By Patrick Moran and Taylor Nelder

President Trump’s victory on November 5th, 2024, is yet another example of the right-wing surges that have characterized recent elections across the globe—a pattern that may be projected to continue. This trend can be attributed to various factors, ranging from increased migration pressure to disaffection towards the reigning liberal establishment, creating an opportunity for reactionary challenges against incumbents. While these right-wing administrations’ respective interpretations of traditional conservative economics policies—like decreasing government spending and reducing taxes—slightly differ, their place among a global movement is unmistakable.

“Often supported by a wide voting
base, including above-average
proportions of working-class and
unemployed voters, these parties
appeal to disillusionment with
existing liberal governments,
gaining traction in reaction to an
economic downturn.”

Protectionism, the economic practice of shielding a country’s domestic industries from foreign competition, has also been central to several of these major nations’ rightward, at times nationalist shifts. Most often taking the form of tariffs, protectionism has seemingly risen as a leading campaign promise, highlighted in the recent Trump campaign, where the right-wing candidate promised general tariffs ranging from 10-20 percent on all trade partners, and upwards of 60 percent against China.22 Trump, however, is not the only candidate to see success from these promises.

Italy’s Giorgia Meloni rose to power in 2022 at the helm of right-wing populist party Brothers of Italy, promising a protectionist economic policy shift. Meloni’s implementation has focused its efforts on Italy’s energy industry, where her administration has, along with the rest of the EU, sought to boost domestic energy supply to reduce reliance on Russian oil and gas. However, by reversing its 1987 ban on nuclear energy, Italy differs from other countries in the EU as it aims to boost domestic nuclear power as an alternative.

However, not all right-wing administrations view protectionism in the same positive light. In Argentina, President Javier Milei’s fight against inflation has seen tariffs as a valuable tool, though one to be used reluctantly. Milei’s well-known ideological opposition to tariffs stands in light of a complex and largely failed history of Argentinian tariffs and import substitution. However, when Milei took office, he increased Argentina’s PAIS tax, which effectively acted as an import tariff, with the alleged intention to temporarily increase revenues to control Argentina’s spiraling deficit. Not only did this go against his personal reluctance towards tariffs, but also hurt his mandate to fight price inflation.

Now, Argentina’s federal tax agency has announced that importers will no longer pay the PAIS tax in advance, as they have been, which will have the dual effect of making goods cheaper to import into Argentina and lowering the price of imported goods for the Argentine consumer. Therefore, in his efforts to overhaul the long-failing Argentinian economy, Milei has implemented economic policies that, at some points, differ from both personal preference and traditional norms. In Germany, the rise in popularity of the Alternative for Deutschland (AfD) party reflects the nation’s alignment with the world’s shift to the political right. From holding only 7 seats in the German parliament in 2014, to 94 seats in 2017, the AfD has grown rapidly and has now become the second-most popular German party. Like Milei’s administration in Argentina, the AfD’s representation of economic conservatism is unique.

In a nation where a majority of the government is outspoken against tariffs, the AfD, a non-traditional populist party, has taken an expectedly non-traditional approach to protect German production. Allegedly inspired by Britain’s exit from the EU, the party declared in 2021 that they would seek a departure from the institution—despite opposition from 68 percent of Germans. Regardless, the party stays strong in its aim to isolate Germany from foreign economic entanglements, touting a desire to return to their pre-EU national currency, the Deutsche Mark, citing the euro as a source of trade imbalances. Overall, the party’s goal to restore German economic independence is not represented in strictly protectionist economic policy, but in a hint of isolationism demonstrated by its desire to leave the European Union.

An aim to reduce government size and spending, a traditionally conservative economic ideal, has also found a significant place in several new administrations’ goals. This key policy tool has been another constant in the race to the right, utilized to accomplish the goals of the new administrations in Italy and Argentina, and in Germany’s rising AfD. For example, the AfD has predictably advocated for a large reduction in government spending and government intervention. The AfD’s popularity indicates that Germans are increasingly in favor of a small government, with AP News noting that the AfD proposed income tax cuts and strongly opposed state meddling in the free market during their 2023 federal election campaign. They have additionally characterized many of the nation’s taxes as a progressive means of wealth redistribution, a larger indication, they say, of a form of a state-directed economy. The AfD argues that this far-reaching economic governance “will sooner or later end in misallocation and corruption,” and also advocates for a reduction in state subsidies, as well as the abolishment of wealth and inheritance taxes. Although AfD hasn’t been allowed into a coalition by the other ruling parties, their gained traction indicates a strong possibility of this in the near future, wherein their ideas could be implemented.

The analysis of these right-wing administrations’ varying implementations of economic policy is nuanced and largely depends on the nation’s unique political climate and economic history. As economists and politicians alike look ahead to the potential continuation of this rightward trend, they must look toward common causes.

Domestic tensions fueled by increased migration have affected much of the EU and the US, and are largely seen as a cause for the rising support of right-wing and nationalistic administrations promising a crackdown on illegal immigration. The German AfD has certainly capitalized on people’s frustrations, which largely dwell on a lack of immigration regulation, by promising changes to established policy. Italy’s Meloni has also garnered support for her hard-line immigration policy, which included the diversion of migrant reception centers from Italy to Albania.

On a greater scale, these right-wing shifts can be attributed to larger dissatisfaction with established governments. Often supported by a wide voting base, including above-average proportions of working-class and unemployed voters, these parties appeal to disillusionment with existing liberal governments, gaining traction in reaction to an economic downturn. Javier Milei, much like President Trump, embodies this response—as those discouraged by years of economic downturn, inflation, and poverty are drawn to a cult-of-personality figure, whose inflamed rhetoric touts anti-establishment solutions and a fresh political start.

These movements in Argentina, Italy, and Germany are only examples of a trend that encompasses the US, the EU, and Asia. Their differing interpretation of economic ideals indicates that this rightward shift in politics, largely having an economic basis, has evolved and formed across nations with a wide variety of political climates and economic histories. As future election decisions are made across the globe, the social and economic foundations underwriting these right-wing, populist movements will likely continue to yield the same results when they appear elsewhere, while each unique application of economic policy will continue to shape domestic and international economic futures.

This piece is a reproduction from its original issue in Hemispheres Volume 48 Issue 1. Read more here.