A Hemispheres Retrospective

The current conflict in Gaza reflects a century-long struggle over the lands of Palestine. The Israeli government’s ever-shifting goal post and desire for a homeland exclusive to Jews have prevented a lasting solution since its inception, which has pushed Palestinians increasingly towards retaliation. Over its 47 years at Tufts, Hemispheres has published a number of different perspectives on this long and bloody conflict. This article comprises several excerpts from the journal’s prior publications that reveal patterns between the conflict as it stands today and its past, long before October 7^th. The first part shows how Israeli and Palestinian attitudes and actions have changed throughout the decades while the ideology of Likud (Prime Minister Netanyahu’s party) has not. The second part examines the pressure that the international community placed on Israel during the First Intifada and on apartheid South Africa, which suggests how it could push Israel to resolve this conflict today. This article reflects on a question many have had on their minds recently:

Why is it that Israel, given the means and the opportunity to achieve a lasting peace, has not done so?

THE EVOLUTION OF THE PALESTINIAN CONFLICT

Palestine Before 1967

To the Jews in Palestine, whether recent victims of the Holocaust or settlers since the 1920s, Arab condemnations and calls for the overturning of the Partition Plan represented a threat to their survival both as individuals and as a “people.”

The effect of the Emergency Regulations [of 1945] on the Palestinian populace in the Occupied Territories has been tremendous. … According to the Regulations, Israel may detain someone at will for one year; it may deport someone at will; it may take possession of land; it may demolish property; and it may close areas that it deems “necessary” for closure. These measures and others have been applied by the Israelis extensively. Consequently, the suffering and humiliation that this has brought upon the Palestinian people is immeasurable.

Of all the differences between the situation in ‘48 and ‘78, the greatest contrast can be found in the acceptance of U.N. resolution #242 by those very members of the Arab League who invaded Israel in 1948 (excluding Iraq) and the perceived willingness of Israel to finally recognize and deal with the Palestinian problem. [Their] willingness …to “respect…the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area” in exchange for a return of those territories occupied by Israel in the 1967 war marks a radical turning point in the Mideast conflict. Unlike the “zero-sum game” situation of 1948, the very existence of Israel is no longer at the heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Likud and Its Ideology

Israel’s claim to the [West Bank] is based on the grounds that “Judea” and “Samaria,” as [the founder of Likud and Israel’s sixth] Prime Minister Begin refers to the West Bank, are historically part of the Jewish homeland. How is it possible, he argues, to “occupy” an area that already belongs to you? In Begin’s mind Israel “liberated” the territory… Furthermore, according to Begin, a state of war exists mentally if not in actuality.

The Greater Israel idea had been at the core of the values of the Likud from its inception. …When the territories were taken in 1967, a seemingly heaven-sent opportunity offered to fulfill the dream and establish Greater Israel in one version of its historical frontiers. To the Labor party, the [Palestinian] territories had been a means to security, they were a negotiable asset, but to Likud, the retention of the territories was and still is a prime objective. …Militant new settlers doubled the Israeli population in the territories in the first two years after Likud came to power, and in the years from 1975 to 1985, the number of settlers in the West Bank went from 2,851 to 52,000.

…

According to [Geula Cohen, a former member of the Knesset and a radical Revisionist], “The Jews did not come back to Israel to make peace or even to be safe, but to build a nation on the lands given to us by the Bible.”

It seems, therefore, that Israel’s concept of security is conflicting. On the one hand, it has what could be termed as a well-founded fear of renewed Arab attack, but on the other hand, it defeats the security of its “buffer zone” (West Bank) by placing settlements there which, according to military experts, represent more of a burden than an aid to the security of the Israeli state.

The government’s motivation to develop and settle the West Bank might stem from the desire for increased national security, but the more overreaching rationale seems to be to resolve the sovereignty issue in a manner that would give Israel special privileges in the area. The Begin Plan, submitted …on December 23-26, 1977 [was] a plan for administrative, limited self-rule for the West Bank under a democratically elected council in conjunction with an Israeli military presence which would maintain security and public order. … [However,] the Palestinians see the Begin Plan as worse than continued occupation or direct annexation. It is perceived as annexation of the land without responsibility for the people.

The First Intifada

By the mid-1980s an entire generation of Palestinians had grown up under Israeli occupation. Additionally, Palestinian frustration at the inability of other Arab nations to liberate the territories from Israeli control exacerbated the overall situation in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. By December 1987, Palestinian resentment towards the Israelis had soared. On December 9 spontaneous protests led to a full-fledged civil uprising in response to the killing of four Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, which came to be known as the Intifada. The Intifada had mixed results. It led to tragedy, with the death rate in the first year of the rebellion six times the annual per capita death rate of American soldiers in Vietnam.

[Though] Israel is legally obliged to act in accordance with international law, part of which deals with the behavior of an occupying force, … Israeli strategists have implemented policies based on “realist” assumptions. This has caused the Israeli Defense Forces to completely ignore international human rights law since 1967 with regard to the Occupied Territories. It is no surprise that the collective anger of the Palestinians crystallized into the “Intifada,” which started on December 9, 1987, and still continues at the time of writing [in 1990]. … Israel maintains that it has no choice but to use violent means to achieve order. Further, Israeli officials hold that since disorder, such as the present uprising in the West Bank and Gaza, is a threat to Israeli “national interests,” any means that would eliminate the uprisings are justified.

THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

International Pressure on Israel

Despite its tragic consequences, the Intifada reshaped the nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Palestinians finally attracted attention to themselves, which underscored the need to find a solution to the volatile situation in the Occupied Territories.

The Palestinian Uprising also brought Israel the mounting economic and political costs of continued occupation, thereby reinforcing the recognition of a need for a historic compromise between Arabs and Jews. By 1989, Israeli leaders began searching for some initiatives that would lessen Israeli isolation and soften the judgment that Israeli policy had slipped further into a rejectionist mode. …In the midst of these developments, some Israeli military and political analysts concluded that the cost of continuing Israeli domination over a hostile population in all the territories would exceed any Israeli gains and would not serve Israel’s interests.

[Regarding the Israeli lobby’s loan request in 1991, President H.W. Bush said] that foreign policy could not simply be the construct of domestic political interests. …The President’s comments stunned American Jewry. …Edward Tivnan, author of “The Lobby,” reacted to the President’s remarks by saying the following: “What George Bush said today was the pro-Israel lobby’s worst nightmare come true. An American president stood up before the American people and said that Israel’s interests were not only incompatible with American interests, but they were an obstacle to American interests. ”

Israel, faced with the negative effects of the Intifada both within the nation and in the international arena, chose to initiate peace talks, which resulted in the Declaration of Principles in September 1993. …[Also,] as the political, economic, and psychological effects of the Uprising became unbearable for Israel, the government was compelled to modify its former policies and begin negotiations with the Palestinians.

Lessons from Apartheid South Africa

[The] challenge to apartheid began to develop under the Carter administration. In his Inaugural Address [in 1977] , Carter said, “Because we are free, we can never be indifferent to the fate of freedom elsewhere…our commitment to human rights must be absolute.” …Under Carter, the United States supported UN Resolution 418, which denounced apartheid and instituted a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa.

[During Reagan’s presidency,] despite overwhelming evidence of continued oppression of South Africa’s blacks, Reagan referred to the [South African] government as “an ally and a friend.” Many viewed this remark as evidence of what they called Reagan’s indifference to global demands for human rights and freedom for South Africa’s blacks. This perceived indifference sparked widespread protest, which in turn brought added attention to the plight of South Africa’s blacks. …The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) of 1986, which Congress passed over Reagan’s veto, …consisted mainly of trade and financial sanctions, but included measures to aid victims of apartheid. This act finally put America’s economic clout and global influence behind the anti-apartheid movement, influencing other nations to impose sanctions as well.

Eleanor Holmes, a Georgetown law professor, …said “What can we do except draw the attention of the world to black South Africans who cannot speak for themselves?” and that “constructive engagement” was merely “letting the South African government go and do what it feels like doing.”

It is time for those people who are waiting for the Palestinians to give up their struggle and return to “normalcy” to realize that, like the Jews who longed for Israel for almost two thousand years, the Palestinians will not forget their homeland.

Image courtesy: Lauren Schrier

This piece is a reproduction from its original issue in Hemispheres vol. 47, no. 1.