By Lauren Higuchi

The three states of the Southern Caucasus—Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia—have been under Russia’s control since the 1800s. Now, nearly four decades after gaining independence, a crucial question emerges: are the Caucasus nations finally beginning to break away from Moscow’s sphere of influence?

Armenia’s faith in Russia began to wane in the wake of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war with Azerbaijan, where Armenians felt unsupported and abandoned by Russia, which did little to support them militarily or humanitarianly. Armenia has since turned towards the West, particularly in its cooperation with the United States and the European Union. On January 15, 2025, Armenia and the U.S. launched a strategic partnership promising security and economic aid, as well as support for Armenia’s recent anti-corruption efforts. In August 2025, President Donald Trump mediated a peace deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan. In 2023, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan expressed interest in EU membership, stating that “Armenia is ready to move closer to the European Union as much as Brussels considers it possible.” In 2025, he approved a bill proposing a roadmap for EU accession. However, pro-Russian officials cite Turkey’s exclusion from the EU as proof that Armenian acceptance is unfeasible and that Western support would be unreliable. Others fear the country’s withdrawal from the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union will trigger disastrous economic repercussions. Despite internal skepticism, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security, Kaja Kallas, publicly affirmed that “the EU and Armenia have never been as close as we are now.” 

In support of its mission to diversify its foreign policy, Armenia is not only looking to the West but also to the East. Recently, in a meeting between Armenia and China, the states committed to strengthening bilateral relations, and Pashinyan reaffirmed Armenia’s interest in joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). In an August 2025 meeting, Chinese President Xi Jinping also “welcomed the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan” and Armenia’s “Crossroads of Peace” project, suggesting a future for China as a mediating force between the two states. Russia’s role as a major power in the SCO and its overall favorable relations with China could mean that Armenia’s shift to China would be more acceptable to domestic skeptics as a less hazardous source of new foreign support. Armenia’s application to the SCO also suggests that it is still willing to accept Russia as a security guarantor, albeit within the framework of a larger regional organization. 

Like Armenia, Azerbaijan is also looking eastward for an alternative to Russian power. In 2024, Azerbaijan applied for BRICS membership, and in April 2025, it established a strategic partnership with China. Azerbaijan’s strongest push, however, has been towards the Turkic world. In 2024, Azerbaijani President Aliyev affirmed that “The Organization of Turkic States is our primary international organization because it is our family. We have no other family.” Despite the implied determination not to bid for Western integration like Armenia, Azerbaijan-US relations have been strengthening with the re-election of President Trump after a strained period following the Karabakh conflict. Since the peace deal, Azerbaijan has pursued deeper cooperation with the US. On June 27, 2025, around 50 Azerbaijanis were arrested and then beaten in Yekaterinburg, Russia, on account of a series of murders from 2001–2011. The incident was met with outrage from Azerbaijan, which has been slowly drawing a harder line on what it will tolerate from Russia, and could signal a definitive deterioration in Azerbaijan-Russian relations. 

Georgia was an outlier in the South Caucasus, having already undergone a long period of pro-Western governance after the Rose Revolution in 2003 and being seemingly poised for EU integration. However, the 2012 election of Russian-linked oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili and his Georgian Dream (GD) party reversed that trend. GD has accelerated corruption and an authoritarian trajectory that is rapidly eroding Georgia’s relationship with the EU and NATO. The party announced that all EU accession efforts would be paused until 2028 and announced the closure of Tbilisi’s EU and NATO information center.GD cites NATO’s lack of military aid during the 2008 Russo-Georgian War as proof that Georgia cannot rely on its security assurances and assures that Western interference is what will escalate tensions in the Southern Caucasus, not Russian. Despite this conviction, the 2008 War severed diplomatic relations between the two states and resulted in the Russian occupation of the territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. A critical part of Georgian Dream’s election platform was the reassurance that rapprochement to Moscow is the only way to achieve territorial return and economic prosperity. 

Experts suggest that Georgian Dream is also posturing towards China, allured by its revisionist authoritarian leadership. The two states established a strategic partnership in 2023, and China has already made concrete infrastructure investment plans to serve its goal of using Georgia as its strategic crux of the Middle Corridor transit route.

The Caucasian states are all seeking new partnerships with China, suggesting a Chinese challenge to traditional Russian power in the region. The trajectory of the Caucasian governments seems to be one of divergence as the three states look to different powers for future cooperation: Armenia turns toward a new relationship with the West, Azerbaijan reforges a pre-colonial alliance with the Turkic world, and Georgia retreats back into the Russian sphere of influence.