By Khue Edwards

On May 13, 2025, the Satellite Industry Association published the 28th annual State of the Satellite Report, highlighting shifts in the commercial satellite industry. The industry has been growing at an unprecedented rate – 11,539 satellites were operating in Earth’s orbit at the end of 2024, compared to 3,371 satellites in 2020, representing a nearly 400 percent increase in four years.¹ With the rapid development of satellites, a spike in satellite-based defense spending for national security purposes is inevitable, and following this, international tensions are likely to rise. In light of these progressions, a call for a stronger international governing body of space is imperative to facilitate cooperative interactions in space.

The foundation of space law is built upon the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST), negotiated nearly 60 years ago.² The treaty declares that all states have a right to access space and that celestial bodies are to be used for peaceful purposes, forbids the placement of weapons of mass destruction, and holds states accountable for their actions.³ At the time of its drafting, space was largely the domain of two major actors: the United States and the Soviet Union.⁴ The treaty reflected the geopolitical realities and technological limitations of the time. However, since the implementation of the treaty, space relations have evolved and the treaty has thus become outdated. Not only do the regulations for space need to be updated, a concrete international governing body of space is also required.

Individual space agencies exist to guide national interests in space, the principal organizations being: NASA, CNSA (China) Roscosmos (Russia), Canadian Space Agency, JAXA (Japan), ESA (Europe), & IRSO (India).⁵ At the international level the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) exists as the primary governing body of space governance. However, UNOOSA, in its current state, functions more as a forum than as a governing body, navigating potential disputes in the wake of increasing space competition. Both the 1967 treaty and UNOOSA provide frameworks for space relations; however, they lack mechanisms to promote the implementation of space law.⁶

The question is then posed: what is a viable solution? To formulate a response to this question, we must analyze existing frameworks of the most comparable territory: the sea. The sea is treated as a global “commons” which are spaces and resources that are collectively managed by and for all.⁷ Governance of the sea is based on its classification as a commons, and space should be regarded in the same manner. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) is the central governing body of maritime affairs focused on enforcing compliance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), a treaty establishing a legal framework for all marine and maritime activities.⁸ The first step toward a more viable solution is reassessing the OST, and taking inspiration from UNCLOS to serve as a model. UNCLOS consists of 17 sections, totalling 320 articles, each specific and comprehensive, defining all necessary technical language.⁹ The OST, however, in its entirety consists of 17 vague articles.¹⁰ While UNCLOS outlines specific laws and consequences, enforced by the IMO, the OST provides guidelines for peaceful cooperation rather than enforceable laws and regulations.

The second aspect would be the strengthening and restructuring of UNOOSA, should it continue to exist as the primary governing body. The IMO holds much more legal authority over states as it is a specialized agency of the UN that adopts binding international conventions that carry legal weight for member states that ratify them.¹¹ However, UNOOSA is a subsection of the office UN Secretariat and a body of the General Assembly.¹² Due to this, UNOOSA holds no legislative power and instead acts as a guiding force for states, facilitating cooperation. The key issue, however, is that given the rapidly shifting space sector, violations of space law and norms are likely to occur. With no overarching legal authority, states have no incentive to comply with UNOOSA. Thus, UNOOSA should be established as a specialized agency with legal authority, similar to that of the IMO.

Another major consideration which remains insufficiently addressed is the rapid commercial expansion of the space sector over the past decade. Private companies such as SpaceX and Blue Origin have emerged as dominant players in a domain once reserved for state actors. SpaceX, valued at over $400 billion, conducts frequent launch missions and manages extensive satellite operations, highlighting the growing influence of corporate stakeholders in outer space.¹³ This shift presents a pressing need for updated regulatory frameworks that account for commercial activities alongside governmental ones. Space is no longer merely a frontier for scientific exploration or national prestige. It has become a commercial economic environment with immense financial and geopolitical implications. Therefore, new international treaties and regulatory bodies must incorporate mechanisms to ensure that the commercialization of space remains transparent, equitable, and aligned with the peaceful use principles established under international law.

Space exploration is expanding at an unprecedented rate, driven by both private innovation and strategic national interests. With the rapid commercialization and militarization of space, the absence of a legally binding and enforceable framework presents significant risks to global security. Should the OST and UNOOSA serve as the primary entities of space diplomacy, meaningful change is imperative. Space governance is not solely a technical or bureaucratic issue; it is a defining test of international cooperation in the 21st century. Establishing a concrete international framework is not merely about the management of space, it is about safeguarding global stability and redefining the future of international affairs.