An Interview with Dr. Ohannes Geukjian
By Jake Lanier
While Nagorno-Karabakh has been internationally recognized as a territory of Azerbaijan since Azerbaijan’s independence in 1991, it and the surrounding regions comprised, until recently, the breakaway territory of Artsakh—an unrecognized state with a majority ethnic Armenian population and government. During Soviet rule, it was known as the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO). From 1988 to 1994, Azeri and Armenian troops fought over territory in and around the NKAO, with fighting escalating after the collapse of the USSR. The fighting saw war crimes committed by both Armenian and Azeri forces, including the Khojaly Massacre and the Maraga Massacre. In 1994, a Russian-brokered ceasefire led Artsakh to become a de facto independent region, although it was not recognized by any UN member during its existence. In 2020, Azerbaijan took control of much of the area surrounding the Nagorno-Karabakh region including the strategic Lachin corridor, a mountain pass that had connected Artsakh to Armenia. The 2020 war was short but resulted in a decisive Azeri victory over the armies of Armenia and Artsakh.
In September 2023, Azeri forces conducted another offensive against Artsakh, lasting about two days. It ended with a ceasefire and agreements to talks regarding reintegration of the region with Azerbaijan. Armenia did not intervene militarily to stop the September offensive, which resulted in an exodus of ethnic Armenians—who were the majority in Artsakh—as well as the disintegration of Artsakh as an independent entity. Many observers deem the events of September a human rights violation.
I had the pleasure of interviewing Dr. Ohannes Geukjian at the American University of Beirut. Dr. Geukjian is an expert on the Caucasus and Nagorno-Karabakh, having written many books and articles on the region, such as Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Conflict in the South Caucasus and Negotiating Armenian-Azerbaijani Peace.
Q: In your opinion, why do you think Azerbaijan chose this time to move against Artsakh? The control of Artsakh had been a goal of the Azerbaijani government for a long time.
OG: Three reasons determined Azerbaijan’s decision to move against Artsakh in 2020. Firstly, the West was preoccupied with the Russia-Ukraine war; second, the strong Turkish military support of Azerbaijan – prior to the 2020 war, Ankara conducted military drills with Baku; and third, Russia consented to weaken Nikol Pashinyan, who captured power in 2018 and therefore removed the pro-Russian President, Serge Sarkisian. Russia disliked “color revolutions” and regime change. True, Azerbaijan regained control of Karabakh, but the conflict is not solved.
Q: What was Russia’s involvement in preventing or allowing conflict? Russian peacekeepers were in Artsakh to enforce the 2020 ceasefire, but they don’t seem to have tried to stop the 2023 annexation.
OG: Russia did not prevent the second Karabakh war mainly because Moscow in its foreign policy documents has been emphasizing the territorial integrity of states. Russia’s position was clear: it supported self-determination, provided that it was realized by the consent of the parent state – in this case, Azerbaijan. It also did not prevent the war because [Putin] had made it clear that Karabakh belongs to Azerbaijan. In addition, Karabakh was outside the borders of Armenia.
True, the Russian peacekeepers did not try to stop the September 2023 military attack on the remaining parts of Nagorno-Karabakh that were still under Armenian control for three main reasons:
Firstly, considering the deteriorated relations between Russia and Armenia, Moscow was seeking new alliances with Azerbaijan and Turkey. Pashinyan no longer trusted Russia and declared that Armenia had committed a “strategic mistake” by relying on Russia. Secondly, Russia did not want to get involved militarily in Karabakh because it was preoccupied with Ukraine. Thirdly, Moscow negotiated gas deals with Ankara after being hit by Western sanctions.
Q: How will this change the balance of power in the region? Is the lack of Russian support for Artsakh emblematic of a shifting Russian alignment in the region, or did they not intervene for some other reason, like being bogged down in Ukraine or lacking the will to act on behalf of an unrecognized state?
OG: As I said earlier, Russia has been seeking new alliances with Azerbaijan and Turkey given Pashinyan’s criticism of Russia and the CSTO [Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Russian-led military alliance], which did not deter Azerbaijan from its military campaign. In addition, to the dismay of Russia, Armenia has invited European mediation and the deployment of European monitors in Armenia to prevent Azerbaijani violations of Armenia’s borders.
The loss of Armenian control of Karabakh will also provide an opportunity for Turkey to boost its influence in the region and seek the creation of a land corridor between Azerbaijan and Turkey through the Nakhichevan exclave. Both Azerbaijan and Turkey have been pushing toward the establishment of the so-called “Zangezur Corridor” in Armenia’s Sunik region to connect Azerbaijan to Turkey and consequently create territorial continuity between Turkey and the Turkic-speaking republics of Central Asia. Meanwhile, Armenia and Iran oppose the creation of such a corridor.
Q: The streets of Yerevan have seen widespread protests asking for Pashinyan’s resignation, while Ilham Aliyev has seen a boost of domestic support. Will politics change dramatically in Armenia and Azerbaijan because of this? Also, will the large number of ethnic Armenian refugees from Artsakh now in Armenia change the Armenian political environment?
OG: After the loss of Karabakh, demonstrations in Armenia failed to depose Pashinyan from power. Even more, he won a snap election after the Armenian defeat against Azerbaijan. Certainly, the Armenian refugees from Artsakh will create a humanitarian and economic burden on Armenia’s authorities. It is not likely that the Artsakh refugees would create domestic infighting in Armenia mainly because the government is trying to settle them in the countryside and provide housing for them. In addition, the political leaders of the Artsakh refugees are imprisoned in Azerbaijan, and the opposition Dahsnak party is powerless. More importantly, the alternative to Pashinyan is uncertain, and therefore Armenia could experience chaos. As for Azerbaijan, Aliyev will invest his victory domestically to entrench further his corrupt dynasty and authoritarian rule. Concerning Armenian properties, including the cultural heritage such as churches and monasteries as well as many factories established by Armenian-American citizens who invested big sums of money to develop the region, it is uncertain how Azerbaijan would protect them. So far, Azerbaijan has been trying to change all Armenian names and demolish religious sites to change the Armenian identity of those sites and erase what is Armenian. Azerbaijan could be held accountable for its acts.
Q: Was Turkish support key to the decision by Azerbaijan to mount an offensive? Erdogan has come out in support of Azerbaijan, but is it likely he had prior knowledge of Azerbaijan’s plans?
OG: Sure, Turkish support was key to Azerbaijan’s decision to mount its offensive. Both Erdogan and Aliyev planned the offensive. But we should not forget that modern weaponry, Turkish drones, satellite data provided by Israel, and the mercenaries from Syria were the real game changers during the 2020 war.
Q: Is Turkey’s role in the Caucasus changing? We’ve seen Turkish-made drones in combat in Ukraine (and in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war), and Turkey has emerged as a major producer and vendor of drone technology. Do you see Turkey as a greater force in this region in the future?
OG: Certainly, Turkey’s role in the Caucasus will change, particularly if the Zangezur corridor becomes a reality. After the 2020 war, Turkey and Russia had already established the ceasefire monitoring center in Agdam, Azerbaijan, to maintain a balance with Moscow. But currently, this monitoring center has lost significance after the enforced departure of the 120,000 Armenians from Karabakh and the dissolution of the de facto Armenian authorities. As long as Russia is in a weak position because of the war in Ukraine and the Western economic and financial sanctions imposed on Moscow, Erdogan will try to manipulate Russia.
Q: Finally, you have written on paths to peace in the South Caucasus. How do these events change the landscape, and is more conflict likely to occur in the future? Azerbaijani officials have spoken of creating a corridor to Nakhichevan – could this be a future flashpoint?
OG: Peace in the South Caucasus depends on a peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan and between Armenia and Turkey. However, several factors could determine whether peace would prevail. Firstly, demarcating and delimiting the Armenian-Azerbaijani border; Secondly, opening of all transportation links between Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Turkey; and Turkey’s position with regard to Armenia. The possible establishment of the “Zangezur corridor” could become a future flashpoint because so far it is unclear who would control it. Armenia and Iran categorically oppose its establishment, Azerbaijan and Turkey insist on it, whereas Russia says it is ready to control it. However, Armenia cannot trust Russia anymore.
Note from the author: The Zangezur Corridor is a proposed corridor between mainland Azerbaijan and the Nakhichevan exclave. It would create a continuous link from Turkey to Central Asia and has been one of Ankara’s recent policy objectives.
Jake Lanier is a sophomore at Tufts University studying Chemistry and International Relations.
Image courtesy: Robert Levonyan on Unplash.com
This piece is a reproduction from its original issue in Hemispheres vol. 47, no. 1.
tuftshemispheres.org 