zimbabwean African People's Union) cadres infiltrated into the Wankie Game Reserve in western

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[41] *Karis et al. (vol. 4), p. 152.*
[42] *Lodge, p. 297.*
[43] *For a description of Tambo's personality see Karis et al. (vol. 4), p. 151.*
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Rhodesia.[46] The unit openly engaged the Rhodesian Army in a series of actions but was quickly overpowered. Two more incursion of a similar nature and outcome were launched in 1968. This ANC/ZAPU alliance was more a symbolic gesture than a strategic step; the alliance's actions did not have a significant impact on either the Rhodesian or South African situations. However, they did generate publicity for the ANC and helped raise the declining morale of the MK troops in Tanzania.[47]

In May of 1969, the ANC held its "Third Consultative Conference" in Morogoro, Tanzania. This seven-day conference was an important point in the history of the ANC.[48] The National Executive of the ANC was reduced from twenty-three to nine members. An internal commission was established specifically for resolving grievances within the ANC and MK membership, and was charged with formulating a code of conduct. A Revolutionary Council was set up to oversee Umkonto and coordinate military matters. This council was responsible only to the National Executive. The conference went beyond merely organizational reforms. a 'Revolutionary Program' was adopted which reaffirmed the ANC's committment to the Freedom Charter but went on to clarify some of the ambiguities in the original text. Here the ANC embraced armed struggle and a people's war. The conference took another step by admitting whites into the ANC as members. While this did cause some black resentment, the move strengthened ANC support and reflected the movement's commitment to nonracialism and its growing self-confidence. Now, almost six years after Rivonia, the ANC set itself to the task of building the organization inside and outside the Republic that would be needed to conduct guerrilla war.

During this time the white Government in the RSA was not idle. The Nationalist Party took advantage of the fear generated by black political violence to push security legislation through Parliament. The Sabotage Act of 1962 was a rushed response to the initial sabotage campaigns. The act defined sabotage as any willful act that:

> threaten[s] public health and safety; interfere[s] with supplies and deliveries of water, fuel, or food; obstruct[s] free movement of traffic; or destroy[s] or endanger[s] property with the intention to committing a 'general disturbance.'[49]

Violators of the act were subject to sentences ranging from five years to death. The General Laws Amendment Act, passed in 1963, gave the Government even more power to dispense with civil rights. Under this law, anyone labelled subversive by the Minister of Justice could be detained for repeated periods

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of ninety days without trial or charges.[50] But the most formidable legislation confronting the ANC in the sixties was passed in 1967. The Terrorism Act was a glaring example of a law whose vagueness granted the Government power to silence almost any challenge under its provisions. Beyond the acts of violence usually associated with terrorism, this law defined terrorism as any act designed

> to further or encourage the achievement of any political aim, including the bringing about of any social or economic change, by violence or forcible means. . . ; to cause or encourage further feelings of hostility between the white and other inhabitants of the Republic; or to embarrass the administration of the affairs of State.[51]

Then the law went on to grant the authorities permission to detain anyone suspected of terrorism, or of having information about terrorism, for an indefinite period of time.[52] The courts in the Republic were prohibited from intervening in such cases. Thus, if the State had unprecedented legal power to repress the majority of the population in 1960, by the end of the decade, that power was increased immeasurably.

During this rebuilding period, substantial changes were taking place inside and outside the RSA which had a dramatic impact on the ANC's situation. All of Africa was changing rapidly. Colonial regimes were removing themselves, and those that were not leaving were being thrown out. Whereas Tanzania had been the nearest independent state during the Sabotage Campaign, by 1966, Zambia, Botswana and Lesotho were also independent. By 1969, Swaziland was independent and guerrilla war erupted in Angola, Mozambique and Angola won their independence in 1975. In a region which had been a redoubt of colonial rule and white supremacy, the Republic of South Africa was now faced with a ring of hostile African nations, the 'Frontline States.'

Within South Africa another phenomenon was being witnessed, the emergence of the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM). While this article will not discuss the details of the BCM, its importance to Africans throughout the Republic and to the ANC is very significant. In 1968, black and Indian university students broke away from the multiracial National Union of South African Students to form their own body, the South African Students' Organization (SASO).[53] Led by its president, Steve Biko, SASO promulgated an ideology derived from Anton Lembede and the Africanists. Black pride,

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self-improvement and self-reliance became the themes of the BCM. "Black man, you are on your own."[54] Reaching out to Africans outside the universities, SASO fostered a number of other organizations, the most important of which was the Black People's Convention (BPC).[55] It was not until 1973 that the Nationalist Government began to suppress SASO and the BPC by banning their leaders.[56] By this time, however, SASO had created "a level of political education and ideological diffusion never before achieved by any Black poltical organization."[57] Coinciding with the emergence of the BCM came strikes staged by black workers across the country in 1972 and 1973 which displayed surprising militancy.[58] While some strikes were organized, others appeared to be spontaneous reactions to labor conditions, allied with the Black Consciousness movement.

That the twelve years after Rivonia was a trying and difficult time for the ANC is not questionable. However, more important than its weaknesses during this period was the fact that the ANC survived as a coherent organization in exile while substantial changes were taking place on their own within South Africa.[59]

> Their ability to affect the course of black resistance in South Africa in the dramatically altered conditions of the late 1970s was more a result of the extent to which they had succeeded in overcoming the inherent difficulties of the exile environment, than their relative degree of influence within the country at the point when internal circumstances began to change in their favor.[60]

By 1976, the RSA was ringed by independent black states that were sympathetic to the ANC. These countries would provide bases and support for ANC cadres. Inside South Africa, the BCM was politicizing the masses of blacks, something that the ANC had not done effectively on a large scale.

The Year of Crisis (1976)

In 1976, Andries Treurnicht, the Minister of Bantu Education, moved to enforce an old government policy requiring that half of all courses above primary levels be taught in Afrikaans. The policy backfired and fanned the flames of student discontent. "The irony with Bantu Education is that instead of making the Africans docile, it has produced the worst kind of frustration,

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resentment and hatred."[61] The black students of Soweto, a black urban township near Johannesburg, responded with demonstrations and class boycotts. On June 16, the South African Students' Movement, a BCM organization, sponsored a massive student demonstration. Confronted by riot police, the police responded with gunfire.[62] The ensuing riots inflamed Soweto and, within three days, spread to black urban areas across the Republic. The Government response, as always, was brutal, The Cillie Commission, which was established by the Nationalist Government to investigate the disturbances, reported that 575 people were killed and 3,907 injured in the violence which erupted sporadically over a year-long period.[63]

On September 12, 1977, Steve Biko died in police detention after torture and beatings. The world was shocked. Five weeks later, a Government crackdown destroyed the organized BCM. On October 19th, eighteen BCM organizations were issued bans. Another era in black politics was closed.

The Soweto riots revealed two important things: the extent of black anger and frustration, and the serious Laws in BCM strategy. Black Consciousness was an important transitional philosophy which instilled in Africans a new sense of their own abilities and aroused a new sensitivity to the realities of white oppression.[64] However, the BCM provided no strategy for bringing change to the RSA.

> All that Black Consciousness did was mobilize our people inside the country. It pulled them togehter; it got them to understand the situation; it just 'consciencitized' them. But it had no direction.[65]

The ANC was not behind the Soweto riots, nor did it forsee them. However, Congress reacted rapidly to June's events. The conflict was publicized and spread through ANC channels and, through contacts with the leadership of the Soweto Students' Representative Council, the ANC helped shape the young people's strategy.[66] ANC presence and support grew during the period of unrest. Numerous MK attacks and the arrests and trials of ANC cadres in the RSA brought the Congress a lot of publicity. In addition, the circulation of underground literature and "Radio Freedom" broadcasts from Lusaka and Tanzania were constant reminders to the black population that the ANC was at work.[67] The underground recruiting network which had been developing over the years rapidly increased its activity. "As other groups waxed and waned, the underground appears to have experienced a steady expansion of

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[66] *Hirson, p. 201.*
[67] Time Running Out, *p. 186.*

its influence after June 16, 1977."[68]

It was perhaps the African National Congress which benefited most from the BCM and the violence of 1976. Young Africans went abroad in search of training and leadership to "fight the white Government of the RSA. This exodus provided MK with recruits who had a higher level of education and motivation than previously available. RSA authorities estimated that some 4,000 refugees were undergoing military training by mid-1978.[69] The BCM's eight years of political education programs had mobilized the populace to levels that could never have been accomplished by the ANC underground. Previously viewed as an old failure following the defeats of the 1960's, militant young people now saw the Congress as not only relevant, but essential for defeating the Government.[70] Where the BCM and the security forces respectively sowed awareness and discontent, the ANC reaped the harvest. One author summed up the Congress' position at this time:

> The ANC has the initiative in its hands now, being the only movement with the capacity of mounting some armed incursion. It also has the following and the good will of large parts of the population.[71]

Forging the Spear: Guerrilla War (1978-Present)

By 1978, the Congress was ready to launch the guerrilla war which it had been preparing for nearly a decade. While the great influx of ANC recruits was not due primarily to ANC activity, the Congress' patient rebuilding programs, initiated at the Morogoro Conference, provided the essential weapons, bases, training facilities, financial support and intelligence needed. The armed struggle has kept the ANC in the forefront of black politics in South Africa. Even the strictly controlled South African press reported over 160 ANC actions by 1982. Some outstanding raids included the destruction of two of South Africa's vital oil-from-coal plants on June 1, 1980,[73] and the bombing of South Africa's only nuclear reactor at Koeberg in December of 1982, which has considerably delayed its completion.[74] Defense Minister Magnus Malan has conceded that MK bombings have caused about $635 million in damage since 1978.[75]

The ANC has spread its external organization across the Frontline States.[76]

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[68] *Ibid.*
[69] *Lodge, p. 339.*
[70] *Gerhart, p. 315.*
[71] *Hirson, p. 328.*
[72] *Taken from the* Rand Daily Mail, *December 21, 1982.*
[73] *See the* Star *(RSA), June 2, 1980.*
[74] *Reported in the* Star, *December 21, 1982; and in the* New African *(London), February 1983, p. 31.*
[75] New York Times, *October 12, 1983, p. A8.*
[76] *Organization described in* Africa Confidential *(vol. 24, no. 14), London, July 6, 1983, p. 3. Also in Davis, p. 217.*

By decentralizing its structure, the ANC has limited the influence of host governments while also protecting itself from attack by the RSA. New recruits are filtered out of the RSA through Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. They are then transported to the ANC secretariat in Lusaka. There, recruits are slotted for administrative or military training. Administrative training is done at the Morogoro camp in Tanzania. Military training is conducted primarily at four bases in Angola with additional programs in Ethiopia, East Germany and the USSR. Much of the training is conducted jointly with the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO). Umkonto we Sizwe is now believed to command between eight and ten thousand trained guerrillas.[77] Inside South Africa, the Congress has been cautious in meticulously organizaing its underground into small vertically controlled cells. This underground is responsible for screening recruits and getting them abroad for training. This is a slow process and the RSA security forces have been successful and persistent in infiltrating the organization.[78]

Support for the ANC has come from a number of sources in the international community. Thanks to the ANC's intimate relationship with the SACP, the Congress has been assured the continued support of the Soviet Union in the form of funds, weapons, training and diplomatic assistance.

> Soviet aid, given the stability and continuity of the Soviet regime, has on the whole been more consistent and less subject to sudden changes of attitude than Chinese, American or African assistance.[79]

The Soviet aid has had the additional benefit of freeing the ANC from dependence on its African host governments. Although this support has required the Congress to align itself with Soviet foreign policy, "Soviet support does not appear to have had a marked influence on the ANC's strategy which has on the whole been pragmatic and flexible."[80] Financial aid and diplomatic support has also come from a number of non-governmental organizations. The United Nations, through the Special Committee Against Apartheid and the High Commission on Refugees, has been a significant contributor.[81] The Organization of African Unity (OAU) has steadfastly supported the Congress.[82] However, OAU contributions have been minimal. For example, in 1967-68, the OAU members promised to provide $80,000 to the ANC. Only $3,940 ever reached Congress.[83] Other contributions to the ANC have come from

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[77] *In* Africa Confidential *(op. cit.), and* Time Running Out, *p. 203.*
[78] New York Times *(op cit.).*
[79] *Lodge, p. 304.*
[80] *Ibid., p. 305.*
[81] Southern African Facts Sheet *no. 32 (Sandton, RSA: Southern African Editorial Services Ltd., Feb. 1982), p. 2.*
[82] *See its most recent expression of solidarity: Resolution 112 of the 19th Summit of Heads of State at Addis Ababa (6-12 June 1983).*
[83] *Lodge, p. 300.*

the World Council of Churches (to the outrage of many religious Afrikaners).[84] Finally, a number of Western governments, notably Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands, have contributed directly or indirectly.[85]

The ANC has been very careful to present itself as a responsible revolutionary organization. Although Umkonto's attacks are military in form, their objectives are political: "the building up of political support through armed propaganda which may be defined as attacks designed to impress the black people at large with the ANC's viability as a resistance movement."[86] ANC attacks do not occur at random. ANC announcements and publications have gone to great lengths to link Umkonto's actions with popular grievances in order to demonstrate the Congress' "sensitivity" to local conditions. For example, during a local rent strike in Orlando, the ANC bombed the rent collection offices of the West Rand Administrative Board.[87] The explosions at the Loeberg nuclear plant occurred at a time when Cape Town residents were expressing deep concern about having a potential nuclear disaster at their doorstep.[88] Playing to the international audience, the ANC declared its adherence to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Protocol I of 1977 on the humanitarian conduct of war during a ceremony at the headquarters of the International Red Cross in November of 1980.

Much effort has been made to ensure that MK attacks avoid inflicting civilian casualties. The Congress has consistently refused to identify its enemy as all whites and has expressed an abhorrence of terrorism.[89] "On the whole, their intention seems to have been to inspire confidence amongst the dominant population rather than terror within the white community."[90] There have been a number of assassinations and attacks on informers and black policemen. These attacks were important for enforcing discipline and hampering RSA intelligence operations. Prior to May of 1983, only two MK actions involved the deaths of white civilians.

> The Goch Street killing of two whites in Johannesburg in 1977 was an instance of panic, and the January 1980 death of two white hostages in a bank in the Pretoria suburb of Silverton resulted from an apparently impulsive and suicidal takeover of the bank by three ANC guerrillas who thought they were about to be apprehended.[91]

But last May, a car bomb exploded on a crowded street outside a military

[84]Facts Sheet, *p. 4.*
[85]*Ibid., p. 3.*
[86]Rand Daily Mail, *December 21, 1982.*
[87]Sechaba, *January 1983, p. 2.*
[88]New African, *February 1983, p. 31.*
[89]New York Times *(op. cit.).*
[90]*Lodge, p. 340.*
[91]Time Running Out, *p. 203.*

installation in Pretoria. Eighteen people were killed and almost two hundred were injured by the blast.[92] ANC press releases took credit for the blast, stating that the attack:

> was specifically directed at military establishments of the South African regime. The enemy casualties consist essentially of Air Force and Military Intelligence personnel. The escalating armed struggle, which was imposed on us as a result of the intransigence and violence of the apartheid regime, will make itself felt among an increasing number of those who have chosen to serve in the enemy's forces of repression.[93]

Directly targeting personnel marks a departure from previous MK sabotage activity, but to date there have not been any other attacks of a similar nature.

While the ANC has come into its own since 1976, other militant black organizations have faded into the background. The most important of these has been the Pan-Africanist Congress. Although the development of the PAC after its prohibition is not the focus of this article, it provides a useful comparison for evaluating the ANC. The PAC advocated a racially exclusive approach to change in the RSA. Its ideology called for the black masses to rise up and violently overthrow their white oppressors and take back what was rightfully theirs. With this simple formula, one would think that the PAC would be more successful at mobilizing support than the ANC with its ambiguous and confusing ideology. However, since the loss of Robert Sobukwe in 1960, the PAC has been plagued by incompetent leadership. The most notorious of these leaders was Potlake Leballo. By 1976, eight members of the PAC executive committee were expelled from the organization because of conflicts with Leballo, the acting president.[94] After its banishment the PAC created an underground guerrilla organization named Poqo. In March of 1963, Leballo held a press conference announcing that Poqo was prepared to begin a revolution in the Republic. A few days later, Basutoland police raided the PAC headquarters in Maseru and confiscated the organization's membership lists.[95] By the end of 1963, the RSA Government announced that it had arrested 3,246 Poqo members.[96] Leading the PAC in exile, Leballo used very poor judgment in allying the PAC with such pariahs as COREMO in Mozambique and UNITA in Angola.[97]

Beyond Leballo's leadership, one analyst presented three more basic PAC

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[92] Africa Report *(vol. 28, no 4), July-August 1983, p. 20.*
[93] *Press release from ANC Department of Information and Publicity May 23, 1983. Distributed by the ANC Observer Mission to the United Nations.*
[94] *Lodge, p. 305.*
[95] *Gerhart, pp. 252-3.*
[96] *Ernest Harsch,* South Africa: White Rule, Black Revolt *(New York: Monad Press, 1980), p. 252.*
[97] *Lodge, pp. 312 and 315.*

weaknesses.[98] First, the original ideological cohesion of the PAC stemmed from a rejection of external and multiracial influences on the ANC. This is a negative basis for unity. In the exile environment, these issues became increasingly irrelevant, and the movement has had to look for new sources of inspiration. The second weakness has been the PAC's adherence ot concepts of spontaneous mass revolution. Thus, there has been little energy put toward effective organization. Finally, the PAC leadership has generally come from the less privileged sections of black society, making them more susceptible to the "temptations, pretensions, and delusions of exile politics."

Although the ideology of both the Black Consciousness Movement and the PAC descended from the ideas of Lembede and Mda, most of the youths who became militant in 1976 joined the ANC. There were two reasons for this development. First, security forces devastated the PAC underground in the end of 1977 with the arrest of the Bethal Eighteen.[99] This loss limited the PAC's ability to recruit new members and hurt its credibility. Second, at the PAC's Arusha conference in 1978, eight central committee members, including Leballo, and about sixty other PAC members were expelled from the organization.[100] Then, in 1979, David Sibeko, the new chairman, was assassinated in Dar es Salaam.[101] In February 1981, an ex-Robben Island prisoner, John Nyati Pokela, became the new chairman. Thus, during this critical period in the late 1970s, the PAC was experiencing internal transitions and was not prepared for the militant youth.

Today, the African National Congress is the paramount exile movement opposing the Nationalist regime. Considering that the Congress has achieved very little substantial change in its twenty years of armed struggle, one questions how the ANC continues to draw and maintain the support of so many Black South Africans. Two factors are apparent. First, out of all black political groups, only the Congress has the military capacity to bring apartheid home to the white Government. The escalating struggle and successful armed propaganda are drawing more and more individuals and groups to the ANC.[102] Every new successful operation by MK not only reminds blacks that the ANC is fighting their struggle, but also promoted the ANC's credibility. In addition to this credibility, the Congress has a certain amount of 'legitimacy' derived from such a long history of being the center of black resistance.[103] The history of the ANC is the history of the blacks' struggle for equality in their own land. The heroes of the ANC are well remembered. Many believe that Nelson Mandela, still in prison after twenty years, will one day be South Africa's

[98] *Ibid., p. 313.*
[99] Rand Daily Mail, *June 26, 1979.*
[100] Africa News *(Africa News Service, Inc), Durham, NC, January 31, 1983, p. 6.*
[101] *Lodge, p. 306.*
[102] *Saul and Gelb, pp. 138-9.*
[103] *Ibid.*

first black Prime Minister.[104] In 1980, a Transvaal newspaper launched a six-month "Free Mandela" campaign which gathered over 75,000 signatures on its petitions.[105] Where blacks have resisted their oppressors in South Africa, the ANC was there. Most believe that it will always be there until the struggle is over.

The View From Behind the Laager

The seige mentality of South African whites is often symbolized by the laager: the circle of wagons in the open veld behind which the Boer trekkers fought the black "savages". Black fear, or swartgevaar, has been the rallying cry of the Nationalists for support of apartheid. As a threatened minority, there is a sense of solidarity among whites as they are convinced that they will have to fight for their continued existence. The primary concern of the white Government is Afrikaner survival. Unlike white colonials, Afrikaners have nowhere else to go.[106] But the South African Government does not present itself as fighting a racial struggle against blacks, rather it sees itself defending Western Christianity from the evil onslaught of international Communism. "The Nationalist regime has loosely defined Communism as any doctrine or scheme that seeks to change the political, social, or economic structure of South Africa or to promote disorder and violence."[107]

To the South African Government, the ANC is a puppet directed by Moscow through the SACP with the support of Communists and Western liberals. They are labelled "merchants of terror, champions of bloody revolution and servants of International Communism."[108] A recent example of the battle against Communism has been the presentation of the RSA's latest incursion into Angola. In the town of Cuvelai, South African forces encountered an Angolan/Cuban force which greatly outnumbered them. Apparently the South African Defense Force (SADF) handled itself well in combat and then withdrew. This action was praised in the South African press as a victory over Moscow. One newspaper announced that "we beat the Russians hands down."[109] Another journal reported that the battle "upset Soviet plans for hegemony over entire tracts of Africa" and that "it must surely please Pretoria that it has managed to rattle the strategists in the Kremlin."[110]

To combat this "total threat", the Botha Government has designed their "total strategy." The Defense Minister, General Magnus Malan, describes this strategy as war on eight fronts: political, diplomatic, economic, ideolog-

[104]Time Running Out, *p. 192.*
[105]Sunday Post *(Johannesburg), October 5, 1980.*
[106]*Simon Jenkins, "Destabilization in Southern Africa,"* The Economist, *vol. 228, no. 7298, (July 16, 1983), p. 20.*
[107]A Country Study, *p. 295.*
[108]Facts Sheet, *p. 6.*
[109]The Sunday Times *(RSA), January 8, 1984, p. 1.*
[110]Financial Mail *(vol 91, no. 2), Johannesburg, January 13, 1984, p. 30.*

ical, cultural, psychological, semantic and military.[111] The SADF is stronger than any conventional opponent in Africa. "As South Africa contemplates its neighbors, it perceives an extensive vacuum of conventional military power — a vacuum that African states are not in a position to fill for some time to come."[112] However, the Nationalist Government realizes the unconventional threat and has been mobilizing the RSA psychologically and materially for a protracted war of low-intensity.[113] The SADF has been reorganized into conventional and counter-insurgency (COIN) units. Finally, the new constitution, which was approved in a public (white) referendum in November 1983, gives the president the power "to proclaim or terminate martial law" and the power "to declare war and make peace."[114]

Still, the white regime does not feel secure behind this powerful laager. South Africa has frequently conducted or sponsored attacks across its borders to assault ANC bases or to coerce those governments supporting the Congress. Whether or not they have overstated the threat, the excuse for all incursions has been the same — destroy the ANC.[115] The RSA has demanded that its neighbors prohibit ANC presence within their borders and has demonstrated its willingness to enforce that demand. In January 1981, a group of SADF commandos attacked Matola, a suburb of Maputo, killing twelve and capturing three.[116] On December 10, 1982, a large force of SADF troops landed in Maseru by helicopter and proceeded to massacre forty-two refugees in their homes.[117] A week after the Pretoria bombing in May of 1983, RSA aircraft bombed Matola killing six and wounding twenty-six.[118] In addition, RSA has destabilized the Frontline States by supporting guerrilla organizations which seek to overthrow the existing governments. The Lesotho Liberation Army, the Mozambique National Resistance, UNITA and perhaps ZIPRA all are being trained and aided by South Africa. "Apart from Russia, South Africa is the only major nation prepared to arm and train foreign guerrillas in Africa."[119] As a result, all the Southern African states except Angola and Tanzania have withdrawn public support from the ANC.[120] These policies have recently forced the government of Mozambique to the bargaining table. There are demands from both sides that the other side end its support of the guerrillas.[121]

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[111] A Country Study, *p. 310.*
[112] Time Running Out, *p. 241.*
[113] A Country Study, *p. 295.*
[114] *Fleur de Villiers (ed.)* Bridge or Barricade; The Constitution: a First Appraisal *(Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Paperbacks, 1983), p. 3.*
[115] The Economist *(op. cit.), p. 22.*
[116] *Ibid., p. 23.*
[117] Africa: The International Business, Economic and Political Monthly, *London (January 1983), p. 14.*
[118] Africa Report, *vol. 28, no. 4 (July-August, 1983), p. 20.*
[119] The Economist *(op. cit.), p. 28.*
[120] Africa Confidential *(op. cit.), p. 3.*
[121] The Economist, *January 28, 1984, p. 31.*

The loss of bases in Mozambique could be a substantial set-back for the Congress.

The Future

For the African National Congress, the struggle for majority rule will be a long one. Yet this fact is accepted by both the leadership and its cadres. Opposing the white Government for over seventy years, the Congress has demonstrated remarkable persistence and patience. But more than patience will be needed to overthrow the apartheid regime. In the face of the awesome resources and real power of the RSA, one wonders how the ANC will be able to effect change through small groups conducting sabotage operations. Neither MK nor the Frontline Stazates are in a position to confront the SADF openly.

Within the ANC itself, a number of issues must be resolved as the Congress continues its armed struggle. As the ANC continues to grow and comes to dominate black politics, so too will black politics come to be an issue inside the ANC. Young people are becoming increasingly radical and pressuring the older leadership. Those of the BCM generation have difficulty viewing the conflict along class lines instead of racial lines. On the other hand the Communists of the SACP are pushing for a more doctrinaire approach to the class struggle. As the ANC seeks a wider base of international support, it risks alienating both the SACP and the Soviet Union. Inside South Africa, the Congress msut clearly define its position towards black political leaders like Gatsha Buthelezi in Kwazulu and white liberals of the Progressive Reform Party. Also, the growing labor militancy among blacks and the rise of black unions has given the Congress an impetus to alter its ideology to accommodate working class grievances. Black labor unions could be a powerful ally for the Congress.

But for now the armed struggle will continue.

> We in the African National Congress do not imagine that the defeat of imperialism in Southern Africa will be quick or easy. We realize that it will be longdrawn and bloody. But we are confident of the final outcome. As our forces drive deeper into the South, we have no doubt that they will be joined not by some, but by the whole African nation; by the oppressed minorities, the Indians and Coloured people; and by an increasing number of white democrats. Towards this victory we will fight to the bitter end.[122]
>
> — Comrade O.R. Tambo
> President — ANC

[122] *Quoted in an ANC pamphlet entitled* In Combat, *distributed by the ANC Department of Information and Publicity (May, 1981), p. 1.*

The Inconsistencies of Deterence Theory

Michael Horn

There is a dangerous policy that has been let loose within the Western Alliance. It is the belief in nuclear war–fighting and the feasibility of "winning" with such weapons. "Victory is Possible"[1] say Colin S. Gray and his ideological bedfellows. This group is not as much concerned with deterrence as with its failure. In the event that deterrence should cease to operate and hostilities break out, American decision–makers would be presented with policy prescriptions that fall between the unacceptable extremes of surrender or all–out strategic exchange. Mr. Gray fears that, through a process labeled self–deterrence, the West might be forced to accept the former under the duress caused by the threat of the latter.

It is a distorted argument, as well might be expected from a field that concerns those most distorted manifestations of human endeavour and ingenuity, nuclear weapons. Mr. Gray's hidden premise is that surrender constitutes defeat, whereas limited nuclear exchange does not. In the course of the discussion that follows, Mr. Gray will soon fall by the wayside. More subtle victims, such as perverted forms of deterrence theory, should also lose their hold over us. Our destination is a safer, saner Europe, led to this goal by the actions we will consider here.

We are not speaking of arms control, but of arms reductions. If by arms control we mean the steady increase of the armament levels of both blocs, commonly sold to the world under the semantic banner of what are functionally irrelevant numeric balancing considerations, then arms control can be happily erased from our agenda. It is indeed unfortunate that the language of arms reduction has been so abused as to now appear to be the exclusive domain of the military — advocates of spending Teleological argumentation, blind scholasticism, and adamant casuistry must be revealed for what they are, in order to conduct a serious debate of the issues. Contact and communication across Europe's Great Divide is of course the most desirable route to our

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[1]*Colin S. Gray and Keith Payne, "Victory is Possible,"* Foreign Policy, *39, (Summer 1980).*

goal; it would be foolish to dismiss these methods. Rather, it must be understood that the present perversion in negotiations is counterproductive.

The logic employed in this study is predominantly of the sort used by those we seek to disprove. This is admittedly a reductionist approach, for we mirror a group of strategists who theorize as if strategy operated within a vacuum, wholly separate from political, economic, sociological, and other influences (see Appendix I). Nevertheless, we are of the opinion that this study stands to gain in legitimacy through the use of these illegitimate methods. If, to refute a certain body of reasoning, we must employ its line logic, then so be it. We can expect to be all the more successful if we can show that many sound suppositions are not to be discarded, but rather appropriately and consistently applied, thus generating vastly different conclusions. In short, we intend to analyze strategic thought solely in strategic terms, revealing that even at the core bulwark of justification, nuclear planners are sadly lacking.

Nuclear weapons, we are told, are an evil that we are handcuffed to. Learn to love our Bombs; for all of their hateful qualities, they act as a deterrent to those who would use these same devices against us. Deterrence is then the issue to be addressed. As a theory, it has fallen on hard times through overuse by clumsy thinkers. Edward Thompson offers the strongest of condemnations. "When a theory can be employed [as this theory is] to endorse *every* new development in strategy and in weaponry — one knows, in advance that this will be done — then one has every reason to suppose that one is dealing with ideology, with the apologetics of power."[2] There is more than a grain of truth to Thompson's argument, which of course does not necessarily mean that the theory should be held suspect, but rather that the application and interpretation thereof require close scrutiny.

One can only claim shelter for one's actions in pure deterrence, seen here as operating between like objects, when policy is based upon an important assumption; that retaliation is the only plausible usage envisioned. Weapons deployments must be justified as a response to an adversary's deployments. Lacking this justification begs the question of what in fact is being deterred. Historically, both NATO and American policy have not been reactions of this sort.

The United States was the first to have an atomic weapon, first with the hydrogen bomb, first with intercontinental bombers, first with ICBM's, first with an invulnerable submarine launched nuclear force, first with MIRVed weapons . . . The list continues. That the United States and NATO have led the technological arms race implies that theory trails technology, not vice versa.

Deterrrence as a concept is also weak, not merely because it has been abused, but because it is quite simply inapplicable to nuclear weapons in all cases. Colin Gray believes that "an ability to wage and survive war is vital

[2] *E.P. Thompson,* Beyond the Cold War, *(New York: Pantheon, 1982), p. 6.*

for the effectiveness of deterrence; there can be no such thing as an adequate deterrent posture unrelated to probable wartime effectiveness."[3] Despite Mr. Gray's faith in the insane notion of a survivable nuclear war, we can accept this line of reasoning, provided the complete picture is analyzed.

Deterrence is clearly only credible if one is willing and able to execute the threatened act. No one in his right mind, however, should see himself as willing and able to use nuclear weapons . . . and thereby initiate a process of escalation and mass suicide. In terms of destructive power, nuclear weapons are subject to a law of diminishing marginal utility. For this reason, redundancy, commonly referred to as overkill, is ridiculous. In terms of fungible power, nuclear weapons approach a law of zero utility, with one important caveat. Nuclear weapons are wholly useless unless one is prepared solely to retaliate after an adversary initiates, at the strategic countervalue level, the execution of the suicide pact. Even here, it is not the retaliation that is useful, but rather the threat thereof. Once deterrence breaks down, the execution of retaliation is a perverse formality. A deterrent requires the willingness ot use the weapon; nuclear weapons cannot rationally be used. Therefore deterrence itself becomes a highly questionable justification for the deployment of nuclear weapons.

It is the near certainty of escalation that makes all nuclear weapons irrational. No one is certain how a major war between nuclear powers would develop. We have been fortunate enough to be left without a case study. Nevertheless we can accept the conventional wisdom along a broad political spectrum and infer that escalation to ever higher levels of nuclear usage will prove swift and certain.

The advocates of "flexible response" hope to untie the hands of NATO forces, allowing for a wide choice of responses at various levels of intensity. If we imagine a ladder, capitulation being the very bottom rung and all–out nuclear exchange the top, flexible response can be seen as filling in the rungs in between. The assumption is that a controlled escalation to ever higher rungs can be expected to restrain rational Soviet decision–makers, who, realizing the grave danger of the new force level, will agree to a cessation of hostilities. They will no longer attempt to exploit weaknesses in NATO's middle rungs. The greater likelihood is, however, quite the opposite. Not controlled escalation, but rather, rapid spiralling towards total war is to be expected. We refer here to both the characteristics of the weaponry and the inclinations of the military field commanders.

We begin at the lowest nuclear rung. Nuclear landmines and artilliery shells, Lance missiles, and Honest Johns are stationed perilously close to the inner–German frontier, in some cases as little as 5 km away. As long as these weapons remain in this absurd position, we can expect that, in the event of

[3]*Gray & Payne, p. 19.*

a Warsaw Pact attack, they will be vulnerable to the attacker's early advances. Rather than risk their being overrun, field commanders are certain, with or without authorization, to commit them to the battle. "Use them or lose them" logic operates in this situation. This is the likely manner in which NATO will be the first to escalate and violate the fragile nuclear threshhold. What is important here is the willingness to use nuclear weapons.

As a consequence, both the Soviets and the Americans will grow nervous as to the fate of their other nuclear systems. All landbased systems are vulnerable to some degree, a result of the reduced flight time and high accuracy of the SS-20 and Pershing II. Either side might launch on warning to avoid losing their weapons on the ground in a preemptive strike. The Soviet propensity to arrive at such a decision is significantly higher than that of the Americans. Lacking a balanced distribution such as the American triad, both Soviet theatre and strategic forces are considerably more vulnerable as first-strike targets.

The NATO Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF), as stipulated in the present counterforce doctrine (PD 59) and Air-Land Battle 2000, will be used for "forward defense" purposes. Reading through this semantic disguise, we discover a deep strike attack in the event of impending defeat of NATO conventional forces. Targets preordained for NATO theatre weapons include both theatre and strategic nuclear weapons in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The likelihood that the Soviets, fearing just such an attack, will launch on warning is what is meant when theatre forces are said to have put a "hair trigger" on nuclear war.

The Soviet Union is not likely to distinguish the source of such a strike and respond accordingly with theatre weapons. A strike against their strategic force, even if executed with theatre weapons, is likely to elicit a strategic response. For this reason, US controlled theatre forces must be viewed as forward–based strategic systems, effectively a fourth leg to the American triad, with the capability to destroy targets within the European homeland of the USSR. Violation of the strategic homeland threshhold by NATO must, in its terrible logic, lead to a similar homeland strategic strike by the Soviets.

NATO policy might possibly initiate escalation, not accidently, but rather quite consciously. As dangerous as we have recognized Mr. Gray to be, we can accept his arguments concerning the policy of limited nuclear options (LNO). This policy foresees the use of a small number of nuclear devices during the early stages of conflict in hopes of reestablishing an "intrawar deterrence". The "warning shot" concept recently alluded to by loose but honest tongues in the Reagan administration is essentially just such a policy. The intent behind its execution is a demonstration of credibility and determination. It hopes to remove suspicions that a bluff is being played in the nuclear poker game.

Gray believes that these limited options constitute the initiation of an escalation process that would not be "concluded on satisfactory terms" for the Western alliance.[4] These options would in fact not be limited at all. Despite its bloodless avoidance of the horror that constitutes "unsatisfactory" outcomes, we should agree wholeheartedly with this conclusion. Nonetheless we must reject the reasoning hidden in this statement. The nuclear war–fighting contingent fears not the annihilation of millions, but rather the "defeat" of our nuclear strategic forces, the false assumption being, by implication, the concept of victory. The chain of escalation, it is believed, will end in domination by the "superior" strategic forces of the USSR. There is, of course, evidence not of superiority, but of parity at the strategic level. This is not the place to argue the existence of strategic parity, the point having been so ably established elsewhere. Suffice to say that numerous Rand and Defense analysts have said as much in their recent publications. We can conclude, therefore, that strategic nuclear "superiority" is a myth. In addition, such terms as a "window of vulnerability" are revealed to be little more thanpolitical slogans for candidates and not logical evaluations grounded in reality. Concepts such as "superiority" lose all meaning, except as manipulative symbols in an age of overkill. Furthermore, it should not for a moment be forgotten that escalation should not raise fears of a truly illusionary Warsaw Pact "victory", but instead of certain loss for all inhabitants of Europe, both East and West.

We have been publically and repeatedly told that only a second–strike, counter–value force of restricted size can be justified by deterrence theory. All other uses of nuclear weapons at lower levels invite and assure escalation. Deterrence, as commonly understood by NATO, foresees, however, not a nuclear response to a nuclear attack, but rather a nuclear response to a conventional attack. This is Type-2 Deterrence, as detailed by Herman Kahn.[5] It is a dangerous policy, that clearly violates the principle of proportionality. The lives of the inhabitants of the northern hemisphere are put at stake in order that NATO conventional forces not risk defeat in battle. The intended benefits are certainly outweighed by the potential costs. In fact, this unacceptable risk is precisely the intent of the NATO concept of deterrence. The Soviets, follows this reasoning, will not initiate conventional hostilities, no matter how limited, for fear of the total destruction of both parties.

This is childish, irresponsible logic. It assumes that conventional attack can only be deterred through a nuclear threat. Great faith is set in the rational analysis of Soviet leaders who must make decisions, under the stress of crisis and using purely speculative models, regarding weaponry that has fortunately never been tested under battle conditions. The possibility of accidents, misper-

[4]*Gray & Payne, p. 18.*

[5]*Herman Kahn, "The Nature and Feasibility of War and Deterrence," in* American Strategy for the Nuclear Age, *eds. Walter F. Hahn and John C. Neff, (New York: Doubleday, 1960), pp. 233-234.*

ceptions, and irrational, impulsive action are pushed aside. Should, however, this deterrent fail, the stage has been consciously set for rapid escalation.

We suggest that conventional attack is most sanely deterred with a conventional defense. Furthermore, we suggest that conventional deterrence has not been standard NATO policy for reasons as mundane as money. More "kills per dollar," more "bangs for the buck" encouraged NATO's nuclear dependency. This financial decision, once arrived at, directly encouraged the tailor–fitted justifications and doctrines that followed. NATO lost all sense of proportionality and orientation when it decided to save money and thereby risk suicide.

NATO commonly speaks of the "defensive" nature of its tactical and intermediate range weapons. For example, study the flood of memorandums issued by the Nuclear Planning Group of NATO.[6] That "forward defense" requires a deep–strike attack makes public relations increasingly problematic. Michael Nacht's "Theory of Preemtive Deterrence" stretches defensive deterrence further than it will comfortably go, outlining a clearly aggressive posture that would invite ridicule, were the stakes not so high. We must acknowledge that there can be no defensive use of nuclear weapons in the classic military sense. Retaliation, while perhaps feasible and desirable, is not to be mistaken for defense. It is an attack — responding to another's attack, but nevertheless an attack.

A simpler argument can be made against NATO's claimed defensive posture, an argument based upon weapons characteristics and theories culled from the works of the planners themselves. Consequently we will reject Pershing II's and Cruise missiles. With the issuing of Presidential Directive 59 (PD 59) and National Security Decision Document 13 (NSDD 13), the newly deployed weapons have been linked to a policy of protracted, winnable war, first use, and counterforce, the last being a policy that actually only makes official the military targeting which had been operative in the SIOP (the Single Integral Operating Plan, which orchestrates coordinated nuclear engagement) since the days of Curtis LeMay. These weapons are intentionally rapid, radar evading, and highly accurate, three qualities which are only necessary when one intends to strike the adversary's forces before they can respond. The essential logic is as follows: counterforce targeting assumes that the forces to be struck are present. One does not logically attack empty silos. It follows that counterforce weaponry is designed specifically for first–strike usage. It is a short semantic step from the phrase "first-use," NATO's self–claimed right, to "first-strike."

The strategists have claimed that military targeting is more "humane" than the threatened destruction of whole populations. We refute this point emphatically. "Collateral damage," the innocent phrase used to describe destruction

[6]NATO: Texts of Final Communiques *(vol. II), 1975-1980 NATO Information Service, Brussels.*

caused by a counterforce attack, will create casualties reaching well into the tens of millions. Michael Mandelbaum is one amongst many who recognize that counterforce and countervalue are equivalents in population–dense areas such as Europe and the western regions of the USSR.[7] In other words, there can be no "limited" nuclear war; it is an oxymoron, a contradiction in terms. Counterforce doctrine is by no means the humane policy that it pretends to be. Damage is enormous, and the destabilizing effects of such a policy make it far more likely that such damage will be inflicted.

Does NATO plan to fight a limited nuclear war, or are the deterrent effects perceived in the escalation mechanism what are desired? Arguments such as those brought forth by Michael Howard may be misleading. He believes that recent NATO policy has been designed, not to fight a limited war in Europe, but rather "their [the planners] object is precisely to *prevent* such a war."[8] Mr. Howard has evidently not been listening carefully or reading the statements found in such books as Robert Scheer's *With Enough Shovels* (NY, 1982). Perhaps Mr. Howard has made the honorable human mistake of not wishing to believe the insanity that is being discussed. The truth is that the planners want both deterrence through threatened escalaction *and* war–fighting capability. Of course strategy has been couched in the defensive deterrent terms that we have come to expect, but in their trade journals, we see that their primary concern no longer appears to be the strengthening of deterrence, but rather the development of war–fighting ability, to be in place if and when deterrence should cease operating. Scheer has assembled more than enough shocking quotes from officials in the present administration to support this statement.

While I agree with Mr. Howard's belief that NATO policy is not appropriate for a limited war, I am still left puzzled. For deterrent purposes, NATO expressly linked conventional weapons with battlefield, theatre, and strategic nuclear forces in a continuous spectrum, hoping to impress upon the Soviets that, because Western Euope was so coupled to U.S. strategic forces, even limited conventional aggression would escalate rapidly to the highest levels.

Having constructed, with intent, a deadly escalatory mechanism, the planners now consciously provide the key to start the machine. Intermediate–range weapons are the link, seen as both part of the guaranteed escalation and as a war–fighting class of weapons that can act as a "firebreak," supplying a "flexible response" so that the adversary cannot attain "escalation dominance." Intermediate Nuclear Forces provide one more stage of "controlled escalation," each stage providing an opportunity to reconsider before advancing further down the slippery slope.[9]

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[7] *Michael Mandelbaum,* The Nuclear Future *(Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 59.*

[8] *Michael Howard, "Surviving a Protest" in* The Causes of Wars *(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), p. 126.*

[9] *For a sceptical view of the ability to control escalation see Desmond Ball's Adelphi Paper "Can Nuclear War Be Controlled?"*

Which is it to be then, a firebreak that interrupts the process or a bridge towards intended escalation? Are intermediate–range weapons intended as a link between Europe and the American strategic umbrella, or are they meant to be the tools of limited war that are used specifically so that war plans can be executed without resorting to the guaranteed holocaust of strategic weapons? NATO cannot have its cake and eat it too. The one intends to strengthen deterrence, the other "effective" war–fighting. They work, however, at odds with one another, as the one can never halt that which the other intends to propel forward.

This is clearly a function of the credibility issue. Theorists believe it rational to purposely build an irrational process of escalation into their deterrence models. A fundamental contradiction exists here. We have promised to slit our throats if they initiate aggression. This author suggests that bounded rationality, built upon a base of supreme irrationality, is not rationality at all, but rather an irrationality made confusing by virtue of its disguise as its opposite.

Deterrence theory places overly great emphasis upon the assumption of rationality, primarily in decision–making. The death penalty sometimes serves as an effective deterrent against murder; many times it has not. When the latter is the case, we can venture that the murderer, although previously cognizant of the connection between murder and capital punishment, nevertheless momentarily pushes this logic aside and acts irrationally. In the moment of the act he is motivated wholly by other factors, generally emotional and psychological. Similarly, we cannot place too great a faith in a leader's ability and clarity of analysis in the midst of an international crisis. The hostile relations between East and West that have existed since 1945 have twisted their perspectives of one another considerably. Suspicion abounds and the tense atmosphere of crisis will not be conducive to detached rationality at the very time when this quality is most in need. Some who study decision–making in high risk, high pressure situations tells us otherwise. Surely they are sometimes correct; flashes of clarity under pressure are not unknown. Often this will not be the case however. Befuddled, random, desperate behavior is a common response to high risk, short time situations. In a nuclear age, the price we might pay for planning around an illusionary state of rationality will indeed be high. The issue is this: can two parties construct a mutual suicide pact with a hair trigger and expect the other to rationally respect the rules imposed by grevious punishment?

The reduced time factor that is characteristic of the youngest generations of theatre weapons is not only an important indication of increased first-strike tensions. It also reduces rational decision–making time radically. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, Admiral Anderson reacted like a preprogrammed automaton. Trained as a Navy man and with predetermined options at his disposal, Anderson exhibited tendencies similar to what we fear many nuclear

commanders will act out. These fears have been confirmed by NATO exercises in the field. Reduced flight times and the targeting of political leadership destroys the true firebreak, that of diplomacy. It is a process of foreclosure, buried deep in the sinews of the terrible nuclear logic.

This is a determinist model, devoid of all considerations other than strategic ones. Commanders will not accept the loss of tactical nuclear weapons; locked into the straitjacket of military logic, they will use them. Anderson's blockade positioning reflected a military/strategic decision that, assuming the rationality that is also so essential for nuclear deterrence, should have been subordinated to political requirements. The predetermined military option won the day, as it will if commanders are ever under pressure, fearing the destruction of the theatre nuclear weapons under their command. Nuclear decapitation, an irresponsible and short-sighted policy spin-off of improved weapons accuracy, only increases the likelihood that predetermined military options and thought processes will unfold despite their dangerous effects. It is bitterly ironic that strategists think nothing of discussing decapitation and de-escalation in the same breath. Wright Mills understood that "the immediate cause of World War III is the preparation of it."[10] As we prepare military options, so we can expect to see them acted out.

A memorandum from the NATO Defense Planning Committee, Brussels, reported: "Ministers state that NATO's defense planning must continue to be based primarily on assessments of the Warsaw Pact's capabilities rather than assumptions about its intentions."[11] Such statements are undeniable proof that NATO has divorced strategy from politics. Furthermore, it must be recognized that "assessments of capabilities" are not to be contrasted with "assumptions of intentions." Rather, such assessments are *de facto* assumptions of the worst case scenario — that these capabilities will be used aggressively at fullest magnitude — disregarding all estimations of the likelihood that the worst case will in fact occur.

Worst case thinking is extremely limiting for two reasons. Firstly, one's hands are tied when cases other than the worst appear. Options are not readily at hand, one's perceptions are not appropriate for the context, and the chance for mistaken decision–making increases dramatically. Secondly, and more importantly, worst case analysis has the nasty habit of becoming a self–fulfilling prophecy. Foreclosed options are not always hastily reconstructed. Instead, the existing option, foreseeing the greatest possible application of military force by the opponent, and therefore encouraging an equal (or greater) response, are applied, acting as locomotion in the escalatory mechanism.

If one plans on the basis of worst case assumptions, events are likely to be misinterpreted as being just that case that one has expected to see. Percep-

[10] *C. Wright Mills*, The Cause of World War III *(New York: 1958), p. 47.*
[11] NATO: Texts, *p. 110.*

tions are distorted, representing the cummulative weight of decades of mistrust. Given that both parties are aware that the other also plans upon the worst case, it is unlikely that previously foreclosed options might be reactivated. Manichean analysis by both parties, however, can only serve to increase tensions and dangers to the point that the initiator of an act will not rationally consider a limited approach. Why should he, after all, when the indications are that the adversary will not respond with corresponding constraint? Are we then to sit back self–satisfied because our suspicions of our adversary's intentions, through an interactive dynamic of logic, have proven true?

For our purposes, this dilemma can be illustrated as follows: Political tensions between the Warsaw Pact and NATO reach unprecedented heights. Each party fears that the other will strike, using their full capability despite statements to the opposite. From the Soviet perspective, this might mean the early use of their nuclear weapons for the simple reason that NATO also has such weapons. Nuclear destruction will rain down upon NATO members, not in spite of, but because of NATO's nuclear arsenal. In short, our planning, based as it is upon worst case assumptions, may create just that scenario that we most fear.

The present danger, quite different from the one envisioned by the committee so named, is of such a magnitude that we cannot merely analyze the theoretical strengths and weaknesses of strategy, but must also examine the weapons themselves. As has been mentioned, battlefield nuclear weapons are stationed perilously close to the East/West frontier. They are therefore vulnerable, and should at the very least be pulled back, allowing NATO to choose the time and place of their employment. These weapons (Lance, Honest John, M109 & M110 artillery shells, land mines, and surface-to-air missiles) perform, however, no function that could not be performed by conventional weapons. Their blast yields are also very high, potentially laying waste to the very territory NATO intends to defend. NATO planners themselves acknowledge the uselessness of these weapons. In the 1979 Brussels decision on theatre nuclear deployment, Nato defense ministers decided to remove 1,000 of the more than 7000 tactical weapons in NATO's arsenal. These weapons are first and foremost to be rejected because they set such a low nuclear threshhold. Their removal is the first step to dismantling the escalation mechanism. The more than 30,000 troops assigned to these nuclear units can be added to the conventional force.

Pershing II's, Cruise missiles, and F-111 fighter–bombers form NATO's theatre force (TNF). As has been mentioned, these first two weapons are highly destablizing as they could employed as directed in PD 59 and NSDD 13 as first-strike weapons. We also must not make the common mistake of overlooking the more than 6,000 Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missiles allocated to NATO. Cruise missiles are a Soviet planner's nightmare, being dual–capable. The Soviets may detect their launching during wartime, but

they will quickly lose these weapons on their radar. They then face an agonizing decision concerning an appropriate response. Are they nuclear or conventional, aimed at Eastern Europe or Soviet ICBM's? The choice is to wait and see, perhaps paying an unacceptable price, or to launch on warning.

The French and British nuclear forces, arguably independent, pose a political problem. They are clearly not a paltry threat to the USSR; they can inflict damage upon the Soviets that all but the most callous among us must call "unacceptable." The French system is land–based and therefore vulnerable. If a modernization of its guidance system takes place, as recently happened with the British force, the French will possess a first–strike capability. The French are not however certain to give up their system, in the best interests of NATO, without a fight. Neither will this option be well received by the present British government or, foreseeing a change in government, the British military establishment.

NATO conventional forces will need improvement, but as the safest, most certain brake to nuclear escalation is not nuclear weapons themselves, but a conventional deterrence posture, such a restructuring of NATO conventional forces should receive the necessary funds. We stress that restructuring is needed; an increase in quantities of men and material, while expected, can remain more modest and limited than those who support nuclear dependency would have us believe. As those presently in power tightly control the flow of information concerning this question, it is not surprising that their task has been relatively easy. Interestingly enough, the US Department of Defense stated in its 1975 FY Report that rough conventional parity had been achieved in Europe. Since that time, NATO has installed many successful reforms. The Soviets have simultaneously been seeking elusive results in Afghanistan and must now question the role of Poland in any military planning with great care.

Moreover, it is an error to measure balances weapon for weapon, be they nuclear or conventional. Statistical disparity can be highly misleading. Instead, we must balance not weapons against one another, but rather our weapons against our needs. The belief that a conventional force on the defensive holds an advantage in expected combat loss has gained wide acceptance recently. Anti–tank weapons, surface–to–air missiles, air defense guns, and similar weapons can be used to great effectiveness, such that the attacker's ratio of loss is far greater than the defender's. For NATO, this implies that numerical inferiority will not translate into automatic defeat.

NATO should obviously standardize its weaponry and munitions calibration. Each nation will be required to drop its present nationalistic concern for independent arms producers and begin the process of integration. That these same producers are aided by NATO governments in arms sales to developing countries is a well known fact. Perhaps this disreputable activity will be discontinued as a welcome side-effect. NATO's great worries about tank

nefficiencies and defficiencies can also be abandoned. It is hard to image unning tank battles on the "North German Plain," a highly urbanized area.

The state of Warsaw Pact troops must also be taken into consideration. Units are typically manned at less than 75 percent strength. Combat readiness, ypically overestimated by military units in NATO who seek increased budgets and more glamorous weapons, is questionable. Warsaw Pact moral is low, alcoholism is extremely high, as is, incidentally, the use of illegal narcotics amongst American troops. The Soviet units, of mixed nationality, present problems of language and loyalty.

The dependability of East European troops is another important factor. The Bulgarians appear to stand by the Soviets. The Rumanians, with an independent foreign policy, are less certain. Hungarians and Czechs have not quickly forgotten their recent brushes with the Soviet army, and one must wonder if the German Democratic Republic will reveal itself to be German first and socialist second. Polish troops are perhaps the biggest worry for Soviet planners, for the use of Polish territory figures highly in all imaginable scenarios. In general, the issue concerns the direction in which East Europeans will turn their rifles. The suggestion that Soviet troops in Eastern Europe are as much a standing occupation force as an attack force must be given some credence. While the common image of Warsaw Pact forces found in Western sources is of a highly unified centralized force, an army bifurcated into Soviet command and East European grouped troops is a picture closer to reality. Should we chose to compare Warsaw Pact forces to NATO forces, the former outnumber the latter. Soviet forces on their own however are outnumbered by NATO troops. Such a comparison is admittedly misleading. The actual comparison should fall somewhere in between.

The policy suggestion implicit in this study is obviously the gradual withdrawal and dismounting of all nuclear weapons in the present American and NATO arsenals. One critical scenario imagines that the Warsaw Pact uses nuclear weapons, either for purposes of enhanced attack or nuclear blackmail. If NATO still possesses theatre nuclear weapons, the intricacies of the scenario no longer matter — escalation ensues as deterrence had guaranteed. A non-nuclear NATO need worry less over the use of nuclear weapons against it. The Warsaw Pact's defensive tactical weapons (land mines, ground-to-air missiles) would prove useless in an attack. Offensive tactical weapons, if used, will actually differ little from the highly destructive conventional weapons that will also be used. Soviet commanders might prefer to stay non-nuclear on the battlefield, if only to keep from wiping out their own troops and themselves. Earlier in this study, we suggested that tactical nuclear weapons are dangerous in that they begin the cycle of escalation. A non-nuclear NATO would not escalate the conflict if the Warsaw Pact used such weapons, but would instead respond with adequate conventional means, with the caveat that unacceptable countervalue damage would activate a proportional conven-

tional response.

The major targets — the inviting land–based nuclear weapons themselves — will no longer be present. Command positions might be attacked, but so too might they be attacked with conventional weapons. No longer will NATO nations be laden with Cruise missile–carrying ships, nuclear wings of aircraft, or ground units with tactical nuclear weapons. Therefore, the likelihood that the Soviets will attack with nuclear weapons is reduced.

Neither does nuclear blackmail constitute a great worry. Nuclear blackmail is most effective when a nuclear power threatens a non–nuclear power. It is still effective against a nation(s) with a large number of nuclear devices and an escalation spectrum, for if the blackmailer can convince his victim that he is irrational and will no longer be constrained by the potential punishment of escalation, then the victim is self–deterred, rationally fearing the explosion built into the mechanism he created. The minimal deterrence state is also vulnerable to this form of blackmail.

We can safely say that in all nuclear situations the irrational actor who cares little for the risks he runs will always have the upper hand. The point here is, however, that a state or states that do not possess nuclear weapons are no more vulnerable to nuclear blackmail than any other power by virtue of the eternal risk of irrationality. In fact, such states may be less vulnerable. Having fewer weapons, there are fewer flashpoints that might release the systems cummulative destructive power, which itself is by definition of a smaller magnitude. The great danger in nuclear blackmail involving a victim with an escalation–oriented system is that this system may be activated too rapidly, too automatically, to allow for diplomacy and negotiations. Critics of this study will suggest that our intent, the radical raising of the nuclear threshold and a radical reduction of the raw destructive power in the system, is not desirable. They believe that raising the threshold advertises NATO's lack of will to use nuclear weapons at lower levels and encourages an adversary to conventionally exploit weaknesses at this level. It is true that a Waltzian model could operate here: increased conflict at lower levels of the system as stable balance was established at the strategic level. We accept this criticism in its entirety, but suggest that our planned withdrawal of nuclear weapons justifies low intensity conflict if nuclear holocaust is thereby avoided.

There is no escaping from the simple truth just articulated — the irrational actor cannot be restrained by deterrence. But what choice does that leave us? We know that states are quite often irrational, and yet we can only hope to design a stable mechanism in terms of a rationality that is not always present. Barring this, we may as well give up trying to manage stability and just throw ourselves into the currents of unpredictable, dangerous situations. We have not abandoned rationality as a policy guideline, but rather believe that disarmament is the inevitable destination reached when this principle is correctly applied.

It should be understood that the critiques of deterrence theory that were developed earlier in this study concern both the abuses in application and the shortcomings of the premises themselves. They disguise war–fighting in deterrence terms, creating agonizing complexities of choice — when to set the whole insane powder keg off — and creating inherent instabilities that make nuclear exchange more likely, simply because each side is preparing for that contingency. Some will attempt to criticize this work because it is essentially critical in nature, undermining the existing framework of nuclear strategy without offering a fully developed alternative. These critics should keep two points clearly in mind. Firstly, nuclear weapons are wholly useless weapons; for this reason, the only viable alternative to our present strategy, total nuclear disarmament, is glaringly obvious and yet to some extremely discomforting. Secondly, those who object to a "destructive" approach must realize that criticism is the first necessary step to all change and improvement. We must always identify faulty logic before we can redress the situation. The enthusiastic position that others espouse can only be realized if the gloomy efforts of the critic point the way towards what has to be undone. Critics essentially clear the ground so that others may build solid and safe structures. The likelihood that rationality shall win the day increases as that space under the level of the irrational nuclear decision expands. The psychological perversion of our presently threatening and destabilizing posture should, with time, be corrected. Military/strategic considerations will relax their hold over decision–making, opening vast opportunities for the construction of political solutions for what is essentially a political dispute. We impatiently await the day when a political solution can be reached. That day will most certainly never arrive as long as the priests of nuclear strategy continue to offer the sorry solace of deterrence theory, while concealing the true threat that confronts us.

Appendix I

Many of its practitioners have brought strategic studies to the point where it resembles a disreputable pseudo–science. They disregard accepted rules for valid academic inquiry, a fact, that once analyzed, leads us to conclude that they are either ignorant of their errors or operate upon the dictates of a secret agenda for purposes wholly other than those stated.

We are often given geopolitical arguments, some of which are sound. An asymmetry of geography does give the Soviet Union an initial advantage over the United States in the movement of materiel to Europe. Sometimes, however, we begin to read statements hauntingly similar to the 19th century saber rattlers who gave "Geopolitik" its discredited name. The master of the Eurasian heartland can use Europe to isolate the World Island runs this argument, prominent in Colin Gray's *The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era*. Perhaps Mr.

Gray should be reminded that the last two Great Wars of Conquest involved "tiny" European powers, Napoleon's France and Hitler's Germany, invading the Eurasian landmass.

Many strategists employ counterfactual historical methods to support their arguments. Counterfactual history is the use of historical examples that admit no evidence, either validating or disproving. It is the practice of foreclosure, and is *prima facie* proof that its employer knows little of formal historical methodology. The most frequently encountered example of this method is the suggestion that nuclear deterrence had "kept the peace" in Europe since 1945. Consider for a moment Oskar Morgenstern. "The fact that the United States has not been attacked [directly] by Russia since the end of the Second World War is due either to the possibility that Russia did not want to attack us [even if our deterrent force had been much smaller or perhaps even zero] or to the strength of our deterrent force, presumably in particular, to our nuclear capacity. We can forget about the first possibility; we would have been attacked had we been much weaker." (*National Defense*, p. 29)

There is no supporting evidence provided, no grounds for logical validation. Neither can we disprove such statements. Nevertheless, this line of argumentation has entered popular consciousness and taken on a line of its own. That war might have been deterred by the (rational) lack of gains or by the horror of war itself — any war, nuclear or conventional — is never considered. Consequently, we are encouraged to think in maximizing terms. "If some nuclear weapons have kept the peace" runs this argument, "then clearly ever greater numbers of these weapons will ensure a more stable peace."

Strategists operate in a vacuum, manipulating a form of deterrence theory that excludes, at the onset, the importance or anything other than military considerations. Michael Howard has recognized this shoddy academic practice. "This war they are describing, what is it about? . . . Has not the bulk of American thinking been exactly what Clausewitz described — something that, because it is divorced from any political context, is pointless and devoid of sense?" *(On Fighting a Nuclear War)*

If intellectual inadequacies are to be explained, perhaps we might find them attributable to the fascination that the field arouses. This is the stuff of war, an object of simultaneous repulsion and attraction since the beginning of intellectual inquiry. It is a field that generates mind puzzles that have the surface appearance of formal logic and scientific theorems; the manipulation of them is intriguing for those who can distance their models and sensibilities from the very real destruction embodied within them. Increasingly large numbers of people are fortunately finding that they cannot.

Appendix II

I challenge any takers to uncover one historical example of a balance-of-power system that did not eventually break down into a major war. For lack of an example, we must conclude that the present balance–of–power in Europe is either a historical anomaly, or that we are presented with a serious predicment. Balance–of–power systems have one major shortcoming — they substitute military precautions for the required political solutions of what are essentially political problems. Each party involved in the system maintains a posture of threat against all adversaries. Therefore, while war may be postponed as a consequence of cost-benefit analysis, so is the resolution of peace indefinitely postponed.

Locked into this system, states continually add to their arsenals in order that numeric balances may be established and reestablished. Each time the system appears unbalanced, and therefore in danger of collapse, a balancing decision — a fix — is injected. The cummulative effect is such that when the balance–of–power system breaks down, as historical probability indicates it eventually will, the destructive force unleashed by the collapse has been substantially increased as a result of the means of postponement, the balancing decisions. It is the operation of this dynamic that gives a balance–of–power system the characteristics of addiction.

Appendix III

The author of this study has, with intent, footnoted only those terms and direct quotations associated with specific authors. Most of the concepts discussed herein are common to theorists in the field; to attribute them to a specific figure would be inappropriate, removing from these concepts their generality of character.

In addition, the author is of the opinion that such discussions are the common intellectual property of all inhabitants of nations living under the nuclear threat. A denial of this fact would amount to an admission of resignation, delivering nuclear strategy back into the hands of a closed, private group of professional strategists who have single-handedly set the course of strategy since the advent of the nuclear age.

Finally, the author hopes that all readers of this study exercise their rights to the utmost and take a serious and penetrating look at modern military strategy. Perhaps the tone of this work has offended some readers; others might find this clear mixture of anger and fear reassuring. In either case, if the intent has been realized — interest has been aroused. This study is admittedly in part a polemic, inherently emotional and passionate. Perhaps we need more polemics (of which this is merely a poor facsimile) if they bring nuclear issues to the light of the day. Footnotes, academic acknowledgement, and tone are secondary; a serious consideration of our predicament is the issue.

The Implication of US Withdrawal from UNESCO

Maxine Pitter

This paper will examine some historical precedents of withdrawal from international organizations — namely, the US's frozen contribution to the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 1974,[1] and US withdrawal from the International Labor Organization (ILO) in 1977.[2] We will then explore events leading up to the official United States letter of withdrawal on December 29, 1983, and analyze the decision–making process therein.[3] On the theoretical level, we will analyze how the administration's decision–making process fared in considering the alternatives and in understanding the implications of taking such a drastic measure. Finally, we will conclude and offer policy options. Specifically focusing on the area of communications, we will demonstrate that, especially in longer-term policy–contingency frameworks, the administration's policy goals simply are not best served by withdrawal from UNESCO — one of the Department of State's many erroneous conclusions.[4]

The general focus of our argument will be the official US government position, namely that the costs of our participation in UNESCO outweigh the benefits. Any program deemed worthy can be funded directly by the government. State–ism, politicization, and excessive budget mismanagement provide evidence of US and Western impotence in the face of a new Third World/Soviet block majority in international organizations in general, and in UNESCO in particular. This author feels, however, that changes in UNESCO's posture in 1984 have been sufficient, given the infrequent consultations of the Executive

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[1] *Fact confirmed by many articles and speecnes, but officially documented in a Department of State letter from Gregory Newell to Dante B. Fascell, February 29, 1984.*

[2] *This withdrawal was in response to USSR demands for trade union representation within UNESCO. Documented in February, 1984 Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.*

[3] *This may appear to be an overly harsh statement, but briefly and generally, the Department of State has been accused of undermining all forms of multilateral diplomacy, thus leaving the least qualified and least motivated personnel to monitor behavior in the UN's largest specialized agency.*

[4] *UNESCO works on a biennium. Budget proposals, projects, meetings of the General Conference, and even many job rotations occur on a two year cycle. See Constitution of UNESCO — Article*

Board and no meetings of the General Assembly, to prove American influence and warrant reconsideration.[5] We must explore our own capacities in the realm of multilateral diplomacy — reappraising the Department of State's management of its relations with UNESCO,[6] and reevaluating government policy toward international regimes. As Robert Keohane writes in *After Hegemony:*

> . . . the legacy of American hegemony persists in the form of a number of international regimes. These regimes create a more favorable institutional environment for cooperation than would otherwise exist; it is easier to maintain them than . . . to create new ones. They create the conditions for orderly multilateral negotiations, legitimate and deligitimate different types of state action. By clustering issues together in the same forums over a long period of time, they help to bring governments to continuing interaction with one another, reducing incentives to cheat and enhancing the value of reputation.[7]

In the area of press freedom vs. the "New World Information and Communication Order," (NWICO), insufficient attention has been turned toward the evolution and implications of this debate — especially given the number of government officials involved in monitoring this area of operation, and the wealth of literature available. Many of the non-governmental organization's (NGO's) workings with UNESCO deal specifically with theories of "free flow of information" and "the right to communicate." And though Western NGO criticism has often been strong,[8] it always advocates multilateral diplomacy within the system. Leonard R. Sussman, Executive Director of Freedom House (and Vice-Chairman of the US National Commission), cites the Voices

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IV, sec. 9(a) and Article IX section 2, November, 1945.

[5]*Report of the Congressional Committee on Foreign Affairs,* US Withdrawal from UNESCO, *February 10-23, 1984. 98th Congress 2nd Session, Washington DC; US Government Printing Office.*

[6]*Robert Keohane.* After Hegemony. *(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). p. 245-46. Keohane's reference to reputation is interesting because according to many sources (Congressional report, correspondances, editorials), UNESCO members feel almost unanimously that US finances will not be as sorely missed as its intellectual leadership in the sciences and humanities.*

[7]*In these ranks we find Rosemary Righter, Dana Bullen, Mort Rosenblum, etc. Even within the administration we encounter dissent. In a speech by Charles Zwick, director of the US Information Agency to the French Institute of International Relations (Embargoed before presentation on October 23, 1983) He states, "It is not our intention . . . to remain in UNESCO only for the purpose of limiting the damage that others may wish to inflict on press freedom. We participate in order to foster and promote freedom as is provided in UNESCO's own constitution. This is our commitment."*

[8]*Leonard R. Sussman. "Press Freedom Advocates are Gaining, Not Losing, at UNESCO."* New York Times, *January 23, 1984.*

of Freedom '83 conference sponsored by the World Press Freedom Committee (WPFC) in Talloires, France (October, 1983):

> "If anyone is looking for an assault on the media at this conference serious enough to justify a US withdrawl from UNESCO, they won't find it . . . Neither the WPFC nor Freedom House believes the struggle over communications has ended — at UNESCO or in the world outside. But that struggle had best be conducted on the basis of realities."[9]

This issue will be explored in greater detail in the text of this paper, but I cite two obvious and conveniently ignored examples of multilateral diplomacy. Firstly, one must note the success of US efforts regarding UNESCO participation in the World Conference on the Working Conditions and Safety of Journalists. Despite UNESCO claims to the contrary, sources indicate that Secretariat members Hamdi Kandil and Morton Giersing were involved from the start in preparation of this highly politicized and controversial conference organized by the International Organization of Journalists (the IOJ is Prague-based and Soviet controlled), the International Frederation of Journalists (IFJ), the Latin American Federation of Journalists (FELAP), the United Catholic International Press (UCIP), the Union of African Journalists, the International Labor Organization (ILO), the Red cross (IRC), and UNESCO. The most disturbing aspect of this conference was the idea that "effective protection measures" should include an International Protection Commission that would issue "identity documents" to journalists.[10]

Due to extensive and careful diplomacy by members of western NGO's such as Dana Bullen (WPFC)[11] and Leonard Sussman, UNESCO "will neither provide funds nor participate in a meeting in Mexico city next March."[12] Sussman's personal correspondence with Director General M'Bow provides

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[9] *World Press Freedom Committee Fact Sheet on UNESCO involvement in Mexico City meeting on Protection of Journalists. Edward R. Murrow Center, Medford, MA.*

[10] *Mr. Bullen campaigned for support among other Western delegates to object to the political and subversive nature of this conference — one of his most moving speeches was to the NY Public Library Panel on September 9, 1984. Director General M'Bow also attended this conference.*

[11] *"UNESCO Says Mass Media Work Conditions Should Be Resolved 'Entirely' by Journalists." Newsletter of the WPFC, November 5, 1984. We note that there are signs UNESCO may be reconsidering — another reason to continue efforts on our side.*

[12] *Amadou-Mahtmar M'Bow. Letter to Leonard Sussman. October 20, 1984. "You stated in your letter that, since there is no unanimity among the professional organizations on the subject of the proposed Conference, UNESCO should leave it entirely to the professional organizations themselves to discuss and possibly resolve the matters involved. Indeed, this is precisely the position taken by UNESCO . . . You will thus realize that any decision with regard to the preparation of the Conference, let alone the items on its agenda, rests entirely in the hands of the professional organizations concerned.*

the first evidence of this extraordinary reversal.[13]

The second example of successful cooperation is the success of the International Program for the Development of Communication (IPDC). At Voices of Freedom 1983, Charles Wick, Director of the US Information Agency, commented:

> "The organization's goals are to gather information about developing country communications needs and to mobilize financial and technical support to help meet them."[14]

The IPDC was organized under the auspices of the Western working group within UNESCO. They have offices in both Africa and Latin America. There they are working to implement programs to build communication infrastructures such as newspapers, TV and radio stations, film studios and publishing houses. During the Voices of Freedom Conference, Mr. Zwick distributed the fruit of the IPDC's labor — an index of training programs available to Third World journalists in the US, thereby evoking the spirit of a "free and balanced flow of information."

Efforts like these prove Western goodwill. They provide the only hope to temper complaints of cultural imperialism and news monopolization by UPI, AP, Reuters and Agence France Presse. Unfortunately, polarization characterizes today's media debates and shows no sign of abating in light of the administration's uncompromising stance.

Secretary of State, George P. Schultz, in his letter of withdrawal from UNESCO, dismisses any gains in one sentence:

> "If the results of the Conference [General Conference of October, 1938] demonstrate the best that can be expected from the Organization, . . . there can be little hope for a . . . return of the organization to its founding principles."

This is an offensive policy based on thinly veiled concerns for a particular domestic constituency. Other claims of politicization and management abuse are similarly weak attempts to satisfice excuses that negate diplomatic alternatives. One after another excuse has been employed as justification for this essentially illegal act. The Reagan administration should reconsider this irresponsible, beligerent, and effectively unprecedented move because it threatens to unravel the entire United Nations System. No power, no matter how self-in-

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[13] *Charles Wick. "UNESCO: A Time for Change." Remarks prepared for delivery at the French Institute of International Relations. Paris, France. October 27, 1983. p. 8.*

[14] *"US Plans to Quit UNESCO." Newsletter of the World Press Freedom Committee. January 9, 1984.*

terested, can afford such isolation in the long-term of events.[15]

History of United States Participation in UNESCO

UNESCO was created in the aftermath of World War II. The actual birth occurred during a drafting conference from April to July, 1945 of the Conference of Allied Ministers of Education (CAME). This particular body concerned itself with the prospects of quickly reorganizing educational systems for the millions of children in war-devastated allied areas. According to Cheever and Haviland, authors of *Organizing for Peace*,

> "England's new Labor Prime Minister, Mr. Clement Attlee, set the theme of the conference with his phrase 'war begins in the minds of men' subsequently woven into the UNESCO preamble by the American poet-statesman (and first American ambassador to UNESCO) Archibald MacLeish, and the distinguished French scholar, Etienne Gilson."[16]

In a report of the first session of the General Conference of UENSCO, the introduction warns,

> "The world in which we live has no place and no time for an agency of international understanding which confines its efforts to those subjects on which understanding does not greatly matter. The areas of disagreement are too critical and too great. That the General Conference did produce agreement on a program which faced up to some, at least of the controversial questions of the time, was a matter of gratification, not to the United States delegation alone, but to all delegations."[17]

Ideally functionalist in matters of copyrights, preservation of national landmarks, etc., politicization is inherent in an organization seeking international understanding. Thus, politicization is not new and serves as a weak excuse for withdrawal from an organization based on the notion of debate. The Congressional Committee on Foreign Affairs states:

> "Politics and politicization could be said to be gradations of the intensity of controversy. UNESCO makes political decisions on

[15] *John Chancellor, Forward,* Third World and Press Freedom. *Ed. Phillip Horton. (New York: Praeger Special Studies, 1978). p. x. "Our Third World Colleagues are urging us to use our freedom to assume more responsibility, while we are telling them of their responsibility to be free."*

[16] *Daniel S. Cheever and H. Field Haviland, Jr.* Organizing for World Peace; International Organizations in World Affairs. *(PA: Haverford College, 1954). p. 271.*

[17] *First Session of the General Conference of UENSCO,* p. 18.

many issues that are not politicized."[18]

Historically, the new attitude towards UNESCO has evolved from international and domestic events. Primarily, with the emergence of newly independent Third World Nations, the United States and her allies lost their automatic majority within the General Conference and the Executive Board.[19] Secondly, a reshuffling of priorities took place in the Department of State which inevitably lowered the caliber of personnel involved with international organizations in general and UNESCO in particular. From 1946 until the mid 1960's, for example, we had two ambassadors, Archibald MacLeish and William Benton. From that time on, there were many rotations of personnel. Ambassador Hewson Ryan of the Edward R. Murrow Center for Public Diplomacy, quips that several ambassadors were such avid fans of Parisian fashion shows that they rarely attended meetings of the Board and Conference.[20] In 1977, the positions of Executive Board member and ambassador were combined, and the Department of State split the UNESCO National Commission into two offices; the Bureau for Ocean Environments and Scientific Affairs and the Bureau for International Organizational Affairs.

Thus we found ourselves, during an era of new controversies within international regimes, with a personnel reflective of their new lowly stance. On the defense both in UNESCO and in the Department, efficiency and morale declined — contributing significantly to the WPFC's subsequent loss of influence.[21]

In this context, I shall return to the chronology of events leading up to Secretary Shultz's letter. In 1974, the United States felt its interests in terms of Israel sufficiently compromised to suspend payment of its dues for a period of one year, during which several proposals, including a Yugoslav effort to equate zionism with racism, had to be withdrawn. In response, Congress enacted Public Law 98-164 (1984-85), which prohibits contributions "if Israel is illegally expelled, suspended, or denied its credentials or its right to participate in the General Conference of the UN or any specialized agency."[22] This case can be seen as a precedent for the first time the US ever pulled out of

[18]The Report of the Congressional Committee on Foreign Affairs, p. 12, says in this regard, "Rather than develop positive long-term strategies to deal with this situation, the US and the West adopted, seemingly by default, a defensive, damage-limitation posture to counteract controversial policies advocated by the Eastern Bloc and Third World countries (and thereby facilitating further transformation within the organization)."

[19]Ibid., *p. 26.*

[20]*Interview with Ambassador Hewson Ryan. November 10, 1984.*

[21]*The Congressional Committee on Foreign Affairs reveals that it is common knowledge that to be assigned to any aspect of multilateral diplomacy is tantamount to being "on the way out" (p. 12).*

[22]*Congressional Report. p. 8. The specific complaint was that PLO subsidies and various anti-Israeli resolutions were not consistent with educational, scientific and cultural objectives, and that UNESCO must correct this political move.*

an international organization — in 1975, when Secretary Kissinger gave two years' notice to the International Labor Organization (ILO).[23]

The United States' withdrawal from the ILO was accompanied by a letter stating the exact program of change desired. With two years' notice mandated by that organization's constitution, we pulled out in 1977. Reform measures were already underway, but because a broken treaty must be re-ratified by a ⅔ majority in the Senate, we did not re-enter until early 1980.[24]

Questionable Validity of Precedents: Where They Highlight the Necessity for Clearer Policy-Analysis

The oft-cited ILO precedent differs significantly from current events on the levels of both international and domestic policy. I feel that the first action seems to have been taken with intention to re-enter at a later date, while in our current action, we send an isolationist message that ominously opens the door to further withdrawals. My argument that evidences the administration's beligerent behavior is based on three areas; legal, procedural and ideological. To quote Jean Kirkpatrick, US ambassador to the UN in a remark in September regarding reforms taken by the Executive Board, "You should know that we are going to leave anyway."[25]

In the area of legal responsibility, Congress was empowerred in 1946 with joint legislative authority over US relations with UNESCO. They have taken their responsibility seriously, holding hearings in 1978 on UNESCO and Freedom of Information, in 1980 reviewing US participation, and in 1984 compiling a 200 page policy analysis of the decision to withdraw. By law, the US may withold contributions or withdraw from the organization only if it violates two laws: (1) Public Law 37-241(1982), prohibiting US contributions if UNESCO implements any policy or procedure that licenses journalists or restricts press freedoms, or (2) Public Law 98-164(84-84) (already cited) regarding Israel. In its policy paper of February 1984, Congress finds no such violations. And Secretary Schultz, Edmund P. Hennelly, chairman of the delegation selected to oversee withdrawal, and the majority of the US National Commission admit no such violation transpired in the October 1983 Executive Board meeting. And finally, the policy report says Congress was not informed of the decision to withdraw until December 10, 1983. Congress had recessed on November 18, 1983.

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[23]*Congressional Report. p. 3. The* Christian Science Monitor *editorializes over this event in its issue of December 22, 1983.*

[24]*Ronald Koven. "UNESCO: A Blizzard of Paper, A Stand-Pat Position." Memo to WPFC. September 1984.*

[25]*It must be noted that the unofficial document was available to delegates and carred influence in the implementation of these measures.*

In addition, responding to charges of gross mismanagement, Congress ordered a Government Accounting Office (GAO) Audit of UNESCO affairs. One of the administration's major public complaints and justifications for following through with withdrawal has been the Executive Board's refusal to discuss this document in October. If Mexico was the first excuse, we deem this the second. It also serves as an example of unreasonable demands that yield satisficing justifications.

The reality is that the GAO document still has not been published in its final form. Director General M'Bow has agreed to distribute and discuss a published document at the General Conference in Sofia, Bulgaria next year. By then, of course, the question will be moot. In response to complaints, three reform measures were implemented.[26] The Exeuctive Board:

1. Accepted a 'no-growth budget of $39 million for 1986-87 (this represents an approximately 2% 'unavoidable' increase as opposed to 6-9% proposed increase).
2. Extended the life of its 13-nation 'Temporary Committee' by a year to supervise implementation of approved management reform steps.
3. Started parliamentary–style question and answer sessions for Assistant Directors-General about their program sectors.[27]

Internationally, the legal implications are graver. The Reagan Administration has no intention to pay its dues for the year 1986-87. It may be added that this comes as no surprise. But in fact, the refusal to pay second year's dues is in direct violation of the UNESCO Constitution's terms of membership, and constitutes the breaking of international law. Director General M'Bow had threatened to bring this matter to the International Court of Justice. But the administration's reaction will most likely be similar to that of the Nicaragua incident.

Procedural Abuses

In this area, there are two appalling examples of the Reagan administration's self-serving isolationism and reliance on public ignorance: (1) disregard of the majority sentiments of its National Commission, and (2) negligence to consider the findings of its own special delegation, headed by Edmund P. Hennelly, to monitor developments within the General Conference.

Primarily, in reference to the National Commission, we find that a vote of 41-8 in favor of remaining cannot be ignored. The administration has responded that not all 100 members of the Commission voted, but I doubt that fewer than nine members would have agreed with the original 41. Ambassador

[26] *"Few Gains at 'Last Chance' UNESCO Executive Board." Newsletter of WPFC. p. 2.*
[27] Ibid.

Gerard, former president of the League of Republican Women, appears to be working on direct orders from the administration — responding to the desires of a small constituency of special interest groups. Unfortunately, these groups are also the members of the private sector involved in funding our National Commission.

Secondly, it is interesting to note our almost complete isolation on this matter. With the exception of a reticent Britain, our allies have been either neutral or have expressed dismay at our action. Amongst the latter, Israeli, French and Canadian delegates have been particularly vocal.

And finally, the administration's decision to ignore its own special commission evidences and enhances Mrs. Kirkpatrik's disturbing remark. James Traub explained this aspect of the debate very clearly on the opinion-editorial page of the *New York Times* of November 28, 1984:

> "What this debate is really all about is that the days when the West ran UNESCO, and everything else, are over. The radical conservatives in ascendancy in Washington do not seem to accept this. To them, willingness to debate as equals amounts to defeatism."

Ideological Imperialism

The three principal complaints against UNESCO — politicization, statism and budget mismanagement, demonstrate the desire to re-instate Western hegemony in an organization based upon consensus. I will briefly discuss why one should dismiss charges of politicization and budget mismangement as adequate reasons for withdrawal. The conclusion of this paper will be an analysis of the charge of statism, or "state's rights" as seen through the call for a "New World Information Order" and a subsequent consideration of policy options and implications.

Politicization is like the proverbial cry 'wolf.' Whenever ideologies clash, we accuse politicization. If we examine the '85–'87 budget, we see that the major part is slated for literacy programs, adult education, essential endeavors in the natural sciences, copyrighting, publishing, etc. Controversial programs account for relatively small percentages of the budget across the board. In communications in particular, the budget is $16 million of $374 million. And within that area, only the goal of "establishment of a 'new world information and communication order' has been publicly cited as objectionable. In addition, we must recall that the United States was part of the consensus that agreed on the original "Declaration of the Media" in 1978.

On the other hand, the areas in which we stand to lose range from administration of UNESCO's Man and Biosphere Program, which has 10,000 resear-

chers in more than 100 countries,[28] to the loss of corporate contacts within the database of UNESCO's General Information Program.

Budget mismanagement is another catchall accusation. To be sure, there are grounds for complaint. Some of the more serious charges in the GAO draft report include full salaries for vacant and part-time positions, transfer of budgeted funds, excessive budget growth and duplicity within programs.[29]

Reform measures are underway, however, and Reagan administration demands for a complete change in the program are unreasonable for the short time period prescribed. Budget increases, for example, were cut from 9.5% to 2.5% — well on the way toward zero-growth. But the administration is not satisfied. One may conclude that nothing short of M'Bow's resignation would suffice.[30]

Statism and the New World Information Order

The area with which we are concerned, communications, has become the forum for heated ideological debate since the early 1970's. Withdrawal, however, is not the answer to an ideological trend that the administration is trying to ignore — state's rights. UNESCO is precisely the arena in which one can work for the convergence of individual and state rights; a kind of Carterian floor and a Waltzerian ceiling a la Hoffman.

Rosemary Righter writes in 1978,

> "Cooperation to confront these problems is possible, provided that Western governments shed the notion that everybody can be bought."[31]

In 1984, concerns for state's rights have expanded, thereby polarizing North and South and East and West even further. Government censorship and threats to journalists have grown in authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. More and more borders are closed to our entry. And this trend is likely to continue unabated because the administration consistently assigns low priority to multilateral cooperation on difficult issues.

I ask two perhaps simplistic questions:

1. What will aid freedom of the press more — isolationism or diplomacy, shared technology and a reassessment of Western media monopolies?
2. With the difficulty of securing treaty-bound money during a period of

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[28] *Walter Sullivan. "Politics Hasn't Hampered UNESCO's Scientific Method." n.d., n.p. Article from WPFC files.*

[29] *"Called to Account," September 26, 1984. Unidentified article from WPFC files.*

[30] *Ryan interview. This fact is confirmed by many sources in the press. Personality conflicts with M'Bow have a long history, but are certainly not grounds for withdrawal.*

[31] *Rosemary Righter. "Battle of the Bias."* Foreign Policy. *Number 34, (spring 1979) p. 126.*

massive budget cuts, what are the chances of continuing or parallel participation in "acceptable" efforts similar to those already underway in UNESCO?

The answers, unfortunately, are grim — especially over the long run. Statist concerns will not moderate if faced with no strong and intelligent opposition. If American goals are to re-instate its status as a leader in international regimes, as Senator Newell has stated, then why take an action that jeopardizes the entire system? Needless to say, we lose our arena for debate as well as risking the professional positions of 82 Americans working within the organization, and alienating Third World nations even further. We must be careful of pulling too far away from statist concerns, for we too believe in the principles of sovereignty and self-determination. As a situation grows more polarized, there is a tendency to forget the middle ground. We must avoid this vicious circle that leaves out many legitimate demands for a free and balanced flow of information. Moreover, the United States does not have entirely clean hands regarding a free press. The recent news black-out in Grenada evidences our obvious statist tendencies.

For the present, UNESCO has decided to delegate the highly politicized realm of press freedoms to the journalists themselves. Thus, we are left with their valid call for resource and infrastructure development intrinsic to the NWICO. We quote William A. Hachten, who writes in the conclusion to his book *The World News Prism, Changing Media, Clashing Ideologies:*

> "We are only at the threshold of efforts that must be made in the years ahead to identify and comprehend the nature of the various planes and surfaces of the prism that is our news gathering and distribution system. Only then can the beams of news refracting through it illuminate paths to understanding and accommodation which before have been roads to conflict and discord."[32]

Conclusion and Policy Options

In conclusion, I offer three policy options:

1. Continue the present course and withdraw as stated on December 31, 1984.
2. Remain in for the period of one year, during the course of which we would upgrade our participation and emphasis within the Department of State — including increased attention to personnel assignment. I urge the assignment of a USAID officer and a GAO budget specialist. Note that this option does not preclude later reversal or withdrawal after a period of more than one year.
3. Rescind the letter of withdrawal.

I submit that option one is still unacceptable. Primarily, United States loss

[32] *William Hachten.* The World News Prism Changing Media Clashing Ideologies. *(Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1981). p. 126.*

of face will be great in light of the obvious evidence of domestic ideological linkage. Secondly, even taking a realist state-centric stance, the arena would then be open to new Soviet control. As the second largest donor (after the US's 25% contribution), they will have great political leverage and access to several key positions within the UNESCO administration. Ironically, the long-term implications indicate that the administration's isolationist interest groups will greatly miss the facility of contact and research benefits provided by UNESCO.

Option three, unfortunately, is ideal but probably unfeasible at this late date. It may even be beneficial to continue with a fairly consistent policy in order to encourage reform.

Option two is possible because there are many legitimate justifications for extending our time frame: reconsideration of the Mexico Conference, budget reforms, less politicized jargon, and promised consideration of the GAO report. And finally, we have the added threat of British withdrawal to carry momentum another year. If not only to complete a full biennium, we find it imperative that we fulfill our commitment at least until the General Conference.

There is no evidence that upgraded participation has ever been evaluated by the administration — either as a cause of the year's successes, or as an alternative to next year's non-participation. Our efforts at multilateral diplomacy deserve attention. For it is this channel that must ultimately prevail if the United Nations system is to survive.

Nicaragua: The Role of the Agrarian Reform in the Transition to the New Economy

John P. Baker

Since their triumph on July 19, 1979, the Sandanistas have been striving to fulfill the promises of their revolution. The urgent need for reconstruction, reactivation, and a restructuring of the economy are the "three R's" guiding Sandinista policies. The Sandanistas have undertaken the task of transforming the polarized, capitalist structure they inherited into an open, mixed, socialist economy. Since 1979, significant strides toward this restructuring have been marked by success. Yet, formidable obstancles, both internal and external, persist in making this task a slow-moving one.

Among the promises of the Sandinista revolution are real economic development, social justice, and the provision of basic needs by the government. Real economic development is the ideal of growth with equity, though growth is often secondary to equity. In principle, the simultaneous goals of growth with equity will be achieved through a mixed economy, where the private sector is dominant, yet the public sector controls the accumulated surplus for public investment. The public sector does not want to absorb the private sector, but to control and direct the generated surplus toward national development goals.

In keeping with its policy of national unity, the government strives to cement the worker–peasant alliance with the private sector. The Sandanistas recognize the private sector as the primary source for the generation of the surplus. Because the private sector produces most of the material production and employs a majority of the work force, the government only has "indirect" control of the generated surplus.

The redistribution of land and wealth is the primary objective in the transition to the new economy. It is the resulting new pattern of demand which now requires the restructuring of the economy. Increases in the demand for basic grains, agricultural inputs, and consumer goods have, so far, resulted from the redistribution. The production sector must be reorganized to meet the new demand pattern, reduce the dependence on imports, and generate domestic employment.

The agricultural sector is the base of the Nicaraguan economy and, thus,

the focus of the transformation to the new economic structure. The role of agrarian reform is central to this transition and the overall goals of the revolution. The pursuit of agrarian reform is the immediate priority of the revolution in fulfilling the urgent needs of the majority, and providing for a longer-term economic structure to maintain these interests.

Considerable progress has been achieved in the reconstruction and reactivation phases of the new economy. Significant amounts of land and wealth have already been redistributed in a variety of forms, hence the resulting pattern of demand. The restructuring phase, while trying to maintain adequate production and consumption levels, is not moving as smoothly as possible for several reasons. The major constraint is the recent decline in agricultural production, which limited the resources available to finance the restructuring. The challenge of the mid-1980's is, therefore, to stimulate production to exceed consumption levels, and to generate enough of a surplus to finance the restructuring.

Agrigultural output is a function of the relationship between the forces of the production process. Since the Sandinistas took power, these relationships have been changing. The role of agrarian reform is to resturcture the organization of the forces of production by redistributing land and providing incentives for production that favor the interests of the majority. While the Sandinista revolution is grounded in its commitment to the rural, landless laborers and small peasant producers, the new government must also, in order to maximize agricultural production, take into account the interest of the medium and large agricultrual producers. These relationships, and the Sandinistas' role in guiding them, will determine the success of the revolution.

The Sandinistas' policy of national unity tries to reconcile the differences between the often conflicting interests of the various sectors of production. The tensions between the Association of Rural Workers (ATC) and the private producer organizations represent serious political forces which shape Sandinista policies. The ability of the Sandinistas to court the interests of these and other competing concerns toward common national development goals is the most important factor in achieving the desired agrarian reform and fulfilling the promises of the revolution.

The Legacy and Reconstruction

During the Somoza years, the expansion of agro-export crop (coffee, cotton, livestock pasture) acreage displaced peasant holdings. In 1978, 37.1 percent of the economically active population in agriculture was landless, 19.8 percent (85,595 people) were permanent laborers, and 17.3 percent (74,788) were seasonal laborers.[1] Because the poorer peasants grow almost all the corn and

[1] *Deere, Marchetti and Reinhardt,* Agrarian Reform and the Transition in Nicaragua: 1979-83, *November 1983. Mimeo. p. 6.*

beans, agro-exports expanded at the expense of basic grain production. This pattern of expansion started with coffee in the 1870's, and by 1955, cotton and beef pasture-land had increased so much that a once self-sufficient Nicaragua had to start depending on food imports. Throughout the 1970's food production did not keep pace with population growth. The deterioration of the agrarian relations at the expense of the small producers and rural landless laborers fueled much of the support for the Sandanista revolution.

To redress the heavy dependence on imported food and to improve food availability and increase peasant incomes, the Sandinistas have made a concerted effort to increase domestic production of basic grains. This, however, was only after they consolidated the Areas of People's Property (APP's) formed from the inherited agro-export farms.

When the Sandinistas assumed power, they expropriated the Somoza-controlled holdings left behind by the elite. Among other things, these properties included about half of the farms of over 500 hectares, a quarter of all industry, large construction companies, the main supermarket chain, hotels, an airline, and a fishing fleet.[2] This included 23 percent of the arable land, mostly in the form of large, modernized agro-export farms and extensive pastureland. It accounted for 40 percent of the sugar, 30 percent of the irrigated rice, 20 percent of the cotton, 15 percent of the livestock and 15 percent of the coffee acreage.[3] With these farms came a significant portion of the agricultural processing sector, including sugar mills, tobacco, cotton and coffee processing plants, and an animal feed producing capacity.[4] This accounted for about 20 percent of the agricultural production, mostly in the agro-export sector.

After the country had recovered from the shock of war and the administration was pulled together, the Sandinistas began the reconstruction and mobilization of the economy. On the inherited farms, the Sandinistas immediately organized state farms (APP's) under the Ministry of Agrarian Reform (INRA), in order to continue agro-export production. This gave the public sector a means of generating a public surplus and export earnings to finance necessary imports.

The Sandinistas believe that state control of this sector allows the gains to be distributed more widely. They felt that employment on these farms would be greater under state management because worker-ownership might limit broader participation and lead to the formation of a rural elite.[5] The APP's expanded the permanent rural labor force by employing 45,000 landless laborers, (about 32 percent of the total number of such laborers).

The extreme concentration of wealth in the hands of the Somoza clan

[2] *Fitzgerald, E.V.K., "The Economics of the Revolution", Walker,* Nicaragua in Revolution, *(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982). p. 209.*
[3] *Deere, Marchetti and Reinhardt, p. 3.*
[4] *Barraclough and Marchetti,* A Preliminary Analysis of the Nicaraguan Food System, *Geneva and Managua. UNRISD, June 1982. p. 62.*
[5] *Deere, Marchetti and Reinhardt, p. 5.*

facilitated the build-up of the Sandinista public sector. While the state's share in gross material production is 25 percent, and in agricultural production 20 percent, it controls well over half of the "modern" sector. This is because "a large part of Somoza property was concentrated in the modern commercial and financial sectors, with the rest consisting largely of construction, modern manufacturing and estate agriculture."[6] This share of state property does not match the new pattern of demand emerging from the redistributed sector. Thus, the ability of the state to generate its own surplus was more limited than anticipated.

The Sandinistas also inherited an external debt of about $1.7 billion US: owed to 115 banks from 12 countries.[7] While short-term assistance was pouring in from neighboring and sympathetic countries, any longer-term plan would have to consider access to credit from international agencies and private banks. This means that the Sandinistas would have to come to terms with the debt they inherited in the interest of the revolution. The debt renegotiation in 1980 alleviated the immediate pressure, as the bankers realized the impossibility of timely repayment. Because the loans were from commercial banks, which wanted to set a precedent for other countries ready to renegotiate at the time, the terms were strictly commercial. Normally, this would entail a debt service of about 20 percent of annual exports, but the Sandinistas managed to get some concessions on Past Due Interest (PDI) rates, and an unequal payment schedule, the bulk of which will be due around 1992.[8]

Aside from the external debt left by Somoza and his allies, an estimated $1.5 billion US in capital flight during the previous years left only about $3.5 million US or two days worth of normal imports in the national coffers.[9] This was in addition to the destruction of the war itself. "In purely economic terms, the United Nations estimates that the direct damage to infrastructure, plant equipment, and inventories, was $481 million US."[10] The damage in human terms was overwhelming. "The 50,000 dead in the years of the war were the equivalent of about two percent of the populatrion and an even greater portion of the work force (possibly 5 percent). Many of the 100,000 wounded would require long-term care; and there were an equal number of orphans to look after."[11] So, while Somoza and his allies left the infrastructure to build up the public sector, they also left considerable obstacles which will plague the Sandinistas for some years to come.

[6] *Irvin, George, "Nicaragua: Establishing the State as the Centre of Accumulation"*, Cambridge Journal of Economics, *1983, 7 p. 125-139. p. 127.*
[7] *Weinert, Richard, "Nicaragua's Debt Renegotiation"*, Cambridge Journal of Economics, *1981, 5, 187-194. p. 187.*
[8] *Weinert, p. 188.*
[9] *Weinert, p. 188.*
[10] *Fitzgerald, p. 207.*
[11] *Fitzgerald, p. 207.*
[12] *Barraclough and Marchetti, p. 72.*

Reactivation

In both the transition and the new economy itself, the agricultural sector will be the primary surplus generating area. In 1982, the agricultural sector accounted for about 25 percent of GDP and employed about 40 percent of the work force. The agricultural sector produces almost all the exports and as much of the domestic food supply as possible.

The Sandinistas have made an increased basic–food–grain production capacity a major goal of the new economy. The Sandinistas hope to establish food self-sufficiency through increases in corn, bean, and sorghum production, and in the long term, to create export capacity in these basic grains. This will diversify their export dependence from the traditional agro-export crops of coffee, cotton, and sugar. A surplus production of basic grains would allow livestock to be fed from grain stocks, rather than occupy extensive prime landholdings which could be used to further food production. A feeding capability would allow larger scale poultry and pork operations, which could fill domestic demand and stimulate small-scale industry, construction, and services in the peripheral areas of the cities where employment is badly needed.

Neighboring countries such as El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala, and the Carribbean are potential export markets for a basic grains surplus. Grain and livestock prices in these countries are higher than in Nicaragua, where producer prices are below the world price level. Nicaragua produces white corn, which is the preferred variety for human consumption, especially in this region of the world. The grain surplus could also be exported in the form of grain-fed livestock, for which there is also a considerable export demand.

These goals are, of course, still a long way off, and while there have been some successes in increasing the production of basic grains, many difficulties persist. In conjunction with the priority of increasing food production, the Sandinistas have maintained the agro-export sector and encouraged production of the export crops to earn badly needed foreign exchange.

Foreign exchange had been the scarcest resource throughout the transition and it continues to be a grave problem. While the private sector produces about 80 percent of the agricultural output, the public sector controls the generated surplus only indirectly. With full ownership of the banking, insurance and financial sectors, and control of all foreign trade, the public sector is able to command most of the legal surplus. Decapitalization in the form of across-border livestock sales in Honduras, and the removal of equipment from farms showed a lack of a sense of security in the private sector, most specifically among the large and medium land holders. During reactivation, their production was badly needed and some were puersuaded to cooperate; but others continued to decapitalize their holdings. Convincing these producers that, as long as they produce, they are safe from expropriation is still a major policy objective.

Six months after taking power, the Sandinistas had yet to address the issue

of domestic food production and the peasants' demand for secure land tenure. In February 1980, the Association of Rural Workers (ATC) led a massive demonstration in Managua calling for: a reduction in land rental rates, a law requiring that landlords rent unused land at these rates, a more liberal credit policy for small peasant producers, and the legalization of takeovers of Somoza lands. The ATC was the primary organizer of the landless laborers, and the small producers who were a major force in the revolution. It had been actively organizing cooperatives, advocating minimum wage enforcement, and improving working conditions. In several cases the ATC succeeded in making the landlords provide health-care assistance for the workers. As the voice of the landless rural laborers and small producers, it called for an acceleration of the agrarian reform. The Sandinistas responded to most of the ATC's requests, but were constrained by their policy to maintain national unity, and the alliance with the private sector.

In the spring of 1980, the Sandinistas responded formally with "Plan 80". This was a package of several policies designed to start production in the agricultural sector. It consisted of a reduction of land rental rates by 85 percent, a prohibition of tenant eviction, and the provision of extensive credit for the peasant sector. The credit was intended to improve the economic situation of the small producers, encourage cooperative organization, and increase basic grain production. The credit policy stressed the active role of the private producers, while also providing incentives for cooperative organization. Producer cooperatives were offered credit at nine percent interest, credit and service cooperatives at ten percent interest, and private producers at eleven percent interest. 76 percent of the subsidized credit went to the cooperative and state sectors while the private producers received over seven times the 1978 amount.[13] By June 1980, 73,854 members (60 percent) of all peasant households, belonged to 2,512 cooperatives.[14]

This credit proliferation policy of 1980 did little to increase production. For a variety of reasons — some peasants were late in receiving the credit, the amounts were often inappropriate to the productive capacity of the holdings, agricultural inputs were short in supply, producer price guarantees provided insufficient incentives, and marketing facilities were inadequate — this credit policy improved consumption but not production in the peasant sector.[15] Most of the grain produced was consumed in the rural sector. The nationwide demand for food increased by 45 percent, 20 percent more than anticipated.[16] Rural inflation soared due to the increase in purchasing power and the short supply of agricultural inputs and other consumer goods. The price spiral affected the smallest producers the most. Those who benefitted the most were

[13] *Deere, Marchetti and Reinhardt, p. 11.*
[14] *Deere, Marchetti, Reinhardt, p. 12.*
[15] *Deere, Marchetti, Reinhardt, p. 14.*
[16] *Deere, Marchetti, Reinhardt, p. 16.*

the merchants, truckowners, and larger landowners with equipment and draft animals to rent.[17]

This widespread infusion of credit into the countryside caused some indebtedness, due to a lack of effective lending supervision. Others who were caught in debt were those who had borrowed too much, used the credit for consumption, or were illiterate. Those credit recipients who were unable to read and comprehend the terms of their loan agreements often failed to repay their loans on time. This was no fault of their own, loan supervisors should have compensated for those who did not fully understand the terms of the loans. This is an example of the rushed and understaffed nature of the early Sandinista administration. Only 33.6 percent of the 1980 loans were repaid.[18] The private sector repaid over 60 percent of their debts, the cooperatives about 60 percent and the state sector hardly any.[19].

Efforts to increase food production in the following year 1981/82) were much more comprehensive. With the agrarian reform laws finally announced in July 1981, and the institution of the National Food Plan (PAN), the structural facilities to increase food production were finally being implemented. Thus far, the previous programs had succeeded in raising disposable incomes, but basic grains production had still not met domestic demand. On the whole, medium and large producers were still not cooperating in the production process, due to their fears of a lack of clear protection for privately owned means of production. Pressures by producer organizations to increase food security have shown that the government had not yet sufficiently addressed the issue.

The announced agrarian reform law had three major objectives. Firstly, it sought to bring idle lands in the private sector into production to increase basic grain production. Secondly, it was designed to meet the peasant demand for secure land tenure and thereby increase peasant commitment to the revolution. Thirdly, it attempted to quiet the fears of the bourgouisie by resolving the land issue.[20]

The land reform law sets no upper limit on land holdings, allows individual and collective ownership, and intends to distribute parcels of adequate size and quality to provide a family with the equivalent of at least a minimum wage income level. The only lands subject to appropriation were idle or under-utilized plots on estates over 350 hectares in the Pacific region, and 700 hectares in the rest of the country. Smaller plots, farmed under pre-capitalist arrangements on holdings over 35 hectares in the Pacific, and 70 hectares in the rest of the country, were also subject. The removal of capital

[17] *Deere, Marchetti, Reinhardt, p. 15.*
[18] *Barraclough and Marchetti, p. 68.*
[19] *Barraclough, p. 69.*
[20] *Deere, Marchetti and Reinhardt, p. 22.*

from any appropriated farm was strictly prohibited to prevent further losses of the scarcest resources. While these laws provided for the transfer of holdings, the actual titles were slow in coming.

The Sandinistas' desire to build a successful cooperative sector slowed the implementation of the agrarian reform policy in the first year after it was announced. The Sandinistas were looking to give land and credit to viable cooperative arrangements which they were still organizing. This period saw tensions between the government and the producer organizations. Decapitalization in the medium and large producers' sector was still rampant. The small producers split off from ATC to form UNAG in April 1981, and they were both pressing the government to accelerate the implementation of the agrarian reform policy.

It was not until the announcement of the agrarian reform laws and the National Food Plan (PAN) program that agricultrual production really began to improve. The PAN policies provided marketing and distribution mechanisms, incentive producer prices, and a more cautious credit policy. Because inputs and available credit were scarce, and to avoid waste and dispersion, the inputs were distributed mostly in the areas where technical assistance, storage, and transport were assured.

To increase the area sown with basic grains, producer prices were increased significantly in 1981. Maize prices were increased by 25 percent, beans by 45 percent, rice by 58 percent, and sorghum by 55 percent. To handle the increased crop production, feeder roads and storage facilities were expanded. The State Food Distribution Ministry (ENABAS) installed simple holding bins to improve storage capacity in the more remote areas, and to prevent high post-harvest losses. Government grain collection services were also increased in the more remote areas. The ability of ENABAS to purchase a significant amount of the harvest was crucial for the policy to work. If producers couldn't sell their grain at the guaranteed prices due to a lack of access to the ENABAS procurement centers, their surplus would not leave their locality or they would get limited returns due to high transport fees. The reluctance of many of these farmers to increase their indebtedness also had a limiting effect on participation.

With this program, inputs were more readily available, and the delivery of technical assistance and services improved. This meant that the farmers who did participate by borrowing to purchase inputs had a better chance of increasing their productivity. In fact, 73 percent of the 1981 internal debt was repaid, compared to the 34 percent of the previous year.[21]

The 1981-82 harvest showed considerable improvement over the previous one. The biggest gains were made in the basic grains sector. Bean output

[21] *Deere, Marchetti, and Reinhardt, p. 27.*

doubled over the 1980-81 level and rice increased by about 30 percent. Maize and sorghum showed only marginal increases.

In 1982-83, producer prices for maize and beans were increased, but output was limited due to floods and fighting. While rice production did increase, it is estimated that ten percent of the rice crop was lost due to fighting in the Jalapa valley.[22] Production in beans, maize, and sorghum fell below 1981-82 levels.

Despite the 2.7 percent of GDP spent on producer-price subsidies in 1983, substantial imports of basic grains and edible oils still had to be made late in the year.[23] The National Emergency Committee estimated that, in 1984, 100,000 tons of maize, 50,000 tons of wheat, 15,000 tons of rice, 10,000 tons of beans, and 10,000 tons of oats would have to be imported to satisfy domestic demand.[24]

The agricultural export sector (the main foreign exchange earner) has also had its difficulties. The traditional export crops of cotton, coffee, and sugar are susceptible to world price fluctuations, which have certainly impaired Nicaragua's foreign exchange earnings.

Production of these crops is also dependent upon the availability of labor in the rural sector, which is a problem. Cotton has suffered the most due to a shortage of labor. This has occurred for several reasons. First, since 1978, many of the landless laborers who harvested the cotton crop seasonally now own land or are permanently employed. Consequently, the amount of seasonal labor has been reduced. Second, the wages offered were much below the opportunity costs. This inhibited those who would have harvested the cotton on a part-time basis. The lack of spare parts and capital to purchase new machinery limited the mechanical harvesting capacity. This situation has since been improved slightly, but spare parts are still scarce.

The shortage of labor also affects the coffee crop because it is harvested at the same time of the year (November-January) as cotton and sugar, which both require large amounts of labor. The fact that coffee cannot be mechanically harvested does not provide much opportunity for the alleviation of the high demand for labor. Because a significant portion of the coffee crop is grown in the northern Contra–affected area, it is even harder to harvest the full crop (due to farmers' and workers' fears of the counter-revolutionaries). Voluntary coffee picking campaigns among schoolchildren and families have been used to supplement the labor force. Nicaragua has used the high emotional tide of the revolution effectively in this respect.

The coffee crop for 1983-84 is only expected to reach 54,545 tons, compared

[22] *Barraclough and Marchetti, p. 80.*
[23] Quarterly Economic Review, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama, *no. 1 1984, London. Economist Intelligence Unit. p. 21.*
[24] *Quarterly Economic Review, p. 22.*

with the revolution's high of 67,850 tons in the previous year.[25] In 1982 real exports fell by 9.8 percent, this reduction in export earnings really hurt the progress of the transition.[26] Cotton and coffee prices for 1984 should bring better returns than the last few years, but production still remains a problem.

The transition to the new economy is dependent upon a certain amount of foreign exchange to purchase necessary imports. Until an export capacity in the basic grains is achieved, foreign exchange will have to be generated from the agro-export crop sector. Because some foreign exchange is needed to increase basic grains production, the transition is still dependent on the agro-export sector. Presently, basic grain production is far from achieving an export capacity. The production of basic grains requires labor at different times of the year than the agro-export crops. This, along with a strong domestic and regional demand, makes the basic grains a viable economic strength. Thus, the emphasis of the restructuring of the economy is to increase the basic grain production capacity while encouraging export crop production to finance essential imports and service the external debt.

Restructuring the Economy

The restructuring of the economy is just underway and progress is limited due to the constraints in the production sector. The goals of the restructuring phase are numerous and address every sector. The emphasis on the agricultural sector is still primary, but actions in other areas of the economy hope to streamline the transition process. Establishing the basic foundations for the new economy while increasing production and consumption levels is the basic task.

The agricultural policy of the restructuring is oriented toward consolidating what has already been established and strengthening the cooperative sector. The emphasis on cooperative development and answering the peasants demand for land seems contradictory, since the priority of a strong cooperative sector had previously slowed land redistribution. Because of the Contras' influence in the northern portion of the country, the Sandinistas have accelerated land redistribution in this area to strengthen the commitment of regional producers. During the first 18 months of the agrarian reform, the government was slow to redistribute land due to the desire to build a strong cooperative sector and to maintain the alliance with the private sector. 260,000 of the 450,000 hectares that had been distributed by the end of 1983 were distributed that very year.[27] Of the 25,000 families thought to have benefitted, 7,000 received their titles in the last two months of 1983.[28] Most of this land was in the

[25] *Quarterly Economic Review, p. 23.*
[26] *Quarterly Economic Review, p. 24.*
[27] *Quarterly Economic Reveiw, p. 25.*
[28] *Quarterly Economic Reveiw, p. 24.*

northern area, where pressure from the Contras still limits production. The producer organizations felt that by giving title to the producers, they would continue to produce rather than turn against the revolution.

By strengthening the cooperative sector, the Sandinistas hope to improve productivity. Increasing membership in both producer and credit and service cooperatives, in principle, will improve access to the necessary inputs. Cooperatives also improve access to schooling, health-care, and adult education programs, which can be effective in improving the standard of living among the peasantry. The Sandinistas must improve the production capacity in order to sustain increased levels of production. Productivity is a major concern in this respect because Nicaraguan crop yields are low, even by Central American standards. The structural ability to sustain high levels of production is of primary importance to the goal of food self-sufficiency, to say nothing of a food export capacity. The creation of modern cooperatives is essential to the institutionalization of this new economic structure.

A traditional method of cattle raising has caused large areas of prime Pacific region farmland to lie idle, unexploited in the production of vital crops. this method must be switched to a land intensive mode. Such a program would require feeding the cattle to free up pastureland for conversion to basic grains production. Again, increased basic grain production is necessary to provide feed for the cattle. Although this valuable land would improve the capacity for grain production, present grain import requirements suggest that this will be a slow transformation. As much as it may be desired, increased grain production is also dependent upon increased grain production in other parts of the country, to make up the current deficit. The idle Pacific lands are gradually being given to small producers expressly for food production. The faster the idle pasture is cultivated, the faster the new economy will be achieved.

This livestock–feeding production scheme will hopefully increase production, which will increase employment and export capacity. Increased production in the agricultural processing sector will stimulate construction and services in peripheral areas, where employment is also needed. Increases in poultry and pork production, through the same scheme, would help that much more. Due to the lack of a technological base, the scope for irrigation and merchanization plans is limited.

Restructuring import requirements, to alleviate the pressure placed by the import bill on the debt–service ratio, is a major goal of the medium–term investment plan. Petroleum imports are now the biggest expenditure. Short-term supplies from Mexico and Venezuela have been cut due to the drop in the world price of oil. Eighty percent of the electrification capacity built up under Somoza is petroleum based.[29] This and transport requirements soak up

[29]*Irvin, p. 135.*

a significant portion of the meager export earnings. Imports have been limited to the "essentials", allowing of course, for those imports necessary to maintain the alliance with the upper–income classes. Gasoline is rationed, and is a high factor cost in transportation and industry. There are projects underway to build electrification plants based on geothermal and hydro-electric resources, but these will not be finished until the mid-1990's.

There are several projects designed to diversify the structure of the new economy and to provide for higher incomes. With the assistance and support of many of the socialist countries, the Netherlands, the Arab countries, Mexico, Spain, and France, almost US$ 1.2 billion has been mobilized for 20 assorted projects.[30] These projects include: a sugar refinery, two African palm plantations, four blond tobacco production plants, irrigation for about 15,700 hectares of cropland, and two dairy complexes capable of producing 100 million liters of milk per year.[31]

In 1982 the debt-service ratio was about 40 percent, and since then, it is believed to have increased. With more of the debt coming due in the later 1980's and early 1990's, this problem could be the most serious of the many. Efforts to close the trade–gap will take priority until the debt is under control.

Another serious problem which might have political consequences is the rising inflation rate in Nicaragua. A short supply of inputs and consumer goods, combined with slowly improving incomes, led to a 25 percent inflation rate in 1982.[32] As supplies are still short, it has been estimated that inflation could reach 50 percent in 1984.[33] While nominal incomes have not increased much in the urban sector, the social wage provided through free services, subsidized food prices and progressive tax rates has increased disposable incomes.

Conclusions

There are several strategies which can be followed to increase employment in the urban sector and productivity in the agricultural sector, but any increase in agricultural production will rely on the *implementation* of these policies. Increasing feeder roads into the uncultivated pastureland to increase basic grains production; the use of the surplus (after self-sufficiency has been achieved) to improve the livestock sector, and generate employment and exports; and the use of the ATC to teach collective farm management, in addition to union building; are just a few of the many possibilities.

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[30] *Harnecker, Marta. "The Revolution's Great Challenge,"* Intercontinental Press, *December 1983. Mimeo. p. 737.*
[31] *Harnecker, p. 737.*
[32] *Quarterly Economic Review, p. 28.*
[33] *Quarterly Economic Review, p. 28.*

Goals such as closing the trade-gap, managing the debt, and minimizing inflation should be the focus of policy for the medium–term. All of this hinges on a healthy agricultural sector; crop production must remain the primary concern throughout. Minimizing imports and modifying the structure of import demand are also important. Reliance on the traditional export crops must be diversified, though only after food self-sufficiency is achieved. Seeking stable markets for exports through long–term arrangements, and seeking out new, separate markets, can also maintain export demand.

In order to achieve all of this, production must be sustainable. The government must provide incentives for production in the form of well distributed consumer goods and financial incentives, as well as the necessary government services. The surplus controlled by the government must continue to complement the production goals, as well as the distribution goals. The crucial element to success is the maintenance of a mixed economy through a strong alliance with the private and cooperative sectors.

Security, Peace and Freedom: West Germany's permanent balancing act

Samuel W. Blake

German security policy is a particularly complicated affair in that it has three tiers of importance, none being mutually exclusive. The first tier is its national territory component, with which West German policy-makers are most concerned; the second tier is the place of German security within the European security framework, i.e. the Atlantic Alliance; and lastly, the third tier consists of German security inside the global or superpower security arrangement. Each one of these security tiers is inextricably linked to the other. This makes for a multitude of variables with which the Federal Republic's leaders have had to contend in formulating security policy for their country. These variables include the domestic populace of the FRG, Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) which has recently become a major factor in the security debate of West Germany: the governments of the Western Alliance, who often have their own national interests to promote and their own goals regarding Germany's security posture; the Eastern Europeans, who harbor fears of a resurgent Germany, but who include among themselves East Germany; and finally, the superpower rivals, whose relations pervade every facet of German security. With all these contending forces it is a wonder that the Federal Republic's leaders have been as successful as they have in arranging for their nation's security. This paper concerns itself primarily with the third tier, German security inside the Global or Superpower security arrangement.

Coming to Grips With the Soviet Military Build-up

The 1970's saw Helmut Schmidt and Georg Levber presiding over a subtle but important shift in German defense opinion, from a policy of accentuating the extreme military threat of the Warsaw Pact forces to one which feared the "narrowing, through pressure or threats, of their freedom of political decision."[1] This shift in opinion became apparent in the 1970 "White Paper"

[1]Wolfram F. Hanrieder, The Stable Crisis: Two Decades of German Foreign Policy, *(New York: Harper and Row, 1970), p. 39.*

on defense published by the Defense Ministry of the FRG, and in succeeding statements by Social Democrat (SPD) experts. These statements "refer to the contingency . . . popularity known in Europe as 'Finlandization.'"[2] This would most likely be a process where the West European countries found themselves so overwhelmed by Soviet power that "they would have to attune their domestic politics and, even more so, their foreign policies to the dictates of Moscow."[3]

Closely tied to this fear of "Finlandization" and politcal domination is the West German notion of "balance." This notion sees a fine distinction between American military strategy, which regards "military power more or less in its direct appliations: They see the political implications of military strength essentially in terms of the enforceability of military advantage."[4] The Europeans see less of a need for absolute parity, rather a general feeling of "balance" will suffice to preclude any political pressures from the East. This view was shared by the opposition military experts in the Christian Democratic Party (CDU). Manfred Worner demonstrated this outlook:

> The rationale of military efforts for the Soviet Union does not have to do predominantly with waging war, but rather with winning political terrain in peace time. Therefore, the greatest danger that faces the West in the neglect of its own military power is not one of getting involved in war — although this, too, cannot be completely excluded — but rather of gambling away the peace. For this reason the real danger lies in a military-political imbalance, between East and West.[5]

This view, which perceived the military situation in terms of political pressures and an overall "balance," relied upon a conspicuous American presence in Western Europe and especially in West Germany. Whenever this troop presence seemed to be compromised, the Germans became quite anxious, since it questioned the "commitment that the American military presence symbolized to West Germany and, above all, that it projected to the potential aggressor."[6] Thus, while there was a fear that the American Strategic guarantee no longer applied, as in the "missile gap" and during the uproar about "Flexible Response," there also existed a fear that American conventional forces would be drawn down. To the West Germans, the fewer American troops in the

[2] *Walter F. Hahn,* Between West Politik and Ostpolitik: Changing West German Security Views, *(Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1975), p. 41.*
[3] *Hahn, p. 42.*
[4] *Hahn, p. 43.*
[5] *Hahn, p. 45.*
[6] *Hahn, p. 50.*

FRG, the less secure was the strategic guarantee for Europe; American troops were "hostages to American intent." When the United States threatened to pull out some forces because of balance-of-payments problems, the Germans moved to help alleviate this problem. Again, in the late 1960's America sent a part of its European force to Vietnam, and in the early 1970's, with Senator Mansfield's attempt at troop reductions, the Germans' anxiety grew. In light of the fact that in 1962 America had 416,000 troops in Europe, and by 1970 only 291,000, the West Germans had reason for concern.[7]

These reductions posed a serious problem for NATO, whose "Flexible Response" strategy relied on conventional forces. There existed in the late 1960's and early 1970's a gap between doctrine and capabilities:

> By 1969 . . . the gap between NATO's declaratory strategy . . . and the military capabilities that presumably gave it effect had grown dangerously wide. The risk existed that at any time the fragile doctrinal consensus might rupture altogether, lending its own contribution to the political and economic disarray already afflicting the Alliance.[8]

This gap was filled in the late 1960's and early 1970's by tactical nuclear weapons provided by the United States — some 7,000. But this reliance on tactical nuclear weapons had serious flaws: first, there was no recognized deployment doctrine; second, the conventional forces were ill-equipped to fight in a nuclear environment; and third, the Soviets had matching systems that could destroy Western Europe.[9]

This problem was exacerbated by the acknowledged parity in strategic nuclear forces achieved by the Soviet Union in the early 1970's. The reality of Soviet–American strategic parity did not go unnoticed by defense experts in the Federal Republic, namely Helmut Schmidt and Georg Leber. While the linkage between American strategic forces and European defense was never guaranteed, even in the heyday of American superiority, "the tremendous growth in the Soviets' strategic nuclear arsenal . . . rendered all the more questionable America's willingness to 'stake Chicago for Bonn' in the event of a European conflict."[10]

In part, tactical nuclear weapons helped to alleviate this problem of a non-credible conventional defense tied to an incredible strategic deterrent, but the Alliance's military position was still precarious. The Nixon Adminis-

[7] *Richard Hart Sinnreick, "NATO's Doctrinal Dilemma," in* Nuclear Strategy and National Security Points of View, *(Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1977), p. 308.*
[8] *Sinnreick, p. 309.*
[9] *Sinnerieck.*
[10] *Hahn, p. 48.*

tration set out to address this dual problem. First, the Americans initiated a program designed to enhance American conventional forces and reduce Warsaw Pact superiority. Next, they moved toward a counter-force strategy against Soviet nuclear forces. This strategic priority focused on plans for a Trident submarine program, the B-1 bomber and a new, larger MIRV-ed ICBM (today's MX missile). All of these systems were incorporated into the new counter-force strategy, which "demostrated a willingness to use those forces selectively and thus raise the cost of aggression in the eyes of Soviet decision-makers."[11]

While this new counter-force strategy, and the attempts to re-establish some of the conventional side of the deterrent, promised to shore-up the "balance" in the later 1970's, they did very little to mitigate the effects of strategic parity upon the West German psyche. In fact, as the Soviets began to develop their own counter-force capability with the SS-18 and SS-20 Euro-strategic forces, the problems faced by West Germany, in terms of NATO defense being coupled to America's power, began to grow, not diminish.

During these last ten years, from 1975 to the present, we witnessed the immense Soviet gains in all categories: conventional (which they already enjoyed), Euro-strategic, and strategic. The pressures from this build-up began to manifest themselves in the form of West German anxiety about overall Western Security. At the same time, West German society began to experience a resurgence of the youthful radicalism which had sprung-up in the late 1960's, but did not become a decisive force in the political arena until the late 1970's. The combination of Soviety military pressures, the West German–allied actions to counter them, and the upsurge of radical, anti-nuclear neutralism, created friction, which led to the breakdown of the security consensus within the Federal Republic in the early 1980's.

The major question for West German security policy and the Atlantic Alliance since Helmut Schmidt assumed the Chancellor's office has been how best to deal with the increasing threat of Soviet build-ups on all levels of the defense spectrum in Europe. The Schmidt Government in the mid-1970's followed a defense policy which de-emphasized tactical nuclear weapons in NATO strategy, most of which were stationed in West Germany. This was evident in consecutive annual "White Papers" on defense which devoted only several paragraphs to the topic of "Nuclear Weapons in Europe" and tactical nuclear use in West Germany.[12] While this policy could be seen as a hold-over from the Brandt Ostpolitik where the FRG tried to allay Eastern European fears by signing the non-proliferation treaty in November 1969, Schmidt's and Leber's motivations were more complex: The Schmidt-Leber attitude toward nuclear weapons was:

[11] *Sinnreich, p. 315.*
[12] *Hahn, p. 56.*

> (1) to accept tactical nuclear weapons as did previous West German governments, primarily for their deterrent role; (2) to argue more strongly than predecessor governments that the weapons must remain exclusively in US possession and subject to US decision-making (in short, that such weapons are strictly part of the US nuclear deterrent); and (3) to lower the general visibility of such weapons in the West German political milieu.[13]

The Schmidt Government's policy on nuclear weapons in Europe may have been low-key, but it surely was not a policy aimed at removing tactical nuclear weapons. In fact, the Schmidt policies were contradictory in that the FRG balked in 1975 when Henry Kissinger proposed to withdraw "1,000 warheads as a unilateral US gesture designed to breathe new life into the MBFR negotiations in Vienna."[14] The official German view, expressed by General Ulrich de Maiziere, former Chief of Staff of the West German Armed Forces, stated that, "It will not be feasible to make a considerable change in the number of nuclear weapons stored in Europe."[15]

Helmut Schmidt preferred a high nuclear threshold, yet without the loss of the nuclear deterrent embodied in the American nuclear guarantee. More accurately, Schmidt and Leber wanted a nuclear threshold that was "clouded," thus eliminating the ability of the "Soviet planner . . . to calculate with confidence that he can press a conventional attack . . . without triggering a NATO nuclear response."[16] This posture would "prevent that a conventional war becomes thinkable," because "the conventional as well as the nuclear form an incalculable unity within the strategic concept and remain credible as such."[17] In these statements by Leber and Schmidt, one may see the beginnings of their later anxiety. In 1977, at London's International Institute for Strategic Studies, Schmidt publicized his fears of the possibility of the Soviety SS-20 force decoupling European defense from American strategic forces, and called for NATO to counter the threat.

Another source of anxiety for the Schmidt Government concerned American efforts at modernizing its tactical nuclear forces in the way of "size, accuracy, yield and collateral damage."[18] Not only did the West German government feel that these "imrovements would provide . . . the pretext for US force reductions," they also lowered the threshold by implication, since these weapons became more useful in lower intensity situations.[19] A good example

[13] *Hahn, p. 57-58.*
[14] *Hahn, p. 63.*
[15] *Hahn, p. 63.*
[16] *Hahn, p. 60.*
[17] *Hahn, p. 60.*
[18] *Hahn, p. 61.*
[19] *Hahn, p. 62.*

of this hostility to "mini-nukes" occurred during the Carter Administration's attempt to deploy Enhanced Radiation Weapons ("neutron-bombs") in the Federal Republic of Germany.

This propensity to "oscillate" between support and hostility to tactical nuclear weapons is summed-up neatly by Walter Hahn:

> For purposes of deterrence, West German planners . . . would like a reasonably low nuclear threshold, at least as seen from the vantage point of the potential adversary. For purposes of actual warfare, however, they would like a much higher threshold. They know that they cannot have it both ways. The only answer, therefore, is to keep the weapons but to remain as ambiguous as possible with regard to their use in a conflict contingency.[20]

By 1977, the Carter Administration assumed office and, within the first year, made a new proposal to the Soviets in the SALT II negotiations — which was promptly rejected by the Soviet leadership without a counter–proposal. The Carter proposal was rejected by the Russians because it had been too radical in scope and because it failed to retain the continuity of the Vladivostok Accord which had been negotiated for several years under Henry Kissinger. In his zeal to achieve radical reductions in nuclear weapons, President Carter neglected to heed the warnings from his advisors on Soviety obstinacy in the field of nuclear diplomacy. The Carter Administration was forced to regroup after the Soviet rebuff and start again, this time with more conservative proposals.

While this activity on the Superpower level proceeded, the theater-nuclear situation in Europe had begun to take on ominous signs. The major Soviet build-up of a new Long–Range Theater Nuclear missle termed the SS-20 had begun. This missile possesses several qualities which distinguish it from the more cumbersome SS-4's and SS-5's — the older Soviet INF's. The first is its capability to be deployed and redeployed without detection. The second characteristic is the fact that is has three warheads, each of which is highly accurate. Third, the SS-20 can be reloaded and fired again at any time, provided a reload is available. Finally, the rocket operates on solid-fuel, rather than the more cumbersome liquid fuel on which the SS-4's and SS-5's ran. Thus, the Soviets were building and deploying a new missile which "if it was set up at a presurveyed site, its warheads were believed capable of coming within 1,200 feet of a target nearly 3,000 miles away."[21]

The Soviets began to deploy this weapon in 1977. By this time the West Germans had become increasingly uneasy about the problems that this weapon

[20] *Hahn, p. 63.*
[21] *Strobe Talbott,* Deadly Gambits, *(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1984), p. 30.*

posed for European and German security, especially within the context of strategic parity and conventional inferiority. The Federal Chancellor delivered a speech at London's International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), in which he spelled-out the threat posed by the SS-20 for Western defense. The issue in Schmidt's mind was "decoupling" and matching the Soviets in the deterrent "continum" or "spectrum" with a Western equivalent of the SS-20.[22] Schmidt's fear originated out of the long-held German concern with the credibility of the American strategic deterrent. The SS-20 opened up a gap between NATO's tactical nuclear weapons and America's strategic forces. To make matters worse, President Carter's new SALT II proposals "would constrain, and perhaps modestly reduce, the strategic weaponry of the two superpowers at levels not far below those that already existed."[23] Schmidt believed that this failure to achieve substantial cuts in the Soviet land-based ICBM's meant that "in an era of strategic equality, inequalities at lower, substrategic levels of the East-West military rivalry took on new importance, and here the West was at a disadvantage."[24]

Following the IISS speech, the deployment of the SS-20's continued at an alarming rate: ten by October 1977, 60 by May 1978, 140 by December 1979, 200 by December 1980, 250 by November 1981, 300 by April 1982, 333 by December 1982, and 351 by March 1983. Today, there are roughly 390 SS-20's deployed in Russia with close to 1150 warheads.

Under West German pressure the Alliance set up the High Level Group (HLG) to look into "the problem of enhancing extended deterrence."[25] This group of defense experts, chaired by an American Assistant Secretary of Defense, split over whether Europe needed theater nuclear forces or whether the American strategic weapons could provide the adequate cover. The Europeans insisted on the need for "Euro-Strategic" weapons, preferably the cruise missile.

After much European pressure, the High Level Group decided, in April 1979, that not only should West Germany receive Pershing II missiles, but the other NATO nations would also have to share the burden of deployment by hosting some cruise missiles. Just before this, in January 1978, at the Guadeloupe Summit between the leaders of France, West Germany and Britain, the idea of "joining deployment to an arms control initiative" was raised by France's President Giscard.[26] His idea received immediate support from Helmut Schmidt and the British Prime Minister because:

[22] *Talbott, p. 30.*
[23] *Talbott, p. 28.*
[24] *Talbott, p. 28.*
[25] *Talbott, p. 32.*
[26] *Talbott, p. 37.*

> . . . it was seen as a way to lessen the danger of war and to salvage the near–defunct policy of detente from which West Europeans felt they were deriving tangible benefits.[27]

During the course of 1979, the idea of disarmament and armament proceeding at the same time became "institutionalized in the structure of NATO and ultimately consecrated in a formal decision by the allied leaders."[28] As a counterweight to the High Level Group, the NATO governments formed the Special Consultative Group (SCG), made up of foreign ministry officials, to pursue the idea of an arms control initiative. These two initiatives eventually became public in the form of the Integrated Decision Document (IDD) which the NATO ministers called the "dual track" decision.

The NATO ministers' decision thus set in motion the events which transpired during the first three years of the new decade — events which were intended to promote "an intense and divisive political debate over security policy in the Federal Republic of Germany."[29] The consensus which had been developed over the last 20 years in the FRG, began to deteriorate:

> Not since the rearmament debate of the 1950's and the 1959 adoption by the Social Democratic Party of Godesberger Program had the agreement between the major parties faced such serious challenge.[30]

The public debate during the 1980's in West Germany erupted because of several factors: first, the rise of radical "left-nationalists" within the SPD began to tie the hands of Helmut Schmidt's "flexible Atlanticists"; second, along with this left challenge inside the SPD, there arose a more vocal element of radical peace groups which espoused views on German security policy. These peace activists had not been prominent in the past, and had avoided foisting their own alternative secruity program onto the West German policy-making sector. Now, in the 1980's, they focused their sights on nuclear defense policy and specifically on the NATO deployments.

The radical peace movement, whose best known element is the Green Party, consists of an "issue-oriented-almalgam of ecologists, anti-nuclearists, leftists, feminists and urban populists."[31] The political power of the Greens has not been a decisive influence in German politics; however, the 27 seats that they

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[27]*Talbott, p. 37.*
[28]*Talbott, p. 37.*
[29]*Gale A. Mattox, "West German Perspectives on Nuclear Armament and Arms Control," (ANNALS, AAPSS, no. 469, Sepember 1983), p. 104.*
[30]*Mattox, p. 104.*
[31]*Robert G. Livingston,* The Federal Republic of Germany In the 1980's, *(New York: German Information Center, 1983), p. 55*

won in the 498 seat Bundestag in 1983 has given them a degree of legitimacy and a voice in national government circles. The success of the Greens stems from their appeal among young voters who had not lived through the Cold War years, when America and the Western Alliance provided much-needed security and support to the new West German nation. They also missed the economic miracle years of reconstruction in the 1950's and 1960's which saw West Germany grow into an economic power. These young radicals grew-up during the Vietnam years and the "stagflationary" years of the 1970's. They became disenchanted with the economic situation and with the "stifling monopoly of the three established parties."[32]

While this is no place for a political analysis of the Greens, it is important to mention their major security proposals for the Federal Republic. The peace activists believe that the United States and NATO are stifling their country. They see the United States as using West Germany "to more safely and more effectively carry on its competition with the Soviet Union in areas outside of Europe."[33] The Green Party sees the NATO double-track decision as a ploy "to make 'tactical' nuclear strategy in Europe carry the brunt of American strategic nuclear deterrence."[34] To them, the INF deployment is a way of decoupling the United States from Europe so that American territory won't have to be a part of the nuclear battleground. The Greens' security policy has several important aspects: (1) Rejection of INF deployment; (2) creation of a nuclear-free zone in Western Europe; (3) withdrawal of all foreign troops from occupied territory (i.e., West Germany and Eastern Europe); (4) the dismantling of West Germany's armaments industry; (5) abolition of the West German Army and military conscription; (6) prohibition of the sale of war games, toys, books, and films which the Greens deem to be violent; (7) unionization of soldiers in an all-volunteer civilian guard; and (8) sponsoring a "worldwide denunciation of all politicians, scholars, military strategists . . . who plan, operate or support . . . weapons systems of mass destruction and genocide."[35]

Some peace researchers have called for novel defense strategies for the FRG: One calls for an army of 10,000 "techno-commando" units of 36 men each. These units would be equipped with "smart" weapons and could provide deterrence through the sheer "price of entry" to the Soviets. Another idea calls for a "defensive policy of passive non-cooperation and civil disobedience to deprive the aggressor of the aims he hoped to gain by the invasion."[36] Neither the Greens, nor the other peace–activists could effectively change

[32] *Livingston, p. 56.*
[33] *Kim Holmes,* The West German Peace Movement and the National Question, *(Cambridge: The Institute For Foreign Policy Analysis, 1984), p. 42.*
[34] *Holmes, p. 42.*
[35] *Holmes, p. 45.*
[36] *Holmes, p. 43.*

West German security policy in the 1980's. But their voices and political activism have served to make the general populace more aware of nuclear issues — issues which used to be reserved for a small elite.

The deployment of the NATO Pershing II and Cruise missiles sparked the German anti-nuclear protests of the 1980's. While these protesters would like to believe that the decision to deploy the INF's emanated from the minds of some sinister American policy-makers, the reality is just the opposite. The INF deployment issue had its roots in a general Alliance debate over how to counter the soviet build-up of conventional, Euro-strategic (SS-20's) and strategic nuclear arms which had threatened to undo basic Alliance strategy of Flexible Response and Forward Defense. In the early 1980's responsible sectors of the security policy-making elite within the Alliance, primarily American and German, involved themselves in a debate over the viability of Flexible Response and Forward Defense as well as the efficacy of a higher "nuclear threshold" and a "no-first-use" of nuclear weapons policy. This debate highlighted the real problems posed by the Soviet build-up — that is the breakdown of the Alliance's ability to defend itself and to deter agression successfully.

The threat posed by the Soviet SS-20 forces to NATO's Flexible Response Doctrine existed within the context of the total military picture in Europe and in the Superpower security realm. Soviet equality in strategic systems, coupled with a clear advantage in conventional armaments, made the SS-20 deployments all the more sinister because, in their larger quantity, they "provided the Soviet Union with an in-theater 'selective' targeting — a capability that it previously had lacked."[37] Added to this capability was the "relatively well known" status of NATO's 108 Pershing 1A missiles, as well as its "nuclear capable aircraft."[38] These two realities meant that the Warsaw Pact, in a surprise attack, might be able to eliminate NATO's nuclear weapons and at the same time destroy its major supply depots and its Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence centers (C^3I) before the Warsaw Pact conventional forces even began to move against the West, and before the American strategic weapons could come into play:

> . . . the ability of the Alliance to rely on its theater-nuclear assets as a means of sustaining the credibility of NATO's escalatory option and hence its deterrent posture was itself questionable because of the augmentation of Soviet Warsaw Pact theater forces, especially capabilities designed to destroy NATO nuclear weapons.[39]

[37] *Jacquelyn K. Davis, "Theater-Nuclear Force Modernization and NATO's Flexible Response Strategy," (ANNALS, AAPSS, no. 457, September 1981), p. 81.*
[38] *Davis, p. 81.*
[39] *Davis, p. 80.*

Also called into question by the Soviets' SS-20 deployments and their conventional superiority was NATO's strategy of Forward Defense. As West Germany is a "shallow" country (meaning it has no strategic depth with which to fall back on) the Alliance requires an ability to strike deep into Warsaw Pact supply lines, thus preventing the build-up of a steamroller that cannot be stopped. With the destruction of the Pershing 1A's and NATO's nuclear-capable aircraft, the Alliance would not be able to break-up Soviet second and third echelon forces; this development would effectively eliminate the possibility of a successful Forward Defense.

Forward Defense and Flexible Response rely on the ability of NATO to meet any act of aggression at any level on the escalatory ladder. This means that the NATO forces are prepared to use nuclear weapons first; to destroy Warsaw Pact "follow-on" forces deep in Warsaw Pact territory. The problem with this strategy lies in its willingness, on NATO's part, to use nuclear weapons first — something the West German public has a hard time coming to grips with. While this has been NATO's strategy for years, the anti-nuclear uproar over the INF deployments led some former American defense policy-makers to question NATO's policy and to suggest a policy of "no-first-use."

In 1982, four former American policy-makers, McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara and Gerard Smith, suggested that the Alliance should gradually change its strategy of first use of nuclear weapons, to one of "no-first-use." The four suggested that in light of the inevitability of the useof even the smallest nuclear weapons escalating into a major nuclear conflagration, there was little logic in continuing a policy of using nuclear weapons first. The Alliance could, they maintained, through a sustained conventional build-up, eliminate the need for nuclear weapons to be employed first by NATO.

The Germans responded with their own four defense policy experts using the same forum: foreign affairs. These four experts, Karl Kaiser, Georg Leber, Alois Mentes, and Franz-Josef Schulze, attacked the Americans' proposal on several grounds. First, they contended that a "renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons would certainly rob the present strategy of war prevention . . . of a decisive characteristic."[40] That characteristic would be the inability of the Soviet Union to "calculate its risk, and thus be able to wage war in Europe."[41] With the knowledge that no nuclear weapons would face the Soviets, the deterrent value of NATO's strategy would be undermined, because uncertainty about nuclear escalation would no longer exist. Resurrecting that great German strategist Clausewitz, they said this situation would allow the Soviets to continue "politics by other means" — through war.

[40]*Karl Kaiser, et al. "Nuclear Weapons and the Preservation of Peace," (Foreign Affairs, vol. 60, no. 5, Summer 1982), p. 1160.*
[41]*Kaiser, p. 1160.*

Another problem which these experts found with the "no-first-use" proposal was one that has surfaced throughout West German membership in NATO: the greater likelihood of a war being fought-out in Europe by the Superpowers, without the US and USSR being touched themselves. The proposal seemed to them to favor the United States and threaten European members of the Alliance:

> The liberation of nuclear risk would, of course, benefit the United States to some degree. It must be questioned, therefore, whether renunciation of first use represents a contribution to the "internal health of the Western Alliance itself" or whether, instead, a no-first-use policy increases insecurity and fear of even more probable war.[42]

The Germans also felt that a policy of "no-first-use" relied too heavily on conventional forces capable of countering the Warsaw Pact. The enlarged NATO troop levels, aside from being prohibitively expensive, would mean that "the Federal Republic of Germany would have to accept on its territory large contingents of additional troops . . . [It] would be transformed into a large military camp for an indefinite period."[43]

Finally, the four Germans Sopined that, even if a conventional force could be maintained, the Alliance could never rule out a war that "degenerate[d] into nuclear war."[44] Besides, the thought of fighting another conventional war — a war worse than any before — terrified them as much as an unlikely nuclear war.

The Germans agree with General Bernard Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, who does not believe in a "no-first-use" posture, but does espouse a stronger conventional deterrent that would allow for a policy of "no early use of nuclear weapons." This strategy would be effected through strengthening the conventional forces in several ways: first, by better meeting Allied Command Europe's (ACE) standards "for manning, equipping, training and sustaining" its forces; second, by continuing "to modernize . . . weapons systems and . . . exploit the technology emerging in the West which would give the means to . . . locate and target, delay, disrupt and neutralize the follow-on echelons of Pact forces and thereby make manageable the ratio of their forces reaching our defensive positions"; and third, by enhancing NATO's capability, to disrupt the centralized direction of the Pact operational units."[45]

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[42] *Kaiser, p. 1160.*
[43] *Kaiser, et al, p. 1163.*
[44] *Kaiser, et al, p. 1163.*
[45] *General Bernard W. Rogers, "Strengthening NATO's Conventional Forces," (Konrad Adenauer Foundation — Institute For Foreign Policy Analysis Sixth German-American Roundtable, Bonn, November 11, 1983.), p. 3.*

An example of plans to utilize these new technologies and new tactics to disrupt the invasion forces is the new American Air-Land Battle 2000 concept.

General Rogers insists that the German fear, that his plan to "raise the nuclear threshold" will reduce the Soviet Union's belief that the Alliance is "resolved to escalate to nuclear weapons, if necessary," is unwarranted. He contends that:

> In strengthening conventional forces we are not trying to create a firebreak between conventional and nuclear war. Between nuclear powers, such a firebreak is unenforceable, immune to declarations or lofty intentions. Between nuclear powers the flames of any conflict would burn too intensely to allow us to have faith in the existence of any such firebreak.[46]

The strengthening of NATO's conventional deterrent, and the raising of the nuclear threshold with deep-strike conventional weapons and innovative maneuver tactics would, believes General Rogers, enhance the Alliance's Flexible Response Doctrine, and thus add to the credibility of the deterrent. West German strategists such as Manfred Worner, the present Minister of Defense, and General Graf Kielmansegg, believe in the ideas of General Rogers, yet in light of American "out-of-area" commitments which rob NATO of the necessary forces, they are skeptical regarding the implementation of such a policy. The American Rapid Deployment Force is symbolic of American non-European commitments which could threaten the success of a stronger conventional deterrent and a Forward Defense strategy with no early first use of nuclear weapons.

The new ideas concerning the strengthening of conventional forces and filling in the Theater-Nuclear gap caused by the Soviets' deployment of SS-20's, have been adopted by the new West German government under Helmut Kohl. The big newsmaker was the INF controversy, but the resolution of these equally important defense arguments have allowed the West German security situation to stabilize sufficiently, so that a distinct goal of peace through a policy of strength has been reestablished.

The 1983 elections in West Germany ushered in the Christian Democrats, a party whose leadership had been out of power since Willy Brandt defeated them in 1969. While the CDU/CSU-FDP Coalition victory was largely due to disillusionment with the economic situation under SPD rule, debate during the campaign focused on security issues. The SPD candidate Hans-Jochen Vogel, "lacked Schmidt's charisma, authority and international experience."[47] In addition, he seemed to lack control over his party's left wing. Thus, when

[46] *Rogers, p. 3.*
[47] *Livingston, p. 52.*

the SPD voted to oppose deployment of INF, the CDU was able to portray "the SPD's indecisiveness as opposition to the Atlantic Alliance and to the United States, both of which enjoy strong support among the voters."[48]

The new Christian Democratic-Free Democratic Coalition held firm on the INF deployments and didn't flinch when the Soviet Union, after resorting to threats and intimidation tactics throughout the "dual track" period, stalked out of the INF and START negotiations. The Kohl Government then set out to reaffirm its Atlantic partnership and Alliance with the United States. In his speech upon assuming office in October 1982, Kohl laid down five main points on his views about where West German security policy was headed: (1) he projected a policy of "reaffirming and stabilizing [German] friendship [with America]" by intensifying partnership through increased consultations and expanding exchanges at all levels; (2) he reaffirmed the FRG's commitment to the Atlantic Alliance and to the Harmel Report's tenets of military security before, but compatibile with, relations with the East; (3) he expressed the need to "reestablish and stabilize the necessary military equilibrium at the lowest possible level of armaments by means of concrete balanced and verifiable negotiated results." Kohl also announced that the FRG would abide by the NATO two-track decision and that it supported greater arms control endeavors in Europe; (4) he pressd for new initiatives toward the unification of Europe by strengthening existing community institutions; (5) and lastly, he proclaimed the Federal Republic's commitment to "genuine detente, dialogue and cooperation," and to "do everything possible to make the division of Germany and Europe more bearable for the people affected . . ."[49]

The Kohl Government, from the start of its term, reaffirmed the defense concepts which had been formed over the last twenty years, but had been called into question by the INF controversy and the left-radical neutralism. Since 1982, and especially after its huge election victory in 1983, the West German CDU Government has been a steady supporter of the Americans in negotiating with the Soviets and, after their walkout, in supporting America's Strategic Defense Initiative in its research stage — a program that single-handedly brought the Soviets back to the arms-control table.

The work of the Kohl Government over the last three years, in trying to heal the tattered security concensus in the FRG and in reasserting its special ties to the United States, has increased West German influence in the halls of the Reagan Administration. The likelihood that the Christian Democrats will remain in power suggests that there will be little possibility of a significant change in traditional German security policy for some time. However, the

[48] *Livingston, p. 51.*
[49] *Dr. Helmut Kohl, Chancellor, Policy Statement to Bundestag, October 13, 1982, Bonn. (New York: German Information Office, 1982), p. 4.*

radical peace activists, as well as the more radical elements of the SPD, may join hands against the Kohl policies. While this coalition might not directly hinder German security efforts, it could cause another upswing in public anxiety over Germany's role in the Alliance and its position between the two superpowers. This could get in the way of renewed efforts to counter the real Soviety military threat in Europe.

In closing, German security policy, beginning with Chancellor Adenauer, has had to adjust itself over the years to many forces and event beyond West Germany's control. These changes have often been difficult and filled with anxiety, as was the case duiring the Flexible Response debate and the Berlin Crisis of the 1960's. However, the West Germans' ability to flow with these forces inside the European security tier and the Superpower security tier, has been well proven, as they demonstrated during the Ostpolitik era. They have, since 1955, adhered to a policy that bases itself in the maxim that the only secure country is a strong country inside a strong alliance. The Germans almost always refrained from an unrealistic view of the security situation in Europe. Unfortunately, today there has arisen a neutralist element which fantacizes about a defense based on illusions. In light of the past forty years of stable, successful deterrence, it is hardly likely that the West Germans will lose their way along these tempting, but dangerous, paths of neutralism and unilateral disarmament in the face of a threat greater in magnitude than at any time since their induction into the Atlantic Alliance.

The Shaping of Modern Latin America: A Study of Cuba & Argentina

Lucy Lockwood

The history and development of Latin America, (like that of any region), has been determined by a complex set of factors, all interwoven over the course of time. The dominating influence on this region, however, has been economic. The following article argues that economic events and processes rather than political ones have been the determining factors in shaping the character and evolution of politics and society in Latin America between 1810 and 1946.

The argument presented is based on the following observations:

1) Economic power in Latin America has traditionally been the basis of political power. Even in the twentieth century, when one starts to see political action by the middle classes and the urban workers, economic power, or the lack thereof, is usually the primary motivation.

2) Given that economic power is the basis for political power, one sees that Latin American political systems have evolved with the purpose of protecting and advancing the economic interests from which the leaders derive their power.

3) Outside actors (e.g. Great Britain, Spain, Portugal, the United States) played a major role in Latin American development, and all were involved for economic reasons.

4) Political and social stratification has followed along the lines of economic stratification. Moreover, the development of middle classes and of urban and rural working classes all had important political and social counsequences, but were the result of economic processes. Immigrants also had a major effect on many Latin American countries, but their presence was the result of economic forces.

5) The period under discussion was marked by remarkable socio-economic stability and great political instability. Had politics indeed been the decisive force in Latin American development, one would expect such instability to have had a greater effect on the socio-economic realm than would appear.

6) A final observation on the matter may be taken from Professor Peter Winn:

> New economic booms can cause a contradiction between sources of political power and sources of economic power. When this happens, the new economic power forces a shift in political power . . .[1]

This may somewhat restate #1 above, but it emphasizes the casual nature of economic events and processes in relation to political ones.

Using Argentina and Cuba as examples, the following article attempts to provide specific examples of these observations and thus demonstrate the primacy of economics in the history and development of Latin America.

The decline in Spain's power following the Seven Years War foretold coming changes in Latin America, changes brought on by the inexorable forces of economics. With Great Britain emerging from the war as the ruler of the Atlantic, Spain could no longer maintain a monopoly on trade with her colonies and had to content herself instead with the role of intermediary between her colonies and the newly industrialized Europe, especially Great Britain.[2] The British invasions of the Rio de la Plata in 1806-7 opened up the colonial ports of Argentina to free trade with the British Empire and showed the merchants and estancieros "how profitable it was to be tied to the world's most dynamic economy rather than the stagnant Spanish one."[3] Prior to the invasions hides and fats had piled up in warehouses while the pastoral industries declined. All this changed during the brief period of free trade. Cheaper and superior British manufactured goods swept the market, providing needed consumer items, while British purchases of hides and tallow, at twice the going Spanish rate, stimulated that sector of the economy and encouraged further trade. When Spain regained control of the area, the taste of free trade was not forgotten by the Colonials. Merchants and especially producers viewed the colonial relationship with Spain as a hindrance. They now wanted to establish direct links with Europe in order to expand their markets and to get higher prices, and thus higher profits, by eliminating the Spanish government and Spanish businessmen as intermediaries.[4] In 1809 a memorandum of the *estancieros* demanded the right to trade with British and Portuguese merchants, only to be met with much more limited measures coming from the Spanish authorities.[5] As often happens with governments, it was a case of too little, too late. Spain did not have the shipping or the industry necessary to absorb the coast's production of raw materials or to provide the colonies with needed goods, but she stubbornly insisted on maintaining her position as middleman

[1] *Peter Winn, lecture of Tufts University, February 14th, 1983.*
[2] *Fernando Henrique Cardoso, and Enzo Faletto,* Dependency and Development in Latin America *(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), p. 31.*
[3] *Peter Winn, lecture at Tufts University, January 31, 1983.*
[4] *Cardoso and Faletto, p. 31.*
[5] *James R. Scobie,* Argentina: A City and a Nation, *(New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 75.*

between the Rio de la Plata and the rest of the world.

The Napoleonic invasion of Spain and the deposition of Ferdinand provided an opportune moment for the colonials to rid themselves of the Spanish mercantile yoke. The commercial and cattle interests in Buenos Aires strongly supported independence, as one might expect, for it was livestock and trade that formed the economic basis of political power and leadership conferred on the city by Spain. In the aftermath of independence, the crop farming and local industries of the interior went into a period of rapid decline. The coast produced raw materials and had nothing to offer the interior, while the interior, deprived of the artificial supports of the Spanish empire, had little to offer the coast. This situation was exacerbated by the fact that at the time of Argentina's independence, Great Britain was shifting from a mercantilist system to one of free trade with the emphasis on finding additional markets for her manufactured goods. This economic dichotomy became the basis of a century-long struggle betwen the interior and the coast.

One final remark on the effects of economic forces at this point in Argentina's history — because the civilian ranching elite were economically strong, the war for independence having done nothing to undermine their economic position, one does not see the militarization of politics in the manner of Mexico, for instance.[6]

Unlike Argentina, Cuba remained a formal Spanish colony for a hundred years. In 1819 the Cuban economy was much more integrated and diversified, especially in terms of its domestic market, than was Argentina's. Nonetheless, indications of Cuba's future course already existed. The Haitian slave rebellion in the 1790's closed off what had been one of the world's major sources of sugar. Prices for sugar rose and new markets suddenly opened to Cuba making sugar a lucrative commodity. Another sign of the future: Cuba was already trading heavily with the United States. By the turn of the century "the United States was rapidly becoming a voracious customer of the Caribbean sugar"[7] and Cuba stood ready to satisfy her appetite.

Just as the origins of Argentina's independence struggle were economic, so too were the origins of Cuba's decision not to war against Spain. Under the Marquis de Someruelos, who reigned as captain general from 1799-1812, Cuba's ports remained open to world trade, often in defiance of orders from the Crown. Moreover, times were more often good than not for Cuba economically during this same period. Another factor which predisposed the Cubans against independence was the institution of slavery on the island, necessitated by the sugar industry. The large numbers of slaves brought in for the labor-intensive process of raising sugar made for a labor force ill-prepared for any

[6]*Peter Winn, lecture at Tufts University, February 2, 1983.*

[7]*John Edwin Fagg,* Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic, *(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1965), p. 27.*

sort of coordinated rebellion,[8] and the example of nearby Haiti served as a constant reminder to the white elite of the dangers of rebellion turned revolution. The United States had economic interests at the time which led her to oppose Cuban thoughts of independence. Such a move, the Americans feared, would open the possibility of Great Britain establishing herself in Cuba and further dominating trade with Latin America, as well as posing a commercial and strategic threat to the United States. Safer, thought American leaders, to keep Cuba weak and dependent on economically stagnant Spain for power. Nevertheless, Americans well believed in the island's worth and had no intention of letting Cuba out of the nation's shadow. To quote Secretary of State Adams in 1823:

> [Cuba], from a multitude of considerations has become an object of tremendous importance to the commerical and political interests of our Union. . . .[9]

Ater the successful rebellion of 1810, the former colonials of Buenos Aires and the inland provinces faced the task of creating a nation out of the disparate elements of the former Spanish domain. The process of consolidation in Argentina was typical of that which occured throughout Latin America and was led by the national producing groups.

> [It] was conditioned as much by the 'market situation' directed by the group who controller the port facilities, and the basic production sector, and so forth, as by the capacity of some segments of the dominant class to establish a political system of control.[10]

Thus after 1810, while the ideologies and ambitions clashed in the political arena, it was the economic factor that proved to be decisive. The man who emerged as the nation's first powerful leader, Juan Manual de Rosas, had not even been involved with the Creole seizure of power and the ensuing struggle for independence. Roasa had invested well in the *saladeros* of Buenos Aires and had soon captured economic power in the area. "Control of cattle and ports lead to political control"[11] and so it was that Rosas became governor of Buenos Aires and by 1835 had established himself as *de facto* ruler of Argentina.

Economics also proved decisive in the initial struggle between the farmers of the interior and the landowning and cattle interests of the Rio de la Plata

[8] *Stanley J. Stein, and Barbara H. Stein,* The colonial Heritage of Latin America, *(New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 163.*

[9] *Terence Cannon,* Revolutionary Cuba, *(New York: Thomas V. Crowell, 1981), p. 28.*
[10] *Cardoso and Faletto, p. 6.*
[11] *Scobie, p. 77.*

region. As the rise of Rosas showed, economic power rested with the cattleman and the *estancias*, and so it was this group which won out politically, much to the future detriment of Argentina. After the overthrow of Rividavia (who had attempted measures potentially favorable to an agricultural interior such as land reform), Rosas committed the country to the interests of the cattlemen through the government's use of taxes, customs, public land distribution, and control of the ports and transportation. All of the government's policies and actions were designed to aid the cattle interests of the coast while subjugating the *guachos* and farmers of the interior. Here is a clear example of how economic processes affect political ones — almost from its onset the Argentine political system was designed to protect the economic elite who formed the nation's power base and to maintain the conditions which had made these elite so powerful and prosperous.

External economic forces shaped Argentina as well during this period. Although she did not realize it at the time, Argentina had "exchanged the tutelage of Spain for that of European industry."[12] Industrial development had little chance for "the Industrial Revolution gave England, Europe, and the United States a head start in products, standards, transportation, and prices."[13] Moreover, a problem shared by all Latin American countries was that economic growth

> through diversification and industrialization would not occur while the colonial patterns of production, capital formation and investment, income distribution, and expenditure survived.[14]

Release from the Spanish mercantilist system, therefore, merely served as a stimulus for the increased production of raw materials. This process occured in both Argentina and in Cuba, as shall be noted later. Independence brought with it another economic influence, that of external and internal debt. The struggle for independence, as always, had been expensive, and naturally it was Great Britain, as the financial and commercial leader of the world, which stepped in to finance the country. As early as the Rividavia Administration, all the banking interests in Argentina came under British control.

The power of economic events may be noted, finally, in the overthrow of Rosas in 1852. Rosas lost power because he could not maintain economic expansion in the form of a purely cattle economy. Blockades of the Buenos Aires region by the British and French in the 1840's, along with worldwide economic downturns, had revealed the vulnerability of the Argentine economy. In addition, the interior provinces had been economically driven into the

[12] *Ibid., p. 27.*
[13] *Ibid., p. 76.*
[14] *Stein and Stein, p. 136.*

ground under Rosas, and when he tried to counteract the country's economic stagnation by expanding the cattle economy to the entire Entre Rios area, open revolt followed.

Although Cuba remained loyal to Spain throughout the revolutionary fever of the first part of the century, an economic struggle continued to develop between the Creoles, who owned the means of production, and the Spaniards, who controlled all of the island's commerce and trade.[15]

By the 1850's, the lure of sugar had created thousands of small farmers involved in its production. Economic events abroad insured that this decentralized system would have to change, however. Beginning in the 1840's and 1850's, sugar beet production in Europe rose to challenge the traditional cane markets. By the 1850's sugar beet production had topped that of cane, and the overall increase in production had driven down world sugar prices. An economic process was thus set in motion that would completely change the Cuban existence. In order to compete with Europe, the Cuban sugar industry had to become more efficient. New machinery and new methods were needed in order to increase production and develop more cost-effective techniques for the industry. Advances in technology demanded ever greater amounts of capital necessary for operating a mill, thus forcing out the smaller farmer-owned mills. Only the more efficient producers and the larger farmers could survive under these conditions.

"The Ten Years' War (1868-78) delivered the final blow to the old system of production, and by the war's end, the two major features of the new system, the *central* and the *colono,* were already in widespread existence. As the *centrals* (mills, and increasingly, large mills, which bought cane from independent farmers — colonos) grew and began to compete with each other, the problem became one of getting enough cane at the lowest possible cost. Two means of overcoming the problem evolved: in the first, the mill reduced the *colono* to the status of vassal, bound by contract and unable to sell his product freely; in the second, the mill purchased lands and then hired sharecroppers or day laborers, or might rent it to the *colono,* increasing his dependence on the mill. Both methods meant economic domination of the *colono* by the *central* and led to the formation of sugar latifundia across Cuba.[16] A struggle ensued between the *colonos* and the *centrals,* one which remained stalemated until independence and the United States worked to tip the balance clearly in the favor of the *centrals*. In the meantime, a new social class had developed in Cuba — the *colono* — whose dependence on the mills would have important implications for the future.

[15]*Cannon, p. 29.*

[16]*Ramiro Guerra y Sanchez,* Sugar and Society in the Caribbean, *(New Haven, Yale University Press, 1964), p. 67.*

The second half of the nineteenth century also saw the rise of the "colossus of the north" as an influence in Cuban development. By the 1850's the United States accounted for one third of Cuba's foreign trade, more than did Spain.[17] The Ten Years' War, while it did not bring home rule for the Cubans, did result in the emancipation of the slaves and the bankrupting of Spanish sugar interests, who quickly sold out to U.S. investors. The end of slave labor made machines much cheaper than paid labor, and new machinery came, naturally, from the United States. Thus in the aftermath of the war, U.S. investment in Cuba grew significantly and by the late 1880's was quite heavy among the island's sugar plantations. Indeed, Cuba has been described as being "in the grip of 'the Sugar Trust' [the American Sugar Refining Company]" as early as 1870.[18] A reciprocity treaty signed with the United States after the Ten Years' War meant sudden and great prosperity for the sugar industry, but the boom ended just as quickly when economic bad times in the United States prompted the Wilson Tariff Act of 1894, plunging Cuba into depression. Economic fluctuations, particularly from good to bad, often result in political or social challenges to the status quo and it has been argued that the Wilson Tariff was the catalyst for the final war against Spain. The economic hardship suffered by all Cubans spread the spirit of rebellion to all groups within the society.[19] Beginning in 1895, Jose Marti renewed the struggle for independence, but by this time Cuba was already "an economic colony of the United States"[20] and that fact would have profound consequences after 1898.

With the fall of Rosas in 1852, Argentina entered a period of tremendous change. During the second half of the century a radical transformation of the *pampas* took place; the process commenced with sheep raising and then moved to grain and beef production in the 1880's and 1890's. As historian James Scobie has pointed out:

> Argentine history provides an excellent illustration of how the life of a people can be completely changed through a shift in economic focus.[21]

Argentina's economy underwent rapid expansion during the period, which, combined with the shift in focus, had many social and political ramifications. The economic conquest of the *pampas*, for instance, led to a rapid rise in the

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[17]*Leo Huberman, and Paul M. Sweezy,* Cuba: Anatomy of a Revolution, *(New York: Monthly Review Press, 1960), p. 12.*
[18]*Cannon, p. 36.*
[19]*Ramon Eduardo Ruiz,* Cuba: The Making of a Revolution, *(New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1968), p. 47.*
[20]*Cannon, p. 36.*
[21]*Scobie, p. 136.*

cities, especially Buenos Aires. Immigrants were another development resulting from economic events, and one which was intimately tied to the growth of the cities. What began as a steady stream in the 1850's had reached flood level by the 1880's as Argentina's economic growth and prosperity continued to attract impoverished and land-hungry Europeans, particularly from Italy. By the 1870's however, land was no longer to be had due to the nation's land tenure policies which were designed to maintain oligarchal control of the *pampas*. Immigrants, unable to obtain land, became tenant farmers and laborers on the *estancias*, or as was most common, settled in the cities of the coast and became members of the urban working class. These immigrants from Europe, particularly their offspring, would constitute a significant force in Argentine politics of the twentieth century for they politicized the urban masses and had brought with them the desire for material improvement.

The rise of Buenos Aires had begun with the break-up of the Spanish system, but it was the agricultural revolution of the later nineteenth century that brought about its complete dominance of the country. Buenos Aires had evolved form a trade terminus and administrative capital to being the nation's only point of contact with the outside world — by the end of the century it had "become everything."[22] One of the reasons the agricultural revolution resulted in the growth of the coastal cities was that the money made by the agro-exporting bourgeoisie often remained in the cities. This process heightened as oligarchs increasingly became absentee landlords living almost year-round in the city. The development of railroads in Argentina reinforced the supremacy of Buenos Aires for virtually all the lines originated from the city. Isolation continued in the interior as the railways served only to link cattle and wheat to the port; lacking feeders or connecting-lines, the railroads did nothing to integrate and unite the rural villages.

The dichotomy between the coast and the inland, the urban and the rural, the prosperous and the poor, continued to intensify during the second half of the century. The basis of the schism was economic, but it came to affect the country in the political and social spheres as well. Following the ouster of Rosas, a political struggle ensued along the lines of this split. the inland provinces vainly sought to check the domination of the *porteno* economy and the power of Buenos Aires. Even the social structure of the interior fell into stagnation, dominated by local oligarchs and a strong class system. It was only where there was economic growth and activity — on the coast — that political and social changes, or at least agitation for changes, began to develop.

The emergence of the *porteno* sheep economy had brought with it an influx of foreign capital, especially from Great Britain. The British invested heavily in the nation's infrastructure — railroads, processing plants, packing plants,

[22] *Scobie, p. 94.*

warehouses, and port facilities. Argentina herself lacked money, entrepreneurial skills, and technical knowledge. Investment by the Argentine elite went mostly to symbols of status within the society: land, cattle, and European luxury goods. The railroads, financed as they were by foreign capital, "merely widened the markets for European consumer goods and committed the economy to continual production of raw materials for industrial Europe."[23]

The economic expansion beginning in the 1850's favored the emergence of new social groups in the La Plata region. At the same time however, all of society was finding itself increasingly subordinate, both economically and politically, to the agro-export sector. This process had begun when Rosas was overthrown in 1852 and was consolidated under Roca after 1880.[24] The economic expansion of the 1880's therefore was not accompanied by any political or social readjustments. The new socio-economic classes (the urban middle classes of the littoral provinces, the rural middle class of immigrant wheat farmers, small cattle ranchers not connected with the oligarchy) began aligning with the marginal groups of the old dominant classes.[25] This process, originating from economic and political frustration, would have significant consequences when the crisis of 1890 hit the nation.

The *porteno* sheep economy had marked the transition from the *estancia/saladero* economy to the modern *estancia* economy.[26] It had also marked the consolidation of the external linkage and the bourgeois-oligarch domination.[27] External linkage was of several types, but the most prominent one was that of British economic imperialism.

> The English had been the major factor in the destruction of Iberian imperialism; on its ruins they erected the informal imperialism of free trade and investment.[28]

The result of this process was that the oligarchy "became a credit and a support to British interests rather than the defender of Argentine nationalism."[29] As the relationship between between the two countries continued, Britain kept forcing further concessions from Argentina in each of its bi-lateral agreements. Perhaps the only small point of satisfaction to the Argentines in the face of such domination was the fact that when the Baring Crisis struck in 1890, it very nearly brought the Bank of England down with it.

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[23] *Scobie, p. 109.*
[24] *Cardoso and Faleeto, p. 83.*
[25] *Ibid., p. 84.*
[26] *Scobie, p. 86.*
[27] *Cardoso and Faletto, p. 101.*
[28] *Stein and Stein, p. 155.*
[29] *Scobie, p. 196.*

The Crisis of the 1890's revealed the extent to which the dynamic elements of the Argentine economy were out of the nation's control. Internally the economic crisis had been brought on by wild speculation and the craze for making money that had swept the country under Celman. It was the external crisis in the world wool markets, however, that brought the economy under.

The economic development of the second half of the century had brought about political changes, the most significant element of which was the creation of a middle class. Although limited to the coastal regions, the newly formed middle class was important politically and socially for those in it aspired to join the class above, in this case, the agro-export oligarchy. Economic events during the period of the Crisis united the middle class and other discontented elements of the society into a potent political force directed against Celman. Oligarchal consumption and speculation had depleted the country's gold reserves, to the point that by 1889 there was no longer any hard currency, and very high inflation ensued as the Celman Administration kept expanding the nation's paper currency. The impact of this hit hardest at the middle class, who responded by turning an economic crisis into a political one, marked by the beginning of the Union Civica Radical.

The importance of economics as the primary motivating factor is exemplified by the fact that when economic conditions were better (the period from 1904 to 1912, for instance), the revolutionary movements, especially those within the middle class, lessened.[30] In 1912 the economy went into a downswing and pressure for political reform finally resulted in universal suffrage and free elections. Although the Union Civica Radical came to power, the government continued to contain many representatives of the old dominant strata who still had firm control of the nation's wealth. Indeed, the country had survived the crisis of the 1890's with very little structural change in the economy or the balance of economic or political power. It would take the world depression of the 1930's to convince the oligarchy that the nation could not continue with the same economic structure.

In the case of Argentina, the victory against Spanish imperialism had merely brought in British economic imperialism as a replacement. For the Cubans, it was the "Yanqui" dollar and "Yanqui" troops which replaced those of the Iberian Peninsula. In 1898 the Spanish surrendered to American rather than Cuban troops, marking the beginning of a four year period of United States occupation of the island. Although the Teller Amendment in 1898 had promised that the United States would "leave the government and control of the island to its people."[31], the promise never translated into reality. Within three years of Cuban "independence", the Platt Amendment had effectively made the island into a U.S. protectorate.

[30] *Ibid., p. 206.*
[31] *Cannon, p. 35.*

Economic incentives lay behind the Cuban upper class support for both the U.S. occupation and the Platt Amendment. Political unrest, as well as endangering their own privileged position, deterred foreign investment and trade. For the United States, Cuba was an economic bonanza. As General Wood said in reference to the Platt Amendment:

> With the control that we have over Cuba . . . soon we will practically control the sugar market in the world . . . The island will gradually be 'Americanized' and in the due course we will have one of the most rich and desirable possessions existing in the world . . . [32]

The reciprocity Treaty of 1903 continued even further the American exploitation of the nation. The treaty granted Cuban goods — which were almsot exclusively sugar — a twenty percent lower tariff coming into the United States in return for a forty percent lower tariff in U.S. manufactured goods coming into Cuba. Thus it is not surprising that within the country's first three decades after independence, United States capital and business took over the Cuban economy.

World War One shook the economies and political systems of the Latin American countries, but as may be seen in Argentina and Cuba, the tremors felt were not so strong as to alter the established socio-economic patterns. Indeed, these nations prepared to enter the third decade of the century with the same vulnerable economics and ruling oligarchies more firmly entrenched than ever. It remained to be seen, however, if any systems could survive the turbulent boom-and-bust decades which followed without straining to the breaking point.

In Argentina, the war boosted agricultural sales while severely limiting importation of needed manufactured items. The shortage of manufactured goods gave a starting push to the development of industry within the country, but so long as the war continued, capital goods and technology were not readily forthcoming. Agriculture, moreover, continued to be the primary source of the nation's wealth, providing little impetus for the oligarchs to invest outside of it. Although the radicals held political control during the war, the economic crisis of 1918-19 and the political unrest that accompanied it provided the agro-exporting sector with an ideal opportunity to re-assert its power. Gaining the support of the agrarian and urban bourgeoisie (who also perceived themselves to be threatened by the Radical government), the upper strata of Argentine society sought to limit or if possible reverse the reforms of the Irigoyen government. By 1922 prosperity once more reigned within

[32] *Ibid, p. 38.*

the system and the agro-exporting bourgeoisie had recaptured its leading role. So long as the Argentine economic system functioned satisfactorily, the middle and urban bourgeoisie felt no need to split from the agro-exporting bourgeoisie politcally.[33]

Cuba, with her strong ties to the United States, experienced little disruption of her normal economic patterns as a result of the First World War. Politically life remained relatively unchanged, for the United States had demonstrated conclusively her determination to maintain the *staus quo* through invocation of the Platt Amendment. United States troops moved in to protect American interests in 1912, 1916, and again in 1920. Internal legislation had continued to favor sugar and those connected with it, effectively narrowing a once more diverse agricultural base to the point where the fertile island found itself dependent on importation of basic foodstuffs. As in Argentina, an embryonic industrial sector had little ability to lure the national elite away from the lucrative investments of the agro-export economy.

Beginning in January of 1920, an economic event took place in Cuba that would affect the country profoundly. The "Dance of the Millions" saw the price of sugar rise to a staggering 22.5 cents per pound within less than six months. In their haste to get in on the profits, Cuban owned mills, planters, and *colonos* borrowed heavily in order to expand. Then disaster struck as the inflated price began falling with equal rapidity. By December of that year, sugar was selling for only 3.75 cents per pound. Those who had borrowed were unable to meet their loan payments, which meant that Cuban banks soon fell into default as well. Naturally, it was U.S. capital which poured in to buy up banks, sugar mills, and land.[34] The extent of United States investment in the island is indicated by the following figures: in 1896 American-owned mills accounted for ten percent of total Cuban sugar production; in 1914 it had increased to thirty-five percent, and by 1926 it was a full sixty-three percent.[35]

World War One and the post-war economic depression had not been long enough to cause a major shift in Argentina's economy; in the 1920's the country quickly reverted back to pre-war conditions. Grains held the number one place in the national economy, followed closely by beef and wool. Such industrialization as did occur during the decade was centered on the production of these raw materials for export and was heavily financed from abroad. The period also saw the increasing politicization of the masses. The Irigoyan government found its attempts at reform checked by the strong conservative group of the agro-exporting class. At the same time, the government was failing to satisfy the aspirations of the lower and middle classes as the decade

[33] *Cardoso and Faletto, p. 88.*
[34] *Ruiz, p. 47.*
[35] *Huberman and Sweezy, p. 38.*

progressed. When the world depression hit, the Radicals could no longer retain power and following the military coup of 1930, it was the agro-exporting groups who regained domination politically.

The conservatives attempted to cope with the depression using traditional economic measures, but the depression of the Thirties was long and severe enough to finally hit home that "Argentina simply could not go on as a raw materials producer dependent on the industrialized nations."[36] Significantly, it was the elite sector of Argentine society which suffered greatly during the depression, thus driving home the need for industrialization and diversification. In the midst of a depression, however, Argentina could not successfully develop an industrial sector. The country lacked sufficient foreign exchange to purchase capital goods necessary for industrial expansion. Moreover, the nation's economic vulnerability forced Argentina to maintain her agricultural markets at the expense of her industry. Underlying this point was the influence of foreign powers over Argentina, especially that of Great Britain. The Roca-Runciman Pact of 1933, for instance, forced the Argentines to "buy British" if they wished access to British markets for their raw materials.[36]

The fallen price of sugar continued to affect Cuba in the 1920's. The only way to profit from cheap sugar was to produce more, which drove down prices even further, or to produce it for less cost. As historian Ruiz had stated:

> By 1925 the requirements of cheap sugar had imposed on the formerly sleepy island an agro-industrial wage economy of huge mill complexes, renter planters, and seasonal labor. The ownership and operation of this new sugar system were largely in the hands of American bankers, managers, and technicians.[38]

Nonetheless, Cuban businessmen and politicians had always made money from sugar and they stubornly clung to the belief that they always would. Only the onset of the world depression revealed to the national bourgeoisie the extent to which they had lost control of the export sector. The nationals finally began to agitate for reform and government action, but by then it was too late, for the United States was in effective economic and political control of the country.[39]

President Machado had been a client of the United States as a businessman, and therefore had ignored plans for agrarian reform and had continued to finance the government through loans from America. In 1933, faced with massive unemployement, poverty, and political unrest, Machado was forced

[36]*Scobie, p. 182.*
[37]*Ibid, p. 183.*
[38]*Ruiz, p. 42.*
[39]*Cardoso and Faletto, p. 98.*

to resign, having lost support from all quarters. A revolution followed, one which aimed to change the entire system and grant the country a greater degree of economic and political independence. Within a short time however, American forces threatened to occupy the island once again, intent on shoring up the sugar economy for the benefit of the United States. "American interests more than three decades old, controlling nearly two thirds of the sugar economy were at stake."[40] The revolution of 1933 was quickly laid to rest by the American threat of intervention and the old system reinstated under the brutal, authoritarian, but pro-U.S. Batista regime. In return, the United States signed the Reciprocity Act of 1934 which lowered tariffs on raw Cuban sugar, but gave preferential treatment ot four hundred American manufactured goods, once again undermining any hopes for Cuban industrial development. The Platt Amendment was also revoked at this time — a reward for getting Cuba "back to normal."

The settlement of 1934 thus had left intact the lopsided monoculture sugar economy. No efforts were made to disturb Cuba's almost complete dependence on the industrialized nations. The nation was more than ever dependent upon the United States, and even less autonomous economically than before. The force of economic clout and economic interests had won decisively during the decade of the Thirties.

Argentina's young industrial sector suffered somewhat during World War Two due to shortages of needed materials and equipment, but the country emerged from the war committed to industrialization. Industry became the newest economic factor to shape politics and society in Argentina and elsewhere. Lower class blue collar workers appeared in great numbers in the cities such as Buenos Aires and constituted a new social and political force. Industry also sharpened the division between the dominant *porteno* economy and the poor, undeveloped island. Finally, the large factories of the coast created a new class of wealthy industrialists quite different from the oligarchs and land owners of the interior.[41] Nationalism was another product of twentieth century growth in Argentina. It arose mostly through the lower industrial classes and from the elite who had suffered during the depression of the 1930's. The economic basis to Argentine nationalism was that of a reaction against foreign expropriation of the nation's wealth and the extent of foreign control over the country's destiny.[42] What the political effects of this new force would be remained to be seen.

World War Two revived Cuba's stagnating sugar economy and ushered in a period of prosperity lasting into the late Forties. With the abrogation of the Platt Amendment, the threat of direct U.S. military action faded, particularly as long as American sugar interests were reaping profits from the war-related

[40] *Ruiz, p. 93.*
[41] *Scobie, p. 228.*
[42] *Ibid, p. 229.*

sugar boom. In Argentina, the immediate prosperity from feeding war-torn Europe disguised the serious structural problems hindering development, and revived the middle class democratic elements to political action. However, the lower classes had finally found their political champion in Peron and thus it was their aspirations which brought him to power in 1946. Such was the situation as both nations entered into the post-war era and into what would be revealed as a completely restructured international system.

The evolution of these two countries, or any of the countries in Latin America, naturally involved forces both complex and varied, especially in the aftermath of World War One. Militarism, nationalism, mass politics, national conscience — all these constituted new elements influencing twentieth century development. Nonetheless, it is fair to say that in the period discussed — 1810-1946 — the single most important factor determining the shape of each country's future character was that of economics.

The Theory of Limited War and the Vietnam War

Marc G. Corrado

This essay is an analysis of the American involvement in Vietnam during the period of 1965 to 1968, which witnessed a climactic end of the escalation of US military forces with the 1968 Tet Offensive. It is my opinion that these were the crucial years which determined our fate in Vietnam. More importantly, this period offers the most lessons that must be drawn by our leadership, if the latter is to make a legitimate and justified decision once it is confronted with a situation similar to that which faced President Lyndon Johnson in July 1865.

To help in the unraveling of these lessons, the theory of limited war, as expounded by Stephen Peter Rosen, will be applied to the case of the Vietnam War to help explain why the United States, with all of its military might, failed to prevent a communist victory in the Republic of South Vietnam.* With its assumptions regarding military and political courage, proportionate retaliation, the fungibility of power and the level of resolve and determination on the part of the actors to the conflict, this theory successfully explains why military victory, and therefore success on the political and diplomatic front, will never be forthcoming without due consideration to these presuppositions. This does not mean to say that other approaches to this subject are not pertinent. Quite the contrary, the theory of the balance of power proposed by Kennth Waltz, the analysis of the decision-making process by Larry Berman, and the emphasis Harry Summers places on military strategy are all relevant sources which shall help to clarify the theory of limited war and shall also point to its weaknesses.

In their disregard of the prerequisites necessary for success, the participants

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**On this point, Leslie Gelb and Richard Betts have suggested that "the decision making system . . . did achieve its stated purpose of preventing a Communist victory in Vietnam until the domestic balance of opinion shifted and Congress decided to reduce support to Saigon in 1974-75 . . ." (Leslie H. Gelb and Richard K. Betts,* The Irony of Vietnam: The System That Worked, *Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1979). p. 24. But the fact of the matter is that by the end of 1968, the decision was made to deescalate and to engage in the "Vietnamization" of the war precisely because the decision making system had failed.*

in the decision-making process decided to concentrate on merely signalling US intentions to the enemy, centralizing their power at the top, and implementing a strategy described by John Gaddis as "flexible response" and summarized by Rosen in the phrase "war limitation by means of flexible policies,"[1] As shall be appreciated later, these decisions led the United States into a quagmire. But which alternative should the leadership have chosen: a complete commitment of American troops aimed at a decisive victory over the enemy, as proposed by General Bruce Palmer Jr. and Lieutenant General William Peers, or simply a complete withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam altogether? This question shall be the subject of the last portion of this report. Let us begin with the facts.

On December 20, 1960, the leaders of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) formed the National Liberation Front for South Vietnam, whose members were to become known as the "Vietcong," or Communist Vietnamese. The United States, more concerned with problems in Laos at the time, did not respond until 1962 with the formation of an American Military Assistance Command in South Vietnam, allowing for an increase from 700 to 12,000 American advisors.

However, this aid did not deter communist victories as the Vietcong defeated army units of the South Vietnamese government at, for example, the battle of Ap Bac in January 1963. In addition, the government of the South appeared to be losing its legitimacy as Buddhist demonstrators demanded their religious rights. An American-backed coup overthrew President Nao Dinh Diem on November 1, 1963, who was subsequently murdered. Three weeks later, President Kennedy was assassinated and succeeded by Lyndon Johnson. By the end of 1963, 15,000 US military advisors were located in South Vietnam and the latter had received $500 in American aid.

In retaliation for the supposed North Vietnamese attacks on American destroyers in the Tonkin Gulf, the US Congress, with the dissent of only two in the Senate, passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, allowing President Johnson to have extraordinary power to act in Southeast Asia, in effect a "blank check" for the supply of economic and military aid to South Vietnam. But he did not take advantage of this until 1965 largely because of his election bid the previous year. In March 1965, Johnson authorized "Rolling Thunder": a program involving the sustained bombing of the North which would last three years. But as early as April 1965, it was apparent that these air strikes were not succeeding in reducing the military capabilities of North Vietnam, nor

[1] *Stephen P. Rosen, "Vietnam and the American Theory of Limited War,"* International Security, *Vol. 7, No. 2, Fall 1982, p. 83-113.*

had they seriously damaged the latter's economy.*.

On March 8, 1965, reflecting the new strategy of sustained pressure, two US marine battalions landed at Danag: the first American combat troops to be stationed in Vietnam. By the beginning of July, eighteen US combat battalions were in South Vietnam. On July 28, 1965, the President approved General Westmoreland's request for forty-four additional combat battalions. This was the first significant escalation. By December 1965, there were 184,000 American combat troops in Vietnam. By the end of 1968, this figure would rise to more than 500,000.

On January 30, 1968, approximately 70,000 communist soldiers violated the truce they had pledged to observe during Tet, the lunar New Year, and launched a surprise offensive into more than one hundred cities and towns, including Saigon. After twenty-six days of fighting, the American and South Vietnamese troops regained the initiative and Westmoreland requested the additional support of 206,000 troops. But the new secretary of defense Clark Clifford concluded that such a buildup was unnecessary and endorsed the process of de-escalation. Dejected because of his failure in Vitenam, President Johnson announced on March 31, 1968, that he would not seek re-election. His successor, Richard Nixon, would soon articulate the Nixon Doctrine in which he would officially put an end to the involvement of American combat troops in Southeast Asia.

By the end of 1968, approximately 540,000 troops were stationed in Vietnam. Why had not this massive force achieved a strategic military victory, as opposed to only tactical gains? Should it have been deployed all at once in the middle of 1965? Should it have been sent to Vietnam at all? Or was incremental retaliation, as a part of a strategy of attrition, a sound policy whereby the fault lay instead in the military as opposed to the civilian leadership? Should the blame be placed on bureaucracies of the military, in its chain of command, or its own strategies and tactics? The answers to these questions are crucial to any leader who must make a decision regarding the commitment of American military forces in foreign lands. To help us answer these questions, we shall first look at the assumptions of limited war theory, or the requirements needed for military and political success.

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*". . . *studies indicated that while bombing raids against North Vietnam had increased four times between 1965 and 1968, they had not significantly impaired Hanoi's ability to supply its forces in the south: enemy attacks there had increased on the average five times, and in places eight times, during the same period. The bombing was estimated to have done some $600 million worth of damage in the north, but at a cost in lost aircraft alone of $6 billion a year. Such strikes, the analysts concluded, probably killed about one hundred North Vietnamese or Vietcong in 1966, but in the process provided 27,000 tons of dud bombs and shells which the enemy could use to make booby traps, which that same year accounted for 1,000 American deaths." John L. Gaddis, "Implementing Flexible Response: Vietnam as a Test Case,"* The Use of Force — International Politics and Foreign Policy, *edited by Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz, University Press of America, 1983, p. 321.*

Once the American leadership had defined victory in such broad terms as the containment of either Soviet, Chinese, or international communism, it should have determined before the decision was made to commit American troops, whether or not the United States did in fact have the means to achieve that end. But lacking in political courage, the leadership chose to ignore this issue altogether. It is not only important to see if success is attainable; it is also imperative to calculate precisely the quality and quantity of resources that are to be used to attain any military objective. This will allow for a clear decision regarding the missions that are to be accomplished by the military forces, and for sufficient consideration of the context in which those human and material resources are to be allocated.

For example, many who participated in the decision-making process during the Vietnamese conflict believed that the strategic bombing of North Vietnam would obliterate the latter's capacity to produce war materiel. But little was it considered that such attacks could scarcely deprive the North of its principal resource, people, and would not succeed in limiting the supplies provided by the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.*

Linked to the American goal of getting the North to leave the South alone, was the added burden of having to allow for the establishment of a stable South Vietnamese government which was representative of the people. But given that five changes of government had occurred between July 1964 and July 1965, was this at all possible? Moreover, as Larry Berman notes, the United States, having supported the overthrow of Diem, had now become directly responsible for any successive government of South Vietnam. Stanley Hoffmann observes that the lack of a solid political base from which to operate rendered political failure practically inevitable.** As we shall come to appreciate, President Johnson's decision of 1965 reflected a disregard for the political environment which would confront the American forces when they arrived.***

**The annual infiltration rate of communist soldiers into South Vietnam increased from 35,000 in 1965 to over 200,000 in 1968, "despite the presence of 500,000 American troops, despite the expenditure of more bomb tonnage than the United States had dropped in all of World War II, despite estimated enemy casualties of up to 140,000 men in 1967 . . ." (Geddis, p. 371).*

***Stanley Hoffmann states that "it is impossible to get a nation that is not a nation at the outset to coalesce, if the kind of war one wages destroys it in the process. The political foundations of the military effort need to be strong. If they are rotten, the likelihood that one will build them up with a war in progress is quite low," (Stanley Hoffman, Samuel Huntington, Ernest May, Richard N. Neustadt, and Thomas C. Scelling, "Vietnam Reappraised."* International Security, *Vol. 6, No. 1, Summer 1981, p. 3–26.*

****Maxwell Taylor, American ambassador in 1964, noted: "Until the fall of Diem and the experience gained from the events of the following months, I doubt that any one appreciated the magnitude of the centrifugal political forces which had been kept under control by his iron rule. The successive political unheavals and the accompanying turmoil which have followed Diem's demise upset all prior US calculations as to the duration and outcome of the counter-insurgency in South Vietnam and the future remains uncertain today." (Larry Berman,* Planning a Tragedy — The Americanization of the War in Vietnam, *NY: W.W. Norton & Co., 1984, p. 35.)*

The American leadership did make a choice between withdrawal and commitment of American troops. But as these examples have illustrated, it lacked the political courage to make the quantitative and qualitative extent of that commitment explicit at the time the decision was made in 1965. President Johnson refused "to make clear decisions about the missions and resources allocated to the theater commander."[2] For to do so would mean that President Johnson would have to take into serious consideration two alternatives: withdrawal or national mobilization. The former had already been discarded since it would mean defeat and humiliation to his Administration, which had inherited a legacy of defending the principles of democracy throughout the world. The latter would create public dissent at home and ruin his plans for a Great Society. The consequences of such lack of courage shall be explained later. We shall now turn to that other assumption of limited war theory.

Success in the Vietnam War would follow from the fulfillment of not only political goals, but also from the accomplishment of military objectives. This required military courage for three reasons. The first concerns the distinction made by Larry Berman between offensive and defensive strategy. The United States only wished to protect South Vietnam from communist incursion and convince the North that it could not unify Vietnam by force. This objective was inextricably linked to the political goal of containing communism. The latter was very large in scope and as mentioned above, suffered from imprecision. So when it was translated into military terms, the objective became very limited in scope, for it restrained the military forces and forced them to adopt a defensive strategy. To compensate for this lack of definition on the part of the civilian leadership, the military would be required to display an extraordinary level of courage. As Larry Berman points out, the United States did not really seek a strategic military victory for itself. Nor did it seek to capture any territory. The level of courage required of the military to even tolerate such a policy, when fighting against an adversary committed to total war, was simply nonexistent.

The second reason why military courage was needed pertained to the importance of adapting quickly to changing circumstances, to changes in tactics on the part of the enemy. This requires having to, as Rosen notes, "adopt operational changes that necessarily stake the lives of the soldiers on untried and possibly incorrect tactics."[3] The "theater commander" must be willing to take such risks. But General Westmoreland, commander of American ground forces in South Vietnam, did not fall into this category. Encouraged to do so by his superior (President Johnson), Westmoreland tried to avoid any kind of dramatic

[2] *Rosen, p. 83.*
[3] *Rosen, p. 83.*

failure.* As a result, many seemingly successful tactical offensives added up to a military strategic defeat. The latter was in turn aggravated by the defensive strategy the US ground forced had adopted.

Finally, military courage is needed by the officers who should share the risks and dangers of combat to which the soldiers are exposed. This is crucial in order to maintain the confidence of the men and to provide for what Richard Gabriel and Paul Savage identify as a sense of cohesion. These authors suggest that cohesion and unity were very much absent among the American ground troops in Vietnam. Officers were reluctant to subordinate their self-interests to the welfare of their unit, their battalion and their army. The lack of what Gabriel and Savage call "traditional military cohesion," seems largely due to the transformation of the American military from a "corporative bureaucratic structure" into an "entrepreneurial" one.** The result of this change was an increasing unwillingness on the part of the officers to face actual combat as well as a constant concern for promotion, regardless of merit. This in turn produced a very low level of the cohesion necessary under conditions of high combat stress, such as had been prevalent in Vietnam.

In short, the civilian leadership must have the political courage to define the missions and plans with sufficient precision for the military leadership to know what to do. The former must be willing to at least consider the possibility that the means at its disposal can not achieve the objective. As Harry Summers suggests, the civilian leadership must "tailor" the political objectives to the military means that it is prepared to use.*** The military leadership must

As a result of their dramatic defeat at the battle of Ia Drang in November 1965, the North Vietnamese switched from what Harry Summers calls a "tactical offensive" to a "tactical defensive." The US army failed to reciprocate. The result was an overemphasis on "hit and withdraw" operations which, as Rosen observes, were designed to defeat large Vietcong units. Not enough stress was given to "clear and hold" operations which would have been better suited for the defeat of the enemy's small, highly mobile units. This failure to change tactics was due to a lack of willingness on the part of the military leadership to absorb risks.

**"The doctrine of economic rationality requires that entrepreneurial bureaucracies be 'rational' in that norms and values are perceived to have worth only in terms of the 'products' produced by the organization. Corporative bureaucracies, on the other hand, often develop operating procedures and norms that are 'arational' in that they come to be valued for themselves far more than for the contribution they make to the product . . . Entrepreneurial bureaucracies classically stress the ethics of self-interest both in an organizational and individual sense, the latter being relied upon to motivate the individual to desired modes of behavior. Corporative bureaucracies, by contrast, stress an ethic of community interest . . . An ethic of community obligation or community service supplants rapacious individual laissez-faire or uncontrolled free enterprise," (Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L. Savage,* Crisis in Command — Mismanagement in the Army, *NY: Hill and Wang, 1978, p. 145.)*

***"Without (a militarily attainable fixable objective) we did not have unity of effort at the national level, which made it impossible at the theater level to obtain coordinated action among the ground war in the south, the pacification effort and the air war in the north . . . Without a common goal it is impossible to have unity of effort or unity of command," (Harry G. Summers, Col. of Infantry,* On Strategy — A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War, *NY: Dell Publishing Co., 1984, p. 203.)*

the courage to put into effect these plans and implement the necessary strategies. But having realized that it is not making progress, it must immediately inform its civilian superiors, without hesitation, of the infungibility, and not just the insufficiency, of the resources available to the armed forces. The consequences of not having such courage in the civilian and military decision-making processes are the next subject of this study.

Stephen Rosen has identified three outcomes which arise when the two assumptions outlined above have been violated. Combined, these effects spell diplomatic, political and military defeat. These outcomes are related in that they originate from the same source: the inability to make precise and specific decisions regarding the conduct on the war. From the beginning of 1965, and even before, the United States had adopted a limited war strategy of signalling its intentions to the enemy in order to show just how committed it was to the conflict. Rosen notes that in 1965, Johnson did not want to withdraw, but nor was he prepared to send the 208,000 troops that the military believed were necessary. Instead, he could avoid making the decision by concentrating on sending signals to Hanoi.

If Hanoi was rational, reasoned Johnson and his advisors, it would respond to the escalation of US forces in South Vietnam and to the bombardment of its own nation by seeking a diplomatic resolution of the conflict. "It was a cheap, low-risk approach," says Rosen.[4] The US would continue to increase the number of American troops until it had reached the breaking point beyond which North Vietnam could not longer continue the conflict. It would only be a matter of time before the US reached this point. This assumption of rationality would never be questioned by any of the decision-makers and as a result, escalation became a self-reinforcing process.*

No attention was paid to the military problem of how to win the war. As increases in the stakes were being considered, more and more emphasis was placed on the action as a signal, as opposed to inquiring if that action would have any effect on the conflict itself. It would no longer matter whether ground troops were in an offensive or defensive position, for they were there as a signal to the enemy and increases in their number would increase the strength

[4] *Rosen, p. 91.*

**There was in fact much room for questioning, for the rationality assumption failed to consider several factors that would render it invalid, perhaps the very reason why these factors were never entertained. Larry Berman notes that the national strategy Hanoi had adopted was based on a parotracted armed and political struggle. It was committed to a total war and as long as the North had the human resources needed to continue the conflict, it would not be forced into a negotiated settlement. Samuel Huntington observes that democracies are not well equipped for fighting lengthy limited wars. We, the US public, would not tolerate such a long conflict and the military forces of the US were not well prepared for limited wars. "Wars of liberation, or guerilla wars," says Stanley Hoffmann, "are always extraordinarily difficult for soldiers to fight. And they are particularly demoralizing for an army when the stakes are not very clear," (Hoffmann, Huntington, May, Neustadt, and Scelling, p. 10).*

of the signal, regardless of the strategy and tactics they adopted, or the training these troops received. As long as that signal of American intention was being sent, Washington would regard everything else, even the effectiveness of that signal, as of secondary importance.

The lack of courage led to a second outcome. The political leadership felt an urgent need to keep control of the war by silencing American public opinion. Otherwise, full-scale escalation would ensue at too rapid a pace; this could very well lead to a large conventional or nuclear war. As was mentioned earlier, this would ruin the Johnson Administration as well as the President's plan for a Great Society. This belief led to the tendency of choosing plans which were controllable, but not necessarily successful in military terms.* "The desire to keep the war limited . . . increased the pressure to centralize control of the war in the hands of the president."[5]

The result was inadequate flexibility given to the military. The latter's mission had not been well defined and no clear limit as to the amount of resources that were to be used had been established. The military was left with very little room to maneuver.** Harry Summers observes that such flexibility in thought, plans and operations, is crucial to the afore-mentioned ability of the military to react rapidly to changing and unforeseen circumstances. This in turn allows for a reduction in one's vulnerability and enhances one's capacity to place the adversary at a disadvantage. In a sense, this centralization of power resulted from the traditional fear of placing too much of this power in the hands of the military. But the civilian decision-making process forgot during the years preceding the Tet Offensive, that it was the military who was fighting the war.

The third and final outcome was the implementation of a strategy known as "flexible response." John Gaddis has enumerated four features of this strategy which in many ways point to the inevitability of the fate of the American involvement in Vietnam. The first element of flexible response has to do with the attitude prevailing at the time that it was crucial to defend Southeast Asia, and specifically South Vietnam, in order to maintain the world

[5]*Rosen, p. 95.*

**Option C, for example, recommended by assistant secretary of state William Bundy, was a program to escalate only gradually the pressure against North Vietnam. it would at the same time allow for a halt in such pressure to facilitate negotiations. It gave Johnson the choice at any given point in time to decide if escalation, a quickening of the pace of the conflict, or even a halt in the increases in US forces should take place.*

***Harry Summers suggests that "in obtaining a decision on the precise definition of the objective, there is an inherent contradiction between the military and its civilian leaders. For both domestic and international political purposes, the civilian leaders want maximum flexibility and maneuverability and are hesitant to fix on firm objectives. The military, on the other hand, need just such a firm objective as early as possible in order to plan and conduct military operations," (Summers, p. 248). The solution to the dilemma would have to be a balance between the two positions. In the case of the Vietnam War, the balance lay too much in favor or the civilian leadership.*

order and the balance of power. As Kenneth Waltz would argue, the bipolar international system gave rise to global interests. The United States would now be concerned with every corner of the globe, and any gain or victory for the communist world in one area was perceived as an automatic loss to the United States.* But the latter did not want to risk nuclear war. Symmetrical response, as defined by Gaddis, would be the solution to this dilemma.** It would allow for the flexibility necessary to avoid the risk of escalation or the humiliation of surrender. But these global interests precluded any attempt at achieving a decisive military victory over the enemy, who was perceived as a Soviet puppet. Consequently, the United States led itself into a protracted, costly, and eventually unacceptable conflict.

Symmetrical response implies calibration, the second feature of flexible response proposed by Gaddis. It embraces the notion that force may be applied with precision and exactitude, as long as the type of force that is to be used is properly selected. Such selection, as Gaddis notes, requires discrimination. Yet in Vietnam, there was no basis for discriminating between friend and foe. There was no way to distinguish between those who were and those who were not communists or members of the National Liberation Front.***

In addition, calibration promoted the decision to do no more than that which was necessary to counter aggression. But this policy was bound to pass the initiative over to Hanoi. The latter could now predict what the US response would be to its attacks and it could therefore "control the risks involved in the action [Hanoi] is contemplating" with certainty.[6] Any US strategy of

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[6] *John L. Gaddis,* The Use of Force — International Politics and Foreign Policy, *"Implementing Flexible Response: Vietnam as a Test Case," edited by Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz, University Press of America, 1983.*

**Waltz states: "In a bipolar world there are no peripheries. With only two powers capable of acting on a world scale, anything that happens anywhere is potentially of concern to both of them." In such a system, who is a danger to whom is clear and therefore "few changes in the world at large . . . are likely to be thought irrelevant," (Kenneth N. Waltz,* Theory of International Politics, *Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., Reading, MA, 1979, p. 121).*

***"Symmetrical response means reacting to threats to the balance of power at the same location, time, and level or original provocation . . . doing no more but also no less than is required to counter the threat in question," (John L. Gaddis, "Containment: Its Past and Future",* International Security, *Vol. 5, No. 4, Spring 1981, p. 80).*

****The inability to apply force with precision and to discriminate between the actors in the conflict was reflected in the pacification programs aimed at reducing the "population base" of the enemy. Operation Cedar Falls of 1967, for instance, with the help of 30,000 American troops, destroyed hamlets and sprayed herbicides over the rice fields and surrounding areas, causing massive defoliation in the Binh Duong province, a communist stronghold. These tactics would supposedly deny the Vietcong of the support of the peasants through "forced urbanization." The result was clearly the opposite to what had been intended. In addition, the Vietcong were often forewarned and could easily escape these large and slow American units. The former would then return to these sanctuaries from which they could launch such an attack as the Tet Offensive.*

deterrence would never be effective. In its fear of escalating the war to a nuclear level, the United States had, as Harry Summers suggests, "lost the ability to pose a threat to the enemy to raise the level of warfare beyond his ability (or willingness) to respond."[7] The enemy now knew that the US would never use its most powerful weapons and would never invade North Vietnamese territory. Such knowledge made Hanoi dangerously certain of the risks it could take.

Another deficiency resulted from flexible response: the inability to monitor performance, both because we did not want to and because the means of measuring that performance were inadequate. This was reflected in McNamara's methods of analysis. As secretary of defense, he created the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System which provided a framework to answer questions regarding the power of the principal actors to the conflict: the United States and North Vietnam. These methods were, however, erroneous for they left out key variables which could not be quantified into the power equation. The tendency to measure every source of power in terms of numbers resulted in an exaggeration of the fungibility of American power resources, and an underestimation of North Vietnam's capacity to continue the conflict. For such factors as "superior élan . . . [and] . . . an intense spirit compounded by the elemental drives of nationalism and anti-colonialism,"[8] could not be quantified and considered by McNamara's approach. Our potential for success had been overestimated.

The encouraging answers were gladly accepted and the possibility of there being more realistic, albeit discouraging, estimates would not and could not be entertained. Because the decision-making process had become so centralized, as had the process of gathering information, there was no mechanism or system to filter out the useless from the useful data. Consequently, as Rosen observes, the civilian leadership "had no theory to help them understand the macro-course of the war. They had a mass of detailed data, but no way to understand the micro-course of the war."[9]

The last deficiency in the flexible response strategy was exacerbated by the other two outcomes resulting from a lack of military and political courage. With its obsession for signalling American intentions to the enemy, and its desire for central control and flexibility in its decision-making, the civilian leadership forgot to inquire if success was actually being achieved. The American leadership had paid so much attention to the means, that it had lost sight of the ends. Moveover, how could success even be attained if it had not been

[7] *Harry G. Summers, Col. of Infantry,* On Strategy — A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War, *New York: Dell Publishing Co, 1984.*

[8] *Larry Berman,* Planning a Tragedy — The Americanization of the War in Vietnam, *New York, W.W. Norton & Co., 1984.*

[9] *Rosen, p. 101.*

well defined? As Harry Summers says, "if we don't have the firm objectives, if we don't know where we are going, it is impossible to know when we get there."[10] The intention had been to "enhance American power, prestige and credibility in the world,"[11] but in 1968, it became apparent that this goal would never be realized. The strategy of flexible response was "designed to produce a precise correspondence between intentions and accomplishment [but] in fact produced just the opposite."[12]

In applying the theory of limited war to the case of Vietnam during the period 1965-1968, I have attempted to demonstrate the importance of displaying political and military courage at a time when a decision is to be made with regard to the overseas commitment of American combat troops. The consequences of not doing so, of choosing indecision, have been and will be, according to the limited war theory, disastrous. Clearly, a compromise between withdrawal and immediate full-scale escalation is not acceptable. Then which of the two extremes should the Johnson Administration have chosen in July 1965? General Bruce Palmer, Jr. and Lieutenant General William Peers have outlined preferences for the latter,* in order to allow for a relatively quick and decisive victory.

[10] *Summers, p. 248.*
[11] *Gaddis, p. 344.*
[12] *Gaddis, p. 344.*

**General Bruce Palmer, Jr., former commander of US Army Vietnam and former Vice Chief of Staff, US Army, said in 1977 that "together with an expanded Naval blockade, the Army should have taken the tactical offensive along the demilitarized zone (DMZ) across Laos to the Thai border in order to isolate the battlefield and then deliberately assume the strategic and tactical defensive . . . In brief, General Palmer's strategic concept called for a five-division force (two US, two ROK and one ARVN) along the DMZ with three more US divisions deployed to extend the defensive line to the Lao-Thai border. An additional US division would have been used to stabilize the situation in the central highlands and in the Saigon area. The Marine divisions would have been held in strategic reserve, to be available to reinforce the DMZ and to pose an amphhibious threat, thereby tying down North Vietnamese forces in coastal defense," (Summers, p. 170).*

** The following are Lieutenant General William R. Peers's proposals: "1) national mobilization, 2) early deployment of sufficient combat forces to insure a quick victory, 3) eliminate the Commander in Chief, Pacific, from the chain of command between the Pentagon and the US military command in South Vietnam, 4) create a unified command, under single commander, to control all the forces in South Vietnam (US military command in South Vietnam, Republic of Korea, etc.), 5) declare the areas in Cambodia and Laos that were used as sanctuaries by the North Vietnamese as open areas, with North Vietnamese Army units subject to hot pursuit, 6) inform the North Vietnamese government it must withdraw its military units from South Vietnam and end the flow of combat supplies or face massive retaliation, 7) if the North Vietnamese government failed to comply, establish a naval blockade of all ports, and conduct unrestricted conventional bombardment of all road and rail centers and military industries and installations. If necessary, deploy ground forces across the entire Ho Chi Minh trail, and 8) terminate such applications of force only when positive assurance is forthcoming from the North Vietnamese government that the people of South Vietnam will be granted the right of self-determination," (Vietnam Reconsidered, edited by Harrison E. Salisbury, New York: Harper & Row, 1984, p. 47.)*

Both, however, make the same fallacious assumptions that had been made in 1965 and throughout the period until 1968. General Palmer seems to feel that American sources of power, both human and material, were entirely fungible and applicable to the environment in Vietnam; that American forces would be able to adapt quickly to the circumstances that were not only different from those for which most American soldiers had been trained, but were also undergoing changes as time went on. Thus, just as his predecessors had in 1965, Palmer fails to consider the context of the situation in South Vietnam.

Linked to this is his assumption that the North Vietnamese would eventually reach a point at which they would be forced to surrender and seek a negotiated settlement. But, as has been mentioned, the Vietnamese had an unlimited determination to remove all imperialist influences from their lands. For centuries they had fought for their independence and right to self-determination. Unlike the United States, they were committed to total war. Palmer ignores all of those factors mentioned by Larry Berman which would have at least established a more balanced equation when comparing the relative power of the United States with that of North Vietnam.

General Peers seems to be of the opinion that national mobilization and massive retalilation were indeed acceptable to the American democracy and its interest groups, while, at the peak of US involvement in Vietnam, the latter were clamoring for peace and an end to our entanglement in South Vietnam (and Southeast Asia in general). In addition, Peers assumes, as does Palmer to a certain extent, that once victory had been achieved and the United States had eventually withdrawn, South Vietnam would have been able to establish a stable government that was reasonably representative of the people (and sympathetic to US interests). The months preceding 1965 had reflected the very high improbability of this occurring.

But the primary presuppositions made by the generals are that the political leadership would have had the courage to agree to, and adopt, the strategies proposed by Palmer and Peers, and the courage to delegate the necessary responsibility to the military. And they assume that the military leadership would have had the courage required to allow for the quick and skillful adaptation on the part of the troops to their new environment. In addition, victory would demand an unattainable level of cohesion, which only the officers could, but would not, help provide. As has been suggested throughout this paper, the civilian and military leaderships lacked the willingness and the ability to achieve a decisive victory.

In conclusion, withdrawal from Vietnam in July 1965 would have been the only legitimate decision. Perhaps it is unfair to place so much blame on the American civilian and military decision-making processes, almost two decades after the decision was made in, July 1965, to escalate the commitment of American troops. Today, one has the unquestionable advantage of hindsight. What is important, however, is not the level of guilt that should have been

felt by President Johnson and his Administration, but the lessons that the current presidential administration can and must draw from the American experience in Vietnam during the 1965–1968 period.

The theory of limited war predicts that unless the civilian and military decision-making processes display that essential courage so often mentioned in this essay, the achievement of success, however the latter is defined, in a limited war will be very unlikely. This suggests that the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, should have the ability to decide for himself, prior to the making of the decision, whether or not he has the courage to both risk total war and to accept the humiliation of defeat. If both of these conditions hold true, then the decision may be made to commit those combat troops abroad, armed with a coherent military strategy as well as the objective of achieving a quick and decisive military victory. If either of these conditions does not hold true, American forces must withdraw, and accept the consequences.

US Foreign Policy Towards the Philippines

Ned O'Brien

The United States has played a key role in Filipino politics since the turn of the century, and is presently confronted with a difficult choice of action. The authoritarian regime of President Ferdinand E. Marcos, a democratically-elected leader who has resorted to dictatorial measures to illegally perpetuate his term in office, has shown signs of imminent collapse. This is largely due to the widespread unrest following the assassination of popular opposition leader Benigno Aquino in August 1983, a killing in which high-ranking government officials almost certianly took part. This instability can also be attributed to Marcos' reportedly failing health and the inevitable speculation concerning his succession.

Whether Marcos lives or dies, the policy of the United States should remain clear: an immediate scheduling of truly free elections in the near future should be an imperative to continuing American economic and military assistance. The situation is quite delicate, so the United States should avoid all maneuvers that could bring either the Maoist rebels or a rightist military junta to power.

Nevertheless, the vast majority of the Filipino people as well as their opposition leaders are still pro-American, although this may soon be a thing of the past if our present support for Marcos continues. A farsighted policy that protects American vital interests in the Philippines must not fail to use America's unequalled influence to bring about progressive change and a return to constitutional methods.

The Republic of the Philippines is the only former colony of the United States that is now an independent country. As such, the United States has always perceived a vested interest in guaranteeing the survival of democracy, and the proliferation of goodwill and pro-American policies, in the only country that it ostensibly tutored in American democratic values and practices. The Philippines were groomed from the very start of the American colonization to be our "showcase of democracy" in Asia. Indeed, the Philippines were intended as the chosen beneficiary of both the US's political *savoir-faire* and its economic prosperity. In order to fully understand the evolution and the

importance of the Filipino-American relationship and the subsequent extent of American influence over Filipino policymakers, a brief overview of the history of American involvement in the Philippines is essential.

Eager to demonstrate its newly-emerging power in the international arena, the United States declared war on Spain in 1898 and won decisive land victories in Cuba. In what is still referred to as "el desastre de 1898" in Spanish history textbooks, Commodore Dewey attacked and virtually annihiliated the trapped Spanish Fleet in Manila Bay, and occupied the city shortly thereafter. The entire Philippine archipelago fell into American hands, and a heated debate ensured as to the future of the territory.[1]

Among Filipinos, however, this was not a subject of debate. Having been promised American "aid" in an independence struggle that became an open revolt in 1896, General Emilio Aquinaldo declared the independence of the Philippine Republic on June 12, 1898, only to find himself involved in hostilities with American troops as of February 4, 1899, and embroiled in a futile guerrilla war until 1902.[2] This conflict, called the "Philippine insurrection" in American textbooks and the "Filipino-American War" by Filipino scholars, claimed eight times as many American lives as the preceding war against Spain, and, by some estimates as many as 16,000 Filipinos were killed in action and 200,000 died from starvation and sickness.[3]

The American colonial administration, as unpopular as it was at the outset, was benevolent in comparison to any European standard and soon came to be widely accepted by the great majority of the Philippine populace.[4] This was largely due to the condition of eventual independence for the Philippines, as promised to the anti-imperialist factions of the US Congress. This condition was necessary in order to obtain ratification for the annexation.[5]

American policymakers preferred to see themselves not as slave-driving colonial masters but rather as the temporary developers and enlighteners of a people that would have been easy prey for a less benevolent European colonizer. Indeed, in 1938, High Commissioner McNutt exclaimed, "While our flag flies over the US islands, no foreign power will trespass; if our flag comes down, the Philippines will become a bloody battleground and the center of war within war for a generation."[6] The granting of Commonwealth status in 1936 further convinced most Filipinos of the temporary nature of the American presence.

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[1] *Buss, Claude A.*, The United States and the Philippines: Background for Policy. *(Washington: American Enterprise Inst., 1977) p. 1.*
[2] *Buss, p. 3.*
[3] *Buss, p. 3.*
[4] *Marcos, Ferdinand*, The New Philippine Republic, *(Manila: Philippine Government Printing Office, 1982) p. 10.*
[5] *Buss, p. 4.*
[6] *Buss, pp. 17–18.*

During the Second World War, Filipinos and Americans fought side by side against Japanese invaders. Many Filipinos retreated to the hills to fight a protracted guerilla war against the occupying forces; one of the most prominent resistance groups was the Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon, better known as the "Huks", the military branch of the Philippine Communist Party (Partido Komunista ng Pilpinas, "PKP"). The Huks would later rise in rebellion in the early years of independence, claiming that they had not received sufficient recognition for their armed resistance against the Japanese.[7]

The Philippines gained independence from the United States on July 4, 1946, the US having bequeathed its political institutions to the new Filipino government. A period of close cooperation followed during the cold war years of the late 1940's and early 1950's, culminating in a Mutual Defense Treaty.[8] In addition, the United States, upon granting independence, retained the right to keep two important military bases in the Philippines, Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Base. The latter, to this day "forms the operational hub of the US Navy in two oceans, [and] is reputed to have the largest stockpile of American nuclear weapons in Asia."[9] Manila's agreement to allow American bases to operate within the bounds of Philippine national sovereignty has been a key factor in determining Washington's support for successive Filipino presidents. This was especially so during the Vietnam War, when the Philippines' strategic geopolitical importance rendered the bases inestimably vital to the American war effort.

In 1965, when the American military presence in Vietnam was beginning to escalate markedly, Ferdinand E. Marcos was elected President of the Philippines. One analysts described Marcos at the beginning of his term as "intensely nationalistic and committed to the economic and social development of his country," and as acutely aware of "the unpalatable fact that every aspect of Philippine security and prosperity depended upon the health of the American connection."[10] Marcos supported the American policy in Vietnam and in 1966 he journeyed to the United States at President Johnson's invitation.

Amid unproven accusations of ballot-box stuffing, falsifying returns, and other methods of election fraud, Marcos was re-elected in 1969. This was to be the last legitimate presidential election that the Philippines has had to date, for economic crisis was soon to lead to mounting social unrest. The growth rate of GNP barely kept ahead of population growth, and many sectors of Filipino society, especially students and peasants, grew discontented with the policies of the Marcos government.[11] In 1970 Marcos called for special elections for a new constitutional convention and there was widespread suspicion

[7]Problems of Communism, *Sept/Oct 1984, p. 30.*
[8]*Buss, p. 29.*
[9]To Sing Our Own Song, *as reviewed in* Tufts Observer, *April 29, 1983, p. 5.*
[10]*Buss, p. 45.*
[11]*Buss, p. 58.*

that Marcos was looking for a pseudo-legal means to extend his term in office past the date of mandatory expiration which was set for 1973.

In 1971, the most prominent leaders of the opposition Liberal Party were killed or wounded when a grenade was thrown onto their platform at a party rally in Manila. Senator Benigno Aquino was the only politician of national reknown to escape unscathed by the unfortunate incident. Using this unsolved political atrocity as an excuse, Marcos suspended the writ of habeas corpus on August 21, 1971, and hinted at the possibility of imposing martial law.[12] Hence it came as no surprise when on September 23, 1972, Marcos finally did declare martial law in the face of impending revolt, increased lawlessness, and a "reign of terror" in the Communist and Muslim-secessionist dominated areas of the countryside.[13]

For more than a decade now, Marcos has ruled the Philippines in flagrant defiance of the democratic tenets of Philippine electoral law. In the United States a President is legally limited to two terms in office. Marcos, however, will soon have completed the equivalent of a fifth term, with no new presidential election scheduled until 1987. Incidents of torture, killings, and imprisonment without charge and for prolonged periods of time have multiplied astronomically during the twelve years since Marcos first declared martial law, not to mention the recently-confirmed participation of the military, and quite possibly Marcos himself, in the assassination of senator Benigno Aquino on Aug. 21, 1983.[14] The near total supression of the freedoms of speech and of the press (although these have been relaxed somewhat in the past year) has also been an integral feature of the Marcos reign.

In 1973, Marcos went as far as to dissolve the Senate and replace the constitution of 1935 with his own, creating a new National Assembly (Batasang Pambansa) on his own terms.[15] In addition to disdaining traditional democratic institutions of the Philippines, Marcos engaged in blatant violations of human rights to subdue the opposition and gain an unchallenged stranglehold on national authority. "In an interview in Manila with the delegates of an Amnesty International mission on 25 November 1975," the same organization reports, "President Marcos said that altogether some 50,000 people had been arrested and detained since the imposition of martial law."[16] Marcos had claimed that his draconian measures were necessary to "prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion."[17] The Amnesty

[12] *Buss, p. 60.*
[13] *Buss, p. 65.*
[14] New York Times, *October 24, 1984, p. 1.*
[15] Report of a Fact-Finding Mision to the Philippines, *American Association for the Advancement of Science, American Committee for Human Rights, et al. 28 November — December 1983, p. 1.*
[16] Report of an Amnesty International Mission to the Philippines, *22 November — 5 December 1975, p. 6.*
[17] *Amnesty International Mission, p. 6.*

International delegation:

> had not anticipated the extent to which torture was practiced against martial law detainees. The delegates were deeply concerned by the harshness of such torture and at the evidence of its widespread use. The practice of torture during detention under martial law underlines the deeply troubling aspects of the system of arrest and detention employed as a consequence of the exceptional powers available to the martial law administration . . . Almost 70% of the prisoners interviewed by the mission said they had been tortured.[18]

The use of torture does not appear to be completely indiscriminate, i.e., those who are the most vulunerable tend to be the most victimized:

> At the time of the interview, the delegates found many cases of persons with physical scars consistent with the allegations of ill-treatment . . . The delegates' unavoidable conclusion was that torture was used freely and with extreme cruelty, often over long periods. In particular, torture was used systematically against those who had no means of appeal to influential friends or established institutions.[19]

The Marcos Administration rejected the report as "based on fabrications, biased and without factual foundations." It further accused the mission of being "used as a propaganda tool by those who would subvert and overthrow by force the government of the Philippines."[20]

Marcos chose to gloss over the violent and unconstitutional excesses of his regime with his proclamation of his drive toward a "New Society", setting aside both the Western and Communist senses of democracy in favor of a so-called "Third World Approach to Democracy" (which is also the sub-title of his most recent book). His critics charge, however, that this is merely a facade in his corrupt master plan.

Asserts political opponent and former Filipino President Diosdado Macapagal:

> The exploitation of his leadership for wealth, is again proof that under Marcos a 'New Society' is a bare excuse for his indefinite exercise of absolute power beyond his legitimate tenure of office through the coercion of martial law. He has no moral authority

[18] *Amnesty International Mission, p. 7.*
[19] *Amnesty International Mission, p. 12.*
[20] *Amnesty International Mission, p. 84.*

> to lead in destroying corruption in which he has notoriously indulged and immensely profited.[21]

Martial law in the Philippines was lifted on January 17, 1982, but according to most reports conditions have not correspondingly improved.[22] A fact-finding mission to the Philippines was conducted from November 28, 1983 through December 17, 1983 by a joint delegation comprised of members of the American Committee for Human Rights as well as five other affiliated groups in the health field. This group found that

> there has been a continuing pattern of gross violation of human rights by certain elements within the government and the military forces of the Philippines. Such abuses include killings, "disappearance", torture, arrests, and searches without proper legal safeguards . . .[23]

The report also faults President Marcos and his military staff for not having "taken adequate steps to put an end to these abuses." "Credible disciplinary measures," it argues, "must be implemented if these abuses are to stop."[24]

The British Broadcasting Corporation documentary *To Sing Our Own Song* paints a bleak picture of contemporary life in the Philippines. Narrated by an anti-Marcos leader named Jose Diokno, the BBC sheds its image of meticulous objectivity in presenting the plight of the opposition. Diokno describes the violent measures to which the Marcos regime has resorted including opening fire on demonstrators four times in 1979 "killing scores of people". He also contends that, in addition to the army and the more clandestine Philippine Constabulary, paramilitary forces have been formed to "oppress and terrorize in ways the regular army can't".[25]

Protest against the government has been forced underground by bellicose retaliation and, as mentioned several times in the course of the program, such responses are exacerbated by governmental accusations of "subversion" for simply disagreeing with official policy. The inevitable result, according to the film, has been to push those formerly content with working within the system to revolutionary extremes. An example cited is that of "the most wanted man in the Philippines", a Roman Catholic priest named Father Balweg who also happens to be a Communist guerrilla leader and a living legend among Filipinos.

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[21] *Macapagl, Diosdado,* Democracy in the Philippines, *(Ontario: published by Ruben J. Casipag, 1976), p. 94.*
[22] *Fact-Finding Mission, p. 2.*
[23] *Fact-Finding Mission, p. 2.*
[24] *Fact-Finding Mission, p. 2.*
[25] To Sing Our Own Song, *BBC, 1980. Film review in the* Tufts Observer, *April 29, 1983, p. 5.*

President Marcos tries to justify his treatment of his people by stressing what he considers to be the irrelevance of Western democratic standards to the situation in the Philippines.[26] "The political system," he argues in his book *The New Philippine Republic*, "borrowed uncritically from the Western tradition, was ill-equipped to respond to the contigencies of a Third-World power."[27] His declaration of martial law, he claims, was necessary to "defend the integrity of the Republic" from the threat of both "the totaltarianism of the leftists" and "the tyrannical rule of the rightists." He maintains that the severity to which he has resorted is no more than "constitutional authoritarianism", and denies allegations of brutality in spite of overwhelming evidence to the contrary.[28] Basing his argument on rhetoric and quoting legislation and Supreme Court cases rather than presenting the facts surrounding individual controversies, his position seems hardly credible. He writes:

> The intellectual freedom which includes freedom of speech and of the press, freedom of assembly and petition for redress of grievance, freedom of association and freedom of religion did not suffer any unnecessary dimunition during our emergency years. The Supreme Court was uncompromising in the protection of these individual freedoms . . .[29]

His ensuing recital of petty examples and ostensible legal viewpoints of his government are thoroughly unconvincing and do little to offset the faltering credibility of the Marcos presidency.

Despite his close ties to the United States, Marcos tries to gain popularity among the dissatisfied in his society by verbally attacking American influence. Many Filipinos, he claims, especially the younger ones, "consider our relationship with the United States oppressive".[30] His "New Society", he contends, is a moderate solution to what the opposition sees as a dilemma rectifiable only through revolution. "One has only to talk to a few militants," he declares, "to realize at its gentlest, the disenchantment with, and at its harshest, the bitter resentment of, the United States".[31]

But is the United States as detested among the Filipino populace as Marcos would have us believe? According to William H. Sullivan, US Ambassador to the Philippines from 1973-1977,

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[26] *Marcos, pp. 3–4.*
[27] *Marcos, p. 15.*
[28] *Marcos, p. 15.*
[29] *Marcos, p. 230.*
[30] *Marcos, p. 4.*
[31] *Marcos, p. 4.*

> . . . in the eyes of most Filipinos the United States undertook an open-ended obligation to assure Philippine national independence and democratic institutions. There is an enormous reservoir of good will in the Philippines for the United States.[32]

This disposition, however, is likely to change for the worse if the United States does not use its influence to secure a return to democratic rule in the Philippines. Sullivan continues:

> Overwhelmingly, Filipino leaders are moderate, friendly to the United States, and responsible. The nondemocratic extremist leaders who are voluble and violently anti-American are few in number, but they represent an elite university-based movement that could grow in strength if no prospects for change appear possible through the ballot box.[33]

In a private interview, Dr. Jonathan Fine, President of the American Committee for Human Rights, reiterated the Filipino's affinity for the United States. "The great reservoir of goodwill toward America in the Philippines", he stated, "is gradually being eroded away. The younger generation does not remember World War Two or American help against the Japanese." Doctor Fine stressed the urgency with which American policy should be change, and the eventual hostility that the United States will engender among most Filipinos if that change fails to occur. He warned, "A large majority of Filipinos are anti-Communist, although that's changing."[34]

The situation is indeed delicate. If the United States were to continue in its present policy, the Communist appeal to an exasperated Filipino population will eventually supplant any vestige of faith in the United States. Indeed, Professor Boone Schirmer of Boston University blames US policy for exacerbating the present political quagmire in the Philippines. "The policy being pursued by the Reagan Administration", he said, "is polarizing issues in the Philippines . . . and as a result it's pushing people to the left."[35] The Marcos regime is, by most estimates, in an untenable position, especially since the widespread discontent that followed the assassination of Benigno Aquino last year. By putting distance between Manila and Washington, we can hope to preserve some semblace of genuine respect for the United States, and hence greater influence with whatever regime succeeds the present administration.

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[32]Foreign Policy, *No. 53, Winter 1983/84, p. 156.*
[33]Foreign Policy, *p. 56.*
[34]*Dr. Jonathan Fine, President, American Committee for Human Rights, Parker Street, Cambridge, Mass., November 27, 1984.*
[35]Tufts Observer, *April 29, 1983, p. 5.*

The dilemma facing the future of United States foreign policy in the Philippines is a formidable one. With the health of Marcos reportedly deteriorating rapidly, the importance of bringing about accelerated change in the Philippines cannot be overemphasized. Were President Marcos to remain in power for the next few years or even longer, the issue would remain equally as pressing, for the forces working toward his violent overthrow have been gaining support at an alarming rate.

We must, however, proceed in a cautious and responsible manner, as a violent overthrow by the Maoist PKP "New People's Army" would be an indisputable setback for American policy. Widespread discontent with American inaction, however, has been a primary cause of increased support for the Maoist guerrillas.[36] As David Rosenberg, a prominent analyst of Philippine affairs, writes, "[The] combination of radical and popular insurgency comes at a particularly perilous time in Philippine politics."[37] He does nevertheless mention that "the revolutionary movement is not strong enough to pose a serious challenge in a coming succession struggle".[38]

Any United States support for or covert participation in a military takeover in the Philippines would be foolhardy. Theorist Kenneth Waltz would agree, as he postulates,

> Military forces, whether domestic or foreign, are insufficient for the task of pacification, the more so if a country is rent by faction and if its people are politically engaged and active.[39]

The case for "progressive change" is lent further credence by theorist Stanley Hoffman, who argues that such domestic factors as "gross violations" should play an integral part in determining policy in a more systemic domain such as international relations. Otherwise, he argues, "these violations will breed revolt against them, and our own enterprises, or our own security interests, will be affected, if the country in turmoil is one with close links to our own".[40] By bolstering a repressive regime against a perceived threat from revolutionary subversives, the US is promulgating a self-fullfilling prophecy. His theory states that

. . . in the long run regimes of repression and misery will become centers of turmoil and opportunities for "destabilization". In the long run, stability requires — for the US — what might be called progressive change. Or else we shall be caught in an infernal cycle between attempts to perpetuate the ugly

[36]New York Times, *November 26, 1984, p. 1.*
[37]Problems of Communism, *p. 46.*
[38]Problems of Communism, *p. 24.*
[39]*Waltz, Kenneth,* Theory of International Politics, *p. 189.*
[40]*Hoffman, Stanley,* Duties Beyond Borders, *p. 111.*

so as to defend our interests, and violently anti-American explosions.[41]

Although writing in response to American policy in another area of the world, Chester Crocker's theory on relations with South Africa is also applicable to the situation in the Philippines. He states that

> . . . the fundamental goal is the emergence in South Africa of a society with which the United States can pursue its varied interests in a full and friendly relationship, without constraint, embarrassment, or political damage . . . Consequently, a basic US objective should be to foster and support such (progressive) change, recognizing the need to minimize the damage to our interests in the process, but also recognizing that American interests will suffer inevitably if such change fails to occur.[42]

Another specialist in Southern African affairs, Sam Nolutshungu, has a similar theory in specific reference to the Portuguese loss of both Angola and Mozambique. "The regime," he contends, "which had been allied to the Portuguese there learned the lesson of insurgency, namely, that victory would be impossible ultimately if the majority of the population within the country was disconcerted and disloyal."[43]

Does the United States have the power to intervene without driving the remainder of the democratic opposition into the arms of the New People's Army? According to the aforementioned fact-finding mission, the answer is yes, largely due to the historic ties of "the American invasion and conquest beginning in 1898, colonial rule until the Japanese occupation of 1941, and the granting of independence in 1946."[44] This influence has continued due to "close JS economic and cultural ties", and the fact that "about one million Filipinos now reside in the United States."[45]

Former Filipino President Diosdado Macapagal faults American "shortsightedness," mentioning of course that there is still time to salvage the American image and position in the Philippines:

> After such a cherished history, for the Filipinos to see and realize now that America will support a dictatorship in the Philippines . . . will mean a bitter disillusionment of the Filipinos about America and Americans as champions of democracy and liberty . . . The Filipinos will then rightly blame the Americans for the

[41] *Hoffman, p. 111.*
[42] Foreign Affairs, *No. 59, Winter 1980/81, p. 324.*
[43] International Journal, *p. 648.*
[44] *Fact-Finding Mission, p. 3.*
[45] *Fact-Finding Mission, p. 3.*

> loss of their democracy knowing that no dictatorship can survive in the Philippines with disapproval from the American government and leaders.[46]

The theory of Kenneth Waltz pertaining to alliances in a bipolarity system also applies to the Marcos case. "In alliances among unequals," he surmises, "alliance leaders need worry little about the faithfulness of their followers, who usually have little choice anyway." This, of course, is true only if carried out in a delicate manner devoid of the characteristic recklessness of recent American foreign policy.

Ambassador Sullivan's proposal for change in the Philippines takes into account the accusation by a recent Wall Street Journal editorial that "all transitions from authoritarian politics of the Right inevitably result in authoritarian regimes of the Left."[48] He cites the examples of Spain, Portugal, and Greece to effectively dispell this myth. Time Magazine writer Ross Munro writes in *Foreign Policy* that any US action would be "arrogant and dangerous," and that

> A US — provoked ouster of Marcos is more likely to saddle the Philippines with a military junta, a Marcos regime without Marcos, or a nationalist-leftist coalition lacking a popular base and highly vulnerable to communist influence. In every case, both the US national interest and the people of the Philippines would suffer.[49]

"The most tempting option of all is to do nothing," Sullivan retorts, but "such a course of attentisme would entail serious risks." Rather, the United States should "take immediate, positive action to lend American weight to a process of orderly political transition,"[50] meaning the scheduling of truly free presidential elections in the very near future.

In order to obtain Marcos' compliance with this demand, the United States should abandon quiet diplomacy and speak out strongly against Marcos' interruption of the democratic process. Our private diplomacy should be consistent with our stated policy objectives so as to avoid reducing our statements to the level of mere contemptible rhetoric.

If Marcos remains intransigent, the US should respond to what one American critic has called the request of the democratic majority political opposition:[51] an ultimatum to cut all aid unless free elections are held, and an ensuing

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[46] *Macapagal, p. 183.*
[47] *Waltz, pp. 168–169.*
[48] Foreign Policy, *No. 53, Winter 1983/84.*
[49] Foreign Policy, *No. 56, Fall 1984.*
[50] Foreign Policy, *No. 53, Winter 1983/84.*
[51] *Dr. Jonathan Fine, interview.*

gradual reduction in aid until our demand is met, in the event Marcos refuses to heed our warning. Only through these measures can a potential revolution be forestalled, a military coup d'etat be averted, and America's former colony be brought back into the democratic fold.

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